JOJIT GARINGARAO,

Petitioner,

G.R. No. 192760

Present:

- versus -

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,*
BRION,
PERALTA,** and
PEREZ, JJ.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Promulgated:
Respondent.
July 20, 2011
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 26 November 2009 Decision2 and 22 June 2010
Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31354. The Court of Appeals affirmed with
modifications the decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Carlos City, Pangasinan, Branch 56 (trial court),
finding Jojit Garingarao (Garingarao) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of acts of lasciviousness in
relation to Republic Act No. 7610 (RA 7610).4
The Antecedent Facts
The facts of the case, as can be gleaned from the decision of the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
On 28 October 2003, AAA5 was brought to the Virgen Milagrosa Medical Center by her father BBB and mother
CCC due to fever and abdominal pain. Dr. George Morante (Dr.Morante), the attending physician,
recommended that AAA be confined at the hospital for further observation. AAA was admitted at the hospital
and confined at a private room where she and her parents stayed for the night.
On 29 October 2003, BBB left the hospital to go to Lingayen, Pangasinan to process his daughters Medicare
papers. He arrived at Lingayen at around 8:00 a.m. and left the place an hour later. CCC also left the hospital
that same morning to attend to their store at Urbiztondo, Pangasinan, leaving AAA alone in her room.
When BBB returned to the hospital, AAA told him that she wanted to go home. Dr. Morante advised against it
but due to AAAs insistence, he allowed AAA to be discharged from the hospital with instructions that she
should continue her medications. When AAA and her parents arrived at their house around 11:30 a.m., AAA
cried and told her parents that Garingaraosexually abused her. They all went back to the hospital and
reported the incident to Dr. Morante. They inquired from the nurses station and learned that Garingarao was
the nurse on duty on that day.
On 20 January 2004, the City Prosecutor filed an Information against Garingarao for acts of lasciviousness in
relation to RA 7610, as follows:
That on or about the 29th day of October 2003, at Virgen Milagrosa University Hospital, San Carlos
City, Pangasinan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with
lewd designs, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously touched the breast of AAA, 16
years of age, touched her genitalia, and inserted his finger into her vagina, to the damage and
prejudice of said AAA who suffered psychological and emotional disturbance, anxiety, sleeplessness
and humiliation.

Contrary to Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to RA 7610. 6

During the trial, AAA testified that on 29 October 2003, between 7:00 a.m. and 8:00 a.m., Garingarao, who was
wearing a white uniform, entered her room and asked if she already took her medicines and if she was still
experiencing pains. AAA replied that her stomach was no longer painful. Garingarao then lifted AAAs bra and
touched her left breast. Embarrassed, AAA asked Garingarao what he was doing. Garingarao replied that he
was just examining her. Garingarao then left the room and returned 15 to 30 minutes later with a
stethoscope. Garingarao told AAA that he would examine her again. Garingarao lifted AAAs shirt, pressed the
stethoscope to her stomach and touched her two nipples. Garingarao then lifted AAAs pajama and underwear
and pressed the lower part of her abdomen. Garingarao then slid his finger inside AAAs private part. AAA
instinctively crossed her legs and again asked Garingarao what he was doing. She asked him to stop and
informed him she had her monthly period. Garingarao ignored AAA and continued to insert his finger inside
her private part. Garingarao only stopped when he saw that AAA really had her monthly period. He went
inside the bathroom of the private room, washed his hands, applied alcohol and left. When BBB arrived at the
hospital, AAA insisted on going home. She only narrated the incident to her parents when they got home and
they went back to the hospital to report the incident to Dr. Morante.
Dr. Morante testified on AAAs confinement to and discharge from the hospital.
The prosecution presented the following documents before the trial court:
(a) AAAs birth certificate to establish that she was 16 years old at the time of the incident;
(b) AAAs medical records establishing her confinement to and discharge
from Virgen Milagrosa Medical Center;
(c) the schedule of duties of the nurses at the hospital showing that Garingarao was on duty from
12:00 a.m. to 8:00 a.m. on 29 October 2003;
(d) a certificate from the Department of Education Division Office showing that BBB was present at
the office from 8:00 a.m. to 9:00 a.m. on 29 October 2003;
(e) AAAs Medical Payment Notice;
(f) the incident report filed by AAAs parents with the police; and
(g) a letter from the hospital administrator requiring Garingarao to explain why no administrative
action should be filed against him in view of the incident.
For the defense, Garingarao gave a different version of the incident. Garingarao alleged that on 29 October
2003, he and his nursing aide Edmundo Tamayo (Tamayo) went inside AAAs room to administer her
medicines and check her vital signs. BBB then accused them of not administering the medicines properly and
on time. Garingarao told BBB that they should not be told how to administer the medicines because they
knew what they were doing and that they would be accountable should anything happen to AAA. A heated
argument ensued between BBB and Garingarao. BBB told Garingarao he was an arrogant
nurse. Garingarao replied that if BBB had any complaint, he could report the matter to the
hospital.Garingarao denied that he inserted his finger into AAAs private part and that he fondled her
breasts. Garingarao alleged that the filing of the case was motivated by the argument he had with BBB.
Tamayo testified that he was with Garingarao when they went to AAAs room between 7:00 a.m. and 8:00 a.m.
of 29 October 2003. He alleged that BBB was present and he accusedGaringarao of not administering the
medications properly. Tamayo alleged that Garingarao and BBB had an argument. Tamayo stated that he
would always accompany Garingaraowhenever the latter would visit the rooms of the patients.
The Decision of the Trial Court

