Law 156 - ELECTORAL PROCESS AND PUBLIC OFFICE | B2015

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PubOMBUDSMAN vs CA and
Armilla, et. al.
June 16, 2006
Callejo, Sr., J.:]
Mica Maurinne M. Adao

enforcement of laws on anti-graft and corrupt practices and

such other offenses that may be committed by such officers
and employees. The legislature has vested him with broad
powers to enable him to implement his own actions.

Long case due to provisions of law but the doctrine is simple

SUMMARY: The Corominas filed a criminal complaint for

trespassing with the Office of the Ombudsman against DENR
employees. The same was treated as an administrative
complaint for abuse of authority and misconduct. DENR
employees averred that they just conducted a relocation
survey pursuant to RTC Order. The Ombudman dismissed
the criminal case but ruled that respondents were guilty of
simple misconduct and imposed on them the penalty of
suspension for one month. MR was denied. On appeal, CA
ruled that the Ombudsman has no power to impose the
penalty of suspension because its power is limited to
recommendation of penalties. Ombudsman appealed to the
SC claiming that the phrase ensure compliance therewith
implies that its recommendation is not merely directory but
is mandatory. SC reversed the CA ruling. Ombudsman has
power to impose a penalty of suspension.
DOCTRINE: The Office of the Ombudsman was intended to
possess full administrative disciplinary authority, including
the power to impose the penalty of removal, suspension,
demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer or
employee found to be at fault. The lawmakers envisioned
the Office of the Ombudsman to be "an activist watchman,"
not merely a passive one.
Uy v. Sandiganbayan: Clearly, the Philippine Ombudsman
departs from the classical Ombudsman model whose
function is merely to receive and process the peoples
complaints against corrupt and abusive government
personnel. The Philippine Ombudsman, as protector of the
people, is armed with the power to prosecute erring public
officers and employees, giving him an active role in the

The Corominas (Joan, Thomas and Maria) filed with the

Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) a criminal complaint for
violation of Article 281 of the RPC (Other Forms of Trespass)
against Arregadas, Armilla and 9 other employees of the
DENR, Regional Office No. VII, Banilad, Mandaue City.The
same criminal complaint was also treated as an
administrative complaint for abuse of authority and
misconduct.
It was alleged that the said DENR employees conspired to
enter the parcel of land owned by the Corominas family
without seeking permission from the latter or their
representative and despite the big "NO TRESPASSING" sign
attached to the perimeter fences enclosing the said
property.
Except for Arregadas, who executed his own affidavit,
Armilla, et al. executed a joint counter-affidavit decrying the
charge against them as malicious, unfounded and untrue.
By way of refutation, they alleged that they entered the
Corominas landholding pursuant to the Order of the RTC of
Cebu City bin connection with Civil Case (entitled Republic
of the Philippines v. Larrazabal, et al.), involving a complaint
for annulment and cancellation of title. The RTC ordered the
relocation survey of the questioned lots and the Sudlon
National Park. In Compliance with such order, DENR
assigned a team to do the survey. The team together with 2
members of the PNP went to inform the Barangay Captan of
the conduct of the survey. However, the barangay captain
was not around so the team requested the barangay
secretary to relay the message to him.The following day, the
DENR Survey Team, the members of the PNP and two
barangay tanods of Sudlon II, Cebu City, commenced the

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relocation survey. Armilla, et al maintained that they were

merely acting in the performance of their official functions
and complying with a court order.
For his part, Arregadas averred in his counter-affidavit that
he was not part of the DENR Survey Team tasked to relocate
and monument the western boundary corners of the Sudlon
National Park. He met with the group briefly on October 25,
1999 but since then, he had not returned nor had been
physically present inside the said park or area that he had
allegedly trespassed on. Hence, the charge against him was
baseless and malicious.
The Graft Investigation Officer of the Office of the
Ombudsman, dismissed the criminal complaint for lack of
probable cause. However, in the administrative case, the
Office of the Ombudsman rendered the Decision, finding
that, except for Arregadas, the other named DENR
employees are guilty of simple misconduct and
imposed on them the penalty of suspension for one
month. MR of said decision was denied.
Upon appeal, CA affirmed the finding of the Office of the
Ombudsman that Armilla, et al. were guilty of simple
misconduct. However, it ruled that the Office of the
Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in
imposing on them the penalty of suspension for one month.
Citing the case of Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsman, CA
declared that the Office of the Ombudsmans power is
limited only to the recommendation of the penalty of
removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or
prosecution of a public officer or employee found to
be at fault. Accordingly, it has no power to impose the
penalty of suspension on Armilla, et al.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: DOES THE OMBUDSMAN HAVE THE POWER TO
IMPOSE A PENALTY OF SUSPENSION?
RULING: YES.

Petitioners (Ombudsman) Arguments

1. The statement in the Tapiador case declaring that the
power of the Office of the Ombudsman to be limited
only to the recommendation of the penalty of
removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure or
prosecution of a public officer or employee found to
be at fault. According is mere obiter dictum.
2. Apart from the powers and functions of the Office of
the Ombudsman enumerated in the Constitution, it
expressly authorized Congress to grant the Office of
the Ombudsman additional powers. Pursuant to this
constitutional fiat, Congress enacted RA. 6770
vesting in the Ombudsman full administrative
disciplinary powers.1
3. Petitioner stresses that the grant of administrative
disciplinary authority to the Office of the
Ombudsman is not prohibited by, or inconsistent
with, the Constitution. It invokes the legislative
history of Republic Act No. 6770 to buttress its claim
that it was the intention of the lawmakers to provide
for an independent constitutional body that would
serve as "the protector of the people" with "real
powers."
4. Petitioner reiterates that its disciplinary authority
necessarily includes the authority to determine the
penalty in an administrative proceeding and cause its
implementation.
5. Section 13(3), Article XI of the Constitution is also
cited by petitioner. The said provision reads that the
Ombudsman has the authority "to direct the officer
concerned to take appropriate action against a public
1

Powers of the Ombudsman provided in RA 6770: (1) [it] can, on its own,
investigate any apparent illegality, irregularity, impropriety, or inefficiency
committed by any public officer or employee not excepted from its
disciplinary authority; (2) it can and must act on administrative complaints
against them; (3) it can conduct administrative adjudication proceedings;
(4) it can determine their guilt; (5) at its discretion, it can fix the penalty in
case of guilt; (6) it can order the head of the office or agency to which the
guilty public officer belongs to implement the penalty imposed; and (7) it
can ensure compliance with the implementation of the penalty it fixed.

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official or employee at fault, and recommend his

removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or
prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith."
According to petitioner, the clause "ensure
compliance therewith" taken together with the
term "recommend" connotes an element of
compulsion such that the latter does not
merely signify "to advise" or "to prescribe."
Rather, the clause "ensure compliance therewith"
prescribes that the Ombudsman procedurally pass on
to the head of office concerned the imposition of the
penalty on the public officer at fault, and then
compels said head to enforce the same penalty. This
element of compulsion, petitioner theorizes, was
provided by the framers of the Constitution in order
to keep the Ombudsman from becoming a "toothless
tiger," a "eunuch" or a "scarecrow."
Respondents (Armilla, et al ) Counter-Arguments
1. Armilla, et al. (the respondents) maintain that the
Office of the Ombudsman has no authority to impose
administrative sanctions on erring public officials. It
is their position that subparagraph (8) of Section 13,
Article XI of the Constitution which states that the
Ombudsman shall "perform such other functions or
duties as may be provided by law" is circumscribed
by subparagraph (3) thereof which enjoins the
Ombudsman to recommend the removal, suspension,
demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of public
officials found to be at fault.
2. According to respondents, subparagraph (8) of
Section 13, Article XI is a catch-all phrase intended to
bestow on the Office of the Ombudsman such other
powers necessary to discharge its function as the
constitutional
watchdog
of
the
government.
However, the said provision does not include powers
inconsistent with those already enumerated. Hence,
its recommendatory power to impose penalties
in subparagraph (3) of the same section

necessarily forecloses the grant of the power

to actually impose the said penalties.
RULING: THE OMBUDSMAN HAS POWER TO IMPOSE
PENALTY OF SUSPENSION
As correctly pointed out by petitioner, the statement in the
Tapiador case is mere obiter dictum. In fact, in Ledesma v.
CA, the Court categorically pronounced that the statement
in Tapiador on the Ombudsmans power "is, at best, merely
an obiter dictum" and, as such, "cannot be cited as a
doctrinal declaration of the Supreme Court:" The main poin
in the Tapiador case was the failure of the complainant
therein to present substantial evidence to prove the charges
of the administrative case.
Likewise in Ledesma vs. CA, the Court rejected the
argument that the power of the Office of the Ombudsman is
only advisory or recommendatory in nature. It cautioned
against the literal interpretation of Section 13(3), Article XI
of the Constitution which directs the Office of the
Ombudsman to "recommend" to the officer concerned the
removal, suspension demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution
of any public official or employee at fault. Notwithstanding
the term "recommend," according to the Court, the
said provision, construed together with the pertinent
provisions in Republic Act No. 6770, is not only
advisory in nature but is actually mandatory within
the bounds of law.
The Court further explained in Ledesma that the mandatory
character of the Ombudsmans order imposing a sanction
should not be interpreted as usurpation of the authority of
the head of office or any officer concerned. This is because
the power of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute
any illegal act or omission of any public official is not an
exclusive authority but a shared or concurrent authority in
respect of the offense charged. By stating therefore that the
Ombudsman "recommends" the action to be taken against
an erring officer or employee, the provisions in the

