ReconceivingPolicyChangeandPunctuatedEquilibriumATypology

ChristianBreunigandChrisKoski
UniversityofKonstanzandReedCollege

Paperpreparedforpresentationatthe7thAnnualCAPMeeting
Konstanz,2010604

1|P a g e

Introduction
Currentresearchonstateandnationalpolicymakingcanbeseparatedbyafocusonpolicychangeina
particularpolicydomainandsystemicanalysesrevealingbroadpatternsofpolicychange.Punctuated
equilibrium (PE) represents a variant of policy analysis increasingly interested in explaining particular
distributions of policy change. However, several notable authors (e.g. Cashore and Howlett 2007 and
Patashnik2008)haverecentlyargued thatpunctuatedequilibriumtheoryischallengedto explainany
changethatisnonpunctuated.Otherscholarscontesttheverynotionofpunctuatedchange,stating
that policy change is simply policy change. Still other scholars (Cashore) argue that punctuated
equilibriumdoesnotfullyaccountforlongtermimplicationsassociatedwithpunctuatedchanges;that
the cumulative effect of policy punctuations is undertheorized and that the total direction of policy
changeisafunctionofalongerviewthatincorporatesseveraliterationsofpunctuations.
How policy types interact with theories of institutional decisionmaking (in this case, PE theory), form
the basis of our inquiry. More specifically, we ask to about the extent to which policy typologies are
useful in identifying the conditions under which punctuations might occur, but respond to recent
criticismsbyCashoreandHowletttoexaminetheextenttowhichpolicytypesinfluencethecumulative
effect of policy change. In so doing we meld together two branches of the policy literature for the
purpose of advancing a research agenda that considers institutions, politics, and the policy types that
contributetopoliticalconflict.
We compare and contrast our policy outcome based typology with two classic typologies of policy
domains:Lowisfourgroups(1964)andWilsons(1973)classificationaccordingtobenefitsandcostsof
particular policy alternatives. Policy typologies are at once universally understood and, at the same
time,widelycriticizedforinabilitiestoexplainallcases.ThefundamentalargumentLowiandWilson
advancearethatcertaintypesofpolicyaremorelikelytoexperienceconflictthanothersandthatthis
conflictdeterminespolitics.ThisisnotdissimilartoPEtheorywhereinstitutionalfrictionisanecessary
componentforpolicychange.Institutionsaresticky;whentheyfinallymovebecauseofsomechangein
theinternalorexternalconditionssurroundingpolicy,theylurchforwardinafashionmorevolatilethat
asmoothlyupdatingmachine.Issues,targetpopulationsandpolicytypescontributeto theextentto
which policy subsystems are compelled to incorporated new preferences and hear challenges to the
statusquo. However,conflict createswinnersandlosers;lessconsistencyineachproducesagreater
opportunityforpunctuations,butspeakslesstotheoverallcumulativeeffectofthesevictories.

2|P a g e

Weaskquestionsregardingtheratesofchangefordistributiveversusregulatoryversusredistributive
policies: to what extent do these classic accounts of policies determining politics help to describe the
typesofpunctuationsweempiricallyobserve?Howdopolicyareastheorizedtoproduceinterestgroup
politicsinWilsonsframeworklinkedtopolicieswithhigherorlowerpropensityforpunctuatedchange?
The papers empirical focus builds on Breunig and Koskis (2012) existing work and analyses state
budgets from 1980 to 2012 across all ten spending functions. After computing average budgetary
changes and the degree of punctuation for each function and state, we statistically cluster policy
categoriestodevelopandtestourtwobytwotypology.Bytheoreticallyderivinggroupcharacteristics
and then empirically examining state budgets across government functions, we follow Ertman (2005)
andusetypologiesinanexplanatorymanner.

