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Family Code Case Reports

Marriage
1.
Ninal
Bayadog
WILFRIED
FORMALEJO

v.
by:
P.

Doctrine: The 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of
the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by
exclusivity meaning no third party was involved at anytime within the 5 years
and continuity that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year
cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were
capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then the law would be
sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common law relationships
and placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their
spouse.
Facts: Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones in September 1974. Out of
their marriage were born herein Petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting
in her death in April 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or in December
1986, Pepito and Respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage
license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an Affidavit dated December
11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. In February 1997,
Pepito died in a car accident. After their father's death, Petitioners filed a Petition
for Declaration of Nullity of the Marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said
marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. RTC of Toledo City dismissed said
Petition; hence, this Petition for Review.
Issue: WON the nature of cohabitation contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil
Code is one wherein both parties are capacitated to marry each other during the
entire five-year continuous period?
Held: YES. The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code (FC), the applicable law to determine their validity is
the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of their celebration. A valid
marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, the
absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) in
relation to Article 58. However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil
Code wherein a marriage license is dispensed with, one of which is that provided in
Article 76, referring to the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived
together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and
unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. The rationale why no
license is required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation,
shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of
persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every applicant's name
for a marriage license. The publicity attending the marriage license may discourage
such persons from legitimizing their status. To preserve peace in the family, avoid
the peeping and suspicious eye of public exposure and contain the source of gossip
arising from the publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to preserve
their privacy and exempt them from that requirement.
Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband

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and wife for five years without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should
be computed on the basis of a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the only
missing factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the union. In other
words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from
the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not
been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years
immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of
cohabitation characterized by exclusivity meaning no third party was involved at
anytime within the 5 years and continuity that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that
continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether
the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then
the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common
law relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who lived
faithfully with their spouse.
In this case, at the time of Pepito and Respondent's marriage, it cannot be said
that they have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least five years
prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepito's first marriage was dissolved to
the time of his marriage with Respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed.
Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter
both Pepito and Respondent had started living with each other that has already
lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was
not the cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect
union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the
marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started
cohabiting with Respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other,
Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence
of the marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial companionship
between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any
third party as being one as "husband and wife". Having determined that the
second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the exception to the
requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of
such element.

2.
Silverio
v.
Republic G.R. No.
174689
October
22,
2007
By:
Armie Francisco

Doctrine: The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and
relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at
his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or
not. The comprehensive term status include such matters as the beginning and
end of legal personality, capacity to have rights in general, family relations, and its
various aspects, such as birth, legitimation, adoption, emancipation, marriage,
divorce, and sometimes even succession.
Facts: Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio is a male transsexual. Hes a biological
male who feels trapped in a male body. Being that, he sought gender reassignment in Bangkok, Thailand. The procedure was successful he (she) now
has a female body. Thereafter, in 2002, he filed a petition for the change of his
first name (from Rommel to Mely) and his sex (male to female) in his birth
certificate. He filed the petition before the Manila RTC. He wanted to make these
changes, among others, so that he can marry his American fianc.
The RTC granted Silverios petition. The RTC ruled that it should be granted

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based on equity; that Silverios misfortune to be trapped in a mans body is not his
own doing and should not be in any way taken against him; that there was no
opposition to his petition (even the OSG did not make any basis for opposition at
this point); that no harm, injury or prejudice will be caused to anybody or the
community in granting the petition. On the contrary, granting the petition would
bring the much-awaited happiness on the part of Silverio and [her] fianc and the
realization of their dreams.
Later, a petition for certiorari was filed by the OSG before the CA. The CA
reversed the decision of the RTC.
Issue: Whether the entries pertaining to sex and first name in the birth certificate
may be changed on the ground of gender re-assignment.
Held: No. The Supreme Court ruled that the change of such entries finds no
support in existing legislation.
"Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is,
the sum total of capacities and incapacities) of a person in view of his age,
nationality and his family membership.
The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and
relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at
his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or
not. The comprehensive term status include such matters as the beginning and
end of legal personality, capacity to have rights in general, family relations, and its
various aspects, such as birth, legitimation, adoption, emancipation, marriage,
divorce, and sometimes even succession.(emphasis supplied)
A persons sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a
part of a persons legal capacity and civil status. In this connection, Article 413 of
the Civil Code provides: ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration
of civil status shall be governed by special laws.
But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex
reassignment and its effects. This is fatal to petitioners cause
Issue on the change of first name
Under the law, a change of name may only be grounded on the following:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with
dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by
the petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in
the community; or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.
Unfortunately, Silverio did not allege any of the above, he merely alleged gender
re-assignment as the basis.
Issue on the change of sex
This entry cannot be changed either via a petition before the regular courts or a
petition for the local civil registry. Not with the courts because there is no law to
support it. And not with the civil registry because there is no clerical error

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involved. Silverio was born a male hence it was just but right that the entry written
in his birth certificate is that he is a male. The sex of a person is determined at
birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining
the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex
reassignment, the determination of a persons sex made at the time of his or her
birth, if not attended by error, is immutable.
But what about equity, as ruled by the RTC?
No. According to the SC, this amounts to judicial legislation. To grant the
changes sought by Silverio will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws
on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man
who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative
transsexual). Second, there are various laws which apply particularly to women
such as the provisions of the Labor Code on employment of women, certain
felonies under the Revised Penal Code and the presumption of survivorship in case
of calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, among others. These laws
underscore the public policy in relation to women which could be substantially
affected if Silverios petition were to be granted.
But the SC emphasized: If the legislature intends to confer on a person
who has undergone sex reassignment the privilege to change his name and sex to
conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the
guidelines in turn governing the conferment of that privilege.
3. Garcia v. Recio
By: Gemma Javier

Doctrine The burden of proof lies with "the party who alleges the existence of a
fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action." In civil cases,
plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint when
those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of proving the
material allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters. Since the
divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent
Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him. It is well-settled in our
jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any
other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not
among those matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial
function. The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every
reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative.
FACTS:
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian
Citizen, in Malabon, Rizal on March 1, 1987. They lived as husband and wife in
Australia. However, an Australian family court issued purportedly a decree of
divorce, dissolving the marriage of Rederick and Editha on May 18, 1989.
On January 12, 1994, Rederick married Grace J. Garcia where it was solemnized at
Our lady of Perpetual Help Church, Cabanatuan City. Since October 22, 1995, the
couple lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. As a
matter of fact, while they were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided
on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in
Australia.
Petitioner filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage in the court a
quo on the ground of bigamy, alleging that respondent, an Australian citizen, had
a prior subsisting marriage to one Editha Samson, also an Australian citizen at

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the time he married her in 1994. Pending trial of the case, respondent obtained a
divorce decree from a family court in Australia. The court held that the Australian
divorce had ended the marriage, thus, there was no more marital union to
nullify.
Issue:
Whether the decree of divorce submitted by Rederick Recio is admissible
as evidence to prove his legal capacity to marry petitioner and absolved him of
bigamy.
Held:
Tthe Australian divorce decree did not absolutely establish respondent's legal
capacity to remarry under his national law, hence, there is no basis for the ruling
of the trial court which assumed that the Australian divorce restored
respondent's capacity to remarry; that as it is, there is no evidence that proves
respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner; that the case should, therefore,
be remanded to the lower court for the purpose of receiving evidence which
conclusively show respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner; and that
failing in that, of declaring the parties' marriage void on the ground of bigamy.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a
public or official record of a foreign country by either:
(1) an official publication or
(2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If
the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be:
(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer
in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record
is kept and
(b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
Thus, the Supreme Court remands the case to the Regional Trial Court of
Cabanatuan City to receive or trial evidence that will conclusively prove
respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner and thus free him on the ground of
bigamy.
4. Edgar San
Luis vs.
Felicidad
Sagalongos By:
Roselle Jimeno

Doctrine: Marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between two parties,
cannot possibly be productive of any good to the society where one is considered
released from the marital bond while the other remains bound to it. Such is the
state of affairs where the alien spouse obtains a valid divorce abroad against the
Filipino spouse.
Facts: During the lifetime of Felicisimo San Luis, he contracted 3 marriages. In
1942, he married Virginia Sulit who died in 1963. In 1968, Felicisimo married
Merry Lee Corwin, an American citizen. Merry Lee filed a divorce in 1971 in the
State of Hawaii which issued a decree of absolute divorce. In 1974, Felicisimo
married respondent Felicidad Sagalongos. Felicisimo died in 1992.
For the settlement of estate, Felicidad petitioned that Letters of
Administration be awarded to her. The trial court dismissed the petition, ruling that
Felicidad was w/out legal capacity since her marriage to Felicisimo was bigamous.
It found that the decree of absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimo's marriage to

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Merry Lee was not valid in the Philippines.

The CA held that Felicisimo had legal capacity to marry Felicidad by virtue
of paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code and the rulings in Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr. and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera. It found that the marriage between
Felicisimo and Merry Lee was validly dissolved, capacitating Felicisimo to marry
Felicidad.
Issue: Whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly
remarry under the Civil Code (considering that Felicidad's marriage to Felicisimo
was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the Family Code took effect on August
3, 1988)
Held: Paragraph 2, Art. 26 of the Family Code applies in this case. Records of the
proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of the
provision is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to
the Filipino spouse.
Its origin is traced to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr (even before
the Family Code). The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by
the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is
capacitated to remarry under Philippine law. With the enactment of the Family
Code and paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers codified the law already
established through judicial precedent.
5. Van Dorn v
Romillo G.R. No.
L-68470 October
8, 1985 By: Lea
Josef

Nationality Principle Divorce

Doctrine: It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of
the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute
divorces[,] the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and
morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in
the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this
case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from
the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.
Facts : Petitioner Alice Reyes is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent
is a citizen of the United States; they were married in Hongkong. Thereafter, they
established their residence in the Philippines and begot two children.
Subsequently, they were divorced in Nevada, United States, and that petitioner
has re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.
Private respondent filed suit against petitioner, stating that petitioners business in
Manila is their conjugal property; that petitioner he ordered to render accounting
of the business and that private respondent be declared to manage the conjugal
property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case contending that the cause of action
is barred by the judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court. The
denial now is the subject of the certiorari proceeding.
ISSUE: Whether or not the divorce obtained by the parties is binding only to the
alien spouse.
HELD: Is it true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the
Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute
divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and
morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in
the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this
case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from

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6.
IMELDA
MANALAYSAY
PILAPIL
vs.
HON.
CORONA
IBAY-SOMERA
G.R. No. 80116,
June 30, 1989 By:
Carmichael Lapina

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the standards of American Law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband
petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioners
husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the
decision of his own countrys court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him,
and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is stopped by his own representation
before said court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.
Doctrine: In prosecutions for adultery and concubinage, the person who can
legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse. It necessarily follows that
such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the
time of the filing of the criminal action.
Facts:
Petitioner Imelda Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich Geiling, a
German national, were married in the Federal Republic of Germany. After about
three and a half years of marriage, a connubial disharmony eventuated in private
respondent initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany. The
Schoneberg Local Court, Germany, promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground
of failure of marriage of the spouses.
More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, Geiling filed two
complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging in one that, while
still married, Pilapil had an affair with a certain William Chia. Pilapil argued that
Article 344 of the RPC thus presupposes that the marital relationship is still
subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for adultery.
Issue: Whether or not Geiling had the legal capacity at the time of the filing of the
complaint for adultery.

7.
Edgar
San
Luis v. San Luis
GR
133743
2007
By: Nino Lina

Held: None. Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that the
marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal
action for adultery. It is indispensable that the status and capacity of the
complainant to commence the action be definitely established and, as already
demonstrated, such status or capacity must indubitably exist as of the time he
initiates the action. Under the same considerations and rationale, private
respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to
commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse
at the time he filed suit.
Doctrine: Par. 2 of Art. 26 of the Family Code traces its origin to the 1985 case of
Van Dorn v. Romillo. The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino
and a foreigner. The court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by
the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is
capacitated to marry under Philippine law. As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient
basis in resolving a situation where a divorce is validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse. With the enactment of the family code and paragraph 2 of Art. 26,
the lawmakers merely codified the law already established through a judicial
precedent.

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Facts:
Former Gov. Felicisimo San Luis contracted 3 marriages during his
lifetime. First with Virginia with whom he had 6 children including Edgar, Second
with Merry Lee an American with whom he had a son, Tobias, but he was divorced
by her on 1973 and third with respondent Felicidad they married in 1974 in
California USA they lived together for 18 years up to his death. Felicisimo died on
1992.
Felicidad sought the dissolution of the conjugal partnership and the
settlement of the assets of the estate of Felicisimo. Edgar filed a motion to dismiss
claiming that Felicidad had no capacity to sue since she was only a mistress and at
the time of the death of his father the latter was still married to Merry Lee.
Felicidad presented the decree of absolute divorce obtained by Merry Lee to prove
that the marriage was dissolved and that by virtue of par. 2 Art 26 of the family
code Felicisimo had the capacity to marry her. Edgar claimed that the alleged
marriage between Felicidad and Felicisimo was on 1974 and the passage of the
family code was on 1987 and that the family code cannot be given a retroactive
effect.
Issue:
W/N the marriage of Felicisimo and Felicidad was valid and therefore
would give the latter the legal capacity to sue in the petition for the settlement of
the estate of Felicisimo?
Held: Yes. The marriage is valid. Par. 2 of Art. 26 of the Family Code traces its
origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo. The Van Dorn case involved a
marriage between a Filipino and a foreigner. The court held therein that a divorce
decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and
consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to marry under Philippine law. With
the enactment of the family code and paragraph 2 of Art. 26, the lawmakers
merely codified the law already established through a judicial precedent.
Indeed when the object of the marriage is defeated by rendering its
continuance intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no possible good to
the community, relief in some way should be obtainable. Marriage being a mutual
and shared commitment between two parties, cannot possibly be productive of any
good to the society where one is considered released from the marital bond while
the other remains bound to it. Such is the state of affairs where the alien spouse
obtains a valid divorce abroad against the Filipino spouse as in this case.
8. REPUBLIC OF
THE
PHILIPPINES,
petitioner, vs.
CRASUS L. IYOY,
respondent.
G.R. No. 152577,
September 21,
2005
Case Report by:
Lipnica, Mary Joan

DOCTRINE:
Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines contemplates downright
incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital
obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part
of the errant spouse. Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual
infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a
finding of psychological incapacity under the said Article. As has already been
stressed by this Court in previous cases, Article 36 "is not to be confused with a
divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest
themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before
the celebration of marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to
deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond
one is about to assume.
FACTS:

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Crasus and Fely Iyoy married on December 16, 1961 which they had
fivechildren. In 1984, Fely went to the United States and at the same year sent
divorce papers to Crasus asking the latter to sign them. In 1985, Crasus found out
that Fely married an American Citizen named Stephen Micklus and eventually bore
him a child. Fely went back to the Philippines occasionally, including once when
she attended the marriage of one of her children where she freely used the
surname of her second husband in the invitations.
On March 1997, Crasus filed a complaint for declaration of nullity in their
marriage in the ground of psychological incapacity since Fely unambiguously
brought danger and dishonor to the family.
Fely however filed a counterclaim and avouched therein that Crasus was a
drunkard, womanizer, and jobless, the reason forced the former to left for the
United States. Furthermore, Fely argued her marriage to Stephen Micklus valid
since shes already an American Citizen and therefore not covered by our laws
ISSUE:
Whether or not the abandonment and sexual infidelity per se constitute
psychological incapacity.
HELD:
Using the guidelines established by jurisprudence, this Court finds that the
totality of evidence presented by respondent Crasus failed miserably to establish
the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife Fely; therefore, there is no basis for
declaring their marriage null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code of the
Philippines. The only substantial evidence presented by respondent Crasus before
the RTC was his testimony, which can be easily put into question for being selfserving, in the absence of any other corroborating evidence. He submitted only
two other pieces of evidence: (1) the Certification on the recording with the
Register of Deeds of the Marriage Contract between respondent Crasus and Fely,
such marriage being celebrated on 16 December 1961; and (2) the invitation to
the wedding of Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, in which Fely used her American
husband's surname. Even considering the admissions made by Fely herself in her
Answer to respondent Crasus's Complaint filed with the RTC, the evidence is not
enough to convince this Court that Fely had such a grave mental illness that
prevented her from assuming the essential obligations of marriage.
9. Republic vs.
Orbecido
G.R. No. 154380,
Oct. 5, 2005 By:
Marco Miguel E.
Lozada

