Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

SULTAN YAHYA JERRY M.

TOMAWIS vs. HON. RASAD G. BALINDONG, AMNA A. PUMBAYA, JALILAH A. MANGOMPIA,
and RAMLA A. MUSOR
VELASCO, JR., J.:
This petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus under Rule 65 seeks to nullify the
Orders dated July 13, 2005, September 6, 2005, and February 6, 2008 issued by respondent
Judge Rasad G. Balindong of the Sharia District Court (SDC), Fourth Judicial District in Marawi
City, in Civil Case No. 102-97 entitled Amna A. Pumbaya, et al. v. Jerry Tomawis, et al.
The Facts
Private respondents Amna A. Pumbaya, Jalilah A. Mangompia, and Ramla A. Musor are
the daughters of the late Acraman Radia. On February 21, 1997, private respondents filed with
the SDC an action for quieting of title of a parcel of land located in Banggolo, Marawi City,
against petitioner Sultan Jerry Tomawis and one Mangoda Radia. In their complaint, styled as
Petition[1] and docketed as Civil Case No. 102-97, private respondents, as plaintiffs a quo,
alleged the following:
(1) They were the absolute owners of the lot subject of the complaint, being the legal
heirs of Acraman Radia, who had always been in peaceful, continuous, and adverse possession
of the property; (2) Tomawis assumed ownership of the said property on the claim that he
bought the same from Mangoda Radia, who, in turn, claimed that he inherited it from his late
father; (3) in 1996, they were informed that their land *was+ leveled and the small houses
[built] thereon with their permission were removed upon the orders of Tomawis; and (4) they
had been unlawfully deprived of their possession of the land, and Tomawis actions had cast a
cloud of doubt on their title.
In his answer, Tomawis debunked the sisters claim of ownership and raised, as one of
his affirmative defenses treated by the court as a motion to dismiss, SDCs lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the case.[2] As argued, the regular civil court, not SDC, had such

jurisdiction pursuant to Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 129 or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980.[3]
Following the hearing on the affirmative defenses, respondent Judge Rasad Balindong,
by Order of April 1, 2003, denied the motion. Apropos the jurisdiction aspect of the motion,
respondent judge asserted the SDCs original jurisdiction over the case, concurrently with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), by force of Article 143, paragraph 2(b) of Presidential Decree No.
(PD) 1083 or the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines.
On June 16, 2005, Tomawis filed an Urgent Motion to Dismiss with Prayer to Correct the
Name of Defendants to Read Sultan Yahya Jerry M. Tomawis & Mangoda M. Radia.[4] In it, he
alleged that title to or possession of real property or interest in it was clearly the subject matter
of the complaint which, thus, brought it within the original exclusive jurisdiction of the regular
courts in consonance with existing law. [5] On July 13, 2005, the SDC denied this motion to
dismiss.
Unsatisfied, Tomawis later interposed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration with Prayer
to Cancel and Reset the Continuation of Trial Until After the Resolution of the Pending
Incident.[6] Per Order[7] dated September 6, 2005, the SDC denied Tomawis urgent motion for
reconsideration and ordered the continuation of trial.
Forthwith, Tomawis repaired to the Court of Appeals (CA), Mindanao Station, on a
petition for certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition under Rule 65 to nullify, on jurisdictional
grounds, the aforesaid SDC July 13, 2005 and September 6, 2005 Orders.
By Resolution[8] of February 8, 2006, the appellate court dismissed the petition on the
ground that the CA was not empowered to resolve decisions, orders or final judgments of the
*SDCs+. Justifying its disposition, the CA held that, pursuant to Art. 145 [9] of PD 1083, in relation
to Art. VIII, Section 9[10] of Republic Act No. (RA) 9054,[11] the new organic law of the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, final decisions of the SDC are reviewable by the yet
to be established Sharia Appellate Court. Pending the reorganization of the Sharia Appellate
Court, the CA ruled that such intermediate appellate jurisdiction rests with the Supreme Court.
Undeterred by the foregoing setback before the CA, Tomawis interposed, on January 29,
2008, before the SDC another motion to dismiss on the same grounds as his previous motions
to dismiss. The motion was rejected by respondent Judge Balindong per his order of February
6, 2008, denying the motion with finality.