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Constitution and in Republic Act No. 6770 intended that the

implementation of the order be coursed through the proper
officer.
In the present case, the Court similarly upholds the
Office of the Ombudsmans power to impose the
penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine,
censure, or prosecution of a public officer or
employee found to be at fault, in the exercise of its
administrative disciplinary authority. The exercise of
such power is well founded in the Constitution and
Republic Act No. 6770.
The mandate of the Office of the Ombudsman is expressed
in Section 12, Article XI of the Constitution in this wise:
Sec. 12. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of
the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any
form or manner against public officials or employees of the
Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality
thereof,
including
government-owned
or
controlled
corporations, and shall, in appropriate cases, notify the
complainants of the action taken and the result thereof.
Section 13 thereof vests in the Office of the Ombudsman the
following powers, functions, and duties:
(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any
person, any act or omission of any public official,
employee, office or agency, when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or
inefficient;
(2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any
public official or employee of the Government, or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as
well as of any government-owned and controlled
corporation with original charter, to perform and
expedite any act or duty required by law, or to stop,
prevent and correct any abuse or impropriety in the
performance of duties;

(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate

action against a public official or employee at fault,
and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion,
fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance
therewith;
(4) Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate
case, and subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law to furnish it with copies of
documents relating to contracts or transactions
entered into by his office involving the disbursement
or use of public funds or properties, and report any
irregularity to the Commission on Audit for
appropriate action;
(5) Request any government agency for assistance
and information necessary in the discharge of its
responsibilities, and to examine, if necessary,
pertinent records and documents;
(6) Publicize matters covered by its investigation
when circumstances so warrant and with due
prudence;
(7) Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape,
mismanagement, fraud and corruption in the
Government and make recommendations for their
elimination and the observance of high standards of
ethics and efficiency; and
(8) Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise
such other powers or perform such functions or
duties as may be provided by law.
In Acop v. Office of the Ombudsman, the Court recognized
that the foregoing enumeration is not exclusive and
that the framers of the Constitution had given Congress the
leeway to prescribe, by subsequent legislation, additional
powers to the Ombudsman. In Acop, Commissioner Monsod
was quoted saying that Congress was given legislative
discretion to provide future additional functions and powers
to the Office of the Ombudsman.
Congress thus enacted Republic Act No. 6770 to provide for
the functional and structural organization of the Office of the

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Ombudsman. It substantially reiterates the constitutional

provisions relating to the Office of the Ombudsman.

employees. The legislature has vested him with broad

powers to enable him to implement his own actions.

The explanation of Senator Edgardo Angara, one of the

sponsors of Senate Bill No. 534 which, as consolidated with
House Bill No. 13646, became RA 6770, is instructive: the
Ombudsman here is granted the power of disciplining public
officers and employees, while other bodies may not be so
authorized; second, the Constitution itself empowers the
Office of the Ombudsman merely to investigate and review;
but the bill here authorizes the Ombudsman, and grants the
power of disciplining public officers and employees. It goes
beyond the constitutional provision I do not see any
conflict. The grant of disciplinary power is something that
the Constitution does not forbid. I submit that the means,
that is, the disciplinary power, is necessary to achieving that
objective of making an effective Ombudsman.

It is noted that the Office of the Ombudsman and the

appellate court invariably found respondents guilty of simple
misconduct. The Court affirms this finding following the
salutary rule that factual findings of administrative bodies
are accorded great respect by this Court.

The legislative history of Republic Act No. 6770 thus bears

out the conclusion that the Office of the Ombudsman was
intended to possess full administrative disciplinary
authority, including the power to impose the penalty of
removal,
suspension,
demotion,
fine,
censure,
or
prosecution of a public officer or employee found to be at
fault. The lawmakers envisioned the Office of the
Ombudsman to be "an activist watchman," not merely a
passive one.
And this intent was given validation by the Court in Uy v.
Sandiganbayan, where it stated that: Clearly, the
Philippine Ombudsman departs from the classical
Ombudsman model whose function is merely to receive and
process the peoples complaints against corrupt and abusive
government personnel. The Philippine Ombudsman, as
protector of the people, is armed with the power to
prosecute erring public officers and employees,
giving him an active role in the enforcement of laws
on anti-graft and corrupt practices and such other
offenses that may be committed by such officers and

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED.

The Decision dated of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED
AND SET ASIDE. The Decision dated October 24, 2001 of the
Office of the Ombudsman iis REINSTATED.
ANNEX: POWERS OF THE OMBUDSMAN UNDER RA 6770
Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. The Office of
the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions
and duties:
xxxx
(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action
against a public officer or employee at fault or who neglects
to perform an act or discharge a duty required by law, and
recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine,
censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith;
or enforce its disciplinary authority as provided in Section 21
of this Act: Provided, That the refusal by any officer without
just cause to comply with an order of the Ombudsman to
remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure or prosecute an
officer or employee who is at fault or who neglects to
perform an act or discharge a duty required by law shall be
a ground for disciplinary action against said officer.
Sec. 19. Administrative Complaints. The Ombudsman
shall act on all complaints relating, but not limited, to acts or
omissions which:
(1) Are contrary to law or regulation;
(2) Are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or
discriminatory;

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(3) Are inconsistent with the general course of an

agencys functions, though in accordance with law;
(4) Proceed from a mistake of law or an arbitrary
ascertainment of facts;
(5) Are in the exercise of discretionary powers but for
an improper purpose; or
(6) Are otherwise irregular, immoral or devoid of
justification.
Other provisions in Republic Act No. 6770, likewise, pertain
to the exercise by the Office of the Ombudsman of its
administrative disciplinary authority. For example, Section
19 states that Republic Act No. 6770 shall apply "to all kinds
of malfeasance, misfeasance, and non-feasance that have
been committed by any officer or employee x x x, during his
tenure of office." Section 21 defines the jurisdiction of its
disciplinary authority to include "all elective and appointive
officials of the Government and its subdivisions,
instrumentalities and agencies, including members of the
Cabinet,
local
government,
government-owned,
or
controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, except over
officials who may be removed only by impeachment or over
Members of Congress, and the Judiciary."
Section 22 thereof vests in the Office of the Ombudsman
the power to investigate any serious misconduct in the
office allegedly committed by officials removable by
impeachment, for the purpose of filing a verified complaint
for impeachment, if warranted. Such power, likewise,
includes the investigation of private persons who conspire
with public officers and employees. Section 23 requires
that the administrative investigations conducted by the
Office of the Ombudsman shall be in accordance with its
rules of procedure and consistent with due process. The
Office of the Ombudsman is, however, given the option to
refer certain complaints to the proper disciplinary authority
for the institution of appropriate administrative proceedings
against erring public officers or employees.

Sec. 24. Preventive Suspension. The Ombudsman and

his Deputy may preventively suspend any officer or
employee under his authority pending an investigation, if in
his judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the
charge against such officer or employee involves
dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct, or neglect in
the performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant
removal from the service; or (c) the respondents continued
stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.
The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is
terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman but not more
than six months, without pay, except when the delay in the
disposition of the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is
due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, in
which case the period of such delay shall not be counted in
computing the period of suspension herein provided.
Sec. 25. Penalties. (1) In administrative proceedings
under Presidential Decree No. 807, the penalties and rules
provided therein shall be applied.
(2) In other administrative proceedings, the penalty ranging
from suspension without pay for one year to dismissal with
forfeiture of benefits or a fine ranging from five thousand
pesos (P5,000.00) to twice the amount malversed, illegally
taken or lost, or both at the discretion of the Ombudsman,
taking into consideration circumstances that mitigate or
aggravate the liability of the officer or employee found
guilty of the complaint or charges.
As referred to in the above provision, under Presidential
Decree No. 807,32 the penalties that may be imposed by the
disciplining authority in administrative disciplinary cases are
removal from the service, transfer, demotion in rank,
suspension for not more than one year without pay, fine in
an amount not exceeding six months salary, or reprimand.
Sec. 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. (1) All
provisionary orders of the Office of the Ombudsman are
immediately effective and executory.
A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or
decision of the Office of the Ombudsman must be filed

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within five (5) days after receipt of written notice and shall
be entertained only on any of the following grounds:
(1) New evidence has been discovered which
materially affects the order, directive or decision;
(2) Errors of law or irregularities have been
committed prejudicial to the interest of the movant.
The motion for reconsideration shall be resolved
within three (3) days from filing: Provided, That only
one motion for reconsideration shall be entertained.
Findings of facts by the Office of the Ombudsman when
supported by substantial evidence are conclusive. Any
order, directive or decision imposing the penalty of public
censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one
months salary shall be final and unappealable.

appointees were not qualified for the positions they

were appointed to. Moreover, their appointments
were duly attested to by the Head of the CSC field
office at Lucena City. By virtue thereof, they had
already assumed their appointive positions even
before petitioner himself assumed his elected
position as town mayor.
Consequently, their
appointments took effect immediately and cannot be
unilaterally revoked or recalled by petitioner.
DOCTRINE: Upon the issuance of an appointment
and the appointees assumption of the position in the
civil service, he acquires a legal right which cannot
be taken away either by revocation of the
appointment or by removal except for cause and with
previous notice and hearing. An appointment issued
in accordance with pertinent laws and rules shall take
effect immediately upon its issuance by the
appointing authority, and if the appointee has
assumed the duties of the position, he shall be
entitled to receive his salary at once without awaiting
the approval of his appointment by the Commission.
The appointment shall remain effective until
disapproved by the Commission. In no case shall an
appointment take effect earlier than he date of its
issuance.