ChangeandPunctuations
Much has been made of the binary that marks the greatest visible contribution of PE theory the
addition of the theory to understanding monumental changes during periods of overall stability.
Important to remember is that PE theory is a theory that describes stability and change, though PE
theoryisoftenfocusedonwhenthinkingaboutpunctuationsindistributions.AsHowlettandMigone
(2011)adeptlynotedsaid,Lindblomisaliveandwellandlivinginpunctuatedequilibriumland.
The theory is one that gains an audience because it purports to explain extreme changes which are
ofteninterestinggiventheirmagnitudeinpolicymakingand,mostimportantly,theirdistancefromthe
status quo. This is somewhat unfortunate given that the theory that underlies the numerous
distributions of hearings, budgetary changes, laws, and other policy outputs is one that seeks to
understandadecisionmakingenvironmentthatcanproducepolicychangeingeneralforthepurposeof
understanding the peculiar empirical realities of punctuated distributions of a variety of policy
indicators.
It is fitting that a theory that emerged to describe a pattern of empirical phenomena should be
questioned when empirical phenomena do not seem to fit within the broader framework of policy
changethatPEToffers.Inaseriesofworks,CashoreandHowletthaveadrawnheightenedawareness
to the fact that PET has trouble explaining moderate or, in the words of the scholars non
paradigmatic change. Indeed the theory evolves precisely in response to what Baumgartner and
Jones call the weak shoulders of change distributions that characterize public policy. In other
critiques, Givel notes that punctuated changes are better thought of as tipping points related to
3|P a g e

steadily mounting perhaps not necessarily incremental change that eventually pushes policy from
onestatustotheother.Theseweakshouldersareweakbecauseofgeneralfindingsthatthereare
fewmoderatechangescertainlyfewerthanmightbeexpectedinarationalanalyticdecisionmaking
model of policymaking. In truth, though fewer than expected, moderate changes do occur and the
effectofthosemoderate changesovertime canbequitelarge. Thesecond basisoftheCashoreand
Howlettcritiqueisonethatextendsthediscussionofpolicychangebyarguingthattheoveralldirection
ofpolicychangeisnotafunctionofthelargeoneoffchangesthatareoftenassociatedwithPET,but
theoveralleffectovertimewhattheycalldirectionality.
The major underlying critique of this class of scholars is that policy change could be better
conceptualizedand,whenbetterconceptualized,PETischallengedtoexplainsomepolicytheories.Part
ofthisdiscussionislikelyadifferencebetweenmacro,meso,andmircolevelanalysesofpolicychange.
Punctuated equilibrium theory, while applicable at the microlevel of case study, is a much more
powerful theory of policy change when viewed at the macro level. Still, the theory purports specific
decisionmakingmechanismsthatoughttobeusefulatalllevelsofanalysisand,infact,relyuponavery
microlevelsetofassumptionsaboutinformationgathering,institutions,andhumanbehaviormanifest
inpolicychange.

JustaTheoryofExtremeEventsLeadingtoExtremeChanges?
Thus it is that the majority of the empirical focus and critique of PE theory is on, in a paraphrase of
Howlett,exogenouslydrivenparadigmaticchange.Whileitisnotnecessarilythetaskofthispaperto
arguefororagainstthebroadargumentthatPEtheoryisfocusedonanarrowrangeofpolicyoutputs,it
isclearthatPEtheoryneedstodoabetterjobaddressinganentirerangeofchanges.Moreover,PE
theoryissomewhathamperedbyitsearlyfocusonCongressandotherlawmakinginstitutionsinterms
oftheorder(CH2007)ofanalysisexaminedbyearlyscholars.Thereismuchtobegainedwithaformal
expansion of PE theory empirics, if not mechanics, to understand changes between incremental and
punctuated.
Inarecentarticle,Breunigand Koski(2012)begin extend this moreinclusiveapproachtounderstand
wholedistributionstoincorporatethedirectionalityofpolicychange.BreunigandKoskiempirically
showthelongtermimpactsoftheentirerangeofdistributions,findingthatsimilartooneversionof
HCs focus on the potential for incremental change to be ultimately large more punctuated
distributions of state budget categories grow at slower rates than less punctuated distributions. Of
4|P a g e