Hence, this recourse on the sole issue of:

WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN DENYING PETITIONERS MOTIONS TO DISMISS ON THE GROUND
OF LACK OF JURISDICTION AND IN DENYING PETITIONERS MOTION SEEKING
RECONSIDERATION OF THE ORDER DENYING HIS MOTION TO DISMISS.
Simply put, the issue is whether or not the SDC can validly take cognizance
of Civil Case No. 102-97.
The Courts Ruling
Prefatorily, the Court acknowledges the fact that decades after the enactment in 1989 of
the law[12] creating the Sharia Appellate Court and after the Court, per Resolution of June 8,
1999,[13] authorized its creation, the Sharia Appellate Court has yet to be organized with the
appointment of a Presiding Justice and two Associate Justices. Until such time that the Sharia
Appellate Court shall have been organized, however, appeals or petitions from final orders or
decisions of the SDC filed with the CA shall be referred to a Special Division to be organized in
any of the CA stations preferably composed of Muslim CA Justices.
For cases where only errors or questions of law are raised or involved, the appeal shall be
to this Court by a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court pursuant
to Art. VIII, Sec. 5 of the Constitution and Sec. 2 of Rule 41 of the Rules.
To be sure, the Court has, on several occasions, passed upon and resolved petitions and
cases emanating from Sharia courts. Among these was one involving the issue of whether or
not grave abuse of discretion attended the denial of a motion to implement a writ of
execution.[14] Still another involved the Sharia courts jurisdiction in custody and guardianship
proceedings,[15] nullity of marriage and divorce when the parties were both married in civil and
Muslim rites,[16] and settlement of estate proceedings where the deceased was alleged to be
not a Muslim,[17] or where the estate covered properties situated in different provinces.[18]
The instant petition, involving only a question of law on the jurisdiction of the SDC over a
complaint for quieting of title, was properly instituted before the Court.

Petitioner asserts that Sec. 19(2), in relation to Sec. 33(3) of BP 129, as amendedby
vesting original exclusive jurisdiction to the RTCs or Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs), as the case
may be, over civil actions that involve the title to, or possession of, real propertyeffectively
removed the concurrent jurisdiction once pertaining to the SDC under Art. 143(2)(b) of PD
1083. In fine, petitioner contends that Art. 143 of PD 1083, insofar as it granted the SDC
concurrent jurisdiction over certain real actions, was repealed by the BP 129 provisions
adverted to.
Disagreeing as to be expected, private respondents balk at the notion of the implied
repeal petitioner espouses, arguing that PD 1083, being a special, albeit a prior, law, has not
been repealed by BP 129. Putting private respondents contention in a narrower perspective,
Art. 143(2)(b) of PD 1083 is of specific applicability and, hence, cannot, under the rules of legal
hermeneutics, be superseded by laws of general application, absent an express repeal.
Petitioners claim has no basis.
The allegations, as well as the relief sought by private respondents, the elimination of
the cloud of doubts on the title of ownership[19] on the subject land, are within the SDCs
jurisdiction to grant.
A brief background. The Judiciary Act of 1948 (RA 296) was enacted on June 17, 1948. It
vested the Courts of First Instance with original jurisdiction:

(b) In all civil actions which involve the title to or possession of real
property, or any interest therein, or the legality of any tax, impost or
assessment, except actions of forcible entry into and detainer on lands or
buildings, original jurisdiction of which is conferred by this Act upon city and
municipal courts.[20] x x x

Subsequently, PD 1083, dated February 4, 1977, created the Sharia courts, i.e., the SDC
and the Sharia Circuit Court, both of limited jurisdiction. In Republic v. Asuncion,[21] the Court,
citing the Administrative Code of 1987,[22] classified Sharia courts as regular courts, meaning
they are part of the judicial department.

Art. 143 of PD 1083 vests SDCs, in certain cases, with exclusive original jurisdiction and
with concurrent original jurisdiction over certain causes of action. As far as relevant, Art. 143
reads as follows:
ARTICLE 143. Original jurisdiction. (1) The Sharia District Court shall
have exclusive original jurisdiction over:
xxxx
d) All actions arising from customary contracts in which the parties are
Muslims, if they have not specified which law shall govern their relations; and
xxxx
(2) Concurrently with existing civil courts, the Sharia District Court shall have
original jurisdiction over:
xxxx
(b) All other personal and real actions not mentioned in paragraph 1
(d) wherein the parties involved are Muslims except those for forcible entry
and unlawful detainer, which shall fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction of
the Municipal Circuit Court. (Emphasis added.)

