Handbook for Joint Force Commanders

Assessing progress in environments

involving irregular adversaries

SUMMARY
INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................................... 4
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY...................................................................................................... 5
GLOSSARY.............................................................................................................................. 9
GENERAL PRINCIPLES..................................................................................................... 10
1.1

Assessment in general ........................................................................................................... 10

1.2
Evaluation in military campaigns: the basis of assessment and an instrument of
dialogue ................................................................................................................................................ 10
1.3

Assessment in irregular environnement ............................................................................. 11

1.4

Implications of a comprehensive approach for assessment .............................................. 11

WHAT TO MEASURE?THE SPECIFIC CONTEXT OF IRREGULAR

ADVERSARIES ..................................................................................................................... 12
2.1
2.1.1
2.1.2

2.2
2.2.1
2.2.2

2.3
2.3.1
2.3.2

2.4
2.4.1
2.4.2

2.5
2.5.1
2.5.2

2.6
2.6.1
2.6.2

Characterization of irregular entities ................................................................................. 12

Characterization by generic goal ............................................................................................... 12
Characterization by forms of violence....................................................................................... 13

Evaluate organizational changes of irregular entities ....................................................... 14

Based on the forms of collective violence employed ................................................................. 14
Based on their territorial footprint ............................................................................................ 15

Evaluate insurgency dynamics............................................................................................. 16

Winning central power ............................................................................................................... 16
Denial of central power............................................................................................................... 17

Evaluate irregular adversaries strategy ............................................................................ 18

Objective of the indirect strategy: destabilisation of institutions............................................ 18
Characterize legitimacy .............................................................................................................. 19

Counter insurgency in the first model: re-establishment of State institutions................ 19

No counter-insurgency without a solid government................................................................. 19
Regular forces cover the process by violent organizations demilitarisation .......................... 20

Counter-insurgency in the second model: association and rallying strategies................ 21

Absence of State implies shaping an integral strategy ............................................................. 21
Operational strategy consist in isolating violent non-cooperative elements........................... 21

2.7
Conclusion: in both cases assess appropriateness of civil and military systems to
neutralise irregulars ............................................................................................................................ 22
2.7.1
2.7.2

Protect government legitimacy by re-establishing territorial sovereignty ............................. 22

Strategy of association as a way to shape the peace process.................................................... 23

ASSESSMENT METHOD .................................................................................................... 24

3.1
3.1.1
3.1.2
3.1.3
3.1.4
3.1.5
3.1.6
3.1.7

3.2
3.1.1
3.2.2
3.2.3
3.2.4

Assessment planning............................................................................................................. 24
Preparation of the operational environment............................................................................. 25
Framework for planning............................................................................................................. 27
Situation awareness..................................................................................................................... 27
Operational orientation .............................................................................................................. 27
Concept of operation development ............................................................................................ 28
Operation plan development ...................................................................................................... 28
Method and recommendation to define indicators................................................................... 29

The assessment process during the conduct of operations............................................... 31

Monitoring ................................................................................................................................... 31
Assessment cycles ........................................................................................................................ 31
Assessment method during the conduct of operation............................................................... 32
Evaluation products .................................................................................................................... 35

PRINCIPLES OF ORGANIZATION FOR THE ASSESSMENT FUNCTION ............. 36

4.1
4.1.1
4.1.2
4.1.3
4.1.4

4.2
4.2.1
4.2.2

4.3

The assessment function within the Force HQ................................................................... 36

Assessment Cell ........................................................................................................................... 36
Assessment Working Group..................................................................................................... 366
Multidisciplinary Groups for evaluations ................................................................................. 37
Experts ....................................................................................................................................... 377

Relationships with other levels of command ...................................................................... 38

Relationships with strategic level of command ......................................................................... 38
Relationships with tactical level of command ........................................................................... 38

Relationships with civilian and host-nation actors ............................................................ 39

ANNEX 1 CANVAS SAMPLE OF AN ASSESSMENT PLAN....................................... 41

ANNEX 2 TERMINOLOGY EQUIVALENCES ............................................................. 41

INTRODUCTION
Irregular adversaries practise non conventional forms of fighting in societies broken by major political
and social crises. In some cases, host nations cannot ensure the proper functioning of their
institutions; these may even have progressively disappeared because of armed rebellions. The
international community is then faced with extremely difficult situations in which international and nongovernmental organizations cannot undertake assistance, reconstruction and development activities.
Military strategies aiming to contain irregular adversaries, including through cooperation with the nonmilitary sphere, are not new. However they are seldom successful. Indeed, whilst military action
remains essential to establish a secure environment, military force is no longer decisive for the
resolution of crises resulting from the weakness or even the absence of State institutions. Difficulties
in finding a winning strategy are clearly indicative of the challenges of understanding irregular
environments and of positioning military engagements within them.
Understand in order to act . This axiom is more than ever valid. The complexity of modern
engagements increases the necessity, but also the difficulty, of understanding a given situation. How
is the opposing force evolving and what threats do we face? To what extent do changes of security
conditions result from the coalitions actions? What actions should be rectified in order to enable
security conditions to progress in the desired direction? Military leaders seek answers to questions
such as these, in addition to determining their strategys relevance, often under the pressure of
events. Evaluating a campaigns progress towards its goal and adjusting the campaign/operational
plan - in short, assessing the engagement - is precisely what allows the adaptation of the armed
forces role to changes in the environment. This effort is not simple. It is exposed to subjectivity, even
partiality, because a campaign is multifaceted, the adversary is elusive, and public opinion is versatile.
The present guide proposes a method to be used to design and conduct assessments when engaging
forces in a non-conventional operation or campaign. It is particularly intended for Force Commanders,
who have been entrusted with the command of operations in the theatre.
It does not provide a pre-defined, easy solution including indicators for every type of operation. The
assessment framework is designed as an integral part of operational planning; defining indicators
appeals to the same intellectual modes, deductive and inductive. Assessment results from a
methodical analysis of these indicators, rather than from a reliance on statistics.
This method is meant to be complementary to existing assessment methods it is indeed largely
inspired from principles and methods in use and is particularly adapted to the specifics of irregular
adversaries, though it also applicable to other types of conflicts.
There are two main aspects to this document:

One provides the intellectual framework necessary to conduct assessments in nonconventional engagements. It offers concepts and useful terminology, a typology of
conceivable campaigns, a typology of non-conventional violent entities, which may become
adversaries, models of State destabilisation strategies, as well as civil and military means and
activities to be combined in order to reach campaign objectives.

The other supplies methodological tools and processes for planning and conducting
assessments, as well as proposals regarding the organization of assessment within the joint
Force, as well as regarding its relationships with other levels of command and with the
institutional and political environment in which it operates.

Lastly, it advocates having experts attached to the Force Commander staff which, more than the
method itself, is decisive for the quality of assessment. This recommendation calls for the adoption of
policies, where required, for the recruitment and management of these experts.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
General Framework
The framework of this guide includes counter-insurgency and stability operations, which seek to bring
a solution in conflicts characterized by the struggle between State and non-State actors for legitimacy
and influence over relevant populations.
The assessment of these types of campaigns implies:

understanding the fundamental motives that have led irregular entities to take up arms:
-

the inability of State institutions to satisfy populations basic needs,

the will to take power,

the perception that institutions perpetuate certain injustices,

conflicting values,

cultural habits.

a thorough characterization of the nature of these entities, which function according to a certain
model that is non-institutional and is capable of conducting a global destabilisation strategy
through one or more forms of organized collective violence. This characterization depends on the
principal objective of the irregulars:
-

predation,

ideological subversion,

power-claiming.

The type of socio-political organization chosen by these irregular entities also conditions the form
of collective violence that they exert:
-

Counter-state entities, which mobilize and control populations. Some may consist in
community organizations, particularly tribo-clanic societies that are able to manage
paramilitary violence with a degree of sophistication corresponding to their maturation and to
their freedom of action;

Secret-cells, which are limited to carrying out acts of terrorism in order to advance their
(subversive) cause;

Private military societies which operate for the benefit of uncontrolled or hostile employers
(foreign State, local chief);

Criminal organizations, principally aiming at illegal profit, although some contribute to (or are
integrated in) the power-claiming entities funding system. The most powerful of these are
close to counter-states, for they control populations and use paramilitary violence.
Theses entities preferentially exert one or another form of collective violence, according to
their organization: disobedience or rioting in an uprising logic, or, for armed rebellions,
guerrilla (paramilitary organizations) or terrorism (secret-cells).
Lastly, irregular entities are characterized by the nature of their territorial footprint, which has a
social (establishment within the population) and a geographic dimension, except for secretcells.

Once irregular entities are well characterized, assessments necessarily require an evaluation of
their dynamics, founded on one of the following logics (which may coexist in a single theatre):
-

Conquest of central power, characterized first by a progressive extension of areas controlled

by the irregular entities (where State institutions are no longer capable of enforcing their
policies, are absent or are rejected), as well as by increasingly sophisticated machinery (cells
then paramilitary) and by the method of control of the populations;

Denial of central power, characteristic of community entities and notably tribo-clanic

organizations (emerging in anarchical societies and where the State is very weak). Conflicts
occur when the consensus among communities regarding hierarchy and the control over
territories and resources is broken by efforts to reinforce the central power.

Irregular entities generally employ indirect strategies: they use means other than military (or very
limited military means) to reach a long-term goal. This strategy by attrition always aims to
destabilise and then to neutralise the existing institutions, in order to replace them (conquest of
central power) or prevent their implementation (denial of central power). On the operational side, it
may take the shape of subversion or a strategy of chaos, seeking an overreaction of the security
apparatus. The logic varies with the nature of the irregular adversaries:
-

Counter-states especially practise denial of territory,

Secret-cells practise denial of public security,

Criminal organizations put their efforts into denying good governance.

In all of these cases, the political legitimacy of the State is at stake. Populations consent to the
leadership in place is necessarily based on some level of common identity and on their acceptance of
the way that power is organized and distributed. Nonetheless, legitimacy has different meanings
depending on countries and social organizations: in communities or tribo-clanic societies, efforts must
be made to seek legitimacy in the eyes of chiefs rather than in those of individuals. More generally,
legitimacy is a long term task going beyond the short-term acquisition of the populations goodwill.
Countering insurgents who aim to seize full power over the State consists in re-establishing State
institutions and cannot be without a strong, durable government. Indeed, populations, whose
allegiance may vary momentarily and locally because of terror or attraction, will remain with those
whom they sense will be able to maintain power in the long term. This process is accompanied by the
demilitarisation of irregular actors - notably by following a Clear-Hold-Build modus operandi - seeking
to reduce the paramilitary organization into secret-cells, which can then be dealt with by police.
Countering insurgents who aim to deny central power necessarily implies intervention from outside,
given the weakness of the State. This can be done through massive support to one of the communities
or through the implementation of joining and association strategies, which aim to re-create consensus
regarding power sharing arrangements among entities. This strategy is accompanied by a security
strategy aiming to isolate and reduce non-cooperative actors, either by a direct approach (punishment)
or by an indirect approach (reconciliation).
Process
The very goal of assessment is to understand what is happening according to the above framework
and to be able to explain the changes that occurred in relation to ones own activities, in order to
decide on the actions to take and adjustments to make, as well as to be able to justify the meaning of
the action and the correct use of the allocated means. Thus, it is principally a decision-making and a
communication tool for the Force Commander.
Inherent complexity in operations makes causal links between what has been done and the observed
results far from obvious, and thus hampers deductions and forecasts. The proposed method is original
in that it crosschecks the evaluation of progress, which military and civilian planners are used to doing,
against the situation analysis, which is usually completed by the intelligence function, thereby allowing
for a complete assessment of the strategy.
Assessment is a process, which encompasses monitoring - a permanent process aiming to maintain
updated knowledge of the situation and several evaluations - periodic processes aiming to measure
and give a meaning to observed trends to enable a better understanding of the situation.
It relies partly on following a number of indicators, which are specific information themes meant to
reveal an expected trend. Indicators encompass: situation indicators, which show trends in the
conflicts evolution; measures of effectiveness pertaining to the achievement of the elements of the
campaign design (objectives, decisive conditions, effects); and measures of performance pertaining
to the tasks undertaken. These indicators may be quantitative or qualitative; they must always be
observable, simple and explicit.

