Strong States, Poor Control

John A. Bertetto June 17, 2014

Much has been written about the concept of ungoverned spaces: what they are; where
they exist; implications for national security, terrorism, and criminal activity; and how they may
be dealt with. While these are all important questions, the answer to the latter all depend upon
the answer of the first: What is an Ungoverened Space? How this is defined has clear and
profound implication on where they exist and how they are dealt with, both tactically and
strategically.
Perhaps the clearest definition comes from the RAND Corporation, who defined ungoverned
territories in their RAND Project Air Force report as:

(A)reas in which a state faces significant challenges in establishing control. They

can be failed or failing states, poorly controlled land or maritime borders, or
areas within otherwise viable states to which the central governments authority
does not extend (Rand Corporation 2006).
Many similar definitions have been offered, ranging across both ends of the spectrum
RAND attempts to cover; they are territories in which no central government exists (failed
states or states engaged in civil/tribal war), they are spaces within a state where the
government does not maintain a strong presence or control.
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This spectrum, however, is far too broad. It asserts that strong governments with
internal territories where state authority is challenged are equivalent to failed states where
armed groups engage in open conflict for control and no centralized government exists to
oppose them. While operationally we may approach these two scenarios differently, the two
definition model of governed/ungoverned forces leaders and scholars to deftly examine and
treat these situations differently. From the perspective of the researcher, strategist, and policy
writer, the work toward understanding and resolving conflict and increasing territory stability by
providing leaders proper recommendations depends on proper framing of the problem. What is
required is a third category of space governance: undergoverened spaces.
An undergoverened space is an area where government services (such as utilities,
streets and sanitation, social, health, and public safety) are underrepresented, and where the
criminal element does not desire to exert direct control over the population.
The Englewood neighborhood of Chicago provides an excellent example of an
undergoverned space. The City of Chicago is not only governed, but strongly governed. It has
many affluent neighborhoods which are well maintained by the city, it has a vibrant and
economically rich downtown region, it has modern infrastructure and public utilities and safety
systems. Furthermore, its political power within the State of Illinois is strong. To its robust
municipal governance it is supported by strong, well defined state and national governance; the
city receives aid from both of these government structures in terms of both financial support
and legal support (state and federal crime task forces; state and federal prosecutorial support).
Yet within this wealth of governance neighborhoods like Englewood exist, where street gangs
commit frequent acts of violence, public utilities go unrepaired or are not provided,
infrastructure literally crumbles, and health care and education suffer. Most strikingly, though,
Englewood suffers these problems in ways other neighborhoods within Chicago do not. This is
the crux of the issue: How do territories with strong government and strong government
representation in some areas have such weak government control in others?
It is because these areas suffer from undergovernance. For whatever reason lack of
political will, lack of regard, or lack of resources the functions of government do not reach
these areas in a significant way so as to alleviate their poor condition.
Recognizing the difference between undergoverned spaces and ungoverned spaces has
profound implication on how we both understand and approach these areas. Most simply put, it
is the difference between supporting a government and building a government. If military
efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan have taught us only a few things, then this should be one of
them.
Before concluding, two final notes.
First, it is entirely possible that an area be fully governed but that government is
illegitimate or criminal. Returning to the example of Englewood in Chicago, the street gangs
within are not attempting to establish control over the area and its residents in any way outside
of their turning a blind eye to their criminal activities. There is no desire for or even accidental
usurping of functions of government. Rather, the conflict between gangs remains primarily
driven by competing criminal enterprises. The local population, for the most part, is instead part
of the physical landscape, much the same way buildings are. Gangs operate around them but

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do not engage them unless they make a concerted effort to stand in the gangs way. When this
happens, the gangs deal with the individual and move on. The result of this undergovernance
by both the state and the malefactors in an area is a local population largely ignored and forced
to fend for itself.
Second, no declarative statements regarding poor governing is made here. To the
degree which poor planning, inattentiveness, corruption, or any other form of poor governing
plays a part in creating undergovernance remains a point for discussion. While poor governing
demonstrably exists within strong government control (governed spaces), it remains open for
debate if undergovernance is always caused by poor governing. Given the existence of the state
and therefore the act of governing within the complex environment, it is difficult to assert
that all undergovernance can be avoided had governing only been better.

The thoughts, opinions, and strategies described here are the original work of the author and
are not intended to represent or speak on behalf of the Chicago Police Department, its policies,
or its strategies.

John A. Bertetto is a sworn member of the Chicago Police Department.

His current areas of study and work include criminal street gangs, social
network analysis, and asymmetric threat mitigation. He is the author of
Counter-Gang Strategy: Adapted COIN in Policing Criminal Street Gangs,
Countering Criminal Street Gangs: Lessons from the Counterinsurgent
Battlespace, Designing Law Enforcement: Adaptive Strategies for the
Complex Environment, and Toward a Police Ethos: Defining Our Values
as a Call to Action. Officer Bertettos most recent research article
Reducing Gang Violence through Network Influence Based Targeting of
Social Programs has been accepted to the Industry & Government Track
of the 2014 Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining (KDD) annual
conference, a conference with a 20% acceptance rate. Officer Bertetto has
worked street patrol, organized crime, and research and development
assignments. His applied research projects have led to collaborative
partnerships with students and faculty at USMA West Point, George
Mason University, and the University of Maryland. He is one of the
primary designers and the law enforcement SME behind the GANG social
network analysis software, which has been featured in Popular Science,
Governing, and on MITs technology blog, as well as profiled on ABC
and BBC news. Officer Bertetto holds a Master of Science degree from
Western Illinois University and a Master of Business Administration
degree from St. Xavier University.

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