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or by its Chairman. We hereby rule that as to the first kind of damages, the same may be claimed only
if the MB's action is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith, and that the action therefor is inseparable
from an action to set aside the conservatorship. In other words, the same must be filed within ten (10)
days from receipt of notice of the order placing the bank under conservatorship. Otherwise, the
provision of the fifth paragraph of Section 29 of the Central. Bank Act could be rendered meaningless
and illusory by the bank's filing, beyond the prescribed ten-day period, of an action ostensibly claiming
damages but in reality questioning the conservatorship. As to actions for the second kind of damages
and for injunction to restrain the enforcement of the CB's implementing resolutions, said fifth
paragraph of Section 29 of the Central Bank Act, as amended, equally applies because the questioned
acts are but incidental to the conservatorship. The purpose of the law in requiring that only the
stockholders of record representing the majority of the capital stock may bring the action to set aside a
resolution to place a bank under conservatorship is to ensure that it be not frustrated or defeated by
the incumbent Board of Directors or officers who may immediately resort to court action to prevent its
implementation or enforcement. It is presumed that such a resolution is directed principally against
acts of said Directors and officers which place the bank in a state of continuing inability to maintain a
condition of liquidity adequate to protect the interest of depositors and creditors. Indirectly, it is likewise
intended to protect and safeguard the rights and interests of the stockholders. Common sense and
public policy dictate then that the authority to decide on whether to contest the resolution should be
lodged with the stockholders owning a majority of the shares for they are expected to be more
objective in determining whether the resolution is plainly arbitrary and issued in bad faith.
The original complaint in Civil Case No. 17692 was not initiated by the majority of the stockholders,
hence it should have been dismissed. However, confronted with this fatal flaw, counsel for PBP,
through shrewd maneuvering, attempted to save the day by impleading as co-plaintiff a corporation,
the PPI, which was not under conservatorship. Unfortunately, the maneuver was crudely and
imperfectly executed. Except for the inclusion of its name, nothing new was actually added to the
original complaint in terms of causes of action and reliefs for PPI. The amendment then was an
exercise in futility. We cannot, however, subscribe to the petitioner's view that: (a) once a bank is
placed under conservatorship, no action may be filed on behalf of the bank without prior approval of
the conservator, and (b) since in this case such approval was not secured prior to the filing of Civil
Case No. 17692, the latter must also be dismissed on that ground. No such approval is necessary
where the action was instituted by the majority of the bank's stockholders. To contend otherwise would
be to defeat the rights of such stockholders under the fifth paragraph of Section 29 of the Central Bank
Act. It must be stressed here that a bank retains its juridical personality even if placed under
conservatorship; 44 it is neither replaced nor substituted by the conservator who, per Section 28-A of
the Central Bank Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1932, shall only:
. . . take charge of the assets, liabilities, and the management of that institution, collect
all monies and debts due said institution and exercise all powers necessary to preserve
the assets of the institution, reorganize the management thereof, and restore its
viability. He shall have the power to overrule, or revoke the actions of the previous
management and board of directors . . ., any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, and such other powers as the Monetary Board shall deem necessary.
Producers Bank (now called First Philippine International Bank), which has been under
conservatorship since 1984, is the owner of 6 parcels of land. The Bank had an agreement with
Demetrio Demetria and Jose Janolo for the two to purchase the parcels of land for a purchase price of
P5.5 million pesos. The said agreement was made by Demetria and Janolo with the Banks manager,
Mercurio Rivera. Later however, the Bank, through its conservator, Leonida Encarnacion, sought the
repudiation of the agreement as it alleged that Rivera was not authorized to enter into such an
agreement, hence there was no valid contract of sale. Subsequently, Demetria and Janolo sued
Producers Bank. The regional trial court ruled in favor of Demetria et al. The Bank filed an appeal with
the Court of Appeals.
Meanwhile, Henry Co, who holds 80% shares of stocks with the said Bank, filed a motion for
intervention with the trial court. The trial court denied the motion since the trial has been concluded
already and the case is now pending appeal. Subsequently, Co, assisted by ACCRA law office, filed a
separate civil case against Demetria and Janolo seeking to have the purported contract of sale be
declared unenforceable against the Bank. Demetria et al argued that the second case constitutes forum
shopping.
ISSUE: Did the bank conservator have the unilateral power to repudiate the authority of the bank
officers and/or to revoke the said contract?
HELD: It is not disputed that the petitioner Bank was under a conservator placed by the Central Bank
of the Philippines during the time that the negotiation and perfection of the contract of sale took place.
Petitioners energetically contended that the conservator has the power to revoke or overrule actions of
the management or the board of directors of a bank, under Section 28-A of Republic Act No. 265
(otherwise known as the Central Bank Act) as follows:
or Court of Appeals. As already stated earlier, issues not raised and/or ventilated in the trial court, let
alone in the Court of Appeals, "cannot be raised for the first time on appeal as it would be offensive to
the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process."43
In the second place, there is absolutely no evidence that the Conservator, at the time the contract was
perfected, actually repudiated or overruled said contract of sale. The Bank's acting conservator at the
time, Rodolfo Romey, never objected to the sale of the property to Demetria and Janolo. What
petitioners are really referring to is the letter of Conservator Encarnacion, who took over from Romey
after the sale was perfected on September 30, 1987 (Annex V, petition) which unilaterally repudiated
not the contract but the authority of Rivera to make a binding offer and which unarguably
came months after the perfection of the contract.
In the third place, while admittedly, the Central Bank law gives vast and far-reaching powers to the
conservator of a bank, it must be pointed out that such powers must be related to the "(preservation of)
the assets of the bank, (the reorganization of) the management thereof and (the restoration of) its
viability." Such powers, enormous and extensive as they are, cannot extend to the post-facto
repudiation of perfected transactions, otherwise they would infringe against the non-impairment clause
of the Constitution 44. If the legislature itself cannot revoke an existing valid contract, how can it
delegate such non-existent powers to the conservator under Section 28-A of said law?
Obviously, therefore, Section 28-A merely gives the conservator power to revoke contracts that are,
under existing law, deemed to be defective i.e., void, voidable, unenforceable or rescissible. Hence,
the conservator merely takes the place of a bank's board of directors. What the said board cannot do
such as repudiating a contract validly entered into under the doctrine of implied authority the
conservator cannot do either. Ineluctably, his power is not unilateral and he cannot simply repudiate
valid obligations of the Bank. His authority would be only to bring court actions to assail such contracts
as he has already done so in the instant case. A contrary understanding of the law would simply not
be permitted by the Constitution. Neither by common sense. To rule otherwise would be to enable a
failing bank to become solvent, at the expense of third parties, by simply getting the conservator to
unilaterally revoke all previous dealings which had one way or another or come to be considered
unfavorable to the Bank, yielding nothing to perfected contractual rights nor vested interests of the
third parties who had dealt with the Bank.