As described above, determining trends in the conflicts evolution requires being able to detect
emerging patterns. Revealing these relies on a joint preparation of the operational environment,
which includes four steps:

Identification and characterization of irregular entities and the actual State, their respective
components, functions and goals; and the distinctive factors of the theatre (geography, society,
cognitive factors, etc.);

Analysis of interactions between irregular entities, the State and the above factors, among which
are territorial footprints, as mentioned previously;

Analysis of interactions between all these and foreign civilian actors and the Force deployed;

Analysis of irregular entities strategies and courses of action and the corresponding dynamics.

As stated before, assessment planning is a facet of operational planning. The process is as follows:

The first three steps of the list are implemented during the knowledge development and at the
beginning of the operational orientation phase. Uncertainties and risks noted throughout this
process are turned into hypotheses or assumptions, which frame planning, and lead to the
selection of situation indicators for their follow-up and validation;

The orientation phase determines objectives, decisive conditions and effects, and articulates them
in a coherent campaign design. Measures of effectiveness are determined during this phase;

During the concept development phase, the fourth of the steps listed above leads to the
development of the last situation indicators; the selection of a course of action and subsequent
assignment of tasks leads to the establishment of measures of performance;

Lastly, the phase involving the development of the campaign plan is completed by the
development of the assessment annex to the campaign plan, which combines both the
assessment plan and the organization method for the assessment function.

Indicators are determined in the following manner:

Based the preparation of the operational environment and on the campaign design, a group
brainstorming is undertaken to develop an initial list of indicators that can reveal evolutions of the
situation, decisive conditions, hypotheses, etc.;

Then the group checks that indicators reveal nothing but the object they should be revealing;

Each indicator is unambiguously defined;

The ability to observe the indicators is checked;

The physical area, the duration and the frequency of observation are fixed;

Indicators are prioritised then allocated to organizations capable of observing them.

An assessment process implemented in the conduct of the campaign includes:

Monitoring, i.e. collection, analysis and reporting of operational information.

A raw evaluation, based on this operational information routinely collected as well as on a

specific complementary collection of information and intelligence; the raw evaluation is threefold:

Evaluation of the operational situation, consisting in updating the joint preparation of the
operational environment;

Evaluation of campaign design progression, by analysing measures of effectiveness then

progresses made toward each evaluated effect, decisive condition and objective;

Evaluation of the courses of action progression, which reviews the realisation of the assigned
tasks and judges the appropriateness of operational capacities;

Host nation and civil organizations own evaluations are also considered at this stage.

Based on this work, a net evaluation is undertaken as follows:

-

The evaluation of the operational environment is crosschecked against the evaluation of the

campaign design progress, to explain why the strategy followed led to the expected results or
not;
-

The evaluation of the operational environment is then crosschecked against an evaluation of

the completion of the course of action, to deduce constraints and mutual influences between
the course of action and the operational environment;

Engagement perspectives, notably opportunities, constraints and risks relating to the

execution of the campaign design, the course of action as well as other actors activities, are
deduced.

This net evaluation results in a set of conclusions regarding the relevance of the campaign design,
the course of action and the adequacy of resources, and in explicit recommendations regarding
planning efforts and resources. This evaluation also results in updating the assessment plan. A
written report follows, which is exploited to satisfy communication needs, according to the
communication strategy in force.
Organization
1

The Force Commander relies on an assessment function . It is comprised of:

An assessment cell, which organises and integrates work undertaken;

A multifunctional assessment working group including, beyond the HQ staff, representatives of

tactical commanders, civil agencies and the host nation. It is a permanent network, gathered on an
ad hoc basis to carry out net evaluations. It is recommended that the Force Commander
participates directly.

More than the method, success in assessment lies in expertise. It is recommended that the staff
include area experts, experts in the civil organizations which the Force works with, and experts in
irregular conflicts. The availability of expertise dictates the actual organization of the function. Due to
anticipated shortage of expertise, the analysis strength should not be stretched across too many
groups, which is ineffective. Moreover, it is critical to get an external expertise from local services or
from partnerships with civil agencies (e.g. political units from the UN). Such expertise shall be
resourced through an explicit statement of requirements, stemming from the planning process.
In the end, assessing progress rests with the only one having the necessary overarching expertise: the
Force Commander. The strategic level of command contributes by providing him with strategic
information. The Strategic Commander also carries out his own assessment, relying on the theatre
assessment, completed by strategic perspectives. Commanders at the tactical level, who also assess
their mission in their areas of responsibility for their own needs, provide the Force Commander with
information necessary for a comprehensive understanding of the environment and for the construction
of a holistic vision of the campaign and the conflicts underlying dynamics.
Assessment of the campaign design encompasses various domains in which the Force acts in support
of other primary responsible organizations. Relationships with civil actors and the host Nation are
crucial. However, it is acknowledged that in many cases a comprehensive approach is rarely a reality.
Several levels of exchange with civil actors are envisaged:

Selected data exchange;

Sharing assessment plans;

Sharing assessment products;

Developing a common assessment, recognising that this is hardly conceivable, given different
agendas and varying approaches.

This guide finally advocates that a Senior Civilian Representative entrusted with the civil expertise of
the headquarters and serving as an interface with civil organizations, assist the Force Commander.

Operational function refers to a set of operational activities that are transverse to the hierarchical organization

GLOSSARY

The different notions used in evaluation are based on diverse theories and approaches, each
responding to differing needs. Thus terminology varies from an organization to another. Clarification is
always required to avoid being equivocal. Below are the key notions used in this guide.
Assessment. It is the whole process that: facilitates understanding the current situation and the
mechanisms by which the situation changes; evaluates the results of the military engagement and
compares them to its final objectives; and decides on short-, mid- and long-term changes necessary to
improve the execution of the mission. It encompasses monitoring and evaluation.
Monitoring. It is the function which continuously collects and compiles information, in order to
maintain an updated situational awareness and facilitate its perception. Monitoring answers the
question: what is happening? or what happened? , as well as the implicit question Is it
according to expectations? . It does not provide explanations.
Evaluation is the punctual, normally periodic process, which consists of raw and net evaluations.
Raw evaluation. It aims to measure: on one hand the results of the action of the Force, seen from
an objective perspective; and on the other hand the situation changes in the operational environment.
Raw evaluation is used to understand the situation, according to the engagement.
It answers the questions: where are we compared to mission objectives? and how is the general
situation in-theatre progressing?
Net evaluation. It is the judgement made on which conduct the force should adopt for the sake of
mission accomplishment. It is based on the comparison of raw evaluations. Net evaluation explains:
why and how did things happen? or why did they not happen? and determines consequences for
the pursuit of the mission.
Indicator. An indicator is a specific information topic that reveals a trend. It is used to steer data
collection. Three types of indicators are used in this guide :
- Situation indicators, which reveal a trend in the evolution of the operational environment.
- Measures of effectiveness (MoE), which measure the trend towards the attainment of an
objective, effect, or decisive condition.
- Measures of performance (MoP), which measure the completion of tasks by the Force units.

Principally sorted in two terminological families, attached to distinct theories: one result-oriented - Result Based Management
Terminology; the other effect-oriented - Effect-Based Operations Terminology.

Chapter

1
1

GENERAL PRINCIPLES
1.1 Assessment in general
Assessment in general refers to evaluation and designates the process that allows drawing up a
judgement on a programme, by verifying that the outcomes it produces enable the attainment of the
objectives that have been established.
To be objective, evaluation draws on a method, which may vary according to the activity sector to be
evaluated, and on the respect of principles and criteria. To be credible, evaluation should be
independent and call for experts generally working in multidisciplinary groups.
There are several evaluations in a programme life: one is generally undertaken ex-ante to draw up a
baseline; many are conducted at regular intervals during its implementation to survey its progress,
judge its appropriateness and recommend adjustments to the process or the strategy or even
reconsider its validity; lastly an ex-post evaluation draws up the overall results.

1.2 Evaluation in military campaigns: the basis of assessment and an instrument of

dialogue
Force Commanders also need both to judge the effects created by the military forces and to compare
these to their expectations in order to rectify gaps and remain in line with to strategic objectives.
However, military operations involve opposition to adversaries who constantly adapt in terms of
organization and courses of action. Determinism is thereby ruled out: even when based on a valid
initial estimate and even if performed exceptionally well, military action does not automatically lead to
the desired changes, for the causal chain between actions and effects, on which the operations plan
is based, is continually thwarted by unwanted effects. To fulfil their objectives, military forces must
adapt their responses to environmental changes and consequently detect and correctly interpret signs
of change. Therefore, evaluation in military campaigns must take into account the operational
environment in which forces are engaged.
Evaluating the campaigns progress ultimately amounts to assessing the engagement, i.e.:
-

Understanding what is happening, including on-going conflict dynamics;

Identifying the direct and indirect effects of the military action based on observed situation changes;

Anticipating what could happen;

in order to:
-

decide on short-, mid- and long-term desirable adjustments;

- report to authorities the meaning of actions undertaken and justify the required adjustments to the
strategy, including requests for supplementary resources;
- communicate the meaning of the military action to the other parties involved in the campaign, for
more effective collaboration.

10

Being a supporting tool for decision-making and communication, assessment supports and underpins
the Force Commanders actions. The measurement of success is a fundamental aspect of military
3
operations that should be foremost in the mind of every commander
Assessments must lead Force Commanders to stay at their level, keeping away from events and the
tactical management of the Force and focusing on strategic objectives and the desired end state.
Assessments also take place at every level of command for purposes of understanding, decisionmaking and communication.

1.3 Assessment in irregular environments

Engagements against irregular entities are almost never anticipated and therefore are not planned for
before Force deployment; rather, forces tend to find themselves engaged in non conventional wars
once they are already in theatre and in the midst of on-going operations. In this context, decisionmakers often need to review their objectives accordingly.
Although not predictable, engagements in the presence of irregular entities are governed by a number
of standard schemes. Knowing and integrating them in planning as soon as precursory signs are
detected is necessary to understand engagement in the presence of irregular adversaries. This is why
the recommendation by several methods to characterize a system-state to be reached and to
determine the appropriate instruments of measure accordingly, is unrealistic. Chapter 2 addresses key
points underlying this understanding.

1.4 Implications of a comprehensive approach for assessment

The actual success of an operation will be measured against the overall result and not just on the
1 .
achievement of the military objectives . Though military force is an essential tool to guarantee the
restoration of security by opposing the activities of irregular adversaries and protecting populations,
during the stabilisation phase, military operations are designed to permit the establishment of the
necessary conditions to restore stability. Military force is accordingly only one component of crisis
resolution, among other organizations and institutions, with which it must necessarily coordinate its
efforts and without which there is no long-lasting solution. A comprehensive approach or the
interaction with non-military actors is therefore necessary:

beginning at the planning and design stages, to increase the relevance of military action;

to effectively transition responsibilities to non-military authorities and organizations.

To measure the effectiveness and progress of a campaign, a Force Commander needs to evaluate the
relative contribution of his actions and those of non-military actors, positively or negatively, towards the
attainment of the strategic objectives. The value of this evaluation will depend on the actual sharing of
information and analysis with other key actors, as well as on a solid understanding of how those actors
plan, conduct their projects and evaluate their activities.
Evaluation methods are specific to each evaluated domain (emergency aid, development,
governance, security, etc.) and to the organizations who are involved in these domains. It is therefore
important to make every effort to share perceptions in order to reach a comprehensive approach to
evaluation.
Assessment includes the following key aspects:

Effectiveness of civil and military deployments, at each phase of the campaign, apportioned to
accomplish lines of operation;


3

The right time to transfer responsibility between military and international then local civil actors.

AJP 3(A)

11

Chapter

2
2

WHAT TO MEASURE AGAINST?