De Rama v. Court of Appeals

28 February 2001
Justice Ynares-Santiago

SUMMARY: Mayor Conrado de Rama won as mayor

of Pagbilao, Quezon. One of the first things he did
upon assumption of office was to write the Civil
Service Commission and seek the recall of the
appointments of 14 municipal employees. According
to him, said appointments should be recalled as they
were midnight appointments of the former mayor.
The CSC denied his request saying that the
appointments of the 14 employees were made in
accordance with law and prohibition on midnight
appointments pertains only to the appointments of
the outgoing President and not of local elective
officials. Upon appeal to the CA, Mayor de Rama filed
a supplemental pleading to the appeal alleging that
the appointments were also tainted with fraud since
the former mayor did not follow the CSC rules. The
Supreme Court upheld the appointments. The
fourteen (14) employees were duly appointed
following two meetings of the Personnel Selection
Board.
There is no showing that any of the

FACTS:

Upon his assumption to the position of Mayor of

Pagbilao, Quezon, petitioner Conrado L. de Rama
wrote a letter to the Civil Service Commission (CSC),
seeking the recall of the appointments of fourteen
(14) municipal employees.
De Ramas main contention is that the they were
midnight appointments of the former mayor and is

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contrary to Article VII, Section 152 of the 1987

Constitution.
While the matter was pending before the CSC, three
of the employees filed with the CSC a claim for
payment of their salaries. They alleged:
o
that although their appointments were
declared permanent by the Director II of the
CSC Field Office based in Quezon, De Rama
withheld the payment of their salaries and
benefits pursuant to Office Order No. 95-01,
wherein the appointments of the said fourteen
(14) employees were recalled.
The Legal and Quasi-Judicial Division of CSC held that
they cannot be deprived of their salaries and benefit.
Since the claimants-employees had assumed their
respective positions and performed their duties
pursuant to their appointments, they are entitled to
receive the salaries and benefits appurtenant to their
positions. They also cited Rule V, Section 103 of the
Omnibus Rules.
CSC appointments were valid!
o Bases:
They had already been approved by
the Head of the CSC Field Office in
Lucena City.

Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential

elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall
not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive
positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or
endanger public safety.

if the appointee has assumed the duties of the position, he shall be

entitled to receive his salary at once without awaiting the approval of his
appointment by the Commission,

De Ramas failure to present evidence

that would warrant the revocation or
recall of the said appointments.
De Rama filed an MR with the CSC and for the first
time, brought the argument that the CSC erred
because the appointments were fraudulently issued.
CSC still held that the appointments were valid. CSC
also cited Aquino v. CSC4.
De Rama went to the CA. De Rama, in his appeal to
the CA, argued that the CSC ignored his supplement
to the consolidated appeal and motion for
reconsideration wherein he laid out evidence
showing that the subject appointments were
obtained through fraud.

CA appointments were valid!

o Bases:
The fact that the appointments of four
employees were made more than four
(4) months after the publication of the
vacancies to which they were
appointed is of no moment. Sec. 805 of

It is well-settled that once an appointment is issued and the moment the

appointee assumes a position in the civil service under a completed
appointment, he acquires a legal, not merely equitable right (to the
position), which is protected not only by statute, but also by the
Constitution, and cannot be taken away from him either by revocation of
the appointment, or by removal, except for cause, and with previous notice
and hearing.
5

Section 80. Public Notice of Vacancy: Personnel Selection Board. (a)

Whenever a local chief executive decides to fill a vacant career position,
there shall be posted notices of the vacancy in at least three (3)
conspicuous public places in the local government unit concerned for a
period of not less than fifteen (15) days.
(b)
There shall be established in every province, city or municipality a
personnel selection board to assist the local chief executive in the judicious
and objective selection of personnel for employment as well as for
promotion, and in the formulation of such policies as would contribute to

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RA 7041 does not provide that every

appointment to the local government
service must be made within four (4)
months from publication of the
vacancies.
Neither did the CSCs own Circular
Order No. 27, Section 7, Series of
1991, require that vacant positions
published in a government quarterly
must be filled up before the advent of
the succeeding quarter.
In his MR filed before the CA, De Rama brought four
new grounds:
o No screening process and no criteria were
adopted by the Personnel Selection Board in
nominating the respondents;
o No posting in three (3) conspicuous public
places of notice of vacancy as required by the
rules and the law;
o Merit and fitness requirements were not
observed by the selection board and by the
appointing authority as required by the Civil
Service rules;
o Petitioner has valid grounds to recall the
appointments of respondents.

ISSUES:
1. Does Art. VII, Sec. 15 of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting
midnight appointments apply to local elective officials? NO.

2. Should the new issues, raised before the Court of

Appeals, on the violation of laws and regulations on
issuance of appointments be entertained? NO.
RATIO:
Issue 1

Issue 2

employee welfare.
(c)
The personnel selection board shall be headed by the local
sanggunian concerned. A representative of the Civil Service Commission, if
any, and the personnel officer of the local government unit concerned shall
be ex officio members of the board.

The said prohibition applies only to presidential

appointments.
There is no law that prohibits local elective officials
from making appointments during the last days of his
or her tenure. De Rama did not raise the issue of
fraud on the part of the outgoing mayor who made
the appointments. Neither did he allege that the said
appointments were tainted by irregularities or
anomalies that breached laws and regulations
governing appointments.
His solitary reason for
recalling these appointments was that they were, to
his personal belief, midnight appointments which
the outgoing mayor had no authority to make.

In De Ramas consolidated appeal and motion for

reconsideration, he did not argue that the
appointments were violative of civil service rules and
procedures. De Rama filed a supplement to the
where, for the first time, he alleged that the
appointments were fraught with irregularities for
failing to comply with CSC rules and regulations.
Nevertheless, the CSC overruled his assertions,
holding that no new evidence had been presented to
warrant a reversal of its earlier resolution.
In a petition for review before the Court of Appeals,
petitioner questioned the CSCs conclusion because
it ignored the allegations and documents he

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presented in the supplement to his earlier

consolidated appeal and motion for reconsideration.
The CA simply dismissed petitioners allegations and
documents attached to the supplemental pleading
for they did not constitute new evidence that a court,
board or tribunal may entertain.
There is no question that parties may file
supplemental pleadings to supply deficiencies in aid
of an original pleading, but which should not entirely
substitute the latter.
o Supplemental pleadings must be with
reasonable notice, and it is discretionary upon
the court or tribunal to allow the same or not.
Thus, the CSC was under no obligation to
admit the supplemental pleading.
o Secondly, a supplemental pleading must state
transactions, occurrences or events which
took place since the time the pleading sought
to be supplemented was filed. In the instant
case, petitioner alleged fraud and
irregularities that supposedly occurred
contemporaneous to the execution of the
appointments. They should have been raised
at the very first opportunity. The CA and CSC
found that the allegations in his supplemental
pleading did not constitute new evidence
that can be the proper subject of a
supplemental pleading. These were old facts
and issues which he failed to raise earlier.
Be that as it may, these alleged irregularities were
considered by the CSC and the Court of Appeals as
new issues which were raised for the first time on
appeal. It is rather too late for petitioner to raise
these issues for the first time on appeal. It is wellsettled that issues or questions of fact cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal.

The fourteen (14) employees were duly

appointed following two meetings of the
Personnel Selection Board held on May 31 and
June 26, 1995.
o There is no showing that any of the private
respondents were not qualified for the
positions they were appointed to.
o Moreover, their appointments were duly
attested to by the Head of the CSC field office
at Lucena City. By virtue thereof, they had
already assumed their appointive positions
even before petitioner himself assumed his
elected position as town mayor.
Consequently, their appointments took effect
immediately and cannot be unilaterally
revoked or recalled by petitioner.
Upon the issuance of an appointment and the
appointees assumption of the position in the civil
service, he acquires a legal right which cannot be
taken away either by revocation of the appointment
or by removal except for cause and with previous
notice and hearing. The person assuming a position
in the civil service under a completed appointment
acquires a legal, not just an equitable, right to the
position. This right is protected not only by statute,
but by the Constitution as well, which right cannot be
taken away by either revocation of the appointment,
or by removal, unless there is valid cause to do so,
provided that there is previous notice and hearing.
o

[RELEVANT] The appointments were VALID!

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The appointments may only be recalled on grounds

found in Sec. 20, Rule VI6 of Omnibus Implementing
Regulations of the Revised Administrative Code.
An appointment issued in accordance with pertinent
laws and rules shall take effect immediately upon its
issuance by the appointing authority, and if the
appointee has assumed the duties of the position, he
shall be entitled to receive his salary at once without
awaiting the approval of his appointment by the
Commission. The appointment shall remain effective
until disapproved by the Commission. [Sec. 10, IRR of
Admin Code]

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant

petition for review is DENIED and the Resolution of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 42896 affirming CSC
Resolutions Nos. 96-2828 and 96-7527 is hereby AFFIRMED
in toto.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

positions in the government unless required by the

imperatives of public service. This rule binds all,
including mayors, who are vested with the power of
appointment, and it flows from the principle that a
public office is a public trust.
In Aytona v. Castillo, the court, without citing any
constitutional or statutory provision, held that outgoing
President Garcias 350 appointments after the proclamation
of the new President Diosdado Macapagal and during his
last hours as outgoing Chief was not consistent with "good
faith, morality, and propriety."
In this case, after the unfavorable results of the election
were proclaimed on May 11, 1995, the former mayor made
several appointments within the space of 27 days, from June
1, 1995 to June 27, 1995, just three days before she bowed
out of the service on June 30. Even when there was no
urgent need to do so, she went ahead and filled the
vacancies in the municipal government a few days before
the new mayor stepped in.

MENDOZA, J., dissenting:

What the majority overlooks is that Art. VII, 15 is simply an
application of a broader principle that after the appointing
authority has lost the elections, his is the duty of a prudent
caretaker of the office, and, therefore, he should not fill
6

Sec. 20. Notwithstanding the initial approval of an appointment, the

same may be recalled on any of the following grounds:
(a) Non-compliance with the procedures/criteria provided in the agencys
Merit Promotion Plan;
(b) Failure to pass through the agencys Selection/Promotion Board;
(c) Violation of the existing collective agreement between management and
employees relative to promotion; or
(d) Violation of other existing civil service law, rules and regulations.

Also, the 14 employees appointments were made at only

two meetings of the Personnel Selection Board, held on May
31, 1995 and June 16, 1995, each meeting lasting no more
than an hour.
Despite these facts, the CSC did not find anything wrong or
irregular in the appointments of respondents because it
failed to appreciate the fact that "midnight appointments" whether made by the President or by a mayor - are bad,
because they are made hurriedly, without due deliberation
and careful consideration of the needs of the office and the
qualifications of the appointees, and by an appointing

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authority on the eve of his departure from office. "Midnight

appointments" offend principles of "fairness, justice and
righteousness." They cannot be less bad because they are
made at the local level, by mayors and other local
executives.
Public office - it cannot be too often repeated - is a public
trust. As trustee of a public office, the duty of Mayor Ma.
Evelyn S. Abeja, as outgoing executive, was to preserve the
vacancies in the municipal government for her successor to
fill or not to fill. What this Court said in Aytona v. Castillo
applies with equal force to the case at bar: the outgoing
executive is duty-bound to prepare for the orderly transfer of
authority to the incoming President, hence should not do
acts which he ought to know, would embarrass or obstruct
the policies of his successor.

