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The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are
whether or not the services offered by respondent, The Legal
Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it constitutes practice of law and, in
either case, whether the same can properly be the subject of the
advertisements herein complained of.
Article 26. . . .
be involved is actually the practice of law. If a nonlawyer, such as the Legal Clinic, renders such
services then it is engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law.
1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give
information on divorce, absence, annulment of
marriage and visas (See Annexes "A" and "B"
Petition). Purely giving informational materials may
not constitute of law. The business is similar to that
of a bookstore where the customer buys materials
on the subject and determines on the subject and
determines by himself what courses of action to
take.
It is not entirely improbable, however, that aside
from purely giving information, the Legal Clinic's
paralegals may apply the law to the particular
problem of the client, and give legal advice. Such
would constitute unauthorized practice of law.
It cannot be claimed that the
publication of a legal text which
publication of a legal text which
purports to say what the law is
amount to legal practice. And the
mere fact that the principles or rules
stated in the text may be accepted
by a particular reader as a solution to
his problem does not affect this. . . . .
Apparently it is urged that the
conjoining of these two, that is, the
text and the forms, with advice as to
how the forms should be filled out,
constitutes the unlawful practice of
law. But that is the situation with
many approved and accepted texts.
Dacey's book is sold to the public at
large. There is no personal contact
names, under our custom, Identify the more active and/or more
senior members or partners of the law firm. A glimpse at the
history of the firms of petitioners and of other law firms in this
country would show how their firm names have evolved and
changed from time to time as the composition of the partnership
changed. t.hqw
The continued use of a firm name after the death
of one or more of the partners designated by it is
proper only where sustained by local custom and
not where by custom this purports to Identify the
active members. ...
There would seem to be a question, under the
working of the Canon, as to the propriety of adding
the name of a new partner and at the same time
retaining that of a deceased partner who was
never a partner with the new one. (H.S. Drinker,
op. cit., supra, at pp. 207208) (Emphasis
supplied).
The possibility of deception upon the public, real or
consequential, where the name of a deceased partner continues
to be used cannot be ruled out. A person in search of legal
counsel might be guided by the familiar ring of a distinguished
name appearing in a firm title.
E. Petitioners argue that U.S. Courts have consistently allowed
the continued use of a deceased partner's name in the firm
name of law partnerships. But that is so because it is sanctioned
by custom.
In the case of Mendelsohn v. Equitable Life Assurance Society
(33 N.Y.S. 2d 733) which petitioners Salazar, et al. quoted in
their memorandum, the New York Supreme Court sustained the
use of the firm name Alexander & Green even if none of the
present ten partners of the firm bears either name because the
practice was sanctioned by custom and did not offend any
Separate Opinions
The petitions are denied, as there are only four votes for
granting them, seven of the Justices being of the contrary view,
as explained in the plurality opinion of Justice Ameurfina
Melencio-Herrera. It is out of delicadeza that the undersigned
did not participate in the disposition of these petitions, as the
law office of Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez and Castillo
started with the partnership of Quisumbing, Sycip, and
Quisumbing, the senior partner, the late Ramon Quisumbing,
being the father-in-law of the undersigned, and the most junior
partner then, Norberto J. Quisumbing, being his brother- in-law.
For the record, the undersigned wishes to invite the attention of
all concerned, and not only of petitioners, to the last sentence of
the opinion of Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera: 'Those
names [Sycip and Ozaeta] may, however, be included in the
listing of individuals wtes
AQUINO, J., dissenting:
I dissent. The fourteen members of the law firm, Sycip, Salazar,
Feliciano, Hernandez & Castillo, in their petition of June 10,
1975, prayed for authority to continue the use of that firm name,
notwithstanding the death of Attorney Alexander Sycip on May
5, 1975 (May he rest in peace). He was the founder of the firm
which was originally known as the Sycip Law Office.
On the other hand, the seven surviving partners of the law firm,
Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon, Mabanta & Reyes, in their petition of
August 13, 1976, prayed that they be allowed to continue using
the said firm name notwithstanding the death of two partners,
former Justice Roman Ozaeta and his son, Herminio, on May 1,
1972 and February 14, 1976, respectively.
# Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring:
They alleged that the said law firm was a continuation of the
Ozaeta Law Office which was established in 1957 by Justice
Ozaeta and his son and that, as to the said law firm, the name
Ozaeta has acquired an institutional and secondary connotation.