course,theoverallfindingswerethatstatebudgetsaswholearepunctuatedwhenindividualspending
categoriesareaggregatedovertime;similartothevastmajorityofPEliteratureexaminingthecaseof
budgets.Thus,theissueislessaboutexaminingwhetherbudgetdistributionsarepunctuated,butwhy.
ThewhyofpunctuatedequilibriumistheenduringtheoreticalfeatureofBaumgartnerandJonesearly
work. Ultimately, PE scholars are interested in understanding policy processes generally and are
individuallyspecificallyinterestedincertaintypesofprocessesandoutputsfromthoseprocesses.The
mechanicsofPEtheoryaredependentupontwobasicelements:informationandinstitutions.Clearly,
PEtheoryismorenuanced(thinkdecisionmaking,politics,technologicalchange),butthebasicrecipe
forproducingthesignificantshiftsfromthestatusquosooftenobservedinpoliticsaretheamountof
informationthatexistsinapolicyareaandtheabilityofexistinginstitutionstoprocessthatinformation.
TheclassiccasesofPEtheorye.g.nuclearpowerrelyupontheimportanceofexternalshocksthat
changethetoneandvolumeofinformationinsuchawaythatexistinginstitutionalarrangementsare
overwhelmedintheirabilitytomaintainthestatusquo.AreductionistaccountofPEtheory,therefore,
isonethatonlyfocusingonthetheorysabilitytoexplainextremechangefromextremeevents.

ATheoryofDistributionalChange
Inaseriesofworks,PEscholarssetuponthetaskofexpandingthestudyofpolicyagendasfromone
government the US national government to a comparative study of international and subnational
institutions. This comparative work lost some of the finegrained analysis of policy mechanisms that
emerge from a casestudy approach, but gained leverage in comparing institutional structures across
democratic governments. As PE addresses comparative cases with more data, the theory can be less
legitimatelycharacterizedasonethatisprimarilyconcernedwithextremeeventsandextremechange
(i.e. exogenouslydriven paradigmatic change) given that extreme events are simply not part of the
majorityofcomparativePEanalyses.Infact,onemightgosofartosuggestthatsomescholarsinPE
takepunctuatedchangeasthestatusquo(ironyintended)andthatPEtheoryasageneralkindofpolicy
studyisbettercharacterizedasDistributionalChange(DC)theory.
Examining distributions policy changes is no small task. A major conceptual hurdle is deciding on a
definition of policy and a subsequent definition of change. Another challenge can be found in
creatingaconstantmeasuretocapturetheshapeofadistributionincomparisontosomethingelse
typically some sort of baseline. Breunig and Koski, as well as others have utilized the Lmoment
methodology (Hoskings) to characterize distributions of changes within budgets. Essentially, this
5|P a g e

method allows for the identification of extreme change, but also normal changes, and incremental
changesbypoolingallchangestogetheranscoringdistributionsonascalefromentirelyincrementalto
chaotic. Another, simpler, way to characterize changes in distributions is to assess the volatility of
changeswithinagovernmentorpolicysubsystem.Importanttorememberinthesecasesisthatitis
impossible to characterize something as volatile or extreme without some sort of comparison or
establishedbaselineofstability.Thus,despitesomecritiquestothecontrary,thedistributionalnature
ofpunctuatedequilibriumanalysismeansthathereisnoPEstudythatdoesnotconsiderasubsystem
oversomeperiodoftime.
The advantage to distributional analysis, however, is quite important given some of the limitations of
theearlyconceptionsofPEtheory;namelythatthephenomenontobeexplainedisnotsomelimited
viewofextremeorsmallchanges,butthefactorsthatleadtodistributionsofchange.Distributionsof
policychangeshoulddifferbyinstitutionalstructure;thatmuchisclearfromtheexistingliteratureon
punctuated equilibrium theory. How specific institutions (e.g. state governors, mayors, parliamentary
democracies)specificallydifferisanempiricalquestionthathashithertoformedthebulkofPEtheory
research. Distributional analysis shows that institutions with more agenda control, limited entry, and
more resources are likely to elicit more punctuated distributions than weaker institutions. Again, the
implication from distributional analysis is not simply an explanation of punctuations versus
incrementalism,butanunderstandingoftherangeofdistributionofchange.