DOCTRINE:
The intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining
a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. Thus, taking into
consideration the legislative intent, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted
to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, were Filipino citizens but, later on, one of them becomes naturalized as
a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise
be allowed to remarry as if the other party was a foreigner at the time of the
solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity
and injustice.
FACTS:
Orbecido and his wife, Filipinos, got married in Ozamis City in 1981. In
1986, Orbecidos wife left for the United States with their only son and a few years
later was naturalized an American citizen. Thereafter, she married again in

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California.
Learning of his wifes divorce and remarriage in the U.S., Orbecido filed with
the trial court a petition for authority to remarry, invoking Art. 26, par. 2 of the
Family Code. The petition was granted, but the Republic through the OSG appealed
directly to the Supreme Court on a question of law, claiming that the second
paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code applies only to a mixed couple.
The Supreme Court, conceding that the provision in question on its face
does not appear to govern the case at hand and seems to apply only to cases
where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties were a Filipino
and a foreigner, and that the deliberations of the Committee on the Family Code
showed that it was intended to avoid the absurd situation where a Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse, who after obtaining a divorce, is no longer
married to the Filipino Spouse.
ISSUE: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry.
HELD: The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other
party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule
otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. The reckoning point in the
provision is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry. In resorting to the legislative intent
behind said provision and applying the rule of reason, said provision (art. 26 par.
2) should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen who has been divorced by a
spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry.
10. Llorente vs.
CA 345 SCRA 592
By: Christian
Lugtu

DOCTRINE:
The fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente became an American citizen long
before and at the time of: (1) his divorce from Paula; (2) marriage to Alicia; (3)
execution of his will; and (4) death, is duly established, admitted and undisputed.
Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these incidents are necessarily governed by
foreign law.
FACTS:
Lorenzo Llorente and petitioner Paula Llorente were married in 1937 in the
Philippines. Lorenzo was an enlisted serviceman of the US Navy. Soon after, he left
for the US where through naturalization, he became a US Citizen. Upon his
visitation to his wife, he discovered that she was living with his brother and a child
was born. The child was registered as legitimate but the name of the father was
left blank. Llorente filed a divorce in California, which later on became final. He
married Alicia and they lived together for 25 years bringing 3 children. He made
his last will and testament stating that all his properties will be given to his second
marriage. He filed a petition of probate that made or appointed Alicia his special
administrator of his estate. Before the
proceeding could be terminated, Lorenzo died. Paula filed a letter of administration
over Llorentes estate. The trial granted the letter and denied the motion for
reconsideration. An appeal was made to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed and
modified the judgment of the Trial Court that she be declared co-owner of
whatever properties, she and the deceased, may have acquired during their 25
years of cohabitation.

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ISSUE:
Whether or not the divorce obtained by Lorenzo is valid.
RULING:
Lorenzo Llorente was already an American citizen when he divorced Paula.
Such was also the situation when he married Alicia and executed his will. As stated
in Article 15 of the civil code, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided that
they are validly required in their National Law. Thus the divorce obtained by
Llorente is valid because the law that governs him is not Philippine Law but his
National Law since the divorce was contracted after he became an American
citizen. Furthermore, his National Law allowed divorce.
The case was remanded to the court of origin for determination of the
intrinsic validity of Lorenzo Llorentes will and determination of the parties
successional rights allowing proof of foreign law.

Void Marriage
11. Antonio v.
Reyes
G.R. No. 155800.
March 10, 2006
Case Report by:
Machado,
Jerica
Clara S.

Doctrine: Article 36 of the Family Code states that "a marriage contracted by
any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization."
Facts: Leonilo Antonio, 26 years of age, and Marie Ivonne Reyes, 36 years of age
met in 1989. Barely a year after their first meeting, they got married at Manila
City Hall and then a subsequent church wedding at Pasig in December 1990. A
child was born but died 5 months later. Reyes persistently lied about herself, the
people around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and other
events or things. She even did conceal bearing an illegitimate child, which she
represented to her husband as adopted child of their family. They were separated
in August 1991 and after attempt for reconciliation, he finally left her for good in
November 1991. Petitioner then filed in 1993 a petition to have his marriage with
Reyes declared null and void anchored in Article 36 of the Family Code.
Issue: Whether or not Antonio can impose Article 36 of the Family Code as basis
for declaring their marriage null and void?
Held: Yes. The Court has consistently applied the Molina Case (Republic vs CA).
Psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the obligations of
marriage as opposed to a mere inability to comply with them. The petitioner, aside
from his own testimony presented a psychiatrist and clinical psychologist who
attested that constant lying and extreme jealousy of Reyes is abnormal and
pathological and corroborated his allegations on his wifes behavior, which amounts
to psychological incapacity. Respondents fantastic ability to invent, fabricate
stories and letters of fictitious characters enabled her to live in a world of makebelieve that made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of
giving meaning and significance to her marriage. The root causes of Reyes
psychological incapacity have been medically or clinically identified that was
sufficiently proven by experts. The gravity of respondents psychological
incapacity was considered so grave that a restrictive clause was appended to the
sentence of nullity prohibited by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal from

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12. REPUBLIC OF
THE
PHILIPPINES,
vs.
LOLITA
QUINTEROHAMANO
G.R. No. 149498.
May 20, 2004
By:
Carmina
Manalo

[Type text]

[Type text]

contracting marriage without their consent. It would be difficult for an inveterate

pathological liar to commit the basic tenets of relationship between spouses based
on love, trust and respect. Furthermore, Reyes case is incurable considering that
petitioner tried to reconcile with her but her behavior remain unchanged.
DOCTRINE: As we ruled in Molina, it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to
meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must
be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological, not physical,
illness.There was no proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person,
an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates a person from accepting and complying with the obligations essential
to marriage.
FACTS: Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of her
marriage to her husband Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on the ground of
psychological incapacity. Respondent alleged that in October 1986, she and Toshio
started a common-law relationship in Japan. They later lived in the Philippines for
a month. Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan and stayed there for half of 1987.
On November 16, 1987, she gave birth to their child.On January 14, 1988, she and
Toshio were married by Judge Isauro M. Balderia of the Municipal Trial Court of
Bacoor, Cavite. Unknown to respondent, Toshio was psychologically incapacitated
to assume his marital responsibilities, which incapacity became manifest only after
the marriage. One month after their marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and
promised to return by Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his family. After
sending money to respondent for two months, Toshio stopped giving financial
support. She wrote him several times but he never responded. Sometime in 1991,
respondent learned from her friends that Toshio visited the Philippines but he did
not bother to see her and their child. The trial court ruled that the marriage
between petitioner Lolita M. Quintero-Hamano and Toshio Hamano is NULL and
VOID on the ground of psychological incapacity. On appeal CA affirmed trial
courts decision.. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
RESPONDENT WAS ABLE TO PROVE THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF TOSHIO
HAMANO TO PERFORM HIS MARITAL OBLIGATIONS, DESPITE RESPONDENTS
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE GUIDELINES LAID DOWN IN THE MOLINA CASE.
HELD: We find that the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that
Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities.
Toshios act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged
nor proven to be due to some kind of psychological illness. After respondent
testified on how Toshio abandoned his family, no other evidence was presented
showing that his behavior was caused by a psychological disorder. Although, as a
rule, there was no need for an actual medical examination, it would have greatly
helped respondents case had she presented evidence that medically or clinically
identified his illness. This could have been done through an expert witness. This
respondent did not do. We cannot presume psychological defect from the mere fact
that Toshio abandoned his family immediately after the celebration of the
marriage. As we ruled in Molina, it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to
meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must
be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological, not physical,
illness.There was no proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person,
an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates a person from accepting and complying with the obligations essential
to marriage. According to the appellate court, the requirements in Molina and
Santos do not apply here because the present case involves a mixed marriage,
the husband being a Japanese national. We disagree. In proving psychological

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incapacity, we find no distinction between an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse.

We cannot be lenient in the application of the rules merely because the spouse
alleged to be psychologically incapacitated happens to be a foreign national. The
medical and clinical rules to determine psychological incapacity were formulated on
the basis of studies of human behavior in general. Hence, the norms used for
determining psychological incapacity should apply to any person regardless of
nationality.
13. Landicho vs
Relova Gr No. L 22579
by
Ambrosio
Martinez

Doctrine:
the mere fact that "there are actions to annul the marriages entered into
by the accused in a bigamy case does not mean that 'prejudicial questions
are automatically raised in said civil actions as to warrant the suspension of
the criminal case for bigamy." 1 The answer stressed that even on the
assumption that the first marriage was null and void on the ground alleged
by petitioner, the fact would not be material to the outcome of the criminal
case. It continued, referring to Viada, that "parties to the marriage should
not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for this must be
submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity
of a marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is
no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists,
Facts:
On February 27, 1963, petitioner was charged before the Court of First
Instance of Batangas, Branch I, presided over by respondent Judge, with
the offense, of bigamy. It was alleged in the information that petitioner
"being then lawfully married to Elvira Makatangay, which marriage has not
been legally dissolved, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously contract a second marriage with Fe Lourdes Pasia." On March
15, 1963, an action was filed before the Court of First Instance of
Batangas, likewise presided plaintiff respondent Judge Fe Lourdes Pasia,
seeking to declare her marriage to petitioner as null and void ab initio
because of the alleged use of force, threats and intimidation allegedly
employed by petitioner and because of its allegedly bigamous character.
On June 15, 1963, petitioner as defendant in said case, filed a third-party
complaint, against the third-party defendant
Issue: Whether or not the civil case filed is a prejudicial question.
Held:
Where the first wife filed a criminal action for bigamy against the husband,
and later the second wife filed a civil case for annulment of the marriage on
the ground of force and intimidation, and the husband later files a civil case
for annulment of marriage against the first wife, the civil cases are not
prejudicial questions in the determination of his criminal liability for
bigamy, since his consent to the second marriage is not in issue.

14. Donato vs.

Luna Case Report
By:
Angelica
Mateo

DOCTRINE:
The rule on prejudicial questions since a case for annulment of marriage can be
considered as a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused only if
it is proved that the petitioner's consent to such marriage was obtained by means
of duress, violence and intimidation in order to establish that his act in the
subsequent marriage was an involuntary one and as such the same cannot be the
basis for conviction.||| (Donato v. Luna, G.R. No. 53642, April 15, 1988)

13

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[Type text]

[Type text]

Facts:
An information for bigamy against petitioner Leonilo Donato was filed on January
23, 1979 with the lower court in Manila. This was based on the complaint of
private respondent Paz Abayan. Before the petitioners arraignment on September
28, 1979, Paz filed with Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila, a civil
action for declaration of nullity of her marriage with petitioner contracted on
September 26, 1978. Said civil case was based on the ground that Paz consented
to entering into the marriage which was Donatos second since she had no
previous knowledge that Donato was already married to a certain Rosalinda
Maluping on June 30, 1978. Donato defensed that his second marriage was void
since it was solemnized without a marriage license and that force, violence,
intimidation and undue influence were employed by private respondent to obtain
petitioner's consent to the marriage. Prior to the solemnization of the second
marriage, Paz and Donato had lived together as husband and wife without the
benefit of wedlock for 5 years proven by a joint affidavit executed by them on
September 26, 1978 for which reason, the requisite marriage license was
dispensed with pursuant to Article 76 of the Civil Code. Donato continued to live
with Paz until November 1978 where Paz left their home upon learning that Donato
already previously married.
ISSUE: Whether or not a criminal case for bigamy pending before the lower court
be suspended in view of a civil case for annulment of marriage pending before the
juvenile and domestic relations court on the ground that latter constitutes a
prejudicial question.
HELD:
Petitioner Leonilo Donato cant apply rule on prejudicial question since a case for
annulment of marriage can only be considered as a prejudicial question to the
bigamy case against the accused if it was proved that petitioners consent to such
marriage and was obtained by means of duress violence and intimidation to show
that his act in the second marriage must be involuntary and cannot be the basis of
his conviction for the crime of bigamy.
15. Weigel
Sempio-Dy

vs.

16. Domingo vs.

DOCTRINE:Void marriages are inexistent from the very beginning and no judicial

CA

decree is required to establish their nullity, except in the following instances: (a)

226

SCRA

572

For purposes of remarriage pursuant to the provision of Article 40 of the

Padilla, Kayrel

Family Code and (b) A marriage celebrated prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code in case a party thereto was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage (Article 36, Family Code), where an action
or defense for the declaration of nullity prescribes ten (10) years after the Family
Code took effect (Article 39, Family Code)|..
FACTS:Soledad Domingo, married with Roberto Domingo in 1976, filed a petition
for the declaration of nullity of marriage and separation of property. She did not

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know that Domingo had been previously married to Emerlinda dela Paz in 1969.
She came to know the previous marriage when the latter filed a suit of bigamy
against her. Furthermore, when she came home from Saudi during her one-month
leave from work, she discovered that Roberto cohabited with another woman and
had been disposing some of her properties which is administered by Roberto. The
latter claims that because their marriage was void ab initio, the declaration of such
voidance is unnecessary and superfluous. On the other hand, Soledad insists the
declaration of the nullity of marriage not for the purpose of remarriage, but in
order to provide a basis for the separation and distribution of properties acquired
during the marriage.
ISSUE: Whether a petition for judicial declaration should only be filed for purposes
of remarriage?
HELD:The declaration of the nullity of marriage is indeed required for purposed of
remarriage. However, it is also necessary for the protection of the subsequent
spouse who believed in good faith that his or her partner was not lawfully married
marries the same. With this, the said person is freed from being charged with
bigamy.
When a marriage is declared void ab initio, law states that final judgment shall
provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the
spouses, the custody and support of the common children and the delivery of their
presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous
judicial proceedings. Soledads prayer for separation of property will simply be the
necessary consequence of the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of their
marriage. Hence, the petitioners suggestion that for their properties be separated,
an ordinary civil action has to be instituted for that purpose is baseless. The Family
Code has clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage, one
of which is the separation of property according to the regime of property relations
governing them.
17.

Beltran

vs.

People
G.

R.

137567,
20, 2000

No.
June

Doctrine: SUBSEQUENT PRONOUNCEMENT THAT ACCUSED'S MARRIAGE IS

VOID FROM BEGINNING IS NOT A DEFENSE. With regard to petitioner's
argument that he could be acquitted of the charge of concubinage should his
marriage be declared null and void, suffice it to state that even a subsequent

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[Type text]
by:

Palad,

Nolibelle Anne P.

[Type text]

[Type text]

pronouncement that his marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense.
Analogous to this case is that of Landicho vs. Relova cited in Donato vs.
Luna where this Court held that: ". . . Assuming that the first marriage was null
and void on the ground alleged by petitioner, that fact would not be material to
the outcome of the criminal case. Parties to the marriage should not be
permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to
the judgment of the competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage
is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration
the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a
second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage
assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy."|||
Facts: Petitioner filed the instant petition seeking to review and set aside the
Order issued by respondent judge which denied his prayer for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin Judge Alden Cervantes from proceeding
with the trial of the concubinage case against him. Petitioner contended that the
pendency of the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage which he filed against
his wife based on psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code is a
prejudicial question that should merit the suspension of the criminal case for
concubinage filed against him by his wife. The pendency of the case for declaration
of nullity of petitioner's marriage is not a prejudicial question to the concubinage
case. For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause
the suspension of the latter pending the final determination of the civil case, it
must appear not only that the said civil case involves the same facts upon which
the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue
or issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused
would necessarily be determined.
Issue: Whether or not subsequent pronouncement that marriage is void from the
beginning is a defense of an accused in a case of concubinage.
Held: NO. In Domingo vs. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that the import of
Article 40 of the Family Code is that for purposes of remarriage, the only legally
acceptable basis for declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity is a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void, whereas, for purposes of other
than remarriage, other evidence is acceptable. So that in a case for concubinage,
the accused, like the herein petitioner, need not present a final judgment declaring
his remarriage void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of
his marriage other than proof of a final judgment declaring his marriage void.
In the case at bar it must also be held that parties to the marriage should
not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be
submitted to the judgment of the competent courts and only when the nullity of
the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such

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declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists for all intents and
purposes. Therefore, he who cohabits with a woman not his wife before the judicial
declaration of nullity of the marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for
concubinage. The lower court therefore, has not erred in affirming the Orders of
the judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court ruling that pendency of a civil action for
nullity of marriage does not pose a prejudicial question in a criminal case for
concubinage.
18.
VINCENT
PAUL
G.
MERCADO
vs.
CONSUELO TAN
G.R. No. 137110August 1, 2000
Report case by
Cherie
May
Pastores

DOCTRINE:
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a
subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent
marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This
principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by statute as void.
FACTS:
In April 1976, Dr. Vincent Mercado married Ma. Thelma Oliva. But in June 1991,
Mercado married a second time. He married a certain Consuelo Tan. In October
1992, Tan filed a bigamy case against Mercado.
In November 1992, Mercado filed an action to have his first marriage with Oliva be
declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code (psychological
incapacity). In January 1993, the prosecutor filed a criminal information for bigamy
against Mercado.
In May 1993, Mercados marriage with Oliva was declared void ab initio. Mercado
now sought the dismissal of the bigamy case filed against him. He contended that
since his first marriage was declared void ab initio, there was no first marriage to
speak of, hence, his second marriage with Tan was actually his first marriage.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Mercado is correct?
HELD:
No. The elements of bigamy are as follows:
1. That the offender has been legally married;
2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse
is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil
Code;
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage;
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for
validity
All the elements are present when Mercado married Tan. When he married Tan, his
first marriage was still subsisting and was not declared void. In fact, Mercado only

17

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[Type text]

[Type text]

filed an action to declare his first marriage void after Tan filed the bigamy case. By
then, the crime of bigamy had already been consummated.