Article 1840 of the Civil Code, which speaks of the use by the
partnership of the name of a deceased partner as part of the
The petitions are denied, as there are only four votes for
granting them, seven of the Justices being of the contrary view,
as explained in the plurality opinion of Justice Ameurfina
Melencio-Herrera. It is out of delicadeza that the undersigned
did not participate in the disposition of these petitions, as the
law office of Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez and Castillo
Court, and without her furnishing him with complete records, not
to mention money, for the reproduction of the needed
documents. Despite these constraints, respondent exerted
efforts, albeit lacking in care, to defend his clients cause by
filing two motions for extension of time to file petition. And he in
fact filed the petition within the time he requested, 11 thus
complying with the guideline of this Court that lawyers should at
least file their pleadings within the extended period requested
should their motions for extension of time to file a pleading be
unacted upon.12
Neither do the circumstances warrant a finding that respondent
was motivated by ill-will. In the absence of proof to the contrary,
a lawyer enjoys a presumption of good faith in his favor.13
WHEREFORE, respondent, Atty. Romeo Metila, is SERIOUSLY
ADMONISHED with WARNING that similar charges will be
severely dealt with.
KAPUNAN, J.:
These case touch the very cornerstone of every State's judicial
system, upon which the workings of the contentious and
adversarial system in the Philippine legal process are based
the sanctity of fiduciary duty in the client-lawyer relationship.
The fiduciary duty of a counsel and advocate is also what
makes the law profession a unique position of trust and
confidence, which distinguishes it from any other calling. In this
instance, we have no recourse but to uphold and strengthen the
mantle of protection accorded to the confidentiality that
proceeds from the performance of the lawyer's duty to his client.
The facts of the case are undisputed.
conditions precedent to warrant the latter's exclusion as partydefendant in PCGG Case No. 33, to wit: (a) Letter to respondent
PCGG of the counsel of respondent Roco dated May 24, 1989
reiterating a previous request for reinvestigation by the PCGG in
PCGG Case No. 33; (b) Affidavit dated March 8, 1989 executed
by private respondent Roco as Attachment to the letter
aforestated in (a); and (c) Letter of the Roco, Bunag, and
Kapunan Law Offices dated September 21, 1988 to the
respondent PCGG in behalf of private respondent Roco
originally requesting the reinvestigation and/or re-examination of
the evidence of the PCGG against Roco in its Complaint in
PCGG Case No. 33. 10
It is noteworthy that during said proceedings, private respondent
Roco did not refute petitioners' contention that he did actually
not reveal the identity of the client involved in PCGG Case No.
33, nor had he undertaken to reveal the identity of the client for
whom he acted as nominee-stockholder. 11
On March 18, 1992, respondent Sandiganbayan promulgated
the Resolution, herein questioned, denying the exclusion of
petitioners in PCGG Case No. 33, for their refusal to comply
with the conditions required by respondent PCGG. It held:
xxx xxx xxx
ACCRA lawyers may take the heroic stance of not
revealing the identity of the client for whom they
have acted, i.e. their principal, and that will be their
choice. But until they do identify their clients,
considerations of whether or not the privilege
claimed by the ACCRA lawyers exists cannot even
begin to be debated. The ACCRA lawyers cannot
excuse themselves from the consequences of
their acts until they have begun to establish the
basis for recognizing the privilege; the existence
and identity of the client.
First, the court has a right to know that the client whose
privileged information is sought to be protected is flesh and
blood.
Second, the privilege begins to exist only after the attorneyclient relationship has been established. The attorney-client
privilege does not attach until there is a client.
latter. The reason for the first rule is that it is not within the
professional character of a lawyer to give advice on the
commission of a crime. 48 The reason for the second has been
stated in the cases above discussed and are founded on the
same policy grounds for which the attorney-client privilege, in
general, exists.
In Matter of Shawmut Mining Co., supra, the appellate court
therein stated that "under such conditions no case has ever yet
gone to the length of compelling an attorney, at the instance of a
hostile litigant, to disclose not only his retainer, but the nature of
the transactions to which it related, when such information could
be made the basis of a suit against his client." 49
"Communications made to an attorney in the course of any
personal employment, relating to the subject thereof, and which
may be supposed to be drawn out in consequence of the
relation in which the parties stand to each other, are under the
seal of confidence and entitled to protection as privileged
communications." 50 Where the communicated information,
which clearly falls within the privilege, would suggest possible
criminal activity but there would be not much in the information
known to the prosecution which would sustain a charge except
that revealing the name of the client would open up other
privileged information which would substantiate the
prosecution's suspicions, then the client's identity is so
inextricably linked to the subject matter itself that it falls within
the protection. The Baird exception, applicable to the instant
case, is consonant with the principal policy behind the privilege,
i.e., that for the purpose of promoting freedom of consultation of
legal advisors by clients, apprehension of compelled disclosure
from attorneys must be eliminated. This exception has likewise
been sustained in In re Grand Jury Proceedings 51 and Tillotson
v. Boughner. 52 What these cases unanimously seek to avoid is
the exploitation of the general rule in what may amount to a
fishing expedition by the prosecution.