On August 14, 1981, BP 129 took effect. Sec. 19 of BP 129, as later amended by RA
7691,[23] defining the jurisdiction of the RTCs, provides:
Section 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, is hereby amended to read as follows:
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases.Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction:
xxxx
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property,
or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved
exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000,00) or, for civil actions in Metro
Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except
actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original

jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts,

Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. (Emphasis supplied.)

As things stood prior to the effectivity date of BP 129, the SDC had, by virtue of PD 1083,
original jurisdiction, concurrently with the RTCs and MTCs, over all personal and real actions
outside the purview of Art. 143(1)(d) of PD 1083, in which the parties involved were Muslims,
except those for ejectment. Personal action is one that is founded on privity of contracts
between the parties;[24] and in which the plaintiff usually seeks the recovery of personal
property, the enforcement of a contract, or recovery of damages.[25] Real action, on the other
hand, is one anchored on the privity of real estate,[26] where the plaintiff seeks the recovery of
ownership or possession of real property or interest in it.[27]
On the other hand, BP 129, as amended, vests the RTC or the municipal trial court with
exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions that involve the title to or possession of real
property, or any interest in it, and the value of the property subject of the case or the
jurisdictional amount, determining whether the case comes within the jurisdictional
competence of the RTC or the MTC. Orbeta v. Orbeta[28] differentiated personal action from
real action in the following wise:
A real action, under Sec. 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, is one that affects
title to or possession of real property, or an interest therein. Such actions should
be commenced and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction over the area
wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated. All other
actions are personal and may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any
of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal
defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be
found, at the election of the plaintiff.

Civil Case No. 102-97, judging from the averments in the underlying complaint, is
basically a suit for recovery of possession and eventual reconveyance of real property which,
under BP 129, as amended, falls within the original jurisdiction of either the RTC or MTC. In an
action for reconveyance, all that must be alleged in the complaint are two facts that, admitting
them to be true, would entitle the plaintiff to recover title to the disputed land, namely: (1) that
the plaintiff is the owner of the land or has possessed the land in the concept of owner; and (2)
that the defendant has illegally dispossessed the plaintiff of the land.[29] A cursory perusal of
private respondents complaint readily shows that that these requisites have been met: they
alleged absolute ownership of the subject parcel of land, and they were illegally dispossessed of

their land by petitioner. The allegations in the complaint, thus, make a case for an action for
reconveyance.
Given the above perspective, the question that comes to the fore is whether the
jurisdiction of the RTC or MTC is to the exclusion of the SDC.
Petitioners version of the law would effectively remove the concurrent original
jurisdiction granted by Art. 143, par. 2(b) of PD 1083 to civil courts and Sharia courts over,
among others:
All other personal and real actions not mentioned in paragraph 1 (d) wherein the
parties involved are Muslims except those for forcible entry and unlawful
detainer, which shall fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal
Circuit Court. x x x
Petitioners interpretation of the law cannot be given serious thought. One must bear in
mind that even if Sharia courts are considered regular courts, these are courts of limited
jurisdiction. As we have observed in Rulona-Al Awadhi v. Astih,[30] the Code of Muslim Personal
Laws creating said courts was promulgated to fulfill the aspiration of the Filipino Muslims to
have their system of laws enforced in their communities. It is a special law intended for
Filipino Muslims, as clearly stated in the purpose of PD 1083:
ARTICLE 2. Purpose of Code. Pursuant to Section 11 of Article XV of the
Constitution of the Philippines, which provides that The State shall consider the
customs, traditions, beliefs and interests of national cultural communities in the
formulation and implementation of state policies, this Code:
(a) Recognizes the legal system of the Muslims in the Philippines as part
of the law of the land and seeks to make Islamic institutions more effective;
(b) Codifies Muslim personal laws; and
(c) Provides for an effective administration and enforcement of Muslim
personal laws among Muslims.
A reading of the pertinent provisions of BP 129 and PD 1083 shows that the former, a law
of general application to civil courts, has no application to, and does not repeal, the provisions
found in PD 1083, a special law, which only refers to Sharia courts.