THE SPECIFIC CONTEXT OF IRREGULAR ADVERSARIES
2.1 Characterization of irregular entities4
Many types and forms of Irregular entities characterized here as armed non-governmental
organizations exist, sometimes within one theatre. A clear understanding of how they function should
allow legitimate security forces to react appropriately. Therefore it is essential to identify the patterns of
irregular organizations, which not only will give initial orientation to the intelligence chain, but will also
serve to analyse and design the operation, and thus provide a framework for assessment.
2.1.1 Characterization by generic goal
An irregular entity is organized to achieve a common goal, deemed sufficiently important to justify the
mobilization of means and possibly the sacrifice of lives. It falls in one of the groups:

Taxonomy of Irregular Entities by Goal

Irregular Organizations Systems: Entities organized along a non-bureaucratic framework,
able to plan and conduct a comprehensive strategy of destabilisation by mastering one or
several non-conventional forms of collective violence.
Organizational functions
Systemic
components

Motivations

leadership

Favorite COA

Force generation

External support

Three irregular systems

With specific agenda

Criminal system

Power claiming system

Illegal profit

Local political goal

System of subversion
Worldwide
ideological goal

Fig.1 Taxonomy of irregular entities by goals

Criminal systems and predators. These systems are motivated by profit; their goal is to prosper
and survive within the societies in which they live as parasites by bypassing or by spoiling the security
and judiciary components that could pose a threat to them. Such organizations are mainly comprised
of a resource collection network, protection forces, and channels to sell illicit products and to recycle
profits into local and international legal activities. Typical examples are mafias and cartels, in which
leadership is very hierarchical. In fragile States and societies suffering crisis, predators tend to be
more loosely organized and their activities aim to survive.

This taxonomy is the production of a scholar programme financed by the French Army Staff and the Procurement Board (DGA).

12

 Power-claiming system. These systems seek to respond to dissatisfaction among populations

who regard themselves as victims of injustice in political, institutional or economical fields. Their goal is
to occupy or conquer the local power apparatus. Armed struggle is part of a comprehensive strategy,
seeking to gain national-level political legitimacy and international support. Their objectives consist in:
fighting for territories and corresponding populations, which rebels seek to remove from the
governments authority; and fighting to avoid the development of a strong central power.
Subversive System. These systems are inspired by totalitarian or religious ideological visions.
They aim to substitute prevailing values by alternative ones. Conquest of a local power counts less
than the destruction of the disputed social or international order.
An irregular entity must adapt its organization to one goal only, or risks failure. Yet an initial goal may
change over time, thereby leading to a shift in its organization.
2.1.2 Characterization by forms of violence
To survive and grow, violent irregular organizations must get rid of the supervision of the institutions,
against which they struggle, by the use of some form of collective violence: predators use corruption
and occupation of States components; power-claiming and subversive systems seek to overthrow
State institutions or neutralise their functioning until then. Most known violent irregular entities include:
Counter-state organizations, which carry out armed uprisings by mobilizing populations. They
create parallel structures of government and administration, which are geographically organized, and
aim to control populations and collect resources. They also have a structured command which
designs, plans and conducts armed struggle from a controlled territory. As they are able to mobilize
economic and human resources on a large scale, they preferentially perform structured forms of
paramilitary violence. It is the preferred organization of power-claiming systems. It includes:
-

Revolutionary-type organizations, whose objective is to win over the central government

through strength in numbers (Viet-Cong, FLN, FARC);

Community organizations, based on ethnic, cultural or religious identities, among which are
tribo-clanic organizations, peculiar to anarchical societies (Somalia, Afghanistan, Yemen,
sub-Sahara Africa). These organizations employ armed actions to protect a human group,
whose identity and allegiance are defined by family relationships and territorial alliances. The
decision making structure follows the hierarchy of family heads.

Secret-cell organizations, which promote actions of isolated individuals or groups of violent

activists who do not enjoy popular support (at least initially). They rely on a clandestine functional cell
structure, whose purpose is to isolate its members from the surrounding environment and to protect
the secrecy that is necessary for their freedom of movement and action. Being seldom capable of
performing paramilitary violence, they use terrorist violence.

Organized crime. Those performing violence as predators should be included in the assessment:
-

Rebel organizations which mobilize a part of their means for the exploitation of a resource;

Criminals who finance a violent irregular entitys war effort;

Warlords, heading an armed organization to control a territory in order to derive income. Such
an organization has a paramilitary function, which maintains a local favourable order, a
resource collection function and a trading function to commercialize the products of these
resources worldwide. As opposed to counter-state organizations, it must maintain a certain
level of conflict in its environment in order to avoid the return of police and judiciary
5
institutions . Therefore warlords often constitute a major obstacle to peace processes.

Private Military Firms, harmful when they serve non regular or hostile employers such as :
-

A foreign government wishing to keep its territorial ambitions discreet;

A local government no longer able to maintain an armed force or a security force;

Private contractors, local chiefs or criminals in a country divided by civil war.

5
However, some of well organized and most powerful warlords can be categorized as counter-state organizations, should they have
locally an actual political legitimacy based on the following conditions: share a same community with local population, protect that
community and redistribute a part of the collected illegal income in the form of social aid to members of that community.

13

2.2 Evaluate organizational changes of irregular entities

To oppose a State or regular armed forces, insurgents must master one or several forms of collective
violence, thus develop a specific territorial footprint. Observation of these during the development of
an insurrection will assist the evaluation.
2.2.1 Based on the forms of collective violence employed
To perform a specific type violence requires a strict organization, the choice of which depending on the
following parameters, changes in which are indicative of the evolution of the given violent organization:
-

Support of a part of the population;

Effectiveness of the security institutions of the government being fought and its allies;

Resources amassed with or without the backing of a sponsor State.

In every political system, the struggle for power or against existing institutions goes through
contestation, which has three main non legal forms, supported by four forms of violence:
-

Uprising: either civil disobedience, aiming to paralyse public powers (India-1947, Georgia 2003), or rioting, aiming to overthrow institutions by a general strike and the occupation of the
power places (Romania-1989).

Coup: for an armed faction, it consists of seizing a States nerve centres by surprise and ousting
the government in office. It may be supported by provoked/manipulated riot insurrection. A coup is
swift and decisive, otherwise it fails.

A rebellion is an armed resistance against public authority. If it has a large popular support, it
takes shape of a guerrilla, which is a kind of war, aiming to militarily ruin the legal governments
forces and will. If it is led by a minority of activists without actual support, it takes shape of
terrorism, which aims to intimidate society and disorganize institutions.

These forms of collective violence should be identified through their courses of action and be
connected to the identified irregular organizations described above.

Well Identified Radical Forms of Collective Violence

DISPUTE
Challenging the political
options of legal Authorities

DISSIDENCE

OPPOSITION

Resistance to Authorities

Institutionalized challenge

1.
2.

INSURRECTION

COUP

REBELLION

Social disturbance against

legal Authorities

Replacement by a faction
in power

Armed resistance against

legal authorities

DESOBEDIENCE

UPRISING

GUERRILLA

TERRORISM

Obstructive non-violence

Riot violence

Paramilitary violence

Secret cell violence

Every form of collective violence obeys proper rules and follows operational principles.
The level of people support dictates the selection of appropriate instrument of political
radicalism.

Fig.2 Identified radical forms of collective violence in insurgency

14

2.2.2 Based on their territorial footprint

An irregular entity is also characterized by its territorial footprint, which is comprised of:

a dimension relative to the part of the society in which it operates;

a dimension pertaining to the geographic area in which it has material means at its disposal.

Paramilitary violence used by counter-state organizations requires: controlling thousands of

individuals conscripted to the rebel war effort; time and a great deal of money to obtain sufficient
armament, trained units, logistics bases and sanctuaries beyond the reach of regular forces.
Therefore, their territorial footprint is bound to progressively expand. As the model of popular war
by Mao Ze Dong indicates, it contains: a political direction (unless this acts from abroad) to design and
lead a comprehensive strategy organized by domains (economic, social, military); running structures
for each domain i.e. resources mobilization, military operations, weaponry acquisition and production,
infiltration of socio-professional organizations, internal and external propaganda, justice and police;
and for each structure, a tight occupancy of the geographic space to effectively control the populace.
For tribo-clanic organizations the two dimensions social and geographic often overlap.
Secret-cells rarely demand heavy means and have no geographic space to physically control.
Clandestine cells structures are conceived to avoid leaving any visible footprints. Their human
dimension corresponds to the social fabric in which they operate and move. The best structured
organizations (IRA, Al-Qaeda before 2001) hide their weaponry in caches and have training camps
beyond the reach of regular forces or even abroad, which indicates a possible shift towards a more
sophisticated form of combat.
As for criminals, their territory corresponds to the geographic space in which they exert their illegal
activities and parasitize society. Armed criminal violence does not require a geographic hold.
However, the nature of illegal activities influences the territorialisation of an organization. Conversely
intangible activities do not require space, and to evaluate the territorial footprint of such criminal
organizations relies on deep expertise in police, legal and economic spheres.
Warlords rule the geographic territory from which they derive their income. The size of that de facto
sovereignty area is defined by the social attachment of the chief and is limited by the effective control
exerted by his armed group.

Combined Forms of Collective Violence and Typical Organizations

IRREGULAR VIOLENT ENTITIES
Prevailing
Goal
Type of
functional
organization

Power Claiming

Subversive

Predator

Counter-state

Secret Cell

Business-like

Activist group

Organized Crime
technical violence

Community
Revolutionary
Warlords

Type of
collective
violence

Paramilitary
Violence
(Guerrilla PMF)
Coup

Terrorism
Insurrectionary
committees
Mob Riot

Source: FRS-CEROM

Fig. 3 Combined forms of collective violence and typical irregular organizations

15

2.3 Evaluate insurgency dynamics

Campaign success against irregular entities largely depends on understanding insurgency dynamics.
Insurgency either seeks to gain central power (model 1) or to counter the establishment of a central
power (model 2). In the first model, insurgent organizations promote change against a regime that
seeks to protect the Establishment. On the contrary, the second model is conservative, upholding an
anarchical organization of society against attempts to introduce political and social change.
The evaluation of a given situation against these two theoretic models, which can coexist or succeed
one another, must highlight conflict dynamics and the developing logic of insurgency.
2.3.1

Winning central power

Be it a revolutionary and popular war aiming to overthrow a national political regime or a national
liberation war against an occupying military power and its local political allies, for the contesting entity
the strategy consists in:

undermining the legitimacy of the authority in office by leading an armed rebellion;

building its own political legitimacy;

progressively building up its military and police forces to equal those of the disputed authority.

Rebels will then turn into more and more sophisticated organizations and step by step remove parts of
the territory and the corresponding population from authorities influence. Support from a foreign
sponsor State increases chances of success.

Notional Pattern of Mutation of Power Claiming Entities

Identified as HVT

STATE

Gaining territories:
1.Then population;
2.Then resources;
3.Then legitimacy

Power
Claiming

Mature

COUNTERSTATE
Organization

Paramilitary Violence

Org
a ra
a iire
de
iisst
ri ct
ssa
a tti
lliitta
Orgaanni
niisa
tiioonn ppa
pa
rami
mili
ta
re d
dee ddi
sttri
ct

Org
ni
a ttitiiooonn p
pa
mi
ades
dde
e arms
ddi
ri
ctt
a ra
ch
iitta
ef
iire
g roup
es
ssttri
Orgaan
niissa
sa
pa
ram
miillildu
ta
re
diist
ric
district
ALN Alger 1957 4/4/27
ALN Alger 1957

adjointche f des groupe s arms

d u district

4/4/27

a djoint

Bote lettre

Bote lettre
ch ef de gro upe arm

Bote lettre

Bote lettre

adjoint chef de groupe arm

ad joint

Mutating
successful
Rebel
Movement

Principes de la clandestinit
Organisation cloisonne
Principes
Principes
de
de la
la clandestinit
Aucun contact
direct
entre
cellules
de la cellule de
1.
Organisation cloisonne
base (3
Roger
hommes)
Tr inquier, La guerre moderne, La table r onde, Paris, 1961, p. 27
2.
Aucun contact direct entr e cellules

Armements types
de la cellule de
1.
base (3
hommes) types 2.
Armements

Roger Tr inquier, La guer re moderne, La table ronde, P aris, 1961, p. 27

Activist Violence

Nascent

Fig. 4 Patterns of mutation of power-claiming entities

The progressive shift of a nascent cellular organization towards that of a counter-state organization will
be revealed by a simple set of indicators designed to measure the irregular entitys footprint, which are
the areas where:
-

Regular security forces can no longer circulate or station freely;

Officials of the administration are removed, returned or eliminated;

Taxes are no longer collected by the official collection system;

State justice is no longer provided.