19. Republic vs.

Nolasco G.R. NO.
94053. March 17,
1993 By: Lorenzo
Reyes

Under Article 40 of the Family Code, a judicial declaration of nullity of a void

previous marriage must be obtained before a person can marry for a subsequent
time. Absent that declaration a person who marries a second time shall be guilty of
bigamy.
Doctrine:
Under Article 41, the time required for the presumption to arise has been
shortened to 4 years; however, there is a need for judicial declaration of
presumptive death to enable the spouse present to marry. However, Article 41
imposes a stricter standard before declaring presumptive death of one spouse. It
requires a "well-founded belief" that the absentee is already dead before a petition
for declaration of presumptive death can be granted.
FACTS:
Nolasco, a seaman, first met Janet Monica Parker in a bar in England. After that,
she lived with him on his ship for 6 months. After his seaman's contract has
expired, he brought her to his hometown in San Jose, Antique. They got married
in January 1982.
After the marriage celebration, he got another employment contract and left the
province. In January 1983, Nolasco received a letter from his mother that 15 days
after Janet gave birth to their son, she left. He cut short his contract to find Janet.
He returned home in November 1983.
He did so by securing another contract which England is one of its port calls. He
wrote several letters to the bar where he and Janet first met, but all were returned
to him. He claimed that he inquired from his friends but they too had no news
about Janet. In 1988, Nolasco filed before the RTC of Antique a petition for the
declaration of presumptive death of his wife Janet.
RTC granted the petition. The Republic through the Solicitor-General, appealed to
the CA, contending that the trial court erred in declaring Janet presumptively dead
because Nolasco had failed to show that there existed a well-founded belief for
such declaration. CA affirmed the trial court's decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Nolasco has a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead.
RULING:
No. Nolasco failed to prove that he had complied with the third requirement under
the Article 41 of the Family Code, the existence of a "well-founded belief" that
Janet is already dead.
Under Article 41, the time required for the presumption to arise has been
shortened to 4 years; however, there is a need for judicial declaration of
presumptive death to enable the spouse present to marry. However, Article 41
imposes a stricter standard before declaring presumptive death of one spouse. It

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requires a "well-founded belief" that the absentee is already dead before a petition
for declaration of presumptive death can be granted.
In the case at bar, the Court found Nolasco's alleged attempt to ascertain about
Janet's whereabouts too sketchy to form the basis of a reasonable or well-founded
belief that she was already dead.
Nolasco, after returning from his employment, instead of seeking help of local
authorities or of the British Embassy, secured another contract to London. Janet's
alleged refusal to give any information about her was too convenient an excuse to
justify his failure to locate her. He did not explain why he took him 9 months to
finally reached San Jose after he asked leave from his captain. He refused to
identify his friends whom he inquired from. When the Court asked Nolasco about
the returned letters, he said he had lost them. Moreover, while he was in London,
he did not even dare to solicit help of authorities to find his wife.
The circumstances of Janet's departure and Nolasco's subsequent behavior make it
very difficult to regard the claimed belief that Janet was dead a well-founded one.
20. ARMAS VS
CALISTERIO
[G.R.
No.
136467. April 6,
2000]
Case Digest By:
San Jose, Rica
Pauline B.

DOCTRINE: A judicial declaration of absence of the absentee spouse is not

necessary as long as the prescribed period of absence is met.
The law in force at that time was the Civil Code, not the Family Code which took
effect only on 03 August 1988. Article 256 of the Family Code itself limited its
retroactive governance only to cases where it thereby would not prejudice or
impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
FACTS: Teodorico Calisterio, husband of Marietta Calisterio, the respondent, died
intestate in April 1992 leaving several parcel of land estimated value of
P604,750.00. He was the second husband of Marietta who was previously married
with William Bounds in January 1946. The latter disappeared without a trace in
February 1947. 11 years later from the disappearance of Bounds, Marietta and
Teodorico were married in May 1958 without Marietta securing a court declaration
of Bounds presumptive death.
Antonia Armas y Calisterio, surviving sister of Teodorico filed a petition claiming to
be the sole surviving heir of the latter and that marriage between Marietta and his
brother being allegedly bigamous is thereby null and void. She prayed that her
son Sinfroniano be appointed as administrator, without bond, of the estate of the
deceased and inheritance be adjudicated to her after all the obligations of the
estate would have been settled.
ISSUE: Whether Marrieta and Teodoricos marriage was void due to the absence of
the declaration of presumptive death.
HELD: The marriage between the respondent and the deceased was solemnized in
May 1958 where the law in force at that time was the Civil Code and not the
Family Code which only took effect in August 1988. Article 256 of the Family Code
itself limit its retroactive governance only to cases where it thereby would not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or
other laws. Since Civil Code provides that declaration of presumptive death is not
essential before contracting marriage where at least 7 consecutive years of

19

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[Type text]

[Type text]

absence of the spouse is enough to remarry then Marrietas marriage with

Teodorico is valid and therefore she has a right can claim portion of the estate.
21. EDUARDO P.
MANUEL
vs.
PEOPLE
OF
THE PHILIPPIN
ES
G.R.
No.
165842
Nove
mber 29, 2005
By:
May
Sangalang

Doctrine: Where a spouse is absent for the requisite period, the present spouse
may contract a subsequent marriage only after securing a judgment declaring the
presumptive death of the absent spouse to avoid being charged and convicted of
bigamy.
Facts: Petitioner Manuel was first married to Gaa on July 18, 1975, who,
according to the former, was charged with estafa in 1975 and thereafter
imprisoned and was never seen again by him after his last visit. Manuel contracted
second marriage with Gandalera in January 1996 without latters knowledge of
Manuels first marriage. When Gandalera learned that Eduardo Manuel was in fact
already married when Manuel married her, she filed a criminal case of bigamy
against him. Manuels defense being that his declaration of single in his marriage
contract with Gandalera was done because he believed in good faith that his first
marriage was invalid and that he did not know that he had to go to court to seek
for the nullification of his first marriage before marrying Gandalera.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioners wife cannot be legally presumed dead under
Article 390 of the Civil Code as there was no judicial declaration of presumptive
death as provided for under Article 41 of the Family Code.
Held: Article 41 of the Family Code now clearly provides that for the purpose of
the present spouse contracting a second marriage, he or she must file a summary
proceeding as provided in the Code for the declaration of the presumptive death of
the absentee, without prejudice to the latters reappearance. This provision is
intended to protect the present spouse from a criminal prosecution for bigamy
under Art. 349 of the Revised Penal Code because with the judicial declaration that
the missing spouses presumptively dead, the good faith of the present spouse in
contracting a second marriage is already established. The present spouse will have
to adduce evidence that he had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was
already dead. Such judgment is proof of the good faith of the present spouse who
contracted a subsequent marriage; thus, even if the present spouse is later
charged with bigamy if the absentee spouse reappears, he cannot be convicted of
the crime.
The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent when he
married the private complainant. As a general rule, mistake of fact or good faith of
the accused is a valid defense in a prosecution for a felony by dolo; such defense
negates malice or criminal intent. However, ignorance of the law is not an excuse
because everyone is presumed to know the law. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat.
The court ruled against the petitioner.

22. Morigo vs.

People
GR No. 145226,
February
6,
2004
By: Adrian Saringo

DOCTRINE:
The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid
marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without
more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which
petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial
declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.
FACTS:

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Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates in Bohol. They lost contacts for a
while but after receiving a card from Barrete and various exchanges of letters, they
became sweethearts. They got married in 1990. Barrete went back to Canada for
work and in 1991 she filed petition for divorce in Ontario Canada, which was
granted. In 1992, Morigo married Lumbago. He subsequently filed a complaint for
judicial declaration of nullity on the ground that there was no marriage
ceremony. Morigo was then charged with bigamy and moved for a suspension of
arraignment since the civil case pending posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy
case. Morigo pleaded not guilty claiming that his marriage with Barrete was void
ab initio. Petitioner contented he contracted second marriage in good faith.
ISSUE: Whether Morigo must have filed declaration for the nullity of his marriage
with Barrete before his second marriage in order to be free from the bigamy case.
HELD:
Morigos marriage with Barrete is void ab initio considering that there was no
actual marriage ceremony performed between them by a solemnizing officer
instead they just merely signed a marriage contract. The petitioner does not need
to file declaration of the nullity of his marriage when he contracted his second
marriage with Lumbago. Hence, he did not commit bigamy and is acquitted in the
case filed.

TENEBRO
v. CA
G.R. No.
150758.
February 18,
2004
Case Report
By: SERING,
MOLLY V.
23.

Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage

on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the
date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the
vinculum between the spouses is concerned, it is significant
to note that said marriage is not without legal effects. Among
these effects is that children conceived or born before the
judgment of absolute
nullity of the
marriage
shall
be
considered
legitimate.
There
is
therefore
a
recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage,
although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences.
Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability
for bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the State's penal
laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow individuals to
deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in
some
manner,
and
to
thus
escape
the
consequences of contracting
multiple
marriages,
while
beguiling
throngs of hapless
women
with
the
promise of futurity and commitment.
Petitioner contracted marriage with private complainant Leticia

Ancajas on April 10, 1990. After the wedding, they lived together
continuously and without interruption until the latter part of 1991,
when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to
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[Type text]

[Type text]

a certain Hilda Villareyes on November 10, stating that he was going to

cohabit with Villareyes, which prompted Ancajas to file a case for
bigamy. Thereafter, petitioner obtained a judicial declaration of nullity on
the ground of psychological incapacity for his marriage with Ancajas.
W/N the declaration of nullity of the second marriage on the
ground under Art. 36 of the FC exonerates petitioner from criminal
liability.
NO. A declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar
as the State's penal laws are concerned. As a second or subsequent
marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioner's valid
marriage to Villareyes, petitioner's marriage to Ancajas would be null
and void ab initio completely regardless of petitioner's psychological
capacity or incapacity. Since a marriage contracted during the
subsistence of a
valid
marriage
is automatically void,
the
nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the
avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. Pertinently, Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes "any person who shall
contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former
marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has
been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered
in the proper proceedings". A plain reading of the law, therefore,
would
indicate
that
the
provision
penalizes the
mere
act of contracting a second or a subsequent marriage during the
subsistence of a valid marriage. Thus, as soon as the second
marriage to Ancajas was celebrated during the subsistence of the
valid first marriage, the crime of bigamy had already been
consummated.
24.
25. Ofelia Ty v.
Court of Appeals
G.R.
No.
127406. Novemb
er 27, 2000
By: Solis

Doctrine:
The first marriage of private respondent being void for lack of license and
consent, there was no need for judicial declaration of its nullity before he could
contract a second marriage. In this case, therefore, we conclude that private
respondents second marriage to petitioner is valid.
Moreover, we find that the provisions of the Family Code cannot be
retroactively applied to the present case, for to do so would prejudice the vested
rights of petitioner and of her children. As held in Jison v. Court of Appeals,[25] the
Family Code has retroactive effect unless there be impairment of vested rights. In
the present case, that impairment of vested rights of petitioner and the children is
patent.

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FACTS: In 1977, Reyes married Anna Maria Villanueva in a civil ceremony. They
had a church wedding in the same year as well. In 1980, the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court of QC declared their marriage as null and void; the civil
one for lack of marriage license and the subsequent church wedding due to the
lack of consent of the parties. In 1979, prior to the JDRC decision, Reyes married
Ofelia Ty. Then in 1991, Reyes filed for an action for declaration of nullity of his
marriage with Ofelia. He averred that they lack a marriage license at the time of
the celebration and that there was no judicial declaration yet as to the nullity of his
previous marriage with Anna. Ofelia presented evidence proving the existence of a
valid marriage license including the specific license number designated. The lower
court however ruled that Ofelias marriage with Reyes is null and void. The same
was affirmed by the CA applying the provisions of the Art 40 of the FC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the absolute nullity of the previous of marriage of Reyes
can be invoked in the case at bar.
HELD: Art. 40 of the FC provides that, The absolute nullity of a previous marriage
may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void. This means that before one can enter into
a second marriage he must first acquire a judicial declaration of the nullity of the
previous marriage and such declaration may be invoked on the basis solely of a
final judgment declaring the previous marriage as void. For purposes other than
remarriage, other evidences may be presented and the declaration can be passed
upon by the courts. In the case at bar, the lower court and the CA cannot apply
the provision of the FC. Both marriages entered by Reyes were solemnized prior to
the FC. The old CC did not have any provision that states that there must be such
a declaration before remarriage can be done hence Ofelias marriage with Reyes is
valid. The provisions of the FC (took effect in 87) cannot be applied retroactively
especially because they would impair the vested rights of Ofelia under the CC
which was operational during her marriage with Reyes.
26. CHI MING
TSOI VS. CA
G.R. No. 119190
January
16,
1997 By:
TALATALA,
ANGELO CARLO T.

DOCTRINE: Such abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his

marriage is strongly indicative of a serious personality disorder which to the mind
of this Court clearly demonstrates an 'utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage' within the meaning of Article 36 of the
Family Code. Furthermore, one of the essential marital obligations under the
Family Code is to procreate children thus constant non-fulfillment of this obligation
will finally destroy the integrity and wholeness of the marriage.
FACTS: Private respondent Gina Loi and petitioner Chi Ming Tsoi were married at
the Manila Cathedral on May 22, 1988. Contrary to Ginas expectations that the
newlyweds were to enjoy making love or having sexual intercourse with each
other, the defendant just went to bed, slept on one side thereof, then turned his
back and went to sleep. No sexual intercourse occurred during their first night,
second, third and fourth night.
From May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989, they slept together in the same room
and on the same bed but during this period, there was no attempt of sexual
intercourse between them. A case was then filed to declare the annulment of the

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[Type text]

[Type text]

marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. Gina alleged that Chi Ming was
impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not show him his penis (clinically found to
be only 3 inches and 1 cm. when erect). Defendant admitted that no sexual
contact was ever made and according to him everytime he wanted to have sexual
intercourse with his wife, she always avoided him and whenever he caressed her
private parts she always removed his hands.
ISSUE: Whether Chi Ming Tsois refusal to have sexual intercourse with his wife
constitutes psychological incapacity.
HELD: The abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his marriage is
strongly indicative of a serious personality disorder which to the mind of the
Supreme Court clearly demonstrates an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance tot the marriage within the meaning of Article 36 of the
Family Code.
The Supreme Court held that the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual
intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity.
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her
essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic
marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to
stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological
incapacity. One of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is to
procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of children
through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage. Constant non-fulfillment
of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In
the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill
this
marital
obligation
is
equivalent
to
psychological
incapacity.

27.
28. Marcos
Marcos
Temperante

vs.
By:

Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage,

may be established by the totality of evidence presented. There is no requirement,
however, that the respondent should be examined by a physician or a psychologist
as a conditio sine qua non for such declaration.
FACTS:
BRENDA MARCOS & WILSON MARCOS
They first met sometime in 1980 when both of them were assigned at the
Malacaang Palace, she as an escort of Imee Marcos and he as a
Presidential Guard of President Ferdinand Marcos

After the downfall of President Marcos, he left the military service in 1987
and then engaged in different business ventures that did not however
prosper.
As a wife, she always urged him to look for work so that their children
would see him, instead of her, as the head of the family and a good
provider. Due to his failure to engage in any gainful employment, they
would often quarrel and as a consequence, he would hit and beat her. He
would even force her to have sex with him despite her weariness.
He would also inflict physical harm on their children for a slight mistake and
was so severe in the way he chastised them. Thus, for several times during

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their cohabitation, he would leave their house.