A look at the scope of BP 129 clearly shows that Sharia courts were not included in the
reorganization of courts that were formerly organized under RA 296. The pertinent provision in
BP 129 states:
SECTION 2. Scope. The reorganization herein provided shall include the
Court of Appeals, the Court of First Instance, the Circuit Criminal Courts, the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, the Courts of Agrarian Relations, the
City Courts, the Municipal Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Courts.
As correctly pointed out by private respondents in their Comment, [31] BP 129 was enacted
to reorganize only existing civil courts and is a law of general application to the judiciary. In
contrast, PD 1083 is a special law that only applies to Sharia courts.
We have held that a general law and a special law on the same subject are statutes in pari
materia and should be read together and harmonized, if possible, with a view to giving effect
to both.[32] In the instant case, we apply the principle generalia specialibus non derogant. A
general law does not nullify a special law. The general law will yield to the special law in the
specific and particular subject embraced in the latter.[33] We must read and construe BP 129
and PD 1083 together, then by taking PD 1083 as an exception to the general law to reconcile
the two laws. This is so since the legislature has not made any express repeal or modification of
PD 1083, and it is well-settled that repeals of statutes by implication are not
favored.[34] Implied repeals will not be declared unless the intent of the legislators is
manifest. Laws are assumed to be passed only after careful deliberation and with knowledge of
all existing ones on the subject, and it follows that the legislature did not intend to interfere
with or abrogate a former law relating to the same subject matter.[35]
In order to give effect to both laws at hand, we must continue to recognize the
concurrent jurisdiction enjoyed by SDCs with that of RTCs under PD 1083.
Moreover, the jurisdiction of the court below cannot be made to depend upon defenses
set up in the answer, in a motion to dismiss, or in a motion for reconsideration, but only upon
the allegations of the complaint.[36] Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is determined
from the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought.[37] In the instant
case, private respondents petition[38] in Civil Case No. 102-97 sufficiently alleged the
concurrent original jurisdiction of the SDC.

While we recognize the concurrent jurisdiction of the SDCs and the RTCs with respect to
cases involving only Muslims, the SDC has exclusive original jurisdiction over all actions arising
from contracts customary to Muslims[39] to the exclusion of the RTCs, as the exception under PD
1083, while both courts have concurrent original jurisdiction over all other personal actions.
Said jurisdictional conferment, found in Art. 143 of PD 1083, is applicable solely when both
parties are Muslims and shall not be construed to operate to the prejudice of a nonMuslim,[40] who may be the opposing party against a Muslim.
Given petitioners flawed arguments, we hold that the respondent court did not commit
any grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion is present when there is an arbitrary
exercise of power owing from passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; or a whimsical, arbitrary,
or capricious exercise of power that amounts to a shirking from or refusal to perform a positive
duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law. The abuse of discretion must be
patent and gross for the act to be held as one made with grave abuse of discretion. [41] We find
respondent courts issuance of the assailed orders justified and with no abuse of discretion. Its
reliance on the provisions of PD 1083 in asserting its jurisdiction was sound and unassailable.
We close with the observation that what is involved here are not only errors of law, but
also the errors of a litigant and his lawyer. As may have been noted, petitioner Tomawis
counsel veritably filed two (2) motions to dismiss, each predicated on the sole issue of
jurisdiction. The first may have been understandable. But the second motion was something
else, interposed as it was after the CA, by resolution, denied Tomawis petition for certiorari for
want of jurisdiction on the part of the appellate court to review judgments or orders of the SDC.
The CA stated the observation, however, that Tomawis and his counsel may repair to this Court
while the Sharia Appellate Court has yet to be organized. Petitioner waited two years after the
CA issued its denial before filing what virtually turned out to be his second motion to dismiss,
coming finally to this Court after the same motion was denied. The Court must express
disapproval of the cunning effort of Tomawis and his counsel to use procedural rules to the hilt
to prolong the final disposition of this case. From Alonso v. Villamor,[42] almost a century-old
decision, the Court has left no doubt that it frowns on such unsporting practice. The rule is
settled that a question of jurisdiction, as here, may be raised at any time, even on appeal,
provided its application does not result in a mockery of the basic tenets of fair
play.[43] Petitioners action at the later stages of the proceedings below, doubtless taken upon
counsels advice, is less than fair and constitutes censurable conduct. Lawyers and litigants
must be brought to account for their improper conduct, which trenches on the efficient
dispensation of justice.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Petitioner Yahya Jerry
Tomawis and Atty. Edgar A. Masorong are ADMONISHED to refrain from engaging in activities
tending to frustrate the orderly and speedy administration of justice, with a warning that
repetition of the same or similar acts may result in the imposition of a more severe sanction.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice

LUISA KHO MONTAER, ALEJANDRO MONTAER, JR., LILLIBETH MONTAER-BARRIOS, AND

RHODORA ELEANOR MONTAER-DALUPAN VS. SHARIA DISTRICT COURT, FOURTH SHARIA
JUDICIAL DISTRICT, MARAWI CITY, LILING DISANGCOPAN, AND ALMAHLEEN LILING S.
MONTAER
PUNO, C.J.:
This Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition seeks to set aside the Orders of the Sharia District
Court, Fourth Sharia Judicial District, Marawi City, dated August 22, 2006[1] and September 21,
2006.[2]
On August 17, 1956, petitioner Luisa Kho Montaer, a Roman Catholic, married Alejandro
Montaer, Sr. at the Immaculate Conception Parish in Cubao, Quezon City.[3] Petitioners
Alejandro Montaer, Jr., Lillibeth Montaer-Barrios, and Rhodora Eleanor Montaer-Dalupan
are their children.[4] On May 26, 1995, Alejandro Montaer, Sr. died.[5]
On August 19, 2005, private respondents Liling Disangcopan and her daughter, Almahleen
Liling S. Montaer, both Muslims, filed a Complaint for the judicial partition of properties
before the Sharia District Court.[6] The said complaint was entitled Almahleen Liling S.
Montaer and Liling M. Disangcopan v. the Estates and Properties of Late Alejandro Montaer,
Sr., Luisa Kho Montaer, Lillibeth K. Montaer, Alejandro Kho Montaer, Jr., and Rhodora
Eleanor K. Montaer, and docketed as Special Civil Action No. 7-05.[7] In the said complaint,

private respondents made the following allegations: (1) in May 1995, Alejandro Montaer, Sr.
died; (2) the late Alejandro Montaer, Sr. is a Muslim; (3) petitioners are the first family of the
decedent; (4) Liling Disangcopan is the widow of the decedent;
Montaer is the daughter of the decedent; and

(5) Almahleen Liling S.

(6) the estimated value of and a list of the

properties comprising the estate of the decedent.[8] Private respondents prayed for the Sharia
District Court to order, among others, the following: (1) the partition of the estate of the
decedent; and (2) the appointment of an administrator for the estate of the decedent.[9]
Petitioners filed an Answer with a Motion to Dismiss mainly on the following grounds: (1)
the Sharia District Court has no jurisdiction over the estate of the late Alejandro Montaer, Sr.,
because he was a Roman Catholic; (2) private respondents failed to pay the correct amount of
docket fees; and (3) private respondents complaint is barred by prescription, as it seeks to
establish filiation between Almahleen Liling S. Montaer and the decedent, pursuant to Article
175 of the Family Code.[10]
On November 22, 2005, the Sharia District Court dismissed the private respondents
complaint. The district court held that Alejandro Montaer, Sr. was not a Muslim, and its
jurisdiction extends only to the settlement and distribution of the estate of deceased
Muslims.[11]
On December 12, 2005, private respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration. [12] On
December 28, 2005, petitioners filed an Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration, alleging
that the motion for reconsideration lacked a notice of hearing.[13] On January 17, 2006, the
Sharia District Court denied petitioners opposition.[14] Despite finding that the said motion for
reconsideration lacked notice of hearing, the district court held that such defect was cured as
petitioners were notified of the existence of the pleading, and it took cognizance of the said
motion.[15] The Sharia District Court also reset the hearing for the motion for
reconsideration.[16]
In its first assailed order dated August 22, 2006, the Sharia District Court reconsidered
its order of dismissal dated November 22, 2005.[17] The district court allowed private
respondents to adduce further evidence.[18] In its second assailed order dated September 21,

2006, the Sharia District Court ordered the continuation of trial, trial on the merits,
adducement of further evidence, and pre-trial conference.[19]
Seeking recourse before this Court, petitioners raise the following issues:
I.
RESPONDENT SHARIA DISTRICT COURT MARAWI CITY LACKS JURISDICTION
OVER PETITIONERS WHO ARE ROMAN CATHOLICS AND NON-MUSLIMS.

II.