16

More generally, every indicator revealing inability to implement a governments (or occupying powers)
decision at local level will be sought. The more they increase in number and spread over the territory,
the more the assumption that rebels are gaining actual power must be envisaged.
2.3.2

Denial of central power

These insurgency dynamics are observed inter alia in Somalia and Yemen. They concern anarchical
societies that cannot structure themselves as a Nation and fragile States unable to effectively exert
sovereignty due to chronic instability or civil war. The actual matter of the conflict lies in the rejection of
a States central power.
The political system is based on a consensus between the various communities on:
-

Allocation of power,

Access to various resources,

Respect of an acknowledged hierarchy in terms of privilege and prestige among communities and
for the allegiances that bind them.

Alliances and allegiances vary according to agreement on the following topics:

-

Acknowledgement of communities territories,

Communities self-protection, in the absence of a supra-community security apparatus,

Acceptable apportionment of the permanent sources of income,

Adoption of a common code of behaviour (essentially guided by tradition and religion) pertaining to
the practice of justice/vengeance, mixed marriage and respect of property outside the community.

Blows to the status quo on these topics are punished by reprisals and could degenerate into
intercommunity violence.
Equally, attempts to create or restore a superior central order can generate insurgency.

Denying a Central Government

State spoilers
Cooperation

COMMUNITY Y
COMMUNITY X

Rebellion

Competition

COMMUNITY Z
Allegiance

POLITICAL CONSENSUS

COMMUNITY Z1

Power sharing system

Hierarchy of communities

ALTERNATE ALLIANCES / ALLEGIANCES

Territorial
autonomy

Community selfprotection

Allocation of
resources

RETALLIATION
Agreed common
behavior on
Honor
Justice
Private property
Hospitality

Intruders
Foreigners
Deviant groups

Synthesis of four historical records

Fig. 5 Political model for denying the central State

17

2.4 Evaluate irregular entities strategy

Military operations directed against an irregular adversary are intended to break his strategy rather
6
than his potential in order to set up the favourable conditions required for a political solution . Thus it
is paramount to characterize the strategy of the irregular adversaries. It requires knowledge of the
violent rebel organizations on the ground, their goals, the forms of violence they exert, and their
evolution during their confrontation with regular forces. Rebels strategies are either direct or indirect.
Direct strategies rely principally on military force to reach a goal; they require an advantageous
balance of power to obtain a swift, decisive position allowing them to force the adversary to surrender
rapidly and at a lower cost. Conversely, indirect strategies consist in the utilisation of limited or no
military means, to reach a long-term goal by attrition. For insurgents, to resort to an indirect strategy
responds to three objectives:
-

To save up available means, as they progressively grow;

To raise the physical cost of fighting for the opposing forces by attempting to exhaust them;

To raise the psychological cost of fighting by raising doubt regarding the political legitimacy and
ethicality of the opponents struggle, both within the country and abroad.

2.4.1

Objective of the indirect strategy: destabilization of institutions

Whatever the irregular organization may be, its objective is always to weaken the States institutions.
Courses of action may vary, depending on their capability to control paramilitary violence, but
eventually there is no other outcome than to de-institutionalize the State, in order to:
-

st

annihilate it to replace it (1 model); in this case, the indirect destabilisation strategy consists in
breaking the normal functioning of local institutions, through a set of violent organized activities,
physical or immaterial, in order to instil mistrust among citizens, develop distrust between social
bodies and leading elites, and overthrow the regime in-place.

or
nd
- prevent it from ruling the country (2 model); in this case, the indirect destabilization strategy
consists in impeding consolidation of national institutions that aim to replace existing communities
political and social organizations, through a set of violent, physical or immaterial, organized
activities.
This integral indirect strategy may follow two major forms:
-

Subversive, aiming to reduce the effectiveness of the States institutions and compromise
managers by corruption, through infiltration of rebel elements in the political and security bodies
and circulation of propaganda. The desired outcome is for the public opinion to no longer trust an
incompetent or rotten political system.

Chaotic (scorched earth strategy), aiming to generate large-scale troubles in civil society by
undermining public order (terrorist acts, sabotage, riots, strikes) in order to overload security
services and provoke the suspension of individual freedom, activation of laws of exception and
atrocities. The desired outcome is for the government to be hated and for the population to mature
7
towards rebellion .

These strategies are valid provided that the society is already weakened by economic, social and
political crises. Each organization follows its method:
Counter-state organizations ruin trust in State institutions by denial of territory, i.e. by preventing
State control over parts of its territory and access to part of its population.
Following indicators will reveal the balance of power in favour of counter-state organizations: existence
of territorial sanctuaries; existence of an organized paramilitary power capable of mobilizing largescale manpower and certain political legitimacy; absence of civil servants and State employees in the
concerned area. This is even more important for power-claiming organizations such as tribo-clanic.
6
7

PIA 00-180, Op. Cit.

Theory of country insurgent hotbeds by Che Guevara, repeated by Carlos Marighela and Miguel Guellen in urban environment.

18

A secret cell organization compromises a government by denial of public security. Terrorist

violence undermines trust in police and justice effectiveness.
Mature criminal organizations attack certain State institutions by denial of good governance.
Corruption of local decision-makers and within certain police services, intimidation of magistrates,
infiltration and collusion with national political elites allow neutralising repressive penal activities or
significantly reduce their efficacy. Their territory is the area where they perform their illegal activities.
2.4.2

Characterize legitimacy

Doctrine manuals base success in counter-insurgency campaigns on legitimacy, a notion that is

seldom defined. Legitimacy corresponds, for sociologists, to a population consenting to be ruled. This
consent is conditioned by a common identity, founded on a Nations/communitys history and by the
respect of certain forms of lawfulness and constitutionality. However, other sources of legitimacy exist
such as custom, tradition or the charisma of leaders. As a result, the matter of legitimacy will vary
considerably according to the type of society and the insurgencies it generates. The two generic
models look at legitimacy differently:
-

In the first model, insurgents compete with a weak or corrupt State to win hearts and minds.
While the authority in office relies on legally constituted institutions assumed to function according
to fundamental laws and acknowledged by the international community, insurgents rely on the
populations dissatisfaction to denounce the fake legality of institutions that no longer represent
the will of the people. Competition includes appeal and terror to stop people from going over to the
opposite camp. Eventually, the legitimacy issue is settled by elections, organized by the winner.

In the second model, local populations are ruled by inherited political and social community
systems. The legitimacy of local powers is derived from traditional devolution of the authority
coming from dynasty or from religious or cultural precious knowledge. Chiefs pledge on behalf of
the community and determine collective behaviour. Therefore, the newly established State must
convince chiefs for the new system to be agreed. Should it fail, a struggle would occur and the
new institutions would have to subdue local systems by force or disappear.

2.5 Counter insurgency in the first model: re-establishment of State institutions

Experience gained during the 20th century has led Western countries to develop doctrine for counterinsurgency, stemming from the combination of three models: British, French and American, which
converge around the common observation that a comprehensive counter-insurgency strategy consists
in re-establishing institutions of the attacked State, so that it can take on the actual causes of
discontent. Military force protects this enterprise by demilitarising the most dangerous organizations.
2.5.1

No counter-insurgency strategy without a solid government

Past experiences are often invoked to justify current counter-insurgency strategies that focus on
conquering hearts and minds. However, that is not where the bulk of efforts really go. With no
exception to the rule, the centre of gravity of the counter-insurgency efforts is the maintenance of a
solid government empowered with effective institutions. The re-establishment of State institutions is
what eventually wins the struggle for political legitimacy over power-claiming organizations. Indeed,
institutions act like a functional and geographical network of sensors that understand population
needs, and are also enablers for putting in place public policies for reforms. Presence of strong
institutions also constitutes the best tangible evidence of the permanence of State - and conversely
the weakness of insurgents - which the population seeks above all, even if its allegiance may vary
temporarily and locally because of terror or appeal.
A counter-insurgency strategy amounts to all governmental actions aiming to deprive an insurgency of
its political legitimacy by re-establishing State institutions, in order to respond to the roots of discontent
which can lead to collective violence.
Nonetheless, it is important to be aware of another form of counter-insurgency, more prevalent in
history, which is State terror: State institutions, namely the security and defence apparatus, may
function partially and be used for oppression. In this case, a counter-insurgency strategy amounts to
all governmental institutional repressive actions aimed at eliminating all forms of armed and nonviolent opposition. It is essential to remember this if the campaign is in support of a government.

19

2.5.2

Regular forces cover the process by violent organizations demilitarization

The general strategy of regular forces, normally subordinated to an overarching counter-insurgency

strategy, takes the form of disarmament campaigns against irregular paramilitary organizations, for
which doctrine already exists: counter-guerrilla and counter-terrorism.
The objective consists in safeguarding the process of re-establishing State institutions by the
progressive extension of government-controlled areas through: clearing operations; re-establishment
of security structures and public services supported by military forces (hold); and progressive
normalisation of social and economic life (build).
The desired effect consists in reducing paramilitary organizations into cells, through a tactic of attrition
of combat capacities, whilst attacking their source of force re-generation. Several operations shall be
synchronised aiming to: interdict freedom of manoeuvre on the territory; cover sanctuaries (whenever
accessible in the national territory); and survey trafficking linked to the war effort. This reduction is not
aimed to put an end to insurrection, but to interdict taking the power by arms. If defeated, paramilitary
organizations will be reduced and only able to perform secret-cell forms of violence (terrorism, rioting),
which must then be handled by security services and the judiciary apparatus. Effective national and
local inter-agency coordination and a combined military-police system are of absolute necessity.
The evaluation of campaign success can only be measured by:
-

The extent of conquered and administrated geographical areas;

Capability of security services to work in these areas without support from regular armed forces;

Changes in and frequency of observable violent courses of action. Clearly, a militarization of

courses of action indicates probable sophistication and reinforcement of freedom of movement of
adversaries. Conversely, terrorist activities or riots following paramilitary activities indicate a
weakened position, at least momentarily.

Indications of an effective re-institutionalisation, to include tax collection and functioning of local

and provincial administration, observed by upper level technical inspection missions.

These campaigns demand time and permanent efforts; otherwise cleared territorial areas go back to
adversaries sphere. An important, however often underestimated dimension, is money. Reestablishing a States institutions is an expensive endeavour. Resource gathering is a prerequisite for
sustaining the campaign and should therefore be thoroughly planned for, so as to be able to fund the
various activities required in each phase of the campaign.
One of the key components of this type of campaign consists in ensuring the protection of the local
population, until public order is re-established and secured. Considering the nature of the links
between the local population and the armed rebellion, several options are possible:
-

In an area disputed by a counter-state revolutionary organization, protection can be assured by a

permanent military and police presence (area control, curfew). It can also be indirect by equipping
and training local self-defence units backed up and supported by regular forces set up as a joint
reserve force;

For a local community rebellion, disarmament of respective groups will lead to a perception of
increased insecurity by the community, and therefore in increased hostility. Respecting the rule of
law will be all the more rigorous for regular forces in charge of re-establishing order. It will be
necessarily accompanied by immediate compensating measures: payment, keeping security
elements slightly armed or equipped with non-lethal weapons for maintaining order;

As for tribo-clanic organizations, disarmament is an issue to be handled with extreme caution. It

is perceived as a blow to the warrior status and threatens the survival of the group facing his rivals
8
without means of defence . Security of population shall not be provided in this manner but rather
by negotiation and pressure on local chiefs to put in place a system to control the circulation of
weapons (precise location, identification of holders, exclusion zones), pending a better solution.

Ex. UN forces in Somalia in the early 90s.