There are, after all, alternative source of information available to
the prosecutor which do not depend on utilizing a defendant's
counsel as a convenient and readily available source of
No. 47
Held:
Five of the nine crew members were drowned. Three days later,
the tug owners and the underwriters employed a law firm, of
which respondent Fortenbaugh is a member, to defend them
against potential suits by representatives of the deceased crew
members and to sue the railroad for damages to the tug.
A public hearing was held on March 4, 1943, before the United
States Steamboat Inspectors at which the four survivors were
examined. This testimony was recorded and made available to
all interested parties. Shortly thereafter, Fortenbaugh privately
interviewed the survivors and took statements from them with
an eye toward the anticipated litigation; the survivors signed
these statements on March 29. Fortenbaugh also interviewed
other persons believed to have some information relating to the
accident, and in some cases he made memoranda of what they
told him. At the time when Fortenbaugh secured the statements
of the survivors, representatives of two of the deceased crew
members had been in communication with him. Ultimately
claims were presented by representatives of all five of the
deceased; four of the claims, however, were settled without
litigation. The fifth claimant, petitioner herein, brought suit in a
federal court under the Jones Act on November 26, 1943,
naming as defendants the two tug owners, individually and as
partners, and the railroad.
One year later, petitioner filed 39 interrogatories directed to the
tug owners. The 38th interrogatory read:
"State whether any statements of the members of the crews of
the Tugs 'J. M. Taylor' and 'Philadelphia' or of any other vessel
were taken in connection with the towing of the car float and the
sinking of the Tug 'John M. Taylor.'
Page 329 U. S. 499
Attach hereto exact copies of all such statements if in writing,
and if oral, set forth in detail the exact provisions of any such
oral statements or reports."
its large staff of attorneys and claim agents. At the same time,
the individual plaintiff, who often has direct knowledge of the
matter in issue and has no counsel until some time after his
claim arises, could be compelled to disclose all the intimate
details of his case. By endowing with
Page 329 U. S. 507
The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline set two dates for hearing
but complainant failed to appear in both. Investigating
Commissioner Rosalina R. Datiles thus granted respondent's
motion to file his memorandum, and the case was submitted for
resolution based on the pleadings submitted by the parties. 14
July 3, 2007
Atty. Funk was to collect all expenses for the property transfer
from Hocorma Foundation out of funds that Santos provided. It
was Santos' intention since 1950 to give the land to Mabalacat
Institute free of rent and expenses. The SPA also authorized
Atty. Funk to register the 5-hectare land in the name of
Mabalacat Institute so a new title could be issued to it, separate
from the properties of Hocorma Foundation. 6 When Santos
issued the SPA, Atty. Funk was Mabalacat Institute's director
and counsel. He was not yet Hocorma Foundation's counsel. 7
When Santos executed the deeds of conveyances, Atty. Funk's
clients were only Santos and Mabalacat Institute. 8
According to Atty. Funk, on August 15, 1983 Santos suggested
to Hocorma Foundation's Board of Trustees the inclusion of Atty.
Funk in that board, a suggestion that the foundation followed. 9
After Santos died on September 14, 1983, Atty. Funk was
elected President of Mabalacat Institute, a position he had since
held.10
Atty. Funk claims that in 1985 when Hocorma Foundation
refused to pay his attorney's fees, he severed his professional
relationship with it. On November 9, 1989, four years later, he
filed a complaint against the foundation for collection of his
attorney's fees. The trial court, the Court of Appeals (CA), and
the Supreme Court decided the claim in his favor.11
After hearing, the Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) found
Atty. Funk to have violated Canon 15, Rule 15.03 12 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility (CPR) with the aggravating
circumstance of a pattern of misconduct consisting of four court
appearances against his former client, the Hocorma Foundation.
The CBD recommended Atty. Funk's suspension from the
practice of law for one year.13 On April 16, 2010 the IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved the CBD's report and
recommendation.14 Atty. Funk moved for reconsideration but the
IBP Board of Governors denied it on June 26, 2011.