PolicyConflict,PolicyTypology,andPolicyDirection
Fundamentally, politics is about conflict. Classic accounts of policymaking (Lowi 1964, Wilson) argue
that,whilepoliticsisimportanttounderstandingthepolicyprocess,thestructureofpoliticsisafunction
ofpolicytoolsandtargetpopulations.Runafoulofpowerfulgroups,andtherewillbeconflict;attempt
to change behaviors in fundamental ways, and there will be conflict. Thus, in addition to institutions
andmacropoliticalfactors,afullyformedtheorypolicychangethroughthelensofdistributionsshould
also include some characterization of policy type. Conflict and cooperation manifest themselves in
differentlevelsofattentiontoissues,butultimatelyinthetypesofandvariationinpoliciesthatemerge
fromsubsystems.Highconflictcanleadtovolatilityiftheconflictisoverthefundamentalgoalsofwhat
government does, but high conflict might also lead to relatively low volatility insofar as the conflict is
constrainedtofinerissuesofpolicymaking.

6|P a g e

The critiques of the Lowi typology are well known and are fundamental to all attempts to categorize
policymakingbehavior.Despitethesecritiques,thefundamentalrelationshipbetweencoercion(inthe
caseofLowi)andtheconcentrationofcostsversusbenefits(inthecaseofWilson)andpoliticsisquite
useful when attempting to assess the cumulative changes we might see in otherwise punctuated
distributions. Schneider and Ingrams theoretical contribution of burdens and benefits better
defines the policy typology canon, but also expands the canon to better include social regulatory
policies.Wedevelopaseriesofexpectationsregardingthecumulativechangeofpolicysubsystemsasa
functionofthea)degreeofpunctuationderivedfromPEtheoryandb)politicsthatemergefromthe
distributionofburdensandbenefitsofpolicyinFigure1.
Ashortreviewofempiricalclassificationofpolicydomainsisnecessarybeforewedetaileachquadrant.
In an exhaustive metaanalysis of literature on policy change, Grossmann (2013) found that political
scientists assign different explanatory concepts to each major policy domain, such as health care,
defense,orenvironmentalconcerns.Thiswouldsuggestthatpolicychangehasdistinctsourcesineach
domain and that generalizations across policy domains are hard to come by. However, quantitative
work on public budgeting, either in comparative political economy or the PE tradition, find that some
spendingcategoriesaremoremalleablethanothers.Forexample,Breunig,Koski,andMortensen(2009)
andBreunigandKoski(2012)indicatethatsomebudgetfunctions,inparticulareducationandhealth,
are less punctuated than others, agriculture and general government spending regardless of
institutionalsetting.EppandBaumgartner(2014)alsofindsomespendingdomainstobemoreproneto
punctuationsthanothes.rInshort,differentpolicyoutcomesexistindifferentpolicydomainsandthus
developingadomainspecifictypologystillisaworthwhileendeavor.
Figure1.TypologyofPolicyChangeandPunctuation

DegreeofPunctuation

High
Low

CumulativePolicyChange
Small
Large
MajoritarianPolitics
RunawayIssueExpansion
NormalPolitics
Interestgrouppolitics

NormalPoliticsLowDegreeofPunctuation,SmallCumulativechange
Subsystemsthatengageinlesscoercion,withconcentratedbenefitstosmallgroupsanddiffusecosts
are the most likely candidates to see what we might call normal politics. In these cases, we would
expectthatlowcoercionandanoversubscriptionofbenefitswouldproducelessextremedistributions
ofchange.However,wewouldalsoexpectthatthedesireforthesesubsystemstoremainofftheradar
7|P a g e

would contain the overall cumulative policy change for a given area. Note that in a normal politics
scenario, we would still expect to find punctuations, but that these punctuations would be more
constrainedrelativetootherscenarios.