In 1992, they were already living separately."The 'straw that broke the
camel's back' (is the last thing you are willing to accept after which you will
not put up with any more) took place on October 16, 1994, when they had
a bitter quarrel. As they were already living separately, she did not want
him to stay in their house anymore.
On that day, when she saw him in their house, she was so angry that she
lambasted him.

He then turned violent, inflicting physical harm on her and even on her
mother who came to her aid.

The following day, October 17, 1994, she and their children left the house
and sought refuge in her sister's house

"On October 19, 1994, she submitted herself [to] medical examination at
the Mandaluyong Medical Center where her injuries were diagnosed as
contusions).

Sometime in August 1995, she together with her two sisters and driver,
went to him at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong to look for their missing child,
Niko. Upon seeing them, he got mad. After knowing the reason for their
unexpected presence, he ran after them with a samurai and even [beat] her
driver.

"In the case study conducted by Social Worker Sonia C. Millan, the children
described their father as cruel and physically abusive to them

The court a quo found the appellant to be psychologically incapacitated to

perform his marital obligations mainly because of his failure to find work to
support his family and his violent attitude towards appellee and their
children
Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Reversing the RTC, the CA held that psychological incapacity had not been
established by the totality of the evidence presented. It ratiocinated in this
wise:
The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration
of the marriage and shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable.
It must also be grave enough to bring about the disability of the parties to
assume the essential obligations of marriage as set forth in Articles 68 to 71
and Articles 220 to 225 of the Family Code and such non-complied marital
obligations must similarly be alleged in the petition, established by evidence
and explained in the decision.
"In the case before us, the appellant was not subjected to any psychological
or psychiatric evaluation.

The psychological findings about the appellant by psychiatrist Natividad

Dayan were based only on the interviews conducted with the appellee.

Similarly, there is no evidence at all that would show that the appellant was
suffering from an incapacity which [was] psychological or mental - not

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[Type text]

[Type text]

physical to the extent that he could not have known the obligations he was
assuming: that the incapacity [was] grave, ha[d] preceded the marriage
and [was] incurable."
ISSUES:

"I. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals could set

aside the findings by the Regional Trial Court of psychological
incapacity of a respondent in a Petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage simply because the respondent did not subject himself to
psychological evaluation.

II. Whether or not the totality of evidence presented and the

demeanor of all the witnesses should be the basis of the determination
of the merits of the Petition
The Court's Ruling

We agree with petitioner that the personal medical or psychological

examination of respondent is not a requirement for a declaration
of psychological incapacity. Nevertheless, the totality of the evidence she
presented does not show such incapacity.

Preliminary Issue: Need for Personal Medical Examination

Petitioner contends that the testimonies and the results of various tests that
were submitted to determine respondent's psychological incapacity to
perform the obligations of marriage should not have been brushed aside by
the Court of Appeals, simply because respondent had not taken those tests
himself.
Petitioner adds that the CA should have realized that under the
circumstances, she had no choice but to rely on other sources of
information in order to determine the psychological capacity of respondent,
who had refused to submit himself to such tests.
"psychological incapacity must be characterized by
(a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, (c) incurability.".
For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the
person concerned need not be resorted to.
Main Issue: Totality of Evidence Presented

The main question, then, is whether the totality of the evidence presented
in the present case -- including the testimonies of petitioner, the common
children, petitioner's sister and the social worker -- was enough to sustain a
finding that respondent was psychologically incapacitated.
We rule in the negative. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that
respondent failed to provide material support to the family and may have
resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts
does not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his
part. There is absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already
present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable.
Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had
lost his job and was not gainfully employed for a period of more than six
years. It was during this period that he became intermittently drunk, failed
to give material and moral support, and even left the family home.
Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and
not to the inception of the marriage. Equally important, there is no evidence
showing that his condition is incurable, especially now that he is gainfully

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employed as a taxi driver.

HELD:
this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure of
petitioner to show that the alleged psychological incapacity is characterized by
gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability;)
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and assailed Decision AFFIRMED, SO
ORDERED.
29.
Noel
Buenaventura
vs. CA GR No.
127358 March 31,
2005 By: Rose
Ann Tolentino

DOCTRINE: Since the present case does not involve the annulment of a bigamous
marriage, the provisions of Article 50 in relation to Articles 41, 42 and 43 of the
Family Code, providing for the dissolution of the absolute community or conjugal
partnership of gains, as the case may be, do not apply. Rather, the general rule
applies, which is that in case a marriage is declared void ab initio, the property
regime applicable and to be liquidated, partitioned and distributed is that of equal
co-ownership.
FACTS: Noel Buenaventura filed a position for the declaration of nullity of marriage
on the ground that both he and his wife were psychologically incapacitated. The
RTC in its decision, declared the marriage entered into between petitioner and
respondent null and void, and ordered the liquidation of the assets of the conjugal
partnership property; ordered petitioner a regular support in favor of his son in the
amount of 15,000 monthly, subject to modification as the necessity arises, and
awarded the care and custody of the minor to his mother. Petitioner appealed
before the CA. While the appeal was pending, the CA, upon respondents motion
issued a resolution increasing the support pendants like to P20, 000. The CA
dismissed petitioners appeal for lack of merit and affirmed in to the RTC decision.
Petitioner motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this petition.
ISSUE: WON CA erred.
RULING: No. Since the properties ordered to be distributed by the court a quo
were found, both by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, to have been
acquired during the union of the parties, the same would be covered by the coownership. No fruits of a separate property of one of the parties appear to have
been included or involved in said distribution. The liquidation, partition and
distribution of the properties owned in common by the parties herein as ordered by
the court a quo should, therefore, be sustained, but on the basis of co-ownership
and not of the regime of conjugal partnership of gains.

30.
BOBIS
V.
BOBIS
G.R.
No.
138509
July 31, 2000 By:
Sonby Tolentino

DOCTRINE: Only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as
void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the
marriage exists. No matter how obvious, manifest or patent the absence of an
element is, the intervention of the courts must always be resorted to. That is why
Article 40 of the Family Code requires a "final judgment," which only the courts can
render. Thus, as ruled in Landicho v. Relova, he who contracts a second marriage
before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of
being prosecuted for bigamy, and in such a case the criminal case may not be
suspended on the ground of the pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity.
In a recent case for concubinage, we held that the pendency of a civil case for

27

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[Type text]

[Type text]

declaration of nullity of marriage is not a prejudicial question. This ruling applies

here by analogy since both crimes presuppose the subsistence of a marriage.
FACTS: Respondent Isagani Bobis contracted a first marriage with one Maria Dulce
B. Javier on October 21, 1985. Without said marriage having been annulled,
nullified or terminated, the same respondent contracted a second marriage with
the petitioner Imelda Marbella-Bobis on January 25, 1996 and allegedly a third
marriage with a certain Julia Sally Hernandez.
Subsequently, based on petitioner's complaint-affidavit, an information for bigamy
was filed against respondent before the QC RTC.
However, respondent initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration of absolute
nullity of his first marriage on the ground that it was celebrated without a marriage
license. He then filed a motion to suspend the proceedings in the criminal case for
bigamy invoking the pending civil case for nullity of the first marriage as a
prejudicial question to the criminal case.
The trial judge granted the motion to suspend the criminal case. Hence, this
petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of
nullity of a previous marriage constitutes a prejudicial question to a criminal case
for bigamy.
HELD: No, the action for declaration of nullity of previous marriage is not a
prejudicial question which can suspend the case for bigamy.
Article 40 of the Family Code, which was effective at the time of celebration of the
second marriage, requires a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a previous
marriage before a party may remarry. It should be remembered that bigamy can
successfully be prosecuted provided all its elements concur.
Ignorance of the existence of Article 40 of the Family Code cannot even be
successfully invoked as an excuse.
In the light of Article 40 of the Family Code, respondent, without first having
obtained the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage, can not be said to
have validly entered into the second marriage. Per current jurisprudence, a
marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration of such fact before any party
can marry again; otherwise the second marriage will also be void. The reason is
that, without a judicial declaration of its nullity, the first marriage is presumed to
be subsisting. In the case at bar, respondent was for all legal intents and purposes
regarded as a married man at the time he contracted his second marriage with
petitioner. Against this legal backdrop, any decision in the civil action for nullity
would not erase the fact that respondent entered into a second marriage during
the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential
to the determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial
question. As stated above, respondent cannot be permitted to use his own
malfeasance to defeat the criminal action against him.
31. Lucio Morigo
vs. People GR
No.
145226.
February 6, 2004.
By:
Nathaniel

DOCTRINE: The appellant cannot be held criminally liable for bigamy on the
subsequent marriage if the previous one was void.

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FACTS: Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates. After school
year 1977-78, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete lost contact with each other. Lucio
Morigo was surprised to receive a card from Lucia Barrete. The former replied and
after an exchange of letters, they became sweethearts. Lucia returned to the
Philippines but left again for Canada to work there. While in Canada, they
maintained constant communication. Lucia came back to the Philippines and
proposed to petition appellant to join her in Canada. Both agreed to get married,
thus they were married. Lucia reported back to her work in Canada. Lucia filed
with the Ontario Court a petition for divorce against appellant which was
granted. Appellant Lucio married Maria Jececha Lumbago. Lucio filed a complaint
for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of that no marriage
ceremony actually took place. However, appellant Lucio was charged with Bigamy
in Information filed by the City Prosecutor. The RTC ruled convicting appellant due
to the reason that want of a valid marriage ceremony is not a defense in a charge
of bigamy. Pendency of the appeal, the trial court rendered a decision declaring
declaring the marriage between Lucio and Lucia void ab initio since no marriage
ceremony actually took place. CA held affirming the decision of the RTC convicting
the
appellant.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a marriage between appellant Lucio Morigo and
Lucia
Barrete
to
support
the
charge
of
bigamy.
HELD: The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony
performed between Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what
transpired was a mere signing of the marriage contract by the two, without the
presence of a solemnizing officer. The trial court thus held that the marriage is
void ab initio, in accordance with Articles 3 and 4 of the Family Code. As the
dissenting opinion in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, correctly puts it, This simply means
that there was no marriage to begin with; and that such declaration of nullity
retroacts to the date of the first marriage. In other words, for all intents and
purposes, reckoned from the date of the declaration of the first marriage as
void ab initio to the date of the celebration of the first marriage, the accused was,
under the eyes of the law, never married. The records show that no appeal was
taken from the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 6020, hence, the
decision had long become final and executory.
The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have
been legally married. But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was never
married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Under the
principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were
never married from the beginning. The contract of marriage is null; it bears no
legal effect. Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, for legal purposes,
petitioner was not married to Lucia at the time he contracted the marriage with
Maria Jececha. The existence and the validity of the first marriage being an
essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said
offense cannot be sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of. The
petitioner, must, perforce be acquitted of the instant charge.

32. Gomez vs
Lipana By: Melo
Jean
Trios-

Doctrine: VOID MARRIAGE SUBJECT TO COLLATERAL ATTACK IN INTESTATE

PROCEEDINGS. Where the marriage contracted is bigamous and null and void
for being in violation of Sec. 29 of the Marriage Law, Act 3613, which became

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Peralta

[Type text]

[Type text]

effective on December 4, 1929, the marriage is subject to collateral attack in the

intestate proceedings instituted by the judicial administratrix for the forfeiture of
the husbands share in the conjugal property.
Facts: Joaquin P. Lipana contracted two marriages: the first with Maria Loreto
Ancino in 1930 and the second with Isidra Gomez y Aquino in 1935. At the time of
the second marriage the first was still subsisting, which fact, however, Lipana
concealed from the second wife.
The spouses of the second marriage acquired by purchase a piece of land in
Cubaoin which the TCT was issued in the name of "Joaquin Lipana married to
Isidra Gomez." Isidra Gomez died intestate and childless, and survived only by her
sisters as the nearest relatives. Ofelia Gomez, judicial administratrix of her estate,
commenced suit, praying for the forfeiture of the husband's share in the Cubao
property in favor of the said estate.
The trial court, ruling that the second marriage was void ab initio and that the
husband was the one who gave cause for its nullity, declared his interest in the
disputed property forfeited in favor of the estate of the deceased second wife.
Issue:
WON the court can decide in a collateral attack the validity of the second marriage
and in holding it to be bigamous and void ab initio
Ruling: YES. The controlling statute is Act 3613 of the Philippine Legislature, the
Marriage Law which became effective on December 4, 1929 and was in force when
the two marriages were celebrated.
To the general rule stated in Sec. 29 that any marriage contracted by any person
during the lifetime of his first spouse with any person other than such first spouse
shall be illegal and void from its performance, there are only two exceptions -those mentioned in sub-section (a) when the first marriage was annulled or
dissolved and (b) when the first spouse has been absent for seven consecutive
years. The burden is on the party invoking the exception to prove that he comes
under
it.
There is no suggestion here that the defendants 1930 marriage to Maria Loreto
Ancino had been annulled or dissolved when he married Isidra Gomez in 1935, and
there is no proof that he did so under the conditions envisioned in sub-section (b).
The defendant has not discharged the burden to prove that he comes under the
exceptions; no evidence whatsoever having been adduced by him at the trial.
Indeed, he contracted the second marriage less than seven years after the first,
and he has not shown that his first wife was then generally considered dead or was
believed
by
him
to
be
so.
The facts of the case do not call for the application of Art. 1417 of the Spanish Civil
Code which decrees that the spouse who in bad faith has given cause for nullity (of
the marriage) shall have no share in the conjugal properties. The conjugal
partnership formed by virtue of the marriage of the defendant to the deceased
Isidra Gomez was dissolved by the latters death in 1959. By that time, Art. 1417
was no longer in force having been eliminated in the New Civil Code, which took
effect in 1950. Neither has there been any judicial declaration of nullity of the
second marriage, except possibly in the present action filed after the dissolution by
death had taken place and when Art. 1417 of the Spanish Civil Code was no longer
in
force.

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33.
ENGRACE
NIAL
vs.
NORMA
BAYADOG
G.R. No. 133778.
March 14, 2000
By: Luigi Miguel P.
Villatuya

34. Villanueva v.
CA
G.R. No. 132955.
October
27,
2006.
By:
Zorilla,
Ritchelle R.

Family Code

4S

Doctrine: Void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party
but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and
not after the death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be
left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid.
Facts: Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on in 1974. Out of their
marriage were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her
death in 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter, Pepito and respondent Norma
Badayog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and
Norma executed an affidavit stating that they had lived together as husband and
wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license.
In 1997, Pepito died in a car accident.
After their fathers death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the
marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a
marriage license.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioners have the personality to file a petition to
declare their fathers marriage void after his death.
Held: No. A marriage that is annulable is valid until otherwise declared by the
court; whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is considered as having never to
have taken place and cannot be the source of rights. The first can be generally
ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription while the other can never
be ratified. A voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct
proceeding while a void marriage can be attacked collaterally. Consequently, void
marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable
marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after
death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the
marriage had been perfectly valid.
Doctrine: As to the second assignment of error, appellant cannot claim that his
marriage should be annulled due to the absence of cohabitation between him and
his wife. Lack of cohabitation is, per se, not a ground to annul a marriage.
Otherwise, the validity of a marriage will depend upon the will of the spouses who
can terminate the marital union by refusing to cohabitate. The failure to cohabit
becomes relevant only if it arises as a result of the perpetration of any of the
grounds for annulling the marriage, such as lack of parental consent, insanity,
fraud, intimidation, or undue influence . . . . Since the appellant failed to justify his
failure to cohabit with the appellee on any of those grounds, the validity of his
marriage must be upheld.
Facts: Petitioner Orlando Villanueva and private respondent Lilia CanalitaVillanueva got married on April 13, 1988. On November 17, 1992, Orlando filed
with the trial court a petition for annulment of his marriage alleging that threats of
violence and duress forced him into marrying Lilia, who was already pregnant; that
he did not get her pregnant prior to the marriage; that he never cohabited with her
after the marriage; and that he later learned that private respondent's child died
during delivery on August 29, 1988. Lilia argued that petitioner freely and
voluntarily married her; that petitioner stayed with her in Palawan for almost a
month after their marriage; that petitioner wrote letters to her after he returned to
Manila, during which private respondent visited him personally; and that petitioner
knew about the progress of her pregnancy, which ended in their son being born
prematurely.
Issue: WON the subject marriage may be annulled

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[Type text]

[Type text]

Held: No. SC affirms the findings of the CA that petitioner freely and voluntarily
married private respondent and that no threats or intimidation, duress or violence
compelled him to do so.
As to the second assignment of error, appellant cannot claim that his
marriage should be annulled due to the absence of cohabitation between him and
his wife. Lack of cohabitation is, per se, not a ground to annul a marriage.
Otherwise, the validity of a marriage will depend upon the will of the spouses who
can terminate the marital union by refusing to cohabitate. The failure to cohabit
becomes relevant only if it arises as a result of the perpetration of any of the
grounds for annulling the marriage, such as lack of parental consent, insanity,
fraud, intimidation, or undue influence . . . . Since the appellant failed to justify his
failure to cohabit with the appellee on any of those grounds, the validity of his
marriage must be upheld.
35. Santos vs.
CA
by:
Sonny
Abella

DOCTRINE:
CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; MARRIAGE; ANNULMENT BASED ON
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY; MERE FAILURE TO RETURN HOME FOR
MORE THAN FIVE (5) YEARS, NOT SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY. - Thus, the fact that respondent wife left her
husband and baby two years after her marriage to work as a nurse in the US
and never returned, and that her husband desperately tried to locate her in the
US but all his efforts to find her failed, were considered by the High Court not
sufficient for the wife to be considered "psychological incapacitated" under Art.
36 of the Family Code. The court recognized that petitioner husband had been
aggrieved, but held that the factual setting of his case does not come close to
the standards required to declare a nullity of marriage
FACTS:
Leouel, a member of the Army, met Julia in Iloilo City. In September 1986, they
got married. The couple latter lived with Julias parents. Julia gave birth to a
son in 1987. Their marriage, however, was marred by the frequent interference
of Julias parent as averred by Leouel. The couple also occasionally quarrels
about as to, among other things, when should they start living independently
from Julias parents. In 1988, Julia went to the US to work as a nurse despite
Leouels opposition. 7 months later, she and Leouel got to talk and she
promised to return home in 1989. She never went home that year. In 1990,
Leouel got the chance to be in the US due to a military training. During his stay,
he desperately tried to locate his wife but to no avail. Leouel, in an effort to at
least have his wife come home, filed to nullify their marriage due to Julias
psychological incapacity. Leouel asserted that due to Julias failure to return
home or at least communicate with him even with all his effort constitutes
psychological incapacity. Julia attacked the complaint and she said that it is
Leouel who is incompetent. The prosecutor ascertained that there is no
collusion between the two. Leouels petition is however denied by the lower

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and appellate court.