20

2.6 Counter-insurgency in the second model: association and rallying strategies

The second model illustrates the failure of a process aiming to install a modern form of power
organization. An anarchic society may result from the following three situations, possibly combined:
-

A civil war putting an end to the central State inherited from a post-colonial era, during which
9
institutions progressively declined until reaching the point of total disappearance . Parties are so
weak that none can win.

A community or tribo-clanic organization seizing remnants of the State apparatus in a multicommunity society. Holding the State does not mean assuming power over the entire territory,
only exercising it in the relevant community area. Hence a constant rivalry between communities
10
capable of conquering the capital-city or the presidential palace .

Predominance of traditional forms of power, in which violence is locally accepted as a way of life.
Intrusion of foreigners generates temporary alliances to chase out intruders and their plans for
11
reforming the State .

2.6.1

Absence of State implies shaping an integral strategy

Without the existence of a functioning State, a counter-insurgency strategy based on the first model
cannot produce significant effects. One of two approaches is often adopted:
-

Either a third State eager to stabilise its neighbourhood involves itself in direct support to one
community to the detriment of others to ensure its leadership and domination. This is done by
sending advisors and assistance means, or even by directly engaging with armed forces to end a
12
civil war and support factions favourable to this third State against those which oppose it .

Or the international community agrees to help the State by re-establishing institutions and the UN
(or one of the security organizations covered by chapter VIII of the UN Charter) intervenes with a
multidimensional peacekeeping and peace consolidation operation to facilitate a process of
political association among community chiefs, in the framework of a peace agreement. The
objective is to reach an agreement on the power sharing system in the State. A transition
government is set up, and arrangements are made regarding the complete cessation of hostilities,
disarmament of armed entities, re-constitution of local administrations, all supported by different
actors and aided by funding from donors.

2.6.2

The operational strategy consists in isolating violent non-cooperative elements

It is not possible to re-establish State institutions before a political agreement has been ratified and
implemented. Once this has been done, military and security international apparatuses are deployed
to neutralise predator-type non-cooperative elements by their destruction or arrest, to safeguard the
13
peace process against attempts by power-claiming extremists to hinder it.
The objective of the campaign consists in ensuring a so-called safe and secure environment to allow
the deployment of civil organizations. The generic desired effect on irregular non-cooperative entities
is to convince them that any armed opposition to the process of political association is doomed to fail.
Military and security forces are deployed to compartmentalize the theatre of operations in order to
deny freedom of manoeuvre to violent non cooperative elements and to neutralise their nuisance
strategy. Two branches can be planned sequentially or simultaneously:
-

A direct military-security option of punishment aiming to isolate or to control the area where noncooperative actors are. Destruction of a part of these irregular capacities shall be ensured until
they renounce their violent strategy. This option often supports political pressure from the upper
level (threaten irregulars with prosecution before an international court) ;

Ex. Sierra Leone and Liberia in the 80s and 90s.

Ex. contemporary Yemen.
11
Ex. Somalia since President Syad Barre fell in 1991.
12
Ex. Ethiopia intervening to the benefit of the national transition government against the Islamic Courts militia.
13
This logic corresponds to campaigns or operations known in the 90s as violence control.
10

21

An indirect option of rallying or reconciliation, seeking to offer an alternative to the irregular

violent strategy. Associated tactics are not explicitly mentioned in current counter-insurgency
manuals, which are essentially conceived to counter a model of conquest of central power. Local
solutions may be inspired by practices of the Indirect Rule, consisting in leaning on a network of
chiefs, whose neutrality or helpfulness is bought, while keeping visible and credible means of
retaliation. The social and territorial management tasks continue to rest with these chiefs, provided
that they no longer hinder the process of association by taking up arms. The advantage of this
approach consists in involving local actors in the political process.

This operational modus operandi is very distinct from traditional counter-insurgency campaigns,
because conquering hearts and minds is not set in the same terms. The core issue is to rally
responsible persons through a process of association. Populations influence on their leader can also
help the process by demonstrating that the envisaged global agreement offers a future to the
community, whilst the maintenance of an armed struggle compromises it.

2.7 Conclusion: in both cases assess appropriateness of civil and military

systems to neutralise irregulars
2.7.1 Protect government legitimacy by re-establishing territorial sovereignty
To prevent irregular entities from winning central power, the government must concretely exert the
attributes of sovereignty throughout its territory. The enabling organization in charge of planning and
implementing security and normalisation policies (i.e. to maintain, re-establish or impose these
attributes durably) must have mainly two branches:

One branch must deal with fighting against irregular adversaries. There is no other way as to build
up a territorial network of security and military grid. Geographical areas are split into operational
sectors covered by a mix of local / auxiliary police and military forces backed by tactical and
operational reserve units. Additionally, the centre of gravity of the counter-insurgency strategy is a
Governmental interagency intelligence centre, including all national available resources for
collecting and processing data on the insurgency. This branch should simultaneously:
- enforce law and maintain public order by arresting predators and dismantling secret-cells
organizations;
- keep counter-state organizations, paramilitary units or warlords at bay, either by fighting them or
by repelling them to a temporarily less sensitive sector.
A comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy implemented by a competent state requires tipping
the balance in favour of regular forces and institutions. That is why a discriminate use of military
force is highly recommended. Respecting rule of law and proportionality in law enforcement is not
a guarantee for success, but it at least contributes to hampering the escalation of violence sought
by insurgents using scorched earth and subversive irregular strategies.

The other branch must focus on the establishment of the States institutional control over
populations and territorial regions by:
- building administration and infrastructure networks, necessary for the coming normalisation;
- re-activating local administrations (mayors, councils), police stations and courts;
- re-activating laws and rules in effect, to extend the rule of law to economic and social activities;
- urgently re-starting the economic fabric by rehabilitating transportation and communication
infrastructure.
To succeed, these objectives must be planned by upper levels, but implementation must be
delegated to subordinate territorial levels, to take into account the specifics needs at the
provincial/local levels.

22

In areas newly brought to peace and in those favourable to insurgents, the branches are gathered into
functional and geographic inter-agency structures. They must cover the following generic domains:
-

identification of local needs and their relation with security in the area;

the territorial organization of security and of maintenance of public order;

determination of priorities in terms of programs in key areas;

management of the resources, capabilities and know-how necessary to manage programs;

hand-over of the responsibility of these programs and resources to populations and their official
representatives.

Security operations and re-establishment of State institutions must be synchronized either by the
national military authority in command of all required means or by the civilian representative heading
both civilian and military structures. Campaign evaluation will draw on performance indicators defined
area by area by the local echelons of these structures, which are better positioned to determine the
nature of indicators and their calibration to locally gauge progress against the objectives fixed by
upper levels.
2.7.2

Strategy of association as a way to shape the peace process

Depending on progress in the peace process, the various international organizations involved deploy
full operational expertise and assets when local security is under control. In the recent past, the
14
international community has tried to combine civilian, security and military expertise in various ways .
Based on these experiences, the United Nations have published a doctrine for multidimensional
peacekeeping seeking to combine civilian assistance, police and military issues.
The objectives are normally those of the peace agreement design. So it is indeed possible for a group
of organizations to plan a timely implementation of the peace agreement. Methods exist from the MultiYear Road Map up to the different implementation processes in a comprehensive approach tested by
NATO or the EU.
It is important for the Force Commander to ensure that military forces are appropriately deployed to
allow the establishment of civil activities according to the objectives fixed by the agreements.
Instruments for assessing a campaign that is comprehensive in nature must include:
-

the creation of a board of empowered agency representatives ;

a common evaluation of the situation, which must be defined by heads of mission in place
according to existing or ad hoc processes;

objectives must be compared to the international mandate by each stakeholder in its domain of
competency (for those who do not have a planning system, it is recommended to put in place
appropriate missing tools);

in the campaign phase in progress, combinations of military, civil-military, and civil by geographic
area must be engineered and synchronized (distribution of mission and tasks);

the requirement for necessary resources must be anticipated and their availability verified.

Though criteria for success are specific to each institution, some indicators should be observed by all:
-

commitment of local actors to the process (appropriation of the tools proposed by international
community then self-creation of ad hoc tools to enable the process to succeed);

the alternative expression of antagonisms through forms of action no longer involving collective
organized violence;

progressive occupation of the ground by civil organizations.

14

In Former-Yugoslavia, the first attempt of coordination in BiH by the technique of Boards was disappointing. Progress has been made
thereafter by the institutionalization of the Bureau of the High Representative. In Kosovo the Pillar system under the UN Authority
provided a better framework for coordination.

23

Chapter

3
ASSESSMENT METHOD
In general, assessment processes whether civilian or military seek to determine progress within a
given strategy but do not convey the degree of complexity of the situation as a whole, including its
dynamics and undercurrents. Conversely, intelligence gathering and knowledge development
functions analyse the situation without necessarily seeking to challenge and cross examine their
hypotheses with the progress achieved on the ground. The assessment method developed in this
manual intends to combine both approaches that of looking at progress towards objectives within a
strategy and that of analysing the situation in order to add value to each and arrive at better
explanations regarding relationship between our actions and the evolution of a given situation.3
3

3.1 Assessment planning

Assessment planning requires defining and setting up the tools (indicators), the human resources,
organization and the procedures that will enable the conduct of assessments.
Assessment planning is an integral part of operational planning. Indeed, an assessment process
applies to subjects that result from planning. Therefore, it is appropriate to extract, from the same
analysis, the instruments to measure the actions/operations undertaken, as shown is the graph below.
The next paragraphs present the key steps of assessment planning.

Situation awareness
Initial systemic analysis
Operational
Evaluation of the

orientation

operat

al

environment

Msn analysis : assumption

Preparation of
the operational
environment

Op al objectives,
Development

Situation
indicators

criteria for success , effects

Mesures of
effectiveness
Collection
plan

of the campaign design

CONOPS development

Situation
indicators

Analyse of opposing course of action

Development

of own COA

Development
Planning of C2

of the OPLAN

Mesures of
performance
Annex NN
Campaign
Assessment

Fig.6 Assessment Planning steps in Operational Planning

In this approach, analysis of the operational environment plays a predominant role. The method
proposed below relies largely on the principles of the well-known Joint Preparation of the Operational
Environment, while broadening its scope and focusing on campaigns involving irregular entities.

24

3.1.1

Preparation of the operational environment

Irregular entities make use of the environment to serve their purpose; they exploit not only their natural
surrounding environment, but also and mainly their societal environment, which is complex and ever
evolving. Therefore, it is fundamental for the force commanders staff to understand precisely and
accurately the conflict environment in which it will be operating. The theatre characteristics and
strategic entities actors capable of developing a strategy represent an ensemble of interacting
systems; they have to be modelled within the operational environment preparation framework. This
preparation is elaborated at the beginning of the planning process, then refined and updated as the
campaign progresses.
Akin to any analysis of complex systems, this modelling, which inevitably will tend to be imperfect and
15
simplistic, must integrate five parameters . They are:

The constituting elements of the system under scrutiny;

Their functions;

Their goals, objectives and strategy

The dynamics of their evolution;

The interaction of each of them with the other systems.

This systemic analysis must be performed holistically rather than in detail. At each level of the chain of
command, commanders have to deal with their range of complex systems and analyse them from their
own perspective.
Each theatre is specific, so the method to prepare the operational environment described below
should be flexible:

 Objectives, strategies, courses of action

Capabilities

 Territorial
footprint

 IRR.AD
Power

 Territorial


Geography, terrain, environment
Demographic charact.
Society organization
Economic resources
Cognitive factors

Capabilities

footprint

 STATE

Power

Resources
Control

 Other strategic
entities

Lines of fracture/sources of destabilization

 Opportunities/constraints

 FORCE


 IO/NGO

Fig. 7 Steps of the operational environment analysis

15

That does not question the need for targeted intelligence, information and operational data to plan and execute missions or tasks.

25

 The first step takes place within the knowledge development phase; it consists in mapping
strategic entities in the Force Commanders area of responsibility, aiming at identifying the
irregular adversary system(s), characterizing their identity (ethnic, politic, socio-economic etc),
and finally determining the different functions and elements that constitute this irregular adversary.
At this stage, it is appropriate to begin to characterize the adversary in terms of:

the organization of its power (human network constituting its leadership, power centre and
leverage, mechanism of its exercise, degree of centralisation, etc);

resources (material, human, lawful and unlawful financial resources, external support, etc);

Operating capabilities (personnel, materials) in the different operational C2 functions, action,

support, intelligence, etc.

