Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or
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Chapter 4
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These life-orientational schemes are, however, not, as it were, the rock on which
Islamicate culture and Islamdom ultimately rest. Personal piety (a persons
spiritual devotion) is a persons manner of response to the divine whereas
religion includes the diverse ramifications of those traditions that are focussed
on such responses (Hodgson 1974, I, 360). Religion is the complex of institutions
and practices which embody or focus personal responses to the divine; religion is
the social cult which encases piety.
This encasement is partial and variable. Hodgson argues that the piety of the agents
who happen to belong to religious communities may vary considerably. Similarly,
piety cannot be reduced to ethics or to zealous acceptance of myth and ritual. Piety,
the individual conscience, the personal response to Godthese are in some ways
but a small part of religion (as a set of institutions and orientations). Yet it is the core
of it (Hodgson 1974, I, 360). Piety is thus treated as the ultimately irreducible and
creative core of religion. Religion is the sociologically explicable outer husk of which
piety or conscience is the interior, sociologically inexplicable kernel.
The implication of this scheme is that the closer one draws to the inner circle
of faith, the further one withdraws from sociological forces. The inner religion
of faith is independent of society as an irreducible pious factto give a twist
to Durkheims notion of social facts. Hodgson accepts the fact that religion is
channeled into social traditions which are supported by group interests reflecting
ecological circumstances in general. These sociologically determined channels
and contexts, however, provide merely the location within which piety can play an
historically crucial and creative role, a charisma operating within the interstices
of routine patterns (Hodgson 1974, I, 25). The creative acts of history must, to
some extent, satisfy latent group interests otherwise they would have no social and
historical effect. Yet, these creative acts of the conscience do not merely fit into
an existent pattern of interests as it stands; they lead back not to the ecology as
such but to some thrust of autonomous integration within an individual (Hodgson
1974, III, 6). Sociological factors are written into this account of the nature of
religion as merely limitations on piety.
It is possible to obtain a more comprehensive view of Hodgsons treatment of
piety by considering the analogy he draws between styles of art and styles of piety.
Traditions in art, fashions in aesthetic appreciation and schools can be seen as
analogous to the institutional and cultural network of religion, while personal piety
is analogous to individual, artistic genius or creativity. Just as the existence and
transformations of schools of art might be sociologically explained by reference
to patronage, for example, so changes in religious institutions might be explained
by reference to the decline of the feudal mode of production, but religious piety
and artistic genius are not reducible to ecological circumstances. At most, we
could see the impact of traditions on personal creativity as cramping the creative
expression of the individual. Within the broad limits set by style and tradition, an
enormous range of sociologically undetermined creativity is possible.
In conclusion, Hodgsons treatment of piety/religion results in the sociological
immunity
of faith.
immunization
could
be located
within
implicitly
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Kantian view of human affairs in which men inhabit a phenomenal world where
the laws of Newtonian causality operate and a noumenal world where the private
conscience is free to operate. While the outer, phenomenal world of religious
institutions may be causally determined by ecological laws, the inner world of
noumenal conscience knows only the thrust of autonomous integration of the
private individual. Hodgsons most direct statement of this position is contained
in the following: Ultimately all faith is private We are primarily human beings
and only secondarily participants in this or that tradition (Hodgson 1974, I,
28). Islamdom, Islamicate culture and even Islam as a religion are public and
can be sociologically explained; piety, faith and conscience are private, having an
integrity uncontaminated by sociological factors.
Comparative Religion
Comparative religion has been riddled by problems of neutrality. As Hodgson
notes, it has been all too easy for scholars with a Christian commitment to regard
Islam as a truncated version of Christianity. Muslim scholars, by contrast, are
likely to view Christianity as a perverted form of Islam. A scholar with no overt
religious predilection cannot easily ignore the truth-claims of either religion.2 If
Hodgson is committed to the view that piety is the irreducible locus of religion,
this does raise difficulties for anyone attempting to understand islam from outside.
This problem is compounded by the fact that Hodgson himself was a committed
Christiana point I shall return to in detail at a later stage. Hodgsons final answer
to the issue of understanding alien-belief systems3 seems unsatisfactory because
it is inconclusive, but has the merits of being honest and unsentimental.