ISSUE: Whether or not psychological incapacity is attendant to the case at bar.
HELD: Before deciding on the case, the SC noted that the Family Code did not
define the term psychological incapacity, which is adopted from the Catholic
Canon Law. But basing it on the deliberations of the Family Code Revision
Committee, the provision in PI, adopted with less specificity than expected, has
been designed to allow some resiliency in its application. The FCRC did not
give any examples of PI for fear that the giving of examples would limit the
applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the
FCRC would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis,
guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on
the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken
from Canon Law. The term psychological incapacity defies any precise
definition since psychological causes can be of an infinite variety.
Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of
but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. PI
should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a
party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly
must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which (Art.
68), include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity and render help and support. The intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of PI to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time
the marriage is celebrated. The SC also notes that PI must be characterized by
(a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must
be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the
ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party
antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only
after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the
cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.
In the case at bar, although Leouel stands aggrieved, his petition must be
dismissed because the alleged PI of his wife is not clearly shown by the factual
settings presented. The factual settings do not come close to to the standard

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[Type text]

[Type text]

required to decree a nullity of marriage.

36. Republic of
the
Philippines
v.
CA
and
Roridel MOLINA
G.R. No. 108763.
February 13, 1997
By:
Ma.
Ann
Klaudine
C.
Abrugena

Doctrine: The establishment of the Molina Doctrine in the interpretation and

application of Art.36:
(1)
The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff.
(2)
The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts
and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
(3)
The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage.
(4)
Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent
or incurable.
(5)
Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party
to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
(6)
The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up
to 71 of the Family Code as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same.
(7)
Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given
great respect by our courts.
(8)
The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state.
Facts: Roridel O. Molina filed a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her
marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Essentially, the petition alleged that Reynaldo
showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a father; that
he depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was never honest with his
wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them;
eventually Roridel became the sole breadwinner of the family and ultimately,
Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned them; that
Reynaldo had thus shown that he was psychologically incapable of complying with
essential marital obligations and was a highly immature and habitually quarrel
some individual who thought of himself as a king to be served; and that it would
be to the couple's best interest to have their marriage declared null and void in
order to free them from what appeared to be an incompatible marriage from the
start.
Issue: W/N the marriage can be dissolved under Art. 36 (Psychological Incapacity)
Held: NO. In the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the
psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a
"difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital
obligations. Mere showing of "irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting
personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to
prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married

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persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to
some psychological (nor physical) illness. Marriage subsists and remains valid.
37.
Lucita
Hernandez
vs.
CA
GR No. 126010
December 8, 1999

38. DEDEL VS CA
421 SCRA 426 By:
Stephanie Arevalo

DOCTRINE: The psychological incapacity of a spouse, as a ground for

declaration of nullity of marriage, must exist at the time of the celebration
of marriage.
FACTS:
Lucita and Marcio met in Philippine Christian University in Dasmarinas when lucita
was Marcios teacher for two consecutive semesters. Lucita was 5 years older than
Marcio. They later on became sweethearts and eventually got married. They also
had a child. Lucita supported the family as her husband continued studying,
supported by his parents. The first few years of their marriage went okay. But this
eventually changed. Marcio had an extra-marital relation with another student who
was also married. When Lucita discovered this, he asked Lucio to end it. He
promised to but did not fulfill it and left their conjugal home and child. After some
time, he returned to Lucita and she accepted him. However, his attitude worsened
when he got employed to Reynold Philippines, Inc. He engaged in extreme
promiscuous conduct during the latter part of 1986. As a result, private respondent
contracted gonorrhea and infected petitioner. Petitioner averred that on one
occasion of a heated argument, private respondent hit their eldest child who was
then barely a year old. Private respondent is not close to any of their children as
he was never affectionate and hardly spent time with them. On July 10, 1992,
petitioner filed before the RTC a petition seeking the annulment of her marriage to
private respondent on the ground of psychological incapacity. RTC and CA denied
the petition. Hence, this case.
ISSUE: W/N Marcio is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his marital obligations
HELD:
The psychological incapacity of a spouse, as a ground for declaration of nullity of
marriage, must exist at the time of the celebration of marriage. More so, chronic
sexual infidelity, abandonment, gambling and use of prohibited drugs are not
grounds per se, of psychological incapacity of a spouse. Certainly, petitionerappellants declaration that at the time of their marriage her respondent-husbands
character was on the borderline between a responsible person and the happy-golucky, could not constitute the psychological incapacity in contemplation of Article
36 of the Family Code.
DOCTRINE:
The difficulty in resolving the problem lies in the fact that a personality disorder is
a very complex and elusive phenomenon which defies easy analysis and
definition. In this case, respondents sexual infidelity can hardly qualify as being
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that she could not have known the
obligations she was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given a valid
assumption thereof. It appears that respondents promiscuity did not exist prior to
or at the inception of the marriage. What is, in fact, disclosed by the records is a
blissful marital union at its celebration, later affirmed in church rites, and which
produced four children.
FACTS:
Petitioner David B. Dedel met respondent Sharon L. Corpuz Dedel while he was
working in the advertising business of his father. The acquaintance led to
courtship and romantic relations, culminating in the exchange of marital vows
before the City Court of Pasay on September 1966.
The union produced four children. Petitioner avers that during the marriage,

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[Type text]

[Type text]

Sharon turned out to be an irresponsible and immature wife and mother. She had
extra-marital affairs with several men. Sharon was once confirmed in the Manila
Medical City for treatment by Dr. Lourdes Lapuz, a clinical psychiatrist. Petitioner
alleged that despite the treatment, Sharon did not stop her illicit relationship with
the Jordanian national named Mustafa Ibrahim, whom she married and with whom
she had two children. However, when Mustafa Ibrahim left the country, Sharon
returned to petitioner bringing along her two children by Ibrahim. Petitioner
accepted her back and even considered the two illegitimate children as his
own. Thereafter, on December 9, 1995, Sharon abandoned petitioner to join
Ibrahim in Jordan with their two children. Since then, Sharon would only return to
the country on special occasions. Such immaturity and irresponsibility in handling
the marriage like her repeated acts of infidelity and abandonment of her family are
indications of Anti-Social Personality Disorder amounting to psychological
incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage.
Finally, giving up all hope of a reconciliation with Sharon, petitioner filed on April 1,
1997 a petition seeking the declaration of nullity of his marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity, as defined in Article 36 of the Family Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not the aberrant sexual behavior of respondent adverted to by
petitioner fall within the term psychological incapacity.

39. Lam vs. Chua

G.R. No. 131286.
March 18, 2004
By: Laiza Avila

HELD: NO. In this case, respondents sexual infidelity can hardly qualify as being
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that she could not have known the
obligations she was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given a valid
assumption thereof. It appears that respondents promiscuity did not exist prior to
or at the inception of the marriage. What is, in fact, disclosed by the records is a
blissful marital union at its celebration, later affirmed in church rites, and which
produced four children. Respondents sexual infidelity or perversion and
abandonment do not by themselves constitute psychological incapacity within the
contemplation of the Family Code. Neither could her emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility be equated with psychological incapacity. It must be shown that
these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make respondent
completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, not
merely due to her youth, immaturity or sexual promiscuity.
Doctrine: A court cannot set itself in motion, nor has it power to decide questions
except as presented by the parties in their pleadings. Anything that is decided
beyond them is coram non-judice and void. Therefore where a court enters a
judgment or awards relief beyond the prayer of the complaint or the scope of its
allegations the excessive relief is not merely irregular but is void for want of
jurisdiction, and is open to collateral attack.
Facts: Adriana Chua filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage against
Jose Lam on the ground of psychological incapacity. The trial court then set the
case for hearing. The lone witness was Adriana herself. After her testimony,
counsel for Adriana formally offered the documentary evidence. Subsequently,
Adriana filed an Urgent Motion to Re-Open on the ground that she was able to
secure additional new evidence which were significant, material and indispensable.
The trial court granted the motion. The court admitted into evidence two Marriage
Contracts showing that Jose had been married twice before he married Adriana.
Thereafter, the trial court rendered its decision declaring the marriage between
petitioners null and void for being bigamous by nature.
Issue: Whether or not the Court erred in ruling that the marriage is null and void

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4S

for being bigamous.

Ruling: Yes. It is a serious error for the trial court to have rendered judgment on
issues not presented in the pleadings as it was beyond its jurisdiction to do so. The
amendment of the petition to reflect the new issues and claims against Jose was,
therefore, indispensable so as to authorize the court to act on the issue of whether
the marriage of Jose and Adriana was bigamous. When the trial court rendered
judgment beyond the allegations contained in the copy of the petition served upon
Jose, the Pasay RTC had acted in excess of its jurisdiction and deprived petitioner
Lam of due process. Nonetheless, considering that Jose, did not raise the issue of
jurisdiction of the Pasay RTC to receive evidence and render judgment on his
previous marriages with other woman which were not alleged in the petition filed
by Adriana, petitioner Jose is estopped from questioning the declaration of nullity
of his marriage with Adriana and therefore, the Court will not undo the judgment
of the Pasay RTC declaring the marriage of Adriana and Jose null and void for
being bigamous.
40. Mallion vs.
Alcantara
GR
No.
141528,
October 3, 2006
By: Carlo Vincent
G. Balicas

DOCTRINE: A previous final judgment denying a petition for declaration of nullity

on the ground of psychological incapacity will bar a subsequent petition for
declaration of nullity on the ground of lack of marriage license, because of the fact
that both have the same cause of action (that is, the nullity of the marriage) - only
based on different grounds.
FACTS:
On October 24, 1995, petitioner Oscar P. Mallion filed a petition with the
RTC of San Pablo City seeking a declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent
Editha Alcantara under Article 36 of the Family Code, citing respondents alleged
psychological incapacity. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. SP 4341-95.
After trial on the merits, the RTC denied the petition in a decision upon the finding
that petitioner "failed to adduce preponderant evidence to warrant the grant of the
relief he is seeking."
After the decision in Civil Case No. SP 4341-95 attained finality, petitioner
filed on July 12, 1999 another petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with
the RTC of San Pablo City, this time alleging that his marriage with respondent was
null and void due to the fact that it was celebrated without a valid marriage
license.
ISSUE: Does a previous final judgment denying a petition for declaration of nullity
on the ground of psychological incapacity bar a subsequent petition for declaration
of nullity on the ground of lack of marriage license?
HELD: Yes it will bar subsequent petition. Second case is only a different ground of
the same cause of action in the first case.
Furthermore, the instant case is premised on the claim that the marriage is
null and void because no valid celebration of the same took place due to the
alleged lack of a marriage license. In Civil Case No. SP 4341-95, however,
petitioner impliedly conceded that the marriage had been solemnized and
celebrated in accordance with law. Petitioner is now bound by this admission. The
alleged absence of a marriage license which petitioner raises now could have been
presented and heard in the earlier case. Suffice it to state that parties are bound
not only as regards every matter offered and received to sustain or defeat their
claims or demand but as to any other admissible matter which might have been
offered for that purpose and of all other matters that could have been adjudged in
that case.
Therefore, having expressly and impliedly conceded the validity of their

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[Type text]

marriage celebration, petitioner is now deemed to have waived any defects

therein. For this reason, the Court finds that the present action for declaration of
nullity of marriage on the ground of lack of marriage license is barred by the
decision dated November 11, 1997 of the RTC, Branch 29, of San Pablo City, in
Civil Case No. SP 4341-95.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against
petitioner. SO ORDERED.
41. CARATINGSIAYNGCO
v.
SIAYNGCO
G.R.
NO.
158896, October
27, 2004
By:
Ian
Basconcillo

DOCTRINE: Sexual infidelity, per se, however, does not constitute psychological
incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. It must be shown that
respondent Manuels unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a disordered personality
which makes him completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the
marital state and not merely due to his ardent wish to have a child of his own flesh
and blood.
FACTS: Juanita Carating-Siayngco Manuel were married in 1973. After discovering
that they could not have a child of their own, the couple decided to adopt a baby
boy in 1977, who they named Jeremy.
In 1997 or after 24 years of married life, Manuel filed for the declaration of its
nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity of petitioner Juanita. He alleged
that all throughout their marriage, his wife exhibited an over domineering and
selfish attitude towards him; that she incessantly complained about almost
everything and anyone connected with him like his elderly parents, the staff in his
office and anything not of her liking like the physical arrangement, tables, chairs,
wastebaskets in his office and with other trivial matters; that she showed no
respect or regard at all for the prestige and high position of his office as judge.
Juanita also accused her husband of being a womanizer. In 2001, the trial court
denied respondent Manuels petition. This was reversed by the CA.
ISSUE: WON the marriage of Manuel and Juanita may be declared void for
psychological incapacity of Manuel.
HELD. No. We have here a case of a husband who is constantly embarrassed by
his wifes outbursts and overbearing ways, who finds his wifes obsession with
cleanliness and the tight reign on his wallet "irritants" and who is wounded by her
lack of support and respect for his person and his position as a Judge. In our book,
however, these inadequacies of petitioner Juanita which led respondent Manuel to
file a case against her do not amount to psychological incapacity to comply with
the essential marital obligations.
The psychological report of Dr. Garcia, which is respondent Manuels own evidence,
contains candid admissions of petitioner Juanita, the person in the best position to
gauge whether or not her husband fulfilled the essential marital obligations of
marriage. What emerges from the psychological report of Dr. Garcia as well as
from the testimonies of the parties and their witnesses is that the only essential
marital obligation which respondent Manuel was not able to fulfill, if any, is the
obligation of fidelity.