In its Decision7 dated 5 November 2007, the trial court found Garingarao guilty as charged. The trial court
gave credence to the testimony of AAA over Garingaraos denial. The trial court ruled that Garingarao was
positively identified by AAA as the person who entered her room, touched her breasts and inserted his finger
into her private part. The trial court also found that the prosecution was able to establish that BBB and CCC
were not in the room when Garingarao went inside.
The trial court found as baseless Garingaraos defense that the case was only motivated by the argument he
had with BBB. The trial court ruled that it was illogical for BBB to convince his daughter to fabricate a story of
sexual abuse just to get even at Garingarao over a heated argument.
The dispositive portion of the trial courts Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding the
accused Jojit Garingarao GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of acts of lasciviousness in
relation to Republic Act 7610, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging
from 12 years to 1 day of Reclusion Temporal as minimum to 14 years and 8 months of Reclusion
Temporal as maximum.
The accused is ordered to pay to the minor victim [AAA] P20,000.00 as moral damages
and P10,000.00 as fine.
SO ORDERED.8
Garingarao appealed from the trial courts Decision.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
In its 26 November 2009 Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision with modifications.
The Court of Appeals ruled that while Garingarao was charged for acts of lasciviousness in relation to RA
7610, he should be convicted under RA 7610 because AAA was 16 years old when the crime was committed.
The Court of Appeals ruled that under Section 5(b) of RA 7610, the offender shall be charged with rape or
lascivious conduct under the Revised Penal Code (RPC) only if the victim is below 12 years old; otherwise, the
provisions of RA 7610 shall prevail.
The Court of Appeals ruled that based on the evidence on record and the testimony of AAA, the decision of the
trial court has to be affirmed. The Court of Appeals ruled that under Section 2(h) of the Rules and Regulations
on the Reporting and Investigation of Child Abuse Cases, the introduction of any object into the genitalia of
the offended party as well as the intentional touching of her breasts when done with the intent to sexually
gratify the offender qualify as a lascivious act. AAAs testimony established that Garingarao committed the
lascivious acts.
The Court of Appeals found no reason for AAA or her family to fabricate the charges against Garingarao. The
Court of Appeals ruled that Garingaraos claim that the case was filed so that BBB could get even with him
because of the argument they had was too shallow to be given consideration. The Court of Appeals likewise
rejected Garingaraos defense of denial which could not prevail over the positive testimony of AAA.
The Court of Appeals modified the penalty imposed by the trial court. The Court of Appeals ruled that the
duration of reclusion temporal in its maximum period should be 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years and
not 14 years and 8 months as imposed by the trial court. The Court of Appeals also raised the award of moral
damages and fine, which was deemed as civil indemnity, to conform with recent jurisprudence.
The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision dated November 5, 2007 of the Regional Trial
Court of San Carlos City, Pangasinan in Criminal Case No. SCC-4167 is hereby AFFIRMED with the
following MODIFICATIONS:
1.
2.
3.