If these entities are active at several levels (national, regional, provincial, local, etc), it is important
to understand the dynamics between these levels. However, the idea of partitioning the
operational environment into PMESII domains is not retained in this handbook.
In the meantime, an analysis of the theatre factors should be conducted via the identification of
destabilizing factors, antagonisms and divisions, whether cultural, sociological or geographical,
such as:

geography, the terrain and the environment;

demographic characteristics;

the organization of society: ethnic groups, tribes, socio-political or economic classes;

infrastructure: transportation, communications, etc. ;

economic resources and their distribution;

cognitive factors: the values held by various segments of the population, based on their
position within their society; the codes that regulate social life, the perceptions of one another
held by different groups constituting the population (perception of the force included), etc.

 The second step takes place in the orientation phase of the planning process. It aims at
determining which entity (the host nation or the irregular adversary) controls which part of the
theatre. This involves identifying areas that are under direct or indirect control of either the State or
the adversary; then within these areas determining the mechanisms and means of controlling the
population, such as justice, indoctrination networks, resource redistribution networks, etc. Such
information is used to refine understanding of the adversarys nature and how its power and
resource systems function; it also enables the identification and evaluation of its strengths and
weaknesses, its opportunities and constraints with regard to the theatre and to other strategic
entities. For instance, how does a strategy to control a certain population take advantage of that
populations value system, as well as of its perceptions of the States authority? Each factor is
analysed independently, then the mechanisms that are transversal to these factors are identified.
 The third step analyses the impact of the different factors on the armed forces deployed in
theatre; then, during the conduct of operations, this analysis will take into account the interactions
between the Force, external actors present in theatre, irregular adversaries and the host nation.
 The fourth step seeks to identify the objectives and strategies implemented by the adversary to
weaken the State or the deployed armed forces. This step should take into account:

The goals and strategic objectives (subversion, infiltration) of the irregular adversary;

The territorial dimension of its strategy (territorial gains of the enemy);

The possible operational courses of actions pertaining to the nature of its organization;

Its probable communication strategy: aims, type of messages, audience targeted, means, etc.

26

This analysis starts in the orientation phase as its conclusions are indispensable to conceive the
campaign plan; it will be further refined during the development of the opposing forces course of
action, as part of the concept of operations (CONOPS)
For each step of this analysis of the operational environment, the military staff will identify:

The central questions for which it has no answers

New tendencies/trends that are emerging but need to be confirmed

The possible risks, given the dynamics identified

Each of these elements leads to the formulation of planning hypotheses that are translated into
assessment indicators to be monitored. Some of these hypotheses condition the validity of the
planning: they are assumptions.
This preparation of the operational environment developed during initial planning can be considered a
baseline analysis, based on the available time and information. It will be complemented and updated
iteratively at each assessment cycle.
3.1.2

Framework for planning

The Initiating Directive provides the necessary framework with which to start the operational planning,
namely, inter alia, the political objectives and the desired end state, from which the strategic planning
group derives its strategic objectives. Staff headquarters should be associated with the analysis as
much as possible so as to share the decision makers vision. Further assessments should keep in line
with the political objectives and the desired end state. This Initiating Directive possibly relies on an
incomplete theatre expertise, should armed forces not yet be deployed: so hypotheses are formulated,
which will be followed until proven invalid.
The framework given by the Initiating Directive offers some indications regarding the level of
interaction entitled with non-military actors involved in the stabilisation process. The objectives of
these actors, their theories of change and their indicators are to be taken into account, as they allow
an evaluation of their contribution to the campaign and of the logic underpinning their actions.
Finally, theoretically, by enunciating a desired end state, this directive announces the type of transition
it expects. The transition corresponds to the progressive handover of the forces responsibilities to the
appropriate civil, military, international or local entities. The conditions in which this transition should
be executed are in themselves an objective to be attained.
3.1.3

Situation awareness Knowledge development

During this first phase of the planning, the first step of the aforementioned preparation of the
operational environment is carried out. This initial analysis will identify a first set of situation indicators.
3.1.4

Operational orientation

The operational orientation is a key phase, for the assessment planning, even more so within the
framework of a comprehensive approach. The orientation phase needs to bring together the Force
Commanders staff, the other actors involved on the ground and the strategic level since a coordinated
action cannot be built without a shared understanding of the problem at hand.
During this phase, the staff continues to analyse the operational environment (steps 2 and 3 as
defined above: identification of actors on the ground, balance of powers, population management or
control mechanism, impact of theatre factors, etc.) and to identify the constraints and opportunities this
operational environment represents for the irregular adversary, the host nation and the forces
deployed in theatre. Here again, the dynamics identified allow further definition or refinement of the
situation indicators.

27

Throughout the mission specific analysis, mentioned in paragraph 3.1.2., the military staff makes
assumptions that will constitute the fundamental basis for the campaign design, then the operational
plan. Some of these assumptions, as described above, are directly derived from the hypotheses
developed during the preparation of the operational environmental and need to be substantiated to the
extent possible by situation indicators.
After a specific analysis of the mission, comes the elaboration of the campaign design. This
campaign design sets the operational objectives to be reached, the decisive conditions to be achieved
and the effects to be created in order to achieve these objectives; along the lines of efforts, which are,
typically in a comprehensive approach, security, governance, basic services and economic
development.
It is highly recommended to make explicit and clear the logics that connect actions to effects, effects to
decisive conditions and decisive conditions to objectives. These logics, or theories of change, serve
to underline hypotheses. That means their validity should never be taken for granted insofar as
between action and desired effect may exist imperceptible and unforeseeable shifts that take place
and alter the relation. The approach of explaining these logical connections should at least enable the
identification, if not the isolation, of undesired effects. It is also relevant to bring up the temporal and
geographical dimensions (national, regional, local scale) of these theories of change.
The campaign design is inevitably affected by the plans of each civilian actor independently involved
in the different lines of effort, most significantly in UN missions. It is also affected by the host nations
plans if the host nation still sufficiently robust to be able to implement structured actions. Conversely,
the campaign design can also be affected by the non-existence or weakness of civilian actors plans
within a region or at time that would request the contribution of the armed forces. Therefore, the
participation and contribution of all actors is necessary and should be actively sought.
The most relevant MoE are identified from this reflection on the campaign design. They should reveal
the achievement of objectives, decisive conditions and effects (see method Para. 3.1.7). Some
indicators may also be extracted from the civilian actors assessment framework.
3.1.5

Concept of operation development

During this phase, the following elements are defined:

New situation indicators: by analysing the opposing forces courses of action, it is possible to
spot dynamic elements that will lead to the identification of situation indicators. These indicators
can then be used to measure the execution and therefore as warning signals of actions by
the opposing forces.

Measures of performance: these indicators measure the accomplishment of the armed forces
throughout the execution of essential tasks aimed at creating effects needed to fulfil essential
16
conditions of the campaign design . Tasks are essentially attributed to components of the
Force; therefore, the measure of performance, in principle, will apply to the tactical level. The
only tasks measured by the operational level will be those that pertain to this particular level.

3.1.6

Operation plan development

The Assessment Annex of the campaign plan is developed during this phase. It is comprised of:

The organization of the assessment function and the tasking of the personnel in charge of
implementing it;

The Force Commanders assessment plan (see model at Annex 1), that is the collection of all
indicators and for each of them:

16

The tasks listed in the campaign design can be excessively general and MoPs are relevant only if they refer to detailed actions within a
given area and a given time; this explains why MoPs are more useful during the concept of operation elaborations phase. The selected
mode of actions organize precisely the actions to be led within a given area and timeline, as opposed to the orientation phase.

28

A clear definition of the indicator;

The topic it refers to (that is, for instance, to give the element of situation in the case of a
situation indicator, the measure of success, the essential condition of the effect for a MoE, the
task for a MoP);

The frequency with which it is to be observed and reported on;

A brief explanation of the rationale behind the selection of the indicator regarding the topic
that must be revealed;

The area of observation;

The source that is in charge of making the observation;

The briefing format.

During the development of the assessment plan, potential redundancies among situation indicators
(defined during operational environment analysis), and the MoEs (defined during the campaign design
construction) should be deconflicted.
The assessment plan is a living document that is up-dated along each assessment cycle. It orientates
an important share of the situation monitoring and the one-off information collection undertaken during
the assessment process.
3.1.7

Method and recommendations

ecommendations for the definition of indica
indicators
ndicators

The definition of situation indicators and measures of effectiveness can proceed as follows:

Identify, via brainstorming, an initial set of factors that are deemed to reveal evolution or progress
for each object to be assessed: the operational situation, objectives, decisive conditions, effects,
etc. These indicators can either be quantitative or qualitative measures. In this respect, reality on
the ground calls for caution with regard to indicators relying on opinion polls, which are used to
collate population perceptions; using indicators that focus on the populations actions and activities
seem to be more relevant and reliable.

Ensure that indicators reveal nothing but the object it should be revealing; otherwise, the indicator
should be re-defined or reformulated, so as to avoid any confusion.

Describe the indicator so as to prevent any ambiguity in the understanding.

Once the indicator is characterized, an analysis should be conducted by a multidisciplinary team

regarding the ability to observe this indicator based on the means of information collection
available within the Force and partners. An indicator that demands information that is very difficult
or costly to obtain should be disregarded. Precisions should also be given regarding the
occurrence of the effort to be made in order to monitor the situation: is it permanent or demanding
one-off efforts?

The frequency with which the indicator should be updated and the area of monitoring should then
be fixed. Special attention must to be paid to the conclusions drawn from variations in time and
space. For instance, the time-lag between an action and the effect it is supposed to produce.

Once agreed to, the list of indicators should be organized into a hierarchy so as to prioritise
collection efforts. The priority list must be derived from the campaign design, which articulates the
effects and the distinct decisive conditions to be attained over time.

The workload entailed by this observation should then be appropriately apportioned among
relevant staffs and branches, and even among civilian actors when if they agree to contribute.
They should identify sensors and the most adapted mode of collection strategy taking into account
the area to be observed. A wide number of indicators fall naturally into the intelligence domain and
should be included in the intelligence collection plan. Others may call on databases external to the
Force and can be retrieved by liaison detachment by the host nation and other organizations.
However, given the lack of guarantee in the perennial and objective nature of this data collection,
the assessment should not depend too heavily on them.

Indicators should be reasonably limited in number so as to be adapted to collection capabilities and be

regularly followed without representing an extra burden.

29

A similar method could be applied to the definition of MoPs, despite the fact that their determination is
much easier. This is explained by the fact that the relation between an action and its execution is
deterministic and the aptitude to observe it is obvious.
Indicators should be developed based on the following characteristics:
-

They can be objective (based on an observation) or subjective (based on perceptions and

opinions).

They can be qualitative (countable) or qualitative (uncountable, phenomenon such as changes in

actions, behaviour, or estimated value scales), according to a given context. There is no reason to
prefer one over the other. A quantitative indicator does not offer, in itself, a more objective
evaluation and is not easier to deal with or interpret. The use of both quantitative and qualitative
indicators is useful to compensate for potential biases.

They must imperatively be observable.

They can be punctual (be retrieved on a one-off basis) or, on the contrary, useful all along the
engagement of the armed forces.

They need to remain simple. A permanent simplification effort must be made and supported by
staff officers. One single significant and specific indicator, checked regularly, is more useful than a
range of heavy and constraining indicators that would be too numerous to feed and would
represent a burden to analyse. They would defeat the interest of this approach.

They need to be relevant with regard to the local context.