InterestgrouppoliticsLowDegreeofPunctuation,LargeCumulativeChange
However,Wilsonnotesthat,whilenotcoercive,thedistributionofresourcesisatsomelevelazerosum
game. That is, even within a subsystem that largely engages in policymaking that can be framed as
distributivepolitics;thereareoftennotenoughresourcestobedistributedtoallplayers.Insomeof
thesecases,theconflictoverscarceresourcescanprovidegreatpoliticalopportunitiestobothreward
and punish in the same distribution. We would expect the kind of politics associated with this policy
makingtobeakintoWilsonsinterestgrouppoliticsmodel.Whilegroupsarewinningandlosingover
time,theultimatevalueofthepolicysubsystemisnotinquestion,justsomeofthelowerorder(touse
CashoreandHowlettsterms)policydecisionswithinthatsubsystem.Thus,wewouldexpectthatthe
overallsubsystemoughttohavesimilarlylowdegreeofpunctuationasournormalpoliticsmodel,but
thattheconstantattentionfromgroupsasanendorsementoftheoverallvalueofthesubsystemwould
produceagreatercumulativeeffectonpolicychange.
Similarly,subsystemsthatdealwithalargelyregulatoryagendaarefamiliarwithconflictassociatedwith
policies that advocate governmental coercions. Such subsystems are typically populated by
representativesofboththoseinfavorofregulationandregulatedgroups.Thesepolicyareasshouldbe
fairlyvolatile,withagreatdealofpushandpullfrombothsidesintermsofaverageannualchanges,but
thelongtermaccumulationofpolicychangeislikelyinthesamedirection.
ThedifferencemightcomeintheformofSchneiderandIngramscritiqueofLowisoriginalconception
thatallgovernmentcoercionislikelytobemetwithresistance.Thatis,insomeregulatorysubsystems,
itisquitelikelythatquestionsovercoercivepoliciesareaboutamountratherthanmorefundamental
questionsaboutwhetherthegovernmentshouldtakeacoerciverole.Inthesecases,itismorelikely
thatallmembersofthesubsystemwinbyprovidingmorecoercivepolicy;thus,wearelikelytoseean
overallpolicydirectionmorelikeapolicyforwhichthereisdistributivebenefitsandlowconflictthana
regulatoryenvironmentwithboth.

MajoritarianPoliticsHighDegreeofPunctuation,SmallCumulativeChange
Wewouldexpectlowcumulativechangeintwodistinctcasesrelatedtoanoveralldistributionthatis
punctuated.Wemightexpectevenmatchedgroupsfightingoverfundamentalquestionsrelatedtothe
8|P a g e

involvementofgovernmentinapolicyareatotrademajorvictoriesandlosses.Inmanyways,thisisthe
quintessentiallongtermexpectationofpunctuatedequilibriumtheorythattherearegoingtobelots
ofverysmallchangesovertimeandthatoccasionalrupturesofthepolicyequilibriumwillproducehuge
changesforashortbitleadingtoalongperiodofstabilityvianewinstitutionstocarryingoutthenew
policy regime. However, that institutionallyinduced stability creates the opportunity for massive
changes in part because the status quo remains relatively constant, thereby providing an incremental
baseline against which to compare future changes. In addition, theoretically, it is likely that the new
policymonopolycreatedbytheinstitutionwillmaintainastatusquopositionthatdoesnotmarginally
update according to macropolitical preferences. In this case, then, we would expect a highly
punctuateddistribution,butlowoverallchange.
A second lens through which to predict low cumulative change with interstitial high punctuation is to
thinkofthetypesofpoliciesthataremostsusceptibletoswingsinpublicopinion.Morespecifically,itis
useful to look at the policies for which there are not necessarily more opponents, but very few
advocates. The types of policy that produce politics with few supporters are akin to Wilsons
majoritarian politics, where there are few groups and advocacy is adhoc. Adhoc advocacy is
preciselythevarietythatshouldproducewideswingswithverylittlespecificsustainedstrategytoward
aparticulardirectionofpolicy.Mayspolicieswithoutpublicspoliciesthathavemoderatebenefits
widely distributed with disperse costs are likely examples in this area when not championed by
experts.InSchneiderandIngramterms,onemightexpectpoliciesthatdistributebenefitstodeviantor
dependentgroupstoemergeingreatnumberbecauseofawaveofpublicopinion,onlytobepushed
backyearslater.

RunawayIssueExpansionHighDegreeofPunctuation,LargeCumulativeChange
Thecombinationofhighconflictandlargecumulativechangesistheleastlikelycombinationofconflict
and change from the perspective of PE theory. Policy areas with sustained conflict over time are
unlikelytoproduceafundamentalwinnersandlosersintoperpetuity.Forcumulativepolicyoutputsto
persistinthesamedirectionovertime,winningcoalitionswouldhavetoremainconstantandreceive
significant gains in spite of vigorous opposition. This category would be representative of a perpetual
positive feedback cycle over the long term where issues would constantly expand with previous
victories.Whileconstantissueexpansionistheoreticallypossible,itseemsunlikelythatsuchcontinued
gainswouldproducecontinuedvigorousopposition.Atsomepoint,theoppositionwouldlikelybecome
overpowered and the punctuated nature of the distribution in this area would settle into a new
9|P a g e

equilibrium. A continued positive feedback cycle is akin to a runaway greenhouse effect in climate
modeling;wetermitrunawayissueexpansion.Examplesofrunawayissueexpansionmightinclude
theDepartmentofHomelandSecurityfrom2003until2008.