Remolona v. CSC
August 2, 2001
Puno, J.
Jadd Chururuchuru Dealino

SUMMARY: Infantas DECS District Supervisor inquired w/

the CSC regarding Mrs. Nery Remolonas CS eligibility.
Pursuant to the CSC Chairmans order, a preliminary
investigation was conducted. Only Estelito Remolona, who
was Nerys husband and the Postmaster of Infanta,
appeared. Estelito signed a written statement of facts, and
he admitted that he was responsible for acquiring the
falsified Report of Rating in favor of his wife. The CSC
absolved the wife (finding that she had nothing to do w/
the procurement) but imposed the penalty of dismissal on
Estelito (the Postmaster). The CA dismissed Estelitos

Petition for Review. The SC upheld the CAs dismissal,

finding that civil service employees can be dismissed for
offenses related to neither their work nor official duty.
DOCTRINE: Dishonesty, in order to warrant dismissal,
need not be committed in the course of the performance of
duty by the person charged.
FACTS:
Parties:
o Petitioner Estelito Remolona
Postmaster at the Infanta Postal Office Service in
Quezon.
His wife, Nery, is a teacher at the Kiborosa
Elementary School.
January 3, 1991: The DECS District Supervisor of Infanta
(Francisco America) inquired w/ the CSC as to Mrs. Nery
Remolonas civil service eligibility.
o She purportedly got a rating of 81.25% based on the
National Board for Teachers Report of Rating.
o According to Mr. America, he received information
that Mrs. Remolona campaigns for a fee of P8k per
passing mark in the teachers board exams.
February 11, 1991: The incumbent CSC Chairman
(Patricia Sto. Tomas) issued an Order directing the CSC
Region 4 Director (Bella Amilhasan) to investigate Mrs.
Remolonas eligibility.
o This was ordered after verification from the Office for
Central Personnel Records Register of Eligibles that
Mrs. Remolonas name was neither in the list of
passing examinees, nor failing examinees, nor simply
the list of examinees for December 10, 1989.
The examination that corresponds to Mrs.
Remolonas Report of Rating actually belongs to
Marlou Maldeo, who took the exam in Cagayan
De Oro and got a score of 65%.
A Director of the CSO Field Office of Lucena City
conducted the preliminary investigation.
o Only Estelito Remolona (Nerys husband) attended.

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Estelito signed a written statement of facts regarding

his wifes Report of Rating.
o The written statement of facts was summarized in
the Memorandum submitted by Director Pasion.
Basically, the statement of facts says that:
1) The Report of Rating was obtained after
Estelito paid P3.5k to an Atty. Hadju
Salupadin, whom he met on a random bus
ride.
2) Estelito tried to use the Report of Rating to
convince DECS District Supervisor (America)
to accommodate Nery but the District
Supervisor informed her that there was no
vacancy.
3) Estelito went to Lucena City and complained
to a Dr. Magsino that the District Supervisor
asked for money in exchange for Nerys
appointment but the District Supervisor did
not fulfill his end of the deal.
4) From 1986 to 1988, the District Supervisor got
Nerys salaries and bonuses.
5) The District Supervisor got mad at the
Remolonas, and Estelito burned the original
Report of Rating as he was afraid that the
District
Supervisor
would
verify
its
authenticity.
Estelito admitted that:
1) He was responsible in acquiring the alleged
fake eligibility;
2) His wife has no knowledge of its acquisition;
3) He did it because he wanted them to be
together
Director Pasion recommended administrative action
against Estelito, while Nery should be absolved.
April 6, 1993: A formal charge was filed against Estelito,
Nery, and the Atty. Salupadin for possession of fake
eligibility, falsification, and dishonesty. A formal hearing
took place where the parties submitted their evidence.
o

February 14, 1995: The CSC Regional Director

(Amilhasan) issued a Memorandum recommended that
the Spouses be found guilty as charged.
April 20, 1995: The CSC found the Spouses guilty of
dishonesty and imposed the penalty of dismissal plus all
its accessory penalties. The case against Atty. Salupadin
was held in abeyance pending his identification.
August 27, 1996: On MR, the CSC absolved Nery.
The CA dismissed Estelitos Petition for Review, and
denied his MR/Motion for New Trial.

ISSUES:
1) Whether a civil service employee (Estelito) can be
dismissed for an offense that is not work/official dutyrelated?
2) Whether Estelitos right to due process was violated
when he was not assisted by counsel during the
preliminary investigation?
3) Whether Estelitos extra-judicial admission is admissible?
4) Whether Estelitos Motion for New Trial should be
granted since the TSN of the CSC hearing was not
forwarded to the CA?
5) Whether the penalty is too harsh?
RULING: Yes, a civil service employee can be dismissed for
an offense that is related to neither their work nor official
duty.
RATIO:
1) Yes, a civil service employee (Estelito) can be dismissed
for an offense that is not work/official duty-related.
A) Remolona: Since the removal must be for cause as
provided by law (based on the Security of Tenure
provision in the Constitution), it follows that the act
of dishonesty should have been committed in his
performance of his functions and duties as
Postmaster.
B) SC: The act complained of does not have to be
committed in the course of performance of official

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duty. Such character defects affect the right to

continue in office.
1) The basis for the penalty is Sec. 23, Rule 14, of
the Rules Implementing Book 5 of the
Administrative Code.
2) Dishonesty, in order to warrant dismissal, need
not be committed in the course of the
performance of duty by the person charged.
a) Rationale:
1) If a government officer or employee is
dishonest or is guilty of oppression or
grave misconduct, these defects affect the
officer/employees right to continue in
office even if such defects of character are
not connected with his office.
2) The Government cannot tolerate a
dishonest official in the service, even if
they perform their duties correctly and
well, because by reason of their
government position, they are given more
and ample opportunity to commit acts of
dishonesty.
3) Thanks to their office, such officials have
influence and power such that victims are
less disposed and prepared to resist such
evil acts and actuations.
b) Employees private lives cannot be separated
from their public lives.
c) Dishonesty reflects on the officer/employees
fitness to continue in office, as well as the
services morale and discipline.
d) Thus,
when
officers/employees
are
disciplined, the objective is to improve public
service and the publics faith and confidence
in the government, not mere punishment.
2) No, Estelitos right to due process was not violated when
he was not assisted by counsel during the preliminary
investigation.

A) The Right to Counsel under Sec. 12 of the Bill of

Rights refers to suspects in criminal cases, who are
under custodial investigation.
B) Custodial investigation is when
1) the police investigation is no longer a general
inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to
focus on a particular suspect who had been taken
into custody by the police to carry out a process
of interrogation that lends itself to elicit
incriminating statements.
2) Or, in less words: When questions are initiated by
law enforcement officers after a person has been
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way.
C) The Right to Counsel attaches only at the start of the
custodial investigation.
D) Under the law, parties in administrative inquiries may
or may not be assisted by counsel, regardless of the
nature of the charges and the Respondents capacity
to represent themselves.
E) There is no duty on the part of investigating
administrative bodies to furnish counsel to the
person being investigated, based on the 1959 Civil
Service Act7 and Omnibus Rules Implementing Book
5 of the Administrative Code8.
F) In this case:
7

Section 32. Disciplinary Action. No officer or employee in the civil service

shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law and
after due process: Provided, That a transfer from one position to another
without reduction in rank or salary shall not be considered disciplinary
when made in the interest of public service: Provided, further, That no
complaint against a civil service official or employee shall be given due
course unless the same is in writing and subscribed and sworn to by the
complainant: And provided, finally, That the respondent shall be entitled to
a formal investigation if he so elects, in which case he shall have the right
to appear and defend himself at said investigation in person or by counsel,
to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him, and to have the
attendance of witnesses and production of documents in his favor by
compulsory process of subpoena or subpoena duces tecum.

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1) Estelito is not accused of a crime in the

investigation.
2) The purpose of the investigation was to ascertain
facts and whether there is a prima facie case.
3) Yes, Estelitos extra-judicial admission is admissible.
A) He occupies a high government position (Postmaster)
so he is expected to be circumspect in his actions,
especially where he is administratively charged w/ a
grave offense that could lead to his dismissal.
4) No, Estelitos Motion for New Trial should be granted
since the TSN of the CSC hearing was not forwarded to
the CA.
A) General rule: Findings of administrative bodies are
accorded great respect and binding on the SC, where
such findings are amply supported by substantial
evidence. (citing Tiatco v. CSC)
1) Where there are conflicting versions of factual
matters, it is the administrative agency that has
the discretion to determine which parties are
given credence based on the evidence received.
(citing Gelmart Industries (Phil.) v. Leogardo, Jr.,
et al.)
2) Exception to the general rule: Where there is a
clear showing of government agencies acting
arbitrarily or w/ grave abuse of discretion, or
where the agency has acted in a capricious and
whimsical manner amounting to excess of
jurisdiction. (citing Cuerdo v. COA)
B) In this case:
1) No compelling reason to deviate from the
findings.
2) Estelitos written admission is full of details that
only he could have known.
3) No imputation of ill motive or bad faith upon the
Director who conducted the investigation.
4) Thus, there presumption of regularity prevails.

Sorry, I couldnt find an online edition. The SC implies them to be the

same though.

C) As for the TSN, the CA has the discretion to have the

parties transmit the original records (citing the
Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95).
5) No, the penalty is not too harsh.
A) Even though the government suffered no pecuniary
damage, there was still falsification of an official
document, amounting to gross dishonesty.
B) This
gross
dishonesty
cannot
be
tolerated
considering that Estelito was an accountable officer
who occupied a sensitive position.
C) The states policy is that high standards of ethics and
responsibility should be promoted. (citing the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees)
DISPOSITIVE: Decision AFFIRMED IN TOTO.