They need to be explicit. This means that the format of the indicators must be as clear as possible
and be accompanied by a concise explanation describing what they aim to demonstrate, in order
to avoid any ambiguities that could generate false conclusions. Similarly, the sensor or source (the
person in charge of recovering data) should provide, for each objective measure, a contextual
analysis in order to explain the relevance of the indicator with regard to the conjuncture.
Examples:
One decisive condition in the campaign design is: this province has reached a level of security
that is compatible with the execution of long term development activities. The associated MoE
could be as follows:
- The number of insurgents attacks on this given district
- The feeling of security of its inhabitants
- The number of NGO deployed on the ground in the province.
One of the effects associated to this condition being that the police forces exercise progressively,
on a given timeline (month), an effective and lasting footprint in the province going from one
district to the others. The MoEs measuring these footprints could be formulated as follows:
- The number of policemen (police officers) deployed in a given district at a given time
- The freedom of action of policemen deployed in their mission and in their personal movements
- The number and type of actions which are led by policemen.
However, in practice, one may realise that the last MoE formulated is irrelevant as the policemen
can be deployed without noticeable effects, and the actions identified and enumerated are not
good indicators as far as there is no culture of briefing/debriefing in the context under scrutiny.
During the updating of the preparation of the operational environment, a few elements allow to
notice that following the deployment of troops by the Force in the region, the insurgents organized
so far in companies, split in small groups among the population. One situation indicator could
be:
- The number of important ambushes led in rural areas;
- The number of harassing attacks led by groups.

30

3.2 The assessment process during the conduct of operations

Assessment serves to highlight which trends, some of which are hardly perceptible, could generate
risks and opportunities for action, with regard the fragile equilibrium of the operational environment.
During the engagement, assessment rests on two complementary cycles:

Monitoring, which supports the conduct of the action at operational level;

Evaluation, which facilitates the understanding of the operation in its global context and supports
the planning process in the medium and long term.
Communication
strategy

NET
EVALUATION

RAW
EVALUATION

Capabilities, Recommendations,
organization, planning

Engagement Evaluation
Present situation

Evaluation
of the Situation
per se

Perspectives

Evaluation of the
Campaign design
progression

Assess.
From
the host
nation
Assess.
From IO

MOP

MOE

situation
indicators

One-off
collection

FEEDBACKS
MONITORING

Evaluation of the
course of action
progression

DATA COLLECTION

Info host nation

Infos IO

Fig. 8 Assessment process

3.2.1 Monitoring
Monitoring consists in collecting and analysing data and information that are given by various
collection and analysis channels and operational information briefs ( -REP-type messages from
lower-level units, synthesized by ASSESSREPS and, in the intelligence field, INTSUM messages) and
also by field investigations and reports as well as the exchanges with host nation authorities and
civilian agencies. These pieces of information are used to keep updated vision of the operational
situation.
Such follow-up is naturally carried out principally by subordinate units on the ground; it may also be
done at the operational level for all activities pertaining to it. It is orientated by the assessment plan.
3.2.2 Assessment cycles
There are two categories of assessment cycles:
At campaign level: the campaign assessment aims primarily to orientate operation planning or the
next phases of the operation and to verify the relevance of the campaign plan by proposing
adjustments if need be. Occurring once every several months, it should mark the end of a phase within
the on-going operation. It looks at the achievement on the whole of the campaign plans objectives,
and draws from the analysis of the indicators and measures.

31

At the level of an ongoing operation, the operational assessment aims primarily to validate and reorientate the conduct of on-going operations. Occurring once every several weeks, it focuses more
specifically on the attainment of decisive points and conditions of the various lines of operations. It
delivers recommendations regarding possible changes to orders or regarding the necessity of initiating
new planning, to adapt to new circumstances and improve the efficiency of the armed forces action.
Both assessment types deliver the same capacity to provide an understanding of the current situation.
3.2.3 Assessment method during the conduct of operations
Whatever is the assessment cycle it follows a 5 phase method:
-

Assessment orientation

Information collection effort

Raw evaluation of the engagement

Net evaluation of the engagement

Conclusion and recommendations

Assessment orientation. In addition to the orientation that concludes the previous cycle, a
specific orientation may be provided by the Force Commander to start the on-going assessment
cycle. This leads a re-weighing or a re-definition of the indicators in the assessment plan,
depending on the priorities established and on the evolution of the situation, as presented by the
situation monitoring products; (some indicators could indeed become irrelevant or impossible to
collect as a result of a lack of means to measure them: for instance, measuring the number of
NGOs present in an area to measure its level of security becomes irrelevant if a human disaster
forces them to enter his area regardless of the danger; the measure of the armed forces activities
becomes useless if the contingent in charge of retrieving them is discharged unexpectedly).

Information collection effort. It may be necessary to complement the collection effort by specific
information requirements to fill missing indicators. In particular some data needs to come from
actors external to the Force.
The information collection channels need to be accurately defined to avoid redundancy which can
cause bias in analysis. The intelligence services method of sources inventory and information
grading applies.

Raw evaluation of engagement. It is based on three distinct evaluations carried out

simultaneously :
-

The evaluation of the situation per se, which analyses the operational environment;

The evaluation of the campaign progression, which analyses the achievement of effects,
decisive conditions and objectives;

The evaluation of the progression of the course of action, which analyses the fulfilment of
essential tasks.

These various analyses are based on trends shown by indicators. The definition of thresholds can
be useful, but only in the case of an evaluation of campaign progression, to represent gross
results with colour codes. The establishment of thresholds is done arbitrarily; they should not
normally be sufficient to indicate the attainment or not of an objective or a decisive condition.
These thresholds are not unchanging; however they must be agreed on by the command group.
Indicators having been chosen according to their sensitivity to change, one expects to observe
phenomenon variations within space and time over a period covering an assessment cycle.
Working out averages across the entire space and time should avoid hiding peaks and breaking
points.

32

Evaluation of the situation per se. It is an evaluation of the operational environment, based
on the situation indicators, the monitoring feedbacks and the specific information collection
gathered prior to the evaluation. This evaluation of the situation per se follows the procedure
developed above for the preparation of the operational environment, using updated data on
the host nation, the irregular adversarys constituting elements, its strategy and its interaction
with the components of the theatre. This assessment must include a holistic analysis of
interactions between the irregular adversary and the theatre components on one hand and the
Force and civilian actors on the other. The perception of civilian actors by the irregular
adversary should also be included. This evaluation must enable:

To validate or invalidate the hypotheses previously formulated and readjust them if

needed or formulate new ones taking into account dynamics, antagonisms and cleavages.

To identify new trends to monitor and new risks and uncertainties to watch for.

To identify new situation indicators to be followed and formulate new presuppositions to

be used for planning.

Evaluation of the campaign design progression. This consists in analysing the information
gathered corresponding to the MoE, and then to analyse and synthesize the progresses
towards achievement of each effect, decisive condition and objective. Once this has been
done, partial conclusions for each line of operations or line of effort can be formulated. The
format chosen to present the results of the analysis can include charts or cards, but for
pedagogic purposes and easy visualisation it may adopt the graphics used in campaign
design, labelled with colour codes. Finally and most importantly, the purpose of this effort is to
synthesize the various partial conclusions and to evaluate to what extent the theories of
change on which the campaign design relies are or are not in the process of being completed.

Evaluation of the course of action progression. This relates to the Forces direct
achievements resulting from tasks and instructions contained in the campaign plan (or,
depending on the type of assessment cycle, the operation plan). To start with, an evaluation of
the accomplishment of tasks is drawn from an analysis of monitoring feedback and other data
corresponding to MoPs. Secondly, an evaluation must be made regarding the suitability of the
assigned tasks compared to dedicated operational capabilities. This evaluation is conducted
at the tactical level of command, the tasks being essentially executed by the Force tactical
components, and then synthesized at the operational level.

The evaluations realised by civilian actors and the host nation should be taken into
account as much as possible in order to give a complete and coherent vision of the
stabilisation system in which the Forces actions take place.

The net evaluation of the engagement. This consists in confronting the results of the preceding
evaluations in order to identify possible causal relationships among them and to better understand
the engagements logic. It represents an intellectually demanding phase. It has two distinct parts:
-

The evaluation of the current situation. First, the evaluation of the campaign design
progression is confronted with the evaluation of the situation per se (each synthesis of the
evaluation of the campaign design, or even each partial conclusion developed for the various
lines of effort, is cross examined with each aspect of the preparation of the operational
environment) in order to highlight the elements that led to the success or failure in the
realisation of objectives. This confrontation allows the revelation of second order effects or
external causes that could explain the direction taken by the campaign. The purpose is to
understand and explain why the strategy being carried out is leading or not to the expected
results. For example: MoEs indicate a slow or inexistent progress of the security situation in
most areas, apart from a neighbouring area, where desired effects are reached with an
equivalent level of efforts. The confrontation with the evaluation of the situation per se shows
that in this particular area, irregular adversaries are confronted with a growing resistance from
local political actors who undermine their strategy.
In the second place, this analysis is cross examined with the evaluation of the Forces
fulfilment of its courses of action in order to determine to what extent the Force and civilian
actors actions have influenced the situations evolution and altered the irregular adversaries

33

(or reinforced them through counterproductive effects such as collateral damages,

inappropriate behaviour, etc.). This analysis, inductive by nature, can consist in determining
the probable effects, both direct and indirect, of the actions of the Force and of civilian actors,
and then confronting them with the results obtained from the analysis of the situation per se.
Then, after a reverse analysis, evaluate to what extent the operational situation constrained or
helped the execution of tasks of the course of action. Using the example mentioned above:
this second analysis seems to demonstrate that the achievement of desired effects in the area
can result from a programme implemented by the Force and civilian actors, which was
accepted by local political actors.
-

Perspectives for the engagement. This is about deducing, for the present situation, the
opportunities, constraints and risks deriving from the current circumstances (normally
identified and analysed during the update of the preparation of the operational environment),
for the execution of the campaign design, the course of action and the activities of the other
17
actors engaged . The ability or the inability to conduct actions or produce effects, connected
to designated objectives, serves to identify the scope of feasibility. From these doable actions,
branch plans can be refined and then considered or the campaign plan can be updated by a
definition of new hypotheses.

Formulation of conclusions and recommendations; This phase is the culminating point of the
evaluation cycle. The evaluation conclusions must allow a judgement on:
-

The relevance of the campaign design (what we want to achieve) and the logics that
underpin it (theories of change) or on the contrary the adjustments that must be made.

The relevance of the course of action (what we do) or the need for a contingency plan such
as a sequel or a branch plan.

The appropriateness of operational capabilities with regard to the situation and the state of
campaign progress as well as the proper distribution of efforts.

The evaluation must be concluded with explicit recommendations on:

-

The capability efforts to consent to,

The organizational adjustments to bring,

The reach and nature of FRAGO,

The complementary planning to undertake,

And finally: modifications on indicators.

Some recommendations can be proposed as lessons learned, to improve the operational

preparation of relieving troops.
Feedback on synthesis and decisions made must be given to all involved parties who take part in
the evaluation process.

17

A SWOT (Strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats) applies to the force, its partners and irregular adversaries could be conducted.

34

RAW EVALUATION
Evaluation of
the situation per se
Analyze of the dynamics in:

Evaluation of
the campaign design progression
Analyze of the attainment of effects, decisive
conditions and given objectives:

Composition of entities
analyze of MoE
Theater drivers
synthesis by effect or decisive condition
Interactions btw entities & drivers
or line of operation or objective
Entities strategies
inclusion of host nation and IO/NGO
assessments

Evaluation of
the course of action progression
Analysis and synthesis of:
tasks execution via reports
(ASSESSREP, ), even MoP
appropriateness of operational
capabilities

NET EVALUATION
Evaluation of
the
current situation

Engagement
perspectives

. Understanding of the operating situation and the progression of the engagement:

systems by effect or decisive condition or etc. VS analysis of dynamics
. Analysis of the mutual influences:
execution of the course of action and IO/NGO activities VS operational situation
Analyze of constraints & opportunities of the current situation
for the pursuit of the campaign design and the course of action and IO/NGO activities
Risk analysis: census , analysis and weighting of possible impacts

CONCLUSIONS

Do campaign design and theories of change remain relevant?

Coherence of the course of action with IO/NGO and host nation activities? Realism with regard to the situation?
Can own course of action manage potential risks?
Are the capabilities appropriate?