Data&Methods
WeconfrontthesefourstylesofpoliticswithbudgetarydatafromtheAmericanstates.TheAmerican
statesarewellsuitedherebecausehighquality(mutuallyexclusive,comparable,backwardadjustable)
budgetarydataiseasilyavailableforanextended periodoftimeandvariegatedinstitutionalsettings.
Weobtainedbudgetarydatafromall50statesfortheperiodfrom1984to2009.Thedataisclassifiedin
ten spending components: education, public welfare, highways, natural resources, health, hospitals,
police, corrections, parks, and administration (which is labeled other in the following) (Department of
theCensus).Wecalculatebudgetarychangebytakingthebudgetoutlaysinayear,minusthebudget
outlaysfromtheyearbefore,dividedbytheearlieroutlaysforeachcategory.Thisresultsinyearto
yearpercentagechangesforeachbudgetcategory.
Based on this data, we computed our two dimensions of policy change degree of punctuation and
cumulativepolicychange.WefollowedthePEliteratureandcalculatedthedegreeofpunctuationusing
the Lkurtosis score based on annual spending changes (Breunig and Jones 2011, Hoskins). For the
cumulativepolicychange,wecomputedthelongtermgrowthratebysubtracting1984spendingfrom
2009 spending and divide this by the 1984 budget figure for each state and each function. The figure
essential shows how much a budget category in a particular state grew in a 25 year span. Taken
together,werelyon500observations(10budgetfunctions*50states)forouranalysis.
We assess the placement of particular policy domains in distinct quadrants of policymaking using
cluster analysis. The typology formation and classification of cases into groups remains a core tool in
socialscienceresearch(Collier,LaPorte,andSeawright2012;Elman2005).Theseauthorshighlightthat
typologies are not only useful for generating case groupings inductively but also for classification and
testingofanexplicitlystatedtheory.
Themostcommonquantitativetoolforassessingtypologiesandplacementofindividualobservationsis
clusteranalysis.Clusteranalysisstrivestoidentifysomeoverarchingstructureinthedataandtoplace
individualobservationsintoclustersbasedonsomedefinedmetric.Unfortunately,researchersregularly
employ hierarchical cluster analysis as an inferential tool and consequently may overinterpret their
results. However, these tools provide several measures of similarity, no statistical basis for picking a
10|P a g e

specific solution, no uncertainties about individual cluster assignments, and severely restrict the
geometrical arrangements of the studied objects. Thus traditional cluster methods should serve for
exploratorypurposes.
Recentapplicationsofmixturemodelstoclusteringproblemsprovideanappropriatemeansfortesting
typologicalexplanations.Modelbasedclusteringusingmixtureofprobabilitydistributions(Ahlquistand
Breunig2012;BanfieldandRaftery1993;FraleyandRaftery1998)formulatetheclusteringproblemasa
problem of model choice. This allows researchers to rely on statistical methods for model evaluation
and selection (using the Bayesian Information Criterion) and to provide measures of uncertainty with
regardtoclusterplacement.
In our analysis, we assumed that the number of cluster is between 1 and 6. Both extremes would
indicatethatclusteringpolicydomainsisnotpossible.Throughouttheempiricalsection,theestimated
resultsarepresentedvisually.Twodimensionalclassificationplotscontainthelabeledobservationsas
wellastheestimatedmixturecomponent.AmodelcomparisonplotincludestheBICforeachestimated
model(andtheirclustergeometries)aswellasahorizontaldashedlineforassessingwhetheracertain
modelclearlyoutperformsallothers.Thesuggestedcutoffpointis10pointslowerthantheBICofthe
bestfittingmodel.

