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INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW


(Act No. 4103, as amended, Dec. 5, 1933)
The purpose of the law is to uplift and redeem valuable human material and prevent unnecessary and excessive deprivation
of personal liberty and economic usefulness. (People v. Onate, 78 SCRA 43) As a rule, it is intended to favor the accused
particularly to shorten his term of imprisonment, depending upon his behavior and his physical, mental, and moral record as
a prisoner to be determined by the Board of Indeterminate Sentence.
Indeterminate sentence is a sentence with a minimum term and a maximum benefit of a guilty person, who is not
disqualified therefore, when the maximum penalty of imprisonment exceeds one year. It applies to both violations of the
RPC and special laws.
COVERAGE:
1. Revised Penal Code
The court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the MAXIMUM TERM of which shall be
that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the Code, and the MINIMUM
TERM which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower in degree to that prescribed by the Code for the
offense.
The maximum is the penalty imposed as provided by law, depending upon the attending circumstances. The minimum is
one degree next lower to the penalty prescribed for the offense. The latter is determined without considering the attending
circumstances to the penalty prescribed, and is left to the discretion of the court. (People v. Yco, 6545, July 27, 1954)
Example: Homicide with one mitigating circumstance. The maximum penalty prescribed by law is Reclusion
temporal. Since there is one mitigating and no aggravating it will be in the minimum or reclusion temporal minimum
period. On the other hand, the minimum is one degree next lower to reclusion temporal without considering the mitigating
circumstance and that will be prision mayor. The range of prision mayor will depend upon the discretion of the
court. Therefore, the indeterminate penalty is a minimum of prision mayor (within the range fixed by the court) to a
maximum of reclusion temporal minimum period.
2. Special Law
The court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the MAXIMUM TERM of which shall not exceed
the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the MINIMUM TERM prescribed by the
same. (Q11, 1994 Bar)
Example: Penalty is one year to 5 years. Indeterminate sentence may be one year to 3 years or 3 years to 5 years.
This act shall not apply to persons:
1. Convicted of offenses punished with death or life imprisonment. (Q12, 1990 Bar)
2. Those convicted of treason, conspiracy or proposal to commit treason, misprision of treason, rebellion, sedition or
espionage, or piracy.
3. Those who are habitual delinquents.
Recidivists are entitled to an indeterminate sentence. (People v. Jaranilla, 28547, Feb. 22, 1974)
4. Those who shall have escaped from confinement or evaded sentence.
A minor who escaped from confinement in the reformatory is entitled to the benefits of the law because confinement is not
considered imprisonment. (People v. Perez, 44 OG 3884) (Q6, 1991 Bar)
5. Those who having been granted conditional pardon by the President shall have violated the terms thereof.

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6. Those whose maximum period of imprisonment does not exceed one year. (Q8, 1999 Bar)

The application of which is based upon the penalty actually imposed in accordance with law. (People v. Hidalgo, 452, Jan.
22, 1962)
7. Those already serving final judgment upon the approval of this Act (December 5, 1933).
8. Those sentenced to the penalty of destierro or suspension. (Q12, 1999 Bar)
Whenever any prisoner who shall have served the minimum penalty imposed on him, said Board of Indeterminate Sentence
may, in its discretion, and in accordance with the rules and regulations adopted thereunder, authorize the release of such
prisoner on parole. If during the period of surveillance, such parolee shall show himself to be a law-abiding citizen and
shall not violate any of the laws of the Philippines, the Board may issue a final certificate of release in his favor. Whenever
any prisoner released on parole shall, during the period of surveillance, violate any of the conditions of his parole, the
Board may issue an order for his re-arrest and shall serve the remaining unexpired portion of the maximum sentence.
The application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law is mandatory if the imprisonment would exceed one year. It would be
favorable to the accused. (People v. Judge German Lee, Jr., 86859, Sept. 12, 1984)

PROBATION LAW
(PD 968, as amended, July 24, 1976)
Probation is a disposition, under which a defendant after conviction and sentence, is released subject to the conditions
imposed by the Court and to the supervision of a probation officer.
The purpose of the law are:
1. Promote the correction and rehabilitation by providing the offender with individualized treatment.
2. Provide an opportunity for the reformation of an offender which might be less probable if he were to serve a prison
sentence.
3. Prevent the commission of offenses.
The trial court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant, and upon application by said defendant within
the period for perfecting an appeal, suspend the
execution of the sentence and place the defendant on probation. No application for probation shall be entertained or
granted if the defendant has perfected an appeal from the judgment of conviction. (PD 1990) In other words, the filing of
the application for probation is considered as a waiver of the right of the accused to appeal. (Q9, 1992 Bar)
An application for probation shall be filed with the trial court. The filing of the application shall be deemed a waiver of the
right to appeal. An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable. However, an outright denial by the court
is a nullity correctible by certiorari. (De Luna v. Hon. Medina, CA 78 OG 599) An accused must fall within any one of the
disqualification in order to be denied probation. (Balleta v. Leviste, 92 SCRA 719) (Q13, 1991 Bar)
The disqualified offenders are:
1. Sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than 6 years.
A penalty of six years and one day is not entitled to the benefits of the law. (Q3, 1995 Bar; Q12, 1990 Bar) In Francisco v.
CA, 243 SCRA 384, the Supreme Court held that in case of one decision imposing multiple prison terms, the totality of the

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prison terms should not be taken into account for the purposes of determining the eligibility of the accused for the
probation. The law uses the word maximum term, and not total term. It is enough that each of the prison term does not
exceed 6 years. The number of offenses is immaterial for as long as the penalties imposed, when taken individually and
separately, are within the probationable period. (Q9, 1997 Bar)
2. Convicted of any crime against the national security (treason, espionage, piracy, etc.) or the public order (rebellion,
sedition, direct assault, resistance, etc.).
3. Who have been previously convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by imprisonment of not less than one
month and one day and/or a fine of not less than P 200. (Q2, 1993 Bar)
4. Who have been once on probation.
5. Who are already serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of the Decree.
Except for the reasons specified by the law, a trial court should not deny a petition for probation, especially when the
probation officer has favorably recommended the grant of probation.
Even if at the time of conviction the accused was qualified for probation but at the time of his application for probation, he
is no longer qualified, he is not entitled to probation. The qualification for probation must be determined as of the time the
application is filed in court. (Bernardo v. Judge Balagot, 86561, Nov. 10, 1992) Supposing, an accused was convicted of a
crime for which he was sentenced to a maximum sentence of 10 years. While affirming the judgment of conviction, the
appellate court reduced the penalty to a maximum of 4 years and 4 months taking into consideration certain modifying
circumstances. The accused now applies for probation. In this case, the accused is not entitled to probation. The law and
jurisprudence are to the effect that appeal by the accused from a sentence of conviction forfeits his right to probation.
(Bernardo v. Balagot, supra; Francisco v. CA; De la Cruz v. Judge Callejo) (Q3, 1995 Bar; Q17, 1994 Bar)
The probationer shall:
1. Present himself to the probation officer within 72 hours from receipt of probation order.
2. Report himself to the probation officer at least once a month during the period of probation.
The court, after considering the nature and seriousness of the violations of probation (if any), may issue a warrant for the
arrest of the probationer. He is then brought to the court immediately for hearing, which is summary. If violation is
established, the Court may revoke or continue the probation and modify the conditions thereof. If revoked, the probationer
shall be ordered to serve the sentence originally imposed and shall commit the probationer. The order of the court is not
appealable.
A final discharge of probation shall operate to restore to the probationer all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of the
conviction and to full discharge of his liability for any fine imposed. Under the Probation Law what is suspended is the
execution of the sentence, while under PD 603, as amended, what is suspended is the pronouncement of the sentence upon
request of the youthful offender. The suspension of the sentence, however, has no bearing on the civil liability, which is
separate and distinct from the criminal action. (Budlong v. Apalisok, 22 SCRA 935)
The provisions of the Probation Law should be liberally construed in order that the objective should be realized and
achieved. (Santos v. Hon. Pano, 55130, Jan. 17, 1983) In probation, the imposition of the sentence is suspended and
likewise its accessory penalties are likewise suspended. An order placing the defendant on probation is not a sentence but is
rather in effect a suspension of the imposition of the sentence. It is not a final judgment but is rather an interlocutory
judgment in the nature of the a conditional order placing the convicted defendant under the supervision of the court for his
reformation. (Baclayon v. Hon. Mutia, 129 SCRA 148)

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