The penalty imposed on the accused-appellant is 14 years and 8 months of

reclusion temporal as minimum to 20 years of reclusion temporal as maximum[;]
The award of moral damages is raised from P20,000.00 to P50,000.00; and
The award of indemnity is raised from P10,000.00 to P50,000.00.

SO ORDERED.9
Garingarao filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 22 June 2010 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied the
motion.
Hence, the petition before this Court.
The Issue
The only issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming with
modifications the trial courts decision.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has no merit.
Garingarao alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial courts decision finding him guilty of
acts of lasciviousness in relation to RA 7610. Garingarao insists that it was physically impossible for him to
commit the acts charged against him because there were many patients and hospital employees around. He
alleges that AAAs room was well lighted and that he had an assistant when the incident allegedly
occurred. Garingarao further alleges that, assuming the charges were correct, there was only one incident
when he allegedly touched AAA and as such, he should have been convicted only of acts of lasciviousness and
not of violation of RA 7610.
We do not agree.

Credibility of Witnesses
The Court has ruled that in case of acts of lasciviousness, the lone testimony of the offended party, if credible,
is sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused.10 In this case, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals
found the testimony of AAA credible over Garingaraos defense of denial and alibi. It is a settled rule that
denial is a weak defense as against the positive identification by the victim.11 Both denial and alibi are
inherently weak defenses and constitute self-serving negative evidence which cannot be accorded greater
evidentiary weight than the positive declaration by a credible witness.12 Garingaraos defense of denial and
alibi must fail over the positive and straightforward testimony of AAA on the incident. Further, like the trial
court and the Court of Appeals, we find incredible Garingaraos defense that the case was an offshoot of a
heated argument he had with AAAs father over the manner Garingarao was giving AAAs medications. It is
hard to believe that AAAs parents would expose her to a public trial if the charges were not true. 13 In
addition, the prosecution was able to establish that, contrary to Garingaraos allegation, both BBB and CCC
were not in AAAs room at the time of the incident.

Violation of RA 7610
Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 provides:
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether male or female, who for
money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate
or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse.

The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon
the following:
(a) x x x
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in
prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the victim is under twelve (12)
years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3 for rape and Article
336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case
may be; Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve
(12) yeas of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period, x x x
(c) x x x
The elements of sexual abuse under Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 are the following:
1.
2.
3.

The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct;

The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse;
and
The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.14

Under Section 32, Article XIII of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 7610, lascivious conduct is
defined as follows:
[T]he intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast,
inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any
person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with the intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or
arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the
genitals or pubic area of a person.15
In this case, the prosecution established that Garingarao touched AAAs breasts and inserted his finger into
her private part for his sexual gratification. Garingarao used his influence as a nurse by pretending that his
actions were part of the physical examination he was doing. Garingarao persisted on what he was doing
despite AAAs objections. AAA twice askedGaringarao what he was doing and he answered that he was just
examining her.
The Court has ruled that a child is deemed subject to other sexual abuse when the child is the victim of
lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult.16 In lascivious conduct under the coercion or
influence of any adult, there must be some form of compulsion equivalent to intimidation which subdues the
free exercise of the offended partys free will.17 In this case, Garingarao coerced AAA into submitting to his
lascivious acts by pretending that he was examining her.