Results
The goal of the empirical analysis is to detect a match between our typology and individual spending
domain.Weworktowardthatgoalintwosteps.First,wepoollongtermgrowthratesandLkurtosis
scoresacrossallstatesinordertofocusonfunctionaldifferences.Withthisfirstanalysisinmind,we
employall500observationsi.e.statefunctionallevelgrowthandLkurtosisscoresinordertoverify
the more narrow analysis. As an initial precautionary step, we examined if median long term growth
rates and lkurtosis scores can be clustered by states. The MBC algorithm identified a one cluster
solutionasthebestmodel.ThisresultmeansthatonecannotgroupAmericanstatesinameaningful
way along these two dimensions. Indirectly, one might also be tempted to ascertain that therefore
institutional and political variation alone cannot provide us with a clear picture on the contours of
policymaking.
AcomparisonofmedianlongtermgrowthratesandLkurtosisscoresshowthatthreetypesofpolicy
making prevail.Weuse the medianratesacrossall50statesforabasicpicture. TheMBCalgorithm
suggeststhatthebestfittingmodelcontainsthreeclusters.Figure3displaystheresults.Therightplot
11|P a g e

shows that the upperleft quadrat high cumulative growth combined with a low degree of
punctuations is occupied by the domains: welfare, corrections, and health. We expected that these
domainsrepresentInterestgrouppolitics.Thelowerrightcorneroftherightplotsholdsfourbudget
functions: education, police, natural resources, and highways. These four categories are characterized
by Normal Politics which result in a low degree of punctuation and small cumulative changes. The
thirdclusterentailsgovernment(other),parks,andhospitalspending.Thesethreedomainsarehighly
punctuated by lack large cumulative changes. We labelled this type of policymaking as Majoritarian
Politics.WedonotfindRunawayIssueExpansioninourdata.
The modelsuggests that thereisaveryhigh degreeofcertainty(p>.99)abouttheplacementofeach
function and the density contours (see middle plot of Figure 3) display three high density regions.
However, the overall model fit is less promising. The left plot indicates that a three cluster solution
providesthebestoverallfit.Butone,two,orevenfourclustersolutionsareapossibility.Thedotsabove
thedashedlineindicatethattheyarenotsubstantivelysuperior.Obviously,theuncertaintyaboutthe
numberofclustermightbeduetothelownumberofcases(10budgetfunctions).
We test this possibility by expanding the analysis to each budget function for each state. Figure 2
summarizes our findings. In the left and middle plot, we color the observations according the
categorizationschemethatwejustidentified.Thiswaywecanvisuallyassessifcertainpolicydomain
areplacedpredominantlywithinoneofthefourquadrantsacrossallstates.TheMBCfindsthatafour
clustersolutionisthemostsuitable.
The left plot of Figure 2 displays the four mixture component and their placements. Apparently, a
category characterized by a medium degree of punctuation and low long term growth is squeezed
betweennormalandinterestgrouppolitics.Infutureanalysis,wewanttotesthowrobustthiscategory
is.Theleftplotindicatesthatallthreetypesofbudgetfunctionsareincludedinthismiddlespot.The
clusteringalgorithmalsoindicatesthatthereisalotofuncertaintyaboutplacingparticularobservations
in this cluster. For example, there is a 49% chance that Correction spending in Michigan should be
includedhere;whileitisalsolikelythatthisobservationbelongstoanotherclustera0.31chanceand
eventoathirdclusterwitha.20chance.Atleast,withMBCwecanacknowledgethesetoughcases.
However,placementintheotherthreeclusterscloselymatchesourpreviousfindings.Hospital,parks,
and government affairs (other) spending from various American states is placed the low growthhigh
punctuationdomainwhichwecallmajoritarianpolitics.Thisisindicatedbythelargeamountsofgreen

12|P a g e

dots. Welfare and health spending (orange dots) in the 50 states is predominately classified together
and located in the interest group politics quadrant of low levels of punctuation and large long term
changes.Finally,spendingonhighways,naturalresources,andpoliceisnormalpoliticsinmanystates
(purpledots).Herestatesdontchangethebudgetmuchovertimeandadjustinaratherincremental
fashion.
Withregardtomodelfit,wecanstatethatafourclustersolutionisclearlythemostappropriate.
Becauseofthepoorfitofsomeclustersolutions,thisisnoteasilyvisible.However,thecomputeBICof
thebestfittingmodelisnearly18pointslowerthanthesecondbestsolution(whichisalsoafourcluster
solutionwithadifferentellipsoidalshape).