Hodgson rejects any attempt to pick out of Christianity and Islam certain
isolated elements which could be regarded as equal and comparable. For example,
the idea that moral behavior should be based on divine revelation could be held
to be common to both religions. Yet behind these superficially common elements
lie profound differences in theology, relating to the moral challenge of the Quran
and the redemptive nature of Christianity as a sacramental community. Any
attempt at syncretism or any notion that ultimately all religions are the same since
they rest on a common human response to the divine is rejected by Hodgson.
Christianity and Islam should be treated as independent, and to some extent
irreconcilable, structures which give different emphases to a range of religious
elements within them. Comparative research would explore what elements
within independent religious structures get subordinated or emphasized. By this
method, the two religions can be seen to be in a state of tension, of productive
dialogue. Persons with or without religious commitments can join in this form
Cf. Turner 1973 on Maxime Rodinson in this connection.
Hodgsons position here bears much in common with the approach defended by
Winch
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81
the range of problems that are to be identified. A social scientist, however, must
exercise ethical neutrality by not taking advantage of his social prestige to make
value judgments about empirical evidence. As a neo-Kantanian, Weber accepted a
radical divorce between facts and values, between the phenomenal and noumenal
worlds. Knowledge about the real world did not entitle the sociologist to make
authoritative ethical pronouncements about the quality of that world. The use of
value-interpretation of the meaning of social actions was crucial if the meaning of
social behaviour was to be adequately conveyed, but this method should not be
confused with the general requirements of scientific objectivity. Once a sociologist
had declared his values and selected his object of research, the usual criteria of
objectivity in the selection and evaluation of data applied automatically. In this
way, it was possible to claim that sociology was both value-relevant and valuefree.6 Hodgsons notion that the values of the scholar, while contributing as it were
to the richness of historical understanding, sets limits within which he can delve
deeply into his selected topic of research. Similarly, for Weber, since causality
is infinite, the value-commitments of the researcher are in fact crucial, not only
for selecting the object of research, but for the researchers total orientation to
his subject matter. Values are not so much embarrassing obstacles, not a painful
encumbrance, but a positive asset in the full appreciation of the meaning of
religious and other human activities.7 From this point of view, Hodgsons Quaker
commitment would set limits to his understanding while enriching his perspective
at a deeper level.
Critical Assessment
(i) Extra ecclesiam nulla salus
One problem with the WeberHodgson position on values is that it is by definition
impossible to choose between ultimate values which are thereby rendered wholly
irrational.8 Values are sharply divorced from facts in terms of the Kantian is/
ought dichotomy. No empirical evidence can ever guide, let alone dictate, moral
positions. It follows that no objections can be raised against a scholar who declares
that he will interpret Islam within the limitations of Quaker Christianity, but it also
follows that no objections could be mounted against the interpretation of Islam
from the point of view of fascism, racialism, utilitarianism, Taoism or any other
belief system. Hodgson, of course, wants to deny that his Quaker convictions are
central to his theoretical comprehension of Islam. As we have seen, he explicitly
claims that his orientation is derived from Eliade and Otto. It is difficult, however,
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82
not to read The Venture of Islam without an awareness of the prominence of Quaker
theology dominating certain key issues.
It could be argued that the view that religion is merely the husk of an inner,
private faith is a specifically Protestant, nineteenth-century view of the relationship
between ritual and faith. For Hodgson, piety is quite literally the inner light that
animates the outward forms of religion. At the end of volume three, Hodgson
writes that in a society dominated by technicalist specialization it is very
difficult for individual values to find an effective expression, but small groups
of inspired individuals may yet shape critical areas of social change. He refers
specifically to the social impact of the tiny Quaker society (Hodgson 1974, III,
434). This minor comment in fact characterizes Hodgsons whole interpretation
of the relationship between faith and religion, individual and society. Hodgson
writes in terms of piety/individual versus religion/society. For example, Hodgson
consistently treats the sharia as essentially oppositional, as an expression of the
autonomy of society against political absolutism (Hodgson 1964, 234). The effect
of the sharia was to stress the rights of the individual as such (Hodgson 1974, I,
344). Just as the Quaker acted as a gadfly within Christianity, so the pious of Islam
constantly threatened the routinization of religion by forming an oppositional
group in the midst of the cultic community.9 In short, Hodgsons emphasis on the
autonomy of the individual, the centrality of conscience, the secondary quality of
religious ritual and of religion itself, the oppositional nature of pietyall of these
elements playing a central role within his orientation to Islam bear decisive
marks of a Quaker commitment.10
The problem with the WeberHodgson approach to the role of valuecommitments, as we have noted, is that in one sense it is closed to critical
inspection. For example, one might adduce evidence to the effect that Islamic
ethics as expressed in the sharia were not oppositional at all, not specifically
conservative and ineffectual as a point of criticism of political control (cf. Lewis
1972). Hodgson could, however, easily counter such an objection by arguing that,
while it is true that his value-commitments lead him to a particular position, the
same can be said of all value-commitments. Every researcher has a value-position;
ergo, all research has limitations. The price of this value-relativity is, however,
inflationary in that it would ultimately silence all debate. Hodgson could have no
objection to an entirely contrasted interpretation of religion, namely a Catholic
viewpoint. It could be argued that ritual is not an optional extra that can somehow
be tacked onto the conscience. Without ritual, sacrament, myth, community, and
an objective religious law, the isolated, individual piety would not only fade
away, it could not exist at all. It is religion that nurtures piety, not vice versa.