RESPONDENT SHARIA DISTRICT COURT MARAWI CITY DID NOT ACQUIRE

JURISDICTION OVER THE ESTATES AND PROPERTIES OF THE LATE ALEJANDRO
MONTAER, SR. WHICH IS NOT A NATURAL OR JURIDICAL PERSON WITH
CAPACITY TO BE SUED.

III.

RESPONDENT SHARIA DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER

THE COMPLAINT OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS AGAINST PETITIONERS DUE TO
NON-PAYMENT OF THE FILING AND DOCKETING FEES.
IV.

RESPONDENT SHARIA DISTRICT COURTMARAWI CITY COMMITTED GRAVE

ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DENIED
THE OPPOSITION OF PETITIONERS AND THEN GRANTED THE MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION OF RESPONDENTS LILING DISANGCOPAN, ET AL. WHICH WAS
FATALLY DEFECTIVE FOR LACK OF A NOTICE OF HEARING.

V.

RESPONDENT SHARIA DISTRICT COURTMARAWI CITY COMMITTED GRAVE

ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT SET
SPL. CIVIL ACTION 7-05 FOR TRIAL EVEN IF THE COMPLAINT PLAINLY REVEALS
THAT RESPONDENT ALMAHLEEN LILING S. MONTAER SEEKS RECOGNITION
FROM ALEJANDRO MONTAER, SR. WHICH CAUSE OF ACTION PRESCRIBED
UPON THE DEATH OF ALEJANDRO MONTAER, SR. ON MAY 26, 1995.

In their Comment to the Petition for Certiorari, private respondents stress that the Sharia
District Court must be given the opportunity to hear and decide the question of whether the
decedent is a Muslim in order to determine whether it has jurisdiction. [20]
Jurisdiction: Settlement of the Estate of Deceased Muslims
Petitioners first argument, regarding the Sharia District Courts jurisdiction, is
dependent on a question of fact, whether the late Alejandro Montaer, Sr. is a Muslim.
Inherent in this argument is the premise that there has already been a determination
resolving such a question of fact. It bears emphasis, however, that the assailed orders did
not determine whether the decedent is a Muslim. The assailed orders did, however, set a
hearing for the purpose of resolving this issue.
Article 143(b) of Presidential Decree No. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, provides that the Sharia District Courts have
exclusive original jurisdiction over the settlement of the estate of deceased Muslims:
ARTICLE 143. Original jurisdiction. (1) The Shari'a District Court shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction over:
xxxx
(b) All cases involving disposition, distribution and settlement of the estate of
deceased Muslims, probate of wills, issuance of letters of administration or

appointment of administrators or executors regardless of the nature or the

aggregate value of the property.
The determination of the nature of an action or proceeding is controlled by the averments and
character of the relief sought in the complaint or petition.[21] The designation given by parties to
their own pleadings does not necessarily bind the courts to treat it according to the said
designation. Rather than rely on a falsa descriptio or defective caption, courts are guided by
the substantive averments of the pleadings.[22]
Although private respondents designated the pleading filed before the Sharia District
Court as a Complaint for judicial partition of properties, it is a petition for the issuance of
letters of administration, settlement, and distribution of the estate of the decedent. It contains
sufficient jurisdictional facts required for the settlement of the estate of a deceased
Muslim,[23] such as the fact of Alejandro Montaer, Sr.s death as well as the allegation that he
is a Muslim. The said petition also contains an enumeration of the names of his legal heirs, so
far as known to the private respondents, and a probable list of the properties left by the
decedent, which are the very properties sought to be settled before a probate court.
Furthermore, the reliefs prayed for reveal that it is the intention of the private respondents to
seek judicial settlement of the estate of the decedent.[24] These include the following: (1) the
prayer for the partition of the estate of the decedent; and (2) the prayer for the appointment of
an administrator of the said estate.
We cannot agree with the contention of the petitioners that the district court does not
have jurisdiction over the case because of an allegation in their answer with a motion to dismiss
that Montaer, Sr. is not a Muslim. Jurisdiction of a court over the nature of the action and its
subject matter does not depend upon the defenses set forth in an answer [25] or a motion to
dismiss.[26] Otherwise, jurisdiction would depend almost entirely on the defendant[27] or result
in having a case either thrown out of court or its proceedings unduly delayed by simple
stratagem.[28] Indeed, the defense of lack of jurisdiction which is dependent on a question of
fact does not render the court to lose or be deprived of its jurisdiction. [29]
The same rationale applies to an answer with a motion to dismiss.[30] In the case at bar,
the Sharia District Court is not deprived of jurisdiction simply because petitioners raised as a