The Issue Presented
The issue here is whether or not Atty. Funk betrayed the trust
and confidence of a former client in violation of the CPR when
he filed several actions against such client on behalf of a new
one.
The excuse proffered by respondent that it was not him but Atty.
Ao who was eventually engaged by complainant will not
exonerate him from the clear violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. The take- over of a clients cause
of action by another lawyer does not give the former lawyer the
right to represent the opposing party. It is not only malpractice
but also constitutes a violation of the confidence resulting from
the attorney-client relationship.
SO ORDERED.
for that which his duty to another client requires him to oppose.
In brief, if he argues for one client this argument will be opposed
by him when he argues for the other client. Such is the case
with which we are now confronted, respondent being asked by
one client to nullify what he had formerly notarized as a true and
valid sale between Bontes and the complainant. (footnotes
omitted)3
The IBP Commissioner recommended that Atty. Sabitsana be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year.4
The Findings of the IBP Board of Governors
In a resolution dated February 27, 2004, the IBP Board of
Governors resolved to adopt and approve the Report and
Recommendation of the IBP Commissioner after finding it to be
fully supported by the evidence on record, the applicable laws
and rules.5 The IBP Board of Governors agreed with the IBP
Commissioners recommended penalty.
Atty. Sabitsana moved to reconsider the above resolution, but
the IBP Board of Governors denied his motion in a resolution
dated July 30, 2004.
The Issue
The issue in this case is whether Atty. Sabitsana is guilty of
misconduct for representing conflicting interests.
The Courts Ruling
xxx
and third, the case he filed was for the annulment of the
Deed of Sale that he had previously prepared and
executed for the complainant.
By his acts, not only did Atty. Sabitsana agree to represent one
client against another client in the same action; he also
accepted a new engagement that entailed him to contend and
oppose the interest of his other client in a property in which his
legal services had been previously retained.
To be sure, Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides an exception to the above prohibition.
However, we find no reason to apply the exception due to Atty.
Sabitsanas failure to comply with the requirements set forth
under the rule. Atty. Sabitsana did not make a full disclosure of
facts to the complainant and to Zenaida Caete before he
accepted the new engagement with Zenaida Caete. The
records likewise show that although Atty. Sabitsana wrote a
letter to the complainant informing her of Zenaida Caetes
adverse claim to the property covered by the Deed of Sale and,
urging her to settle the adverse claim; Atty. Sabitsana however
did not disclose to the complainant that he was also being
engaged as counsel by Zenaida Caete.11 Moreover, the
records show that Atty. Sabitsana failed to obtain the written
consent of his two clients, as required by Rule 15.03, Canon 15
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Accordingly, we find as the IBP Board of Governors did
Atty. Sabitsana guilty of misconduct for representing conflicting
interests. We likewise agree with the penalty of suspension for
one (1) year from the practice of law recommended by the IBP
Board of Governors. This penalty is consistent with existing
jurisprudence on the administrative offense of representing
conflicting interests.12
We note that Atty. Sabitsana takes exception to the IBP
recommendation on the ground that the charge in the complaint
was only for his alleged disclosure of confidential information,
not for representation of conflicting interests. To Atty. Sabitsana,
finding him liable for the latter offense is a violation of his due
process rights since he only answered the designated charge.
We find no violation of Atty. Sabitsanas due process rights.
Although there was indeed a specific charge in the complaint,
we are not unmindful that the complaint itself contained
allegations of acts sufficient to constitute a violation of the rule
on the prohibition against representing conflicting interests. As
stated in paragraph 8 of the complaint:
Atty. Sabitsana, Jr. accepted the commission as a Lawyer of
ZENAIDA CANEJA, now Zenaida Caete, to recover lands from
Complainant, including this land where lawyer Atty. Sabitsana,
Jr. has advised his client [complainant] to execute the second
sale[.]
Interestingly, Atty. Sabitsana even admitted these allegations in
his answer.13 He also averred in his Answer that:
6b. Because the defendant-to-be in the complaint (Civil Case
No. B-1060) that he would file on behalf of Zenaida CanejaCaete was his former client (herein complainant), respondent
asked [the] permission of Mrs. Caete (which she granted) that
he would first write a letter (Annex "4") to the complainant
proposing to settle the case amicably between them but
complainant ignored it. Neither did she object to respondents
handling the case in behalf of Mrs. Caete on the ground she is
now invoking in her instant complaint. So respondent felt free to
file the complaint against her.141wphi1
We have consistently held that the essence of due process is
simply the opportunity to be informed of the charge against
oneself and to be heard or, as applied to administrative
proceedings, the opportunity to explain ones side or the
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of.15 These opportunities were all afforded to Atty.