Fig. 9 Raw and net evaluations

3.2.4 Evaluation products
Communication and feedback as material or immaterial support to the evaluation:

Feedback; The conclusions of the evaluation will be contained in the feedback addressed to
military authorities and political leaders. Depending on the hierarchical level they account to, the
precisions of this feedback will vary. An explanation can be given on the analysis leading to the
situation evaluation.

Institutional communication: Whether it is formal or not, it must conform to the communication

strategy opted for and validated by the highest authorities, to include dissemination, productions,
messages and targeted audiences. This institutional communication must be clear and coherent.
Its conclusions are validated by the Force Commander and accessible at all time.

Theatre Communication; The Force is probably the most structured element present on the
theatre of operations and the only one able to conduct a detailed operational analysis. By
facilitating access to these operational analyses, it participates in developing mutual
understanding. The reports and briefs to be distributed are based on conclusions and elements
contained in the synthesis analyses. Therefore they have the same dissemination frequency.
However, there is no reason to publish the pieces of information that pertain to the internal
functioning of the force outside the hierarchical chain.

Communication support; They can be either written or non-written (physical or not)

-

A written communication is the principal vehicle to communicate with other levels of

command and other actors. The content is adapted to the message to be communicated and,
when appropriate, to restrictions over the release of operational information. Although
originally literal, the content should be illustrated by charts and figures. On the other hand, a
chart illustrating the realisation of effects and decisive conditions cannot explain fully elements
such as the mechanisms that allow the engaged Forces to reach their objectives or not.
Therefore, in these cases, causality and influence diagrams can be relevant.

A briefing completes the written communication. It can easily contain charts and figures and
can be accompanied by a power point presentation.

A knowledge database. All the elements developed within the framework of an evaluation
must be integrated within a knowledge database, accessible depending on the need to have
access to specific pieces of information.

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Chapter

4
PRINCIPLES OF ORGANIZATION OF THE ASSESSMENT FUNCTION
4
The practical organization of assessment varies according to various factors such as the organization
of command and control or the extent to which it interacts with civil organizations. The principles
offered in this chapter are neither absolute, nor specific to a particular type of conflict. Rather, they are
drawn from the analysis method presented in chapter 3.
Decisions regarding organization, like process, must be guided by good sense and simplicity.

4.1 The assessment function within the Force HQ

The assessment function covers the personnel and organizations involved, partly or wholly, in the
process leading to the assessment of the engagement. At Force HQ level, it rests on the Assessment
Cell and on the Assessment Working Group.
The assessment function begins with campaign planning, which is undertaken by the joint operational
planning group (JOPG). As mentioned previously, assessment planning stems from operational
planning. Thus, the assessment cell, which is the heart of the assessment function, must be merged
into the JOPG. In other words, the JOPG should encompass what becomes the core of the
assessment function during the execution phase.
4.1.1 Assessment Cell
It is the permanent component of the assessment function, composed of personnel exclusively
assigned to assessment. It is responsible for:

developing and updating the assessment plan;

coordinating the efforts of the different individuals and functional areas involved in assessment;

as required, developing assessments ;

managing, from a methodology standpoint, the Assessment Working Group;

integrating productions.

4.1.2 Assessment Working Group

It is both a permanent network of experts, through which information and knowledge are exchanged,
and the analysis group which carries out assessment up to completion. It consists of at least:

the Force Commander or chief of staff, in the final phase;

the civilian representative

the Assessment Cell ;

functional experts (from staff sections);

component commanders or their representatives;

civilian agencies and host nation governments representatives and experts

18

18

See further

36

It convenes:

In the planning phase, to develop the assessment plan and ensure that it is properly understood;

to carry out the net evaluation of the engagement, based on the various evaluations provided by
the intelligence branch and the Assessment Cell. Meetings consist in exploring all tracks opened
in the confrontation of raw evaluations. Dialogue should be as open and frank as possible, in view
of raising noteworthy points and outlooks, as per the indications contained in chapter 3. The Force
Commander or his chief of staff joins and directly contributes to this crucial, intellectual phase; it is
warmly recommended to directly involve the Force Commander in debates with experts.

The preparation of the sessions and the handling of meetings is the Assessment Cells responsibility.
Following a session, the Assessment Cell prepares a draft synthesis, returned to the Assessment
Working Group members for proofreading and, once finalized, to the Command Group for approval.
The structure of this synthesis would depend on the Force Commander needs, but should at least
include:

reminder of the Force Commanders guidance;

a perspective of the assessment according to the campaign plan;

risks, opportunities and recommendations;

principal interventions on key points, to keep synthesis as objective as possible and the less
filtered out. Residual differences of views and tricky dialogue with third parties shall be mentioned.

Formal validation of the decisions taken or to be taken, including on external dissemination of the
results.

Compilation of the decisions taken is disseminated for internal needs.

4.1.3 Multidisciplinary Groups for evaluations
Staff branches naturally contribute within the assessment working group to the assessment effort,
each in their domain, by: contributing to monitoring; following-up on indicators; and building their own
part of the assessment.
The assessment working group may be split across three multidisciplinary groups to carry out raw
evaluations, as per Para. 3.2.2.:
-

one group devoted to the evaluation of the completion of course of action, steered by the OPS
branch,

one group to evaluate the progress of the campaign design, steered by the PLANS branch,

one group to evaluate the situation, run by the INTEL branch.

4.1.4 Experts
The quality of assessment is largely dependant on the various experts, who are the only ones really
capable of determining the relative importance of each situation indicator, and therefore of correctly
interpreting the whole situation. Three types of expertise are necessary:

An expertise of the area, consisting of knowledge of the theatre, to include the political and social
structures, the populations, their sociology, cultures, language, etc. This expertise is generally
held by military or non-military personnel who have operated in the country for a number of years.

Expertise in civilian organizations (non-governmental and international organizations and host

nations institutions). This expertise should lie amongst civilian actors who have been involved in
United Nations peace operations.

Expertise in conflict dynamics, particularly in irregular wars. It cannot be acquired without thorough
studies (which military education should give due care). Such experts, should they exist, are not
necessarily deployed, but they should be identified.

37

The scarcity of experts generally precludes assigning one permanently to a single function, but rather
advocates for the centralization of this resource (which moreover limits the risks of circular reporting
and generic meaningless products).
Additionally, staff must seek external expertise, locally hired and/or resulting from a partnership with
civilian agencies in place, to augment HQ analysis capacity, especially if experts are few, and also to
counterbalance institutional, rather conformist staff (phenomenon of group thinking).
The need for this expertise must be clearly identified during the planning process and required during
force generation.

4.2 Relationships with other levels of command19

4.2.1

Relationships with the strategic level of command

Understanding the operational environment is a bottom-up effort, with standpoints and perspectives
becoming increasingly broad as they reach higher levels. A strategic command has its own
assessment process, which seeks to identify campaign progress towards its own strategic objectives
and effects. Assessment at the strategic level is for the most part fed by the Force Commanders
assessment, which constitutes its central piece. The strategic assessment cycle is reliant and
therefore synchronized with the Force Commanders.
Strengthened by a rigorous assessment of the engagement, the Force Commander may call for
changes regarding the strategy, the Force list, the rules of engagement and behaviour, etc. Strategic
decisions are partly oriented and constructed upon the Force Commanders assessment.
The Strategic Commander supports the Force Commanders assessment by providing him with
20
information on his area of interest and by assigning him experts in strategic military intelligence.
4.2.2

Relationships with the tactical level of command

Tactical commanders conduct assessments at their level in their area of responsibility, where they
execute prescribed tasks corresponding to the selected course of action, as per the plan.
Irregular organizations territorial footprints vary according to force factors and display unevenness.
Decentralization of assessment allows capturing local trends and emerging meanings. Thus Tactical
Commanders contribute to Force Commanders situational understanding by:

monitoring;

providing him with the assessments of their missions in their areas of responsibility;

providing the complementary assessments requested by the Force Commander;

directly participating in the Force Commanders assessment through Assessment Working Group.

Changes observed at local level are indeed of interest and may be reflected in the theatre-level Force
Commanders assessment; however, theatre-level dynamics are not meant to be a simple compilation
of local trends.
The Force commander:

defines the assessment plan and orients components for all assessments carried out in the joint
operations area;

integrates and synthesizes tactical-level assessments, which contribute to his own assessment;

19 Relationships between levels of command do not rule out informal exchanges at desk level, which prepare the ground and improve
mutual understanding.
20
Area is taken here in a geographic as well as in a thematic meaning.

38

directs specific information collection and assessment efforts regarding national-level topics such
as; host nation central governance or build-up of security forces;

as requested, directs tactical commanders assessments on specific themes of critical interest;

provides tactical commanders with information on their area of interest.

4.3 Relationships with civilian and host-nation actors

One of the major challenges facing the Force Commander is to understand the progress of the
comprehensive campaign plan, even though he is not responsible for most effects and actions
undertaken. Thus close coordination is required with civilian actors; it is envisaged differently
depending on whether the Force operates under the coordination of or in the absence of a High
Representative mandated to coordinate all efforts.
Moreover the struggle for legitimacy requires the coalition and civilian actors to support a sovereign
host nation government, which may not function or even exist anywhere but on paper. With a fake or
failed government and international stakeholders acting in a scattered manner, a comprehensive
approach and therefore an integrated, or even a well coordinated assessment, is simply unachievable.
When it is the case, one should at least consider the following levels of exchange between the
different stakeholders:
-

exchange of selected raw data;

sharing assessment plans;

sharing assessment products.

Informal exchanges with civilian actors must be encouraged, under the share all, withold by
exception principle, and the classification of assessment products reduced to a bare minimum.
In order to align efforts and to assess the effects of the Force contribution to lines of activities that
come under the leadership of the host nation or of designated civilian organizations, the Force
Commander needs continuous and facilitated relationships with the host nation. The appointment of a
high ranking civilian next to the Force Commander, particularly in a coalition, deserves consideration.
Such an individual heading the various civil advisors and liaison personnel, would hold all the civilian
expertise of the Force headquarters.
The modalities of how to set up of the overall articulation for assessment as well as the information
exchange architecture between the Force and civilian actors is specific to every engagement and
beyond the reach of this guide.

39

Campaign plan
assumption :
for reason X,
community Z should not
politically oppose in the
next six months

Indicators of situation

Effect #1 : level of
security in region Y is
compatible with starting
up X development
activities

Measures of effectiveness

RELATED ITEM

IS 1
Call to fight against the
Force and security forces
within Z community
places of worship.

MoE 1.2
Number of NGO wishing
to work in region Y

MoEs 1.1
Frequenting of district
country towns bazaars by
rural population in region
Y.

INDICATORS

Z community has a strong religious

identity. Sermons are an invaluable
gauge of the political intentions of
the community leaders.

In region Y, bazaars are the principal

place where market exchanges take
place. Frequentation increase should
reveal a greater freedom of action for
rural population, thereby a greater
sense of security.

EXPLANATION

To be launched at once.
Report weekly.

To be launched in two
months.
Report monthly.

To be launched at once.
Report monthly.

FOLLOW-UP TIMESPAN

Regions A, B, C covered
by Z community

Districts A, B and C

Districts A, B and C

AREA FOLLOWED-UP

CANVAS SAMPLE OF AN ASSESMENT PLAN

J2 (incorporated in
the Collection Plan)

J9 through CIMIC
Centre

Task Force Tango

44th Brigade

RESPONSIBLE ENTITY

To include in
INTSUM

To include in
ASSESSREP

REPORT TYPE

ANNEX 1

ANNEX 2
TERMINOLOGY EQUIVALENCES

The following table draws the terminology equivalences among the different planning and assessment
methods, civil and military:

Note that Effect and End State in the first line should be switched, according to definitions proposed
by the OECD document on Results Based Management (RBM).
Source Haugevik, Kristin M., Benjamin de Carvalho Civil-Military Cooperation in Multinational and
Interagency Operations. Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt (NUPI) 2007-, p.14

http://english.nupi.no/content/download/1415/60203/version/5/file/SIP-2-WP-718-CarvalhoHaugevik.pdf
See also :

http://www.oecd.org/secure/pdfDocument/0,2834,en_21571361_34047972_31950682_1_1_1_1,0.pdf

41