13|P a g e

Figure1.ClassificationofLongTermGrowthandPunctuationforStateBudgetFunctions.Theleftplotdisplaysthemedianlongtermgrowth
and the Lkurtosis of each budget function. The three ellipses are the identified mixture components. The middle plot displays the mixture
modelsdensity.TherightplotshowmodelfitusingtheBayesianInformationCriterion.

14|P a g e

Figure2.ClassificationofLongTermGrowthandPunctuationforStateBudgetFunctions.Theleftplotdisplaysthemedianlongtermgrowth
and the Lkurtosis of each budget function. The four ellipses are the identified mixture components. The middle plot displays the mixture
modelsdensity.ThecoloreddotsindicatethethreegroupsofbudgetfunctionsthatwereidentifiedinFigure1.Therightplotshowmodelfit
usingtheBayesianInformationCriterion.

15|P a g e

DiscussionandConclusion
This paper raised three sets of issues. First, we delineated the theoretical distinction between
punctuatedequilibriumtheoryandtheoriesofpurepolicychange.Second,weconnectedthisdebateto
the classic typologies of public policy in order to demonstrate that different type of politics prevail in
differentdomains.Thishasconsequencesforthedegreeofpunctuationandcumulativepolicychange.
Third, we pieced these disparate literatures together and developed four types of policymaking:
MajoritarianPolitics,RunawayIssueExpansion,NormalPolitics,andInterestgrouppolitics.
TheempiricalsectionusesbudgetarydatafromtheAmericanstatefrom1984to2009inordertoshow
that three domains can be identified along the hypothesized groupings. No budget function in the
AmericanstatescanbeclassifiedasRunawayIssueExpansion.Forkeepersofthepurse,thisisagood
thing. When we examined budget functions across all states we found a similar pattern. Our applied
methodologyalsoallowedusshowthatsomespendingdomainsinsomestatesarehardtoclassifyand
dontcorrespondverywelltoourdevelopedidealtypes.
There are two points to take away: Policy domains matter and they can be grouped and classified.
Futurescholarlyeffortsthereforeshouldinquiremoredeeplyintotheattributesofeachdomain.

16|P a g e

Bibliography
BaumgartnerandJones1993
Cashore
CashoreandHowlett2007
HowlettandMigone
JonesandBaumgartner2004
Patashnik2008
Wilson
Ahlquist,JohnS.,andChristianBreunig.2012.ModelBasedClusteringandTypologiesintheSocial
Sciences.PoliticalAnalysis20(1):92112.
Banfield,JeffreyD.,andAdrianE.Raftery.1993.ModelBasedGaussianandNonGaussianClustering.
Biometrics49(3):80321.
Breunig,Christian,andBryanD.Jones.2011.StochasticProcessMethodswithanApplicationto
BudgetaryData.PoliticalAnalysis19(1):103117.
Breunig,Christian,andChrisKoski.2012.TheTortoiseortheHare?Incrementalism,Punctuations,and
TheirConsequences.PolicyStudiesJournal40(1):4568.
Breunig,Christian,ChrisKoski,andPeterB.Mortensen.2009.StabilityandPunctuationsinPublic
Spending:AComparativeStudyofBudgetFunctions.JPublicAdmResTheory:mup028.
Collier,David,JodyLaPorte,andJasonSeawright.2012.PuttingTypologiestoWorkConceptFormation,
Measurement,andAnalyticRigor.PoliticalResearchQuarterly65(1):21732.
Elman,Colin.2005.ExplanatoryTypologiesinQualitativeStudiesofInternationalPolitics.
InternationalOrganization59(02):293326.
Fraley,C.,andA.E.Raftery.1998.HowManyClusters?WhichClusteringMethod?AnswersViaModel
BasedClusterAnalysis.TheComputerJournal41(8):57888.
Grossmann,Matt.2013.TheVariablePoliticsofthePolicyProcess:IssueAreaDifferencesand
ComparativeNetworks.TheJournalofPolitics75(01):6579.
Lowi,TheodoreJ.1964.AmericanBusiness,PublicPolicy,CaseStudies,andPoliticalTheory.World
Politics16(04):677715.

17|P a g e