Garingarao insists that, assuming that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were true, he should not
be convicted of violation of RA 7610 because the incident happened only once. Garingarao alleges that the
single incident would not suffice to hold him liable under RA 7610.
Garingaraos argument has no legal basis.
The Court has already ruled that it is inconsequential that sexual abuse under RA 7610 occurred only
once.18 Section 3(b) of RA 7610 provides that the abuse may be habitual or not.19Hence, the fact that the
offense occurred only once is enough to hold Garingarao liable for acts of lasciviousness under RA 7610.
Indemnity and Moral Damages
In view of recent jurisprudence, we deem it proper to reduce the amount of indemnity to P20,00020 and
moral damages awarded by the Court of Appeals to P15,000.21 We also impose on Garingarao a fine
of P15,000.22
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 26 November 2009 Decision and 22 June 2010
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31354 withMODIFICATIONS. The Court
finds Jojit Garingarao GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of acts of lasciviousness in relation to Republic Act
No. 7610. He is sentenced to suffer the penalty of 14 years and 8 months of reclusion temporal as minimum to
20 years of reclusion temporal as maximum and ordered to pay AAA P20,000 as civil indemnity, P15,000 as
moral damages and a fine of P15,000.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 198732
June 10, 2013
CHRISTIAN CABALLO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the January 28, 2011 Decision2 and
September 26, 2011 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 27399-MIN which affirmed
with modification the April 1, 2003 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Surigao City, Branch 30 (RTC),
finding petitioner Christian Caballo (Caballo) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 10(a),
Article VI of Republic Act No. 76104(RA 7610), otherwise known as the "Special Protection of Children
Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act," in relation to Section 2 of the Rules and
Regulations on the Reporting and Investigation of Child Abuse Cases (Rules on Child Abuse Cases).
The Facts
On March 16, 1999, an Information5 was filed charging Caballo of violation of Section 10(a), Article VI of RA
7610 which was later amended on May 28, 1999, to include statements pertaining to the delivery of private
complainant AAAs6 baby. The Amended Information7 reads:
That undersigned Second Assistant City Prosecutor hereby accuses Christian Caballo of the crime of Violation
of Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610, committed as follows:
That in or about the last week of March 1998, and on different dates subsequent thereto, until June 1998, in
the City of Surigao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
a 23 year old man, in utter disregard of the prohibition of the provisions of Republic Act No. 7610 and taking
advantage of the innocence and lack of worldly experience of AAA who was only 17 years old at that time,
having been born on November 3, 1980, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit
sexual abuse upon said AAA, by persuading and inducing the latter to have sexual intercourse with him,
which ultimately resulted to her untimely pregnancy and delivery of a baby on March 8, 1999, a condition
prejudicial to her development, to the damage and prejudice of AAA in such amount as may be allowed by
law.

CONTRARY TO LAW.
Surigao City, Philippines, May 28, 1999.
Upon arraignment, Caballo pleaded not guilty to the aforesaid charges. 8
Based on the records, the undisputed facts are as follows:
AAA, then 17 years old, met Caballo, then 23 years old, in her uncles place in Surigao City. Her uncle was a
choreographer and Caballo was one of his dancers. During that time, AAA was a sophomore college student at
the University of San Carlos and resided at a boarding house in Cebu City. On January 17, 1998, Caballo went
to Cebu City to attend the Sinulog Festival and there, visited AAA. After spending time together, they
eventually became sweethearts.9 Sometime during the third week of March 1998, AAA went home to Surigao
City and stayed with her uncle. In the last week of March of the same year, Caballo persuaded AAA to have
sexual intercourse with him. This was followed by several more of the same in April 1998, in the first and
second weeks of May 1998, on August 31, 1998 and in November 1998, all of which happened in Surigao City,
except the one in August which occurred in Cebu.10 In June 1998, AAA becamepregnant and later gave birth
on March 8, 1999.11
During the trial, the prosecution asserted that Caballo was only able to induce AAA to lose her virginity due to
promises of marriage and his assurance that he would not get her pregnant due to the use of the "withdrawal
method." Moreover, it claimed that Caballo was shocked upon hearing the news of AAAs pregnancy and
consequently, advised her to have an abortion. She heeded Caballos advice; however, her efforts were
unsuccessful. Further, the prosecution averred that when AAAs mother confronted Caballo to find out what
his plans were for AAA, he assured her that he would marry her daughter.12
Opposed to the foregoing, Caballo claimed that during their first sexual intercourse, AAA was no longer a
virgin as he found it easy to penetrate her and that there was no bleeding. He also maintained that AAA had
(3) three boyfriends prior to him. Further, he posited that he and AAA were sweethearts who lived-in
together, for one (1) week in a certain Litang Hotel and another week in the residence of AAAs uncle.
Eventually, they broke up due to the intervention of AAAs parents. At a certain time, AAAs mother even told
Caballo that he was not deserving of AAA because he was poor. Lastly, he alleged that he repeatedly proposed
marriage to AAA but was always rejected because she was still studying.13
The RTCs Ruling
In a Decision dated April 1, 2003, the RTC found Caballo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of
Section 10(a), Article VI of RA 7610, in relation to Section 2 of the Rules on Child Abuse Cases. Accordingly, it
sentenced Caballo to suffer imprisonment for an indeterminate period ranging from prision correccional, in
its maximum period of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day, as minimum, to prision mayor in its
minimum period of six (6) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day, as maximum. It also ordered Caballo to
pay AAA moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00.14
Aggrieved, Caballo elevated the case to the CA.
The CAs Ruling
In a Decision dated January 28, 2011,15 the CA dismissed the appeal and affirmed with modification the RTCs
ruling, finding Caballo guilty of violating Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610.
It ruled that while the Amended Information denominated the crime charged as violation of Section 10(a),
Article VI of RA 7610, the statements in its body actually support a charge of violation of Section 5(b), Article
III of RA 7610.16
On the merits of the case, it found that the evidence adduced by the prosecution clearly showed that Caballo
persuaded, induced and enticed AAA, then a minor, to have carnal knowledge with him. Towards this end,
Caballo repeatedly assured AAA of his love and even went on to promise marriage to her. He also assured
AAA that she would not get pregnant because he would be using the "withdrawal method." Thus, it was upon
these repeated coaxing and assuring words that AAA succumbed to Caballos evil desires which deflowered
and got her pregnant. On this score, it observed that consent is immaterial in child abuse cases involving
sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct and therefore, the sweetheart defense remains unacceptable. 17 It
also found basis to sustain the award of moral damages. 18
Caballo filed a motion for reconsideration which was, however, denied on September 26, 2011.19
Hence, the instant petition.
The Issue
The core of the present controversy revolves around the interpretation of the phrase "due to the coercion or
influence of any adult" which would thereby classify the victim as a "child exploited in prostitution and other
sexual abuse" as found in Section 5, Article III of RA 7610. Consequently, the interpretation which the Court