42. Navarro vs.

Cecilio-Navarro

Doctrine:

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By:
Bautista

Joshua

Family Code

4S

Psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," "refusal" or

"neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations, it is essential that they
must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological
illness existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
Facts:
Petitioner and respondent were college sweethearts. At the time they
got married, both in civil and church ceremonies, they were awaiting their first
child. Since petitioner was still a medical student, while respondent was a
student of pharmacy, they lived with petitioners parents, on whom they were
financially dependent. Eventually, their union bore four children.
However the petitioner alleged that the marriage was dysfunctional because he
and his wife constantly quarrelled even before the marriage and that his wife
was not supportive of his career. Even marriage counselling did not work.
Thus, prompting him to file a petition for nullification of their marriage.
A psychologist, who conducted a psychiatric test on petitioner, testified that
tests showed that petitioner was a perfectionist, short-tempered, critical,
argumentative and irritable when people do not meet his expectations. He
married Cynthia only after he got her pregnant. He had depressions and
tended to escapism when beset with problems. He was vocal about his marital
problems. He believed that the lack of communication, absence of quality time,
inadequacy in problem-solving, and many problems caused the failure of the
marriage.
The respondent on the other hand refused to submit to the psychiatric
examination asked by the petitioner, but said she would do so only when her
defense requires it. She averred that she had no marital problems, not until
petitioner had an illicit affair with a certain Dr. Lucila Posadas. Petitioner denied
the affair.
On August 21, 1998, the trial court held that petitioner and respondent were
both psychologically incapacitated to perform their marital obligations. But on
appeal the Court of Appeals reversed such decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage is void on the ground of the parties
psychological incapacity.
Held:
No, In the present case, the spouses frequent squabbles and
respondents refusal to sleep with petitioner and be supportive to him do not
constitute psychological incapacity. The records show that petitioner and
respondent were living in harmony in the first few years of their marriage, which
bore them four children. Psychological incapacity must be more than just a
"difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital
obligations, it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so,
due to some psychological illness existing at the time of the celebration of the
marriage.

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[Type text]

petitioner failed to show that grave and incurable incapacity, on the part of both
spouses, existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Their bickerings
and arguments even before their marriage and respondents scandalous
outbursts in public, at most, show their immaturity, and immaturity does not
constitute psychological incapacity.
43.
Sarao
vs.
Guevarra 40 OG
263
(CA)
By:
Berdal,
Joanne
Juris L.

Doctrine: As a ground for annulment (physically incapable), the test of impotency

is not the ability to procreate, but the ability to copulate.
Facts: Plaintiff Felix Sarao and defendant Pilar Guevarra were married on June
1936. In the afternoon of the same day, Sarao tried to have sex with Guevarra but
the latter showed reluctance and begged him to wait until evening. When the night
came, Sarao again tried to have sex with her but the latter complained of pains in
her private parts. Every attempt on Saraos part to have sex with his wife failed
because she would complain of pains in her genital organs. Upon advice of a
physician, his wife submitted to an operation and her uterus and ovaries were
removed. The removal of the organs rendered his wife incapable of procreation.
Issue: Whether or not incapacity to procreate can be construed as physically
incapable of entering into the married state hence a valid ground for annulment
Held: No. Under the marriage law at that time and as consistently applied in the
provision of the present Family Code, marriage may be annulled if either party
was, at the time of marriage, physically incapable of entering into the married
state, and as such incapacity continues, and appears to be incurable. It is held
that the test of impotency is not the ability to procreate, but the ability to copulate.
In the case at bar, defendant was not impotent as supported by the doctor that the
existence of tumor in the ovaries did not necessarily render he incapable of
copulation or even procreation. The removal of her uterus and ovaries rendered
her sterile but did not make her unfit for sexual intercourse. Hence, defendants
sterility cannot be a ground for annulment since what the law provides as a ground
for annulment is the incapacity to copulate, and not to procreate.

44.
Buccat v. Mango
non de Buccat
72 Phil 19(1941)
[GR No. 47101
April 25, 1941]

DOCTRINE: Marriage; Validity Marriage is a most sacred institution. It is the

foundation upon which society rests. To nullify it would need clear and
authentic proof.
In
this
case
no
such
proof
exists.
Appeal from a decision of the Court of First
Instance
of
Baguio.
Carlos,
J.Feliciano Leviste, Toms P. Paganiban andSotera, N. Megia for appellantsLuida
Mangonon de Buccat on her own behalf.
FACTS:
This case has been elevated to this court from the Court of First
Instance of Baguio, since it only raises a question purely of law.
On March 20, 1939 the plaintiff initiated the present case, in which the defe
ndant did not
appear,
despite
being
duly
summoned.
On account
of this, plaintiff was permitted to present his proof, and the lower court decided in
favor of the defendant.
The plaintiff prays for the annulment of his
marriage to Luida Mangonon de Buccat on November 26,1938 in
the City
of
Baguio, on the grounds that when agreeing to the marriage promise, he did so
because the defendant assured him that she was a virgin.
From the decision of the lower court, the following facts are given: The
plaintiff met the defendant in March 1938. After several meetings, they became

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45. Aquino
v.
Delizo
G.R. NO. L-15853.
July
27,
1960
Case Report by:
BLANCAFLOR

Family Code

4S

engaged in September 19 of the same year. In November 26, the plaintiff married
the defendant in the Catholic Cathedral of Baguio City. After living together
for eighty-nine days, the defendant gave birth to a son (of nine months)
in February 23, 1939. As a result of this event, the plaintiff left the defendant and
never returned to married life with her. We see no reason to revoke the appealed
sentence. It is unlikely that the allegation of the plaintiff- appellant that he did not
even suspect the serious situation of the defendant, being as it
is proven, an advanced pregnant condition. On account of this, there is no reason
to consider the fraud of which the plaintiff-appellant speaks. The allegation that it
is not rare to find persons with developed abdomens, seems to us childish to
deserve our consideration, all the more that the plaintiff is a first-year student of
law. Marriage is a most sacred institution. It is the foundation upon which society
rests. To nullify it would need clear and authentic proof. In this case no such proof
exists. Finding the appealed sentence reconciled to law, it must be affirmed,
and we hereby affirm it in toto. Decision affirmed.
Issue:
WON
Luidas
concealment
of
her
pregnancy
constituted a ground for the annulment of marriage (fraud)
Held: No.
Clear
and
authentic
proof
is
needed in
order to nullify a marriage, a sacred institution in which the State is interested. In
this case, the court did not find any proof that there was concealment
of pregnancy
constituting
a ground for
annulment; it was unlikely that
Godofredo, a first- year law student, did not
suspect anything about Luidas condition considering that she was in an advanced
stage of pregnancy when they got married. Decision:SC affirmed the lower courts
decision. ZhaiGar
DOCTRINE: In the case of Buccat vs. Buccat (72 Phil., 19) cited in the decision
sought to be reviewed, which was also an action for the annulment of marriage on
the ground of fraud, plaintiff's claim that he did not even suspect the pregnancy of
the defendant was held to be unbelievable, it having been proven that the latter
was already in an advanced stage of pregnancy (7th month) at the time of their
marriage. That pronouncement, however, cannot apply to the case at bar. Here
the defendant wife was alleged to be only more than four months pregnant at the
time of her marriage to plaintiff. At that stage, we are not prepared to say that her
pregnancy was readily apparent, especially since she was "naturally plump" or fat
as alleged by plaintiff.
FACTS: It was alleged in the complaint that at the date of her marriage (December
27, 1954), Conchita Delizo concealed to Fernando Aquino the fact that she was
pregnant by another man. Four months after their marriage ( April 1955), Conchita
gave birth to a chlld. Conchita claims that the child was conceived out of wedlock
between her and Fernando.
At trial, plaintiff presented the marriage contract as the sole documentary
evidence, while defendant neither appeared or presented evidence despite
reservation it would present on a later date.
RTC dismissed the complaint for annulment on the following grounds: no birth
certificate was presented to show that child was born within 180 days after
marriage of the parties and concealment of the pregnancy do not constitute fraud
to annul such marriage. Plaintiff filed a petition to reopen the case for reception of
evidence but was denied. On appeal, CA affirmed dismissal of the complaint on the
theory that it was not impossible for plaintiff to have sexual intercourse during
engagement and unbelievable for plaintiff did not notice or suspect that defendant
was pregnant when he married her. Plaintiff prayed for motion for reconsideration

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which was denied. Hence this case for certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was fraud- wife concealed pregnancy by another at
the time of marriage?(45 NCC)
HELD: No. Under the new Civil Code, concealment by the wife of the fact that at
the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her husband
constitutes fraud and is ground for annulment of marriage. (Art. 85, par. (4) in
relation to Art. 86, par. (3). In the case of Buccat vs. Buccat (72 Phil., 19) cited in
the decision sought to be reviewed, which was also an action for the annulment of
marriage on the ground of fraud, plaintiff's claim that he did not even suspect the
pregnancy of the defendant was held to be unbelievable, it having been proven
that the latter was already in an advanced stage of pregnancy (7th month) at the
time of their marriage. That pronouncement, however, cannot apply to the case at
bar. Here the defendant wife was alleged to be only more than four months
pregnant at the time of her marriage to plaintiff. At that stage, we are not
prepared to say that her pregnancy was readily apparent, especially since she was
"naturally plump" or fat as alleged by plaintiff. According to medical authorities,
even on the 5th month of pregnancy, the enlargement of a woman's abdomen is
still below the umbilicus, that is to say, the enlargement is limited to the lower part
of the abdomen so that it is hardly noticeable and may, if noticed, be attributed
only to fat formation on the lower part of the abdomen. It is only on the 6th month
of pregnancy that the enlargement of the woman's abdomen reaches a height
above the umbilicus, making the roundness of the abdomen more general and
apparent. (See Lull, Clinical Obstetrics, p. 122.)
The complaint is set aside and remanded to court for new trial
(Aquino v. Delizo, G.R. No. L-15853, July 27, 1960)
46.
Emilio
Tuason,
petitioner vs. CA
and
Maria
Victoria Tuason,
respondents
G.R. No. 116607
April 10, 1996
By: Brazal

Doctrine: A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by default is

fraught with the danger of collusion. Hence, in all cases for annulment, declaration
of nullity of marriage and legal separation, the prosecuting attorney or fiscal is
ordered to appear on behalf of the state for the purpose of preventing any
collusion between the parties and to take care that their evidence is not fabricated
or suppressed. If the defendant spouse fails to answer the complaint, the court
cannot declare him or her in default but instead, should order the prosecuting
attorney to determine if collusion exists between the parties. The prosecuting
attorney or fiscal may oppose the application for legal separation or annulment
through the presentation of his own evidence, if in his opinion, the proof adduced
is dubious and fabricated.
Facts: Maria Victoria Lopez Tuason filed with the RTC-Makati a petition for
annulment or declaration of nullity of her marriage to petitioner Emilio R. Tuason.
Respondent alleged that she and petitioner were married on June 3, 1972 and
from this union, begot two children; that at the time of the marriage, petitioner
was already psychologically incapacitated to comply with his essential marital
obligations which became manifest afterward and resulted in violent fights
between husband and wife. Petitioner answered denying the imputations against
him. As affirmative defense, he claimed that he and private respondent were a
normal married couple during the first ten years of their marriage and actually
begot two children during this period; Petitioner petitioned the court to allow him
to return to the conjugal home.
After private respondent rested her case, the trial court scheduled the reception of
petitioners evidence but the latter failed to appear at the scheduled hearings. On

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oral motion of private respondent, the court declared petitioner to have waived his
right to present evidence and deemed the case submitted for decision on the basis
of the evidence presented. The trial court rendered judgment that marriage
contracted by Ma. Victoria L. Tuason and Emilio R. Tuason is declared null and void
ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of the defendant.
CA affirmed the order of the trial court.
Issue: Whether or not the court may order the prosecutor to intervene for the
state and inquire as to the reason for the petitioners non appearance at the
scheduled hearings.
Held:
No. The facts in the case at bar do not call for the strict application of Articles 48
and 60 of the Family Code. For one, petitioner was not declared in default by the
trial court for failure to answer. Petitioner filed his answer to the complaint and
contested the cause of action alleged by private respondent.
He actively
participated in the proceedings below by filing several pleadings and crossexamining the witnesses of private respondent. It is crystal clear that every stage
of the litigation was characterized by a no-holds barred contest and not by
collusion.
The role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal in annulment of marriage and legal
separation proceedings is to determine whether collusion exists between the
parties and to take care that the evidence is not suppressed or fabricated.
Petitioners vehement opposition to the annulment proceedings negates the
conclusion that collusion existed between the parties. There is no allegation by the
petitioner that evidence was suppressed or fabricated by any of the parties. Under
these circumstances, we are convinced that the non-intervention of a prosecuting
attorney to assure lack of collusion between the contending parties is not fatal to
the validity of the proceedings in the trial court.
47. Corpus vs.
Orchotorena 453
SCRA
447
By:
Dane Carag

Doctrine:
While the record shows that Public Prosecutor Arturo M. Paculanag had filed
a Certification with the respondent judges court, stating, among others, that he
appeared in behalf of the Solicitor General during the ex-parte presentation of
plaintiffs evidence, even cross-examining the plaintiff and his witness, the
psychiatrist Dr. Cheryl T. Zalsos, and that he had no objection to the granting of
the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage, such Certification does not suffice
to comply with the mandatory requirement that the court should order the
investigating public prosecutor whether a collusion exists between the
parties. Such directive must be made by the court before trial could proceed, not
after the trial on the merits of the case had already been had. Notably,
said Certification was filed after the respondent judge had ordered the termination
of the case.
Facts:
In February 6, 2001, a verified Complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage was
filed against Mrs. Macias by Mariano Joaquin S. Macias (Mr. Macias), her husband
and incumbent presiding judge of RTC, Branch 11, Liloy, Zamboanga Del Norte. On
the
same
day
the Complaint was
filed,
the
respondent
immediately
issued Summons to Mrs. Macias. Within 30 days to file an answer, Mrs. Macias filed
a Motion to Dismiss. However, instead of first acting upon the motion, the
respondent judge set the hearing on the merits of the subject case one day before.
Respondent judge denied the Motion to Dismiss and re-set the hearing on the
merits of the case. After the scheduled hearings, the respondent judge terminated

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the proceedings and declared the case submitted for decision. It is in the light of
the foregoing that Mrs. Macias believes that the respondent judge deprived her of
the fundamental right to due process with utmost bias and partiality for Mr.
Macias, she filed a Complaint before the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
praying that an order be issued ex-parte directing the respondent judge to desist
from taking any further action in the subject case and imposing an administrative
sanction against him. The respondent judge claims that the instant Complaint is
fatally defective because it is not supported by the affidavits of persons who have
knowledge of the facts and documents needed to substantiate the allegations
therein. Also, he asserts that malice, bad faith, and the intention to harass,
embarrass and humiliate him had motivated Mrs. Macias to file the said Complaint.
The respondent judge disputes violating Mrs. Macias right to due process. He
argues that Mrs. Macias was given the opportunity to be heard but chose not to
give her side, as shown by her failure to appear during the trial despite prior
notice. Furthermore, he points out that the records of the case would show that
the proceedings was done in good faith and based on law and jurisprudence.
Furthermore, the respondent judge posits that even if he may have committed an
error, such should be corrected by availing of judicial remedies and not by
resorting to the filing of an administrative action. He argues that it is only after
the Supreme Court finds that a judge had committed malice or gross ignorance
that he should be administratively sanctioned.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent judge blatantly transgressing Mrs. Macias right to due
process?
Ruling:
What happened in the case is a classic example of railroading or procedural
short-cut. Instead of resolving the Motion to Dismiss, the respondent judge
completely ignored it and proceeded with the trial on the merits of the case by
receiving Mr. Macias evidence ex-parte.
The respondent judge compounded his blunder when, after denying Mrs.
Macias Motion to Dismiss, he continued with the reception of Mr. Macias
evidence ex-parte, ordered the termination of the trial and thereafter, considered
the case submitted for decision despite Mrs. Macias filing of a Motion for
Reconsideration of the order denying her Motion to Dismiss. In holding the trial of
the case up to its completion, the respondent judge had acted utterly oblivious to
the pending Motion for Reconsideration.
Section 3, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states: If the defending
party in an action for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage or for legal
separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to
investigate whether or not a collusion between the parties exists, and if there is no
collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence
submitted is not fabricated. Thus, the report of the Public Prosecutor is a
condition sine qua non for further proceedings to go on in the case. Respondent
judge ignored this procedural rule.
48. Cervantes v
Fajardo
G.R. No. 79955.
January 27, 1989
By: Chupungco

DOCTRINE: Minor has been legally adopted by petitioners with the full knowledge
and consent of respondents. A decree of adoption has the effect of dissolving the
authority vested in natural parents over the adopted child. The adopting parents
have the right to the care and custody of the adopted child and exercise parental
authority and responsibility over him.
Facts: This is a petition for a writ of Habeas Corpus over the person of the minor

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Angelie Anne Cervantes who was born on 14 February 1987 to Conrado Fajardo
and Gina Carreon, who are common-law husband and wife. They offered the child
for adoption to Gina Carreon's sister and brother-in-law, Zenaida CarreonCervantes and Nelson Cervantes, spouses, who took care and custody of the child
when she was barely two weeks old. An Affidavit of Consent to the adoption of the
child was executed by respondent Gina Carreon. The petition for adoption was filed
by petitioners before the RTC of Rizal, which granted the petition.
Sometime in 1987, the adoptive parents, Nelson and Zenaida Cervantes,
received a letter from the respondents demanding to be paid the amount of
P150,000, otherwise, they would get back their child. Petitioners refused. As a
result, while petitioners were out at work, the Gina Carreon took the child from her
"yaya" at the petitioners' residence, on the pretext that she was instructed to do
so by her mother. Gina Carreon brought the child to her house. Petitioners
demanded the return of the child, but Gina Carreon refused, saying that she had
no desire to give up her child for adoption and that the affidavit of consent to the
adoption she had executed was not fully explained to her.
Issue: Whether or not the natural parents or the adoptive parents have custody
over Angelie Ann Cervantes.