Bernardo v. CA
May 27, 2004
Callejo, Sr. , J.
Manzano

SUMMARY: Bernardo was head of Loans and Discount

Division of LBP. One day, he deposited in his account with
LBP P500,000. He photocopied his passbook showing such
deposit. That same day, he withdrew the same amount
from his account. He made a letter addressed to SEC
saying that at least 25% authorized capital stock of MTMSI
has been subscribed and paid. He did this as treasure of
MTMSI for the incorporation of the same. He also sent an
authorization letter to SEC for the examination and
verification of said account. LBP filed charges against him
for gross misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the interest
of the bank. The Hearing officer, MSPB, CSC, CA, and SC all
found him guilty of the charge.
DOCTRINE: The causes which warrant the dismissal of a
civil servant need not necessarily be work-related or
committed in the course of the performance of duty by the

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person charged.
The principle is that when an officer or employee is
disciplined, the object sought is not the punishment of
such officer or employee but the improvement of the public
service and the preservation of the publics faith and
confidence in the government.
FACTS:
1. Armando Bernardo was the Head of the Loans and
Discount Division of the Land Bank of the
Philippines(LBP).
2. One day, Bernardo deposited the amount of P500,000 in
his savings account with LBP. After making the said
deposit, he photocopied that page in his bank passbook
where the deposit of P500,000 was reflected and, on
the same day, withdrew the said amount. He also
executed, in his capacity as treasurer-in-trust of the
Markay Trading and Manpower Services, Inc. (MTMSI), a
Treasurers Affidavit, falsely certifying that:
at least 25% of the authorized capital stock of the corporation
has been subscribed and 25% of the total subscription has been
paid and received by me in cash or property in the amount
of P500,000.00 in accordance with the Corporation Code.

3. On the same day, Bernardo, still in his capacity as

treasurer-in-trust of the said corporation, executed a
letter-authority to the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), worded as follows:
This is to authorize your office to examine and verify the deposit in
the Land Bank of the Philippines, Baliuag, Bulacan, in my name as
Treasurer-in-Trust for Markay Trading and Manpower Services in the
amount of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos only ( P500,000.00)
representing the paid-up capital of the said corporation, which is in
the process of incorporation.
This authority is valid and inspection of said deposit may be made
even after the issuance of certificate of incorporation to the company.
Should the deposit be transferred to another bank prior to after (sic)
incorporation this letter will also serve as authority to verify and
examine the same.
The representative of the Securities and Exchange Commission is also
authorized to examine the pertinent books and records of accounts of
the corporation as well as all supporting papers to determine the
utilization and disbursement of the paid-up capital.

4. The Articles of Incorporation of the MTMSI was

registered with the SEC. Bernardo signed the said
articles as one of its incorporators. It also appears in the
said articles of incorporation that Bernardo was elected
as a member of the Board of Directors. Bernardo also
executed an affidavit that he was elected treasurer of
the corporation.
5. It turned out that while Bernardo was an elected
treasurer of MTMSI, he never opened an account with
the LBP for the account of the said corporation. In the
meantime, Bernardo was promoted to the position of
Assistant Branch Manager.
6. Later, LBP, through its president filed a formal charge
against Bernardo charging him of gross neglect, grave
misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the bank, and serious violation of Civil Service
Commission (CSC) rules and regulations.
7. Hearing officer found Bernardo guilty for (1 )engaging in
business, occupation or vocation without securing the
permission of the Land Bank in violation of Sec. 36 of
P.D. 807 and (2) committing acts of falsification
amounting to GRAVE MISCONDUCT in office.
8. The LBP approved the recommendation of the hearing
officer.
9. Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) affirmed the
resolution of the LBP, but modified it in that he was
found guilty of misrepresentation of a material fact
amounting to dishonesty for engaging directly in a
private business without the permission required by the
CSC rules and regulations. It, likewise, affirmed the
penalty of dismissal from the service imposed by the
LBP.
10. CSC affirmed the penalty meted on him by the MSPB.
The CSC absolved Bernardo of the charge of dishonesty
in connection with his execution of the treasurers
affidavit and the letter of authorization to the SEC.
11. CA dismissed his petition for certiorari for lack of merit.
ISSUES:

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1. WON the CA erred in affirming the resolution of

the CSC that he violated Section 36(b)(24) of P.D.
No. 807, implemented in Section 14, Rule XVIII of
the CSC Rules and Regulations? NO!
Bernardo: he resigned from the MTMSI even before the
corporation started its business operations. He asserts
that there is no evidence on record that he actually
engaged in business.
SC: The evidence on record shows that he was not only
an incorporator, but was also a member of the Board of
Directors and was, in fact, the treasurer of MTMSI. Even
after the incorporation of the MTMSI, he remained as a
stockholder and a member of the Board of Directors. He
was even elected treasurer of the corporation. He and
his wife signed check vouchers of the corporation during
the period of November 16, 1986 to August 24, 1987:
Bernardo: his alleged act of engaging directly in a
private business without the required permission was
committed only during the incorporation stage of MTMSI.
SC: This is belied by the numerous check vouchers of
MTMSI for the period from November 13, 1986 to August
24, 1987 wherein the name and signature of Bernardo or
his wife appeared. The finding that he engaged directly
in a private business without prior permission from the
head of office as required by Civil Service rules and
regulations is proven.
The petitioner also admitted that before he engaged in
business, he failed to secure the permission of his
employer.
2. WON the petitioner was deprived of his right to
due process when the CA affirmed the resolution
of the CSC finding him administratively guilty of
grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service based on acts not

covered by the formal charges lodged against

him? NO!
Bernardo:
He
was
never
charged
of
depositing P500,000 in his name as treasurer-in-trust of
the corporation, and of withdrawing the money on the
same day without any board resolution authorizing him
to do so prior to the registration of the corporations
Articles of Incorporation with the SEC. Despite this, the
CSC found him administratively guilty of grave
misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest
of the service based on the said acts. He was deprived of
his right to be informed of the charge against him and to
adduce evidence in his defense.
SC: CSC erred in finding the petitioner administratively
liable for depositing P500,000 in his name as treasurerin-trust of MTMSI, and withdrawing the amount prior to
the incorporation thereof in the absence of any
resolution of its Board of Directors authorizing him to do
so, although not alleged in the formal charges. Bernardo
was deprived of his right to be informed of the charges
against him, and to accord him the right to adduce
evidence to controvert the said charges.
However, the CA that the CSC did not err in finding the
petitioner guilty of grave misconduct and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service based on
the evidence on record
Bernardos contention that there was no legal and
factual basis for the decision of the MSPB and the
resolution of the CSC is rejected. LBP adduced the
requisite quantum of evidence to prove the second
charge. Per certificate of the LBP, Baliuag Branch,
Bernardo had no deposit account as treasurer-in-trust of
MTMSI in the said bank. He deposited the amount
of P500,000 in his personal account and this transaction
was reflected in his passbook. A cursory reading of the
said page would lead one to conclude that Bernardo had

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deposited the said amount, without disclosing that he

also withdrew the said amount on the same day.
Bernardo thus made a false statement in his Letter to
the SEC, when he stated that as treasurer-in-trust of the
MTMSI he had deposited P500,000 in his account in LBP
when the truth of the matter was, the money was
deposited in his personal savings account and was also
withdrawn on the same day.
We agree with the MSPB in holding that by his
actuations, the petitioner is guilty of dishonesty. The
inconsistent statements of Bernardo destroy his
credibility, putting the same into serious doubt due to its
weakness.
The Board finds that this is a case of Misrepresentation
amounting to Dishonesty and not Falsification of Official
Documents. To warrant conviction for Falsification of
Official Documents, the respondent must have acted in
his capacity as an employee or official of the LBP and
must have altered the genuine document or execute the
false document relevant to or in connection with the
performance of his duty as such. It is clear from the
records that Bernardo acted in his capacity as Treasurer
of MTMSI, hence, the Board finds him guilty of
Misrepresentation
amounting
to
Dishonesty.
In
misrepresentation of a material fact, he made it appear
that his personal account in LBP belongs to the MTMSI
placed in his name as Treasurer-in-Trust, for purposes of
issuance of certificate of incorporation, by the SEC and
by concealing the truth he committed dishonesty or
deceit and put the integrity of the Bank in jeopardy to
the prejudice of the banking operation and to the
damage of the creditors, if any, of the corporation.
Bernardo: the acts imputed as constituting the offense
of grave misconduct were not connected with the
performance of his duty as an LBP employee or as a
government employee for that matter, the LBP and the
CSC had no jurisdiction over the complaint against him.

SC: The causes which warrant the dismissal of a civil

servant need not necessarily be work-related or
committed in the course of the performance of duty by
the person charged.
The principle is that when an officer or employee is
disciplined, the object sought is not the punishment of
such officer or employee but the improvement of the
public service and the preservation of the publics faith
and confidence in the government.
The rule is that the findings of fact of administrative
bodies, if based on substantial evidence, are controlling
on the reviewing authority.
DISPOSITIVE: CA affirmed.