Once it is conceded that there is no way of arbitrating between ultimate scholarly
For one example of Quakers as a political dissident group, cf. Smith 1973.
One could also trace out connections with Kants absolute Ego, Ottos Unconditioned
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83
commitments, there is total impasse. The two positions are equally valid and
equally incompatible.
Behind Hodgsons phenomenological approach to piety as the irreducible
inner core of religion is, one suspects, a fairly common assumption that to give
a causal account of religion is to explain it away, thereby leaving the scholar
of religion without a subject matter. If religion is not entirely explained away by
sociology, then it is felt that a sociological explanation of religion in some way
casts doubt upon the truth-claims of religion. To these notions is added a sense of
methodological injustice in that, while the science of politics leaves politics as a
phenomenon intact, a science of religion would demolish its own subject matter.11
These three anxieties may to some extent explain the popularity of hermeneutics and
phenomenology of religion amongst sociologists of religion who are religiously
musical. Hermeneutics provides a method which is congenial because it does
justice to religion in its own terms (cf. Royster 1972). At least on one score, these
anxieties seem paranoid in that the causal explanation of a set of beliefs has no
bearing on the truth or falsity of those beliefs. That allegiance to certain minority
sects by American poor whites might be explained by the theory of relative
deprivation does not prove that sectarian beliefs are false. Causal explanations are
appropriate in the case of true and false beliefs indiscriminately.12 What I want to
show is that a sociological explanation of conscience can indeed be provided.
The point of this exercise is to demonstrate that one cannot distinguish between
piety and religion on the grounds that there can be no sociological explanation of
the former. Such an historical/sociological treatment of conscience does not,
however, in some way call into question the validity of conscience.
(ii) Sociological Notes on Conscience
To my knowledge there is no existing sociological analysis of the concept of
conscience as it has been developed within Islam. In default of such a study,
doubts can be raised against Hodgsons view of the irreducibility and universality
of conscience in Islam by briefly commenting on studies of Christendom. These
studies raise a number of general theoretical problems for any Islamicist wishing
to take up Hodgsons general orientation to the sociology of Islamic piety. Since
Hodgson does not define or discuss conscience in any depth or with any precision
apart from general statements to the effect that piety is the human response to
the divine presence, the implication is that piety is common-sensically obvious,
uniform and trans-cultural. No attempt is made to spell out the difference between
the Christian and Islamic notions of consciencesuch an omission is distinctly
odd, given the centrality of the concept to his scheme of analysis. Conscience is
in fact a highly complex, if not ambiguous concept, implying private thoughts,
This is, for example, part of the general tone of Martin 1969.
On this point I am in disagreement with MacIntyres view that true beliefs require
no causal
explanation,
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The market produced the individual who found an interior self not present under
feudalism. Chenus argument can be supported by, for example, comparing the
Irish penitentials of the feudal period with the summas of later theologians (cf.
Bieler 1963). It is also supported by the research of Rosenwein and Little (1974) on
mendicant spirituality. One might also note Goldmanns argument that the growth
of an exchange economy produced characteristically a belief system based on the
notions of individualism, freedom of contact and contract (Goldmann 1973). There
is a sense, however, in which my objections to Hodgson would stand even if these
causal accounts of the rise of conscience under market, urban conditions were
proved inadequate or false. The point is that causal explanations of conscience
are neither improper nor implausible; there is no prima facie reason for regarding
conscience as immune from sociological investigation.