accords herein would determine whether or not the CA erred in finding Caballo guilty of violating paragraph
(b) of the same proviso.
In his petition, Caballo essentially argues that his promise to marry or his use of the "withdrawal method"
should not be considered as "persuasion" or "inducement" sufficient to convict him for the aforementioned
offense, asserting that these should be coupled with some form of coercion or intimidation to constitute child
abuse. He further alleges that he and AAA were sweethearts which thus, made the sexual intercourse
consensual.
In its Comment,20 respondent advances the argument that there was "sexual abuse" within the purview of RA
7610 as well as the Rules on Child Abuse Cases since it was only upon Caballos repeated assurances and
persuasion that AAA gave in to his worldly desires. Likewise, it points out that the sweetheart theory, as
relied on by Caballo, deserves scant consideration in view of the Courts ruling in Malto v. People (Malto).21
The Courts Ruling
The petition has no merit.
Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610 pertinently reads:
SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit,
or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in
sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual
abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the
following: x x x x
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in
prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the victim is under twelve (12) years of
age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3 for rape and Article 336 of Act No.
3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be; Provided, That
the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion
temporal in its medium period x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As determined in the case of Olivarez v. CA (Olivarez),22 the elements of the foregoing offense are the
following:
(a) The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct;
(b) The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual
abuse; and
(c) The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.
In this case, the existence of the first and third elements remains undisputed. Records disclose that Caballo
had succeeded in repeatedly having sexual intercourse with AAA who, during all those instances, was still a
minor. Thus, the only bone of contention lies in the presence of the second element. On this note, the defense
submits that AAA could not be considered as a "child exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse" since
the incidents to do not point to any form of "coercion" or "influence" on Caballos part.
The argument is untenable.
To put things in proper perspective, it must be pointed out that RA 7610 was meant to advance the state
policy of affording "special protection to children from all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation and
discrimination and other conditions prejudicial to their development" and in such regard, "provide sanctions
for their commission."23 It also furthers the "best interests of children" and as such, its provisions are guided
by this standard.24
Driven by the foregoing considerations, Congress crafted Article III of the same law in order to penalize child
prostitution and other forms of sexual abuse. Section 5 thereof provides a definition of who is considered a
"child exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse." As illumined in Olivarez, 25 citing People v. Larin26 and
Amployo v. People,27 the final version of the aforesaid provision was a product of various deliberations to
expand its original coverage to cases where the minor may have been coerced or intimidated into sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct, not necessarily for money or profit, viz:
The second element, i.e., that the act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other
sexual abuse, is likewise present. As succinctly explained in People v. Larin:
A child is deemed exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse, when the child indulges in
sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct (a) for money, profit, or any other consideration; or (b) under the
coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group...