CSC v Belagan
October 19, 2004
Sandoval-Gutierez, J
Rods (you can skip issue I and ratio I)
Note: I omitted parts of the case relating to Gapuzs testimony, as
they are not relevant to the issue related to our topic in PubOff. In
case sir asks, please refer to the original copy of the case

SUMMARY: Belagan was charged with sexual indignities

and harassment and sexual harassment and malfeasances
by Gapuz and Annawi, respectively. DECS found him guilty
of all charges, and ordered him dismissed. CSC affirmed
Gapuzs charges, but denied Annawis. CA reversed CSC,
finding that Gapuzs testimony was incredible by virtue of
several cases against her in the MTC Baguio and Bgys in
Baguio. SC reversed, saying that the testimony of Gapuz
was credible, and also finding that Belagan was guilty of
grave misconduct, but lowered the penalty to 1 year
suspension.
DOCTRINE:

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Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate

violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior, especially
by a government official.
To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should
relate to or be connected with the performance of the
official functions and duties of a public officer.
In grave misconduct as distinguished from simple
misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to
violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rule,
must be manifest.
Corruption as an element of grave misconduct consists in
the act of an official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and
wrongfully uses his station or character to procure some
benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to duty
and the rights of others.
In the determination of the penalties to be imposed,
mitigating, aggravating and alternative circumstances
attendant to the commission of the offense shall be
considered.
FACTS:
1.
Petition for review filed by CSC of the CA decision
which dismissed the complaint filed by Magdalena Gapuz
against Allyson Belagan, and lifted the dismissal of
Belagan and reinstated him to his position.
2.
The case stemmed from 2 cases filed by Magdalena
Gapuz, founder/directress of Mother and Child Learning
Center (charged Belagan with sexual indignities and
harassment) and Ligaya Annawi, public school teacher at
Fort Del Pilar Elem School (charged Belagan with sexual
harassment and malfeasances), against Dr. Allyson
Belagan, Superintendent of the DECS.
3.
Gapuz alleged that she filed an application with the
DECS Baguio City for a permit to operate a pre-school.

a. One of the requisites for issuance of permit is

inspection of the school premises by DECS division
office.
b. Belagan volunteered in lieu of the officer assigned.
c. During the inspection, while descending the stairs,
Belagan placed his arms around Gapuzs shoulder and
kissed her cheek.
d. She kept quiet because she feared that the application
might be jeopardized.
e. Several days later, when Gapuz went to the DECS
office, she asked Belagan about the application, but
the latter replied Mag-date muna tayo.
f. Gapuz declined, saying that she was married, and
reported the matter to DECS assistant superintendent
Peter Ngabit.
g. Gapuzs husband found out about the incident and the
couple went to the office to confront Belagan, but the
latter merely denied having any relationship with
Gapuz.
h. Belagan then forwarded to the DECS regional director
his recommendation to approve the application.
4.
Gapuz then read from a local newspaper about
female employees charging a high-ranking DECS official
with sexual harassment.
a. She found out that this pertains to Belagan.
b. She wrote a letter complaint for sexual indignities and
harassment to former DECS Sec Ricardio Gloria
c. Belagan was suspended on Oct 4, 1994.
5.
Annawi alleged in her complaint that on 4 separate
occasions, Belagan touched her breasts, kissed her
cheek, touched her groins, embraced her from behind
and pulled her close to him, his organ pressing against
the lower part of his back.
6.
Annawi also charged respondent with: (1) delaying
the payment of the teachers salaries; (2) failing to
release the pay differentials of substitute teachers; (3)
willfully refusing to release the teachers uniforms,
proportionate allowances and productivity pay; and (4)
failing to constitute the Selection and Promotion Board, as
required by the DECS rules and regulations.

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7.
DECS conducted a joint investigation, with Belagan
denying the charge of sexual harassment, and presenting
evidence to disprove the charge against him for
dereliction of duty.
a. DECS Sec found him guilty of 4 counts of sexual
indignities or harassments committed against
Annawi, and 2counts of sexual advances or
indignities against Gapuz.
b. He was ordered dismissed.
8.
CSC affirmed the DECS Secs decision with regard to
Gapuzs case, but dismissed that of Annawis.
a. Belagans acts constitutes grave misconduct 9.
b. He was still ordered dismissed.
9.
Belagan filed an MR, while Gapuz was charged with
several offenses before the MTC Baguio City10(22 in all).
10.
Gapuz was also respondent in several cases filed
with Bgy. Chairmen of Bgy. Gabriela Silang and Bgy.
Hillside in Baguio11(23 in all).
11.
Belagan claimed that these cases casted doubt on
the character, integrity, and credibility of Gapuz.
12.
CSC denied the MR of Belagan.
a. The character of a woman who was the subject of a
sexual assault is of minor significance in the

determination of the guilt or innocence of the person

accused of having committed the offense. This is so
because even a prostitute or a woman of ill repute
may become a victim of said offense.
b. The fact that complainant Gapuz is shown to have had
cases against her does not mean that she is not
telling the truth with respect to the charges against
Belagan
13.
CA reversed the CSC, holding that Gapuz was an
unrealiable witness. CA said Given her aggressiveness
and propensity for trouble, she is not one whom any male
would attempt to steal a kiss.
ISSUES:
I.
WON Gapuz was a credible witness [NOT
IMPORTANT]
II.
WON Belagan is guilty of grave misconduct, not
merely for disgraceful or immoral conduct (latter is
punishable by suspension for 6 months and 1 day to
1 year for first offense)
RULING:
I.
Yes, she was credible.
II.
Yes, he is guilty of grave misconduct.

The acts of Belagan are serious breach of good conduct since he was
holding a position which requires the incumbent thereof to maintain a high
degree of moral uprightness. As Division Superintendent, Belagan
represents an institution tasked to mold the character of children.
Furthermore, one of his duties is to ensure that teachers in his division
conduct themselves properly and observe the proper discipline. Any
improper behavior on his part will seriously impair his moral ascendancy
over the teachers and students which can not be tolerated. Therefore, his
misconduct towards an applicant for a permit to operate a private
pre-school cannot be treated lightly and constitutes the offense of
grave misconduct.
10
Light oral defamation, slight physical injuries, grave threats, malicious
mischief, light threats, grave oral defamation, light oral defamation, unjust
vexation
11

Grave threats, unjust vexation, rumor mongering, oral

defamation, false accusation, harassment, habitual trouble
maker

RATIO:
I. WON Gapuz was a credible witness [NOT IMPORTANT]
1. Generally, the character of a party is regarded as
legally irrelevant in determining a controversy. One
statutory exception is that relied upon by respondent,
i.e., Section 51 (a) 3, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence.
2. The Court said that the provision applies only to
criminal cases.
3. Assuming that it does apply, still Belagans position
that Gapuzs record belies her charges cannot be
sustained.
a. Character evidence must be limited to the traits
and characteristics involved in the type of offense
charged

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b. Belagan did not offer evidence that has a bearing

on Gapuzs chastity.
c. The evidence presented on grave oral defamation,
etc are inadmissible because they do not establish
the probability or improbability of the offense
charged.
4. Belagan was trying to establish that Gapuz lacked
credibility, but the Court ruled that he failed to do
this.
a. Most of the cases with MTC Baguio were from the
80s, in contrast with the complaint filed in 1994.
b. The cases cannot be considered reliable proofs of
Gapuzs character/reputation.
c. Also, there was no proof that she was convicted in
any of these crimes.
d. CSCs finding that Gapuz was credible was
supported by substantial evidence.
i.
Gapuz testified in a straightforward and
candid manner.
ii.
The testimony was replete with details.
iii.
The testimony was also corroborated by Peter
Ngabit,
DECS
assistant
division
superintendent.
e. Re: CA ruling that there is ample evidence to
show that Magdalena had a motive in accusing
respondent, i.e. pressure him to issue a permit.
i.
The Court disagreed.
ii. Belagan already issued a permit when Gapuz
filed her letter-complaint.
II.

WON Belagan is guilty of grave misconduct, not

merely for disgraceful or immoral conduct (latter is
punishable by suspension for 6 months and 1 day to
1 year for first offense) [IMPORTANT]
1. Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or
deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of
behavior, especially by a government official.
2. To
constitute
an
administrative
offense,
misconduct should relate to or be connected with

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

the performance of the official functions and

duties of a public officer.
In grave misconduct as distinguished from simple
misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear
intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of
established rule, must be manifest.
Corruption as an element of grave misconduct
consists in the act of an official or fiduciary
person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his
station or character to procure some benefit for
himself or for another person, contrary to duty
and the rights of others.
a. This is apparently present in respondents
case as it concerns not only a stolen kiss but
also a demand for a date, an unlawful
consideration for the issuance of a permit to
operate a pre-school.
b. Respondents act clearly constitutes grave
misconduct, punishable by dismissal.
The Court did not want to impose the penalty of
dismissal
a. Respondent has served the government for a
period of 37 years, during which, he made a
steady ascent from an Elementary Grade
School
Teacher
to
Schools
Division
Superintendent.
b. He received numerous awards.
c. This is the first time that he is being charged.
d. He is retiring, and has in fact filed an
application for retirement.
Section 16, Rule XIV, of the Rules Implementing
Book V of Executive Order No. 292 (Admin Code)
provides: SEC. 16. In the determination of
penalties to be imposed, mitigating and
aggravating
circumstances
may
be
considered. x x x.
Mitigating circumstances are in Section 53, Rule
IV, of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases
in the Civil Service: SEC. 53. Extenuating,
Mitigating,
Aggravating,
or
Alternative

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Circumstances. In the determination of the

penalties to be imposed, mitigating, aggravating
and alternative circumstances attendant to the
commission of the offense shall be considered.
The following circumstances shall be appreciated:
xxxxxx
j. length of service
xxxxxx
l. and other analogous cases.
8. Conformably with the Courts ruling in a similar
case of sexual harassment, and Belagans length
of service, unblemished record in the past and
numerous awards, the penalty of suspension from
office without pay for one (1) year is in order.
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 8, 1998 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 44180 is REVERSED. The CSC Resolution Nos.
966213 and 972423 are AFFIRMED, subject to the
modification
that
respondent
ALLYSONBELAGAN
is
SUSPENDED from office without pay for ONE (1) YEAR, with
full credit of his preventive suspension.

Villanueva v. Court of
Appeals
July 20, 2006
Tinga, J.
Paolo Q. Bernardo
The facts in the Summary-Doctrine box should be enough. Pardon
also the long spaces in said box; I could not fix it.