It is somewhat odd to note that Hodgson himself seems fleetingly aware of the
possibility of a causal account of the rise of conscience in Islam. He suggests
one himself which parallels the theses of Chenu, Goldmann and others. Hodgson
notes that in the Axial Age (800200 BC) new markets for inter-continental trade
began to emerge alongside the development of a citied culture in which merchants
arose as significant social classes. As a result, the Cuneiform literatures of the
time reflect a growing sense of personal individuality which most probably catered
to the tastes of the market more than to either temple or court (Hodgson 1974, I,
11). The problem of the relationship between the private individual and the social
order, argues Hodgson, increasingly came to exercise the religious speculations of
the prophets of the Axial Age, particularly Zarathustra and the Hebrew prophets.
While one might accept this assertion as at least the beginnings of a sociology
of the conscience, it is incompatible with the main thrust of Hodgsons position
that piety is the uncaused origin of religion, that social groups might be explained
sociologically while the individual faith remains entirely independent, that piety
is private while religion is public and dependent on social factors. Hodgson
almost unwittingly acknowledges that both piety and religion can be explained
sociologically, while explicitly maintaining that the conscience belongs to
noumena not phenomena.
(iii) Virtuoso and Mass Religion
Hodgsons treatment of piety is, furthermore, ambiguous in one crucial respect.
The general impression of volume one of The Venture of Islam is that everyone
has an inward conscience, a personal piety, by virtue of being an individual. The
quality of piety is also extremely variable: Devotional response is inevitably a
highly personal thing. As in the case of aesthetic appreciation, every individual
has his own bent (Hodgson 1974, I, 361). However, Hodgson also recognizes that
the quantity, so to speak, of piety also varies from one individual to another in the
obvious sense that some are more pious than others. The result of these variations
in the quality and quantity of personal, devotional life is to produce a definite
religious
stratification
between
the mass
and the
virtuosi.
Hodgson
recognizes
that
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the Sufis, for example, developed a clear stratification system which separated the
mass from the pir. One could think of Sufism as a religious pyramid linking dead
saints, pirs, disciples, novices and the mass. Hodgsons view of the relationship
between material interests (ecology) and inward conscience commits him to
the notion that the hierarchy of charismatic qualities varies independently of the
secular status order. This relationship, involving the autonomy of charisma, was
precisely what Weber had in mind when he wrote about the differences between
mass and heroic religiosity.
Thus, since charisma is in great demand but in short supply,
all intensive religiosity has a tendency towards a sort of status stratification, in
accordance with differences in the charismatic qualifications By mass
understand those who are religiously unmusical; we do not, of course, mean
those who occupy an inferior position in the secular status order. (Weber 1965, 287)
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References
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Advanced Studies.
Chenu, M. D. 1969. LEveil de la conscience dans la civilisation mdivale.
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Dawe, Alan. 1971. The Relevance of Values. In Max Weber and Modern
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Geertz, Clifford. 1966. Religion as a Cultural System. In Anthropological
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George, K., and George, C. H. 1955. Roman Catholic Sainthood and Social
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Gerth, H. H., and Mills, C. Wright. 1961. From Max Weber. London: Routledge
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Gilsenan, Michael. 1973. Saint and Sufi in Modern Egypt. Oxford: Clarendon
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Goldmann, Lucian. 1973. The Philosophy of the Enlightenment. London:
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Gouldner, Alvin. 1962. Anti-Minotaur: The Myth of a Value-free Sociology.
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Hodgson, Marshall G. S. 1955a. The Order of Assassins. The Hague: Mouton.
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Lewis, Bernard. 1972. Islamic Concepts of Revolution. In Revolution in the
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MacIntyre, Alasdair. 1971. Against the Self-Images of the Age. London: Duckworth.
Marcuse, Herbert. 1971. Industrialization and Capitalism. In Max Weber and
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Martin, D. 1969. The Religious and the Secular. London: Routledge and Kegan
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Marx, Karl. 1970. Capital. London: Lawrence and Wishart.
Marx, Karl and Frederick Engels. 1963. Werke. Berlin: Dietz.
Rosenwein, Barbara H., and Little, Lester K. 1974. Social Meaning in the
Monastic and Mendicant Spiritualities. Past & Present 63: 432.
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Section II
Orientalist Debate Positioning
Islam
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