49. Republic of
the
Philippines
vs. Iyoy
G.R. No. 152577.
September
21,
2005.
By:
Monica
A.
David

Ruling: Adoptive parents. In all cases involving the custody, care, education and
property of children, the latter's welfare is paramount. The provision that no
mother shall be separated from a child under five (5) years of age, will not apply
where the Court finds compelling reasons to rule otherwise. In all controversies
regarding the custody of minors, the foremost consideration is the moral, physical
and social welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the resources and
moral as well as social standing of the contending parents.
Conrado Fajardo's relationship with the Gina Carreon is a common-law
husband and wife relationship. His open cohabitation with Gina will not accord the
minor that desirable atmosphere where she can grow and develop into an upright
and moral-minded person. Gina Carreon had also previously given birth to another
child by another married man with whom she lived for almost three (3) years but
who eventually left her and vanished. For a minor to grow up with a sister whose
"father" is not her true father, could also affect the moral outlook and values of
said minor. Upon the other hand, petitioners who are legally married appear to be
morally, physically, financially, and socially capable of supporting the minor and
giving her a future better than what the natural mother, who is not only jobless
but also maintains an illicit relation with a married man, can most likely give her.
Minor has been legally adopted by petitioners with the full knowledge and
consent of respondents. A decree of adoption has the effect of dissolving the
authority vested in natural parents over the adopted child. The adopting parents
have the right to the care and custody of the adopted child and exercise parental
authority and responsibility over him.
DOCTRINE: Article 36 of the Family Code contemplates downright incapacity or
inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations; not a
mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant
spouse. Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity
and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or
perversion, and abandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a finding of
psychological incapacity under the said Article. As has already been stressed by
this Court in previous cases, Article 36 "is not to be confused with a divorce law
that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It

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refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the

celebration of marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive
one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is
about to assume.
FACTS: Crasus married Fely on 16 December 1961 in Cebu City and begot 5
children. After the celebration of their marriage, Crasus discovered that Fely was
"hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant." In 1984, Fely left the Philippines for
USA leaving all of their five children, the youngest then being only six years old, to
the care of Crasus. Barely a year after Fely left for the U.S.A., Crasus received a
letter from her requesting that he sign the enclosed divorce papers; he
disregarded the said request. Sometime in 1985, respondent Crasus learned that
Fely got married to an American, with whom she eventually had a child. In 1987,
Fely came back to the Philippines with her American family, staying at Cebu Plaza
Hotel in Cebu City. Crasus did not bother to talk to Fely because he was afraid he
might not be able to bear the sorrow and the pain she had caused him. Fely
returned to the Philippines several times more: in 1990, for the wedding of their
eldest child, Crasus, Jr.; in 1992, for the brain operation of their fourth child,
Calvert; and in 1995, for unknown reasons. Fely continued to live with her
American family in New Jersey, U.S.A. She had been openly using the surname of
her American husband in the Philippines and in the U.S.A. For the wedding of
Crasus, Jr., Fely herself had invitations made in which she was named as "Mrs.
Fely Ada Micklus." At the time the Complaint was filed, it had been 13 years since
Fely left and abandoned Crasus, and there was no more possibility of reconciliation
between them. Crasus finally alleged in his Complaint that Fely's acts brought
danger and dishonor to the family, and clearly demonstrated her psychological
incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. Such incapacity, being
incurable and continuing, constitutes a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines. RTC ruled in favour of
Crasus. CA affirmed.
ISSUE: Whether or not abandonment by and sexual infidelity of Fely per se
constitute psychological incapacity.
HELD: No. It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 of the Family Code of the
Philippines contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and
to assume the basic marital obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty,
much less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. Irreconcilable differences,
conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse,
habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by
themselves, also do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under the
said Article. As has already been stressed by this Court in previous cases, Article
36 "is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time
the causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological
illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of marriage. It is a malady so
grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. Fely's hot-temper,
nagging, and extravagance; her abandonment of Crasus; her marriage to an
American; and even her flaunting of her American family and her American
surname, may have hurt and embarrassed Crasus and the rest of the family.
Nonetheless, the afore-described characteristics, behavior, and acts of Fely do not
satisfactorily establish a psychological or mental defect that is serious or grave,
and which has been in existence at the time of celebration of the marriage, and is

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incurable. Even when the rules have been relaxed and the personal examination of
Fely by a psychiatrist or psychologist is no longer mandatory for the declaration of
nullity of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines, the
totality of evidence presented during trial by Crasus, as spouse seeking the
declaration of nullity of marriage, must still prove the gravity, judicial antecedence,
and incurability of the alleged psychological incapacity which it failed to do so
herein.
50. Espiritu
CA
By: Eugene
Jesus

vs.
de

Doctrine: The rule that a child below seven years of age should not be separated
from the mother, unless there are compelling reasons is not applicable in this case
anymore. A mothers constant flirtations from one man to another is considered
by the court as a compelling reason not to award the childrens custody to her, for
said behaviour forms an immoral environment especially to a growing child.
FACTS:
Reynaldo Espiritu and Teresita Masanding began to maintain a common law
relationship of husband while in US. Teresita works as a nurse while Reynaldo was
sent by his empolyer, National Steel Corporation, to Pittsburgh for a temporary
post. They begot a child in 1986 named Rosalind. After a year, they went back to
the Philippines for a brief vacation when they also got married. Subsequently,
they had a second child named Reginald. In 1990, they decided to
separate. Reynaldo pleaded for second chance but instead of Teresita granting it,
she left Reynaldo and the children and went back to California. Reynaldo brought
the children in the Philippines and left them with his sister. When Teresita
returned in the Philippines sometime in 1992, he filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus against Reynaldo and his sister to gain custody of the children.
ISSUE: WON the custody of the 2 children should be awarded to the mother.
HELD:
In cases of care, custody, education and property of children, the latters welfare
shall be the paramount concern and that even a child under 7 years of age may be
ordered to be separated from the mother for compelling reasons. The presumption
that the mother is the best custodian for a child under seven years of age is strong
but not conclusive. At the time the judgment was rendered, the 2 children were
both over 7 years of age. The choice of the child to whom she preferred to stay
must be considered. It is evident in the records submitted that Rosalind chose to
stay with his father/aunt. She was found of suffering from emotional shock caused
by her mothers infidelity. Furthermore, there was nothing in the records to show
that Reynaldo is unfit well in fact he has been trying his best to give the children
the kind of attention and care which their mother is not in the position to
extend. On the other hand, the mothers conviction for the crime of bigamy and
her illicit relationship had already caused emotional disturbances and personality
conflicts at least with the daughter.
Hence, petition was granted. Custody of the minors was reinstated to their father.

51.
Mangonon
vs. CA 494 SCRA
1 By: de la Cruz

Doctrine: "SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE" - a court may temporarily grant support

pendente lite prior to the rendition of judgment or final order. Because of its
provisional nature, a court does not need to delve fully into the merits of the case
before it can settle an application for this relief. All that a court is tasked to do is
determine the kind and amount of evidence which may suffice to enable it to justly
resolve the application. It is enough that the facts be established by affidavits or

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other documentary evidence appearing in the record.

Under Article 199 of the Family Code, respondent Francisco, as the next immediate
relative of Rica and Rina, is tasked to give support to his granddaughters in default
of their parents.
FACTS : Within seven months after the annulment of their marriage, petitioner
gave birth to twins Rica and Rina. According to petitioner, she, with the assistance
of her second husband Danny Mangonon, raised her twin daughters as private
respondents had totally abandoned them. Petitioner likewise averred that
demands were made upon Federico and the latters father, Francisco, for general
support and for the payment of the required college education of Rica and Rina.
The trial court ruled in favor of petitioner. However, the amount of support granted
was inadequate for the sustenance of the children. The CA affirmed the ruling of
the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the children are entitled to a larger amount of support.
HELD: The Court partially granted the petition. It held that Francisco Delgado is
partially liable for support. The case was remanded to the trial court for the
determination of the exact amounts of support they are to give to the children.
Considering, however, that the twin sisters may have already been done with their
education by the time of the promulgation of this decision, we deem it proper to
award support pendente lite in arrears to be computed from the time they entered
college until they had finished their respective studies.
52. Anaya vs.
Palaroan GR No.
L-27930,
November,
26,
1970 By: William
Eusores

Doctrine re: Voidable Marriages

Defendant Fernando filed an action for annulment of the marriage on 7 January
1954 on the ground that his consent was obtained through force and intimidation,
which action was docketed in the Court of First Instance of Manila as Civil Case No.
21589.
The main issue is whether or not the non-disclosure to a wife by her husband of
his pre-marital relationship with another woman is a ground for annulment of
marriage.
We must agree with the lower court that it is not. For fraud as a vice of consent in
marriage, which may be a cause for its annulment, comes under Article 85, No. 4,
of the Civil Code.
The intention of Congress to confine the circumstances that can constitute fraud as
ground for annulment of marriage to the foregoing three cases may be deduced
from the fact that, of all the causes of nullity enumerated in Article 85, fraud is the
only one given special treatment in a subsequent article within the chapter on void
and voidable marriages. If its intention were otherwise, Congress would have
stopped at Article 85, for, anyway, fraud in general is already mentioned therein as
a cause for annulment. But Article 86 was also enacted, expressly and specifically
dealing with "fraud referred to in number 4 of the preceding article," and proceeds
by enumerating the specific frauds (misrepresentation as to identity, nondisclosure of a previous conviction, and concealment of pregnancy), making it clear
that Congress intended to exclude all other frauds or deceits. To stress further
such intention, the enumeration of the specific frauds was followed by the
interdiction: "No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, rank, fortune or
chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the
annulment of marriage."
On the merits of this second fraud charge, it is enough to point out that any secret

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intention on the husband's part not to perform his marital duties must have been
discovered by the wife soon after the marriage: hence her action for annulment
based on that fraud should have been brought within four years after the
marriage. Since appellant's wedding was celebrated in December of 1953, and this
ground was only pleaded in 1966, it must be declared already barred.
Legal Separation
53. FRANCISCO vs.
TAYAO G.R. No. L26435.
March
4,
1927 Case Report by:
WILFRIED
P.
FORMALEJO

Doctrine: In the Philippine Islands, the causes for divorce are prescribed by
statute. The grounds for divorce are two: Adultery on the part of the wife or
concubinage on the part of the husband. The Philippine Divorce Law, Act
No. 2710, is emphatically clear in this respect. Section 1 of the law reads: "A
petition for divorce can only be filed for adultery on the part of the wife or
concubinage on the part of the husband . . . ."
Facts: Plaintiff Juanaria Francisco and Defendant Lope Tayao contracted
marriage in the City of Manila in 1912. They separated in 1917. Defendant
Tayao then moved to Zamboanga. There he was later prosecuted for having
committed adultery with a married woman named Bernardina Medrano, wife of
Ambrosio Torres, at whose instance the criminal complaint was instituted. As a
result of that proceeding, Defendant Tayao, together with his co-accused
Bernardina Medrano, was sentenced to imprisonment. On these facts, Plaintiff
Francisco instituted an action to have the bonds of matrimony with Defendant
Tayao dissolved, which action was, however, denied. The trial judge based his
decision principally on the point that the Plaintiff was not an innocent spouse
within the meaning of Sections 1 and 3 of the Divorce Law. Hence, this appeal.
Issue: WON the Plaintiff is entitled to a decree of divorce in accordance with
the Philippine Divorce Law; corollary thereto is, WON the wife can secure a
divorce from the husband, where the latter has been convicted of adultery and
not of concubinage, although the acts for which the husband was convicted of
adultery may also constitute concubinage?
Held: NO. In the Philippine Islands, the causes for divorce are prescribed by
statute. The grounds for divorce are two: Adultery on the part of the wife or
concubinage on the part of the husband. The Philippine Divorce Law, Act No.
2710, is emphatically clear in this respect. Section 1 of the law reads: "A
petition for divorce can only be filed for adultery on the part of the wife or
concubinage on the part of the husband . . . ." Note well the adverb "only" and
the conjunctive "or." The same thought is again emphasized in Section 3 of the
Divorce Law which provides that "The divorce may be claimed only by the
innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the
adultery or concubinage, as the case may be. . . ." Later on comes Section 8
providing that "A divorce shall not be granted without the guilt of the defendant
being established by final sentence in a criminal action"that is, in relation with
Section 1 of the same law, by final sentence in a criminal action for adultery on
the part of the wife or concubinage on the part of the husband. Act No. 2716,
amendatory of article 437 of the Penal Code, adds nothing to the Divorce Law
except as it clarifies the meaning of concubinage.
Counsel argues along the line that the Plaintiff is here the innocent spouse and

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that acts for which the Defendant was convicted of adultery also constitute
concubinage. But the undeniable fact remains that the Defendant was
prosecuted for, and was convicted of, the crime of adultery and not the
crime of concubinage. The criminal case was instituted on the complaint of
the injured husband. It was not instituted by the injured wife which is essential
for the proper initiation of a prosecution for concubinage.

54.
Gandionco
vs.Penaranda
G.R.
No.
79284
November 27, 1987
By: Armie Francisco

In its last analysis, what counsel is asking this court to do is to sit as a trial
court to convict the Defendant of the crime of concubinage, although no
prosecution for the same has been instituted by the aggrieved wife and no
hearing has been had or judgment rendered in a lower court. This the appellate
court cannot do. What counsel also desires this court to do is to add a third
cause for divorce to the law and to insert two words in section 1 of the Divorce
Law so that it will read: "A petition for divorce can only be filed for adultery on
the part of the wife or husband or concubinage on the part of the husband."
This likewise the court cannot do. It would amount to judicial amendment of the
law.
Doctrine: A decree of legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, may be
issued upon proof by preponderance of evidence in the action for legal
separation. No criminal proceedings or conviction is necessary.
Facts: Private respondent Teresita Gandionco filed a civil case for legal
separation and a criminal complaint against her husband, petitioner Froilan
Gandionco, both on the ground of concubinage. Private respondent likewise filed
an application for the provisional remedy of support penedente lite, pending a
decision in the action for legal separation. Consequently, respondent judge
ordered the payment of support pendent lite. However, petitioner contends that
the civil action for legal separation and the incidents consequent thereto, such
as the application for support pendent lite, should be suspended in view of the
criminal case for concubinage filed against him. Petitioner also argues that the
civil action for legal separation arises from, or is inextricably tied to the criminal
action for concubinage, so that all proceedings related to legal separation will
have to be suspended to await conviction or acquittal for concubinage in the
criminal case.
Issue: Whether a civil case for legal separation can proceed pending the
resolution of the criminal case for concubinage.
Held: The Supreme Court held that petitioners contention is untenable. Under
the rules on criminal procedure, a civil action for legal separation, based on
concubinage, may proceed ahead of, or simultaneously with, a criminal action
for concubinage, because said civil action is not one to enforce the civil liability
arising from the offense even if both the civil and criminal actions arise from or
are related to the same offense. Such civil action is one intended to obtain the
right to live separately, the legal consequences thereof such as, the dissolution
of the original partnership of gains, custody of offsprings, support, and
disqualification from inheriting from the innocent spouse. A decree of legal
separation, on the ground of concubinage, may be issued upon proof by
preponderance of evidence in the action for legal separation. No criminal
proceedings or conviction is necessary.

55.Ong vs. Ong G.R.

No. 153206. October

DOCTRINE:
The abandonment referred to by the Family Code is abandonment without

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By: Gemma Javier

Family Code

4S

justifiable cause for more than one year. As it was established that Lucita left
William due to his abusive conduct, such does not constitute abandonment
contemplated by the said provision.
FACTS:
Ong Eng Kiam, also known as William Ong (William) and Lucita G. Ong (Lucita)
were married on July 13, 1975 at the San Agustin Church in Manila. They have
three children: Kingston, Charleston, and Princeton who are now all of the age
of majority. On March 21, 1996, Lucita filed a complaint for legal separation
under Art 55 (1) of FC on grounds of physical violence, threats, intimidation and
grossly abusive conduct of petitioner. RTC granted prayer for legal separation.
CA upheld RTCs decision when herein petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration (MR). The climax of the couples drama was on December 14,
1995 when the respondent asked petitioner to bring Kingston, their son, back
from Bacolod which turned into a violent quarrel with the petitioner hitting the
respondent on the head, left cheek, eye, stomach, arms, and ultimately
pointing a gun at respondents head asking her to leave the conjugal house.
Issue:
Whether or not CA erred in upholding the RTCs decision granting legal
separation to Lucita when she herself has given ground for legal separation
when she abandoned her family?NO
HELD:
It is without merit that since Lucita has abandoned the family, a decree of legal
separation should not be granted, following Art. 56, par. (4) of the Family Code
which provides that legal separation shall be denied when both parties have
given ground for legal separation. The abandonment referred to by the Family
Code is abandonment without justifiable cause for more than one year. As it
was established that Lucita left William due to his abusive conduct, such does
not constitute abandonment contemplated by the said provision.

56.
Republic
vs.
Iyoy
By:
Roselle
Jimeno

Doctrine: Abandonment, sexual infidelity, and bigamy, give respondent

Crasus grounds to file for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family
Code of the Philippines, but not for declaration of nullity of marriage
under Article 36 of the same Code. While this Court commiserates with
respondent Crasus for being continuously shackled to what is now a hopeless
and loveless marriage, this is one of those situations where neither law nor
society can provide the specific answer to every individual problem.|||
Facts: After the celebration of their marriage in 1961, Cracus discovered that
Fely was "hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant. In 1984, Fely left for the
US, leaving her 5 children with Cracus in the Philippines. She obtained a divorce
in the US shortly after and married an American citizen in 1985. In 1988, Fely
became an American citizen.
13 years after Fely left, Cracus Iyoy filed a petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage under Art. 36 of the Family Code. RTC declared their
marriage null and void ab initio. Petitioner Republic through the Solicitor

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General, believing that the decision was contrary to law and evidence, filed an
appeal with the CA which affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage is void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family
Code.
Held: The totality of evidence presented during trial is insufficient to support the
finding of psychological incapacity of Fely.|
Article 36 of the FC contemplates downright incapacity or inability to
take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations; not a mere
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse.
Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or
perversion, and abandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a finding of
psychological incapacity.
Fely's hot-temper, nagging, and extravagance; her abandonment of
respondent Crasus; her marriage to an American; and even her flaunting of her
American family and her American surname, may have hurt and embarrassed
respondent Crasus and the rest of the family. Nonetheless, such do not
satisfactorily establish a psychological or mental defect that is serious or grave,
and which has been in existence at the time of celebration of the marriage, and
is incurable.

57.
Ginez
v
Bugayong
G.R.
No.
L10033
December
28, 1956 By: Lea
Josef

At most, Fely's abandonment, sexual infidelity, and bigamy, give

respondent Crasus grounds to file for legal separation under Article 55 of the
Family Code of the Philippines, but they do not make the marriage void under
Art. 36.
Doctrine:
Granting that infidelities amounting to adultery were committed by the wife, the
act of the husband in persuading her to come along with him and the fact which
she went with him and together they slept as husband and wife deprives him as
the alleged offended spouse of any action for legal separation against the
offending wife because his said conduct comes within the restriction of article
100 of the Civil Code.
FACTS:
Benjamin Bugayong, a serviceman in the US Navy was married with Leonila
Ginez on August 1949 at Pangasinan while on furlough leave. Immediately
after the marriage, they lived with the sisters of Bugayong in said municipality
before he went back to duty. The couple came to an agreement that Ginez
would stay with his sisters who later moved in Manila. On or about July 1951,
she left the dwelling of the sisters-in-law and informed her husband by letter
that she had gone to Pangasinan to reside with her mother and later on moved
to Dagupan to study in a local college.Petitioner then began receiving letters
from Valeriana Polangco, (plaintiffs sister-in-law) and some from anonymous
writers, which were not produced at the hearing, informing him of alleged acts
of infidelity of his wife. He admitted that his wife informed him by letter that a
certain Eliong kissed her. All these communications, prompted him in October
1951 to seek the advice of the Navy Chaplain who asked him to consult with the
navy legal department.In August 1952, Bugayong went to Pangasinan and

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looked for his wife. They met in the house of the defendants godmother. They
proceeded to the house of Pedro, cousin of the plaintiff where they stayed for 1
day and 1 night as husband and wife. The next day, they slept together in their
own house. He tried to verify with Leonila the truth on the information he
received but instead of answering, she merely packed up and left which he took
as a confirmation of the acts of infidelity. He then filed a complaint for legal
separation.
ISSUE: Whether there was condonation between Bugayong and Ginez that may
serve as a ground for dismissal of the action.
HELD: Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground
for legal separation. A single voluntary act of marital intercourse between the
parties ordinarily is sufficient to constitute condonation and where the parties
live in the same house, it is presumed that they live on terms of matrimonial
cohabitation. Furthermore, Art. 100 of the Civil Code states that the legal
separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has
been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage.
58. CARMEN LAPUZ
SY vs. EUFEMIO S.
EUFEMIO G.R. No.
L-30977 January 31,
1972 By: Carmichael
Lapina

Doctrine: An action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff,
even if property rights are involved.
Facts: Carmen Lapuz-Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio
Eufemio in 1953. They were married civilly in 1934. They had lived together
until 1943 when her husband abandoned her. They acquired properties during
their marriage. Petitioner then discovered that her husband cohabited with Go
Hiok, a Chinese woman, in 1949. She prayed for the issuance of a decree of
legal separation, which, inter alia, would order that the defendant Eufemio
should be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership profits. Trial
proceeded and the parties adduced their respective evidence. However, before
the trial could be completed, petitioner died in a vehicular accident in 1969.
Eufemio moved to dismiss the petition for legal separation on the ground that
the death of Carmen abated the action for legal separation. Petitioners counsel
moved to substitute the deceased Carmen by her father, Macario Lapuz.
Issue: Whether or not an action for legal separation is abated by the death of
the plaintiff even if property rights are involved.
Held: Yes. An action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff,
even if property rights are involved because these rights are mere effects of
decree of separation, their source being the decree itself; without the decree
such rights do not come into existence, so that before the finality of a decree,
these claims are merely rights in expectation. If death supervenes during the
pendency of the action, no decree can be forthcoming, death producing a more
radical and definitive separation; and the expected consequential rights and
claims would necessarily remain unborn.

59. Cervantes
Fajardo

v.

Doctrine: In all cases involving the custody, care, education and property of
children, the latter's welfare is paramount. The provision that no mother shall

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GR 79955 1989
By: Nino Lina

[Type text]

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be separated from a child under five (5) years of age, will not apply where the
Court finds compelling reasons to rule otherwise. In all controversies regarding
the custody of minors, the foremost consideration is the moral, physical and
social welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the resources and
moral as well as social standing of the contending parents. Never has this Court
deviated from this criterion.
Facts:
A child was born on Feb 14, 1987 to respondents Conrado
Fajardo and Gina Carreon who are common law husband and wife. They offered
the child for adoption to Carreons sister and brother in law, herein Cervantes.
An affidavit of consent to the adoption of the child was executed by Gina
Carreon on 1987. The appropriate petition for adoption was filed by herein
petitioners over the child before the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, Fourth Judicial
District, Branch 67 which, on 20 August 1987, rendered a decision granting the
petition. The child was then known as Angelie Anne Fajardo. The court ordered
that the child be "freed from parental authority of her natural parents as well as
from legal obligation and maintenance to them.
Sometime in March or April 1987, the adoptive parents, herein
petitioners Nelson and Zenaida Cervantes, received a letter from the
respondents demanding to be paid the amount of P150,000.00, otherwise, they
would get back their child. Petitioners refused to accede to the demand. As a
result, on 11 September 1987, while petitioners were out at work, the
respondent Gina Carreon took the child from her "yaya" at the petitioners'
residence in Angono, Rizal, on the pretext that she was instructed to do so by
her mother. Respondent Gina Carreon brought the child to her house in
Paraaque. Petitioners thereupon demanded the return of the child, but Gina
Carreon refused, saying that she had no desire to give up her child for adoption
and that the affidavit of consent to the adoption she had executed was not fully
explained to her. She sent word to the petitioners that she will, however, return
the child to the petitioners if she were paid the amount of P150,000.00.
Issue:
W/N Gina Carreon has the right to have the custody of her
natural child who is below 7 years old?
Held: No. In all cases involving the custody, care, education and property of
children, the latter's welfare is paramount. The provision that no mother shall
be separated from a child under five (5) years of age, will not apply where the
Court finds compelling reasons to rule otherwise. In all controversies regarding
the custody of minors, the foremost consideration is the moral, physical and
social welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the resources and
moral as well as social standing of the contending parents. Never has this Court
deviated from this criterion.
It is undisputed that respondent Conrado Fajardo is legally married to a woman
other than respondent Gina Carreon, and his relationship with the latter is a
common-law husband and wife relationship. His open cohabitation with corespondent Gina Carreon will not accord the minor that desirable atmosphere
where she can grow and develop into an upright and moral-minded
person. Besides, respondent Gina Carreon had previously given birth to another
child by another married man with whom she lived for almost three (3) years
but who eventually left her and vanished. For a minor (like Angelie Anne C.
Cervantes) to grow up with a sister whose "father" is not her true father, could

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60.
REYNALDO
ESPIRITU
and
GUILLERMA
LAYUG, petitioners,
vs.
COURT
OF
APPEALS
and
TERESITA
MASAUDING,
respondents
Case
Report
by:
Lipnica, Mary Joan

Family Code

4S

also affect the moral outlook and values of said minor. Upon the other hand,
petitioners who are legally married appear to be morally, physically, financially,
and socially capable of supporting the minor and giving her a future better than
what the natural mother (herein respondent Gina Carreon), who is not only
jobless but also maintains an illicit relation with a married man, can most likely
give her.
DOCTRINE:
The task of choosing the parent to whom custody shall be awarded is not
a ministerial function to be determined by a simple determination of the age of
a minor child. Whether a child is under or over seven years of age, the
paramount criterion must always be the child's interests. Discretion is given to
the court to decide who can best assure the welfare of the child, and award the
custody on the basis of that consideration.
FACTS:
At Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu and respondent
Teresita Masauding began with a common law relationship. Their relationship
resulted to Rosalind, their daughter who was born on August 16, 1986. When
they were on brief vacation in the Philippines, they got married. Upon returning
to United States, their second child Reginald Vince was born.
On January 12, 1988. Their relationship went sour and they decided to separate
some time on 1990. Instead of giving their marriage a change as allegedly
pleaded by Reynaldo, Teresita left Reynaldo and the children and went back to
California. Reynaldo brought his children home to the Philippines, but he was
sent back by his company to Pittsburg. He had to leave his children with his
sister, co petitioner Guillerma Layug.
Teresita claims that she did not immediately follow her children because
she was afraid of being arrested since Reynaldo had filed a criminal case for
bigamy against her. On 1992, she returned to the Philippines and filed the
petition of writ of habeaus corpus to gain custody over her children. The trial
court favored Reynaldo for the children chose him over their mother. However,
the Court of Appeal reversed the trial courts decision. Petitioner filed for review
to the Supreme Court contending that the Court of Appeals awarded the
custody of the children to the mother through an automatic and blind
application of the age proviso that children below 7 shall not be separated from
their mothers.
ISSUE:
Whether or not custody of the children should be awarded to the
mother.
HELD:
In ascertaining the best interest of the child, courts are mandated by the
Family Code to take into account all relevant considerations. If a child is under
seven years old, the law presumes the mother is the best custodian. However,
it is not conclusive. It can be overcome by compelling reason. If a child is over
seven, his choice is paramount but the court is not bound by that choice. In its
discretion the court may find the chosen parent unfit and award custody to the
other parent, or even to third party as it deem fit under the circumstances.
Both children Reginald Vince and Rosalind are now over 7 years old, capable of
fair and intelligent decision. Their best interest would be better served in an
environment characterized by emotional stability and a certain degree of

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material sufficiency for which they mother Teresita sorely is incapable or

lacking. There is nothing in the records to show that Reynaldo is unfit under
the Family Code. Moreover, the childrens clear choice is their father.

Obligations Between Husband and Wife

61. Goitia
vs.
Campos-Rueda
G.R.
No.
11263
No
vember 2, 1916
by: Marco Miguel
E. Lozada

DOCTRINE:
Where a person by his wrongful and illegal acts creates a condition which
under ordinary circumstances would produce the loss of rights or status pertaining
to another, the law will, whenever necessary to protect fully the rights or status of
the person affected by such acts, regard the condition by such acts created as not
existing and will recur to and act upon the original situation of the parties to
determine their relative rights or the status of the person adversely affected.
FACTS:
Eloisa Goitia, plaintiff-appellant, and Jose Campos-Rueda, defendant, were
legally married in the city of Manila. They established their residence 115 Calle San
Marcelino, where they lived together for about a month. However, the plaintiff
returned to the home of her parents.
The allegations of the complaint were that the defendant, one month after
they had contracted marriage, demanded plaintiff to perform unchaste and
lascivious acts on his genital organs in which the latter reject the said
demands. With these refusals, the defendant got irritated and provoked to
maltreat the plaintiff by word and deed. Unable to induce the defendant to desist
from his repugnant desires and cease of maltreating her, plaintiff was obliged to
leave the conjugal abode and take refuge in the home of her parents.
Plaintiff appeals for a complaint against her husband for support outside of
the conjugal domicile. However, the defendant objects that the facts alleged in the
complaint do not state a cause of action.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Goitia can claim for support outside of the
conjugal domicile.
RULING:
Marriage is something more than a mere contract. It is a new relation, the
rights, duties and obligations of which rest not upon the agreement of the parties
but upon the general law which defines and prescribes those rights, duties and
obligations. When the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance
intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no possible good to the
community, relief in some way should be obtainable.
The law provides that defendant, who is obliged to support the wife, may
fulfill this obligation either by paying her a fixed pension or by maintaining her in
his own home at his option. However, the option given by law is not absolute. The
law will not permit the defendant to evade or terminate his obligation to support
his wife if the wife was forced to leave the conjugal abode because of the lewd
designs and physical assaults of the defendant, Beatriz may claim support from the
defendant for separate maintenance even outside of the conjugal home.

62. Arroyo vs.

Vasquez 42 Phil
54 By: Christian
Lugtu

DOCTRINE:
Upon examination of the authorities we are convinced that it is not within
the province of the courts of this country to attempt to compel one of the spouses

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to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other. Of course where the
property rights of one of the pair are invaded, an action for restitution of such
rights can be maintained.
FACTS:
Plaintiff Mariano and defendant Dolores were married in 1910, and lived in
Iloilo City. They lived together with a few short intervals of separation. On July 4,
1920, defendant Dolores went away from their common home and decided to live
separately from plaintiff. She claimed that she was compelled to leave on the
basis of cruel treatment on the part of her husband. She in turn prayed for a
decree of separation, a liquidation of their conjugal partnership, and an allowance
for counsel fees and permanent separate maintenance.
CFI ruled in favor of the defendant and she was granted alimony amounting
to P400, also other fees
Plaintiff then asked for a restitution of conjugal rights, and a permanent
mandatory injunction requiring the defendant to return to the conjugal home and
live with him as his wife.
ISSUES:
1. WON defendant had sufficient cause for leaving the conjugal home
2. WON plaintiff may be granted the restitution of conjugal rights or
absolute order or permanent mandatory injunction
HELD:
1. The wife had sufficient cause for leaving the conjugal home. Cruelty done
by plaintiff to defendant was greatly exaggerated. The wife was inflicted with a
disposition of jealousy towards her husband in an aggravated degree. No sufficient
cause was present.
Courts should move with caution in enforcing the duty to provide for the
separate maintenance of the wife since this recognizes the de facto separation of
the two parties. Continued cohabitation of the pair must be seen as impossible,
and separation must be necessary, stemming from the fault of the husband. She is
under obligation to return to the domicile.
2. On granting the restitution of conjugal rights. It is not within the
province of the courts to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render
conjugal rights to, the other. In the case of property rights, such an action may be
maintained. Said order, at best, would have no other purpose than to compel the
spouses to live together. Other countries, such as England and Scotland have
done this with much criticism.
Plaintiff is entitled to a judicial declaration that the defendant absented
herself without sufficient cause and it is her duty to return. She is also not entitled
to support.

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