SUMMARY: Villanueva is a married man and the

Legislative Assistant II of the Cashiering and Administrative

Records Division of the House of Representatives.
He was caught, inside the room of Representative Navarro,
naked, together with a female.
They were asleep on the couch.
The female was Navarro-Arguelles), House
Representative Navarro's daughter and confidential
assistant.
Both were married, but not to each other.
A complaint was lodged against Villanueva for two charges:
Grave Misconduct, and Disgraceful and Immoral Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service before the
House Disciplinary Board.
The Board found him guilty on both charges, and dismissed
him from service.
Villanueva then appealed before the CSC which modified
the penalty to suspension.
The House filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. The CA
granted the petition and reinstated the decision of the
Board dismissing Villanueva.
The CA held that Villanueva was guilty of
misconduct because his offense relates to his
official functions as it was made possible precisely
by his official functions.
By virtue of his position, Villanueva had free rein
inside the building even after office hours.
Clearly, therefore, Villanueva used his office to
commit the misconduct for which he was charged.
The Supreme Court held that Villanueva was not guilty of
Grave Misconduct, but was guilty of Disgraceful and
Immoral Conduct, punishable by suspension
DOCTRINE:
On what constitutes misconduct:
Misconduct in office has a definite legal meaning. By
uniform legal definition, it is a misconduct such as affects
performance of duties as an officer and not such only as
affects his character as a private individual.

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Hence, to constitute an administrative offense, misconduct

should relate to or be connected with the performance of
the official functions and duties of a public officer.
To determine whether a public officer committed
misconduct, it is necessary to separate the character of the
man from the character of the officer.
On distinguishing grave misconduct from simple
misconduct:
In grave misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear
intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of established
rule, must be manifest.
Corruption as an element of grave misconduct consists in
the act of an official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and
wrongfully uses his station or character to procure some
benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to duty
and the rights of others.
On which penalty for Disgraceful and Immoral Conduct
should be imposed:
The Court held that Dicdican v. Fernan, Jr. should not be the
controlling precedent for this case such that the penalty of
dismissal should be imposed.
In Dicdican, the Court sanctioned its own errant personnel
according to its capacity as a personnel administrator, but
not without the guidance of the rules in the civil service.
In this case, however, the Court is acting as an adjudicative
appellate tribunal of last resort reviewing the decisions of
lower courts.
In this capacity, the Court confirms that the lower courts
upheld the law. The law in this case clearly states that the
proper penalty is suspension and not dismissal as held by
the appellate court, hence, suspension it must be.

FACTS:

Maramba and Castillo are security officers of the House of

Representatives (House). When on regular roving patrol
duty of the Congressional building, they passed upon the
room of Representative Constantino H. Navarro, Jr., of the
First District of Surigao Del Norte.
Inside,
they
saw
Roberto
M.
Villanueva
(Villanueva), a MARRIED man, and the Legislative
Assistant II of the Cashiering and Administrative
Records Division of the House, along with a female
asleep on the couch.
Both were naked, and the woman's arm rested on
Villanueva's body.
The female was later identified as Elizabeth NavarroArguelles (Navarro-Arguelles), House Representative
Navarro's [the Congressman to whom the room
belonged] daughter and confidential assistant.
She was also married.
Villanueva's immediate supervisor, Jose Ma. Antonio
B. Tuano, lodged a complaint against the former, for
two charges: Grave Misconduct, and Disgraceful and
Immoral Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of
the Service before the House Disciplinary Board.
The House Disciplinary Board found Villanueva guilty
on both charges and suspended him for 1 year
without pay.
However, acting on Villanueva's motion for
reconsideration, the House Disciplinary Board
increased the penalty to dismissal with forfeiture of
all benefits.
Speaker Manuel B. Villar, Jr. affirmed the Decision of the
House Disciplinary Board.
Villanueva moved for a reconsideration of the Decision but
this was denied by Speaker Feliciano Belmonte, Jr.
Villanueva then appealed before the Civil Service
Commission (the Commission) which modified the penalty
to suspension.
In its motion for reconsideration, the House prayed for the
re-imposition of the penalty of dismissal on Villanueva. For

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his part, Villanueva moved for partial reconsideration,

seeking that he be awarded his benefits that were forfeited.
The Commission denied both motions
The House filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals (CA). The CA granted the petition and reinstated
the decision of the House Disciplinary Board dismissing
Villanueva. In ruling this way, the CA pointed out:
1. The similarity of the factual circumstances of the
case at bar with Dicdican v. Fernan, Jr., wherein the
Court dismissed the court personnel found guilty of
disgraceful and immoral conduct.
2. Villanueva not only disregarded his marriage vows
but also exhibited total disrespect of the marital
status of Navarro-Arguelles.
3. Villanueva's is guilty of misconduct because his
offense relates to his official functions as it
was made possible precisely by his official
functions.
o By virtue of his position, Villanueva had
free rein inside the building even after
office hours.
o Clearly, therefore, Villanueva used his
office to commit the misconduct for
which he was charged,
4. That it wanted to improve the public regard of the
government sector by safeguarding morality in the
ranks.
The CA denied Villanueva's Motion for Reconsideration.
Thus, Villanueva filed this petition for review of the CA
decision.
Villanueva argues that:
1. the Commission acted well within the confines of its
jurisdiction when it imposed the penalty prescribed
by law for disgraceful and immoral conduct.
2. Dicdican finds no application as it was arrived at in
the Court's exercise of its administrative jurisdiction
over its personnel.

3. His misconduct is in no way connected with his

official functions and it cannot thus be equated with
grave misconduct as defined by law.
ISSUES:
1. WON Villanueva is guilty of Grave Misconduct.
2. WON Villanueva is guilty of Disgraceful and Immoral
Conduct.
RULING:
1. No;
2. Yes.
RATIO:
1. Misconduct in office has a definite legal
meaning. By uniform legal definition, it is a
misconduct such as affects performance of
duties as an officer and not such only as affects
his character as a private individual.
a. It is settled that misconduct, misfeasance, or
malfeasance warranting removal from office
of an officer, must have direct RELATION TO
and be CONNECTED with the performance of
OFFICIAL DUTIES amounting either to
maladministration
or
willful,
intentional
neglect and failure to discharge the duties of
the office.
i.

Misconduct also means intentional

wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a
rule of law or standard of behavior,
especially by a government official.

b. Hence, to constitute an administrative

offense, misconduct should relate to or
be connected with the performance of
the official functions and duties of a
public officer.

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i.

The Court then described how

grave misconduct, the offense
charged in this case, may be
committed; and it proceeded by
distinguishing
it
from
simple
misconduct. The Court stated that:

In grave misconduct, the

elements
of
corruption,
clear intent to violate the
law or flagrant disregard of
established rule, must be
manifest.
Corruption as an element of
grave misconduct consists
in the act of an official or
fiduciary
person
who
unlawfully and wrongfully
uses his station or character
to procure some benefit for
himself
or
for
another
person, contrary to duty
and the rights of others.

c. Applying these rules to the present case, the

Court held that Villanueva's offense was in no
way connected with the performance of his
functions and duties as a public officer.
i.

His office was used as a venue for the

commission of the offense and
definitely,
his
offense
speaks
despicably of his character as a man
but it in no way evinced any failure on
his part to discharge his duties as a
public officer.

ii.

The offense is gravely immoral but it

falls short of grave misconduct as
defined by law.

d. The Court furthermore held that to

determine whether a public officer
committed misconduct, it is necessary to
separate the character of the man from
the character of the officer.
i.

Here, Villanueva's transgression laid

bare the values of his inner being but
did not expose any of his shortcoming
as a public officer.

ii.

What is material is whether Villanueva

properly
discharged
his
public
functions and the Court believes that
these were in no way compromised or
affected by the commission of his
offense.

2. Villanueva is guilty of Disgraceful and Immoral

Conduct for having engaged in an illicit affair. In a
catena of cases, the Court has ruled that government
employees engaged in illicit relations are guilty of
"disgraceful and immoral conduct" for which he/she
may be held administratively liable
a. As Villanueva is a first-time offender, the
proper penalty is suspension, according to
Section 22 (o), Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V of the Administrative
Code of 1987 and Section 52 A (15) of the
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service.

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b. [Note: Dean may also ask about this] The

Court held that Dicdican should not be the
controlling precedent for this case such that
the penalty of dismissal should be imposed.
i.

In Dicdican, the Court sanctioned its

own errant personnel according to its
capacity as a personnel administrator,
but not without the guidance of the
rules in the civil service.

ii.

In this case, however, the Court is

acting as an adjudicative appellate
tribunal of last resort reviewing the
decisions of lower courts.

In this capacity, the Court

confirms that the lower courts
upheld the law. The law in this
case clearly states that the
proper penalty is suspension
and not dismissal as held by
the appellate court, hence,
suspension it must be.

DISPOSITIVE: The Court held that Villanueva was not guilty

of grave misconduct; but was guilty of disgraceful and
immoral misconduct, punishable by suspension.

Bacsin v. Wahiman
April 30, 2008
Velasco, Jr., J.
Francis G. Francisco

SUMMARY: Bacsin was charged with Misconduct allegedly

for fondling one of his students breast 5 times. He was
found guilty of Grave Misconduct (Acts of Sexual
Harassment under RA 7877). Bacsin argues he cannot be
held liable for an offense different from that in the formal

charge against him. CSC, CA, and SC held him liable for
grave misconduct.
DOCTRINE: The charge against the respondent in an
administrative case need not be drafted with the precision
of an information in a criminal prosecution. It is sufficient
that he is apprised of the substance of the charge against
him. What is controlling is the allegation of the acts
complained of, not the designation of the offense. Due
process, as applied to administrative proceedings, is an
opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to
seek for a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of.
FACTS: Dioscoro Bacsin is a public school teacher
of Pandan Elementary School, Pandan, Camiguin Province.
Eduardo Wahiman is the father of AAA, an elementary
school student of the Bacsin. AAA claimed that Bacsin asked
her to go to his office where Bacsin held her hand, then
touched and fondled her breast five times. Vincent B.
Sorrabas, AAAs classmate, witnessed the incident and
testified that the fondling happened. Regional Director
Muego of the SCS charged Bacsin with Misconduct. Bacsin
claimed that the touching happened by accident, just as he
was handing AAA a lesson book which happened in about 2
or 3 seconds, and that the girl left his office without any
complaint.
CSC found Bacsin guilty of Grave Misconduct(Acts of Sexual
Harassment defined in Sec. 3 of RA 7877, the Anti-Sexual
Harassment Act of 1995), and dismissed him from the
service.
The CA ruled that Bacsin had the opportunity to be heard
and due process was not violated. Even if Bacsin was
formally charged with disgraceful and immoral conduct and
misconduct, the CSC found that the allegations and
evidence sufficiently proved Bacsins guilt of grave
misconduct, punishable by dismissal from the service.