Sabitsana, as shown by the above circumstances.
SO ORDERED.
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
In a verified Complaint2 dated August 7, 1999, Elesio C.
Pormento, Sr. charged Atty. Elias A. Pontevedra with
malpractice and misconduct, praying that on the basis of the
facts alleged therein, respondent be disbarred.
Complainant alleges that between 1964 and 1994, respondent
is his family's legal counsel having represented him and
members of his family in all legal proceedings in which they are
involved. Complainant also claims that his family's relationship
with respondent extends beyond mere lawyer-client relations as
they gave respondent moral, spiritual, physical and financial
support in his different endeavors.3
Based on the allegations in the complaint, the rift between
complainant and respondent began when complainant's
counterclaim in Civil Case No. 1648 filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Bacolod City was dismissed. Complainant claims that
respondent, who was his lawyer in the said case, deliberately
failed to inform him of the dismissal of his counterclaim despite
receipt of the order of dismissal by the trial court, as a result of
which, complainant was deprived of his right to appeal said
order. Complainant asserts that he only came to know of the
existence of the trial court's order when the adverse party in the
said case extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage executed over
the parcel of land which is the subject matter of the suit. In order
to recover his ownership over the said parcel of land,
complainant was constrained to hire a new lawyer as Atty.
Pontevedra refused to institute an action for the recovery of the
subject property.4
Complainant also claims that in order to further protect his rights
and interests over the said parcel of land, he was forced to
initiate a criminal case for qualified theft against the relatives of
the alleged new owner of the said land. Respondent is the
counsel of the accused in said case. Complainant claims that as
On January 19, 2000, the Court referred the instant case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report
and recommendation.12
On February 18, 2002, respondent filed a Rejoinder to
complainant's Reply adding that the instant complaint was
orchestrated by complainant's son who wanted political
vengeance because he lost the vice-mayoralty post to
respondent during the 1988 local elections. 13
On February 20, 2002, complainant filed a Sur-Rejoinder to
respondent's Rejoinder.14
Thereafter, the parties filed their respective Position Papers, 15
after which the case was deemed submitted for resolution.
In his Report and Recommendation dated February 20, 2004,
Investigating Commissioner Agustinus V. Gonzaga found
respondent guilty of violating Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. He recommended that
respondent be meted the penalty of suspension for one month.
In a minute Resolution passed on July 30, 2004, the IBP Board
of Governors resolved to annul and set aside the
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and instead
approved the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit, to wit:
SO ORDERED.
xxx
xxx
about the demand letter, the latter explained that she had to
send it so that her clients defrauded investors of Multitel
would know that she was doing something for them and assured
complainant that there was nothing to worry about. 9
Both parties continued to communicate and exchange
information regarding the persistent demands made by Multitel
investors against complainant. On these occasions, respondent
impressed upon complainant that she can closely work with
officials of the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC), the
Department of Justice (DOJ), the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI), the Bureau of Immigration and Deportations
(BID),10 and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 11
to resolve complainants problems. Respondent also convinced
complainant that in order to be absolved from any liability with
respect to the investment scam, he must be able to show to the
DOJ that he was willing to divest any and all of his interests in
Precedent including the funds assigned to him by Multitel. 12
Respondent also asked money from complainant allegedly for
safekeeping to be used only for his case whenever necessary.
Complainant agreed and gave her an initial amount of
P900,000.00 which was received by respondent herself. 13
Sometime thereafter, complainant again gave respondent
P1,000,000.00.14 Said amounts were all part of Precedents
collections and sales proceeds which complainant held as
assignee of the companys properties. 15
When complainant went to the United States (US), he received
several messages from respondent sent through electronic mail
(e-mail) and short messaging system (SMS, or text messages)
warning him not to return to the Philippines because Rosario
Baladjay, president of Multitel, was arrested and that
complainant may later on be implicated in Multitels failed
investment system. Respondent even said that ten (10) arrest
warrants and a hold departure order had been issued against
him. Complainant, thereafter, received several e-mail messages
from respondent updating him of the status of the case against
Multitel and promised that she will settle the matter discreetly
I will also need the P30 M proof of deposit with Real [B]ank and
the trust given [to] you. So we can inform them [that] it was not
touched by you.
side. Always pray though to the best legal mind up there. You
will be ok!
Candy22
SO ORDERED.