defense the allegation that the deceased is not a Muslim. The Sharia District Court has the
authority to hear and receive evidence to determine whether it has jurisdiction, which requires
an a priori determination that the deceased is a Muslim. If after hearing, the Sharia District
Court determines that the deceased was not in fact a Muslim, the district court should dismiss
the case for lack of jurisdiction.
Special Proceedings
The underlying assumption in petitioners second argument, that the proceeding before
the Sharia District Court is an ordinary civil action against a deceased person, rests on an
erroneous understanding of the proceeding before the court a quo. Part of the confusion may
be attributed to the proceeding before the Sharia District Court, where the parties were
designated either as plaintiffs or defendants and the case was denominated as a special civil
action. We reiterate that the proceedings before the court a quo are for the issuance of letters
of administration, settlement, and distribution of the estate of the deceased, which is a special
proceeding. Section 3(c) of the Rules of Court (Rules) defines a special proceeding as a remedy
by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. This Court has applied
the Rules, particularly the rules on special proceedings, for the settlement of the estate of a
deceased Muslim.[31] In a petition for the issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and
distribution of estate, the applicants seek to establish the fact of death of the decedent and
later to be duly recognized as among the decedents heirs, which would allow them to exercise
their right to participate in the settlement and liquidation of the estate of the
decedent.[32]Here, the respondents seek to establish the fact of Alejandro Montaer, Sr.s death
and, subsequently, for private respondent Almahleen Liling S. Montaer to be recognized as
among his heirs, if such is the case in fact.
Petitioners argument, that the prohibition against a decedent or his estate from being a
party defendant in a civil action[33] applies to a special proceeding such as the settlement of the
estate of the deceased, is misplaced. Unlike a civil action which has definite adverse parties, a
special proceeding has no definite adverse party. The definitions of a civil action and a special
proceeding, respectively, in the Rules illustrate this difference. A civil action, in which a party
sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a

wrong[34] necessarily has definite adverse parties, who are either the plaintiff or
defendant.[35] On the other hand, a special proceeding, by which a party seeks to establish a
status, right, or a particular fact,[36] has one definite party, who petitions or applies for a
declaration of a status, right, or particular fact, but no definite adverse party. In the case at bar,
it bears emphasis that the estate of the decedent is not being sued for any cause of action. As a
special proceeding, the purpose of the settlement of the estate of the decedent is to determine
all the assets of the estate,[37] pay its liabilities,[38] and to distribute the residual to those
entitled to the same.[39]
Docket Fees
Petitioners third argument, that jurisdiction was not validly acquired for nonpayment of docket fees, is untenable. Petitioners point to private respondents petition in
the proceeding before the court a quo, which contains an allegation estimating the
decedents estate as the basis for the conclusion that what private respondents paid as
docket fees was insufficient. Petitioners argument essentially involves two aspects: (1)
whether the clerk of court correctly assessed the docket fees; and (2) whether private
respondents paid the correct assessment of the docket fees.
Filing the appropriate initiatory pleading and the payment of the prescribed docket
fees vest a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter. [40] If the party filing the case
paid less than the correct amount for the docket fees because that was the amount
assessed by the clerk of court, the responsibility of making a deficiency assessment lies with
the same clerk of court.[41] In such a case, the lower court concerned will not automatically
lose jurisdiction, because of a partys reliance on the clerk of courts insufficient assessment
of the docket fees.[42] As every citizen has the right to assume and trust that a public officer
charged by law with certain duties knows his duties and performs them in accordance with
law, the party filing the case cannot be penalized with the clerk of courts insufficient
assessment.[43] However, the party concerned will be required to pay the deficiency.[44]
In the case at bar, petitioners did not present the clerk of courts assessment of the
docket fees. Moreover, the records do not include this assessment. There can be no

determination of whether private respondents correctly paid the docket fees without the
clerk of courts assessment.
Exception to Notice of Hearing
Petitioners fourth argument, that private respondents motion for reconsideration
before the Sharia District Court is defective for lack of a notice of hearing, must fail as the
unique circumstances in the present case constitute an exception to this requirement. The
Rules require every written motion to be set for hearing by the applicant and to address the
notice of hearing to all parties concerned.[45] The Rules also provide that no written motion set
for hearing shall be acted upon by the court without proof of service thereof. [46] However, the
Rules allow a liberal construction of its provisions in order to promote *the+ objective of
securing

just,

speedy,

and

inexpensive

disposition

of

every

action

and

proceeding.[47]Moreover, this Court has upheld a liberal construction specifically of the rules of
notice of hearing in cases where a rigid application will result in a manifest failure or
miscarriage of justice especially if a party successfully shows that the alleged defect in the
questioned final and executory judgment is not apparent on its face or from the recitals
contained therein.[48]In these exceptional cases, the Court considers that no party can even
claim a vested right in technicalities, and for this reason, cases should, as much as possible, be
decided on the merits rather than on technicalities.[49]
The case at bar falls under this exception. To deny the Sharia District Court of an
opportunity to determine whether it has jurisdiction over a petition for the settlement of the
estate of a decedent alleged to be a Muslim would also deny its inherent power as a court to
control its process to ensure conformity with the law and justice. To sanction such a situation
simply because of a lapse in fulfilling the notice requirement will result in a miscarriage of
justice.
In addition, the present case calls for a liberal construction of the rules on notice of
hearing, because the rights of the petitioners were not affected. This Court has held that an
exception to the rules on notice of hearing is where it appears that the rights of the adverse
party were not affected.[50] The purpose for the notice of hearing coincides with procedural

due process,[51] for the court to determine whether the adverse party agrees or objects to the
motion, as the Rules do not fix any period within which to file a reply or opposition.[52] In
probate proceedings, what the law prohibits is not the absence of previous notice, but the
absolute absence thereof and lack of opportunity to be heard.[53] In the case at bar, as evident
from the Sharia District Courts order dated January 17, 2006, petitioners counsel received a
copy of the motion for reconsideration in question. Petitioners were certainly not denied an
opportunity to study the arguments in the said motion as they filed an opposition to the same.
Since the Sharia District Court reset the hearing for the motion for reconsideration in the same
order, petitioners were not denied the opportunity to object to the said motion in a hearing.
Taken together, these circumstances show that the purpose for the rules of notice of hearing,
procedural process, was duly observed.
Prescription and Filiation
Petitioners fifth argument is premature. Again, the Sharia District Court has not yet
determined whether it has jurisdiction to settle the estate of the decedent. In the event that a
special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a decedent is pending, questions
regarding heirship, including prescription in relation to recognition and filiation, should be
raised and settled in the said proceeding.[54] The court, in its capacity as a probate court, has
jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of the decedent. [55] In the case at bar, the
determination of the heirs of the decedent depends on an affirmative answer to the question
of whether the Sharia District Court has jurisdiction over the estate of the decedent.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The Orders of the Sharia District Court,
dated August 22, 2006 and September 21, 2006 respectively, are AFFIRMED. Cost against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Soliven v Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393 (1988)FACTS

FACTS:
Beltran is among the petitioners in this case. He together with others was charged for libel by
the president. Cory herself filed a complaint-affidavit against him and others. Makasiar averred
that Cory cannot file a complaint affidavit because this would defeat her immunity from suit. He
grounded his contention on the principle that a president cannot be sued. However, if a
president would sue then the president would allow herself to be placed under the courts
jurisdiction and conversely she would be consenting to be sued back. Also, considering the
functions of a president, the president may not be able to appear in court to be a witness for
herself thus she maybe liable for contempt.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the President, under the Constitution, may initiate criminal proceedings against
the petitioners through the filing of a complaint-affidavit?
HELD:
The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure
the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction,
considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring
all of the office- holders time, also demands undivided attention. But this privilege of immunity
from suit, pertains to the President b yvirtue of the office and may be invoked only by the
holder of the office; not by any other person in the Presidents behalf. Thus, an
accused like Beltran et al, in a criminal case in which the President is complainant cannot raise
the presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against such
accused. Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving
the privilege. Thus, if so minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the
privilege and submit to the courts jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege
or to waive it is solely the Presidents prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and
imposed by any other person.
WHEREFORE finding no grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on the part of the
public respondents, the court resolved to DISMISS the petitions.

SCRA 291 p. 585

SCRA 241 p. 607
SCRA 128 p. 471