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Bacsin argues that the CSC cannot validly adjudge him

guilty of an offense, such as Grave Misconduct (Acts of
Sexual Harassment), different from that specified in the
formal charge which was Misconduct. He further argues
that the offense of Misconduct does not include the
graver offense of Grave Misconduct.
ISSUES: WON Bacsin may be held guilty of Grave
Misconduct (Acts of Sexual Harassment), which is different
from that specified in the formal charge which was
Misconduct - YES
RATIO: Dadubo v. CSC held that the charge against the
respondent in an administrative case need not be drafted
with the precision of an information in a criminal
prosecution. It is sufficient that he is apprised of the
substance of the charge against him. What is controlling is
the allegation of the acts complained of, not the
designation of the offense.
Bacsin was sufficiently informed that the basis of the
charge against him was his act of fondling AAAs breast.
The formal charge, while not specifically mentioning RA
7877, imputes on Bacsin acts penalized by said
law. Contrary Bacsins argument, as held in Domingo v.
Rayala, though the provision calls for a demand, request or
requirement of a sexual favour, it is not necessary that the
demand, request, or requirement of a sexual favor be in a
categorical oral or written statement. It may be discerned
from the acts of the offender.
Also, under Sec. 3(b)(4) of RA 7877, sexual harassment in
an education or training environment is committed when
the sexual advances result in an intimidating, hostile or
offensive environment for the student, trainee or
apprentice. AAA testified that she felt fear at the time
Bacsin touched her. Factual findings of administrative
agencies, when supported by substantial evidence, are
binding upon the Court.

The next issue is, based on the facts, is Bacsin guilty of

Grave or only Simple Misconduct.
CSC and CA are correct. In grave misconduct, the elements
of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant
disregard of established rule must be manifest. The act of
Bacsin cannot in any way be construed as a case of simple
misconduct. Sexually molesting a child is, by any norm, a
revolting act categorized as a grave offense. Parents
entrust the care and molding of their children to teachers.
Bacsin has violated that trust.
Under Rule IV, Sec. 52 of the CSC Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases, Grave Misconduct carries with it
the penalty of dismissal for the first offense. Thus, the
penalty imposed on Bacsin is in accordance with the Rules.
Due process, as applied to administrative proceedings, is
an opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to
seek for a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. These elements are present in this case,
where Bacsin was properly informed of the charge and had
a chance to refute it, but failed.
DISPOSITIVE: Judgment of CSC and CA are AFFIRMED.
Bacsin is dismissed from the service.

Narvasa v Sanchez
March 26, 2010
Per curiam
Rods

SUMMARY: Sanchez, municipal assessor of Municipality of

Diadi, Nueva Vizcaya, was charged by 3 persons for sexual
harassment. The Mayor found him guilty. CSC dismissed
the appeal but held him liable for grave misconduct

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instead of grave sexual harassment, and he was dismissed.

CA found Sanchez guilty only of simple misconduct, and
lowered the penalty to suspension of 1 month and 1 day.
SC reversed, and found him guilty of grave misconduct and
ordered his dismissal from the service.
DOCTRINE:
Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate
violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior.
To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should
relate to or be connected with the performance of the
official functions and duties of a public officer.
In grave misconduct, as distinguished from simple
misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to
violate the law or flagrant disregard of an established rule
must be manifest.
Section 53 of Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases provides a list of the circumstances
which may be considered in the determination of penalties
to be imposed.
FACTS:
1. Petition for review of the CA decision and resolution.
2.
Teresita Narvasa is a senior bookkeeper, while
Benjamin Sanchez is the municipal assessor, both of
Municipality of Diadi, Nueva Vizcaya (the LGU).
3.
This case stemmed from 3 cases of sexual
harassment filed by Narvasa, along with dela Cruz and
Gayaton, against Sanchez.
4.
De La Cruzs allegations:
a. Dela Cruz clamied that sometime in 2000, Sanchez
handed her a note saying Gay, I like you.
b. Offended, she admonished him and threatened to give
the note to the latters wife.
c. Sanchez took the note and tore it to pieces.
d. In 2002, she received another note saying Ka date ko
si Mary Gay ang tamis ng halik mo.

5.
Gayatons allegations:
a. In 2002, Sanchez whispered to her during a
retirement program Oy flawless, pumanaw ka met
ditan12 while twice pinching her upper left arm near
the shoulder in a slow manner.
b. After a few days, she received a text while she was
passing Sanchezs car in front of the municipal hall
which said: Pauwi ka na ba sexy?
c. She later verified with one Agas, Sanchezs clerk, that
the sender was indeed Sanchez.
d. She later received several messages from Sanchez:
(1) I like you; (2) Have a date with me; (3) Dont
tell to (sic) others that I told that I like you because
nakakahiya; (4) Puso mo to pag bigay motosakin, I
would be very happy and (5) I slept and dreamt nice
things about you.
6.
Narvasas complaint:
a. In 2000, during a field trip of officers and members of
the St. Joseph Multi-Purpose Cooperative to the
Grotto Vista Resort in Bulacan, Sanchez pulled her
towards him and attempted to kiss her.
b. She was able to escape him, and Sanchez apologized
thrice about the incident.
7.
Sanchez was found guilty by Mayor Padilla of all 3
charges based on the investigation conducted by the
LGUs Committee on Decorum and Investigation (CODI).
a. For the offenses committed against De la Cruz and
Gayaton, Sanchez was meted the penalties of
reprimand for his first offense of light harassment and
30 days suspension for his first offense of less grave
sexual harassment.
b. For the one against Narvasa, it was deemed to be
grave sexual harassment for which he was dismissed
from the government service.
8.
CSC, on appeal, passed only on the decision in the
case filed by Narvasa, since under CSC rules, the penalty
of reprimand and/or suspension of not more than 30 days
cannot be appealed.
12

Hey, flawless, get away from there.(SCRA footnote)

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a. CSC dismissed the appeal but modified Mayor

Padillas order by holding respondent guilty of grave
misconduct instead of grave sexual harassment.
b. He was still given the penalty of dismissal.
9. CA found Sanchez guilty only of simple misconduct and
lowered the penalty to suspension of 1 month and 1 day.

5.

ISSUES: Whether the acts committed by Sanchez against

Narvasa constitute simple or grave misconduct.
RULING: He is guilty of grave misconduct.
RATIO:
1. Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or
deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of
behavior.
2. To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct
should relate to or be connected with the performance
of the official functions and duties of a public officer.
3. In grave misconduct, as distinguished from simple
misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent
to violate the law or flagrant disregard of an
established rule must be manifest.
4. With regard to Sanchezs acts:
a. His acts of grabbing petitioner and attempting to
kiss her were, no doubt, intentional.
b. The incident occurred months after he had made
similar but subtler overtures to De la Cruz, who
made it clear that his sexual advances were not
welcome. Also, there was no proof that she was
convicted in any of these crimes.
c. Considering that the acts respondent committed
against petitioner were much more aggressive, it
was impossible that the offensive nature of his
actions could have escaped him.
d. They were not having a relationship that might
have justified his actions.
e. They were both married to different persons,
hence Sanchez not only took his marital status

6.

7.

8.

lightly, but also ignored Narvasas marriage, as

well.
SC disagreed with the CA that neither corruption,
clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of
an established rule attended the incident in question.
a. RA 7877, the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of
1995, took effect on March 5, 1995.
b. Sanchez was charged with knowing this law,
since he was a public servant.
c. His act of grabbing Narvasa and attempting to
kiss her without her consent was an unmistakable
manifestation of his intention to violate laws that
specifically prohibited sexual harassment in the
work environment.
d. Even if he did not intend to violate RA 7877, his
attempt to kiss Narvasa was a flagrant disregard
of a customary rule that had existed since time
immemorial that intimate physical contact
between individuals must be consensual.
e. Furthermore, he was a married man.
f. His act showed a low regard for women and
disrespect for Narvasas honor and dignity.
CA interpreted his repeated apologies as an
indication of the absence of intention on his part to
commit so grave a wrong as that committed.
a. SC said that on the contrary, it indicated how well
respondent was aware of the gravity of the
transgression he had committed.
b. He certainly knew of the heavy penalty that
awaited him if Narvasa complained of his
behavior.
Section 53 of Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases provides a list of the
circumstances which may be considered in the
determination of penalties to be imposed.
SC once again disagrees with the CAs consideration
of respondents more than ten years of government
service and claim of being awarded Most Outstanding
Municipal Assessor of Region II for three years as
mitigating circumstances.

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a. SC said that his long years of government service

should be seen as a factor which aggravated the
wrong that he committed.
b. Having been in the government service for so
long, he, more than anyone else, should have
known that public service is a public trust; that
public service requires utmost integrity and
strictest discipline, and, as such, a public servant
must exhibit at all times the highest sense of
honesty and integrity.
c. His actions did not reflect the integrity and
discipline that were expected of public servants.
9. Also, this is the third time that respondent is being
penalized for acts of sexual harassment.
10. SC: He is a perverted predator preying on his female
colleagues
and
subordinates.
Respondents
continued misbehavior cannot, therefore, be allowed
to go unchecked.
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby
GRANTED. Resolution No. 031176 issued by the Civil
Service Commission finding respondent Benjamin A.
Sanchez, Jr. guilty of grave misconduct is REINSTATED.
Respondent Benjamin A. Sanchez, Jr. is ordered DISMISSED
from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits except
accrued leave credits, if any, and with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the
government, including government-owned and controlled
corporations. This is without prejudice to any criminal
complaints that may be filed against him.

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