It must be noted that the law covers not only a situation in which a child is abused for profit, but also one in
which a child, through coercion or intimidation, engages in lascivious conduct.
We reiterated this ruling in Amployo v. People:
... As we observed in People v. Larin, Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 7610 does not merely cover a situation of a child
being abused for profit, but also one in which a child engages in any lascivious conduct through coercion or
intimidation...
Thus, a child is deemed subjected to other sexual abuse when the child indulges in lascivious conduct under
the coercion or influence of any adult. In this case, Cristina was sexually abused because she was coerced or
intimidated by petitioner to indulge in a lascivious conduct. Furthermore, it is inconsequential that the sexual
abuse occurred only once. As expressly provided in Section 3(b) of R.A. 7610, the abuse may be habitual or
not. It must be observed that Article III of R.A. 7610 is captioned as "Child Prostitution and Other Sexual
Abuse" because Congress really intended to cover a situation where the minor may have been coerced or
intimidated into lascivious conduct, not necessarily for money or profit. The law covers not only child
prostitution but also other forms of sexual abuse. This is clear from the deliberations of the Senate:
Senator Angara. I refer to line 9, who for money or profit. I would like to amend this, Mr. President, to cover a
situation where the minor may have been coerced or intimidated into this lascivious conduct, not necessarily
for money or profit, so that we can cover those situations and not leave loophole in this section.
The proposal I have is something like this: WHO FOR MONEY, PROFIT, OR ANY OTHER CONSIDERATION OR
DUE TO THE COERCION OR INFLUENCE OF ANY ADULT, SYNDICATE OR GROUP INDULGE, et cetera.
The President Pro Tempore. I see. That would mean also changing the subtitle of Section 4. Will it no longer
be child prostitution?
Senator Angara. No, no. Not necessarily, Mr. President, because we are still talking of the child who is being
misused for sexual purposes either for money or for consideration. What I am trying to cover is the other
consideration. Because, here, it is limited only to the child being abused or misused for sexual purposes, only
for money or profit.
I am contending, Mr. President, that there may be situations where the child may not have been used for
profit or ...
The President Pro Tempore. So, it is no longer prostitution. Because the essence of prostitution is profit.
Senator Angara. Well, the Gentleman is right. Maybe the heading ought to be expanded. But, still, the
President will agree that that is a form or manner of child abuse.
The President Pro Tempore. What does the Sponsor say? Will the Gentleman kindly restate the amendment?
ANGARA AMENDMENT
Senator Angara. The new section will read something like this, Mr. President: MINORS, WHETHER MALE OR
FEMALE, WHO FOR MONEY, PROFIT, OR ANY OTHER CONSIDERATION OR INFLUENCE OF ANY ADULT,
SYNDICATE OR GROUP INDULGE IN SEXUAL INTERCOURSE, et cetera.
Senator Lina. It is accepted, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection? [Silence] Hearing none, the amendment is approved.
How about the title, Child Prostitution, shall we change that too?
Senator Angara. Yes, Mr. President, to cover the expanded scope.
The President Pro Tempore. Is that not what we would call probable child abuse?
Senator Angara. Yes, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Subject to rewording. Is there any objection? [Silence] Hearing none, the
amendment is approved. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As it is presently worded, Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 provides that when a child indulges in sexual
intercourse or any lascivious conduct due to the coercion or influence of any adult, the child is deemed to be a
"child exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse." In this manner, the law is able to act as an effective
deterrent to quell all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation and discrimination against children,
prejudicial as they are to their development.
In this relation, case law further clarifies that sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct under the coercion or
influence of any adult exists when there is some form of compulsion equivalent to intimidation which
subdues the free exercise of the offended partys free will.28 Corollary thereto, Section 2(g) of the Rules on
Child Abuse Cases conveys that sexual abuse involves the element of influence which manifests in a variety of
forms. It is defined as:

The employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement or coercion of a child to engage in or assist
another person to engage in, sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct or the molestation, prostitution, or
incest with children.
To note, the term "influence" means the "improper use of power or trust in any way that deprives a person of
free will and substitutes anothers objective."29 Meanwhile, "coercion" is the "improper use of x x x power to
compel another to submit to the wishes of one who wields it."30
In view of the foregoing, the Court observes that Caballos actuations may be classified as "coercion" and
"influence" within the purview of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610:
First, the most crucial element is AAAs minority. It is undisputed that AAA was only 17 years old at the time
of the commission of the crime and is hence, considered a child under the law.31 In this respect, AAA was not
capable of fully understanding or knowing the import of her actions and in consequence, remained vulnerable
to the cajolery and deception of adults, as in this case.
Based on this premise, jurisprudence settles that consent is immaterial in cases involving a violation of
Section 5, Article III of RA 7610; as such, the argument that AAA and Caballo were sweethearts remains
irrelevant. The Malto ruling is largely instructive on this point:
For purposes of sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct in child abuse cases under RA 7610, the sweetheart
defense is unacceptable. A child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse cannot validly
give consent to sexual intercourse with another person.
The language of the law is clear: it seeks to punish "those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse."
Unlike rape, therefore, consent is immaterial in cases involving violation of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610.
The mere act of having sexual intercourse or committing lascivious conduct with a child who is exploited in
prostitution or subjected to sexual abuse constitutes the offense. It is a malum prohibitum, an evil that is
proscribed.
A child cannot give consent to a contract under our civil laws. This is on the rationale that she can easily be
the victim of fraud as she is not capable of fully understanding or knowing the nature or import of her actions.
The State, as parens patriae, is under the obligation to minimize the risk of harm to those who, because of
their minority, are as yet unable to take care of themselves fully. Those of tender years deserve its protection.
The harm which results from a childs bad decision in a sexual encounter may be infinitely more damaging to
her than a bad business deal. Thus, the law should protect her from the harmful consequences of her attempts
at adult sexual behavior. For this reason, a child should not be deemed to have validly consented to adult
sexual activity and to surrender herself in the act of ultimate physical intimacy under a law which seeks to
afford her special protection against abuse, exploitation and discrimination. (Otherwise, sexual predators like
petitioner will be justified, or even unwittingly tempted by the law, to view her as fair game and vulnerable
prey.) In other words, a child is presumed by law to be incapable of giving rational consent to any lascivious
act or sexual intercourse. x x x x32 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)
Second, coupled with AAAs minority is Caballos seniority. Records indicate that Caballo was 23 years old at
the time of the commission of the offense and therefore, 6 years older than AAA, more or less. The age
disparity between an adult and a minor placed Caballo in a stronger position over AAA so as to enable him to
force his will upon the latter.
Third, Caballo's actions effectively constitute overt acts of coercion and influence.1wphi1 Records reveal that
Caballo repeatedly assured AAA of his love for her, and even, promised to marry her. In addition, he also
guaranteed that she would not get pregnant since he would be using the "withdrawal method" for safety.
Irrefragably, these were meant to influence AAA to set aside her reservations and eventually give into having
sex with him, with which he succeeded.
Fourth, at least, with respect to the parties' first sexual encounter, it is observed that the brash and
unexpected manner in which Caballo pursued AAA to her room and pressed on her to have sex with him,
effectively placed her in, to a certain extent, a position of duress .. An important factor is that AAA refused
Caballo's incipient advances and in fact, asked him to leave. However, AAA eventually yielded. Thus, it stands
to reason that she was put in a situation deprived of the benefit of clear thought and choice. In any case, the
Court observes that any other choice would, nonetheless, remain tarnished due to AAA's minority as abovediscussed.
Hence, considering that Caballo's acts constitute "coercion" and "influence" within the context of the law, and
that AAA indulged in sexual intercourse and/or lascivious conduct with Caballo due to the same, she is

deemed as a "child exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse"; as such, the second element of the
subject offense exists.
In fine, finding all elements to be present, the Court hereby sustains Caballo's conviction for violation of
Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The January 28, 2011 Decision and September 26, 2011 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR No. 27399-MIN are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED .