Declaration of Principles and State Policies

[No. L-2662.
March 26, 1949]

Shigenori Kuroda, petitioner, vs. Major General Rafael
Jalandoni, Brigadier General Calixto Duque, Colonel
Margarito Toralba, Colonel Ireneo Buenconsejo, Colonel
Pedro Tabuena, Major Federico Aranas, Melville S. Hussey
and Robert Port, respondents.
1.Constitutional Law; Validity of Executive Order No. 68
Establishing a National War Crimes Office.Executive
Order No. 68 which was issued by the President of the
Philippines on the 29th day of July, 1947, is valid and
constitutional. Article 2 of our Constitution provides in its
section 3 that "The Philippines renounces war as an
instrument of national policy, and adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law
of the nation."
2.International Law; Violators of the Laws and Customs of
War, of Humanity and Civilization, Liability and Responsibility of.In accordance with the generally accepted
principles of international law of the present day,
including the Hague Convention, the Geneva Convention
and significant precedents of international jurisprudence
established by the United Nations, all those persons,
military or civilian, who have been guilty of planning,
preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the
commission of crimes and offenses consequential and
incidental thereto, in violation of the laws and customs of
war, of humanity and civilization, are held accountable
therefor*
3.Id.; Power of the President of the Philippines.In the
promulgation and enforcement of Executive Order No. 68,
the President of the Philippines has acted in conformity
with the generally accepted principles and policies of

international law which are part of our Constitution.
4.Constitutional Law; Power of President as Commander
in Chief of Armed Forces of the Philippines.The
promulgation of said executive order is an exercise by the
President of his powers as Commander in Chief of all our
armed forces.
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172
PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

kurada vs. Jalandoni
5.Id. ; Id.The President as Commander in Chief is fully

empowered to consummate this unfinished aspect of war,
namely, the trial and punishment of war criminals,
through the issuance and enforcement of Executive Order
No. 68.
6.International Law; Hague and Geneva Conventions
Form Part of the Law of the Philippines; Even if the Philippines was not Signatory Thereof, Provisions of Philippine
Constitution has been Comprehensive to that Effect.The
rules and regulations of the Hague and Geneva Conventions form part of and are wholly based on the generally
accepted principles of international law. In fact, these
rules and principles were accepted by the two belligerent
nations, the United States and Japan, who were
signatories to the two Conventions. Such rules and
principles, therefore, form part of the law of our nation
even if the Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them, for our Constitution has been
deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is not
confined to the recognition of rules and principles of

international law as contained in treaties to which our
government may have been or shall be a signatory.
7.Id.; Rights and Obligations of a Nation were not Erased
by Assumption of Full Sovereignty; Right to Try and Punish
Crimes Theretofore Committed.When the crimes
charged against petitioner were allegedly committed, the
Philippines was under the sovereignty of the United
States, and thus we were equally bound together with the
United States and with Japan, to the rights and
obligations contained in the treaties between the
belligerent countries. These rights and obligations were
not erased by our assumption of full sovereignty. If at all,
our emergence as a free state entitles us to enforce the
right, on our own, of trying and punishing those who
committed crimes against our people.
8.Id.; Id.; Id.War crimes committed against our people
and our government while we were a Commonwealth, are
triable and punishable by our present Republic.
9.Military Commission Governed by Special Law.Military
Commission is a special military tribunal governed by a
special law and not by the Rules of Court which govern
ordinary civil courts.
10.Military Commission; Counsel Appearing Before it not
Necessarily a Member of the Philippine Bar.There is
nothing in Executive Order No. 68 which requires that
counsel appearing before said commission must be
attorneys qualified to practice law in the Philippines in
accordance with the Rules of Court. In fact, it is common
in military tribunals that counsel for the
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VOL. 83, MARCH 26, 1949
173
parties are usually military personnel who are neither

attorneys nor even possessed of legal training.
11.Id.; Trial of War Crimes Before Philippine Courts;
Allowance of American Attorneys to Represent United
States.The appointment of the two American attorneys
is not violative of our national sovereignty. It is only fair
and proper that the United States, which has submitted
the vindication of crimes against her government and her
people to a tribunal of our nation, should be allowed
representation in the trial of those very crimes. If there
has been any relinquishment of sovereignty, it has not
been by our government but by the United States
Government Which has yielded to us the trial and punishment of her enemies. The least that we could do in the
spirit of comity is to allow them representation in said
trials.
12.Id.; Id.; Id.It is of common knowledge that the United
States and its people have been equally, if not more
greatly, aggrieved by the crimes with which petitioner
stands charged before the Military Commission. It can be
considered a privilege for our Republic that a leader
nation should submit the vindication of the honor of its
citizens and its government to a military tribunal of our
country.
13.Id.; Jurisdiction; Supreme Court Will not Interfere with
Due Processes of Military Commission.The Military Com-
mission having been convened by virtue of a valid law,

with jurisdiction over the crimes charged which fall under
the provisions of Executive Order No. 68, and having
jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner by having
said petitioner in its custody; this court will not interfere
with the due processes of such Military Commission. Per
Perfecto, J., dissenting:
14.Attorneys at Law; Aliens Cannot Practice Law.It
appearing that Attys. Hussey and Port are aliens and have
not been authorized by the Supreme Court to practice
law, they cannot appear as prosecutors in a case pending
before the War Crimes Commission.
15.Constitutional Law; Legislative Power Vested in
Congress; Exception.While there is no express provision
in the fundamental law prohibiting the exercise of
legislative power by agencies other than Congress, a
reading of the whole context of the Constitution would
dispel any doubt as to the constitutional intent that the
legislative power is to be exercised exclusively by
Congress, subject only to, the veto power of the
President, to his power to suspend the writ of habeas
corpus, to place any part of the Philippines under martial
law, and to
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174

the rule-making power expressly vested by the

Constitution in the Supreme Court.
16.Id.; Id.; Scope of Powers of Different Governmental

Departments.Because the powers vested by our
Constitution to the several departments of the
government are in the nature of grants, not a recognition
of pre-existing powers, no department of the government
may exercise any power or authority not expressly
granted by the Constitution or by law by virtue of express
authority of the Constitution.
17.Id.; Id.; Power of President to Promulgate Executive
Order Defining and Allocating Jurisdiction for Prosecution
of War Crimes on Military Commissions.The provision in
Executive Order No. 68 (series of 1947) of the President
of the Philippines, that persons accused as war criminals
shall be tried by military commissions, is clearly
legislative in nature and intends to confer upon military
commissions jurisdiction to try all persons charged with
war crimes. But, the power to define and allocate
jurisdiction for the prosecution of persons accused of
crimes is exclusively vested by the Constitution in
Congress.
18.Id.; Id.; Power to Establish Government Office.
Executive Order No. 68 establishes a National War Crimes
Office; but, the power to establish government offices is
essentially legislative.
19.Id.; Rule-Making Power of Supreme Court; President
Has no Power, Much Less Delegate Such a Power, to
Provide Rules of Procedure for Conduct of Trials.
Executive Order No. 68 provides rules of procedure for
the conduct of trials before the War Crimes Office. This
provision on procedural subject constitutes a usurpation
of the rule-making power vested by the Constitution in
the Supreme Court. It further authorizes military
commissions to adopt additional rules of procedure. If the

President of the Philippines cannot exercise the rulemaking power vested by the Constitution in the Supreme
Court, he cannot, with more reason, delegate that power
to military commissions.
20.Id,; Legislative Power Vested in Congress; Usurpation
of Power to Appropriate Funds.Executive Order No. 68
appropriates funds for the expenses of the National War
Crimes Office. This constitutes another usurpation of
legislative power, as the power to vote appropriations
belongs to Congress.
21.Id.;
Emergency
Powers
of
President
Under
Commonwealth Acts Nos. 600, 620 and 671.
Commonwealth Acts Nos. 600, 620 and 671, granting the
President of the Philippines emergency powers to
promulgate rules and regulations during national
emergency has ceased to have effect since the liberation
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VOL. 83, MARCH 26, 1949
175
of the Philippines, or, at latest, upon the surrender of

Japan on September 2, 1945. The absurdity of the
contention that these emergency acts continued in effect
even after the surrender of Japan cannot be gainsaid.
Only a few months after liberation, and even before the
surrender of Japan, the Congress started to function
normally. To let the hypothesis on continuance prevail will
result in the existence of two distinct, separate and
independent legislative organsthe Congress and the
President of the Philippines. Should there be any

disagreement between Congress and the President, a
possibility that no one can dispute, the President may
take advantage of the long recess of Congress (two-thirds
of every year) to repeal and overrule legislative
enactments of Congress, and may set up a veritable
system of dictatorship, absolutely repugnant to the letter
and spirit of the Constitution.
22.Statutory Construction; Presumption that Legislative
Body did not Intend to Violate Constitution.It has never
been the purpose of the National Assembly to extend the
delegation (embodied in Commonwealth Acts Nos. 600,
620 and 671) beyond the emergency created by war, as
to extend it farther would be violative of the express
provisions of the Constitution. We are of the opinion that
there is no doubt on this question; but, if there could still
be any, the same should be resolved in favor of the
presumption that the National Assembly did not intend to
violate the fundamental law.
23.Constitutional Law; Due Process and Equal Protection
of Law.Executive Order No. 68 violates the fundamental
guarantees of due process and equal protection of the
law, because it permits the admission of many kinds of
evidence by which no innocent person can afford to get
acquittal, and by which it is impossible to determine
whether an accused is guilt or not beyond all reasonable
doubt.
ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Prohibition.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Pedro Serran, Jose G. Lukban, and Liberato B. Cinco for

petitioner.
Fred Ruiz Castro, Federico Arenas, Mariano Yengco, Jr.,
Ricardo A. Arcilla, and S. Meville Hussey for respondents.
Moran,C. J.:
Shigenori Kuroda, formerly a Lieutenant-General of the
Japanese Imperial Army and Commanding General of the
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176

Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines during a

period covering 1943 and 1944, who is now charged
before a Military Commission convened by the Chief of
Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, with having
unlawfully disregarded and failed "to discharge his duties
as such commander to control the operations of members
of his command, permitting them to commit brutal
atrocities and other high crimes against noncombatant
civilians and prisoners of the Imperial Japanese Forces, in
violation of the laws and customs of war"comes before
this Court seeking to establish the illegality of Executive
Order No. 68 of the President of the Philippines; to enjoin
and prohibit respondents Melville S. Hussey and Robert
Port from participating in the prosecution of petitioner's
case before the Military Commission; and to permanently
prohibit respondents from proceeding with the case of
petitioner.
In support of his case, petitioner tenders the following

principal arguments:
First."That Executive Order No. 68 is illegal on the
ground that it violates not only the provisions of our constitutional law but also our local laws, to say nothing of
the fact (that) the Philippines is not a signatory nor an adherent to the Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations
covering Land Warfare and, therefore, petitioner is
charged of 'crimes' not based on law, national and
international." Hence, petitioner argues"That in view of
the fact that this commission has been empanelled by
virtue of an unconstitutional law and an illegal order, this
commission is without jurisdiction to try hereing
petitioner."
Second.That the participation in the prosecution of the
case against petitioner before the Commission in behalf
of the United States of America, of attorneys Melville Hussey and Robert Port, who are not attorneys authorized by
the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines, is a
diminution of our personality as an independent state,
and their appointments as prosecutors are a violation of
our Constitution for the reason that they are not qualified
to practice law in the Philippines.
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VOL. 83, MARCH 26, 1949
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Third.That Attorneys Hussey and Port have no

personality as prosecutors, the United States not being a
party in interest in the case.
Executive Order No. 68, establishing a National War

Crimes Office and prescribing rules and regulations
governing the trial of accused war criminals, was issued
by the President of the Philippines on the 29th day of July,
1947. This Court holds that this order is valid and
constitutional. Article 2 of our Constitution provides in its
section 3, that
"The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of
national policy, and adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the
nation."
In accordance with the generally accepted principles of
international law of the present day, including the Hague
Convention, the Geneva Convention and significant
precedents of international jurisprudence established by
the United Nations, all those persons, military or civilian,
who have been guilty of planning, preparing or waging a
war of aggression and of the commission of crimes and
offenses consequential and incidental thereto, in violation
of the laws and customs of war, of humanity and
civilization, are held accountable therefor. Consequently,
in the promulgation and enforcement of Executive Order
No. 68, the President of the Philippines has acted in
conformity with the generally accepted principles and
policies of international law which are part of our
Constitution.
The promulgation of said executive order is an exercise
by the President of his powers as Commander in Chief of
all our armed forces, as upheld by this Court in the case
of Yamashita vs. Styer (L-129, 42 Off. Gaz., 664) 1 when
we said
"War is not ended simply because hostilities have ceased.

After cessation of armed hostilities, incidents of war may
remain pending which should be disposed of as in time of
war. 'An important incident to a conduct of war is the
adoption of measures by the military command not only
to repel and defeat the enemies but to seize and subject
to disciplinary measures those enemies who in their
attempt
_______________
75 Phil., 563.
178
178

to thwart or impede our military effort have violated the

law of war/ (Ex parte Quirin, 317 U. S., 1; 63 Sup. Ct., 2.)
Indeed, the power to create a military commission for the
trial and punishment of war criminals is an aspect of
waging war. And, in the language of a writer, a military
commission 'has jurisdiction so long as a technical state
of war continues. This includes the period of an armis*
tice, or military occupation, up to the effective date of a
treaty of peace, and may extend beyond, by treaty
agreement. (Cowles, Trial of War Criminals by Military
Tribunals, American Bar Association Journal, June, 1944.)"
Consequently, the President as Commander in Chief is
fully empowered to consummate this unfinished aspect of
war, namely, the trial and punishment of war criminals,
through the issuance and enforcement of Executive Order

No. 68.
Petitioner argues that respondent Military Commission
has no jurisdiction to try petitioner for acts committed in
violation of the Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention because the Philippines is not a signatory to the
first and signed the second only in 1947. It cannot be
denied that the rules and regulations of the Hague and
Geneva conventions form part of and are wholly based on
the generally accepted principles of international law. In
fact, these rules and principles were accepted by the two
belligerent nations, the United States and Japan, who
were signatories to the two Conventions. Such rules and
principles, therefore, form part of the law of our nation
even if the Philippines was not a signatory to the
conventions embodying them, for our Constitution has
been deliberately general and extensive in its scope and
is not confined to the recognition of rules and principles
of international law as contained in treaties to which our
government may have been or shall be a signatory.
Furthermore, when the crimes charged against petitioner
were allegedly committed, the Philippines was under the
sovereignty of the United States, and thus we were
equally bound together with the United States and with
Japan, to the rights and obligations contained in the
treaties between the belligerent countries. These rights
and obliga179
VOL. 83, MARCH 26, 1949
179
tions were not erased by our assumption of full

sovereignty. If at all, our emergence as a free state
entitles us to enforce the right, on our own, of trying and
punishing those who committed crimes against our
people. In this connection, it is well to remember what we
have said in the case of Laurel vs. Misa (76 Phil, 372):
* * * the change of our form of government from
Commonwealth to Republic does not affect the
prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason
committed during the Commonwealth, because it is an
offense against the same government and the same
sovereign people * * *."
By the same token, war crimes committed against our
people and our government while we were a
Commonwealth, are triable and punishable by our
present Republic.
Petitioner challenges the participation of two American
attorneys, namely, Melville S. Hussey and Robert Port, in
the prosecution of his case, on the ground that said attorneys are not qualified to practice law in the Philippines in
accordance with our Rules of Court and the appointment
of said attorneys as prosecutors is violative of our
national sovereignty.
In the first place, respondent Military Commission is a
special jnilitary tribunal governed by a special law and
not by the Rules of Court which govern ordinary civil
courts. It has already been shown that Executive Order
No. 68 which provides for the organization of such
military commissions is a valid and constitutional law.
There is nothing in said executive order which requires

that counsel appearing before said commissions must be
attorneys qualified to practice law in the Philippines in
accordance with the Rules of Court. In fact, it is common
in military tribunals that counsel for the parties are
usually military personnel who are neither attorneys nor
even possessed of legal training.
Secondly, the appointment of the two American attorneys
is not violative of our national sovereignty. It is only fair
and proper that the United States, which has submitted
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180

the vindication of crimes against her government and her

people to a tribunal of our nation, should be allowed representation in the trial of those very crimes. If there has
been any relinquishment of sovereignty, it has not been
by our government but by the United States Government
which has yielded to us the trial and punishment of her
enemies. The least that we could do in the spirit of comity
is to allow them representation in said trials.
Alleging that the United States is not a party in interest in
the case, petitioner challenges the personality of attorneys Hussey and Port as prosecutors. It is of common
knowledge that the United States and its people have
been equally, if not more greatly, aggrieved by the
crimes with which petitioner stands charged before the
Military Commission. It can be considered a privilege for
our Republic that a leader nation should submit the
vindication of the honor of its citizens and its government

to a military tribunal of our country.
The Military Commission having been convened by virtue
of a valid law, with jurisdiction over the crimes charged
which fall under the provisions of Executive Order No. 68,
and having jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner
by having said petitioner in its custody, this Court will not
interfere with the due processes of such Military
Commission.
For all the foregoing, the petition is denied with costs de
oficio.
Paras,
Feria,
Pablo,
Bengzon,
Montemayor, and Reyes, J J., concur.
Briones,
Tuason,
Perfecto.J., dissenting:
A military commission was empaneled on December 1,
1948, to try Lt. Gen. Shigenori Kuroda for violation of the
laws and customs of land warfare.
Melville S. Hussey and Robert Port, American citizens and
not authorized by the Supreme Court to practice law,
were appointed prosecutors representing the American
CIC in the trial of the case.
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VOL. 83, MARCH 26, 1949
181
The commission was empaneled under the authority of

Executive Order No. 68 of the President of the Philippines,
the validity of which is challenged by petitioner on constitutional grounds. Petitioner has also challenged the
personality of Attorneys Hussey and Port to appear as
prosecutors before the commission.
The charges against petitioner has been filed since June
26, 1948, in the name of the People of the Philippines as
accusers.
We will consider briefly the challenge against the
appearance of Attorneys Hussey and Port. It appearing
that they are aliens and have not been authorized by the
Supreme Court to practice law, there could not be any
question that said persons cannot appear as prosecutors
in petitioner's case, as with such appearance they would
be practicing law against the law.
Said violation vanishes, however, into insignificance at
the side of the momentous questions involved in the
challenge against the validity of Executive Order No. 68.
Said order is challenged on several constitutional
grounds. To get a clear idea of the questions raised, it is
necessary to read the whole context of said order which
is reproduced as follows:
"Executive Order No. 68
"ESTABLISHING A NATIONAL WAR CRIMES OFFICE AND
PRESCRIBING RULES AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE
TRIAL OF ACCUSED WAR CRIMINALS.
"I, Manuel Roxas, President of the Philippines, by virtue of
the powers vested in me by the Constitution and laws of
the Philippines, do hereby establish a National War
Crimes Office charged with the responsibility of
accomplishing the speedy trial of all Japanese accused of
war crimes committed in the Philippines, and prescribe

the rules and regulations governing such trial.
"The National War Crimes Office is established within the
Office of the Judge Advocate General of the Army of the
Philippines and shall function under the direction,
supervision and control of the Judge Advocate General. It
shall proceed to collect from all available sources
evidence of war crimes committed in the Philippines from
the commencement of hostilities by Japan in December,
1941,
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maintain a record thereof, and bring about the prompt

trial of the accused.
"The National War Crimes Office shall maintain direct
liaison with the Legal Section, General Headquarters,
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and shall
exchange with the said Office information and evidence
of war crimes.
"The following rules and regulations shall govern the trial
of persons accused as war criminals:
"I. ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY COMMISSIONS
"(a) General.Persons accused as war criminals shall be
tried by military commissions to be convened by, or
under the authority of, the President of the Philippines.
"II. JURISDICTION
"(a) Over Persons.The military commissions appointed

hereunder shall have jurisdiction over all persons charged
with war crimes who are in the custody of the convening
authority at the time of the trial.
"(b)
Over
Offenses.The
military
commissions
established hereunder shall have jurisdiction over all
offenses including, but not limited to, the following:
"(1) The planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a
war of aggression or a war in violation of international
treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a
common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of
any of the foregoing.
"(2) Violations of the laws or customs of war. Such
violations shall include, but not be limited to, murder, illtreatment or deportation to slave labor or for any other
purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory;
murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or internees or
persons on the seas or elsewhere; improper treatment of
hostages; plunder of public or private property; wanton
destruction of cities, towns or villages; or devastation not
justified by military necessity.
"(3) Murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and
other inhuman
acts committed
against
civilian
populations before or during the war, or persecutions on
political, racial or religious grounds in execution of, or in
connection with, any crime denned herein, whether or not
in violation of the local laws.
"III. MEMBERSHIP OF COMMISSIONS
"(a) Appointment.The members of each military
commission shall be appointed by the President of the
Philippines, or under authority delegated by him.

Alternates may be appointed by the convening authority.
Such alternates shall attend all sessions of the
commission, and in case of illness or other incapacity of
any principal member, an alternate shall take the place of
that member. Any vacancy among the members or
alternates, occurring after a trial has begun, may be filled
by the convening authority, but the substance of all
proceedings had and evidence taken in that case shall be
made known to the said new member or alternate. This
fact shall be announced by the president of the
commission in open court.
"(b) Number of Members.Each commission shall consist
of not less than three (3) members.
"(c) Qualifications.The convening authority shall
appoint to the commission persons whom he determines
to be competent to perform the duties involved and not
disqualified by personal interest or prejudice, provided
that no person shall be appointed to hear a case in which
he personally investigated, or wherein his presence as a
witness is required. One specially qualified member shall
be designated as the law member whose ruling is final in
so far as concerns the commission on an objection to the
admissibility of evidence offered during the trial.
"(d) Voting.Except as to the admissibility of evidence,
all rulings and findings of the Commission shall be by
majority vote, except that conviction and sentence shall
be by the affirmative vote of not less than two-thirds (2/3)
of the members present.
"(e) Presiding Member.In the event that the convening

authority does not name one of the members as the
presiding member, the senior officer among the members
of the Commission present shall preside.
"IV. PROSECUTORS
"(a) Appointment.The convening authority shall
designate one or more persons to conduct the
prosecution before each commission.
"(b) Duties.The duties of the prosecutors are:
"(1) To prepare and present charges and specifications for
reference to a commission.
"(2) To prepare cases for trial and to conduct the
prosecution before the commission of all cases referred
for trial.
"V. POWERS AND PROCEDURE OF COMMISSIONS
"(a) Conduct of the Trial.A Commission shall:
"(1) Confine each trial strictly to a fair and expeditious
hearing on the issues raised by the charges, excluding
irrelevant issues or evidence and preventing any
unnecessary delay or interference.
"(2) Deal summarily with any contumacy or contempt,
imposing any appropriate punishment therefor.
"(3) Hold public sessions except when otherwise decided
by the commission.
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"(4) Hold each session at such time and place as it shall

determine, or as may be directed by the convening
authority.
"(b) Rights of the Accused.The accused shall be
entitled:
"(1) To have in advance of the trial a copy of the charges
and specifications clearly worded so as to apprise the
accused of each offense charged.
"(2) To be represented, prior to and during trial, by
counsel appointed by the convening authority or counsel
of his own choice, or to conduct his own defense.
"(3) To testify in his own behalf and have his counsel
present relevant evidence at the trial in support of his
defense, and cross-examine each adverse witness who
personally appears before the commission.
"(4) To have the substance of the charges and
specifications, the proceedings and any documentary
evidence translated, when he is unable otherwise to
understand them.
"(c) Witnesses.The Commission shall have power:
"(1) To summon witnesses and require their attendance
and testimony; to administer oaths or affirmations to
witnesses and other persons and to question witnesses.
"(2) To require the production of documents and other

evidentiary material.
"(3) To delegate to the Prosecutors appointed by the
convening authority the powers and duties set forth in (1)
and (2) above.
"(4) To have evidence taken by a special commissioner
appointed by the commission.
"(d) Evidence.
"(1) The commission shall admit such evidence as in its
opinion shall be of assistance in proving or disproving the
charge, or such as in the commission's opinion would
have probative value in the mind of a reasonable man.
The commission shall apply the rules of evidence and
pleading set forth herein with the greatest liberality to
achieve expeditious procedure. In particular, and without
limiting in any way the scope of the foregoing general
rules, the following evidence may be admitted:
"(a) Any document, irrespective of its classification, which
appears to the commission to have been signed or issued
by any officer, department, agency or member of the
armed forces of any Government without proof of the
signature or of the issuance of the document.
"(b) Any report which appears to the commission to have
been signed or issued by the International Red Cross or a
member thereof, or by a doctor of medicine or a member
of any medical service personnel, or by any investigator
or intelligence officer, or by any other person whom the
commission considers as possessing knowledge of the
matters contained in the report.
"(c). Affidavits, depositions or other signed statements.

"(d) Any diary, letter or other document, including sworn
or unsworn statements, appearing to the commission to
contain information relating to the charge.
"(e) A copy of any document or other secondary evidence
of the contents, if the original is not immediately
available.
"(2) The commission shall take judicial notice of facts of
common knowledge, official government documents of
any nation, and the proceedings, records and findings of
military or other agencies of any of the United Nations.
"(3) A commission may require the prosecution and the
defense to make a preliminary offer of proof, whereupon
the commission may rule in advance on the admissibility
of such evidence.
"(4) The official position of the accused shall not absolve
him from responsibility, nor be considered in mitigation of
punishment. Further, action pursuant to an order of the
accused's superior, or of his Government, shall not
constitute a defense, but may be considered in mitigation
of punishment if the commission determines that justice
so requires.
"(5) All purported confessions or statements of the
accused shall be admissible in evidence without any
showing that they were voluntarily made. If it is shown
that such confession or statement was procured by
means which the commission believes to have been of
such a character that they may have caused the accused
to make a false statement, the commission may strike out
or disregard any such portion thereof as was so procured.
"(e) Trial Procedure.The proceedings of each trial shall

be conducted substantially as follows, unless modified by
the commission to suit the particular circumstances:
"(1) Each charge and specification shall be read, or its
substance stated, in open court.
"(2) The presiding member shall ask each accused
whether he pleads 'Guilty' or 'Not guilty.'
"(3) The prosecution shall make its opening statement.
"(4) The presiding member may, at this or any other time,
require the prosecutor to state what evidence he
proposes to submit to the commission and the
commission thereupon may rule upon the admissibility of
such evidence.
"(5) The witnesses and other evidence for the prosecution
shall be heard or presented. At the close of the case for
the prosecution, the commission may, on motion of the
defense for a finding of not guilty, consider and rule
whether the evidence before the commission supports
the charges against the accused. The commission may
defer action on any such motion and permit or require the
prosecution to reopen its case and produce any further
available evidence.
186
186

"(6) The defense may make an opening statement prior

to presenting its case. The presiding member may, at this
or any other time, require the defense to state what
evidence it proposes to submit to the commission, where

upon the commission may rule upon the admissibility of
such evidence.
"(7) The witnesses and other evidence for the defense
shall be heard or presented. Thereafter, the prosecution
and defense may introduce such evidence in rebuttal as
the commission may rule as being admissible.
"(8) The defense, and thereafter the prosecution, shall
address the commission.
"(9) The commission thereafter shall consider the case in
closed session and unless otherwise directed by the
convening authority, announce in open court its judgment
and sentence, if any. The commission may state the
reasons on which judgment is based.
"(f) Record of Proceedings.Each commission shall make
a separate record of its proceedings in the trial of each
case brought before it. The record shall be prepared by
the prosecutor under the direction of the commission and
submitted to the defense counsel. The commission shall
be responsible for its accuracy. Such record, certified by
the presiding member of the commission or his
successor, shall be delivered to the convening authority
as soon as possible after the trial.
"(g) Sentence.The commission may sentence an
accused, upon conviction, to death by hanging or
shooting, imprisonment for life or for any less term, fine,
or such other punishment as the commission shall
determine to be proper.
"(h) Approval of Sentence.No sentence of a military
commission shall be carried into effect until approved by
the Chief of Staff: Provided, That no sentence of death or

life imprisonment shall be carried into execution until
confirmed by the President of the Philippines. For the
purpose of his review, the Chief of Staff shall create a
Board of Review to be composed of not more than three
officers none of whom shall be on duty with or assigned
to the Judge Advocate General's Office. The Chief of Staff
shall have the authority to approve, mitigate, remit in
whole or in part, commute, suspend, reduce or otherwise
alter the sentence imposed, or (without prejudice to the
accused) remand the case for rehearing before a new
military commission; but he shall not have authority to
increase the severity of the sentence. Except as herein
otherwise provided, the judgment and sentence of a
commission shall be final and not subject to review by
any other tribunal.
"VI. RULE-MAKING POWER
"Supplementary Rules and Forms.Each commission
shall adopt rules and forms to govern its procedure, not
inconsistent with the
187
VOL. 83, MARCH 26, 1949
187
provisions of this Order, or such rules and forms as may

be prescribed by the convening authority or by the
President of the Philippines.
"VII. The amount of seven hundred thousand pesos is
hereby set aside out of the appropriations for the Army of
the Philippines for use by the National War Crimes Office

in the accomplishment of its mission as hereinabove set
forth, and shall be expended in accordance with the
recommendations of the Judge Advocate General as
approved by the President. The buildings, fixtures,
installations, messing, and billeting equipment and other
property heretofore used by the Legal Section, Manila
Branch, of the General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, which will be turned over
by the United States Army to the Philippine Government
through the Foreign Liquidation Commission and the
Surplus Property Commission are hereby specifically
reserved for use of the National War Crimes Office*
"Executive Order No. 64, dated August 16,1945, is hereby
repealed.
"Done in the City of Manila, this 29th day of July, in the
year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and forty-seven, and
of the Independence of the Philippines, the second.
"Manuel Roxas "President of the Philippines
"By the President:
"Emilio Abello
"Chief of the Executive Office"
EXECUTIVE LEGISLATION
Executive Order No. 68 is a veritable piece of legislative
measure, without the benefit of congressional enactment.
The first question that is thrust at our face, spearheading

a group of other no less important questions, is whether
or not the President of the Philippines may exercise the
legislative power expressly vested in Congress by the
Constitution.
The Constitution provides:
"The Legislative powers shall be vested in a Congress of
the Philippines, which shall consist of a Senate and a
House of Representatives." (Section 1, Article VI.)
While there is no express provision in the fundamental
law prohibiting the exercise of legislative power by
agencies other than Congress, a reading of the whole
context of the Constitution would dispel any doubt as to
the con188
188

stitutional intent that the legislative power is to be exercised exclusively by Congress, subject only to the veto
power of the President of the Philippines, to the specific
provisions which allow the President of the Philippines to
suspend the privileges of the writ of habeas curpus and to
place any part of the Philippines under martial law, and to
the rule-making power expressly vested by the Constitution in the Supreme Court.
There cannot be any question that the members of the
Constitutional Convention were believers in the tripartite
system of government as originally enunciated by

Aristotle, further elaborated by Montesquieu and
accepted and practiced by modern democracies,
especially the United States of America, whose
Constitution, after which ours has been patterned, has
allocated the three powers of governmentlegislative,
executive, judicialto distinct and separate departments
of government.
Because the powers vested by our Constitution to the
several departments of the government are in the nature
of grants, not a recognition of pre-existing powers, no
department of government may exercise any power or
authority not expressly granted by the Constitution or by
law by virtue of express authority of the Constitution.
Executive Order No. 68 establishes a National War Crimes
Office, and the power to establish government office is
essentially legislative.
The order provides that persons accused as war criminals
shall be tried by military commissions. Whether such a
provision is substantive or adjective, it is clearly legislative in nature. It confers upon military commissions
jurisdiction to try all persons charged with war crimes.
The power to define and allocate jurisdiction for the
prosecution of persons accused of any crime is
exclusively vested by the Constitution in Congress.
It provides rules of procedure for the conduct of trials.
This provision on procedural subject constitutes a usurpation of the rule-making power vested by the Constitution
in the Supreme Court.
189
VOL. 83, MARCH 26, 1949

189
It authorizes military commissions to adopt additional

rules of procedure. If the President of the Philippines
cannot exercise the rule-making power vested by the
Constitution in the Supreme Court, he cannot, with more
reason, delegate that power to military commissions.
It appropriates the sum of P700,000 for the expenses of
the National War Crimes Office established by the said
Executive Order No. 68. This constitutes another
usurpation of legislative power as the power to vote
appropriations belongs to Congress.
Executive Order No. 68, is, therefore, null and void, because, through it, the President of the Philippines usurped
powers expressly vested by the Constitution in Congress
and in the Supreme Court.
Challenged to show the constitutional or legal authority
under which the President of the Philippines issued Executive Order No. 68, respondents could not give any definite
answer. They attempted, however, to suggest that the
President of the Philippines issued Executive Order No. 68
under the emergency powers granted to him by
Commonwealth Act No. 600, as amended by
Commonwealth Act No. 620, and Commonwealth Act No.
671, both of which are transcribed below:
"Commonwealth Act No. 600
"AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF EMERGENCY AND AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO PROMULGATE RULES AND
REGULATIONS TO SAFEGUARD THE INTEGRITY OF THE
PHILIPPINES AND TO INSURE THE TRANQUILITY OF ITS
INHABITANTS.
uBe it enacted
Philippines:
by
the
National
Assembly
of the
"Section 1. The existence of war in many parts of the

world has created a national emergency which makes it
necessary to invest the President of the Philippines with
extraordinary powers in order to safeguard the integrity
of the Philippines and to insure the tranquility of its
inhabitants, by suppressing espionage, lawlessness, and
all subversive activities, by preventing or relieving
unemployment, by insuring to the people adequate
shelter and clothing and sufficient food supply, and by
providing means for the speedy evacuation of the civilian
population, the establishment of an air protective service,
190
190

and the organization of volunteer guard units, and to

adopt such other measures as he may deem necessary
for the interest of the public. To carry out this policy the
President is authorized to promulgate rules and
regulations which shall have the force and effect of law
until the date of adjournment of the next regular session
of the First Congress of the Philippines, unless sooner
amended or repealed by the Congress of the Philippines.
Such rules and regulations may embrace the following
objects: (1) to suppress espionage and other subversive
activities; (2) to require all able-bodied citizens (a) when

not engaged in any lawful occupation, to engage in
farming or other productive activities or (b) to perform
such services as may be necessary in the public interest;
(3) to take over farm lands in order to prevent failure or
shortage of crops and avert hunger and destitution; (4) to
take over industrial establishments in order to insure
adequate production, controlling wages and profits
therein; (5) to prohibit lockouts and strikes whenever
necessary to prevent the unwarranted suspension of work
in productive enterprises or in the interest of national
security; (6) to regulate the normal hours of work for
wage-earning and salaried employees in industrial or
business undertakings of all kinds; (7) to insure an even
distribution of labor among the productive enterprises;
(8) to commandeer ships and other means of
transportation in order to maintain, as much as possible,
adequate and continued transportation facilities; (9) to
requisition and take over any public service or enterprise
for use or operation by the Government; (10) to regulate
rents and the prices of articles or commodities of prime
necessity, both imported and locally produced or
manufactured; and (11) to prevent, locally or generally,
scarcity, monopolization, hoarding, injurious speculations,
and private controls affecting the supply, distribution, and
movement of foods, clothing, fuel, fertilizers, chemicals,
building
materials,
implements,
machinery,
and
equipment required in agriculture and industry, with
power to requisition these commodities subject to the
payment of just compensation. (As amended by Com. Act
No. 620.)
"Sec. 2. For the purpose of administering this Act and
carrying out its objectives, the President may designate
any officer, without additional compensation, or any

department, bureau, office, or instrumentality of the
National Government.
"Sec. 3. Any person, firm, or corporation found guilty of
the violation of any provision of this Act or of any of the
rules or regulations promulgated by the President under
the authority of section one of this Act shall be punished
by imprisonment of not more than ten years or by a fine
of not more than ten thousand pesos, or by both. If such
violation is committed by a firm or corporation, the
manager, managing director, or person charged with the
manage191
VOL. 83, MARCH 26, 1949
191
ment of the business of such firm, or corporation shall be

criminally responsible therefor.
"Sec. 4. The President shall report to the National
Assembly within the first ten days from the date of the
opening of its next regular session whatever action has
been taken by him under the authority herein granted.
"Sec. 5. To carry out the purposes of this Act, the
President is authorized to spend such amounts as may be
necessary from the sum appropriated under section five
of Commonwealth Act Numbered Four hundred and
ninety-eight.
"Sec. 6. If any provision of this Act shall be declared by
any court of competent jurisdiction to be unconstitutional
and void, such declaration shall not invalidate the

remainder of this Act.
"Sec. 7. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
"Approved, August 19, 1940."
"Commonwealth Act No. 671
"AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF TOTAL EMERGENCY AS A
RESULT OF WAR INVOLVING THE PHILIPPINES AND
AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO PROMULGATE RULES
AND REGULATIONS TO MEET SUCH EMERGENCY.
"Be it enacted
Philippines:
by
the
National
Assembly
of
the
"Section 1. The existence of war between the United

States and other countries of Europe and Asia, which
involves the Philippines, makes it necessary to invest the
President with extraordinary powers in order to meet the
resulting emergency.
"Sec. 2. Pursuant to the provisions of Article VI, section
16, of the Constitution, the President is hereby
authorized, during the existence of the emergency, to
promulgate such rules and regulations as he may deem
necessary to carry out the national policy declared in
section 1 hereof. Accordingly, he is, among other things,
empowered (a) to transfer the seat of the Government or
any of its subdivisions, branches, departments, offices,
agencies or instrumentalities; (b) to reorganize the
Government of the Commonwealth including the determination of the order of precedence of the heads of
the Executive Departments; (c) to create new
subdivisions, branches, departments, offices, agencies or
instrumentalities of government and to abolish any of

those already existing; (d) to continue in force laws and
appropriations which would lapse or otherwise become
inoperative, and to modify or suspend the operation or
application of those of an administrative character; (e) to
impose new taxes or to increase, reduce, suspend, or
abolish those in existence; (f) to raise funds through the
issuance of bonds or otherwise, and to authorize the
192
192

expenditure of the proceeds thereof; (g) to authorize the

National, provincial, city or municipal governments to
incur in overdrafts for purposes that he may approve; (h)
to declare the suspension of the collection of credits or
the payment of debts; and (i) to exercise such other
powers as he may deem necessary to enable the Government to fulfill its responsibilities and to maintain and
enforce its authority.
"Sec. 3. The President of the Philippines shall as soon as
practicable upon the convening of the Congress of the
Philippines report thereto all the rules and regulations
promulgated by him under the powers herein granted.
"Sec. 4. This Act shall take effect upon its approval, and
the rules and regulations promulgated hereunder shall be
in force and effect until the Congress of the Philippines
shall otherwise provide.
"Approved, December 16, 1941."

The above Acts cannot validly be invoked, because they
ceased to have any effect much before Executive Order
No. 68 was issued on July 29, 1947. Said Acts had elapsed
upon the liberation of the Philippines from the Japanese
forces or, at the latest, when the surrender of Japan was
signed in Tokyo on September 2, 1945.
When both Acts were enacted by the Second National
Assembly, we happened to have taken direct part in their
consideration and passage, not only as one of the
members of said legislative body but as chairman of the
Committee on Third Reading, popularly known as the
"Little Senate." We are, therefore, in a position to state
that said measures were enacted by the Second National
Assembly for the purpose of facing the emergency of an
impending war and of the Pacific War that finally broke
out with the attack of Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.
We approved said extraordinary measures, by which,
under the exceptional circumstances then prevailing,
legislative powers were delegated to the President of the
Philippines, by virtue of the following provisions of the
Constitution:
"In times of war or other national emergency, the
Congress may by law authorize the President, for a
limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may
prescribe, to promulgate rules and regulations to carry
out a declared national policy." (Article VI, section 26.)
193
VOL. 83, MARCH 26, 1949
193
It has never been the purpose of the National Assembly

to extend the delegation beyond the emergency created
by the war, as to extend it farther would be violative of
the express provisions of the Constitution. We are of the
opinion that there is no doubt on this question; but if
there could still be any, the same should be resolved in
favor of the presumption that the National Assembly did
not intend to violate the fundamental law.
The absurdity of the contention that the emergency Acts
continued in effect even after the surrender of Japan
cannot be gainsaid. Only a few months after liberation
and even before the surrender of Japan, or since the
middle of 1945, the Congress started to function
normally. In the hypothesis that the contention can
prevail, then, since 1945, that is, four years ago, even
after the Commonwealth was already replaced by the
Republic of the Philippines with the proclamation of our
Independence, two distinct, separate and independent
legislative organs,Congress and the President of the
Philippineswould have been and would continue
enacting laws, the former to enact laws of every nature
including those of emergent character, and the latter to
enact laws, in the form of executive orders, under the socalled emergency powers. The situation would be
pregnant with dangers to peace and order, to the rights
and liberties of the people, and to Philippine democracy.
Should there be any disagreement between Congress and
the President of the Philippines, a possibility that no one
can dispute, the President of the Philippines may take
advantage of the long recess of Congress (two-thirds of
every year) to repeal and overrule legislative enactments
of Congress, and may set up a veritable system of

dictatorship, absolutely repugnant to the letter and spirit
of the Constitution.
Executive Order No. 68 is equally offensive to the
Constitution because it violates the fundamental
guarantees of the due process and equal protection of the
law. It is especially so, because it permits the admission
of many kinds of evidence by which no innocent person
can afford
2866013194
194

to get acquittal, and by which it is impossible to

determine whether an accused is guilty or not beyond all
reasonable doubt.
The rules of evidence adopted in Executive Order No. 68
are a reproduction of the regulations governing the trial
of twelve criminals, issued by General Douglas
MacArthur, Commander in Chief of the United States
Armed Forces in Western Pacific, for the purpose of trying,
among others, Generals Yamashita and Homma. What we
said in our concurring and dissenting opinion to the
decision promulgated on December 19, 1945, in the
Yamashita case, L-129,1 and in our concurring and
dissenting opinion to the resolution of January 23, 1946,
in disposing the Homma case, L-244,2 are perfectly
applicable to the offensive rules of evidence embodied in
Executive Order No. 68. Said rules of evidence are
repugnant to conscience as under them no justice can be
expected.
For all the foregoing, conformably with our position in the

Yamasita and Homma cases, we vote to declare Executive
Order No. 68 null and void and to grant the petition.
Petition denied.
VOL. 88, FEBRUARY 2, 1979

Agustin vs. Edu
No. L-49112. February 2, 1979
195
LEOVILLO C. AGUSTIN, petitioner, vs. HON. ROMEO

F. EDU, in his capacity as Land Transportation
Commissioner; HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, in his
capacity as Minister of National Defense; HON.
ALFREDO L. JUINIO, in his capacity as Minister of
Public Works, Transportation and
Communications; and HON: BALTAZAR AQUINO,
in his capacity as Minister of Public Highways,
respondents.
Constitutional Law; Police power construed.The broad
and expensive scope of the police power, which was
originally identified by Chief Justice Taney of the American
Supreme Court in an 1847 decision, as nothing more or
less than, the powers of government inherent in every
sovereignty was stressed in the aforementioned case of
Edu v. Ericta thus: Justice Laurel in the first leading
decision after the Constitution came into force, Calalang
v. Williams, identified police power with state authority to
enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty
or property in order to promote the general welfare.
Persons and property could thus be subjected to all kinds
of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general
comfort, health and prosperity of the state. Shortly after
independence in 1948; Primicias v. Fugoso reiterated the
doctrine, such a competence being referred to as the
power to prescribe regulations to promote the health,
morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and

general welfare of the people. x x x The police power is
thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from
precisely defined, rooted in the conception that men in
organizing the state and imposing upon its government
limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not
intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group
of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of
such salutary measures calculated to insure communal
peace, safety, good order, and welfare.
Same; Due process; Letter of Instruction No. 229
requiring the installation of early warning devices to
vehicles is not repugnant to the due process clause.
Conjectural claims of petitioner as to number of nighttime
vehicular collisions cannot be a basis for setting aside a
requirement of law that was promulgated after a careful
study by the Executive Department.Nor did the Solicitor
General, as he very
_______________
*
EN BANC
196
196
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Agustin vs. Edu
well could, rely solely on such rebutted presumption of

validity. As was pointed out in his Answer: The President
certainly had in his possession the necessary statistical
information and data at the time he issued said letter of
instructions, and such factual foundation cannot be
defeated by petitioners naked assertion that early
warning devices are not too vital to the prevention of
nighttime vehicular accidents because allegedly only 390

or 1.5 per cent of the supposed 26,000 motor vehicle
accidents that occurred in 1976 involved rearend
collisions (p. 12 of petition). Petitioners statistics is not
backed up by demonstrable data on record. As aptly
stated by this Honorable Court: Further: It admits of no
doubt therefore that there being a presumption of
validity, the necessity for evidence to rebut it is
unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void on its
face, which is not the case here * * *. But even
assuming the verity of petitioners statistics, is that not
reason enough to require the installation of early warning
devices to prevent another 390 rear-end collisions that
could mean that death of 390 or more Filipinos and the
deaths that could, likewise result from head-on or frontal
collisions with stalled vehicles? It is quite manifest then
that the issuance of such Letter of Instruction is encased
in the armor of prior, careful study by the Executive
Department. To set it aside for alleged repugnancy to the
due process clause is to give sanction to conjectural
claims that exceeded even the broadest permissible
limits of a pleaders well-known penchant for
exaggeration.
Same; Same; The early-warning device requirement on
vehicles is not expensive redundancy. Said device is
universally recognized.The rather wild and fantastic
nature of the charge of oppressiveness of this Letter of
Instruction was exposed in the Answer of the Solicitor
General thus: Such early warning device requirement is
not an expensive redundancy, nor oppressive, for car
owners whose cars are already equipped with 1) blinking
lights in the fore and aft of said motor vehicles, 2)
battery-powered blinking lights inside motor vehicles, 3)
built-in reflectorized tapes on front and rear bumpers of

motor vehicles, or 4) well-lighted two (2) petroleum
lamps (the Kinke) * * * because: Being universal among
the signatory countries to the said 1968 Vienna
Conventions, and visible even under adverse conditions
at a distance of at least 400 meters, any motorist from
this country or from any part of the world, who sees a
reflectorized rectangular early warning device installed on
the roads, highways or expressways, will conclude,
without thinking, that somewhere along the travelled
portion of that road, highway, or expressway, there is a
motor vehicle which is stationary, stalled or disabled
which obstructs or endangers passing traffic. On the
other
197
Agustin vs. Edu
197
hand, a motorist who sees any of the aforementioned

other built-in warning devices or the petroleum lamps will
not immediately get adequate advance warning because
he will still think what that blinking light is all about. Is it
an emergency vehicle? Is it a law enforcement car? Is it
an ambulance? Such confusion or uncertainty in the mind
of the motorist will thus increase, rather than decrease,
the danger of collision.
Same; Same; There is nothing in Letter of Instruction No.
229 which compels car owners to purchase the
prescribed early warning device. Vehicle owners can
produce the device themselves with a little ingenuity.
Nor did the other extravagant assertions of constitutional
deficiency go unrefuted in the Answer of the Solicitor
General: There is nothing in the questioned Letter of

Instruction No. 229, as amended, or in Administrative
Order No. 1, which requires or compels motor vehicle
owners to purchase the early warning device prescribed
thereby. All that is required is for motor vehicle owners
concerned like petitioner, to equip their motor vehicles
with a pair of this early warning device in question,
procuring or obtaining the same from whatever source. In
fact, with a little of industry and practical ingenuity,
motor vehicle owners can even personally make or
produce this early warning device so long as the same
substantially conforms with the specifications laid down
in said letter of instruction and administrative order.
Accordingly, the early warning device requirement can
neither be oppressive, onerous, immoral, nor
confiscatory, much less does it make manufacturers and
dealers of said devices instant millionaires at the
expense of car owners as petitioner so sweepingly
concludes.
Same; Courts do not pass upon the wisdom of statutes.
It does appear clearly that petitioners objection to this
Letter of Instruction is not premised on lack of power, the
justification for a finding of unconstitutionality, but on the
pessimistic, not to say negative, view he entertains as to
its wisdom. That approach, to put it at its mildest, is
distinguished, if that is the appropriate word, by its
unorthodoxy. It bears repeating that this Court, in the
language of Justice Laurel, does not pass upon questions
of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation.
Same; Delegation of Powers; To avoid the taint of
unlawful delegation of power, the legislature must set
defined standards. In the case at bar the clear objective
is public safety.The alleged infringement of the
fundamental principle of non-delegation of legislative

power is equally without any support in well-settled legal
198
198

Agustin vs. Edu
doctrines. Had petitioner taken the trouble to acquaint

himself with authoritative pronouncements from this
Tribunal, he would not have the temerity to make such an
assertion. An excerpt from the aforecited decision of Edu
v. Ericta sheds light on the matter: To avoid the taint of
unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which
implies at the very least that the legislature itself
determines matters of principle and lays down
fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete
abdication may be heard to repel. A standard thus defines
legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its
boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It
indicates the circumstances under which the legislative
command is to be effected, It is the criterion by which
legislative purpose may fee carried out. Thereafter, the
executive or administrative office designated may in
pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate
supplemental roles and regulations. The standard may be
either express or implied. If the former, the nondelegation objection is easily met. The standard though
does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be
implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered
as a whole. In the Reflector Law, clearly, the legislative
objective is public safety.
Same; International Law; The 2968 Vienna Convention on
Road Signs and Signals is impressed with the character of
generally accepted principles of international law which

under the Constitution the Philippines adopts as part of
the law of the land.The petition itself quoted these two
whereas clauses of the assailed Letter of Instruction:
[Whereas], the hazards posed by such obstructions to
traffic have been recognized by international bodies
concerned with traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna Convention
on Road Signs and Signals and the United Nations
Organization (U.N.); [Whereas], the said Vienna
Convention, which was ratified by the Philippine
Government under P.D. No. 207, recommended the
enactment of local legislation for the installation of road
safety signs and devices: * * *: It cannot be disputed
then that this Declaration of Principle found in the
Constitution possesses relevance: The Philippines * * *
adopts the generally accepted principles of international
law as part of the law of the land, * * *: The 1968 Vienna
Convention on Road Signs and Signals is impressed with
such a character. It is not for this country to repudiate a
commitment to which it had pledged its word. The
concept of Pacta sunt servanda stands in the way of such
an attitude, which is, moreover, at war with the principle
of international morality.
199
Agustin vs. Edu
199
Teehankee, J., dissenting:

Constitutional law; Land Transportation Law;
Administrative Order No. 1 and Memorandum Circular No.
32 issued by the Land Transportation Commission is
oppressive and discriminatory because it requires vehicle
owners to purchase a specific E.W.D.It is oppressive,

arbitrary and discriminatory to require owners of motor
vehicles with built-in and more effective and efficient
E.W.D.s such as a) blinking lights in the fore and aft of
said motor vehicles, b) battery-powered blinking lights
inside motor vehicles, c) built-in reflectorized tapes on
front and rear bumpers on motor vehicles . . . . to
purchase the E.W.D. specified in the challenged
administrative order, whose effectivity and utility have
yet to be demonstrated.
Same; Same; Public necessity for issuance of
Administrative Order No. 1 has not been shown.The
public necessity for the challenged order has yet to be
shown. No valid refutation has been made of petitioners
assertion that the E.W.D.s are not too vital to the
prevention of nighttime vehicular accidents. Statistics
shows that of the 26,000 motor vehicle accidents that
occurred in 1976, only 390 or 1.5 per cent involved rearend collisions, as to require the purchase and installation
of the questioned E.W.D. for almost 900,000 vehicles
throughout the country.
Same; Same; The E.W.D. requirement in too burdensome
on the public.The big financial burden to be imposed on
all motorists is staggering, and petitioners assertion that
as of 1975, there were at least 865,037 motor vehicles
all over the country requiring E.W.D.s and at the
minimum price of P56.00 per set, this would mean a
consumer outlay of P48,451,872.00, or close to P50
million for the questioned E.W.D.s stands unchallenged.
Same; Same; No effort was made to show that there can
be other less expensive and practical device.No real
effort has been made to show that there can be practical
and less burdensome alternative road safety devices for

stalled vehicles than the prescribed E.W.D., such as the
common petroleum lamps kinke which can be placed
just as effectively in front of stalled vehicles on the
highways.
Same; Same; There is no imperative need for imposing
such a blanket requirements on all vehicles.There is no
imperative need for imposing such a blanket requirement
on all vehicles. The respondents have not shown that
they have availed of the powers and prerogatives vested
in their offices such as ridding the country of
200
200

Agustin vs. Edu
dilapidated trucks and vehicles which are the main cause

of the deplorable highway accidents due to stalled
vehicles, establishing an honest and foolproof systems of
examination and licensing of motor vehicle drivers so as
to ban the reckless and irresponsible and a sustained
education campaign to instill safe driving habits and
attitudes that can be carried out for much less than the
P50 million burden that would be imposed by the
challenged order.
ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court, Prohibition.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Leovillo C. Agustin Law Office for petitioner.
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant

Solicitor General Ruben E. Agpalo and Solicitor Amado D.
Aquino for respondents.
FERNANDO, J.:
The validity of a Letter of Instruction1 providing for an
early warning device for motor vehicles is assailed in this
prohibition proceeding as being violative of the
constitutional guarantee of due process and, insofar as
the rules and regulations for its implementation are
concerned, for transgressing the fundamental principle of
non-delegation of legislative power. The Letter of
Instruction is stigmatized by petitioner, who is possessed
of the requisite standing, as being arbitrary and
oppressive. A temporary restraining order as issued and
respondents Romeo F. Edu, Land Transportation
Commisioner; Juan Ponce Enrile, Minister of National
Defense; Alfredo L. Juinio, Minister of Public Works,
Transportation and Communications; and Baltazar Aquino,
Minister of Public Highways; were required to answer.
That they did in a pleading submitted by Solicitor General
Estelito P. Mendoza.2 Impressed with a highly persuasive
quality, it makes quite dear that the imputation of a
constitutional infirmity is devoid of justification. The
challenged Letter of Instruction is a valid
_______________
Letter of Instruction No. 229 (1974) as amended by
Letter of Instruction No. 479 (1976).
1
He was assisted by Assistant Solicitor General Ruben E.

Agpalo and Solicitor Amado D. Aquino.
2
201

Agustin vs. Edu
201
police power measure. Nor could the implementing rules

and regulations issued by respondent Edu be considered
as amounting to an exercise of legislative power.
Accordingly, the petition must be dismissed.
The facts are undisputed. The assailed Letter of
Instruction No. 229 of President Marcos, issued on
December 2, 1974, reads in full: [Whereas], statistics
show that one of the major causes of fatal or serious
accidents in land transportation is the presence of
disabled, stalled, or parked motor vehicles along streets
or highways without any appropriate early warning device
to signal approaching motorists of their presence;
[Whereas], the hazards posed by such obstructions to
traffic have been recognized by international bodies
concerned with traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna Convention
on Road Signs and Signals and the United Nations
Organization (U.N.); [Whereas], the said Vienna
Convention which was ratified by the Philippine
Government under P.D. No. 207, recommended the
enactment of local legislation for the installation of road
safety signs and devices; [Now, therefore, I, Ferdinand E.
Marcos], President of the Philippines, in the interest of
safety on all streets and highways, including expressways
or limited access roads, do hereby direct: 1. That all
owners, users or drivers of motor vehicles shall have at
all times in their motor vehicles at least one (1) pair of
early warning device consisting of triangular, collapsible
reflectorized plates in red and yellow colors at least 15
cms. at the base and 40 cms. at the sides. 2. Whenever
any motor vehicle is stalled or disabled or is parked for
thirty (30) minutes or more on any street or highway,
including expressways or limited access roads, the owner,

user or driver thereof shall cause the warning device
mentioned herein to be installed at least four meters
away to the front and rear of the motor vehicle stalled,
disabled or parked. 3. The Land Transportation
Commissioner shall cause Reflectorized Triangular Early
Warning Devices, as herein described, to be prepared and
issued to registered owners of motor vehicles, except
motorcycles and trailers, charging for each piece not
more than 15% of the acquisition cost. He shall also
promulgate such rules and regulations as are appropriate
to effectively implement this order. 4. All hereby
concerned shall closely coordinate and take such
measures as are necessary or appropriate
202
202

Agustin vs. Edu
to carry into effect these instructions.3 Thereafter, on
November 15, 1976, it was amended by Letter of
Instruction No. 479 in this wise: Paragraph 3 of Letter of
Instructions No. 229 is hereby amended to read as
follows: 3. The Land Transportation Commissioner shall
require every motor vehicle owner to procure from any
source and present at the registration of his vehicle, one
pair of a reflectorized triangular early warning device, as
described herein, of any brand or make chosen by said
motor vehicle owner. The Land Transportation
Commissioner shall also promulgate such rules and
regulations as are appropriate to effectively implement
this order. 4 There was issued accordingly, by
respondent Edu, the implementing rules and regulations
on December 10, 1976.5 They were not enforced as
President Marcos, on January 25, 1977, ordered a six-
month period of suspension insofar as the installation of

early warning device as a preregistration requirement for
motor vehicles was concerned.6 Then on June 30, 1978,
another Letter of Instruction7 ordered the lifting of such
suspension and directed the immediate implementation
of Letter of Instruction No. 229 as amended.8 It was not
until August 29, 1978 that respondent Edu issued
Memorandum Circular No. 32, worded thus: In pursuance
of Letter of Instructions No. 716, dated June 30, 1978,
directing the implementation of Letter of Instructions No.
229, as amended by Letter of Instructions No. 479,
requiring the use of Early Warning Devices (EWD) on
motor vehicles, the following rules and regulations are
hereby issued: 1. LTC Administrative Order No. 1, dated
December 10, 1976; shall now be implemented provided
that the device may come from whatever source and that
it shall have substantially complied with the EWD
specifications contained in Section 2 of said
administrative order; 2. In order to insure that every
motor vehicle, except motorcyles, is equipped with the
device, a pair of
_______________
3
Petition, par. III.
Ibid, par. IV.
Ibid, par. V.
Ibid, par. VIII.
No. 716.
Petition, par. VII.
203
203
Agustin vs. Edu
serially numbered stickers, to be issued free of charge by
this Commission, shall be attached to each EWD. The
EWD serial number shall be indicated on the registration
certificate and official receipt of payment of current
registration fees of the motor vehicle concerned. All
Orders, Circulars, and Memoranda in conflict herewith are
hereby superseded, This Order shall take effect
immediately.9 It was for immediate implementation by
respondent Alfredo L. Juinio, as Minister of Public Works,
Transportation, and Communications. 10
Petitioner, after setting forth that he is the owner of a
Volkswagen Beetle Car, Model 13035, already properly
equipped when it came out from the assembly lines with
blinking lights fore and aft, which could very well serve as
an early warning device in case of the emergencies
mentioned in Letter of Instructions No. 229, as amended,
as well as the implementing rules and regulations in
Administrative Order No. 1 issued by the Land
Transportation Commission,11 alleged that said Letter of
Instruction No. 229, as amended, clearly violates the
provisions and delegation of police power, [sic] * * *: For
him, they are oppressive, unreasonable, arbitrary,
confiscatory, nay unconstitutional and contrary to the
precepts of our compassionate New Society.12 He
contended that they are infected with arbitrariness
because it is harsh, cruel and unconscionable to the
motoring public;13 are one-sided, onerous and patently
illegal and immoral because [they] will make
manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires at the
expense of car owners who are compelled to buy a set of
the socalled early warning device at the rate of P56.00 to

P72.00 per set.14 are unlawful and unconstitutional and
contrary to the precepts of a compassionate New Society
[as being] compulsory and confiscatory on the part of the
motorists who could very well provide a practical
alternative road safety
_______________
9
Ibid, par. VIII.
10
Ibid.
11
Ibid, par. IX.
12
Ibid, par. X.
13
Ibid, par. XI.
14
Ibid, par. X.
204
204

Agustin vs. Edu
device, or a better substitute to the specified set of
EWDs.15 He therefore prayed for a judgment declaring
both the assailed Letters of Instructions and
Memorandum Circular void and unconstitutional and for a
restraining order in the meanwhile.
A resolution to this effect was handed down by this Court
on October 19, 1978: L-49112 (Leovillo C. Agustin v.
Hon. Romeo F. Edu, etc., et al.)Considering the
allegations contained, the issues raised and the
arguments adduced in the petition for prohibition with
writ of preliminary prohibitory and/or mandatory
injunction, the Court Resolved to [require] the

respondents to file an answer thereto within ten (10) days
from notice and not to move to dismiss the petition. The
Court further Resolved to [issue] a [temporary restraining
order] effective as of this date and continuing until
otherwise ordered by this Court.16
Two motions for extension were filed by the Office of the
Solicitor General and granted. Then on November 15,
1978, he Answer for respondents was submitted. After
admitting the factual allegations and stating that they
lacked knowledge or information sufficient to form a
belief as to petitioner owning a Volkswagen Beetle car,17
they specifically deny the allegations in paragraphs X
and XI (including its subparagraphs 1, 2, 3, 4) of Petition
to the effect that Letter of Instruction No. 229 as
amended by Letters of Instructions Nos. 479 and 716 as
well as Land Transportation Commission Administrative
Order No. 1 and its Memorandum Circular No. 32 violates
the constitutional provisions on due process of law, equal
protection of law and undue delegation of police power,
and that the same are likewise oppessive, arbitrary,
confiscatory, one-sided, onerous, immoral, unreasonable
and illegal, the truth being that said allegations are
without legal and factual basis and for the reasons
alleged in the Special and Affirmative Defenses of this
Answer.18 Unlike petitioner who contented himself with a
rhetorical recital of his litany of grievances and merely
invok______________
15
Ibid, par. XI.
16
Resolution of the Court dated October 19, 1978.
17
Answer, pars. 1-6.
18
Ibid, par. 8.
205
205
Agustin vs. Edu
ed the sacramental phrases of constitutional litigation,
the Answer, in demonstrating that the assailed Letter of
Instruction was a valid exercise of the police power and
implementing rules and regulations of respondent Edu
not susceptible to the charge that there was unlawful
delegation of legislative power, there was in the portion
captioned Special and Affirmative Defenses, a citation of
what respondents believed to be the authoritative
decisions of this Tribunal calling for application. They are
Calalang v. Williams,19 Morfe v. Mutuc,20 and Edu v.
Ericta.21 Reference was likewise made to the 1968 Vienna
Conventions of the United Nations on road traffic, road
signs, and signals, of which the Philippines was a
signatory and which was duly ratified.22 Solicitor General
Men-doza took pains to refute in detail, in language calm
and dispassionate, the vigorous, at times intemperate,
accusation of petitioner that the assailed Letter of
Instruction and the implementing rules and regulations
cannot survive the test of rigorous scrutiny. To repeat, its
highly-persuasive quality cannot be denied.
This Court thus considered the petition submitted for
decision, the issues being clearly joined. As noted at the
outset, it is far from meritorious and must be dismissed.
1. The Letter of Instruction in question was issued in the
exercise of the police power. That is conceded by
petitioner and is the main reliance of respondents. It is

the submission of the former, however, that while
embraced in such a category, it has offended against the
due process and equal protection safeguards of the
Constitution, although the latter point was mentioned
only in passing. The broad and expansive scope of the
police power which was originally identified by Chief
Justice Taney of the American Supreme Court in an 1847
deci_______________
70 Phil. 726 (1940). The opinion was penned by Justice
Laurel.
19
L-20387, January 31, 1968; 22 SCRA 424. The writer of

this opinion is the ponente.
20
L-32096, October 24, 1970, 35 SCRA 481. The writer of

this opinion was likewise the ponente.
21
22
Answer, par. 18 (a) and (b).
206
206

Agustin vs. Edu
sion, as nothing more or less than the powers of
government inherent in every sovereignty23 was stressed
in the aforementioned case of Edu v. Ericta thus: Justice
Laurel, in the first leading decision after the Constitution
came into force, Calalang v. Williams, identified police
power with state authority to enact legislation that may
interfere with personal liberty or property in order to
promote the general welfare. Persons and property could
thus be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in
order to secure the general comfort, health and

prosperity of the state. Shortly after independence in
1948, Primicias v. Fugoso reiterated the doctrine, such a
competence being referred to as the power to prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals, peace,
education, good order or safety, and general welfare of
the peo-ple. The concept was set forth in negative terms
by Justice Malcolm in a pre-Commonwealth decision as
that inherent and plenary power in the State which
enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort,
safety and welfare of society. In that sense it could be
hardly distinguishable as noted by this Court in Morfe v.
Mutuc with the totality of legislative power. It is in the
above sense the greatest and most powerful attribute of
government. It is, to quote Justice Malcolm anew, the
most essential, insistent, and at least illimitable powers,
extending as Justice Holmes aptly pointed out to all the
great public needs. Its scope, ever-expanding to meet
the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future
where it could be done, provides enough room for an
efficient and flexible response to conditions and
circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits. In the
language of Justice Cardozo: Needs that were narrow or
parochial in the past may be interwoven in the present
with the well-being of the nation. What is critical or
urgent changes with the time. The police power is thus a
dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from precisely
defined, rooted in the conception that men in organizing
the state and imposing upon its government limitations to
safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to
enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to
obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary
measures
_______________
23
License Cases, 5 How. 504, 583.
207
207
Agustin vs. Edu
calculated to insure communal peace, safety, good order,
and welfare.24
1. 2.
It was thus a heavy burden to be shouldered by

petitioner, compounded by the fact that the
particular police power measure challenged was
clearly intended to promote public safety. It would
be a rare occurrence indeed for this Court to
invalidate a legislative or executive act of that
character. None has been called to our attention, an
indication of its being non-existent. The latest
decision in point, Edu v. Ericta, sustained the validity
of the Reflector Law,25 an enactment conceived with
the same end in view. Calalang v. Williams found
nothing objectionable in a statute, the purpose of
which was: To promote safe transit upon, and avoid
obstruction on roads and streets designated as
national roads * * *.26 As a matter of fact, the first
law sought to be nullified after the effectivity of the
1935 Constitution, the National Defense Act,27 with
petitioner failing in his quest, was likewise prompted
by the imperative demands of public safety.
2. 3. The futility of petitioners effort to nullify both the
Letter of Instruction and the implementing rules and
regulations becomes even more apparent
considering his failure to lay the necessary factual
foundation to rebut the presumption of validity. So it
was held in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators

Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila.28 The ra35
SCRA 481, 487-488. There is no need to repeat
where Calalang and Morfe are reported. Primicias v.
Fugoso is reported in 80 Phil. 71; Rubi v. Provincial
Board, where the first quotation from Justice
Malcolm came, in 39 Phil. 660, 708 (1919); and
Smith Bell and Co. v. Natividad, his other decision
cited, in 40 Phil. 136 (1919); Helvering v. Davis, with
Justice Cardozo writing the opinion, in 301 US 619
(1937).
_______________
35 SCRA 481, 487-488. There is no need to repeat
where Calalang and Morfe are reported. Primicias v.
Fugoso is reported in 80 Phil. 71; Rubi v. Provincial Board,
where the first quotation from Justice Malcolm came, in
39 Phil. 660, 708 (1919); and Smith Bell and Co. v.
Natividad, his other decision cited, in 40 Phil. 136 (1919);
Helvering v. Davis, with Justice Cardozo writing the
opinion, in 301 US 619 (1937).
24
25
Republic Act No. 5715 (1969).
26
Commonwealth Act No. 548 (1940).
Cf. People v. Layman, 66 Phil. 13 (1938). Even earlier in

United States v. Pompeya, 31 Phil. 245 (1915), this Court,
by virtue of the police power, held valid a provision of the
then Municipal Code requiring able-bodied males in the
vicinity between certain ages to perform patrol duty not
exceeding one day each week.
27
28
L-24693, July 31, 1967, 20 SCRA 849.
208
208

Agustin vs. Edu
tionale was clearly set forth in an excerpt from a decision
of Justice Brandeis of the American Supreme Court,
quoted in the opinion: The statute here questioned deals
with a subject clearly within the scope of the police
power. We are asked to declare it void on the ground that
the specific method of regulation prescribed is
unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due
process of law. As underlying questions of fact may
condition the constitutionality of legislation of this
character, the presumption of constitutionality must
prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of
record in overthrowing the statute.29
4. Nor did the Solicitor General, as he very well could, rely
solely on such rebutted presumption of validity. As was
pointed out in his Answer: The President certainly had in
his possession the necessary statistical information and
data at the time he issued said letter of instructions, and
such factual foundation cannot be defeated by
petitioners naked assertion that early warning devices
are not too vital to the prevention of nighttime vehicular
accidents because allegedly only 390 or 1.5 per cent of
the supposed 26,000 motor vehicle accidents that
occurred in 1976 involved rear-end collisions (p. 12 of
petition). Petitioners statistics is not backed up by
demonstrable data on record. As aptly stated by this
Honorable Court: Further: It admits of no doubt
therefore that there being a presumption of validity, the
necessity for evidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless
the statute or ordinance is void on its face, which is not
the case here * * *. But even assuming the verity of
petitioners statistics, is that not reason enough to require

the installation of early warning devices to prevent
another 390 rear-end collisions that could mean the death
of 390 or more Filipinos and the deaths that could
likewise result from head-on or frontal collisions with
stalled vehicles?30 It is quite manifest then that the
issuance of such Letter of Instruction is encased in the
armor of prior,
_______________
Ibid, 857. The excerpt came from OGorman and Young
v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 282 US 251, 328 (1931).
29
Answer, par. 18 (a). The excerpt came from Samson v.

Mayor of Bacolod City, L-28745; October 23, 1974; 60
SCRA 267; 270.
30
209
Agustin vs. Edu
209
careful study by the Executive Department. To set it aside

for alleged repugnancy to the due process clause is to
give sanction to conjectural claims that exceeded even
the broadest permissible limits of a pleaders well-known
penchant for exaggeration.
1. 5. The rather wild and fantastic nature of the charge
of oppressiveness of this Letter of Instruction was
exposed in the Answer of the Solicitor General thus:
Such early warning device requirement is not an
expensive redundancy, nor oppressive, for car
owners whose cars are already equipped with 1)
blinking lights in the fore and aft of said motor
vehicles, 2) battery-powered blinking lights inside

motor vehicles, 3) built-in reflectorized tapes on
front and rear bumpers of motor vehicles, or 4)
well-lighted two (2) petroleum lamps (the Kinke) * *
* because: Being universal among the signatory
countries to the said 1968 Vienna Conventions, and
visible even under adverse conditions at a distance
of at least 400 meters, any motorist from this
country or from any part of the world, who sees a
reflectorized rectangular early warning device
installed on the roads, highways or expressways, will
conclude, without thinking, that somewhere along
the travelled portion of that road, highway, or
expressway, there is a motor vehicle which is
stationary, stalled or disabled which obstructs or
endangers passing traffic. On the other hand, a
motorist who sees any of the aforementioned other
built-in warning devices or the petroleum lamps will
not immediately get adequate advance warning
because he will still think what that blinking light is
all about. Is it an emergency vehicle? Is it a law
enforcement car? Is it an ambulance? Such
confusion or uncertainty in the mind of the motorist
will thus increase, rather than decrease, the danger
of collision.31
2. 6. Nor did the other extravagant assertions of
constitutional deficiency go unrefuted in the Answer
of the Solicitor General: There is nothing in the
questioned Letter of Instruction No. 229, as
amended, or in Administrative Order No. 1, which
requires or compels motor vehicle owners to
purchase the early warning device prescribed
thereby. All that is
_______________
31
Ibid, par. 18 (c).
210
210

Agustin vs. Edu
required is for motor vehicle owners concerned like
petitioner, to equip their motor vehicles with a pair of this
early warning device in question, procuring or obtaining
the same from whatever source. In fact, with a little of
industry and practical ingenuity, motor vehicle owners
can even personally make or produce this early warning
device so long as the same substantially conforms with
the specifications laid down in said letter of instruction
and administrative order. Accordingly, the early warning
device requirement can neither be oppressive, onerous,
immoral, nor confiscatory, much less does it make
manufacturers and dealers of said devices instant
millionaires at the expense of car owners as petitioner so
sweepingly concludes * * *. Petitioners fear that with the
early warning device requirement a more subtle racket
may be committed by those called upon to enforce it * * *
is an unfounded speculation. Besides, that unscrupulous
officials may try to enforce said requirement in an
unreasonable manner or to an unreasonable degree, does
not render the same illegal or immoral where, as in the
instant case, the challenged Letter of Instruction No. 229
and implementing order disclose none of the
constitutional defects alleged against it.32
7. It does appear clearly that petitioners objection to this
Letter of Instruction is not premised on lack of power, the
justification for a finding of unconstitutionality, but on the
pessimistic, not to say negative, view he entertains as to

its wisdom. That approach, it put it at its mildest, is
distinguished, if that is the appropriate word, by its
unorthodoxy. It bears repeating that this Court, in the
language of Justice Laurel, does not pass upon questions
of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. As
expressed by Justice Tuason: It is not the province of the
courts to supervise legislation and keep it within the
bounds of propriety and common sense. That is primarily
and exclusively a legislative concern. There can be no
possible objection then to the observation of Justice
Montemayor: As long as laws do not violate any
Constitutional provision, the Courts merely interpret and
apply them regardless of whether or not they are wise or
salutary.
_______________
32
Ibid, par. 18 (d) and (e).
211
211
Agustin vs. Edu
For they, according to Justice Labrador, are not supposed
to override legitimate policy and * * * never inquire into
the wisdom of the law. It is thus settled, to paraphrase
Chief Justice Concepcion in Gonzales v. Commission on
Elections, that only congressional power or competence,
not the wisdom of the action taken, may be the basis for
declaring a statute invalid. This is as it ought to be. The
principle of separation of powers has in the main wisely
allocated the respective authority of each department
and confined its jurisdiction to such a sphere. There
would then be intrusion not allowable under the
Constitution if on a matter left to the discretion of a

coordinate branch, the judiciary would substitute its own.
If there be adherence to the rule of law, as there ought to
be, the last offender should be courts of justice, to which
rightly litigants submit their controversy precisely to
maintain unimpaired the supremacy of legal norms and
prescriptions. The attack on the validity of the challenged
provision likewise insofar as there may be objections,
even if valid and cogent, on is wisdom cannot be
sustained.33
8. The alleged infringement of the fundamental principle
of non-delegation of legislative power is equally without
any support well-settled legal doctrines. Had petitioner
taken the trouble to acquaint himself with authoritative
pronouncements from this Tribunal, he would not have
the temerity to make such an assertion. An exerpt from
the aforecited decision of Edu v. Ericta sheds light on the
matter: To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there
must be a standard, which implies at the very least that
the legislature itself determines matters of principle and
lays down fundamental policy.
_______________
Morfe v. Mutuc, 22 SCRA 424, 450-451. The citation
from Justice Laurel may be traced to Angara v. Electoral
Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 160 (1936); from Justice Tuason
to People v. Carlos, 78 Phil. 535, 548 (1947); from Justice
Montemayor to Quintos v. Lacson, 97 Phil. 290, 293
(1955); and from Justice Labrador to Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155, 1166 (1957). Chief Justice
Concepcions reiteration of the doctrine, paraphrased in
the quoted opinion, was made by him in Gonzales v.
Commission on Elections, L-28196, November 9, 1967, 21
33
SCRA 774. Cf. Province of Pangasinan v. Secretary of

Public Works, L-27861, October 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 134.
212
212

Agustin vs. Edu
Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be
hard to repel. A standard thus defines legislative policy,
marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the
public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances
under which the legislative command is to be effected. It
is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be
carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative
office designated may in pursuance of the above
guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and
regulations. The standard may be either express or
implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is
easily met. The standard though does not have to be
spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy
and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the
Reflector Law, clearly, the legislative objective is public
safety. What is sought to be attained as in Calalang v.
Williams is safe transit upon the roads. This is to adhere
to the recognition given expression by Justice Laurel in a
decision announced not too long after the Constitution
came into force and effect that the principle of nondelegation has been made to adapt itself to the
complexities of modern governments, giving rise to the
adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of
subordinate legislation not only in the United States
and England but in practicaly all modern governments.
He continued: Accordingly, with the growing complexity
of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of
governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of
administering the laws, there is a constantly growing

tendency toward the delegation of greater powers by the
legislature and toward the approval of the practice by the
courts. Consistency with the conceptual approach
requires the reminder that what is delegated is authority
non-legislative in character, the completeness of the
statute when it leaves the hands of Congress being
assumed.34
9. The conclusion reached by this Court that this petition
must be dismissed is reinforced by this consideration. The
petition itself quoted these two whereas clauses of the
assailed
_______________
35 SCRA 481, 497-498. The following cases were also
cited: People v. Exconde, 101 Phil. 1125 (1957), and
People v. Jolliffe, 105 Phil. 677 (1959).
34
213
213
Agustin vs. Edu
Letter of Instruction: [Whereas], the hazards posed by
such obstructions to traffic have been recognized by
international bodies concerned with traffic safety, the
1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals and
the United Nations Organization (U.N.); [Whereas], the
said Vienna Convention, which was ratified by the
Philippine Government under P.D. No. 207, recommended
the enactment of local legislation for the installation of
road safety signs and devices; * * *35 It cannot be
disputed then that this Declaration of Principle found in
the Constitution possesses relevance: The Philippines * *
* adopts the generally accepted principles of international

law as part of the law of the land,* * *.36 The 1968
Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals is
impressed with such a character. It is not for this country
to repudiate a commitment to which it had pledged its
word. The concept of Pacta sunt servanda stands in the
way of such an attitude, which is, moreover, at war with
the principle of international morality.
10. That is about all that needs be said. The rather court
reference to equal protection did not even elicit any
attempt on the part of petitioner to substantiate in a
manner clear, positive, and categorical, why such a
casual observation should be taken seriously. In no case is
there a more appropriate occasion for insistence on what
was referred to as the general rule in Santiago v. Far
Eastern Broadcasting Co.,37 namely, that the
constitutionality of a law will not be considered unless the
point is specially pleaded, insisted upon, and adequately
argued.38 Equal protection is not a talismanic formula
at the mere invocation of which a party to a lawsuit can
rightfully expect that success will crown his ef-forts. The
law is anything but that.
_______________
35
Petition, par. III.
Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution reads in full:

The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of
national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles
of international law as part of the law of the land, and
adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom,
cooperation, and amity with all nations.
36
37
73 Phil. 408 (1941).
38
Ibid, 412.
214
214

Agustin vs. Edu
WHEREFORE, this petition is dismissed. The restraining

order is lifted. This decision is immediately executory. No
costs.
Castro, C.J., Barredo, Antonio, Santos, Fernandez,
Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro and Melencio-Herrera,
concur.
Teehankee, J. dissents in a separate opinion.
Makasiar, J., reserves the right to file a separate
opinion.
Aquino, J., did not take part.
Concepcion, J., is on leave. Castro, C.J., certifies Justice
Concepcion concurs in their decision.
Petition dismissed.
SEPARATE OPINION
TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:
I dissent from the majoritys peremptory dismissal of the
petition and lifting of the restraining order issued on
October 19, 1978 against the blanket enforcement of the
requirement that all motor vehicles be equipped with the
so-called early warning device, without even hearing the

parties in oral argument as generally required by the
Court in original cases of farreaching consequence such
as the case at bar.
Lack of time presents my filing an extended dissent, I
only wish to state that the petition advances grave and
serious grounds of assailing the rules and regulations
issued by the Land Transportation Commission under
Administrative Order No. 1 and Memorandum Circular No.
32 [which] do not reflect the real intent, noble objectives
and spirit of Letter of Instructions No. 229, as amended
by Letter of Instructions Nos. 479 and 716, because it is
oppressive, unreasonable, arbitrary, confiscatory, may
unconstitutional and contrary to the precepts of our
compassionate New Society, because of the following
considerations, inter alia:
1. It is oppressive, arbitrary and discriminatory to require
owners of motor vehicles with built-in and more effective
and
215
Agustin vs. Edu
215
efficient E.W.D.s such as a) blinking lights in the fore

and aft of said motor vehicles, b) battery-powered
blinking lights inside motor vehicles, c) built-in
reflectorized tapes on front and rear bumpers of motor
vehicles . . . . . to purchase the E.W.D. specified in the
challenged administrative order, whose effectivity and
utility have yet to be demonstrated.
1. 2.
The public necessity for the challenged order has

yet to be shown. No valid refutation has been made
of petitioners assertion that the E.W.D.s are not
too vital to the prevention of nighttime vehicular
accidents. Statistics shows that of the 26,000 motor
vehicle accidents that occurred in 1976, only 390 or
1.5 per cent involved rear-end collisions, as to
require the purchase and installation of the
questioned E.W.D. for almost 900,000 vehicles
throughout the country;
2. 3. The big financial burden to be imposed on all
motorists is staggering, and petitioners assertion
that as of 1975, there were at least 865,037 motor
vehicles all over the country requiring E.W.D.s and
at the minimum price of P56.00 per set, this would
mean a consumer outlay of P48,451,872.00, or close
to P50 million for the questioned E.W.D.s stands
unchallenged;
3. 4.
No real effort has been made to show that there

can be practical and less burdensome alternative
road safety devices for stalled vehicles than the
prescribed E.W.D., such as the common petroleum
lamps kinke which can be placed just as
effectively in front of stalled vehicles on the
highways; and
4. 5.
There is no imperative need for imposing such a

blanket requirement on all vehicles. The
respondents have not shown that they have availed
of the powers and prerogaties vested in their offices
such as ridding the country of dilapidated trucks and
vehicles which are the main cause of the deplorable
highway accidents due to stalled vehicles,
establishing an honest and foolproof system of
examination and licensing of motor vehicle drivers

so as to ban the reckless and irresponsible and a
sustained education campaign to instill safe driving
habits and attitudes that can be carried out for
much less than the P50 million burden that would be
imposed by the challenged order.
I do feel that a greater degree of receptivity and
sympathy could be extended to the petitioner for his
civic216
216

Agustin vs. Edu
mindedness in having filed the present petition

challenging as capricious and unreasonable the allpervading police power of the State instead of throwing
the case out of court and leaving the wrong impression
that the exercise of police power insofar as it may affect
the life, liberty and property of any person is no longer
subject to judicial inquiry.
Notes.Article 30 of the Warsaw Convention on
International Air Transportation does not apply to a case
where an airplane refuses to transport a passenger with
confirmed reservation. (KLM Royal Dutch Airlines vs.
Court of Appeals, 65 SCRA 237).
A drivers license which bear the earmarks of a duly
issued license is a public document which is presumed
genuine. (CCC Insurance Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 31
SCRA 264).
The Revised Motor Vehicle Law allows the registration and

use of motor vehicles with a width of more than 2.5
meters. (Ramos vs. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co., Inc., 19 SCRA
294).
A truck-trailer must be provided either with a helper or a
rear-vision mirror. Where there was no factual finding of
the Court of Appeals that a Truck-Trailer did not have such
a mirror, it cannot be concluded that it was not equipped
with such mirror. (Ramos vs. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co., Inc.,
19 SCRA 294).
Where the legislation complained of is shown to be an
exercise of police power, it does not mean that the
invocation of the protection of the non-impairment clause
would be unavailing; otherwise, the constitutional
guarantee of non-impairment, and for that matter both of
the equal protection and due process clauses which
protect property rights would be rendered nugatory.
(Alalayan vs. National Power Corporation, 24 SCRA 172).
By its nature and scope, police power embraces the
power to prescribe regulations to promote the health,
morals, education, good order, safety, or the general
welfare of the people; an inherent and plenary power of
the state which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to
the conform, safety and welfare of society; the power to
promote the general welfare and public interest; the
power to enact laws in relation to persons and pro217
People vs. Tampus
217
perty as may promote public health, public morals, public

safety and the general welfare of each inhabitant, the
power to preserve public order and to prevent offenses
against the State and to establish for the intercourse of
citizen with citizen those rules of good manners and good
neighborhood calculated to prevent conflict of rights.
(Morfe vs. Mutuc, 22 SCRA 424).
o0o
Copyright 2014 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
No. L-7995. May 31, 1957]
LAO H. ICHONG, in his own behalf and in behalf of
other alien residents, corporations and
partnerships adversely affected by Republic Act
No. 1180, petitioner, vs. JAIME HERNANDEZ,
Secretary of Finance, and MARCELINO
SARMIENTO, City Treasurer of Manila,
respondents.
1156
1156
Ichong, etc., et al. vs. Hernandez, etc., and Sarmiento
1. 1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; POLICE POWER; NATURE
AND SCOPE.Police power is far-reaching in scope,
and it is almost impossible to limit its sweep. It
derives its existence from the very existence of the
State itself, and does not need to be expressed or
defined in its scope. It is said to be co-extensive with
self-protection and survival, and as such it is the
most positive and active of all governmental
processes, the most essential, insistent and
illimitable. Especially is it so under a modern

democratic framework where the demands of
society and of nations have multiplied to almost
unimaginable proportions; the field and scope of
police power has become almost boundless, just as
the fields of public interest and public welfare have
become almost all-embracing and have transcended
human foresight.
1. 2. ID.; GUARANTEES IN SECTION I, ARTICLE III OF
THE CONSTITUTION; UNIVERSALITY OF APPLICATION.
The constitutional guarantees in Section I, Article
III, of the Constitution, which embody the essence of
individual liberty and freedom in democracies, are
not limited to citizens alone but are admittedly
universal in their application, without regard to any
differences of race, of color, or of nationality (Yiek
Wo vs. Hopkins, 30 L. ed., 220, 226).
1. 3. ID.; LAW DEPRIVATION OF LIFE, LIBERTY OR
PROPERTY; TEST OR STANDARD.The conflict
between police power and the guarantees of due
process and equal protection of the laws is more
apparent than real. Properly related, the power and
the guarantees are supposed to coexist. The
balancing is the essence, or the indispensable
means for the" attainment of legitimate aspirations
of any democratic society. There can be no absolute
power, whoever exercises it, for that would be
tyranny. Yet there can neither be absolute liberty, for
that would mean license and anarchy. So the State
can deprive persons of life, liberty or property,
provided there is due process of law; and persons
may be classified into classes and groups, provided
everyone is given the equal protection of the law.
The test or standard, as always, is reason. The

police power legislation must be firmly grounded on
public interest and welfare, and a reasonable
relation must exist between purposes and means.
And if disctinction or classification has been made,
there must be a reasonable basis for said distinction.
1. 4. ID.; EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW CLAUSE;
WHEN NOT DEEMED INFRINGED BY LEGISLATION.
The equal protection of the law clause is against
undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well
as hostile discrimination or the oppression of
inequality.
1157
VOL. 101, MAY 81, 1957
1157
1. It is not intended to prohibit legislation, which is
limited either in the object to which it is directed or
by territory within which it is to operate. It does not
demand absolute equality among residents; it
merely requires that all persons shall be treated
alike, under like circumstances and conditions both
as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.
The equal protection clause is not infringed by
legislation which applies only to those persons
falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all
persons within such class, and reasonable grounds
exist for making a distinction between those who fall
within such class and those who do not (2 Cooley,
Constitutional Limitations, 824-825).
1. 5. ID. ; ID. ; LEGISLATIVE POWER TO MAKE
DISTINCTION AND CLASSIFICATION AMONG
PERSONS; CITIZENSHIP AS GROUND FOR

CLASSIFICATION.The power of the legislature to
make distinctions and classifications among persons
is not curtailed or denied by the equal protection of
the laws clause. The legislative power admits of a
wide scope of discretion, and a law can be violative
of the constitutional limitation only when the
classification is without reasonable basis. Citizenship
is a legal and valid ground for classification.
1. 6. ID.; ID.; NATIONALIZATION OF RETAIL TRADE;
CLASSIFICATION IN REPUBLIC ACT No. 1180 ACTUAL,
REAL AND REASONABLE.The classification in the
law of retail traders into nationals and aliens is
actual, real and reasonable. All persons of one class
are treated alike, and it cannot be said that the
classification is patently unreasonable and
unfounded. Hence, it is the duty of this Court to
declare that the legislature acted within its
legitimate prerogative and it cannot declare that the
act transcends the limits of equal protection
established by the Constitution.
1. 7. ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; TEST OF REASONABLENESS.
The law in question is deemed absolutely necessary
to bring about the desired legislative objective, i.e.,
to free the national economy from alien control and
dominance. It is not necessarily unreasonable
because it affects private rights and privileges (II
Am. Jur., pp. 1080-1081). The test of reasonableness
of a law is the appropriateness or adequacy under
all circumstances of the means adopted to carry out
its purpose into effect. Judged by this test, the
disputed legislation, which is not merely reasonable
but actually necessary, must be considered not to
have infringed the constitutional limitation of

reasonableness.
1. 8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REPUBLIC ACT No. 1180
TOLERANT AND REASONABLE.A cursory study of
the provisions of the law
1158
1158
1. immediately reveals how tolerant and reasonable
the Legislature has been. The law is made
prospective and recognizes the right and privilege of
those already engaged in the occupation to continue
therein during the rest of their lives; and similar
recognition of the right to continue is accorded
associations of aliens. The right or privilege is
denied only to persons upon conviction of certain
offenses.
1. 9. ID.; ID.; ID.; ATTAINMENT OF LEGISLATIVE
ASPIRATIONS OF A PEOPLE NOT BEYOND THE LIMITS
OF LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY.If political
independence is a legitimate aspiration of a people,
then economic independence is none of less
legitimate. Freedom and liberty are not real and
positive, if the people are subject to the economic
control and domination of others, especially if not of
their own race or country. The removal and
eradication of the shackles of foreign economic
control and domination is one of the noblest motives
that a national legislature may pursue. It is
impossible to conceive that legislation that seeks to
bring it about can infringe the constitutional
limitation of due process. The attainment of a

legitimate aspiration of a people can never be
beyond the limits of legislative authority.
1. 10. ID.; ID.; ID.; NATIONALISTIC TENDENCY
MANIFESTED IN THE CONSTITUTION.Nationalistic
tendency is manifested in various provisions of the
Constitution. The nationalization of the retail trade is
only a continuance of the nationalistic protective
policy laid down as a primary objective of the
Constitution, It cannot therefore be said that a law
imbued with the same purpose and spirit underlying
many of the provisions of the Constitution is
unreasonable, invalid or unconstitutional.
1. 11. ID.; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; EXERCISE OF
LEGISLATIVE DISCRETION NOT SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL
REVIEW.The exercise of legislative discretion is not
subject to judicial review. The Court will not inquire
into the motives of the Legislature, nor pass upon
general matters of legislative judgment. The
Legislature is primarily the judge of the necessity of
an enactment or of any of its provisions, and every
presumption is in favor of its validity, and though
the Court may hold views inconsistent with the
wisdom of the law, it may not annul the legislation if
not palpably in excess of the legislative power.
1. 12. ID.; TITLES OF BILLS; PROHIBITION AGAINST
DUPLICITY; PRESENCE OF DUPLICITY NOT SHOWN IN
TlTLE OR PROVISIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT No. 1180.
What Section 21(1) of Article VI of the Constitution
prohibits is duplicity, that is, if its title completely
fails to apprise the legislators or the public of the
nature.
1159
VOL. 101, MAY 31, 1957
1159
1. scope and consequences of the law or its operation
(I Sutherland, Statutory Construction, Sec. 1707, p.
297). A cursory consideration of the title and the
provisions of the bill fails to show the presence of
duplicity. It is true that the term "regulate" does not
and may not readily and at first glance convey the
idea of "nationalization" and "prohibition", which
terms express the two main purposes and objectives
of the law. But "regulate" is a broader term than
either prohibition or nationalization. Both of these
have always been included within the term
"regulation".
1. 13. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; USE OF GENERAL TERMS IN
TITLE OF BILL.The general rule is for the use of
general terms in the title of a bill; the title need not
be an index to the entire contents of the law (I
Sutherland, Statutory Construction, Sec. 4803, p.
345). The above rule was followed when the title of
the Act in question adopted the more general term
"regulate" instead of "nationalize" or "prohibit".
1. 14. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PURPOSE OF CONSTITUTIONAL
DIRECTIVE REGARDING SUBJECT OF A BILL.One
purpose of the constitutional directive that the
subject of a bill should be embraced in its title is to
apprise the legislators of the purposes, the nature
and scope of its provisions, and prevent the
enactment into law of matters which have not
received the notice, action and study of the
legislators or of the public. In case at bar it cannot
be claimed that the legislators have not been

apprised of the nature of the law, especially the
nationalization and prohibition provisions. The
legislators took active interest in the discussion of
the law, and a great many of the persons affected
by the prohibition in the law conducted a campaign
against its approval. It cannot be claimed, therefore,
that the reasons for declaring the law invalid ever
existed.
1. 15. ID.; INTERNATIONAL TREATIES AND OBLIGATIONS
NOT VIOLATED BY REPUBLIC ACT No. 1180;
TREATIES SUBJECT TO QUALIFICATION OR
AMENDMENT BY SUBSEQUENT LAW.The law does
not violate international treaties and obligations.
The United Nations Charter imposes no strict or
legal obligations regarding the rights and freedom of
their subjects (Jans Kelsen, The Law of the United
Nations, 1951 ed., pp. 29-32), and the Declaration of
Human Rights contains nothing more than a mere
recommendation, or a common standard of
achievement for all peoples and all nations. The
Treaty of Amity between the Republic of the
Philippines and the Republic of China of April 18,
1947 guarantees equality of treatment to the
Chinese nationals "upon the same terms as the
nationals of any other
1160
1160
Ichong, etc. et al. vs. Hernandez, etc., and Sarmiento
1. country". But the nationals of China are not
discriminated against because nationals of all other
countries, except those of the United States, who
are granted special rights by the Constitution, are all

prohibited from engaging in the retail trade. But
even supposing that the law infringes upon the said
treaty, the treaty is always subject to qualification or
amendment by a subsequent law (U.S. vs.
Thompson, 258, Fed. 257, 260), and the same may
never curtail or restrict the scope of the police
power of the State (Palston vs. Pennsylvania 58 L.
ed., 539).
ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Injunction and
Mandamus.
Ozaeta, Lichauco & Picazo and Sycip, Quisumbing,
Salazar & Associates for petitioner.
Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Pacifico P.
de Castro for respondent Secretary of Finance.
City Fiscal Eugenio Angeles and Assistant City Fiscal
Eulogio S. Serrano for respondent City Treasurer.
Dionisio Reyes as Amicus Curiae.
Marcial G. Mendiola as Amicus Curiae.
Emiliano R. Navarro as Amicus Curiae.
LABRADOR, J.:
I. The case and the issue, in general
This Court has before it the delicate task of passing upon
the validity and constitutionality of a legislative
enactment, fundamental and far-reaching in significance.
The enactment poses questions of due process, police

power and equal protection of the laws. It also poses an
important issue of fact, that is whether the conditions
which the disputed law purports to remedy really or
actually exist. Admittedly springing from a deep, militant,
and positive nationalistic impulse, the law purports to
protect citizen and country from the alien retailer.
Through it, and within the field of economy it regulates,
Congress attempts
1161
VOL. 101, MAY 31, 1957
1161
to translate national aspirations for economic
independence and national security, rooted in the drive
and urge for national survival and welfare, into a concrete
and tangible measures designed to free the national
retailer from the competing dominance of the alien, so
that the country and the nation may be free from a
supposed economic dependence and bondage. Do the
facts and circumstances justify the enactment?
II. Pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 1180
Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to Regulate the
Retail Business." In effect it nationalizes the retail trade
business. The main provisions of the Act are: (1) a
prohibition against persons, not citizens of the
Philippines, and against associations, partnerships, or
corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by
citizens of the Philippines, from engaging directly or
indirectly in the retail trade; (2) an exception from the
above prohibition in favor of aliens actually engaged in
said business on May 15, 1954, who are allowed to

continue to engage therein, unless their licenses are
forfeited in accordance with the law, until their death or
voluntary retirement in case of natural persons, and for
ten years after the approval of the Act or until the
expiration of term in case of juridical persons; (3) an
exception therefrom in favor of citizens and juridical
entities of the United States; (4) a provision for the
forfeiture of licenses (to engage in the retail business) for
violation of the laws on nationalization, economic control
weights and measures and labor and other laws relating
to trade, commerce and industry; (5) a prohibition against
the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged
in the retail business of additional stores or branches of
retail business, (6) a provision requiring aliens actually
engaged in the retail business to present for registration
with the proper authorities a verified statement
concerning their businesses, giving, among other
matters, the nature of the business, their assets
1162
1162
and liabilities and their offices and principal offices of
juridical entities; and (7) a provision allowing the heirs of
aliens now engaged in the retail business who die, to
continue such business for a period of six months for
purposes of liquidation.
III. Grounds upon which petition is basedAnswer
thereto
Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of

other alien residents, corporations and partnerships
adversely affected by the provisions of Republic Act No.
1180, brought this action to obtain a judicial declaration
that said Act is unconstitutional, and to enjoin the
Secretary of Finance and all other persons acting under
him, particularly city and municipal treasurers, from
enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacks the
constitutionality of the Act, contending that: (1) it denies
to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and
deprives them of their liberty and property without due
process of law; (2) the subject of the Act is not expressed
or comprehended in the title thereof; (3) the Act violates
international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the
Philippines; (4) the provisions of the Act against the
transmission by aliens of their retail business thru
hereditary succession, and those requiring 100% Filipino
capitalization for a corporation or entity to entitle it to
engage in the retail business, violate the spirit of Sections
1 and 5, Article XIII and Section 8 of Article XIV of the
Constitution.
In answer, the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City
of Manila contend that: (1) the Act was passed in the
valid exercise of the police power of the State, which
exercise is authorized in the Constitution in the interest of
national economic survival; (2) the Act has only one
subject embraced in the title; (3) no treaty or
international obligations are infringed; (4) as regards
hereditary succession, only the form is affected but the
value of the property is not impaired, and the institution
of inheritance is only of statutory origin.
1163
VOL. 101, MAY 31, 1957

1163
IV. Preliminary consideration of legal principles
involved
a. The police power.
There is no question that the Act was approved in the
exercise of the police power, but petitioner claims that its
exercise in this instance is attended by a violation of the
constitutional requirements of due process and equal
protection of the laws. But before proceeding to the
consideration and resolution of the ultimate issue
involved, it would be well to bear in mind certain basic
and f undamental, albeit preliminary, considerations in
the determination of the ever recurrent conflict between
police power and the guarantees of due process and
equal protection of the laws. What is the .scope of police
power, and how are the due process and equal protection
clauses related to it? What is the province and power of
the legislature, and what is the function and duty of the
courts? These consideration must be clearly and correctly
understood that their application to the f acts of the case
may be brought forth with clarity and the issue
accordingly resolved.
It has been said that police power is so far-reaching in
scope, that it has become almost impossible to limit its
sweep. As it derives its existence from the very existence
of the State itself, it does not need to be expressed or
defined in its scope; it is said to be co-extensive with
selfprotection and survival, and as such it is the most
positive and active of all governmental processes, the
most essential, insistent and illimitable. Especially is it so
under a modern democratic framework where the

demands of society and of nations have multiplied to
almost unimaginable proportions; the field and scope of
police power has become almost boundless, just as the
fields of public interest and public welfare have become
almost all-embracing and have transcended human
foresight. Otherwise stated, as we cannot foresee the
needs and demands of public interest and welfare in this
constantly changing and progressive world, so we cannot
delimit beforehand the extent or scope
1164
1164
of police power by which and through which the State
seeks to attain or achieve public interest or welfare. So it
is that Constitutions do not define the scope or extent of
the police power of the State; what they do is to set f orth
the limitations thereof. The most important of these are
the due process clause and the equal protection clause.
b. Limitations on police power.
The basic limitations of due process and equal protection
are found in the following provisions of our Constitution:
"SECTION 1.(1) No person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws."
(Article III, Phil. Constitution)
These constitutional guarantees which embody the
essence of individual liberty and freedom in democracies,
are not limited to citizens alone but are admittedly
universal in their application, without regard to any

differences of race, of color, or of nationality. (Yick Wo vs.
Hopkins, 30, L. ed. 220, 226.)
c. The equal protection clause.
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue
favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile
discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not
intended to prohibit legislation, which is limited either in
the object to which it is directed or by territory within
which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute
equality among residents; it merely requires that all
persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances
and conditions both as to privileges conferred and
liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not
infringed by legislation which applies only to those
persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike
to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds
exists for making a distinction between those who fall
within such class and those who do not. (2 Cooley,
Constitutional Limitations, 824-825.)
1165
VOL. 101, MAY 31, 1957
1165
d. The due process clause.
The due process clause has to do with the
reasonableness of legislation enacted in pursuance of the
police power. Is there public interest, a public purpose; is
public welf are involved? Is the Act reasonably necessary
for the accomplishment of the legislature's purpose; is it
not unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive? Is there
sufficient foundation or reason in connection with the

matter involved; or has there not been a capricious use of
the legislative power? Can the aims conceived be
achieved by the means used, or is it not merely an
unjustified interference with private interest? These are
the questions that we ask when the due process test is
applied.
The conflict, therefore, between police power and the
guarantees of due process and equal protection of the
laws is more apparent than real. Properly related; the
power and the guarantees are supposed to coexist. The
balancing is the essence or, shall it be said, the
indispensable means for the attainment of legitimate
aspirations of any democratic society. There can be no
absolute power, whoever exercise it, for that would be
tyranny. Yet there can neither be absolute liberty, for that
would mean license and anarchy. So the State can
deprive persons of life, liberty and property, provided
there is due process of law; and persons may be
classified into classes and groups, provided everyone is
given the equal protection of the law. The test or
standard, as always, is reason, The police power
legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and
welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between
purposes and means. And if distinction and classification
has been made, there must be a reasonable basis for said
distinction.
e. Legislative discretion not subject to judicial
review.
Now, in this matter of equitable balancing, what is the
proper place and role of the courts ? It must not be
overlooked, in the first place, that the legislature, which is

the
1166
1166
constitutional repository of police power and exercises
the prerogative of determining the policy of the State, is
by force of circumstances primarily the judge of
necessity, adequacy or reasonableness and wisdom, of
any law promulgated in the exercise of the police power,
or of the measures adopted to implement the public
policy or to achieve public interest. On the other hand,
courts, although zealous guardians of individual liberty
and right, have nevertheless evinced a reluctance to
interfere with the exercise of the legislative prerogative.
They have done so early where there has been a clear,
patent or palpable arbitrary and unreasonable abuse of
the legislative prerogative. Moreover, courts are not
supposed to override legitimate policy, and courts never
inquire into the wisdom of the law.
V. Economic problems sought to be remedied
With the above considerations in mind, we will now
proceed to delve directly into the issue involved. If the
disputed legislation were merely a regulation, as its title
indicates, there would be no question that it falls within
the legitimate scope of legislative power.. But it goes
further and prohibits a group of residents, the aliens, from
engaging therein. The problem becomes more complex
because its subject is a common, trade or occupation, as
old as society itself, which from time immemorial has
always been open to residents, irrespective of race, color

or citizenship.
a. Importance of retail trade in the economy of the
nation.
In a primitive economy where families produce all that
they consume and consume all that they produce, the
dealer, of course, is unknown. But as group life develops
and families begin to live in communities producing more
than what they consume and needing an infinite number
of things they do not produce, the dealer comes into
existence.
1167
VOL. 101, MAY 31, 1957
1167
As villages develop into big communities and
specialization in production begins, the dealer's
importance is enhanced. Under modern conditions and
standards of living, in which man's needs have multiplied
and diversified to unlimited extents and proportions, the
retailer comes as essential as the producer, because thru
him the infinite variety of articles, goods and
commodities needed for daily life are placed within the
easy reach of consumers. Retail dealers perform the
functions of capillaries in the human body, thru which all
the needed food and supplies are ministered to members
of the communities comprising the nation.
There cannot be any question about the importance of
the retailer in the life of the community. He ministers to
the resident's daily needs, food in all its increasing forms,
and the various little gadgets and things needed for
home and daily life. He provides his customers around his

store with the rice or corn, the fish, the salt, the vinegar,
the ,spices needed for the daily cooking. He has cloths to
sell, even the needle and the thread to sew them or darn
the clothes that wear out. The retailer, therefore, from the
lowly peddler, the owner of a small sari-sari store, to the
operator of a department store or a supermarket is so
much a part of day-to-day existence.
b. The alien retailer's traits.
The alien retailer must have started plying his trade in
this country in the bigger centers of population (Time
there was when he was unknown in provincial towns and
villages). Slowly but gradually he invaded towns and
villages; now he predominates in the cities and big
centers of population. He even pioneers in far away nooks
where the beginnings of community life appear,
ministering to the daily needs of the residents and
purchasing their agricultural produce for sale in the
towns. It is an undeniable fact that in many communities
the alien has replaced the native retailer. He has shown in
this trade, industry without limit, and the patience and
forbearance of a slave.
1168
1168
Derogatory epithets are hurled at him, but he laughs
these off without murmur; insults of ill-bred and insolent
neighbors and customers are made in his face, but he
heeds them not, and he forgets and forgives. The
community takes no note of him, as he appears to be

harmless and extremely useful.
c. Alleged alien control and dominance.
There is a general f eeling on the part of the public, which
appears to be true to f act, about the controlling and
dominant position that the alien retailer holds in the
nation's economy. Food and other essentials, clothing,
almost all articles of daily life reach the residents mostly
through him. In big cities and centers of population he
has acquired not only predominance, but apparent control
over distribution of almost all kinds of goods, such as
lumber, hardware, textiles, groceries, drugs, sugar, flour,
garlic, and scores of other goods and articles. And were it
not for some national corporations like the Naric, the
Namarco, the Facomas and the Accfa, his control over
principal foods and products would easily become full and
complete.
Petitioner denies that there is alien predominance and
control in the retail trade. In one breath it is said that the
fear is unfounded and the threat is imagined; in another,
it is charged that the law is merely the result of racialism
and pure and unabashed nationalism. Alienage, it is said,
is not an element of control; also so many unmanageable
factors in the retail business make control virtually
impossible. The first argument which brings up an issue
of fact merits serious consideration. The others are
matters of opinion within the exclusive competence of the
legislature and beyond our prerogative to pass upon and
decide.
The best evidence are the statistics on the retail trade,
which put down the figures in black and white. Between
the constitutional convention year (1935), when the fear

of alien domination and control of the retail trade already
1169
VOL. 101, MAY 31, 1957
1169
Ichong etc., et al. vs. Hernandez, etc., and Sarmiento
filled the minds of our leaders with fears and misgivings,
and the year of the enactment of the nationalization of
the retail trade act (1954), official statistics unmistakably
point out to the ever-increasing dominance and control by
the alien of the retail trade, as witness the following
tables;
Assets
Gross Sales
Year
No.- Pesos
Percent
Pesos Percent
and
Establishm
Distribut
Distribut
Retailer'
ents
ion
ion
s
National
ity
1941:
Filipino
106,671 200, 323, 55.82 174, 181,
5174
138
924
Chinese
15,356 118,348, 32.98 148,813, 44.21
692
239
Others
1,646 40,187,0 11.20 13,630,2
4.05
90
39
1947:
Filipino
111,107 208, 658, 65.05 279, 583, 57.03
946
333
Chinese
13,774 106,156, 33.56 205, 701, 41.96
Others
1948:
(Census
)
Filipino
Chinese
Others
1949:
Filipino
Chinese
Others
1951:
Filipino
218
354 8,761,26
0
134
.49 4,927,16
8
113,631 213, 342,

264
12,087 93,155,4
59
422 10,514,6
75
67.30 467, 161,

667
29.38 294, 894,
227
3.32 9,995,40
2
60.51
113,659 213, 451,

602
16,248 125,223,
336
486 12,056,3
65
60.89 462, 532,

901
35.72 392, 414,
875
3.39 10,078,3
64
53.47
1.01
38.20
1.29
45.36
1.17
119,352 224, 053, 61.09 466, 058, 53.07

620
052
Chinese
17,429 134,325, 36.60 404, 481, 46.06
303
384
Others
347 8,614,02
2.31 7,645,32
.87
5
7
AVERAGE
ASSETS AND GROSS SALES PER ESTABLISHMENT
Year
Item
Gross
and
Assets
Sales
Retailer'
(Pesos)
s
National
ity
(Pesos)
1941:
Filipino
Chinese
Others
1,878
7,707
24,415
1,633
9,691
8,281
1170
1170
1947:
Filipino
1,878 2,516
Chinese
7,707 14,934
Others
....24,749 13,919
1948: (Census)
Filipino
1,878 1,111
Chinese
7,707 24,398
Others
24,916 23,686
1949:
Filipino
1,878 4,069
Chinese
7,707 24,152
Others
24,807 20,737
1951:
Filipino
1,877 3,905
Chinese
7,707 33,207
Others
24,824 22,033
(Estimated Assets and Gross Sales of Retail
Establishments, By Year and Nationality of Owners,
Benchmark: 1948 Census, issued by the Bureau of
Census and Statistics, Department of Commerce and

Industry; pp. 18-19 of Answer.)
The above statistics do not include corporations and
partnerships, while the figures on Filipino establishments
already include mere market vendors, whose capital is
necessarily small.
The above figures reveal that in percentage distribution
of assets and of gross sales, alien participation has
steadily increased during the years. It is true, of course,
that Filipinos have the edge in the number of retailers,
but aliens more than make up for the numerical gap
through their assets and gross sales which average
between six and seven times those of the very many
Filipino retailers. Numbers in retailers, here, do not imply
superiority; the alien invests more capital, buys and sells
six to seven times more, and gains much more. The same
official report, pointing out to the known predominance of
foreign elements in the retail trade, remarks that the
Filipino retailers were largely engaged in minor retailer
enterprises. As observed by respondents, the native
investment is
1171
VOL. 101, MAY 31, 1957
1171
thinly spread, and the Filipino retailer is practically
helpless in matters of capital, credit, price and supply,
d. Alien control and threat, subject of
apprehension in Constitutional Convention.
It is this domination and control, which we believe has

been sufficiently shown to exist, that is the legislature's
target in the enactment of the disputed nationalization
law. If they did not exist as a fact the sweeping remedy of
nationalization would never have been adopted. The
framers of our Constitution also believed in the existence
of this alien dominance and control when they approved a
resolution categorically declaring among other things,
that "it is the sense of the Convention that the public
interest requires the nationalization of the retail trade; * *
*." (II Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine Constitution,
662663, quoted on page 67 of Petitioner.) That was
twentytwo years ago; and the events since then have not
been either pleasant or comforting. Dean Sinco of the
University of the Philippines College of Law, commenting
on the patrimony clause of the Preamble opines that the
fathers of our Constitution were merely translating the
general preoccupation of Filipinos "of the dangers from
alien interests that had already brought under their
control the commercial and other economic activities of
the country" (Sinco, Phil. Political Law, 10th ed., p, 114);
and analyzing the concern of the members of the
constitutional convention for the economic life of the
citizens, in connection with the nationalistic provisions of
the Constitution, he says:
"But there has been a general feeling that alien
dominance over the economic life of the country is not
desirable and that if such a situation should remain,
political independence alone is no guarantee to national
stability and strength. Filipino private capital is not big
enough to wrest from alien hands the control of the
national economy. Moreover, it is but of recent formation
and hence, largely inexperienced, timid and hesitant.
Under such conditions, the government as the

instrumentality of the national will, has to step in and
assume the initiative, if not the leadership, in the struggle
for the
1172
1172
economic freedom of the nation in somewhat the same
way that it did in the crusade for political freedom. Thus *
* * it (the Constitution) envisages an organized
movement for the protection of the nation not only
against the possibilities of armed invasion but also
against its economic subjugation by alien interests in the
economic field." (Phil. Political Law by Sinco, 10th ed., p.
476.)
Belief in the existence of alien control and predominance
is felt in other quarters. Filipino businessmen,
manufacturers and producers believe so; they fear the
dangers coming from alien control, and they express
sentiments of economic independence. Witness thereto is
Resolution No. 1, approved on July 18, 1953, of the Fifth
National Convention of Filipino Businessmen, and a
similar resolution, approved on March 20, 1954, of the
Second National Convention of Manufacturers and
Producers. The man in the street also believes, and fears,
alien predominance and control; so our newspapers,
which have editorially pointed out not only to control but
to alien stranglehold. We, therefore, find alien domination
and control to be a fact, a reality proved by official
statistics, and felt by all the sections and groups that
compose the Filipino community.
e. Dangers of alien control and dominance in retail.

But the dangers arising from alien participation in the
retail trade does not seem to lie in the predominance
alone; there is a prevailing feeling that such
predominance may truly endanger the national interest.
With ample capital, unity of purpose and action and
thorough organization, alien retailers and merchants can
act in such complete unison and concert on such vital
matters as the fixing of prices, the determination of the
amount of goods or articles to be made available in the
market, and even the choice of the goods or articles they
would or would not patronize or distribute, that fears of
dislocation of the national economy and of the complete
subservience of national retailers and of the consuming
public are not entirely unfounded. Nationals, producers
1173
VOL. 101, MAY 31, 1957
1173
and consumers alike, can be placed completely at their
mercy. This is easily illustrated. Suppose an article of
daily use is desired to be prescribed by the aliens,
because the producer or importer does not offer them
sufficient profits, or because a new competing article
offers bigger profits for its introduction. All that aliens
would do is to agree to refuse to sell the first article,
eliminating it from their stocks, offering the new one as a
substitute. Hence, the producers or importers of the
prescribed article, or its consumers, find the article
suddenly out of circulation. Freedom of trade is thus
curtailed and free enterprise correspondingly suppressed.
We can even go farther than theoretical illustrations to

show the pernicious influences of alien domination. Grave
abuses have characterized the exercise of the retail trade
by aliens. It is a fact within judicial notice, which courts of
justice may not properly overlook or ignore in the
interests of truth and justice, that there exists a general
feeling on the part of the public that alien participation in
the retail trade has been attended by a pernicious and
intolerable practices, the mention of a few of which would
suffice for our purposes; that at some time or other they
have cornered the market of essential commodities, like
corn and rice, creating artificial scarcities to justify and
enhance profits to unreasonable proportions; that they
have hoarded essential foods to the inconvenience and
prejudice of the consuming public, so much so that the
Government has had to establish the National Rice and
Corn Corporation to save the public from their continuous
hoarding practices and tendencies; that they have
violated price control laws, especially on foods and
essential commodities, such that the legislature had to
enact a law (Sec. 9, Republic Act No. 1168), authorizing
their immediate and automatic deportation for price
control convictions; that they have secret combinations
among themselves to control prices, cheating the
operation of the law of supply and demand;
1174
1174
that they have connived to boycott honest merchants and
traders who would not cater or yield to their demands, in
unlawful restraint of freedom of trade and enterprise.
They are believed by the public to have evaded tax laws,
smuggled goods and money into and out of the land,

violated import and export prohibitions, control laws and
the like, in derision and contempt of lawful authority. It is
also believed that they have engaged in corrupting public
officials with fabulous bribes, indirectly causing the
prevalence of graft and corruption in the Government. As
a matter of fact appeals to unscrupulous aliens have been
made both by the Government and by their own lawful
diplomatic representatives, action which impliedly admits
a prevailing feeling about the existence of many of the
above practices.
The circumstances above set forth create well founded
fears that worse things may come in the future. The
present dominance of the alien retailer, especially in the
big centers of population, therefore, becomes a potential
source of danger on occasions of war or other calamity.
We do not have here in this country isolated groups of
harmless aliens retailing goods among nationals; what we
have are well organized and powerful groups that
dominate the distribution of goods and commodities in
the communities and big centers of population. They owe
no allegiance or loyalty to the State, and the State cannot
rely upon them in times of crisis or emergency. While the
national holds his life, his person and his property subject
to the needs of his country, the alien may even become
the potential enemy of the State.
f. Law enacted in interest of national economic
survival and security.
We are fully satisfied upon a consideration of all the facts
and circumstances that the disputed law is not the
product of racial hostility, prejudice or discrimination, but
the expression of the legitimate desire and determina-
1175
VOL. 101, MAY 31, 1957
1175
tion of the people, thru their authorized representatives,
to free the nation from the economic situation that has
unfortunately been saddled upon it rightly or wrongly, to
its disadvantage. The law is clearly in the interest of the
public, nay of the national security itself, and indisputably
falls within the scope of police power, thru which and by
which the State insures its existence and security and the
supreme welfare of its citizens.
VI. The Equal Protection Limitation
a.Objections to alien participation in retail trade.
The next question that now poses solution is, Does the
law deny the equal protection of the laws? As pointed out
above, the mere fact of alienage is the root and cause of
the distinction between the alien and the national as a
trader. The alien resident owes allegiance to the country
of his birth or his adopted country; his stay here is for
personal convenience; he is attracted by the lure of gain
and profit. His aim or purpose of stay, we admit, is
neither illegitimate nor immoral, but he is naturally
lacking in that spirit of loyalty and enthusiasm for this
country where he temporarily stays and makes his living,
or of that spirit of regard, sympathy and consideration for
his Filipino customers as would prevent him from taking
advantage of their weakness and exploiting them. The
faster he makes his pile, the earlier can the alien go back
to his beloved country and his beloved kin and
countrymen. The experience of the country is that the
alien retailer has shown such utter disregard for his

customers and the people on whom he makes his profit,
that it has been found necessary to adopt the legislation,
radical as it may seem.
Another objection to the alien retailer in this country is
that he never really makes a genuine contribution to
national income and wealth. He undoubtedly contributes
to general distribution, but the gains and profits he makes
are not invested in industries that would help the
1176
1176
country's economy and increase national wealth. The
alien's interest in this country being merely transient and
temporary, it would indeed be ill-advised to continue
entrusting the very important function of retail
distribution to his hands.
The practices resorted to by aliens in the control of
distribution, as already pointed out above, their secret
manipulations of stocks of commodities and prices, their
utter disregard of the welfare of their customers and of
the ultimate happiness of the people of the nation of
which they are mere guests, which practices,
manipulations and disregard do not attend the exercise of
the trade by the nationals, show the existence of real and
actual, positive and fundamental differences between an
alien and a national which fully justify the legislative
classification adopted in the retail trade measure. These
differences are certainly a valid reason for the State to
prefer the national over the alien in the retail trade. We
would be doing violence to fact and reality were we to

hold that no reason or ground for a legitimate distinction
can be found between one and the other.
b. Difference in alien aims and purposes sufficient
basis for distinction.
The above objectionable characteristics of the exercise of
the retail trade by the aliens, which are actual and real,
furnish sufficient grounds for legislative classification of
retail traders into nationals and aliens. Some may
disagree with the wisdom of the legislature's
classification. To this we answer, that this is the
prerogative of the law-making power. Since the Court
finds that the classification is actual, real and reasonable,
and all persons of one class are treated alike, and as it
cannot be said that the classification is patently
unreasonable and unfounded, it is in duty bound to
declare that the legislature acted within its legitimate
prerogative and it cannot declare that the act transcends
the limit of equal protection established by the
Constitution.
1177
VOL. 101, MAY 31, 1957
1177
Broadly speaking, the power of the legislature to make
distinctions and classifications among persons is not
curtailed or denied by the equal protection of the laws
clause. The legislative power admits of a wide scope of
discretion, and a law can be violative of the constitutional
limitation only when the classification is without
reasonable basis. In addition to the authorities we have
earlier cited, we can also refer to the case of Lindsley vs.

Natural Carbonic Gas Co. (1911), 55 L. ed., 369, which
clearly and succinctly defined the application of equal
protection clause to a law sought to be voided as contrary
thereto:
"* * *. 1. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment does not take from the state the power to
classify in the adoption of police laws, but admits of the
exercise of the wide scope of discretion in that regard,
and avoids what is done only when it is without any
reasonable basis, and therefore is purely arbitrary. 2. A
classification having some reasonable basis does not
offend against that clause merely because it is not made
with mathematical nicety, or because in practice it results
in some inequality. 3. When the classification in such a
law is called in question, if any state of facts reasonably
can be conceived that would sustain it, the existence of
that state of facts at the time the law was enacted must
be assumed. 4. One who assails the classification in such
a law must carry the burden of showing that it does not
rest upon any reasonable basis, but is essentially
arbitrary.'"
c. Authorities recognizing citizenship as basis for
classification.
The question as to whether or not citizenship is a legal
and valid ground for classification has already been
affirmatively decided in this jurisdiction as well as in
various courts in the United States. In the case of Smith
Bell & Co. vs. Natividad, 40 Phil. 136, where the validity of
Act No. 2761 of the Philippine Legislature was in issue,
because of a condition therein limiting the ownership of
vessels engaged in coastwise trade to corporations
formed by citizens of the Philippine Islands or the United

States, thus denying the right to aliens, it was held that
the Philippine Legislature did not violate the equal pro1178
1178
tection clause of the Philippine Bill of Rights. The
Legislature in enacting the law had as ultimate purpose
the encouragement of Philippine shipbuilding and the
safety for these Islands from foreign interlopers. We held
that this was a valid exercise of the police power, and all
presumptions are in favor of its constitutionality. In
substance, we held that the limitation of domestic
ownership of vessels engaged in coastwise trade to
citizens of the Philippines does not violate the equal
protection of the law and due process of law clauses of
the Philippine Bill of Rights. In rendering said decision we
quoted with approval the concurring opinion of Justice
Johnson in the case of Gibbons vs. Ogden, 9 Wheat., I, as
follows:
" 'Licensing acts, in fact, in legislation, are universally
restraining acts; as, for example, acts licensing gaming
houses, retailers of spirituous liquors, etc. The act, in this
instance, is distinctly of that character, and forms part of
an extensive system, the object of which is to encourage
American shipping, and place them on an equal footing
with the shipping of other nations. Almost every
commercial nation reserves to its own subjects a
monopoly of its coasting trade; and a countervailing
privilege in favor of American shipping is contemplated,
in the whole legislation of the United States on this
subject. It is not to give the vessel an American

character, that the license is granted; that effect has
been correctly attributed to the act of her enrollment. But
it is to confer on her American privileges, as
contradistinguished from foreign; and to preserve the
Government from fraud by foreigners; in surreptitiously
intruding themselves into the American commercial
marine, as well as frauds upon the revenue in the trade
coastwise, that this whole system is projected.'"
The rule in general is as follows:
"Aliens are under no special constitutional protection
which forbids a classification otherwise justified simply
because the limitation of the class falls along the lines of
nationality. That would be requiring a higher degree of
protection for aliens as a class than for similar classes of
American citizens. Broadly speaking, the difference in
status between citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for
reasonable classification in the exercise of police power."
(2 Am. Jur. 468-469.)
1179
VOL. 101, MAY 31, 1957
1179
In Commonwealth vs. Hana, 81 N. E. 149 (Massachusetts,
1907), a statute on the licensing of hawkers and
peddlers, which provided that no one can obtain a license
unless he is, or has declared his intention, to become a
citizen of the United States, was held valid, for the
following reason: It may seem wise to the legislature to
limit the business of those who are supposed to have
regard for the welfare, good order and happiness of the
community, and the court cannot question this judgment

and conclusion. In Bloomfield vs. State, 99 N.E. 309 (Ohio,
1912), a statute which prevented certain persons, among
them aliens, from engaging in the traffic of liquors, was
found not to be the result of race hatred, or inhospitality,
or a deliberate purpose to discriminate, but was based on
the belief that an alien cannot be sufficiently acquainted
with 'our institutions and our life as to enable him to
appreciate the relation of this particular business to our
entire social f abric", and was not, theref ore, invalid. In
Ohio ex rel. Clarke vs. Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392, 71 L. ed.
1115 (1926), the U. S. Supreme Court had under
consideration an ordinance of the city of Cincinnati
prohibiting the issuance of licenses (pools and billiard
rooms) to aliens. It held that plainly irrational
discrimination against aliens is prohibited, but it does not
follow that alien race and allegiance may not bear in
some instances such a relation to a legitimate object of
legislation as to be made the basis of permitted
classification, and that it could not state that the
legislation is clearly wrong; and that latitude must be
allowed for the legislative appraisement of local
conditions and for the legislative choice of methods for
controlling an apprehended evil. The case of State vs.
Carrol, 124 N. E. 129 (Ohio, 1919) is a parallel case to the
one at bar. In Asakura, vs. City of Seattle, 210 P. 30
(Washington, 1922), the business of pawnbroking was
considered as having tendencies injuring public interest,
and limiting it to citizens is within the scope of police
power. A similar statute denying
1180
1180
aliens the right to engage in auctioneering was also

sustained in Wright vs. May, L. R. A., 1915 P. 151
(Minnesota, 1914). So also in Anton vs. Van Winkle, 297 F.
340 (Oregon, 1924), the court said that aliens are
judicially known to have different interests, knowledge,
attitude, psychology and loyalty, hence the prohibition of
issuance of licenses to them for the business of
pawnbroker, pool, billiard, card room, dance hall, is not an
infringement of constitutional rights. In Templar vs.
Michigan State Board of Examiners, 90 N.W. 1058
(Michigan, 1902), a law prohibiting the licensing of aliens
as barbers was held void, but the reason for the decision
was the court's finding that the exercise of the business
by the aliens does not in any way affect the morals, the
health, or even the convenience of the community. In
Takahashi vs. Fish and Game Commission, 92 L. ed. 1479
(1947), a California statute banning the issuance of
commercial fishing licenses to persons ineligible to
citizenship was held void, because the law conflicts with
Federal power over immigration, and because there is no
public interest in the mere claim of ownership of the
waters and the fish in them, so there was no adequate
justification for the discrimination. It further added that
the law was the outgrowth of antagonism toward persons
of Japanese ancestry. However, two Justices dissented on
the theory that fishing rights have been treated
traditionally as natural resources. In Fraser vs. McConway
& Tarley Co., 82 Fed. 257 (Pennsylvania, 1897), a state
law which imposed a tax on every employer of foreignborn unnaturalized male persons over 21 years of age,
was declared void because the court found that there was
no reason for the classification .and the tax was an
arbitrary deduction from the daily wage of an employee.
d. Authorities contra explained.

It is true that some decisions of the Federal court and of
the State courts in the United States hold that the
distinction between aliens and citizens is not a valid
1181
VOL. 101, MAY 81, 1957
1181
ground for classification. But in these decisions the laws
declared invalid were found to be either arbitrary,
unreasonable or capricious, or were the result or product
of racial antagonism and hostility, and there was no
question of public interest involved or pursued. In Yu
Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, 70 L. ed. 1059 (1925), the United
States Supreme Court declared invalid a Philippine law
making unlawful the keeping of books of account in any
language other than English, Spanish or any other local
dialect, but the main reasons for the decisions are: (1)
that if Chinese were driven out of business there would
be no other system of distribution, and (2) that the
Chinese would fall prey to all kinds of fraud, because they
would be deprived of their right to be advised of their
business and to direct its conduct. The real reason for the
decision, therefore, is the court's belief that no public
benefit would be derived from the operation of the law
and on the other hand it would deprive Chinese of
something indispensable for carrying on their business. In
Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 30 L. ed. 220 (1885) an ordinance
conferring power on officials to withhold consent in the
operation of laundries both as to persons and place, was
declared invalid, but the court said that the power
granted was arbitrary, that there was no reason for the
discrimination which attended the administration and

implementation of the law, and that the motive thereof
was mere racial hostility. In State vs. Montgomery, 47 A.
165 (Maine, 1900), a law prohibiting aliens to engage as
hawkers and peddlers was declared void, because the
discrimination bore no reasonable and just relation to the
act in respect to which the classification was proposed.
The case at bar is radically different, and the facts make
them so. As we already have said, aliens do not naturally
possess the sympathetic consideration and regard for
customers with whom they come in daily contact, nor the
patriotic desire to help bolster the nation's economy,
except in so far as it enhances their profit,
1182
1182
Ichong etc.. et al. vs. Hernandez, etc., and Sarmiento
nor the loyalty and allegiance which the national owes to
the land. These limitations on the qualifications of aliens
have been shown on many occasions and instances,
especially in times of crisis and emergency. We can do no
better than borrow the language of Anton vs. Van Winkle,
297 F. 340, 342, to drive home the reality and
significance of the distinction between the alien and the
national, thus:
"* * *. It may be judicially known, however, that aliens
coming into this country are without the intimate
knowledge of our laws, customs, and usages that our own
people have. So it is likewise known that certain classes
of aliens are of different psychology from our fellow
countrymen. Furthermore, it is natural and reasonable to
suppose that the foreign born, whose allegiance is first to

their own country, and whose ideals of governmental
environment and control have been engendered and
formed under entirely different regimes and political
systems, have not the same inspiration for the public
weal, nor are they as well disposed toward the United
States, as those who by citizenship, are a part of the
government itself. Further enlargement, is unnecessary. I
have said enough so that obviously it cannot be affirmed
with absolute confidence that the Legislature was without
plausible reason for making the classification, and
therefore appropriate discrimination against aliens as it
relates to the subject of legislation. * * *."
VII The Due Process of Law Limitation
a. Reasonability, the test of the limitation;
determination by legislature decisive.
We now come to due process as a limitation on the
exercise of the police power. It has been stated by the
highest authority in the United States that:
"* * * And the guaranty of due process, as has often been
held, demands only that the law shall not be
unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means
selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the
subject sought to be attained. * * *."
*
"So far as the requirement of due process is concerned

and in the absence of other constitutional restriction a
state is free to adopt whatever economic policy may
reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare, and to
enforce that policy by legislation adapted
1183
VOL. 101, MAY 31, 1957
1183
to its purpose. The courts are without authority either to
declare such policy, or, when it is declared by the
legislature, to override it. If the laws passed are seen to
have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative
purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the
requirements of due process are satisfied, and judicial
determination to that effect renders a court functus
officio. * * *." (Nebbia vs. New York, 78 L. ed. 940, 950,
957.)
Another authority states the principle thus:
"* * *. Too much significance cannot be given to the word
'reasonable' in considering the scope of the police power
in a constitutional sense, for the test used to determine
the constitutionality of the means employed by the
legislature is to inquire whether the restrictions it imposes
on rights secured to individuals by the Bill of Rights are
unreasonable, and not whether it imposes any restrictions
on such rights. * * *."
*
"* * *. A statute to be within this power must also be

reasonable in its operation upon the persons whom it
affects, must not be for the annoyance of a particular
class, and must not be unduly oppressive." (11 Am. Jur.
Sec. 302, pp. 1074-1075.)
In the case of Lawton vs. Steele, 38 L. ed. 385, 388, it
was also held:
"* * *. To justify the state in thus interposing its authority

in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the
interests of the public generally, as distinguished from
those of a particular class, require such interference; and
second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose, and -not unduly
oppressive upon individuals. * * *."
Prata Undertaking Co. vs. State Board of Embalming, 104
ALR, 389, 395, fixes this test of constitutionality:
"In determining whether a given act of the Legislature,
passed in the exercise of the police power to regulate the
operation of a business, is or is not constitutional, one of
the first questions to be considered by the court is
whether the power as exercised has a sufficient
foundation in reason in connection with the matter
involved, or is an arbitrary, oppressive, and capricious
use of that power, without substantial relation to the
health, safety, morals, comfort, and general welfare of
the public."
1184
1184
lchong etc., et al. vs. Hernandez, etc., and Sarmiento
b. Petitioner's argument considered.
Petitioner's main argument is that retail is a common,
ordinary occupation, one of those privileges long ago
recognized as essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness by free men; that it is a gainful and honest
occupation and therefore beyond the power of the
legislature to prohibit and penalize. This argument
overlooks fact and reality and rests on an incorrect
assumption and premise, i.e., that in this country where

the occupation is engaged in by petitioner, it has been so
engaged by him, by the alien, in an honest creditable and
unimpeachable manner, without harm or injury to the
citizens and without ultimate danger to their economic
peace, tranquility and welfare. But the Legislature has
found, as we have also found and indicated, that the
privilege has been so grossly abused by the alien, thru
the illegitimate use of pernicious designs and practices,
that he now enjoys a monopolistic control of the
occupation and threatens a deadly stranglehold on the
nation's economy endangering the national security in
times of crisis and emergency.
The real question at issue, therefore, is not that posed by
petitioner, which overlooks and ignores the facts and
circumstances, but this, Is the exclusion in the future of
aliens from the retail trade unreasonable, arbitrary and
capricious, taking into account the illegitimate and
pernicious form and manner in which the aliens have
heretofore engaged therein? As thus correctly stated the
answer is clear. The law in question is deemed absolutely
necessary to bring about the desired legislative objective,
i.e., to free national economy from alien control and do
minance. It is not necessarily unreasonable because it
affects private rights and privileges (11 Am. Jur. pp. 10801081.) The test of reasonableness of a law is the
appropriateness or adequacy under all circumstances of
the means adopted to carry out its purpose into effect
(Id.) Judged by this test, disputed legislation, which is
1185
VOL. 101, MAY 31, 1957
1185
not merely reasonable but actually necessary, must be

considered not to have infringed the constitutional
limitation of reasonableness.
The necessity of the law in question is explained in the
explanatory note that accompanied the bill, which later
was enacted into law:
"This bill proposes to regulate the retail business. Its
purpose is to prevent persons who are not citizens of the
Philippines from having a strangle hold upon our
economic life. If the persons who control this vital artery
of our economic life are the ones who owe no allegiance
to this Republic, who have no profound devotion to our
free institutions, and who have no permanent stake in our
people's welfare, we are not really the masters of our own
destiny. All aspects of our life, even our national security,
will be at the mercy of other people.
"In seeking to accomplish the foregoing purpose, we do
not propose to deprive persons who are not citizens of
the Philippines of their means of livelihood. While this bill
seeks to take away from the hands of persons who are
not citizens of the Philippines a power that can be
wielded to paralyze all aspects of our national life and
endanger our national security it respects existing rights.
"The approval of this bill is 'necessary for our national
survival."
If political independence is a legitimate aspiration of a
people, then economic independence is none the less
legitimate. Freedom and liberty are not real and positive
if the people are subject to the economic control and
domination of others, especially if not of their own race or
country. The removal and eradication of the shackles of

foreign economic control and domination, is one of the
noblest motives that a national legislature may pursue. It
is impossible to conceive that legislation that seeks to
bring it about can infringe the constitutional limitation of
due process. The attainment of a legitimate aspiration of
a people can never be beyond the limits of legislative
authority.
c. Law expressly held by Constitutional Convention
to be within the sphere of legislative action.
The framers of the Constitution could not have intended
to impose the constitutional restrictions of due
1186
1186
process on the attainment of such a noble motive as
freedom from economic control and domination, thru the
exercise of the police power. The fathers of the
Constitution must have given to the legislature full
authority and power to enact legislation that would
promote the supreme happiness of the people, their
freedom and liberty. On the precise issue now before us,
they expressly made their voice clear; they adopted a
resolution expressing their belief that the legislation in
question is within the scope of the legislative power. Thus
they declared in their Resolution:
" That it is the sense of the Convention that the public
interest requires the nationalization of retail trade; but it
abstains from approving the amendment introduced by
the Delegate for Manila, Mr. Araneta, and others on this
matter because it is convinced that the National

Assembly is authorized to promulgate a law which limits
to Filipino and American citizens the privilege to engage
in the retail trade.'" (II Aruego, The Framing of the
Philippine Constitution, 662-663, quoted on pages 66 and
67 of the Memorandum for the Petitioner.)
It would do well to refer to the nationalistic tendency
manifested in various provisions of the Constitution. Thus
in the preamble, a principal objective is the conservation
of the patrimony of the nation and as corollary thereto
the provision limiting to citizens of the Philippines the
exploitation, development and utilization of its natural
resources. And in Section 8 of Article XIV, it is provided
that "no franchise, certificate, or any other form of
authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be
granted except to citizens of the Philippines." The
nationalization of the retail trade is only a continuance of
the nationalistic protective policy laid down as a primary
objective of the Constitution. Can it be said that a law
imbued with the same purpose and spirit underlying
many of the provisions of the Constitution is
unreasonable, invalid and unconstitutional ?
The seriousness of the Legislature's concern for the plight
of the nationals as manifested in the approval
1187
VOL. 101, MAY 31, 1957
1187
of the radical measure is, therefore, fully justified. It
would have been recreant to its duties towards the
country and its people would it view the sorry plight of
the nationals with complacency and refuse or neglect to

adopt a remedy commensurate with the demands of
public interest and national survival. As the repository of
the sovereign power of legislation, the Legislature was in
duty bound to face the problem and meet, through
adequate measures, the danger and threat that alien
domination of retail trade poses to national economy.
d. Provisions of law not unreasonable.
A cursory study of the provisions of the law immediately
reveals how tolerant, how reasonable the Legislature has
been. The law is made prospective and recognizes the
right and privilege of those already engaged in the
occupation to continue therein during the rest of their
lives; and similar recognition of the right to continue is
accorded associations of aliens. The right or privilege is
denied to those only upon conviction of certain offenses.
In the deliberations of the Court on this case, attention
was called to the fact that the privilege should not have
been denied to children and heirs of aliens now engaged
in the retail trade. Such provision would defeat the law
itself, its aims and purposes. Besides, the exercise of
legislative discretion is not subject to judicial review. It is
well settled that the Court will not inquire into the
motives of the Legislature, nor pass upon general matters
of legislative judgment. The Legislature is primarily the
judge of the necessity of an enactment or of any of its
provisions, and every presumption is in favor of its
validity, and though the Court may hold views
inconsistent with the wisdom of the law, it may not annul
the legislation if not palpably in excess of the legislative
power. Furthermore, the test of the validity of a law
attacked as a violation of due process, is not its
reasonableness, but its unreasonableness, and we find
1188
1188
he provisions are not unreasonable. These principles also
answer various other arguments raised against the law,
some of which are: that the law does not promote general
welfare; that thousands of aliens would be thrown out of
employment; that prices will increase because of the
elimination of competition; that there is no need for the
legislation; that adequate replacement is problematical;
that there may be general breakdown; that there would
be repercussions from foreigners; etc. Many of these
arguments are directed against the supposed wisdom of
the law which lies solely within the legislative
prerogative; they do not import invalidity.
VIII. Alleged defect in the title of the law
A subordinate ground or reason for the alleged invalidity
of the law is the claim that the title thereof is misleading
or deceptive, as it conceals the real purpose of the bill,
which is to nationalize the retail business and prohibit
aliens from engaging therein. The constitutional provision
which is claimed to be violated in Section 21 (1) of Article
VI, which reads:
"No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace
more than one subject which shall be expressed in the
title of the bill."
What the above provision prohibits is duplicity, that is, if
its title completely fails to apprise the legislators or the
public of the nature, scope and consequences of the law
or its operation (I Sutherland, Statutory Construction, Sec.
1707, p. 297.) A cursory consideration of the title and the

provisions of the bill fails to show the presence of
duplicity. It is true that the term "regulate" does not and
may not readily and at first glance convey the idea of
"nationalization" and "prohibition", which terms express
the two main purposes and objectives of the law. But
"regulate" is a broader term than either prohibition or
nationalization. Both of these have always been included
within the term regulation.
1189
VOL. 101, MAY 31, 1957
1189
lchong etc., et al. vs. Hernandez, etc., and Sarmiento
"Under the title of an act to 'regulate', the sale of
intoxicating liquors, the Legislature may prohibit the sale
of intoxicating liquors." (Sweet vs. City of Wabash, 41
Ind., 7; quoted in page 41 of Answer.)
"Within the meaning of the Constitution requiring that the
subject of every act of the Legislature shall be stated in
the title, the title To regulate the sale of intoxicating
liquors, etc." sufficiently expresses the subject of an act
prohibiting the sale of such liquors to minors and to
persons in the habit of getting intoxicated; such matters
being properly included within the subject of regulating
the sale." (Williams vs. State, 48 Ind. 306, 308, quoted in
p. 42 of Answer.)
"The word 'regulate' is of broad import, and necessarily
implies some degree of restraint and prohibition of acts
usually done in connection with the thing to be regulated.
While word regulate' does not ordinarily convey meaning
of prohibit, there is no absolute reason why it should not
have such meaning when used in delegating police power

in connection with a thing the best or only efficacious
regulation of which involves suppression." (State vs.
Morton, 162 So. 718, 182 La. 887, quoted in p. 42 of
Answer.)
The general rule is for the use of general terms in the title
of a bill; it has also been said that the title need not be an
index to the entire contents of the law (I Sutherland,
Statutory Construction, Sec. 4803, p. 345.) The above
rule was followed when the title of the Act in question
adopted the more general term "regulate" instead of
"nationalize" or "prohibit". Furthermore, the law also
contains other rules for the regulation of the retail trade,
which may not be included in the terms "nationalization"
or "prohibition"; so were the title changed from "regulate"
to "nationalize" or "prohibit", there would have been
many provisions not f alling within the scope of the title
which would have made the Act invalid. The use of the
term "regulate", therefore, is in accord with the principle
governing the drafting of statutes, under which a simple
or general term should be adopted in the title, which
would include all other provisions found in the body of the
Act.
One purpose of the constitutional directive that the
subject of a bill should be embraced in its title is to
apprise the legislators of the purposes, the nature and
scope of its provisions, and prevent the enactment into
law of matters
1190
1190
which have not received the notice, action and study of

the legislators or of the public. In the case at bar it cannot
be claimed that the legislators have not been apprised of
the nature of the law, especially the nationalization and
prohibition provisions. The legislators took active interest
in the discussion of the law, and a great many of the
persons affected by the prohibition in the law conducted
a campaign against its approval. It cannot be claimed,
therefore, that the reasons for declaring the law invalid
ever existed. The objection must therefore, be overruled.
IX. Alleged violation of international treaties and
obligations
Another subordinate argument against the validity of the
law is the supposed violation thereby of the Charter of
the United Nations and of the Declaration of Human
Rights adopted by the United Nations General Assembly.
We find no merit in the above contention. The United
Nations Charter imposes no strict or legal obligations
regarding the rights and freedom of their subjects (Hans
Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations, 1951 ed. pp.
2932), and the Declaration of Human Rights contains
nothing more than a mere recommendation, or a
common standard of achievement for all peoples and all
nations (Id. p. 39.) That such is the import of the United
Nations Charter aid of the Declaration of Human Rights
can be inferred from the fact that members of the United
Nations Organization, such as Norway and Denmark,
prohibit foreigners from engaging in retail trade, and in
most nations of the world laws against foreigners
engaged in domestic trade are adopted.
The Treaty of Amity between the Republic of the
Philippines and the Republic of China of April 18, 1947 is
also claimed to be violated by the law in question. All that

the treaty guarantees is equality of treatment to the
Chinese nationals "upon the same terms as the nationals
of any other country." But the nationals of China are not
dis1191
VOL. 101, MAY 31, 1957
1191
criminated against because nationals of all other
countries, except those of the United States, who are
granted special rights by the Constitution, are all
prohibited f rom engaging in the retail trade. But even
supposing that the law infringes upon the said treaty, the
treaty is always subject to qualification or amendment by
a subsequent law (U. S. vs. Thompson, 258, Fed. 257,
260), and the same may never curtail or restrict the
scope of the police power of the State (Palston vs.
Pennsylvania, 58 L. ed. 539.)
X. Conclusion
Resuming what we have set forth above we hold that the
disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual threat
and danger to national economy posed by alien
dominance and control of the retail business and free
citizens and country from such dominance and control;
that the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the
police power of the State, thru which and by which it
protects its own personality and insures its security and
future; that the law does not violate the equal protection
clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds
exist for the distinction between alien and citizen in the
exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due process

of law clause, because the law is prospective in operation
and recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in
the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege;
that the wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its
objectives appear to us to be plainly evidentas a matter
of f act it seems not only appropriate but actually
necessaryand that in any case such matter falls within
the prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power and
discretion the Judicial department of the Government
may not interfere; that the provisions of the law are
clearly embraced in the title, and this suffers from no
duplicity and has not misled the legislators or the
segment of the population affected; and that it cannot be
said to be void for supposed conflict with treaty
obligations because no treaty has actually been en1192
1192
tered into on the subject and the police power may not be
curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other
conventional agreement.
Some members of the Court are of the opinion that the
radical effects of the law could have been made less
harsh in its impact on the aliens. Thus it is stated that
more time should have been given in the law for the
liquidation of existing businesses when the time comes
for them to close. Our legal duty, however, is merely to
determine if the law falls within the scope of legislative
authority and does not transcend the limitations of due
process and equal protection guaranteed in the
Constitution. Remedies against the harshness of the law

should be addressed to the Legislature; they are beyond
our power and jurisdiction.
The petition is hereby denied, with costs against
petitioner.
Pars, C. J., Bengzon, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo,
Concepcin, Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia, and Felix, JJ.,
concur.
PADILLA, J., concurring and dissenting:
I agree to the proposition, principle or rule that courts
may not inquire into the wisdom of an Act passed by the
Congress and duly approved by the President of the
Republic. But the rule does not preclude courts from
inquiring and determining whether the Act offends
against a provision or provisions of the Constitution. I am
satisfied that the Act assailed as violative of the due
process of law and the equal protection of the laws
clauses of the Constitution does not infringe upon them,
insofar as it affects associations, partnerships or
corporations, the capital of which is not wholly owned by
citizens of the Philippines, and aliens, who are not and
have not been engaged in the retail business. I am,
however, unable to persuade myself that it does not
violate said clauses insofar as the Act applies to
associations and partnerships referred to in the Act and to
aliens, who are and have
1193
VOL. 101, MAY 31, 1957
1193
heretofore been engaged in said business. When they did

engage in the retail business there was no prohibition on
or against them to engage in it. They assumed and
believed in good faith they were entitled to engage in the
business. The Act allows aliens to continue in business
until their death or voluntary retirement f rom the
business or forfeiture of their license; and corporations,
associations or partnerships, the capital of which is not
wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines to continue in
the business for a period of ten years from the date of the
approval of the Act (19 June 1954) or until the expiry of
the term of the existence of the association or
partnership or corporation, whichever event comes first.
The prohibition on corporations, the capital of which is
not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines, to engage
in the retail business for a period of more than ten years
from the date of the approval of the Act or beyond the
term of their corporate existence, whichever event comes
first, is valid and lawful, because the continuance of the
existence of such corporations is subject to whatever the
Congress may impose reasonably upon them by
subsequent legislation.1 But the prohibition to engage in
the retail business by associations and partnerships, the
capital of which is not wholly owned by citizens of the
Philippines, after ten years from the date of the approval
of the Act, even bef ore the end of the term of their
existence as agreed upon by the associates and partners,
and by alien heirs to whom the retail business is
transmitted by the death of an alien engaged in the
business, or by his executor or administrator, amounts to
a deprivation of their property without due process of law.
To my mind, the ten-year period from the date of the
approval of the Act or until the expiration of the term of
the existence of the association and partnership,
whichever event comes first, and the sixmonth period

granted to alien heirs of a deceased alien,
________________
1
Section 76, Act No. 1459.
1194
1194
Ichong etc., et al. vs. Hernandez, etc,, and Sarmiento
his executor or administrator, to liquidate the business,
do not cure the defect of the law, because the effect of
the prohibition is to compel them to sell or dispose of
their business. The price obtainable at such forced sale of
the business would be inadequate to reimburse and
compensate the associates or partners of the association
or partnership, and the alien heirs of a deceased alien,
engaged in the retail business for the capital invested in
it. The stock of merchandise bought and sold at retail
does not alone constitute the business. The goodwill that
the association, partnership and the alien had built up
during a long period of effort, patience and perseverance
forms part of such business. The constitutional provisions
that no person shall be deprived of his property without
due process of law 1 and that no person shall be denied
the equal protection of the laws 2 would have no meaning
as applied to associations or partnerships and alien heirs
of an alien engaged in the retail business if they were to
be compelled to sell or dispose of their business within
ten years from the date of the approval of the Act and
before the end of the term of the existence of the
associations and partnerships as agreed upon by the
associates and partners and within six months after the
death of their predecessorin-interest.
The authors of the Constitution were vigilant, caref ul and

zealous in the safeguard of the ownership of private
agricultural lands which together with the lands of the
public domain constitute the priceless patrimony and
mainstay of the nation; yet, they did not deem it wise and
prudent to deprive aliens and their heirs of such lands, 3
For these reasons, I am of the opinion that section 1 of
the Act, insofar as it compels associations and
partnerships referred to therein to wind up their retail
business within ten years from the date of the approval of
the Act
________________
1
Section 1(1), Article III, of the Constitution.
Ibid.
Section 5, Article XIII, of the Constitution.
1195
VOL. 101, MAY 81. 1957
1195
even before the expiry of the term of their existence as
agreed upon by the associates and partners and section 3
of the Act, insofar as it compels the alien heirs of a
deceased alien engaged in the retail business in his
lifetime, his executor or administrator, to liquidate the
business, are invalid, for they violate the due process of
law and the equal protection of the laws clauses of the
Constitution.
Petition denied.

230

Gonzales vs. Hechanova
No. L-21897. October 22, 1963.

RAMON A. GONZALES, petitioner, vs. RUFINO G.
HECHANOVA, as Executive Secretary, MACARIO
PERALTA,JR., as Secretary of Defense, PEDRO
GIMENEZ, as Auditor General, CORNELIO
BALMACEDA, as Secretary of Commerce and
Industry, and SALVADOR MARINO, as Secretary
of Justice, respondents.
Parties; Real party in interest; Sufficiency of petitioners
interest as rice planter and taxpayer to seek restraint of
allegedly illegal rice importation.The status of
petitioner, as a planter with a rice land of substantial
proportion, entitled him to a chance to sell to the
Government the rice it now seeks to buy abroad and, as a
taxpayer affected by the purchase of the commodity
effected with public funds mainly raised by taxation,
gives said petitioner sufficient interest to file the instant
petition seeking to restrain the allegedly unlawful
disbursement of public funds to import rice from abroad.
Administrative Law; Exhaustion of administrative
remedies; Exceptions applicable to case at bar.The
principle requiring the previous exhaustion of
administrative remedies is not applicable: (1) where the
question in dispute is purely a legal one, or (2) where the
controverted act is patently illegal or was performed
without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction; or (3)
where the respondent is a department secretary, whose

acts as an alter-ego of the President bear the implied or
assumed
231
VOL. 9, OCTOBER 22, 1963
231
approval of the latter, unless actually disapproved by

him, or (4) where there are circumstances indicating the
urgency of judicial intervention. The case at bar falls
under each one of the foregoing exceptions to the
general rule.
Rice and Corn Importation Laws; Illegal importation
where conditions for importation not complied with.
Since the Rice and Corn Importation Laws (Republic Acts
Nos. 2207 and 3452) set conditions for the importation of
rice, and in the case at bar conditions have not been
complied with, it is held that the proposed importations
are illegal.
Same; Importations made by the government itself.
The provisions of Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452,
prohibiting the importation of rice and corn by any
government agency, apply likewise to importations
made by the Government itself, because each and
every officer and employee of our Government, is a
government agency and/or agent.
Same; Protection of local planters of rice and corn to
foster self-sufficiency in local production.The protection
of local planters of rice and corn in a manner that would
foster and accelerate self-sufficiency in the local
production of said commodities constitutes a factor that
is vital to our ability to meet a possible national

emergency.
Constitutional Law; Executive Powers; An executive
officer cannot disregard the law even if he believes that
compliance mill not benefit the people.Respondents
trend of thought, that, if an executive officer believes that
compliance with a certain statute will not benefit the
people, he is at liberty to disregard it, must be rejected
we still live under a rule of law.
Same; Same; President may not, by executive
agreement, enter into a transaction which is prohibited
by statutes enacted prior thereto.Although the
President may, under the American constitutional system,
enter into executive agreements without previous
legislative authority, he may not, by executive
by statutes enacted prior thereto.
Same; Same; Main function of Executive is to enforce
laws enacted by Congress, not to defeat same.Under
the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to
enforce laws enacted by Congress. The former may not
interfere in the performance of the legislative powers of
the latter, except in the exercise of the veto power. He
may not defeat legislative enactments that have acquired
the status of law, by indirectly repealing the same
through an executive agreement providing for the
performance of the very act prohibited by said laws.
Statutory Construction; Theory that in a conflict between
treaty and statute the latest in point of time shall prevail,
not applicable to executive agreements; Case at Bar.
The American
232
232

theory that in the event of conflict between a treaty and a

statute, the one which is latest in point of time shall
prevail, is not applicable to the case at bar, for
respondents not only admit, but, also, insist that the
contracts in question are not treaties. Said theory may be
justified upon the ground that treaties to which the United
States is a signatory require the advice and consent of
the Senate, and, hence, of a branch of the legislative
department. No such justification can be given as regards
executive agreements not authorized by previous
legislation, without completely upsetting the principle of
separation of powers and the system of checks and
balances which are fundamental in our constitutional set
up and that of the United States.
Courts; Jurisdiction; Power to invalidate treaties.The
Constitution of the Philippines has clearly settled the
question of whether an international agreement may be
invalidated by our courts in the affirmative, by providing
in Section 2 of Article VIII thereof that the Supreme Court
may not be deprived of its jurisdiction to review, revise,
reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ of
error, as the law or the rules of court may provide, final
judgments and decrees of inferior courts in (1) all cases in
which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law,
ordinance, or executive order or regulation is in
question. In other words, our Constitution authorizes the
nullification of a treaty, not only when it conflicts with the
fundamental law, but, also, when it runs counter to an act
of Congress.
Bautista Angelo, J., concurring:

Rice Importation; Injunction not granted despite illegality
of importation where arrangements already concluded
with foreign governments; Reasons.Respondents,
despite their lack of compliance with the Rice Importation
Law, should not be enjoined from carrying out the
importation of the rice which according to the record has
been authorized to be imported on government to
government level, it appearing that the arrangement to
this effect has already been concluded, the only thing
lacking being its implementation. Had the writ been
issued, our government would have been placed in a
predicament where, as a necessary consequence, it
would have to repudiate a duly formalized agreement to
its great embarrassment and loss of face.
Constitutional Law; Executive Powers; Civil authority
supreme over the military.The injunction embodied in
the National Defense Act (Sec. 2, Com. Act No. 1) that the
civil authority shall always be supreme, can only mean
that while all precautions should be taken to in-sure the
security and preservation of the State and to this effect
the employment of all resources may be resorted to, the
action must always be taken within the framework of the
civil authority.
233
233
Barrera, J., concurring:

Constitutional Law; Supremacy of civil authority; Theory
that the military may disregard rice importation laws is
dangerous.The theory that rice can be legally imported

by the Armed Forces of the Philippines avowedly for its
future use, notwithstanding the prohibitory provisions of
Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452, is a dangerous trend.
To adopt this theory, is to proclaim the existence in the
Philippines of three economic groups or classes: the
producers, the consumers, and the Armed Forces of the
Philippines. What is more portentous is the effort to
equate the army with the Government itself.
Same; Executive Powers; National Security Council;
Function to deliberate on existence of emergency.It is
not for the Department of National Defense to unilaterally
determine the existence of a threat of emergency, but for
the National Security Council to do so. Otherwise, any
change in the political climate in any region of the world
is apt to be taken as an excuse for the military to conjure
up a crisis or emergency and, thereupon, attempt to
override our laws and legal processes, and imperceptibly
institute some kind of martial law on the pretext of
precautionary mobilization measure avowedly in the
interest of the security of the state.
Same; Same; Theory of the end justifies the means
rejected.Adoption as a government policy of the theory
of the end justifies the means brushing aside
constitutional and legal restraints, must be rejected, lest
we end up with the end of freedom.
ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Prohibition with
preliminary injunction.
Ramon A. Gonzales in his own behalf as petitioner.
Solicitor General and Estanislao Fernandez for

respondents.
CONCEPCION, J.:
This is an original action for prohibition with preliminary
injunction.
It is not disputed that on September 22, 1963,
respondent Executive Secretary authorized the
importation of 67,000 tons of foreign rice to be purchased
from private sources, and created a rice procurement
committee com234
234

posed of the other respondents herein1 for the
implementation of said proposed importation. Thereupon,
or on September 25, 1963, herein petitioner, Ramon A.
Gonzalesa rice planter, and president of the Iloilo Palay
and Corn Planters Association, whose members are,
likewise, engaged in the production of rice and cornfiled
the petition herein, averring that, in making or attempting
to make said importation of foreign rice, the
aforementioned respondents are acting without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, because Republic
Act No. 3452which allegedly repeals or amends
Republic Act No. 2207explicitly prohibits the
importation of rice and corn by the Rice and Corn
Administration or any other government agency; that
petitioner has no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law; and that a
preliminary injunction is necessary for the preservation of
the rights of the parties during the pendency of this case

and to prevent the judgment therein from becoming
ineffectual. Petitioner prayed, therefore, that said petition
be given due course; that a writ of preliminary injunction
be forthwith issued restraining respondents, their agents
or representatives from implementing the decision of the
Executive Secretary to import the aforementioned foreign
rice; and that, after due hearing, judgment be rendered
making said injunction permanent.
Forthwith, respondents were required to file their answer
to the petition which they did, and petitioners prayer for
a writ of preliminary injunction was set for hearing, at
which both parties appeared and argued orally. Moreover,
a memorandum was filed, shortly thereafter, by the
respondents. Considering, later on, that the resolution of
said incident may require some pronouncements that
would be more appropriate in a decision on the merits of
the case, the same was set for hearing on the merits soon
thereafter. The parties, however, waived the right to
argue orally, although counsel for respondents filed their
memoranda.
_______________
The Secretary of National Defense, the Auditor General,
the Secretary of Commerce and Industry, and the
Secretary of Justice.
1
235
I. Sufficiency of petitioners interest.
235
Respondents maintain that the status of petitioner as a

rice planter does not give him sufficient interest to file the
petition herein and secure the relief therein prayed for.
We find no merit in this pretense. Apart from prohibiting
the importation of rice and corn by the Rice and Corn
Administration or any other government agency,
Republic Act No. 3452 declares, in Section 1 thereof, that
the policy of the Government is to engage in the
purchase of these basic foods directly from those tenants,
farmers, growers, producers and landowners in the
Philippines who wish to dispose of their products at a
price that will afford them a fair and just return for their
labor and capital investment, x x x. Pursuant to this
provision, petitioner, as a planter with a rice land of
substantial proportion,2 is entitled to a chance to sell to
the Government the rice it now seeks to buy abroad.
Moreover, since the purchase of said commodity will have
to be effected with public funds mainly raised by taxation,
and as a rice producer and landowner petitioner must
necessarily be a taxpayer, it follows that he has sufficient
personality and interest to seek judicial assistance with a
view to restraining what he believes to be an attempt to
unlawfully disburse said funds.
II. Exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Respondents assail petitioners right to the reliefs prayed
for because he has not exhausted all administrative
remedies available to him before coming to court. We
have already held, however, that the principle requiring
the previous exhaustion of administrative remedies is not
applicable where the question in dispute is purely a legal
one,3 or where the controverted act is patently illegal
or was performed without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction,4 or where the respondent is a department
_______________
2
275 hectares.
Tapales vs. The President and the Board of Regents of

the U.P., L-17523, March 30, 1963.
3
Mangubat vs. Osmea, L-12837, April 30, 1959; Baguio

vs. Hon. Jose Rodriguez, L-11078, May 27, 1959: Pascual
vs. Provincial Board, L-11959, October 31, 1959.
4
236
236

secretary, whose acts as an alter ego of the President
bear the implied or assumed approval of the latter,5
unless actually disapproved by him,6 or where there are
circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial
intervention.7 The case at bar falls under each one of the
foregoing exceptions to the general rule. Respondents
contention is, therefore, untenable.
III. Merits of petitioners cause of action.
Respondents question the sufficiency of petitioners
cause of action upon the theory that the proposed
importation in question is not governed by Republic Acts
Nos. 2207 and 3452, but was authorized by the President
as Commander-in-Chief for military stock pile purposes
in the exercise of his alleged authority under Section 2 of
Commonwealth Act No. 1;8 that in cases of necessity, the
President or his subordinates may take such preventive
measure for the restoration of good order and
maintenance of peace; and that, as Commander-in-Chief
of our armed forces, the President x x x is duty-bound to

prepare for
________________
Marinduque Iron Mines Agents, Inc. vs. Secretary of
Public Works, L-15982, May 31, 1963.
5
In the present case, respondents allege in their answer

that the importation x x x in question x x x is authorized
by the President.
6
Alzate vs. Aldaba, L-14407, February 29, 1960; Demaisip

vs. Court of Appeals, L-13000, September 25, 1959.
7
Which provides that the national defense policy of the

Philippines shall be as follows:
8
1. (a) The preservation of the State is the obligation of

every citizen. The security of the Philippines and the
freedom, independence and perpetual neutrality of
the Philippine Republic shall be guaranteed by the
employment of all citizens, without distinction of sex
or age, and all resources.
2. (b) The employment of the nations citizens and
resources for national defense shall be effected by a
national mobilization.
3. (c) The national mobilization shall include the
execution of all measures necessary to pass from a
peace to a war footing.
4. (d) The civil authority shall always be supreme. The
President of the Philippines as the Commander-inChief of all military forces, shall be responsible that
mobilization measures are prepared at all times.
237
237
the challenge of threats of war or emergency without

waiting for any special authority.
Regardless of whether Republic Act No. 3452 repeals
Republic Act No. 2207, as contended by petitioner herein
on which our view need not be expressedwe are
unanimously of the opinionassuming that said Republic
Act No. 2207 is still in forcethat the two Acts are
applicable to the proposed importation in question
because the language of said laws is such as to include
within the purview thereof all importations of rice and
corn into the Philippines. Pursuant to Republic Act No.
2207, it shall be unlawful for any person, association,
corporation or government agency to import rice and
corn into any point in the Philippines, although, by way
of exception, it adds that the President of the Philippines
may authorize the importation of these commodities
through any government agency that he may designate,
if the conditions prescribed in Section 2 of said Act are
present. Similarly. Republic Act No. 3452 explicitly enjoins
the Rice and Corn Administration or any government
agency from importing rice and corn.
Respondents allege, however, that said provisions of
Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452, prohibiting the
importation of rice and corn by any government
agency, do not apply to importations made by the
Government itself, because the latter is not a
government agency. This theory is devoid of merit. The

Department of National Defense and the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, as well as respondents herein, and each
and every officer and employee of our Government, are
government agencies and/or agents. The applicability of
said laws even to importations by the Government, as
such, becomes more apparent when we consider that:
1. 1.
The importation permitted in Republic Act No.

2207 is to be authorized by the President of the
Philippines and, hence, by or on behalf of the
Government of the Philippines;
2. 2. Immediately after enjoining the Rice and Corn
Administration and any other government agency
from importing rice and corn, Section 10 of Republic
Act No.
238
238

1. 3452 adds that the importation of rice and corn is
left, to private parties upon payment of the
corresponding taxes, thus indicating that only
private parties may import rice under its
provisions; and
2. 3. Aside from prescribing a fine not exceeding P10,000.00 and imprisonment of not more than five (5)
years for those who shall violate any provision of
Republic Act No. 3452 or any rule and regulation
promulgated pursuant thereto, Section 15 of said
Act provides that if the offender is a public official
and/or employees, he shall be subject to the
additional penalty specified therein. A public official
is an officer of the Government itself, as
distinguished from officers or employees of

instrumentalities of the Government. Hence, the
duly authorized acts of the former are those of the
Government, unlike those of a government
instrumentality which may have a personality of its
own, distinct and separate from that of the
Government, as such. The provisions of Republic Act
No. 2207 are, in this respect, even more explicit.
Section 3 thereof provides a similar additional
penalty for any officer or employee of the
Government who violates, abets or tolerates the
violation of any provision of said Act. Hence, the
intent to apply the same to transactions made by
the very government is patent.
Indeed, the restrictions imposed in said Republic Acts are
merely additional to those prescribed in Commonwealth
Act No. 138, entitled An Act to give native products and
domestic entities the preference in the purchase of
articles for the Government. Pursuant to Section 1
thereof:
The Purchase and Equipment Division of the
Government of the Philippines and other officers and
employees of the municipal and provincial governments
and the Government of the Philippines and of chartered
cities, boards, commissions, bureaus, departments,
offices, agencies, branches, and bodies of any
description, including government-owned companies,
authorized to requisition, purchase, or contract or make
disbursements for articles, materials, and supplies for
public use, public buildings, or public works shall give
preference to materials x x x produced x x x in the
Philippines or in the United States, and to domestic
entities, subject to the conditions hereinbelow specified.

(Italics supplied.)
239
239
Under this provision, in all purchases by the Government,

including those made by and/or for the armed forces,
preference shall be given to materials produced in the
Philippines. The importation involved in the case at bar
violates this general policy of our Government, aside from
the provisions of Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452.
The attempt to justify the proposed importation by
invoking reasons of national securitypredicated upon
the worsening situation in Laos and Vietnam, and the
recent tension created by the Malaysia problemand
the alleged powers of the President as Commander-inChief of all armed forces in the Philippines, under Section
2 of the National Defense Act (Commonwealth Act No. 1),
overlooks the fact that the protection of local planters of
rice and corn in a manner that would foster and
accelerate self-sufficiency in the local production of said
commodities constitutes a factor that is vital to our ability
to meet a possible national emergency. Even if the intent
in importing goods in anticipation of such emergency
were to bolster up that ability, the latter would, instead,
be impaired if the importation were so made as to
discourage our farmers from engaging in the production
of rice.
Besides, the stockpiling of rice and corn for purposes of
national security and/or national emergency is within the
purview of Republic Act No. 3452. Section 3 thereof

expressly authorizes the Rice and Corn Administration to
accumulate stocks as a national reserve in such
quantities as it may deem proper and necessary to meet
any contingencies. Moreover, it ordains that the buffer
stocks held as a national reserve x x x be deposited by
the Administration throughout the country under proper
dispersal plans x x x and may be released only upon the
occurrence of calamities or emergencies x x x. (Italics
supplied.)
Again, the provisions of Section 2 of Commonwealth Act
No. 1, upon which respondents rely so much, are not selfexecutory. They merely outline the general objectives of
said legislation. The means for the attainment of those
objectives are subject to congressional legislation. Thus,
the conditions under which the services of citizens, as
indicated in said Section 2, may be availed of, are pro240
240

vided for in Sections 3, 4 and 51 to 88 of said
Commonwealth Act No. 1. Similarly, Section 5 thereof
specifies the manner in which resources necessary for our
national defense may be secured by the Government of
the Philippines, but only during a national mobilization,9
which does not exist. Inferentially, therefore, in the
absence of a national mobilization, said resources shall be
produced in such manner as Congress may by other laws
provide from time to time. Insofar as rice and corn are
concerned, Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452, and
Commonwealth Act No. 138 are such laws.
Respondents cite Corwin in support of their pretense, but

in vain. An examination of the work cited10 shows that
Corwin referred to the powers of the President during
war time11 or when he has placed the country or a part
thereof under martial law.12 Since neither con_______________
In line with the provisions of paragraphs b), c), e), and f)
of Section 2 of said Act.
9
10
The Constitution and What It Means Today, pp. 95-96.
The power of the President as Commander-in-Chief is

primarily that of military command in wartime, and as
such includes, as against the persons and property of
enemies of the United States encountered within the
theater of military operations, all the powers allowed a
military commander in such cases by the Law of Nations.
President Lincolns famous Proclamation of Emancipation
rested upon this ground. It was effective within the
theater of military operations while the war lasted, but no
longer (p. 93, Italics supplied).
11
From an early date the Commander-in-Chief power

came to be merged with the Presidents duty to take
care that the laws be faithfully executed. So, white in
using military force against unlawful combinations too
strong to be dealt with through the ordinary processes of
law the President acts by authorization of statute, his
powers are still those of Commander-in-Chief. x x x
12
Under preventive martial law, so-called because it

authorizes preventive arrests and detentions, the
military acts as an adjunct of the civil authorities but not
necessarily subject to their orders. It may be established
whenever the executive organ, State or national, deems it

to be necessary for the restoration of good order. The
concept, being of judicial origin, is of course for judicial
application, and ultimately for application by the
Supreme Court, in enforcement of the due process
clauses. (See, also, Section III of this Article, and Article
IV, Section IV.) (Pp. 95-96, Italics supplied.)
241
241
dition obtains in the case at bar, said work merely proves

that respondents theory, if accepted, would, in effect,
place the Philippines under martial law, without a
declaration of the Executive to that effect. What is worse,
it would keep us perpetually under martial law.
It has been suggested that even if the proposed
importation violated Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452, it
should, nevertheless, be permitted because it redounds
to the benefit of the people. Salus populi est suprema
lex, it is said.
If there were a local shortage of rice, the argument might
have some value. But the respondents, as officials of this
Government, have expressly affirmed again and again
that there is no rice shortage. And the importation is
avowedly for stockpile of the Armynot the civilian
population.
But let us follow the respondents trend of thought. It has
a more serious implication that appears on the surface. It
implies that if an executive officer believes that
compliance with a certain statute will not benefit the
people, he is at liberty to disregard it. That idea must be

rejectedwe still live under a rule of law.
And then, the people are either producers or
consumers. Nowas respondents explicitly admit
Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452 were approved by the
Legislature for the benefit of producers and consumers,
i.e., the people, it must follow that the welfare of the
people lies precisely in the compliance with said Acts. It is
not for respondent executive officers now to set their own
opinions against that of the Legislature, and adopt means
or ways to set those Acts at naught. Anyway, those laws
permit importationbut under certain conditions, which
have not been, and should be complied with.
IV. The contracts with Vietnam and Burma
It is lastly contended that the Government of the
Philippines has already entered into two (2) contracts for
the purchase of rice, one with the Republic of Vietnam,
and another with the Government of Burma; that these
contracts constitute valid executive agreements under
inter242
242

national law; that such agreements became binding and

effective upon the signing thereof by representatives of
the parties thereto; that in case of conflict between
Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452 on the one hand, and
the aforementioned contracts, on the other, the latter
should prevail, because, if a treaty and a statute are
inconsistent with each other, the conflict must be
resolvedunder the American jurisprudencein favor of

the one which is latest in point of time; that petitioner
herein assails the validity of acts of the Executive relative
to foreign relations in the conduct of which the Supreme
Court cannot interfere; and the aforementioned contracts
have already been consummated, the Government of the
Philippines having already paid the price of the rice
involved therein through irrevocable letters of credit in
favor of the sellers of the said commodity. We find no
merit in this pretense.
The Court is not satisfied that the status of said contracts
as alleged executive agreements has been sufficiently
established. The parties to said contracts do not appear
to have regarded the same as executive agreements. But,
even assuming that said contracts may properly be
considered as executive agreements, the same are
unlawful, as well as null and void, from a constitutional
viewpoint, said agreements being inconsistent with the
provisions of Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452. Although
the President may, under the American constitutional
system, enter into executive agreements without
previous legislative authority, he may not, by executive
by statutes enacted prior thereto. Under the Constitution,
the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws
enacted by Congress. The former may not interfere in the
performance of the legislative powers of the latter, except
in the exercise of his veto power. He may not defeat
legislative enactments that have acquired the status of
law, by indirectly repealing the same through an
executive agreement providing for the performance of
the very act prohibited by said laws.
The American theory to the effect that, in the event of

conflict between a treaty and a statute, the one which
243
243
is latest in point of time shall prevail, is not applicable to

the case at bar, for respondents not only admit, but, also,
insist that the contracts adverted to are not treaties. Said
theory may be justified upon the ground that treaties to
which the United States is signatory require the advice
and consent of its Senate, and, hence, of a branch of the
legislative department. No such justification can be given
as regards executive agreements not authorized by
previous legislation, without completely upsetting the
principle of separation of powers and the system of
checks and balances which are fundamental in our
constitutional setup and that of the United States.
As regards the question whether an international
agreement may be invalidated by our courts, suffice it to
say that the Constitution of the Philippines has clearly
settled it in the affirmative, by providing, in Section 2 of
Article VIII thereof, that the Supreme Court may not be
deprived of its jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse,
modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ of error as
the law or the rules of court may provide, final judgments
and decrees of inferior courts in(1) All cases in which
the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law,
ordinance, or executive order or regulation is in
question. In other words, our Constitution authorizes the
nullification of a treaty, not only when it conflicts with the
fundamental law, but, also, when it runs counter to an act

of Congress.
The alleged consummation of the aforementioned
contracts with Vietnam and Burma does not render this
case academic. Republic Act No. 2207 enjoins our
Government not from entering into contracts for the
purchase of rice, but from importing rice, except under
the conditions prescribed in said Act. Upon the other
hand, Republic Act No. 3452 has two (2) main features,
namely: (a) it requires the Government to purchase rice
and corn directly from our local planters, growers or
landowners; and (b) it prohibits importations of rice by
the Government, and leaves such importations to private
parties. The pivotal issue in this case is whether the
proposed importationwhich has not been consummated
as yetis legally feasible.
244
244

Lastly, a judicial declaration of illegality of the proposed

importation would not compel our Government to default
in the performance of such obligations as it may have
contracted with the sellers of the rice in question,
because, aside from the fact that said obligations may be
complied with without importing the commodity into the
Philippines, the proposed importation may still be
legalized by complying with the provisions of the
aforementioned laws.
V. The writ of preliminary injunction.
The members of the Court have divergent opinions on the

question whether or not respondents herein should be
enjoined from implementing the aforementioned
proposed importation. However, the majority favors the
negative view, for which reason the injunction prayed for
cannot be granted.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that
respondent Executive Secretary had and has no power to
authorize the importation in question; that he exceeded
his jurisdiction in granting said authority; that said
importation is not sanctioned by law and is contrary to its
provisions; and that, for lack of the requisite majority, the
injunction prayed for must be and is, accordingly, denied.
It is so ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon
and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Bautista Angelo and Barrera, JJ., concur separately.
Paredes and Regala, JJ., concur in the result.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J., concurring:
Under Republic Act No. 2207, which took effect on May
15, 1959, it is unlawful for any person, association,
corporation or government agency to import rice and
corn into any point in the Philippines. The exception is if
there is an existing or imminent shortage of such
commodity of such gravity as to constitute national
emergency in which case an importation may be
authorized by the President when so certified by the
National Economic Council.
However, on June 14, 1962, Republic Act 3452 was

enacted providing that the importation of rice and corn
245
245
can only be made by private parties thereby prohibiting

from doing so the Rice and Corn Administration or any
other government agency. Republic Act 3452 does not
expressly repeal Republic Act 2207, but only repeals or
modified those parts thereof that are inconsistent with its
provisions. The question that now arises is: Has the
enactment of Republic Act 3452 the effect of prohibiting
completely the government from importing rice and corn
into the Philippines?
My answer is in the negative. Since this Act does not in
any manner provide for the importation of rice and corn
in case of national emergency, the provision of the former
law on that matter should stand, for that is not
inconsistent with any provision embodied in Republic Act
3452. The Rice and Corn Administration, or any other
government agency, may therefore still import rice and
corn into the Philippines as provided in Republic Act 2207
if there is a declared national emergency.
The next question that arises is: Can the government
authorize the importation of rice and corn regardless of
Republic Act 2207 if that is authorized by the President as
Commander-in-Chief of the Philippine Army as a military
precautionary measure for military stockpile?
Respondents answer this question in the affirmative. They
advance the argument that it is the Presidents duty to
see to it that the Armed Forces of the Philippines are

geared to the defenses of the country as well as to the
fulfillment of our international commitments in Southeast
Asia in the event the peace and security of the area are in
danger. The stockpiling of rice, they aver, is an essential
requirement of defense preparation in view of the limited
local supply and the probable disruption of trade and
commerce with outside countries in the event of armed
hostilities, and this military precautionary measure is
necessary because of the unsettled conditions in the
Southeast Asia bordering on actual threats of armed
conflicts as evaluated by the Intelligence Service of the
Military Department of our Government. This advocacy,
they contend, finds support in the national defense policy
embodied in Section 2 of our National Defense Act
(Commonwealth Act No. 1), which provides:
246
246

1. (a) The preservation of the State is the obligation of
every citizen. The security of the Philippines and the
freedom, independence and perpetual neutrality of
the Philippine Republic shall be guaranteed by the
employment of all citizens, witho ut distinction of
sex or age, and all resources.
2. (b) The employment of the nations citizens and
resources for national defense shall be effected by a
national mobilization.
3. (c)
The national mobilization -shall include the

execution of all measures necessary to pass from a
peace to a war footing.
4. (d)
The civil authority shall always be supreme. The

President of the Philippines as the Commander-inChief of all military forces, shall be responsible that
mobilization measures are prepared at all times.
(Italics supplied)
Indeed, I find in that declaration of policy that the

security of the Philippines and its freedom constitutes the
core of the preservation of our State which is the basic
duty of every citizen and that to secure which it is
enjoined that the President employ all the resources at
his command. But over and above all that power and
duty, fundamental as they may seem, there is the
injunction that the civil authority shall always be
supreme. This injunction can only mean that while all
precautions should be taken to insure the security and
preservation of the State and to this effect the
employment of all resources may be resorted to, the
action must always be taken within the framework of the
civil authority. Military authority should be harmonized
and coordinated with civil authority, the only exception
being when the law clearly ordains otherwise. Neither
Republic Act 2207, nor Republic Act 3452, contains any
exception in favor of military action concerning
importation of rice and corn. An exception must be
strictly construed.
A distinction is made between the government and
government agency in an attempt to take the former out
of the operation of Republic Act 2207. I disagree. The
Gov-: ernment of the Republic of the Philippines under the
Revised Administrative Code refers to that entity through
which the functions of government are exercised,
including the various arms through which political
authority is made effective whether they be provincial,
municipal or other form of local government, whereas a

government instrumentality refers to corporations owned
or controlled by the
247
247
government to promote certain aspects of the economic

life of our people. A government agency, therefore, must
necessarily refer to the government itself of the Republic,
as distinguished from any government instrumentality
which has a personality distinct and separate from it
(Section 2).
The important point to determine, however, is whether
we should enjoin respondents from carrying out the
importation of the rice which according to the record has
been authorized to be imported on government to
government level, it appearing that the arrangement to
this effect has already been concluded, the only thing
lacking being its implementation. This is evident from the
manifestation submitted by the Solicitor General wherein
it appears that the contract for the purchase of 47,000
tons of rice from Vietnam had been signed on October 5,
1963, and for the purchase of 20,000 tons from Burma on
October 8, 1963, by the authorized representatives of
both our government and the governments of Vietnam
and Burma, respectively. If it is true that our government
has already made a formal commitment with the selling
countries there arises the question as to whether the act
can still be impeded at this stage of the negotiations.
Though on this score there is a divergence of opinion, it is
gratifying to note that the majority has expressed itself
against it. This is a plausible attitude for, had the writ

been issued, our government would have been placed in
a predicament where, as a necessary consequence, it
would have to repudiate a duly formalized agreement to
its great embarrassment and loss of face. This was
avoided by the judicial statesmanship evinced by the
Court.
BARRERA, J., concurring:
Because of possible complications that might be
aggravated by misrepresentation of the true nature and
scope of the case before this Court, it is well to restate as
clearly as possible, the real and only issue presented by
the respondents representing the government.
From the answer filed by the Solicitor General, in behalf of
respondents, we quote:
The importation of the rice in question by the Armed
248
248

Forces of the Philippines is for military stockpiling

authorized by the President pursuant to his inherent
power as commander-in-chief and as a military
precautionary measure in view of the worsening situation
in Laos and Vietnam and, it may be added, the recent,
tension created by the Malaysia problem. (Answer, p. 2;
italics supplied.)
During the oral argument, Senator Fernandez, appearing
in behalf of the respondents, likewise reiterated that the
imported rice was for military stockpiling, and while he

admitted that some of it went to the Rice and Corn
Administration, he emphasized again and again that the
rice was not intended for the RCA for distribution to the
people, as there was no shortage of rice for that purpose,
but it was only exchanged for palay because this could be
better preserved.
From the memorandum filed thereafter by the Solicitor
General, again the claim was made:
We respectfully reiterate the arguments in our answer
dated October 4, 1963 that the importation of rice sought
to be enjoined in this petition is in the exercise of the
authority vested in the President of the Philippines as
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, as a measure
of military preparedness demanded by a real and actual
threat of emergency in the South East Asian countries, (p.
1, Italics supplied.)
x
It (the stressing of the unsettled conditions in Southeast

Asia) is merely our intention to show the necessity for the
stockpiling of rice for army purposes, which is the very
reason for the importation.
x
As it is, the importation in question is being made by the

Republic of the Philippines for its own use, and the rice is
not supposed to be poured into the open market as to
affect the price to be paid by the public, (p. 4, Italics
supplied.)
x
What we do contend is that the law, for want of express

and clear provision to that effect, does not include in its
prohibition importation by the Government of rice for its
own use and not for the consuming public, regardless of
whether there is or there is no emergency. (p. 5, Italics
supplied.)
From the above, it not only appears but is evident that
the respondents were not concerned with the present rice
situation confronting the consuming public, but were sole249
249
ly and exclusively after the stockpiling of rice for the

future use of the army. The issue, therefore, in which the
Government was interested is not whether rice is
imported to give the people a bigger or greater supply to
maintain the price at P.80 per gantafor, to quote again
their contention: the rice is not supposed to be poured
into the open market to affect the price to be paid by the
public, as it is not for the consuming public, regardless
of whether there is or there is no emergency,but
whether rice can legally be imported by the Armed Forces
of the Philippines avowedly for its future use,
notwithstanding the prohibitory provisions of Republic
Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452. The majority opinion ably sets
forth the reasons why this Court can not accept the
contention of the respondents that this importation is
beyond and outside the operation of these statutes. I can
only emphasize that I see in the theory advanced by the
Solicitor General a dangerous trendthat because the
policies enunciated in the cited laws are for the protection
of the producers and the consumers, the army is removed

from their application. To adopt this theory is to proclaim
the existence in the Philippines of three economic groups
or classes: the producers, the consumers, and the Armed
Forces of the Philippines. What is more portentous is the
effect to equate the army with the Government itself.
Then again, the importation of this rice for military
stockpiling is sought to be justified by the alleged threat
of emergency in the Southeast Asian countries. But the
existence of this supposed threat was unilaterally
determined by the Department of National Defense
alone. We recall that there exists a body called the
National Security Council in which are represented the
Executive as well as the Legislative department. In it sit
not only members of the party in power but of the
opposition as well. To our knowledge, this is the highest
consultative body which deliberates precisely in times of
emergency threatening to affect the security of the state.
The democratic composition of this council is to
guarantee that its deliberations would be non-partisan
and only the best interests of the nation will be
considered. Being a deliberative body, it
250
250

insures against precipitate action. This is as it should be.

Otherwise, in these days of ever present cold war, any
change or development in the political climate in arty
region of the world is apt to be taken as an excuse for the
military to conjure up a crisis or emergency and
thereupon attempt to override our laws and legal
processes, and imperceptibly institute some kind of

martial law on the pretext of precautionary mobilization
measure avowedly in the interest of the security of the
state. One need not be too imaginative to perceive a hint
of this in the present case.
The Supreme Court, in arriving at the conclusion
unanimously reached, is fully aware of the difficult and
delicate task it had to discharge. Its position is liable to be
exploited by some for their own purposes, by claiming
and making it appear that the Court is unmindful of the
plight of our people during these days of hardship; that it
preferred to give substance to the niceties of the law
than heed the needs of the people. Our answer is that,
the Court was left no alternative. It had, in compliance
with its duty, to decide the case upon the facts presented
to it. The respondents, representing the administration,
steadfastly maintained and insisted that there is no rice
shortage; that the imported rice is not for the consuming
public and is not supposed to be placed in the open
market to affect the price to be paid by the public; that it
is solely for stockpiling of the army for future use as a
measure of mobilization in the face of what the
Department of National Defense unilaterally deemed a
threatened armed conflict in Southeast Asia. Confronted
with these facts upon which the Government has built
and rested its case, we have searched in vain for legal
authority or cogent reasons to justify this importation
made admittedly contrary to the provisions of Republic
Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452. I say admittedly, because
respondents never as much as pretended that the
importation fulfills the conditions specified in these laws,
but limited themselves to the contention, which is their
sole defense that this importation does not fall within the
scope of said laws. In our view, however, the laws are

clear. The laws are comprehensive
251
251
and their application does not admit of any exception.

The laws are adequate. Compliance therewith is not
difficult, much less impossible. The avowed emergency, if
at all, is not urgently immediate.
In this connection, it is pertinent to bear in mind that the
Supreme Court has a duty to perform under the
Constitution. It has to decide, when called upon to do so
in an appropriate proceeding, all cases in which the
constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance,
executive order or regulation is in question. We can not
elude this duty. To do so would be culpable dereliction on
our part. While we sympathize with the public that might
be adversely affected as a result of this decision, yet our
sympathy does not authorize Us to sanction an act
contrary to applicable laws. The fault lies with those who
stubbornly contended and represented before this Court
that there is no rice shortage, that the imported rice is
not intended for the consuming public, but for stockpiling
of the army. And, if as now claimed before the public,
contrary to the Governments stand in this case, that
there is need for imported rice to stave off hunger, our
Legislature has provided for such a situation. As already
stated, the laws are adequate. The importation of rice
under the conditions set forth in the laws may be
authorized not only where there is an existing shortage,
but also when the shortage is imminent. In other words,
lawful remedy to solve the situation is available, if only

those who have the duty to execute the laws perform
their duty. If there is really need for the importation of
rice, who adopt some dubious means which necessitates
resort to doubtful exercise of the power of the President
as Commander-in-Chief of the Army? Why not comply
with the mandate of the law? Ours is supposed to be a
regime under the rule of law. Adoption as a government
policy of the theory of the end justifies the means
brushing aside constitutional and legal restraints, must be
rejected, lest we end up with the end of freedom.
For these reasons, I concur in the decision of the Court.
Judgment rendered declaring that the Executive
Secretary had and has no power to authorize the
importation, that
252
252

People vs. Hadji
he exceeded his jurisdiction in granting said authority;

that importation is not sanctioned by law; and that,
injunction must be denied.
Notes.Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452, brought into
play in the above Gonzales case, were subsequently
construed and applied in Iloilo Palay & Corn Planters
Assn. v. Feliciano, et al., L-24022, March 3, 1965. In this
later case, it was held that Republic Act 3452 only
authorizes importation of rice during normal times, but
when there is a national emergency, Republic Act No.
2207 applies. These two laws, therefore, are not

inconsistent with each other.
The Flag Law (CA. No. 138), also involved in the Gonzales
case, was subsequently amended by Commonwealth Act
No. 541 and Republic Acts Nos. 912, 4858 and 5183.
Republic Act 4858 authorizes the President to allow the
procurement of supplies necessary for the rehabilitation
of a project as an exception to the restrictions and
preferences provided for in Republic Act No. 912 and
Commonwealth Act No. 138 (Cf. C & C Commercial Corp.
v. NAWASA, L-27275, Nov. 18, 1967, 21 SCRA 984).
______________
reserved.
VOL. 151, JUNE 23, 1987 279

Alih vs. Castro
No. L-69401. June 23, 1987.*EN BANC.RIZAL ALIH, NASIM

ALIH, AISAN ALIH, MIJAL ALIH, OMAR ALIH, EDRIS
MUKSAN, MULSIDI WARADIL, BILLY ASMAD, RAMSID ASALI,
BANDING USMAN, ANGGANG HADANI, WARMIKHAN HAPA,
GABRAL JIKIRI, ALLAN TAN, MUJAHIRIN MARAJUKI,
KENNEDY GONZALES, URDUJA ALIH, MERLA ALIH, and
NURAISA ALIH VDA DE FEROLINO, petitioners, vs. MAJOR
GENERAL DELFIN C. CASTRO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
COMMANDER SOUTHCOM AND REGIONAL UNIFIED
COMMAND, REGION IX, ZAMBOANGA CITY, COLONEL
ERNESTO CALUPIG, IN HIS CAPACITY AS COMMANDING
OFFICER OF THE SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE)
AND INTERNAL DEFENSE COMMAND, OTHERWISE KNOWN
AS IDC MAJOR ARNOLD BLANCO IN HIS CAPACITY AS
COMMANDING OFFICER OF THE PHILIPPINE MARINES AND
1ST LIEUTENANT DARWIN GUERRA IN HIS CAPACITY AS
ACTS SUPERVISOR, INTERNAL DEFENSE COMMAND,
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Nature of the Constitution; Superior
orders in case at bar cannot countermand the
Constitution: Fact that petitioners were suspected of the
Climaco killing did not excuse the constitutional

shortcuts.Superior orders cannot, of course, counter_______________
* EN BANC.
280
280 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Alih vs. Castro
mand the Constitution. The fact that the petitioners were

suspected of the Climaco killing did not excuse the
constitutional short-cuts the respondents took. As
eloquently affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Ex
parte Milligan: The Constitution is a law for rulers and
people, equally in war and in peace, and covers with the
shield of its protection all classes of men, at all times and
under all circumstances. No doctrine, involving more
pernicious consequences, was ever invented by the wit of
man than that any of its provisions can be suspended
during any of the great exigencies of government.
Same; Rights of accused; Guaranty against unreasonable
searches and seizures, non-observance of, not justified as
there was no state of hostility in Zamboanga City.The
precarious state of lawlessness in Zamboanga City at the
time in question certainly did not excuse the nonobservance of the constitutional guaranty against
unreasonable searches and seizures. There was no state
of hostilities in the area to justify, assuming it could, the

repressions committed therein against the petitioners.
Same; Same; Same; Presumption of innocence; As mere
suspects of Mayor Climacos killing at the time of the
zona or military operation, they were presumed
innocent and not guilty.The record does not disclose
that the petitioners were wanted criminals or fugitives
from justice. At the time of the zona, they were merely
suspected of the mayors slaying and had not in fact even
been investigated for it. As mere suspects, they were
presumed innocent and not guilty as summarily
pronounced by the military.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Due Process; Protection of the
Constitution covers both innocent and the guilty; Lacking
the shield of innocence, the guilty need the armor of the
Constitution to protect them, not from a deserved
sentence, but from arbitrary punishment; Every person is
entitled to due process, including the basest criminal.
Indeed, even if it were assumed for the sake of argument
that they were guilty, they would not have been any less
entitled to the protection of the Constitution, which
covers both the innocent and the guilty. This is not to
stay, of course, that the Constitution coddles criminals.
What it does simply signify is that, lacking the shield of
innocence, the guilty need the armor of the Constitution,
to protect them, not from a deserved sentence, but from
arbitrary punishment. Every person is entitled to due
process. It is no exaggeration that the basest criminal,
ranged against the rest of the people who would
condemn him outright, is still, under the Bill of Rights, a

majority of one.
281
VOL. 151, JUNE 23, 1987 281
Alih vs. Castro
Same; Same; Same; Same; Raid without search warrant;

Constitutional precept that civilian authority is at all
times supreme over the military, defied in case at bar
when the military proceeded to make the raid without a
search warrant.In acting as they did, they also defied
the precept that civilian authority is at all times supreme
over the military so clearly proclaimed in the 1973
Constitution. In the instant case, the respondents simply
by-passed the civil courts, which had the authority to
determine whether or not there was probable cause to
search the petitioners premises. Instead, they proceeded
to make the raid without a search warrant on their own
unauthorized determination of the petitioner s guilt.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Urgency of raid cannot
be pleaded as an excuse due to lack of search warrant as
it was in fact not urgent; Absolute absence of reason why
the orderly processes required by the Constitution were
disregarded in case at bar.The respondents cannot even
plead the urgency of the raid because it was in fact not
urgent. They knew where the petitioners were. They had
every opportunity to get a search warrant before making
the raid, If they were worried that the weapons inside the
compound would be spirited away, they could have
surrounded the premises in the meantime, as a
preventive measure. There was absolutely no reason at
all why they should disregard the orderly processes
required by the Constitution and instead insist on
arbitrarily forcing their way into the petitioners premises
with all the menace of a military invasion.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Search and seizure
made although incidental to a legal arrest, not valid;
Reason.Conceding that the search was truly
warrantless, might not the search and seizure be
nonetheless considered valid because it was incidental to
a legal arrest? Surely not, If all the law-enforcement
authorities have to do is force their way into any house
and then pick up anything they see there on the ground
that the occupants are resisting arrest, then we might as
well delete the Bill of Rights as a fussy redundancy.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Prohibition that one
cannot just force his way into any mans house on the
illegal orders of a superior; Ancient rule that a mans
house is his castle.When the respondents could have
easily obtained a search warrant from any of the TEN civil
courts then open and functioning in Zamboanga City,
they instead simply barged into the beleaguered
premises on the verbal order of their superior officers.
One cannot just force his way into any mans house on
the illegal orders of a superior, however lofty his
282

Alih vs. Castro
rank. Indeed, even the humblest hovel is protected from

official intrusion because of the ancient rule, revered in all
free regimes, that a man s house is his castle.
Same; Same; Same; Criminal Procedure; Arrest not in
connection with a crime about to be committed, being
committed, or just committed under Sec. 5, Rule 113 of
the Rules of Court; Personal knowledge required of the
officer who makes the arrest under Rule 113.If the
arrest was made under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules
of Court in connection with a crime about to be
committed, being committed, or just committed, what
was that crime? There is no allegation in the record of
such a justification. Parenthetically, it may be observed
that under the Revised Rule 113, Section 5(b), the officer
making the arrest must have personal knowledge of the
ground therefor as stressed in the recent case of People v.
Burgos.
Same; Same; Same; Evidence, admissibility of; Search on
petitioners premises being violative of the Constitution,
all firearms and ammunition taken from the raided
compound are inadmissible in evidence in any of the
proceedings against the petitioner; Pending
determination of the legality of the articles, they shall
remain in custodia legis subject to court disposition.If
follows that as the search of the petitioners premises
was violative of the Constitution, all the firearms and

ammunition taken from the raided compound are
inadmissible in evidence in any of the proceedings
against the petitioners. These articles are fruits of the
poisonous tree. As Judge Learned Hand observed, Only
in case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing
officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong, will
the wrong be repressed. Pending determination of the
legality of such articles, however, they shall remain in
custodia legis, subject to such appropriate disposition as
the corresponding courts may decide,
Same; Same; Same; Right against self-incrimination
applies to testimonial compulsion only.The objection to
the photographing, fingerprinting and paraffin-testing of
the petitioners deserves slight comment. The prohibition
against self-incrimination applies to testimonial
compulsion only. As Justice Holmes put it in Holt v. United
States, The prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal
court to be witness against himself is a prohibition of the
use of physical or moral compulsion to extort
communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as
evidence when it may be material.
283
VOL. 161, JUNE 23, 1987 283
Alih vs. Castro
PETITION to review the decision of the Regional Trial Court

of Zamboanga City, Br. 14. Amin, J.
CRUZ, J.:
On November 25, 1984, a contingent of more than two
hundred Philippine marines and elements of the home
defense forces raided the compound occupied by the
petitioners at Gov. Alvarez street, Zamboanga City, in
search of loose firearms, ammunition and other
explosives.1Rollo, p. 81.The military operation was
commonly known and dreaded as a zona, which was
not unlike the feared practice of the kempeitai during the
Japanese Occupation of rounding up the people in a
locality, arresting the persons fingered by a hooded
informer, and executing them outright (although the last
part is not included in the modern refinement).
The initial reaction of the people inside the compound
was to resist the invasion with a burst of gunfire. No one
was hurt as presumably the purpose was merely to warn
the intruders and deter them from entering.
Unfortunately, as might be expected in incidents like this,
the situation aggravated soon enough. The soldiers
returned fire and a bloody shoot-out ensued, resulting in
a number of casualties.2Ibid., pp. 8182.The besieged
compound surrendered the following morning, and
sixteen male occupants were arrested, later to be
fingerprinted, paraffin-tested and photographed over
their objection. The military also inventoried and
confiscated nine M16 rifles, one M14 rifle, nine rifle

grenades, and several rounds of ammunition found in the
premises.3Id., p. 82.On December 21,1984, the
petitioners came to this Court in a petition for prohibition
and mandamus with preliminary injunction and
restraining order. Their purpose was to recover the
articles seized from them, to prevent these from being
used as evidence against them, and to challenge their
finger_______________
1 Rollo, p. 81.
2 Ibid., pp. 8182.
3 Id., p. 82.
284
Alih vs. Castro
printing, photographing and paraffin-testing as violative

of their right against self-incrimination.4id., pp. 316.The
Court, treating the petition as an injunction suit with a
prayer for the return of the articles alleged to have been
illegally seized, referred it for hearing to Judge Omar U.
Amin of the regional trial court, Zamboanga City.5id., p.
43. After receiving the testimonial and documentary
evidence of the parties, he submitted the report and

recommendations on which this opinion is based.6id., pp.
7684.The petitioners demand the return of the arms and
ammunition on the ground that they were taken without a
search warrant as required by the Bill of Rights. This is
confirmed by the said report and in fact admitted by the
respondents, but with avoidance.7id., p. 83.Article IV,
Section 3, of the 1973 Constitution, which was in force at
the time of the incident in question, provided as follows:
Sec. 3. The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall not be violated, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such
other responsible officer as may be authorized by law,
after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
It was also declared in Article IV, Section 4(2) that
Sec. 4(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or
the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.
The respondents, while admitting the absence of the
required search warrant, sought to justify their act on the
_______________
4 id., pp. 316.

5 id., p. 43.
6 id., pp. 7684.
7 id., p. 83.
285
VOL. 151, JUNE 23, 1987 285
Alih vs. Castro
ground that they were acting under superior orders.8id.

There was also the suggestion that the measure was
necessary because of the aggravation of the peace and
order problem generated by the assassination of Mayor
Cesar Climaco.9id.Superior orders cannot, of course,
countermand the Constitution. The fact that the
petitioners were suspected of the Climaco killing did not
excuse the constitutional short-cuts the respondents took.
As eloquently affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Ex
parte Milligan:104 Wall. 2.The Constitution is a law for
rulers and people, equally in war and in peace, and
covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men,
at all times and under all circumstances. No doctrine,
involving more pernicious consequences, was ever
invented by the wit of man than that any of its provisions
can be suspended during any of the great exigencies of
government.
The precarious state of lawlessness in Zamboanga City at

the time in question certainly did not excuse the
nonobservance of the constitutional guaranty against
unreasonable searches and seizures. There was no state
of hostilities in the area to justify, assuming it could, the
repressions committed therein against the petitioners.
It is so easy to say that the petitioners were outlaws and
deserved the arbitrary treatment they received to take
them into custody; but that is a cynical argument. It is
also fallacious. Its obvious flaw lies in the conclusion that
the petitioners were unquestionably guilty on the
strength alone of unsubstantiated reports that they were
stockpiling weapons.
The record does not disclose that the petitioners were
wanted criminals or fugitives from justice. At the time of
the zona, they were merely suspected of the mayors
slaying and had not in fact even been investigated for it.
As mere suspects, they were presumed innocent and not
guilty as summarily pronounced by the military.
Indeed, even if were assumed for the sake of argument
that
_______________
8 id.
9 id.
10 4 Wall. 2.
286
Alih vs. Castro
they were guilty, they would not have been any less
entitled to the protection of the Constitution, which
covers both the innocent and the guilty. This is not to say,
of course, that the Constitution coddles criminals. What it
does simply signify is that, lacking the shield of
innocence, the guilty need the armor of the Constitution,
to protect them, not from a deserved sentence, but from
arbitrary punishment. Every person is entitled to due
process. It is no exaggeration that the basest criminal,
ranged against the rest of the people who would
condemn him outright, is still, under the Bill of Rights, a
majority of one.
If the respondents did not actually disdain the
Constitution when they made their illegal raid, they
certainly gave every appearance of doing so. This is truly
regrettable for it was incumbent on them, especially
during those tense and tindery times, to encourage
rather than undermine respect for the law, which it was
their duty to uphold.
In acting as they did, they also defied the precept that
civilian authority is at all times supreme over the
military so clearly proclaimed in the 1973
Constitution.11Art. II, Sec. 8, 1973 Constitution. In the
instant case, the respondents simply by-passed the civil

courts, which had the authority to determine whether or
not there was probable cause to search the petitioners
premises. Instead, they proceeded to make the raid
without a search warrant on their own unauthorized
determination of the petitioners guilt.
The respondents cannot even plead the urgency of the
raid because it was in fact not urgent. They knew where
the petitioners were. They had every opportunity to get a
search warrant before making the raid. If they were
worried that the weapons inside the compound would be
spirited away, they could have surrounded the premises
in the meantime, as a preventive measure. There was
absolutely no reason at all why they should disregard the
orderly processes required by the Constitution and
instead insist on arbitrarily forcing their way into the
petitioners premises with all the menace of a military
invasion.
Conceding that the search was truly warrantless, might
not
_______________
11 Art. II, Sec. 8, 1973 Constitution.
287
VOL. 151, JUNE 23, 1987 287
Alih vs. Castro
the search and seizure be nonetheless considered valid

because it was incidental to a legal arrest? Surely not. If
all the lawenforcement authorities have to do is force
their way into any house and then pick up anything they
see there on the ground that the occupants are resisting
arrest, then we might as well delete the Bill of Rights as a
fussy redundancy.
When the respondents could have easily obtained a
search warrant from any of the TEN civil courts then open
and functioning in Zamboanga City,12Annexes E, E-1,
E-2, E-3, E-4, E-5, E-6, E7, E-8, and E-9...
they instead simply barged into the beleaguered
premises on the verbal order of their superior officers.
One cannot just force his way into any mans house on
the illegal orders of a superior, however lofty his rank.
Indeed, even the humblest hovel is protected from official
intrusion because of the ancient rule, revered in all free
regimes, that a mans house is his castle.
It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may enter;
the rain may enter. But the King of England may not
enter. All the forces of the Crown dare not cross the
threshold of the ruined tenement.13U.S. v. Arceo, 3 Phil.
381.If the arrest was made under Rule 113, Section 5, of
the Rules of Court in connection with a crime about to be
committed, being committed, or just committed, what
was that crime? There is no allegation in the record of
such a justification. Parenthetically, it may be observed
that under the Revised Rule 113, Section 5(b), the officer
making the arrest must have personal knowledge of the

ground therefor as stressed in the recent case of People v.
Burgos.14144 SCRA 1.If follows that as the search of the
petitioners premises was violative of the Constitution, all
the firearms and ammunition taken from the raided
compound are inadmissible in evidence in any of the
proceedings against the petitioners. These articles are
fruits of the poisonous tree.15Silverthorne Lumber Co.
v. U.S., 251 U.S. 385. As Judge Learned Hand observed,
Only in case the prosecution which itself con_______________
12 Annexes E, E-1, E-2, E-3, E-4, E-5, E-6,
E7, E-8, and E-9.
13 U.S. v. Arceo, 3 Phil. 381.
14 144 SCRA 1.
15 Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. U.S., 251 U.S. 385.
288
Alih vs. Castro
trols the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by

their wrong, will the wrong be repressed.16Pugliese
(1945) 133 F. 2ed. 497. Pending determination of the
legality of such articles, however, they shall remain in
custodia legis, subject to such appropriate disposition as

the corresponding courts may decide.17Roan v. Gonzales,
145 SCRA 687.The objection to the photographing,
fingerprinting and paraffin-testing of the petitioners
deserves slight comment. The prohibition against selfincrimination applies to testimonial compulsion only. As
Justice Holmes put it in Holt v. United States,18218 U.S.
245. The prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal
court to be a witness against himself is a prohibition of
the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort
communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as
evidence when it may be material.
The fearful days of hamleting, salvaging, zona and
other dreaded operations should remain in the past,
banished with the secret marshals and their covert
license to kill without trial. We must be done with
lawlessness in the name of law enforcement. Those who
are supposed to uphold the law must not be the first to
violate it. As Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee stressed in
his concurring opinion in Lacanilao v. De Leon,19G.R. No.
76532. prom. Jan. 26, 1987. It is time that the martial
law regimes legacy of the law of force be discarded and
that there be a return to the force and rule of law.
All of us must exert efforts to make our country truly free
and democratic, where every individual is entitled to the
full protection of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights
can stand as a stolid sentinel for all, the innocent as well
as the guilty, including the basest of criminals.
WHEREFORE, the search of the petitioners premises on

November 25, 1984, is hereby declared ILLEGAL and all
the articles seized as a result thereof are inadmissible in
evidence against the petitioners in any proceedings.
However, the said articles shall remain in custodia legis
pending the outcome of
_______________
16 Pugliese (1945) 133 F. 2ed. 497.
17 Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687.
18 218 U.S. 245.
19 G.R. No. 76532. prom. Jan. 26, 1987.
289
VOL. 151, JUNE 26, 1987 289
Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals
the criminal cases that have been or may later be filed

against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (C.J.), Yap, Fernan, Narvasa,
MelencioHerrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano,
Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Corts, JJ.,
concur.
Search of the petitioners premises declared illegal. [Alih

vs. Castro, 151 SCRA 279(1987)]
[No. 45892. July 13, 1938]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff and appellee,
vs. TRANQUILINO LAGMAN, defendant and appellant.
[No. 45893. July 13, 1938]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff and appellee,
vs. PRIMITIVO DE SOSA, defendant and appellant.
1. NATIONAL DEFENSE; COMPULSORY MILITARY SERVICE;
VIOLATION OF SECTION 60 OF COMMONWEALTH ACT No.
1, REGARDING FAILURE TO REGISTER IN THE MILITARY
SERVICE.The National Defense Law, in so far as it
establishes compulsory military service, does not go
against section 2, Article II of the Philippine Constitution
but is, on the contrary, in faithful compliance therewith.
The duty of the Government to defend the State cannot
be performed except through an army. To leave the
organization of an army to the will of the citizens would
be to make this duty of the Government excusable should
there be no sufficient men who volunteer to enlist
therein.
2. ID.; ID.; IN THE UNITED STATES.In the United States
the courts have held in a series of decisions that the
compulsory military service adopted by reason of the civil
war and the world war does not violate the Constitution,
because the power to establish it is derived from that
granted to Congress to declare war and to organize and
maintain an army. This is so because the right of the

Government to require compulsory military service is a
consequence of its duty to defend the State and is
reciprocal with its duty to defend the life, liberty, and
property of the citizen. In the case of Jacobson vs.
Massachusetts
14
14 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Lagman
(197 U. S., 11; 25 Sup. Ct. Rep., 385), it was said that,
without violating the Constitution a person may be
compelled by force, if need be, against his will, against
his pecuniary interests and even against his religious or
political convictions, to take his place in the ranks of the
army of his country, and risk the chance of being shot
down in its defense.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.In the case of United States vs. Olson (253
Fed., 233), it was also said that this is not deprivation of
property without due process of law, because, in its just
sense, there is no right of property to an office or
employment. The circumstance that these decisions refer
to laws enacted by reason of the actual existence of war
does not make our case any different, inasmuch as, in the
last analysis, what justifies compulsory military service is
the defense of the State, whether actual or whether in
preparation to make it more effective, in case of need.
4. ID. ; ID.; PECUNIARY ALLOWANCE TO ATTEND TO FAMILY

RESPONSIBILITIES.The circumstance that the appellants
have dependent families to support does not excuse
them from their duty to present themselves before the
Acceptance Board because, if such circumstance exists,
they can ask for deferment in complying with their duty
and, at all events, they can obtain the proper pecuniary
allowance to attend to these family responsibilities
(sections 65 and 69 of Commonwealth Act No. 1).
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Bataan. Araneta Diaz, J.
Severino P. Izon for appellants.
Solicitor-General Tuason for appellee.
AVANCEA, C. J.:
In these two cases (G. R. Nos. 45892 and 45893), the
appellants Tranquilino Lagman and Primitivo de Sosa are
charged with a violation of section 60 of Commonwealth
Act No. 1, known as the National Defense Law. It is
alleged that these two appellants, being Filipinos and
having reached the age of twenty years in 1936, willfully
and unlawfully refused to register in the military service
between the 1st and 7th of April of said year,
notwithstanding the fact that they had been required to
do so. The evidence shows that these two appellants
were duly notified by the corresponding authorities to
appear before the Acceptance Board in order to register

for military service in accordance
15
VOL. 66, JULY 13, 1938 15
People vs. Lagman
with law, and that the said appellants, in spite of these

notices, had not registered up to the date of the filing of
the information.
The appellants do not deny these facts, but they allege in
defense that they have not registered in the military
service because Primitivo de Sosa is fatherless and has a
mother and a brother eight years old to support, and
Tranquilino Lagman also has a father to support, has no
military leanings, and does not wish to kill or be killed.
Each of these appellants was sentenced by the Court of
First Instance to one month and one day of imprisonment,
with the costs.
In this instance, the validity of the National Defense Law,
under which the accused were sentenced, is impugned on
the ground that it is unconstitutional.
Section 2, Article II of the Constitution of the Philippines
provides as follows:
"SEC. 2. The defense of the State is a prime duty of

government, and in the fulfillment of this duty all citizens
may be required by law to render personal military or civil
service."
The National Defense Law, in so far as it establishes
compulsory military service, does not go against this
constitutional provision but is, on the contrary, in faithful
compliance therewith. The duty of the Government to
defend the State cannot be performed except through an
army. To leave the organization of an army to the will of
the citizens would be to make this duty of the
Government excusable should there be no sufficient men
who volunteer to enlist therein. In the United States the
courts have held in a series of decisions that the
compulsory military service adopted by reason of the civil
war and the world war does not violate the Constitution,
because the power to establish it is derived from that
granted to Congress to declare war and to organize and
maintain an army. This is so because the right of the
Government to require compulsory military service is a
consequence of its duty to defend the State and is
reciprocal with its duty to defend the life, liberty and
property of the citizen. In the case of Jacobson vs'
16
Panay Autobus Co. vs. Beruo
Massachusetts (197 U. S., 11; 25 Sup. Ct. Rep., 385), it

was said that, without violating the Constitution, a person
may be compelled by force, if need be, against his will,
against his pecuniary interests, and even against his
religious or political convictions, to take his place in the
ranks of the army of his country, and risk the chance of
being shot down in its defense. In the case of United
States vs. Olson (253 Fed., 233), it was also said that this
is not deprivation of property without due process of law,
because, in its just sense, there is no right of property to
an office or employment. The circumstance that these
decisions refer to laws enacted by reason of the actual
existence of war does not make our case any different,
inasmuch as, in the last analysis, what justifies
compulsory military service is the defense of the State,
whether actual or whether in preparation to make it more
effective, in case of need.
The circumstance that the appellants have dependent
families to support does not excuse them from their duty
to present themselves before the Acceptance Board
because, if such circumstance exists, they can ask for
deferment in complying with their duty and, at all events,
they can obtain the proper pecuniary allowance to attend
to these family responsibilities (secs. 65 and 69 of
Commonwealth Act No. 1).
The appealed judgment rendered in these two cases is
affirmed, with the costs to the appellants. So ordered.
Villa -Real, Imperial, Diaz, Laurel, and Concepcion, JJ.,

concur.
Judgment affirmed. [People vs. Lagman, 66 Phil.
13(1938)]
[No. 45459. March 13, 1937]

GREGORIO AGLIPAY, petitioner, vs. JUAN Ruiz, respondent,
1. PROHIBITION; ISSUANCE OF WRIT FOR ACTS
PERFORMED WITHOUT JURISDICTION.While, generally,
prohibition as an extraordinary legal writ will not issue to
restrain or control the performance of other than judicial
or quasi-judicial functions (50 C. J., 658), its issuance and
enforcement are regulated by statute and in this
jurisdiction may issue to "* * * inferior tribunals,
corporations, boards, or persons, whether exercising
functions judicial or ministerial, which are without or in
excess of the jurisdiction of such tribunal, corporation,
board, or person * * *." (Secs. 516 and 226, Code of Civil
Procedure.)
2. ID.; ID.; DIRECTOR OF POSTS.The terms "judicial" and
"ministerial" used with reference to "functions" in the
statute are undoubtedly comprehensive and include the
challenged act of the respondent Director of Posts in the
present case, which act because alleged to be violative of
the Constitution is a fortiori "without or in excess of * * *
jurisdiction."
3. ID.; ID.; WRIT NOT CONFINED EXCLUSIVELY TO COURTS
OR TRIBUNALS.The statutory rule, therefore, in this
jurisdiction is that the writ of prohibition is not confined
exclusively to courts or tribunals to keep them within the
limits of their own jurisdiction and to prevent them from

encroaching upon the jurisdiction of other tribunals, but
will issue, in appropriate cases, to an officer or person
whose acts are without or in excess of his authority. Not
infrequently, "the writ is granted, where it is
202
Aglipay vs. Ruiz
necessary for the orderly administration of justice, or to

prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an
oppressive or vindictive manner, or a multiplicity of
actions." (Dimayuga and Fajardo vs. Fernandez [1922], 43
Phil., 304, 307.)
4. CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES; RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM.What is guaranteed by our Constitution is
religious liberty, not mere religious toleration. Religious
freedom, however, as a constitutional mandate is not
inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not a
denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a
profession of faith to an active power that binds and
elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And, in so far
as it instills into the minds the purest principles of
morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly
appreciated.
5. ID.; ID.; POSTAGE STAMPS ISSUED UNDER ACT No.
4052.The respondent Director of Posts issued the
postage stamps in question under the provisions of Act

No. 4052 of the Philippine Legislature which appropriates
the sum of sixty thousand pesos for the cost of plates
and' printing of postage stamps with new designs and
other expenses incident thereto, and authorizes the
Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications, to dispose of the
amount appropriated in the manner indicated and "as
often as may be deemed advantageous to the
Government."
6. ID.; ID.; ID.Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious
purpose in view. What it gives the Director of Posts is the
discretionary power to determine when the issuance of
special postage stamps would be "advantageous to the
Government." Of course, the phrase "advantageous to
the Government" does not authorize the violation of the
Constitution. It does not authorize the appropriation, use
or application of public money or property for the use,
benefit or support of a particular sect or church. In the
present case, however, the issuance of the postage
stamps in question by the Director of Posts and the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications was not
inspired by any sectarian feeling to favor a particular
church or religious denomination. The stamps were not
issued and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic
Church. Nor were money derived from the sale of the
stamps given to that church.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.The only purpose in issuing and selling the
stamps was "to advertise the Philippines and attract more
tourists to this country." The officials concerned merely

took advantage of an event considered of international
importance "to give publicity to the Philippines and its
people." The stamps as actually
203
VOL. 64, MARCH 13, 1937 203
Aglipay vs. Ruiz
designed and printed (Exhibit 2), instead of showing a

Catholic Church chalice as originally planned, contains a
map of the Philippines and the location of the City of
Manila, and an inscription as follows: "Seat XXXIII
International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937." What
is emphasized is not the Eucharistic Congress itself but
Manila, the capital of the Philippines, as the seat of that
congress.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.While the issuance and sale of the stamps
in question may be said to be inseparably linked with an
event of a religious character, the resulting propaganda,
if any, received by the Roman Catholic Church, was not
the aim and purpose of the Government. The Government
should not be embarrassed in its activities simply
because of incidental results, more or less religious in
character, if the purpose had in view is one which could
legitimately be undertaken by appropriate legislation. The
main purpose should not be frustrated by its
subordination to mere incidental results not
contemplated. (Vide Bradfield vs. Roberts, 175 U. S., 295;

20 Sup. Ct. Rep., 121; 44 Law. ed., 168.)
Vicente Sotto for petitioner.
Solicitor-General Tuason for respondent.
LAUREL, J.:
The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of
the Philippine Independent Church, seeks the issuance
from this court of a writ of prohibition to prevent the
respondent Director of Posts from issuing and selling
postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third
International Eucharistic Congress.
In May, 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the
dailies of Manila that he would order the issuance -of
postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the
City of Manila of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic
Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church. The
petitioner, in the fulfillment of what he considers to be a
civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto, Esq., member of the
Philip-
204
Aglipay vs. Ruiz
pine Bar, to denounce the matter to the President of the

Philippines. In spite of the protest of the petitioner's
attorney, the respondent publicly announced having sent
to the United States the designs of the postage stamps
for printing as follows:
"In the center is a chalice, with grape vine and stalks of
wheat as border design. The stamps are blue, green,
brown, cardinal red, violet and orange, 1 inch by 1.094
inches. The denominations are for 2, 6, 16, 20, 36 and 50
centavos." The said stamps were actually issued and sold
though the greater part thereof, to this day, remains
unsold. The further sale of the stamps is sought to be
prevented by the petitioner herein.
The Solicitor-General contends that the writ of prohibition
is not the proper legal remedy in the instant case,
although he admits that the writ may properly restrain
ministerial functions. While, generally, prohibition as an
extraordinary legal writ will not issue to restrain or control
the performance of other than judicial or quasi-judicial
functions (50 C. J., 658), its issuance and enforcement are
regulated by statute and in this jurisdiction may issue to
"* * * inferior tribunals, corporations, boards, or persons,
whether exercising functions judicial or ministerial, which
are without of in excess of the jurisdiction of such
tribunal, corporation, board, or person * * *." (Secs. 516
and 226, Code of Civil Procedure.) The terms "judicial"
and "ministerial" used with reference to "functions" in the
challenged act of the respondent Director of Posts in the

present case, which act because alleged to be violative of
the Constitution is a fortiori "without or in excess of * * *
jurisdiction." The statutory rule, therefore, in this
jurisdiction is that the writ of prohibition is not confined
exclusively to courts or tribunals to keep them within the
limits of their own jurisdiction and to prevent them from
encroaching upon the jurisdiction of other tribunals,
205
VOL. 64, MARCH 13, 1937 205
Aglipay vs. Ruiz
but will issue, in appropriate cases, to an officer or person

whose acts are without or in excess of his authority. Not
infrequently, "the writ is granted, where it is necessary
for the orderly administration of justice, or to prevent the
use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive or
vindictive manner, or a multiplicity of actions."
(Dimayuga and Fajardo vs. Fernandez [1923], 43 Phil.,
304, 307.)
The more important question raised refers to the alleged
violation of the Constitution by the respondent in issuing
and selling postage stamps commemorative of the
Thirtythird International Eucharistic Congress. It is alleged
that this action of the respondent is violative of the
provisions of section 13, subsection 3, Article VI, of the

Constitution of the Philippines, which provides as follows:
"No public money or property shall ever be appropriated,
applied, or used, directly or indirectly, for the use,
benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination,
sectarian institution, or system of religion, or for the use,
benefit, or support of any priest, preacher, minister, or
other religious teacher or dignitary as such, except when
such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to
the armed forces or to any penal institution, orphanage,
or leprosarium."
The prohibition herein expressed is a direct corollary of
the principle of separation of church and state. Without
the necessity of adverting to the historical background of
this principle in our country, it is sufficient to say that our
history, not to speak of the history of mankind, has
taught us that the union of church and state is prejudicial
to both, for occasions might arise when the state will use
the church, and the church the state, as a weapon in the
furtherance of their respective ends and aims. The
Malolos Constitution recognized this principle of
separation of church and state in the early stages of our
constitutional development; it was inserted in the Treaty
of Paris between the United States and Spain of
December 10, 1898, reiterated in Pres-
206
Aglipay vs. Ruiz
ident McKinley's Instructions to the Philippine

Commission, reaffirmed in the Philippine Bill of 1902 and
in the Autonomy Act of August 29, 1916, and finally
embodied in the Constitution of the Philippines as the
supreme expression of the Filipino people. It is almost
trite to say now that in this country we enjoy both
religious and civil freedom. All the officers of the
Government, from the highest to the lowest, in taking
their oath to support and defend the Constitution, bind
themselves to recognize and respect the constitutional
guarantee of religious freedom, with its inherent
limitations and recognized implications. It should be
stated that what is guaranteed by our Constitution is
religious liberty, not mere religious toleration.
Religious freedom, however, as a constitutional mandate
is not inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is
not a denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a
profession of faith to an active power that binds and
elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And, in so far
as it instills into the minds the purest principles of
morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly
appreciated. When the Filipino people, in the preamble of
their Constitution, implored "the aid of Divine Providence,
in order to establish a government that shall embody
their ideals, conserve and develop the patrimony of the
nation, promote the general welfare, and secure to
themselves and their posterity the blessings of
independence under a regime of justice, liberty and

democracy," they thereby manifested their intense
religious nature and placed unfaltering reliance upon Him
who guides the destinies of men and nations. The
elevating influence of religion in human society is
recognized here as elsewhere. In fact, certain general
concessions are indiscriminately accorded to religious
sects and denominations. Our Constitution and laws
exempt from taxation properties devoted exclusively to
religious purposes (sec. 14, subsec. 3, Art. VI,
Constitution of the Philippines and sec. 1, subsec. 4,
Ordinance appended thereto;
207
VOL. 64, MARCH 13, 1937 207
Aglipay vs. Ruiz
Assessment Law, sec. 344, par. [c], Adm. Code). Sectarian

aid is not prohibited when a priest, preacher, minister or
other religious teacher or dignitary as such is assigned to
the armed forces or to any penal institution, orphanage or
leprosarium (sec. 13, subsec. 3, Art. VI, Constitution of
the Philippines). Optional religious instruction in the
public schools is by constitutional mandate allowed (sec.
5, Art. XIII, Constitution of the Philippines, in relation to
sec. 928, Adm. Code). Thursday and Friday of Holy Week,
Thanksgiving Day, Christmas Day, and Sundays are made
legal holidays (sec. 29, Adm. Code) because of the

secular idea that their observance is conducive to
beneficial moral results. The law allows divorce but
punishes polygamy and bigamy; and certain crimes
against religious worship are considered crimes against
the fundamental laws of the state (see arts. 132 and 133,
Revised Penal Code).
In the case at bar, it appears that the respondent Director
of Posts issued the postage stamps in question under the
provisions of Act No. 4052 of the Philippine Legislature.
This Act is as follows:
"No. 4052.AN ACT APPROPRIATING THE SUM OF SIXTY
THOUSAND PESOS AND MAKING THE SAME AVAILABLE
OUT OF ANY FUNDS IN THE INSULAR TREASURY NOT
OTHERWISE APPROPRIATED FOR THE COST OF PLATES
AND PRINTING OF POSTAGE STAMPS WITH NEW DESIGNS,
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the Philippines in Legislature
assembled and by the authority of the same:
"SECTION 1. The sum of sixty thousand pesos is hereby
appropriated and made immediately available out of any
funds in the Insular Treasury not otherwise appropriated,
for the cost of plates and printing of postage stamps with
new designs, and other expenses incident thereto.
208

Aglipay vs. Ruiz
"SEC. 2. The Director of Posts, with the approval of the

Secretary of Public Works and Communications, is hereby
authorized to dispose of the whole or any portion of the
amount herein appropriated in the manner indicated and
as often as may be deemed advantageous to the
Government.
"SEC. 3. This amount or any portion thereof not otherwise
expended shall not revert to the Treasury.
"SEC. 4. This act shall take effect on its approval.
"Approved, February 21, 1933."
It will be seen that the Act appropriates the sum of sixty
thousand pesos for the cost of plates and printing of
postage stamps with new designs and other expenses
incident thereto, and authorizes the Director of Posts,
with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, to dispose of the amount appropriated
in the manner indicated and "as often as may be deemed
advantageous to the Govvernment". The printing and
issuance of the postage stamps in question appears to
have been approved by authority of the President of the
Philippines in a letter dated September 1, 1936, made
part of the respondent's memorandum as Exhibit A. The
respondent alleges that the Government of the
Philippines would suffer losses if the writ prayed for is
granted. He estimates the revenue to be derived from the

sale of the postage stamps in question at P1,618,179.10
and states that there still remain to be sold stamps worth
P1,402,279.02.
Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view.
What it gives the Director of Posts is the discretionary
power to determine when the issuance of special postage
stamps would be "advantageous to the Government." Of
course, the phrase "advantageous to the Government"
does not authorize the violation of the Constitution. It
does not authorize the appropriation, use or application of
public money or property for the use, benefit or support
of a par-
209
VOL. 64, MARCH 13, 1937 209
Aglipay vs. Riuz
ticular sect or church. In the present case, however, the

issuance of the postage stamps in question by the
Director of Posts and the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications was not inspired by any sectarian
feeling to favor a particular church or religious
denomination. The stamps were not issued and sold for
the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. Nor were
money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that
church. On the contrary, it appears from the letter of the
Director of Posts of June 5, 1936, incorporated on page 2

of the petitioner's complaint, that the only purpose in
issuing and selling the stamps was "to advertise the
Philippines and attract more tourists to this country." The
officials concerned merely took advantage of an event
considered of international importance "to give publicity
to the Philippines and its people" (Letter of the
Undersecretary of Public Works and Communications to
the President of the Philippines, June 9, 1936; p. 3,
petitioner's complaint). It is significant to note that the
stamps' as actually designed and printed (Exhibit 2),
instead of showing a Catholic Church chalice as originally
planned, contains a map of the Philippines and the
location of the City of Manila, and an inscription as
follows: "Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress,
Feb. 3-7, 1937." What is emphasized is not the
Eucharistic Congress itself but Manila, the capital of the
Philippines, as the seat of that congress. It is obvious that
while the issuance and sale of the stamps in question
may be said to be inseparably linked with an event of a
religious character, the resulting propaganda, if any,
received by the Roman Catholic Church, was not the aim
and purpose of the Government. We are of the opinion
that the Government should not be embarrassed in its
activities simply because of incidental results, more or
less religious in character, if the purpose had in view is
one which could legitimately be
210

Aglipay vs. Ruiz
undertaken by appropriate legislation. The main purpose

should not be frustrated by its subordination to mere
incidental results not contemplated. (Vide Bradfield vs.
Roberts, 175 U. S., 295; 20 Sup. Ct. Rep., 121; 44 Law.
ed., 168.)
We are much impressed with the vehement appeal of
counsel for the petitioner to maintain inviolate the
complete separation of church and state and curb any
attempt to infringe by indirection a constitutional
inhibition. Indeed, in the Philippines, once the scene of
religious intolerance and persecution, care should be
taken that at this stage of our political development
nothing is done by the Government or its officials that
may lead to the belief that the Government is taking
sides or favoring a particular religious sect or institution,
But, upon very serious reflection, examination of Act No.
4052, and scrutiny of the attending circumstances, we
have come to the conclusion that there has been no
constitutional infraction in the case at bar. Act No. 4052
grants the Director of Posts, with the approval of the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications, discretion
to issue postage stamps with new designs "as often as
may be deemed advantageous to the Government." Even
if we were to assume that these officials made use of a
poor judgment in issuing and selling the postage stamps
in question still, the case of the petitioner would fail to

take in weight. Between the exercise of a poor judgment
and the unconstitutionality of the step taken, a gap.
exists which is yet to be filled to justify the court in
setting aside the official act assailed as coming within a
constitutional inhibition.
The petition for a writ of prohibition is hereby denied,
without pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.
Avancea, C. J., Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Imperial, Diaz,
and Concepcion, JJ., concur.
Petition denied. [Aglipay vs. Ruiz, 64 Phil. 201(1937)]

Manosca vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 106440. January 29, 1996.*FIRST

DIVISION.ALEJANDRO MANOSCA, ASUNCION MANOSCA
and LEONICA MANOSCA, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, HON. BENJAMIN V. PELAYO, Presiding Judge,
RTC-Pasig, Metro Manila, Branch 168, HON. GRADUACION
A. REYES CLARAVAL, Presiding Judge, RTC-Pasig, Metro
Manila, Branch 71, and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
Constitutional Law; Eminent Domain; Words and Phrases;
Eminent Domain, Explained; The constitutional
qualification that private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation is intended to
provide a safeguard against possible abuse and so to
protect as well the individual against whose property the
power is sought to be enforced.Eminent domain, also
often referred to as expropriation and, with less
frequency, as condemnation, is, like police power and
taxation, an inherent power of sovereignty. It need not be
clothed with any constitutional gear to exist; instead,
provisions in our Constitution on the subject are meant
more to regulate, rather than to grant, the exercise of the
power. Eminent domain is generally so described as the
highest and most exact idea of property remaining in the

government that may be acquired for some public
purpose through a method in the nature of a forced
purchase by the State. It is a right to take or reassert
dominion over property within the state for public use or
to meet a public exigency. It is said to be an essential
part of governance even in its most primitive form and
thus inseparable from sovereignty. The only direct
constitutional qualification is that private property shall
not be taken for public use without just compensation.
This proscription is intended to provide a safeguard
against possible abuse and so to protect as well the
individual against whose property the power is sought to
be enforced.
Same; Same; The power of eminent domain should not
now be understood as being confined only to the
expropriation of vast tracts of land and landed estates.
The court, in Guido, merely passed upon the issue of the
extent of the Presidents power under Com-
____________________________
* FIRST DIVISION.
413
VOL. 252, JANUARY 29, 1996 413
monwealth Act No. 539 to, specifically, acquire private

lands for subdivision into smaller home lots or farms for
resale to bona fide tenants or occupants. It was in this
particular context of the statute that the Court had made
the pronouncement. The guidelines in Guido were not
meant to be preclusive in nature and, most certainly, the
power of eminent domain should not now be understood
as being confined only to the expropriation of vast tracts
of land and landed estates.
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Public Use, Explained;
The term public use must be considered in its general
concept of meeting a public need or a public exigency.
The term public use, not having been otherwise defined
by the constitution, must be considered in its general
concept of meeting a public need or a public exigency.
Black summarizes the characterization given by various
courts to the term; thus: Public Use. Eminent domain.
The constitutional and statutory basis for taking property
by eminent domain. For condemnation purposes, public
use is one which confers some benefit or advantage to
the public; it is not confined to actual use by public. It is
measured in terms of right of public to use proposed
facilities for which condemnation is sought and, as long
as public has right of use, whether exercised by one or
many members of public, a public advantage or public
benefit accrues sufficient to constitute a public use.
Montana Power Co. vs. Bokma, Mont. 457 P.2d 769, 772,
773.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The validity of the exercise of

the power of eminent domain for traditional purposes is
beyond questionit is not at all to be said, however, that
public use should thereby be restricted to such traditional
uses.The validity of the exercise of the power of
eminent domain for traditional purposes is beyond
question; it is not at all to be said, however, that public
use should thereby be restricted to such traditional uses.
The idea that public use is strictly limited to clear cases
of use by the public has long been discarded.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A historical research discloses
the meaning of the term public use to be one of
constant growth.It has been explained as early as Sea
v. Manila Railroad Co., that: x x x A historical research
discloses the meaning of the term public use to be one
of constant growth. As society advances, its demands
upon the individual increase and each demand is a new
use to which the
414
resources of the individual may be devoted. x x x for

whatever is beneficially employed for the community is a
public use.
Same; Same; Separation of Church and State; Freedom of
Religion; An attempt to give some religious perspective to
the case deserves little consideration, for what should be

significant is the principal objective of, not the casual
consequences that might follow from, the exercise of the
power.Petitioners ask: But (w)hat is the so-called
unusual interest that the expropriation of (Felix Manalos)
birthplace become so vital as to be a public use
appropriate for the exercise of the power of eminent
domain when only members of the Iglesia ni Cristo
would benefit? This attempt to give some religious
perspective to the case deserves little consideration, for
what should be significant is the principal objective of,
not the casual consequences that might follow from, the
exercise of the power. The purpose in setting up the
marker is essentially to recognize the distinctive
contribution of the late Felix Manalo to the culture of the
Philippines, rather than to commemorate his founding
and leadership of the Iglesia ni Cristo.
Same; Same; Same; That only a few would actually
benefit from the expropriation of property does not
necessarily diminish the essence and character of public
use.The practical reality that greater benefit may be
derived by members of the Iglesia ni Cristo than by most
others could well be true but such a peculiar advantage
still remains to be merely incidental and secondary in
nature. Indeed, that only a few would actually benefit
from the expropriation of property does not necessarily
diminish the essence and character of public use.
Same; Same; Just Compensation; Due Process; There is
no denial of due process where the records of the case
are replete with pleadings that could have dealt with the
provisional value of the propertywhat the law prohibits
is the lack of opportunity to be heard.Petitioners
contend that they have been denied due process in the
fixing of the provisional value of their property. Petitioners
need merely to be reminded that what the law prohibits is
the lack of opportunity to be heard; contrary to
petitioners argument, the records of this case are replete
with pleadings that could have dealt, directly or
indirectly, with the provisional value of the property.
415
VOL. 252, JANUARY 29, 1996 415
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

Court of Appeals.
Melecio, Virgilio, Emata Law Office for petitioners.
VITUG, J.:
In this appeal, via a petition for review on certiorari, from
the decision1Penned by Justice Nathanael De Pano, Jr.,
with the concurrence of Justices Luis Victor and Fortunato
Vailoces. of the Court of Appeals, dated 15 January 1992,
in CA-G.R. SP No. 24969 (entitled Alejandro Manosca, et
al. v. Hon. Benjamin V. Pelayo, et al.), this Court is asked

to resolve whether or not the public use requirement of
Eminent Domain is extant in the attempted expropriation
by the Republic of a 492-square-meter parcel of land so
declared by the National Historical Institute (NHI) as a
national historical landmark.
The facts of the case are not in dispute.
Petitioners inherited a piece of land located at P. Burgos
Street, Calzada, Taguig, Metro Manila, with an area of
about four hundred ninety-two (492) square meters.
When the parcel was ascertained by the NHI to have been
the birthsite of Felix Y. Manalo, the founder of Iglesia Ni
Cristo, it passed Resolution No. 1, Series of 1986,
pursuant to Section 42The National Museum and the
National Historical Commission are hereby vested with
the right to declare other such historical and cultural sites
as National Shrines, Monuments, and/or Landmarks, in
accordance with the guidelines set forth in R.A. 484... of
Presidential Decree No. 260, declaring the land to be a
national historical landmark. The resolution was, on 06
January 1986, approved by the Minister of Education,
Culture and Sports. Later, the opinion of the Secretary of
Justice was asked on the legality of the measure. In his
Opinion No. 133, Series of 1987, the Secretary of Justice
replied in the affirmative; he explained:
____________________________
1 Penned by Justice Nathanael De Pano, Jr., with the
concurrence of Justices Luis Victor and Fortunato Vailoces.
2 The National Museum and the National Historical

Commission are hereby vested with the right to declare
other such historical and cultural sites as National
Shrines, Monuments, and/or Landmarks, in accordance
with the guidelines set forth in R.A. 4846 and the spirit of
this Decree.
416
According to your guidelines, national landmarks are

places or objects that are associated with an event,
achievement, characteristic, or modification that makes a
turning point or stage in Philippine history. Thus, the
birthsite of the founder of the Iglesia ni Cristo, the late
Felix Y. Manalo, who, admittedly, had made contributions
to Philippine history and culture has been declared as a
national landmark. It has been held that places invested
with unusual historical interest is a public use for which
the power of eminent domain may be authorized x x x.
In view thereof, it is believed that the National Historical
Institute as an agency of the Government charged with
the maintenance and care of national shrines,
monuments and landmarks and the development of
historical sites that may be declared as national shrines,
monuments and/or landmarks, may initiate the institution
of condemnation proceedings for the purpose of acquiring

the lot in question in accordance with the procedure
provided for in Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court. The
proceedings should be instituted by the Office of the
Solicitor General in behalf of the Republic.
Accordingly, on 29 May 1989, the Republic, through the
Office of the Solicitor-General, instituted a complaint for
expropriation3Rollo, pp. 77-82. before the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig for and in behalf of the NHI alleging, inter
alia, that:
Pursuant to Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 260, the
National Historical Institute issued Resolution No. 1,
Series of 1986, which was approved on January, 1986 by
the then Minister of Education, Culture and Sports,
declaring the above described parcel of land which is the
birthsite of Felix Y. Manalo, founder of the Iglesia ni
Cristo, as a National Historical Landmark. The plaintiff
perforce needs the land as such national historical
landmark which is a public purpose.
At the same time, respondent Republic filed an urgent
motion for the issuance of an order to permit it to take
immediate possession of the property. The motion was
opposed by petitioners. After a hearing, the trial court
issued, on 03
____________________________
3 Rollo, pp. 77-82.
417
VOL. 252, JANUARY 29, 1996 417
August 1989,4Rollo, pp. 66-67. an order fixing the

provisional market (P54,120.00) and assessed
(P16,236.00) values of the property and authorizing the
Republic to take over the property once the required sum
would have been deposited with the Municipal Treasurer
of Taguig, Metro Manila.
Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the main
thesis that the intended expropriation was not for a public
purpose and, incidentally, that the act would constitute
an application of public funds, directly or indirectly, for
the use, benefit, or support of Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious
entity, contrary to the provision of Section 29(2), Article
VI, of the 1987 Constitution.5Sec. 29. x x x.(2) No public
money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or
employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or
support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian
institution, or system of religion, or of any priest, pr...
Petitioners sought, in the meanwhile, a suspension in the
implementation of the 03rd August 1989 order of the trial
court.
On 15 February 1990, following the filing by respondent

Republic of its reply to petitioners motion seeking the
dismissal of the case, the trial court issued its denial of

said motion to dismiss.6Rollo, pp. 68-69. Five (5) days
later, or on 20 February 1990,7Rollo, p. 70. another order
was issued by the trial court, declaring moot and
academic the motion for reconsideration and/or
suspension of the order of 03 August 1989 with the
rejection of petitioners motion to dismiss. Petitioners
motion for the reconsideration of the 20th February 1990
order was likewise denied by the trial court in its 16th
April 1991 order.8Rollo, pp. 71-76.
____________________________
4 Rollo, pp. 66-67.
5 Sec. 29. x x x.
(2) No public money or property shall be appropriated,
applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the
use, benefit, or support of any sect, church,
denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion,
or of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious
teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest,
preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed
forces, or to any penal institution, or government
orphanage or leprosarium.
6 Rollo, pp. 68-69.
7 Rollo, p. 70.
8 Rollo, pp. 71-76.
418
Petitioners then lodged a petition for certiorari and

prohibition with the Court of Appeals. In its now disputed
15th January 1992 decision, the appellate court dismissed
the petition on the ground that the remedy of appeal in
the ordinary course of law was an adequate remedy and
that the petition itself, in any case, had failed to show any
grave abuse of discretion or lack of jurisdictional
competence on the part of the trial court. A motion for
reconsideration of the decision was denied in the 23rd
July 1992 resolution of the appellate court.
We begin, in this present recourse of petitioners, with a
few known postulates.
Eminent domain, also often referred to as expropriation
and, with less frequency, as condemnation, is, like police
power and taxation, an inherent power of sovereignty. It
need not be clothed with any constitutional gear to exist;
instead, provisions in our Constitution on the subject are
meant more to regulate, rather than to grant, the
exercise of the power.
Eminent domain is generally so described as the highest
and most exact idea of property remaining in the
government that may be acquired for some public
purpose through a method in the nature of a forced
purchase by the State.9Blacks Law Dictionary, 6th ed., p.

523. It is a right to take or reassert dominion over
property within the state for public use or to meet a
public exigency. It is said to be an essential part of
governance even in its most primitive form and thus
inseparable from sovereignty.10Visayan Refining
Company vs. Camus, 40 Phil. 550. The only direct
constitutional qualification is that private property shall
not be taken for public use without just
compensation.11Sec. 9, Art. III, 1987 Constitution. This
proscription is intended to provide a safeguard against
possible abuse and so to protect as well the individual
against whose property the power is sought to be
enforced.
Petitioners assert that the expropriation has failed to
meet the guidelines set by this Court in the case of Guido
v. Rural
____________________________
9 Blacks Law Dictionary, 6th ed., p. 523.
10 Visayan Refining Company vs. Camus, 40 Phil. 550.
11 Sec. 9, Art. III, 1987 Constitution.
419
VOL. 252, JANUARY 29, 1996 419
Progress Administration,1284 Phil. 847. to wit: (a) the size

of the land expropriated; (b) the large number of people
benefited; and, (c) the extent of social and economic
reform.13Rollo, pp. 38-39. Petitioners suggest that we
confine the concept of expropriation only to the following
public uses,14Rollo, p. 42. i.e., the
x x x taking of property for military posts, roads, streets,
sidewalks, bridges, ferries, levees, wharves, piers, public
buildings including schoolhouses, parks, playgrounds,
plazas, market places, artesian wells, water supply and
sewerage systems, cemeteries, crematories, and
railroads.
This view of petitioners is much too limitative and
restrictive.
The court, in Guido, merely passed upon the issue of the
extent of the Presidents power under Commonwealth Act
No. 539 to, specifically, acquire private lands for
subdivision into smaller home lots or farms for resale to
bona fide tenants or occupants. It was in this particular
context of the statute that the Court had made the
pronouncement. The guidelines in Guido were not meant
to be preclusive in nature and, most certainly, the power
of eminent domain should not now be understood as
being confined only to the expropriation of vast tracts of
land and landed estates.15Rollo, p. 42.The term public
use, not having been otherwise defined by the
constitution, must be considered in its general concept of
meeting a public need or a public exigency.16See U.S. vs.
Toribio, 15 Phil. 85. Black summarizes the
characterization given by various courts to the term;

thus:
Public Use. Eminent domain. The constitutional and
statutory basis for taking property by eminent domain.
For condemnation purposes, public use is one which
confers some benefit or advantage
____________________________
12 84 Phil. 847.
13 Rollo, pp. 38-39.
14 Rollo, p. 42.
15 Rollo, p. 42.
16 See U.S. vs. Toribio, 15 Phil. 85.
420
to the public; it is not confined to actual use by public. It

is measured in terms of right of public to use proposed
facilities for which condemnation is sought and, as long
as public has right of use, whether exercised by one or
many members of public, a public advantage or public
benefit accrues sufficient to constitute a public use.
Montana Power Co. vs. Bokma, Mont. 457 P.2d 769, 772,
773.
Public use, in constitutional provisions restricting the

exercise of the right to take private property in virtue of
eminent domain, means a use concerning the whole
community as distinguished from particular individuals.
But each and every member of society need not be
equally interested in such use, or be personally and
directly affected by it; if the object is to satisfy a great
public want or exigency, that is sufficient. Rindge Co. vs.
Los Angeles County, 262 U.S. 700, 43 S.Ct. 689, 692, 67
L. Ed. 1186. The term may be said to mean public
usefulness, utility, or advantage, or what is productive of
general benefit. It may be limited to the inhabitants of a
small or restricted locality, but must be in common, and
not for a particular individual. The use must be a needful
one for the public, which cannot be surrendered without
obvious general loss and inconvenience. A public use for
which land may be taken defies absolute definition for it
changes with varying conditions of society, new
appliances in the sciences, changing conceptions of
scope and functions of government, and other differing
circumstances brought about by an increase in population
and new modes of communication and transportation.
Katz v. Brandon, 156 Conn., 521, 245 A.2d 579,
586.17Blacks Law Dictionary, p. 1232.The validity of the
exercise of the power of eminent domain for traditional
purposes is beyond question; it is not at all to be said,
however, that public use should thereby be restricted to
such traditional uses. The idea that public use is strictly
limited to clear cases of use by the public has long
been discarded. This Court in Heirs of Juancho Ardona v.
Reyes,18125 SCRA 220. quoting from Berman v. Parker

(348 U.S. 25; 99 L. ed. 27), held:
We do not sit to determine whether a particular housing
project is or is not desirable. The concept of the public
welfare is broad
____________________________
17 Blacks Law Dictionary, p. 1232.
18 125 SCRA 220.
421
VOL. 252, JANUARY 29, 1996 421
and inclusive. See DayBrite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342

U.S. 421, 424, 96 L. Ed. 469, 472, 72 S Ct 405. The values
it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as
well as monetary. It is within the power of the legislature
to determine that the community should be beautiful as
well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced
as well as carefully patrolled. In the present case, the
Congress and its authorized agencies have made
determinations that take into account a wide variety of
values. It is not for us to reappraise them. If those who
govern the District of Columbia decide that the Nations
Capital should be beautiful as well as sanitary, there is
nothing in the Fifth Amendment that stands in the way.
Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the

right to realize it through the exercise of eminent domain
is clear. For the power of eminent domain is merely the
means to the end. See Luxton v. North River Bridge Co.
153 U.S. 525, 529, 530, 38 L. ed. 808, 810, 14 S Ct 891;
United States v. Gettysburg Electric R. Co. 160 U.S. 668,
679, 40 L. ed. 576, 580, 16 S Ct 427.
It has been explained as early as Sea v. Manila Railroad
Co.,1942 Phil. 102. that:
x x x A historical research discloses the meaning of the
term public use to be one of constant growth. As society
advances, its demands upon the individual increase and
each demand is a new use to which the resources of the
individual may be devoted. x x x for whatever is
beneficially employed for the community is a public use.
Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando states:

The taking to be valid must be for public use. There was
a time when it was felt that a literal meaning should be
attached to such a requirement. Whatever project is
undertaken must be for the public to enjoy, as in the case
of streets or parks. Otherwise, expropriation is not
allowable. It is not so any more. As long as the purpose of
the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain
comes into play. As just noted, the constitution in at least
two cases, to remove any doubt, determines what is
public use. One is the expropriation of lands to be
subdivided into small lots for resale at cost
____________________________
19 42 Phil. 102.
422
to individuals. The other is the transfer, through the

exercise of this power, of utilities and other private
enterprise to the government. It is accurate to state then
that at present whatever may be beneficially employed
for the general welfare satisfies the requirements of
public use.20Enrique Fernando, The Constitution of the
Philippines, 2nd ed., pp. 523-524.Chief Justice Fernando,
writing the ponencia in J.M. Tuason & Co. vs. Land Tenure
Administration,2131 SCRA 413. has viewed the
Constitution a dynamic instrument and one that is not to
be construed narrowly or pedantically so as to enable it
to meet adequately whatever problems the future has in
store. Fr. Joaquin Bernas, a noted constitutionalist
himself, has aptly observed that what, in fact, has
ultimately emerged is a concept of public use which is
just as broad as public welfare.22Joaquin Bernas, The
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Vol. 1,
1987 ed., p. 282.Petitioners ask: But (w)hat is the socalled unusual interest that the expropriation of (Felix
Manalos) birthplace become so vital as to be a public use
appropriate for the exercise of the power of eminent
domain when only members of the Iglesia ni Cristo

would benefit? This attempt to give some religious
perspective to the case deserves little consideration, for
what should be significant is the principal objective of,
not the casual consequences that might follow from, the
exercise of the power. The purpose in setting up the
marker is essentially to recognize the distinctive
contribution of the late Felix Manalo to the culture of the
Philippines, rather than to commemorate his founding
and leadership of the Iglesia ni Cristo. The practical
reality that greater benefit may be derived by members
of the Iglesia ni Cristo than by most others could well be
true but such a peculiar advantage still remains to be
merely incidental and secondary in nature. Indeed, that
only a few would actually benefit from the expropriation
of prop____________________________
20 Enrique Fernando, The Constitution of the Philippines,
2nd ed., pp. 523-524.
21 31 SCRA 413.
22 Joaquin Bernas, The Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines, Vol. 1, 1987 ed., p. 282.
423
VOL. 252, JANUARY 29, 1996 423
erty does not necessarily diminish the essence and

character of public use.23Philippine Columbian
Association v. Panis, 228 SCRA 668.Petitioners contend
that they have been denied due process in the fixing of
the provisional value of their property. Petitioners need
merely to be reminded that what the law prohibits is the
lack of opportunity to be heard;24Capuno v. Jaramillo,
234 SCRA 212. contrary to petitioners argument, the
records of this case are replete with pleadings25Those
pleadings include:(a) An urgent motion that the hearing
on the fixing of the propertys provisional value and the
taking of possession by the Republic over the same be
held in abeyance until after petitioners shall have
received a copy of the c... that could have dealt, directly
or indirectly, with the provisional value of the property.
Petitioners, finally, would fault respondent appellate court
in sustaining the trial courts order which considered
inapplicable the case of Noble v. City of Manila.26The
Noble case holds that where there is a valid and
subsisting contract between the owners of the property
and the expropriating authority, there is no need or
reason for expropriation (67 Phil. 1). Both courts held
correctly. The Republic was not a party to the alleged
contract of exchange between the Iglesia ni Cristo and
petitioners
____________________________
23 Philippine Columbian Association v. Panis, 228 SCRA
668.
24 Capuno v. Jaramillo, 234 SCRA 212.

25 Those pleadings include:
(a) An urgent motion that the hearing on the fixing of the
propertys provisional value and the taking of possession
by the Republic over the same be held in abeyance until
after petitioners shall have received a copy of the
complaint and summons (Rollo, pp. 86-88);
(b) A motion to dismiss, dated 08 August 1989, seeking to
dismiss the complaint instituted by the Republic on the
ground that the expropriation in question is not for a
public purpose and contrary to Section 29(a), Article VI, of
the 1987 Constitution (Rollo, pp. 90-91);
(c) A motion for reconsideration and/or suspension of the
implementation of the 03 August 1989 Order (Rollo, pp.
93-95); and
(d) A motion for reconsideration of the orders dated 15
and 20 February, 1990 (Rollo, pp. 103-111).
26 The Noble case holds that where there is a valid and
subsisting contract between the owners of the property
and the expropriating authority, there is no need or
reason for expropriation (67 Phil. 1).
424
which (the contracting parties) alone, not the Republic,

could properly be bound.
All considered, the Court finds the assailed decision to be
in accord with law and jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla (Chairman), Bellosillo, Kapunan and
Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
Petition denied.
Notes.Modernly, there has been a shift from the literal
to a broader interpretation of public purpose or public
use for which the power of eminent domain may be
exercised. The old concept was that the condemned
property must actually be used by the general public (e.g.
roads, bridges, public plazas, etc.) before the taking
thereof could satisfy the constitutional requirement of
public use. Under the new concept, public use means
public advantage, convenience or benefit, which tends to
contribute to the general welfare and the prosperity of
the whole community, like a resort complex for tourists or
housing project. (Province of Camarines Sur vs. Court of
Appeals, 222 SCRA 173 [1993])
The expiration of the Iron and Steel Authoritys statutory
term did not by itself require or justify the dismissal of the
eminent domain proceedings earlier instituted. Also, no
new legislative act is necessary should the Republic
decide, upon being substituted for ISA, in fact to continue
to prosecute the expropriation proceedingsthe

legislative authority, a long time ago, enacted a
continuing or standing delegation of authority to the
President of the Philippines to exercise, or cause the
exercise of, the power of eminent domain on behalf of the
Government. (Iron and Steel Authority vs. Court of
Appeals, 249 SCRA 538, [1995]) [Manosca vs. Court of
Appeals, 252 SCRA 412(1996)]
VOL. 259, JULY 26, 1996 529

Iglesia Ni Cristo vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 119673. July 26, 1996.*EN BANC.IGLESIA NI

CRISTO (INC), petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, BOARD OF REVIEW FOR MOVING PICTURES AND
TELEVISION and HONORABLE HENRIETTA S. MENDEZ,
respondents.
Constitutional Law; Freedom of Religion; P.D. 1986 gives
the Board the power to screen, review and examine all
television programs.The law gives the Board the power
to screen, review and examine all television programs.
By the clear terms of the law, the Board has the power to
approve, delete x x x and/or prohibit the x x x exhibition
and/or television broadcast of x x x television programs x
x x. The law also directs the Board to apply
contemporary Filipino cultural values as standard to
determine those which are objectionable for being
immoral, indecent, contrary to law and/or good customs,
injurious to the prestige of the Republic of the Philippines
and its people, or with a dangerous tendency to
encourage the commission of violence or of a wrong or
crime.
Same; Same; Freedom of religion is designed to protect
the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each
man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his

beliefs and to live as he believes he ought to live,
consistent with the liberty of others and with the common
good.We reject petitioners submission which need not
set us adrift in a constitutional voyage towards an
uncharted sea. Freedom of religion has been accorded a
preferred status by the framers of our fundamental laws,
past and present. We have affirmed this preferred status
well aware that it is designed to protect the broadest
possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to
believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs,
and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with
the liberty of others and with the common good. We
have also laboriously defined in our jurisprudence the
intersecting umbras and penumbras of the right to
religious profession and worship.
Same; Same; The exercise of religious freedom can be
regulated by the State when it will bring about the clear
and present danger of some substantial evil which the
State is duty bound to prevent.We
_______________
* EN BANC.
530
thus reject petitioners postulate that its religious

program is per se beyond review by the respondent
Board. Its public broadcast on TV of its religious program
brings it out of the bosom of internal belief. Television is a
medium that reaches even the eyes and ears of children.
The Court iterates the rule that the exercise of religious
freedom can be regulated by the State when it will bring
about the clear and present danger of some substantive
evil which the State is duty bound to prevent, i.e., serious
detriment to the more overriding interest of public health,
public morals, or public welfare.
Same; Same; Any act that restrains speech is hobbled by
the presumption of invalidity and should be greeted with
furrowed brows.Deeply ensconced in our fundamental
law is its hostility against all prior restraints on speech,
including religious speech. Hence, any act that restrains
speech is hobbled by the presumption of invalidity and
should be greeted with furrowed brows. It is the burden of
the respondent Board to overthrow this presumption. If it
fails to discharge this burden, its act of censorship will be
struck down. It failed in the case at bar.
Same; Same; Ruling of respondent court clearly
suppresses petitioners freedom of speech and interferes
with its right to free exercise of religion.The evidence
shows that the respondent Board x-rated petitioners TV
series for attacking other religions, especially the
Catholic church. An examination of the evidence,
especially Exhibits A, A-1, B, C, and D will show
that the so-called attacks are mere criticisms of some
of the deeply held dogmas and tenets of other religions.

The videotapes were not viewed by the respondent court
as they were not presented as evidence. Yet they were
considered by the respondent court as indecent, contrary
to law and good customs, hence, can be prohibited from
public viewing under Section 3(c) of PD 1986. This ruling
clearly suppresses petitioners freedom of speech and
interferes with its right to free exercise of religion.
Same; Same; The ground attack against another
religion was merely added by the respondent Board in its
Rules.The respondents cannot also rely on the ground
attacks against another religion in x-rating the religious
program of petitioner. Even a sideglance at Section 3 of
PD No. 1986 will reveal that it is not among the grounds
to justify an order prohibiting the broadcast of petitioners
television program. The ground attack against another
Rules. This
531
VOL. 259, JULY 26, 1996 531
rule is void for it runs smack against the hoary doctrine

that administrative rules and regulations cannot expand
the letter and spirit of the law they seek to enforce.
Same; Same; Prior restraint on speech, including religious
speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only
by the showing of a substantive and imminent evil which

has taken the life of a reality already on ground.The
records show that the decision of the respondent Board,
affirmed by the respondent appellate court, is completely
bereft of findings of facts to justify the conclusion that the
subject video tapes constitute impermissible attacks
against another religion. There is no showing whatsoever
of the type of harm the tapes will bring about especially
the gravity and imminence of the threatened harm. Prior
restraint on speech, including religious speech, cannot be
justified by hypothetical fears but only by the showing of
a substantive and imminent evil which has taken the life
of a reality already on ground.
PADILLA, J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Freedom of Religion; There can be no
prior restraints on the exercise of free speech, expression
or religion.It should by now be undisputably recognized
and firmly rooted in this country that there can be no
prior restraints on the exercise of free speech, expression
or religion, unless such exercise poses a clear and present
danger of a substantive evil which the State has the right
and even the duty to prevent. The ban against such prior
restraints will result, as it has resulted in the past, in
occasional abuses of free speech and expression but it is
immeasurably preferable to experience such occasional
abuses of speech and expression than to arm a
governmental administrative agency with the authority to
censor speech and expression in accordance with
legislative standards which albeit apparently laudable in
their nature, can very well be bent or stretched by such

agency to convenient latitudes as to frustrate and
eviscerate the precious freedoms of speech and
expression.
MELO, J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Freedom of Religion; Any prior
restriction upon a religious expression would be a
restriction on the right of religion.The enjoyment of the
freedom of religion is always coupled with the freedom of
expression. For the profession of faith inevitably
532
carries with it, as a necessary appendage, the prerogative

of propagation. The constitutional guaranty of free
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and
worship thus denotes the right to disseminate religious
information (American Bible Society vs. City of Manila,
101 Phil. 386 [1957]). Any prior restriction upon a
religious expression would be a restriction on the right of
religion.
Same; Same; The State can exercise no power to restrict
such right until the exercise thereof traverses the point
that will endanger the order of civil society.Freedom of
religion and expression is the rule and its restriction, the
exception. Any prior restriction on the exercise of the

freedom to profess religious faith and the propagation
thereof will unduly diminish that religions authority to
spread what it believes to be the sacred truth. The State
can exercise no power to restrict such right until the
exercise thereof traverses the point that will endanger
the order of civil society.
KAPUNAN, J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Freedom of Religion; The freedom to
disseminate religious information is a right protected by
the free exercise clause of the Constitution.The freedom
to disseminate religious information is a right protected
by the free exercise clause of the Constitution. It
encompasses a wide range of ideas and takes many
forms. In the process of enlightening the adherents or
convincing non-believers of the truth of its beliefs, a
religious sect or denomination is allowed the free choice
of utilizing various media, including pulpit or podium,
print, television film, and the electronic mail.
MENDOZA, J., Separate Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Freedom of Religion; Fact that judicial
review of administrative action is available does not
obviate the constitutional objection to censorship.
Censorship may be allowed only in a narrow class of
cases involving pornography, excessive violence, and
danger to national security. Even in these cases, only
courts can prohibit the showing of a film or the broadcast
of a program. In all other cases, the only remedy against
speech which creates a clear and present danger to

public interests is through subsequent punishment.
Considering the potentiality for harm which motion
pictures and TV programs may have especially on the
young, all materials may validly be required to be
submitted for review before they
533
VOL. 259, JULY 26, 1996 533
may be shown or broadcast. However, the final

determination of the character of the materials cannot be
left to an administrative agency. That judicial review of
administrative action is available does not obviate the
constitutional objection to censorship.
PANGANIBAN, J., Separate Concurring Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Freedom of Religion; The mere
invocation of religious freedom will not stalemate the
State and ipso facto render it incompetent in preserving
the rights of others and in protecting the general welfare.
Religious freedom is absolute when it is confined within
the realm of thought to a private, personal relationship
between a mans conscience and his God, but it is subject
to regulation when religious belief is transformed into
external acts that affect or afflict others. The mere

VITUG, J., Separate Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Freedom of Religion; The exercise of
religious belief is not without inherent and statutory
limitations.I agree with those who support the view that
religious freedom occupies an exalted position in our
hierarchy of rights and that the freedom to disseminate
religious information is a constitutionally-sanctioned
prerogative that allows any legitimate religious
denomination a free choice of media in the propagation of
its credo. Like any other right, however, the exercise of
religious belief is not without inherent and statutory
limitations.
Same; Same; The Board is empowered to screen, review
and examine all television programs.A reading of
Section 3 of P.D. 1986 shows that the Board is
empowered to screen, review and examine all x x x
television programs and to approve or disprove, delete
objectionable portion from and/or prohibit the x x x
television broadcast of x x x television programs x x x
which, in the judgment of the BOARD (so) applying
contemporary Filipino cultural values as standard, are
objectionable for being immoral, indecent, contrary to law
and/or good customs x x x. I believe that the phrase
contrary to law should be read together with other
existing laws such as, for instance, the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code, particularly Article 201, which
prohibits the exhibition of shows that offend another
534
race or religion. I see in this provision a good and sound

standard. Recent events indicate recurrent violent
incidents between and among communities with diverse
religious beliefs and dogma. The danger is past mere
apprehension; it has become a virtual reality and now
prevalent in some parts of the world.
Same; Same; In order not to infringe constitutional
principles, any restriction by the Board must, of course,
be for legitimate and valid reasons.In order not to
infringe constitutional principles, any restriction by the
Board must, of course, be for legitimate and valid
reasons. I certainly do not think that prior censorship
should altogether be rejected just because sanctions can
later be imposed. Regulating the exercise of a right is not
necessarily an anathema to it; in fact, it can safeguard
and secure that right.
PETITION for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
Cuevas, De la Cuesta & De las Alas for petitioner.
PUNO, J.:
This is a petition for review of the Decision dated March

24, 1995 of the respondent Court of Appeals affirming the
action of the respondent Board of Review for Moving
Pictures and Television which x-rated the TV Program
Ang Iglesia ni Cristo.
Petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo, a duly organized religious
organization, has a television program entitled Ang
Iglesia ni Cristo aired on Channel 2 every Saturday and
on Channel 13 every Sunday. The program presents and
propagates petitioners religious beliefs, doctrines and
practices oftentimes in comparative studies with other
religions.
Sometime in the months of September, October and
November 1992, petitioner submitted to the respondent
Board of Review for Moving Pictures and Television the
VTR tapes of its TV program Series Nos. 115, 119, 121
and 128. The Board classified the series as X or not for
public viewing on the
535
VOL. 259, JULY 26, 1996 535
ground that they offend and constitute an attack against

other religions which is expressly prohibited by law.
Petitioner pursued two (2) courses of action against the

respondent Board. On November 28, 1992, it appealed to
the Office of the President the classification of its TV
Series No. 128. It succeeded in its appeal for on
December 18, 1992, the Office of the President reversed
the decision of the respondent Board. Forthwith, the
Board allowed Series No. 128 to be publicly telecast.
On December 14, 1992, petitioner also filed against the
respondent Board Civil Case No. Q-92-14280, with the
RTC, NCR, Quezon City.1A petition for certiorari,
prohibition and injunction, the case was raffled to Br. 104,
then presided by Judge, now Associate Justice of the
Court of Appeals Maximiano Asuncion. Petitioner alleged
that the respondent Board acted without jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion in requiring petitioner to
submit the VTR tapes of its TV program and in x-rating
them. It cited its TV Program Series Nos. 115, 119, 121
and 128. In their Answer, respondent Board invoked its
power under PD No. 1986 in relation to Article 201 of the
Revised Penal Code.
On January 4, 1993, the trial court held a hearing on
petitioners prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. The
parties orally argued and then marked their documentary
evidence. Petitioner submitted the following as its
exhibits, viz.:
(1) Exhibit A, respondent Boards Voting Slip for
Television showing its September 9, 1992 action on
petitioners Series No. 115 as follows:2Original Records,
p. 24.REMARKS:
There are some inconsistencies in the particular program

as it is very surprising for this program to show series of
Catholic ceremonies and also some religious sects and
using it in their discussion about the bible. There are
remarks which are direct criticism which affect other
religions.
_______________
1 A petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction, the
case was raffled to Br. 104, then presided by Judge, now
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals Maximiano
Asuncion.
2 Original Records, p. 24.
536
Need more opinions for this particular program. Please

subject to more opinions.
(2) Exhibit A-1, respondent Boards Voting Slip for
Television showing its September 11, 1992 subsequent
action on petitioners Series No. 115 as follows:3Original
Records, p. 25.REMARKS:
This program is criticizing different religions, based on
their own interpretation of the Bible.
We suggest that the program should delve on explaining

their own faith and beliefs and avoid attacks on other
faith.
(3) Exhibit B, respondent Boards Voting Slip for
Television showing its October 9, 1992 action on
petitioners Series No. 119, as follows:4Original Records,
p. 27.REMARKS:
The Iglesia ni Cristo insists on the literal translation of the
bible and says that our (Catholic) veneration of the Virgin
Mary is not to be condoned because nowhere it is found
in the bible that we should do so.
This is intolerance and robs off all sects of freedom of
choice, worship and decision.
(4) Exhibit C, respondent Boards Voting Slip for
Television showing its October 20, 1992 action on
p. 28.REMARKS:
I refuse to approve the telecast of this episode for
reasons of the attacks, they do on, specifically, the
Catholic religion.
I refuse to admit that they can tell, dictate any other
religion that they are right and the rest are wrong, which
they clearly present in this episode.
(5) Exhibit D, respondent Boards Voting Slip for
Television showing its November 20, 1992 action on
p. 29. The second review shows the following action of

the respondent Board:_______________
6 Original Records, p. 29. The second review shows the
following action of the respondent Board:
537
VOL. 259, JULY 26, 1996 537
REMARKS:
The episode presented criticizes the religious beliefs of
the Catholic and Protestants beliefs.
We suggest a second review.
(6) Exhibits E, E-1, petitioners block time contract
with ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation dated September
1, 1992.7Original Records, pp. 21-22.
(7) Exhibit F, petitioners Airtime Contract with Island
Broadcasting Corporation.8Original Records, p. 23.
(8) Exhibit G, letter dated December 18, 1992 of former
Ex-ecutive Secretary Edelmiro A. Amante, Sr., addressed
to Henrietta S. Mendez reversing the decision of the

respondent Board which x-rated the showing of
petitioners Series No. 129. The letter reads in part:
x x x
The television episode in question is protected by the
constitutional guarantee of free speech and expression
under Article III, section 4 of the 1987 Constitution.
We have viewed a tape of the television episode in
question, as well as studied the passages found by
MTRCB to be objectionable and we find no indication that
the episode poses any clear and present danger sufficient
to limit the said constitutional guarantee.
(9) Exhibits H, H-1, letter dated November 26, 1992
of Teofilo C. Ramos, Sr., addressed to President Fidel V.
Ramos appealing the action of the respondent Board xrating petitioners Series No. 128.
_______________
REMARKS:
An unbalanced interpretation of some parts of the bible
regarding Christmas. They (The Iglesia ni Kristo)
tackle/discuss only their own interpretations (and) while
the sides of the Protestants and the Catholics who they
pick on in this episode are not heard of.
We feel that this topic of the Iglesia ni Kristo which is (?)
of attacking other religious beliefs does not merit public
telecast.
(Original Records, p. 30).

7 Original Records, pp. 21-22.
538
On its part, respondent Board submitted the following

exhibits, viz.:
(1) Exhibit 1, Permit Certificate for Television Exhibition
No. 15181 dated December 18, 1992 allowing the
showing of Series No. 128 under parental guidance.
(2) Exhibit 2, which is Exhibit G of petitioner.
(3) Exhibit 3, letter dated October 12, 1992 of Henrietta
S. Mendez, addressed to the Christian Era Broadcasting
Service which reads in part:
xxx
In the matter of your television show Ang Iglesia ni
Cristo Series No. 119, please be informed that the Board
was constrained to deny your show a permit to exhibit.
The material involved constitute an attack against
another religion which is expressly prohibited by law.
Please be guided in the submission of future shows.
After evaluating the evidence of the parties, the trial

court issued a writ of preliminary injunction on
petitioners bond of P10,000.00.
The trial court set the pre-trial of the case and the parties
submitted their pre-trial briefs.9Original Records, pp. 120121; pp. 144-149. The pre-trial briefs show that the
parties evidence is basically the evidence they submitted
in the hearing of the issue of preliminary injunction. The
trial of the case was set and reset several times as the
parties tried to reach an amicable accord. Their efforts
failed and the records show that after submission of
memoranda, the trial court rendered a
Judgment,10Original Records, pp. 219-220. on December
15, 1993, the dispositive portion of which reads:
x x x
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering
respondent Board of Review for Moving Pictures and
Television (BRMPT) to grant petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo the
necessary permit for all the series of Ang Iglesia ni
Cristo program.
_______________
9 Original Records, pp. 120-121; pp. 144-149.
539
VOL. 259, JULY 26, 1996 539
Petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo, however, is directed to refrain

from offending and attacking other existing religions in
showing Ang Iglesia ni Cristo program.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration11Original Records,
pp. 223-230. praying: (a) for the deletion of the second
paragraph of the dispositive portion of the Decision, and
(b) for the Board to be perpetually enjoined from
requiring petitioner to submit for review the tapes of its
program. The respondent Board opposed the
motion.12Original Records, pp. 233-242. On March 7,
1993, the trial court granted petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration. It ordered:13Original Records, pp. 245250.x x x
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is granted.
The second portion of the Courts Order dated December
15, 1993, directing petitioner to refrain from offending
and attacking other existing religions in showing Ang
Iglesia ni Cristo program is hereby deleted and set aside.
Respondents are further prohibited from requiring
petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo to submit for review VTR tapes
of its religious program Ang Iglesia ni Cristo.
Respondent Board appealed to the Court of Appeals after
its motion for reconsideration was denied.14Original
Records, pp. 379-381.On March 5, 1995, the respondent
Court of Appeals15Tenth Division with Associate Justice

Antonio P. Solano (ponente), Associate Justice Alfredo
Benipayo (chairman) and Associate Justice Ricardo Galvez
(member). reversed the trial court. It ruled that: (1) the
respondent board has jurisdiction and power to review
the TV program Ang Iglesia ni Cristo, and (2) the
respondent Board did not act with grave abuse of
discretion when it denied permit for the exhibition on TV
of the three series of Ang Iglesia ni Cristo on the ground
that the materials constitute an attack against
_______________
15 Tenth Division with Associate Justice Antonio P. Solano
(ponente), Associate Justice Alfredo Benipayo (chairman)
and Associate Justice Ricardo Galvez (member).
540
another religion. It also found the series indecent,

contrary to law and contrary to good customs.
In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45,
petitioner raises the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ANG IGLESIA NI CRISTO
PROGRAM IS NOT CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED AS A
FORM OF RELIGIOUS EXERCISE AND EXPRESSION.
II
ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT BEING AN EXERCISE OF
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, THE ANG IGLESIA NI CRISTO
PROGRAM IS SUBJECT TO THE POLICE POWER OF THE
STATE ONLY IN THE EXTREME CASE THAT IT POSES A
CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER.
III
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE MTRCB IS VESTED WITH
THE POWER TO CENSOR RELIGIOUS PROGRAMS.
IV
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ANG IGLESIA NI CRISTO, A
PURELY RELIGIOUS PROGRAM IS INDECENT AND
CONTRARY TO LAW AND GOOD CUSTOMS.
The basic issues can be reduced into two: (1) first,

whether the respondent Board has the power to review
petitioners TV program Ang Iglesia ni Cristo, and (2)
second, assuming it has the power, whether it gravely
abused its discretion when it prohibited the airing of
petitioners religious program, series Nos. 115, 119 and
121, for the reason that they constitute an attack against
other religions and that they are indecent, contrary to law
and good customs.
541
VOL. 259, JULY 26, 1996 541
The first issue can be resolved by examining the powers

of the Board under PD No. 1986. Its section 3 pertinently
provides:
Sec. 3. Powers and Functions.The BOARD shall have
the following functions, powers and duties:
xxx
xxx
xxx
b) To screen, review and examine all motion pictures as

herein defined, television programs, including publicity
materials such as advertisements, trailers and stills,
whether such motion pictures and publicity materials be
for theatrical or non-theatrical distribution for television
broadcast or for general viewing, imported or produced in
the Philippines and in the latter case, whether they be for

local viewing or for export.
c) To approve, delete objectionable portion from and/or
prohibit the importation, exportation, production,
copying, distribution, sale, lease, exhibition and/or
television broadcast of the motion pictures, television
programs and publicity materials, subject of the
preceding paragraph, which, in the judgment of the
BOARD applying contemporary Filipino cultural values as
standard, are objectionable for being immoral, indecent,
contrary to law and/or good customs, injurious to the
prestige of the Republic of the Philippines and its people,
or with a dangerous tendency to encourage the
commission of violence or of a wrong or crime, such as
but not limited to:
i) Those which tend to incite subversion, insurrection,
rebellion or sedition against the State, or otherwise
threaten the economic and/or political stability of the
State;
ii) Those which tend to undermine the faith and
confidence of the people, their government and/or duly
constituted authorities;
iii) Those which glorify criminals or condone crimes;
iv) Those which serve no other purpose but to satisfy the
market for violence or pornography;
v) Those which tend to abet the traffic in and use of
prohibited drugs;
vi) Those which are libelous or defamatory to the good

name and reputation of any person, whether living or
dead;
vii) Those which may constitute contempt of court or of
any quasi-judicial tribunal, or pertain to matters which are
sub-judice in nature (emphasis ours).
542
The law gives the Board the power to screen, review and
examine all television programs. By the clear terms of
the law, the Board has the power to approve, delete x x
x and/or prohibit the x x x exhibition and/or television
broadcast of x x x television programs x x x. The law
also directs the Board to apply contemporary Filipino
cultural values as standard to determine those which are
objectionable for being immoral, indecent, contrary to
law and/or good customs, injurious to the prestige of the
Republic of the Philippines and its people, or with a
dangerous tendency to encourage the commission of
violence or of a wrong or crime.
Petitioner contends that the term television program
should not include religious programs like its program
Ang Iglesia ni Cristo. A contrary interpretation, it is
urged, will contravene Section 5, Article III of the

Constitution which guarantees that no law shall be made
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of
religious profession and worship, without discrimination
or preference, shall forever be allowed.
We reject petitioners submission which need not set us
adrift in a constitutional voyage towards an uncharted
sea. Freedom of religion has been accorded a preferred
status by the framers of our fundamental laws, past and
present. We have affirmed this preferred status well
aware that it is designed to protect the broadest possible
liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his
conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he
believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of
others and with the common good.16Victoriano v.
Elizalde Rope Workers Union, L-25246, September 12,
1974 per Mr. Justice Calixto Zaldivar. We have also
laboriously defined in our jurisprudence the intersecting
umbras and penumbras of the right to religious profession
and worship. To quote the summation of Mr. Justice
Isagani A. Cruz, our well-known constitutionalist:17Cruz,
Constitutional Law, 1991 ed., pp. 176-178.
_______________
16 Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, L-25246,
September 12, 1974 per Mr. Justice Calixto Zaldivar.
17 Cruz, Constitutional Law, 1991 ed., pp. 176-178.
543
VOL. 259, JULY 26, 1996 543
Religious Profession and Worship

The right to religious profession and worship has a twofold aspect, viz., freedom to believe and freedom to act
on ones beliefs. The first is absolute as long as the belief
is confined within the realm of thought. The second is
subject to regulation where the belief is translated into
external acts that affect the public welfare.
(1) Freedom to Believe
The individual is free to believe (or disbelieve) as he
pleases concerning the hereafter. He may indulge his own
theories about life and death; worship any god he
chooses, or none at all; embrace or reject any religion;
acknowledge the divinity of God or of any being that
appeals to his reverence; recognize or deny the
immortality of his soulin fact, cherish any religious
conviction as he and he alone sees fit. However absurd
his beliefs may be to others, even if they be hostile and
heretical to the majority, he has full freedom to believe as
he pleases. He may not be required to prove his beliefs.
He may not be punished for his inability to do so.
Religion, after all, is a matter of faith. Men may believe
what they cannot prove. Every one has a right to his
beliefs and he may not be called to account because he

cannot prove what he believes.
(2) Freedom to Act on Ones Beliefs
But where the individual externalizes his beliefs in acts or
omissions that affect the public, his freedom to do so
becomes subject to the authority of the State. As great as
this liberty may be, religious freedom, like all other rights
guaranteed in the Constitution, can be enjoyed only with
a proper regard for the rights of others. It is error to think
that the mere invocation of religious freedom will
stalemate the State and render it impotent in protecting
the general welfare. The inherent police power can be
exercised to prevent religious practices inimical to
society. And this is true even if such practices are pursued
out of sincere religious conviction and not merely for the
purpose of evading the reasonable requirements or
prohibitions of the law.
Justice Frankfurter put it succinctly: The constitutional
provision on religious freedom terminated disabilities, it
did not create new privileges. It gave religious liberty, not
civil immunity. Its essence is freedom from conformity to
religious dogma, not freedom from conformity to law
because of religious dogma.
544
Accordingly, while one has full freedom to believe in

Satan, he may not offer the object of his piety a human
sacrifice, as this would be murder. Those who literally
interpret the Biblical command to go forth and multiply
are nevertheless not allowed to contract plural marriages
in violation of the laws against bigamy. A person cannot
refuse to pay taxes on the ground that it would be against
his religious tenets to recognize any authority except that
of God alone. An atheist cannot express his disbelief in
acts of derision that wound the feelings of the faithful.
The police power can be validly asserted against the
Indian practice of the suttee, born of deep religious
conviction, that calls on the widow to immolate herself at
the funeral pile of her husband.
We thus reject petitioners postulate that its religious
program is per se beyond review by the respondent
Board. Its public broadcast on TV of its religious program
brings it out of the bosom of internal belief. Television is a
medium that reaches even the eyes and ears of children.
The Court iterates the rule that the exercise of religious
freedom can be regulated by the State when it will bring
about the clear and present danger of some substantive
evil which the State is duty bound to prevent, i.e., serious
detriment to the more overriding interest of public health,
public morals, or public welfare. A laissez faire policy on
the exercise of religion can be seductive to the liberal
mind but history counsels the Court against its blind
adoption as religion is and continues to be a volatile area
of concern in our country today. Across the sea and in our

shore, the bloodiest and bitterest wars fought by men
were caused by irreconcilable religious differences. Our
country is still not safe from the recurrence of this
stultifying strife considering our warring religious beliefs
and the fanaticism with which some of us cling and claw
to these beliefs. Even now, we have yet to settle the near
century old strife in Mindanao, the roots of which have
been nourished by the mistrust and misunderstanding
between our Christian and Muslim brothers and sisters.
The bewildering rise of weird religious cults espousing
violence as an article of faith also proves the wisdom of
our rule rejecting a strict let alone policy on the exercise
of religion. For sure, we shall continue to subject any act
pinching the space for the free exercise of religion to a
545
VOL. 259, JULY 26, 1996 545
heightened scrutiny but we shall not leave its rational

exercise to the irrationality of man. For when religion
divides and its exercise destroys, the State should not
stand still.
It is also petitioners submission that the respondent
appellate court gravely erred when it affirmed the ruling
of the respondent Board x-rating its TV Program Series
Nos. 115, 119, 121 and 128. The records show that the
respondent Board disallowed the program series for
attacking other religions. Thus, Exhibits A, A-1,
(respondent Boards Voting Slip for Television) reveal that
its reviewing members x-rated Series 115 for x x x
criticizing different religions, based on their own
interpretation of the Bible. They suggested that the
program should only explain petitioners x x x own faith
and beliefs and avoid attacks on other faiths. Exhibit B
shows that Series No. 119 was x-rated because the
Iglesia ni Cristo insists on the literal translation of the
bible and says that our Catholic veneration of the Virgin
Mary is not to be condoned because nowhere it is found
in the bible that we should do so. This is intolerance x x
x. Exhibit C shows that Series No. 121 was x-rated x x
x for reasons of the attacks, they do on, specifically, the
Catholic Religion. x x x (T)hey can not tell, dictate any
other religion that they are right and the rest are wrong x
x x Exhibit D also shows that Series No. 128 was not
favorably recommended because it x x x outrages
Catholic and Protestants beliefs. On second review, it
was x-rated because of its unbalanced interpretations of
some parts of the bible.18Original Records, p. 30. In
sum, the respondent Board x-rated petitioners TV
program Series Nos. 115, 119, 121 and 128 because of
petitioners controversial biblical interpretations and its
attacks against contrary religious beliefs. The
respondent appellate court agreed and even held that the
said attacks are indecent, contrary to law and good
customs.
We reverse the ruling of the appellate court.

First. Deeply ensconced in our fundamental law is its
hostility against all prior restraints on speech, including
religious speech. Hence, any act that restrains speech is
hobbled by the
_______________
546
presumption of invalidity and should be greeted with

furrowed brows.19Near v. Minnesota, 283 US 697 (1931);
Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 US 58 (1963); New
York Times v. United States, 403 US 713 (1971). It is the
burden of the respondent Board to overthrow this
presumption. If it fails to discharge this burden, its act of
censorship will be struck down. It failed in the case at bar.
Second. The evidence shows that the respondent Board
x-rated petitioners TV series for attacking other
religions, especially the Catholic church. An examination
of the evidence, especially Exhibits A, A-1, B, C,
and D will show that the so-called attacks are mere
criticisms of some of the deeply held dogmas and tenets
of other religions. The videotapes were not viewed by the

respondent court as they were not presented as
evidence. Yet they were considered by the respondent
court as indecent, contrary to law and good customs,
hence, can be prohibited from public viewing under
Section 3(c) of PD 1986. This ruling clearly suppresses
petitioners freedom of speech and interferes with its
right to free exercise of religion. It misappreciates the
essence of freedom to differ as delineated in the
benchmark case of Cantwell v. Connecticut,20310 US
296. viz.:
xxx
In the realm of religious faith, and in that of political
belief, sharp differences arise. In both fields, the tenets of
one man may seem the rankest error to his neighbor. To
persuade others to his own point of view, the pleader, as
we know, at times, resorts to exaggeration, to vilification
of men who have been, or are prominent in church or
state or even to false statements. But the people of this
nation have ordained in the light of history that inspite of
the probability of excesses and abuses, these liberties
are, in the long view, essential to enlightened opinion and
right conduct on the part of the citizens of democracy.
______________________________
19 Near v. Minnesota, 283 US 697 (1931); Bantam Books,
Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 US 58 (1963); New York Times v.
United States, 403 US 713 (1971).
20 310 US 296.
547
VOL. 259, JULY 26, 1996 547
The respondent Board may disagree with the criticisms of

other religions by petitioner but that gives it no excuse to
interdict such criticisms, however, unclean they may be.
Under our constitutional scheme, it is not the task of the
State to favor any religion by protecting it against an
attack by another religion. Religious dogmas and beliefs
are often at war and to preserve peace among their
followers, especially the fanatics, the establishment
clause of freedom of religion prohibits the State from
leaning towards any religion. Vis-a-vis religious
differences, the State enjoys no banquet of options.
Neutrality alone is its fixed and immovable stance. In fine,
respondent board cannot squelch the speech of petitioner
Iglesia ni Cristo simply because it attacks other religions,
even if said religion happens to be the most numerous
church in our country. In a State where there ought to be
no difference between the appearance and the reality of
freedom of religion, the remedy against bad theology is
better theology. The bedrock of freedom of religion is
freedom of thought and it is best served by encouraging
the marketplace of dueling ideas. When the luxury of
time permits, the marketplace of ideas demands that
speech should be met by more speech for it is the spark
of opposite speech, the heat of colliding ideas that can

fan the embers of truth.
Third. The respondents cannot also rely on the ground
attacks against another religion in x-rating the religious
program of petitioner. Even a sideglance at Section 3 of
PD No. 1986 will reveal that it is not among the grounds
to justify an order prohibiting the broadcast of petitioners
television program. The ground attack against another
Rules.21Sec. 4. Governing Standard.a) the Board shall
judge the motion pictures and television programs and
publicity materials submitted to it for review, using as
standard contemporary Filipino cultural values, to abate
what are legally objectionable for ... This rule
_______________
21 Sec. 4. Governing Standard.a) the Board shall judge
the motion pictures and television programs and publicity
materials submitted to it for review, using as standard
contemporary Filipino cultural values, to abate what are
legally objectionable for being immoral, indecent,
contrary to law, and good customs x x x such as but not
limited:
xxx
xxx
xxx
548
is void for it runs smack against the hoary doctrine that

administrative rules and regulations cannot expand the
letter and spirit of the law they seek to enforce.
It is opined that the respondent board can still utilize
attack against any religion as a ground allegedly x x x
because Section 3(c) of PD No. 1986 prohibits the
showing of motion pictures, television programs and
publicity materials which are contrary to law and Article
201 (2) (b) (3) of the Revised Penal Code punishes
anyone who exhibits shows which offend any race or
religion. We respectfully disagree for it is plain that the
word attack is not synonymous with the word offend.
Moreover, Article 201 (2) (b) (3) of the Revised Penal
Code should be invoked to justify the subsequent
punishment of a show which offends any religion. It
cannot be utilized to justify prior censorship of speech. It
must be emphasized that E.O. 876, the law prior to PD
1986, included attack against any religion as a ground
for censorship. The ground was not, however, carried
over by PD 1986. Its deletion is a decree to disuse it.
There can be no other intent. Indeed, even the Executive
Department espouses this view. Thus, in an Opinion dated
November 28, 1985 then Minister of Justice, now
President of the Senate, Neptali Gonzales explained:
x x x
However, the question whether the BRMPT (now MTRCB)

may preview and censor the subject television program of
INC should be viewed in the light of the provision of
Section 3, paragraph (c) of PD 1986, which is
substantially the same as the provision of Section 3,
paragraph (c) of E.O. No. 876-A, which prescribes the
standards of censorship, to wit: immoral, indecent,
prestige of the Republic of the Philippines or its people or
with dangerous tendency to encourage, the commission
of violence, or of a wrong as determined by the Board,
applying contemporary Filipino cultural values as
standard. As stated, the intention of the Board to subject
the INCs television program to previewing and
censorship is prompted by the fact that its religious
program makes mention of beliefs and practices of
_______________
vii. Those which clearly constitute an attack against any
race, creed, or religion as distinguished from individual
members thereof.
549
VOL. 259, JULY 26, 1996 549
other religion. On the face of the law itself, there can

conceivably be no basis for censorship of said program by
the Board as much as the alleged reason cited by the
Board does not appear to be within the contemplation of
the standards of censorship set by law. (Emphasis
supplied)
Fourth. In x-rating the TV program of the petitioner, the
respondents failed to apply the clear and present danger
rule. In American Bible Society v. City of Manila,22101
Phil. 386. this Court held: The constitutional guaranty of
free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and
worship carries with it the right to disseminate religious
information. Any restraint of such right can be justified
like other restraints on freedom of expression on the
ground that there is a clear and present danger of any
substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent.
In Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers Union,2359 SCRA
54, 58. we further ruled that x x x it is only where it is
unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate and
grave danger to the security and welfare of the
community that infringement of religious freedom may be
justified, and only to the smallest extent necessary to
avoid the danger.
The records show that the decision of the respondent
Board, affirmed by the respondent appellate court, is
completely bereft of findings of facts to justify the
conclusion that the subject video tapes constitute
impermissible attacks against another religion. There is
no showing whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will
bring about especially the gravity and imminence of the

threatened harm. Prior restraint on speech, including
religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears
but only by the showing of a substantive and imminent
evil which has taken the life of a reality already on
ground.
It is suggested that we re-examine the application of
clear and present danger rule to the case at bar. In the
United States, it is true that the clear and present danger
test has
_______________
22 101 Phil. 386.
23 59 SCRA 54, 58.
550
undergone permutations. It was Mr. Justice Holmes who

formulated the test in Schenck v. US,24249 US 47, 63 Led
470 (1919). as follows: x x x the question in every case
is whether the words used are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a
clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.
Admittedly, the test was originally designed to determine

the latitude which should be given to speech that
espouses antigovernment action. Bannered by Justices
Holmes and Brandeis, the test attained its full flowering in
the decade of the forties, when its umbrella was used to
protect speech other than subversive speech.25Bridges v.
California, 314 US 252, 262 where J. Black observed that
the test has afforded a practical guidance in a variety of
cases in which the scope of constitutional protections of
freedom of expression was an issue.... Thus, for instance,
the test was applied to annul a total ban on labor
picketing.26Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 US 88 (1940). The
use of the test took a downswing in the 1950s when the
US Supreme Court decided Dennis v. United States
involving communist conspiracy.27341 US 494 (1951). In
Dennis, the components of the test were altered as the
High Court adopted Judge Learned Hands formulation
that x x x in each case [courts] must ask whether the
gravity of the evil, discounted by its improbability,
justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to
avoid the danger. The imminence requirement of the
test was thus diminished and to that extent, the
protection of the rule was weakened. In 1969, however,
the strength of the test was reinstated in Brandenburg v.
Ohio,28Id., at p. 510. when the High Court restored in the
test the imminence requirement, and even added an
intent requirement which according to a noted
commentator ensured that only speech directed at
inciting lawlessness
_______________
24 249 US 47, 63 Led 470 (1919).
25 Bridges v. California, 314 US 252, 262 where J. Black
observed that the test has afforded a practical guidance
in a variety of cases in which the scope of constitutional
protections of freedom of expression was an issue.
26 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 US 88 (1940).
27 341 US 494 (1951).
28 Id., at p. 510.
551
VOL. 259, JULY 26, 1996 551
could be punished.29Gunther, Learned Hand and the

Origins of Modern First Amendment Doctrine, Some
Fragments of History, 27 Stan L. Rev. 719 (1975).
Presently in the United States, the clear and present
danger test is not applied to protect low value speeches
such as obscene speech, commercial speech and
defamation. Be that as it may, the test is still applied to
four types of speech: speech that advocates dangerous
ideas, speech that provokes a hostile audience reaction,
out of court contempt and release of information that
endangers a fair trial.30Hentoff, Speech, Harm and Self
Government: Understanding the Ambit of the Clear and

Present Danger Test, 91 Col. Law Rev. No. 6, p. 1453
(1991). Hence, even following the drift of American
jurisprudence, there is reason to apply the clear and
present danger test to the case at bar which concerns
speech that attacks other religions and could readily
provoke hostile audience reaction. It cannot be doubted
that religious truths disturb and disturb terribly.
It is also opined that it is inappropriate to apply the clear
and present danger test to the case at bar because the
issue involves the content of speech and not the time,
place or manner of speech. Allegedly, unless the speech
is first allowed, its impact cannot be measured, and the
causal connection between the speech and the evil
apprehended cannot be established. The contention
overlooks the fact that the case at bar involves
videotapes that are pre-taped and hence, their speech
content is known and not an X quantity. Given the specific
content of the speech, it is not unreasonable to assume
that the respondent Board, with its expertise, can
determine whether its sulphur will bring about the
substantive evil feared by the law.
Finally, it is also opined by Mr. Justice Kapunan that x x x
the determination of the question as to whether or not
such vilification, exaggeration or fabrication falls within or
lies outside the boundaries of protected speech or
expression is a judicial function which cannot be
arrogated by an administra_______________
29 Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First

Amendment Doctrine, Some Fragments of History, 27
Stan L. Rev. 719 (1975).
30 Hentoff, Speech, Harm and Self Government:
Understanding the Ambit of the Clear and Present Danger
Test, 91 Col. Law Rev. No. 6, p. 1453 (1991).
552
tive body such as a Board of Censors. He submits that a

system of prior restraint may only be validly
administered by judges and not left to administrative
agencies. The same submission is made by Mr. Justice
Mendoza.
This thoughtful thesis is an attempt to transplant another
American rule in our jurisdiction. Its seedbed was laid
down by Mr. Justice Brennan in his concurring opinion in
the 1962 case of Manual Enterprise v. Day.31370 US 478
(1962). By 1965, the US Supreme Court in Freedman v.
Maryland32380 US 51 (1965). was ready to hold that the
teaching of cases is that, because only a judicial
determination in an adversary proceeding ensures the
necessary sensitivity to freedom of expression, only a
procedure requiring a judicial determination suffices to
impose a valid final restraint.33Id. at p. 58.While the

thesis has a lot to commend itself, we are not ready to
hold that it is unconstitutional for Congress to grant an
administrative body quasi-judicial power to preview and
classify TV programs and enforce its decision subject to
review by our courts. As far back as 1921, we upheld this
set-up in Sotto vs. Ruiz,3441 Phil. 468 (1921) per Justice
Malcolm. viz.:
The use of the mails by private persons is in the nature
of a privilege which can be regulated in order to avoid its
abuse. Persons possess no absolute right to put into the
mail anything they please, regardless of its character.
On the other hand, the exclusion of newspaper and other
publications from the mails, in the exercise of executive
power, is extremely delicate in nature and can only be
justified where the statute is unequivocably applicable to
the supposed objectionable publication. In excluding any
publication for the mails, the object should be not to
interfere with the freedom of the press or with any other
fundamental right of the people. This is the more true
with reference to articles supposedly libelous than to
other particulars of the law, since whether an article is or
is not libelous, is fundamentally a le_______________
31 370 US 478 (1962).
32 380 US 51 (1965).
33 Id. at p. 58.
34 41 Phil. 468 (1921) per Justice Malcolm.
553
VOL. 259, JULY 26, 1996 553
gal question. In order for there to be due process of law,

the action of the Director of Posts must be subject to
revision by the courts in case he had abused his
discretion or exceeded his authority. (Ex parte Jackson
[1878], 96 U.S., 727; Public Clearing House vs. Coyne
[1903], 194 U.S., 497; Post Publishing Co. vs. Murray
[1916], 23-Fed., 773)
As has been said, the performance of the duty of
determining whether a publication contains printed
matter of a libelous character rests with the Director of
Posts and involves the exercise of his judgment and
discretion. Every intendment of the laws is in favor of the
correctness of his action. The rule is (and we go only to
those cases coming from the United States Supreme
Court and pertaining to the United States PostmasterGeneral), that the courts will not interfere with the
decision of the Director of Posts unless clearly of opinion
that it was wrong. (Bates & Guilid Co. vs. Payne [1904],
194 U.S., 106; Smith vs. Hitchcock [1912], 226 U.S., 63;
Masses Pub. Co. vs. Patten [1917], 246 Fed., 24. But see
David vs. Brown [1900], 103 Fed., 909, announcing a
somewhat different doctrine and relied upon by the

Attorney-General).
To be sure, legal scholars in the United States are still
debating the proposition whether or not courts alone are
competent to decide whether speech is constitutionally
protected.35See Hunter, Toward a Better Understanding
of the Prior Restraint Doctrine, A Reply to Prof. Mayton, 67
Cornell L. Rev. 283 (1982) for the view that courts are no
better than administrative agencies in protecting First
Amendment rights. The issue involves highly arguable
policy considerations and can be better addressed by our
legislators.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the respondent Court
of Appeals dated March 24, 1995 is affirmed insofar as it
sustained the jurisdiction of the respondent MTRCB to
review petitioners TV program entitled Ang Iglesia ni
Cristo, and is reversed and set aside insofar as it
sustained the action of the respondent MTRCB x-rating
petitioners TV Program Series Nos. 115, 119, and 121.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Francisco and Torres, Jr.,
JJ., concur.
_______________
35 See Hunter, Toward a Better Understanding of the
Prior Restraint Doctrine, A Reply to Prof. Mayton, 67
Cornell L. Rev. 283 (1982) for the view that courts are no
better than administrative agencies in protecting First

Amendment rights.
554
Narvasa (C.J.), In the result.

Padilla, J., See separate concurring and dissenting
opinion.
Bellosillo, J., On leave.
Melo, J., Please see separate opinion.
Vitug, J., Please see separate opinion.
Kapunan, J., See dissenting opinion.
Mendoza, J., Please see separate opinion.
Hermosisima, Jr., J., I join the concurring and dissenting
opinion of Justice Kapunan.
Panganiban, J., Please see separate (concurring)
opinion.
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
PADILLA, J.:
I concur with the majority opinion insofar as it removes
the ban against the showing of petitioners TV Program
Series Nos. 115, 119 and 121. However, I disagree with

that part of the majority opinion which upholds the power
of respondent Board to subject to prior restraint
petitioners religious television programs.
It should by now be undisputably recognized and firmly
rooted in this country that there can be no prior restraints
on the exercise of free speech, expression or religion,
unless such exercise poses a clear and present danger of
a substantive evil which the State has the right and even
the duty to prevent. The ban against such prior restraints
will result, as it has resulted in the past, in occasional
abuses of free speech and expression but it is
immeasurably preferable to experience such occasional
abuses of speech and expression than to arm a
governmental administrative agency with the authority to
censor speech and expression in accordance with
legislative standards which albeit apparently laudable in
their nature, can very well be bent or stretched by such
agency to convenient
555
VOL. 259, JULY 26, 1996 555
latitudes as to frustrate and eviscerate the precious

freedoms of speech and expression.
Besides, any person who may feel aggrieved by the

exercise of free speech, expression and religion, is
afforded, under our system, the remedy of redress in the
courts of law, justice and equity.
In short, it is far better for the individual to live in a
climate of free speech and free expression, devoid of
prior restraints, even at the risk of occasional excesses of
such freedoms than to exist in an ambiance of censorship
which is always a step closer to autocracy and
dictatorship.
MELO, J.:
The enjoyment of the freedom of religion is always
coupled with the freedom of expression. For the
profession of faith inevitably carries with it, as a
necessary appendage, the prerogative of propagation.
The constitutional guaranty of free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession and worship thus
denotes the right to disseminate religious information
(American Bible Society vs. City of Manila, 101 Phil. 386
[1957]). Any prior restriction upon a religious expression
would be a restriction on the right of religion. We
recognize the role and the deep influence that religion
plays in our community. No less than the fundamental law
of the land acknowledges the elevating influence of
religion by imploring the aid of almighty God to build a
just and humane society. Any restriction that is to be
placed upon this right must be applied with greatest

caution.
Judicial notice must be taken of the fact that the Iglesia ni
Cristo as an established religious organization has been
well with us for almost a century, with several millions of
following, quite a number of imposing and elegantly
constructed cathedrals and hundreds of chapels spread in
many parts of the country, injecting profound influence
not only in the social and political aspect of the
community but upon its moral values as well. Respect
must be afforded a well-established
556
church, especially on matters concerning morality and

decency lest no concept of morality could ever be
accepted with deference. Such pre-eminence in the
community deserves no less than the confident
expectation that it will act in accordance with its avowed
mission of promoting religious guidance and
enlightenment. Its religious programs must be accorded
the presumption that the same will instill moral values
that would be beneficial to its adherents and followers,
and perhaps to the community in general. The contrary
must not be presumed. Its television programs, therefore,
should not be equated with ordinary movies and

television shows which MTRCB is bound by the law to
monitor for possible abuse. One must recognize the
power of State to protect its citizenry from the danger of
immorality and indecency motivated by the selfish desire
of media entrepreneurs to accumulate more wealth, or of
bogus religious groups, for that matter, to mislead and
beguile the unlettered and uninformed. But considering
all these circumstances, I see no cogent reason for the
application of such power to the present case.
Freedom of religion and expression is the rule and its
restriction, the exception. Any prior restriction on the
exercise of the freedom to profess religious faith and the
propagation thereof will unduly diminish that religions
authority to spread what it believes to be the sacred
truth. The State can exercise no power to restrict such
right until the exercise thereof traverses the point that
will endanger the order of civil society. Thus we have
ruled in the case of Ebralinag vs. The Division
Superintendent of Schools of Cebu (219 SCRA 270
[1993]):
The sole justification for a given restraint or limitation on
the exercise of religious freedom is the existence of a
grave and present danger of a character both grave and
imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals,
public health or any other legitimate public interest that
the state has the right and duty to prevent.
Correspondingly, the MTRCB has no authority to use as

standard, the dangerous tendency rule, which we have
long
557
VOL. 259, JULY 26, 1996 557
abandoned, and for which reason, the dangerous

tendency standard under Subparagraph C, Section 3 of
Presidential Decree No. 1986 has no place in our statute
books.
I, therefore, vote to grant the petition.
KAPUNAN, J.:
While I concur in the result of the majoritys decision
reversing that of the Court of Appeals insofar as it set
aside the action of respondent MTRCB x-rating
petitioners TV Program Series Nos. 115, 119 and 121,
with due respect, I cannot agree with its opinion that
respondent Board of Review for Motion Pictures and
Television (now MTRCB) has the power to review
petitioners TV program Ang Iglesia ni Cristo. The
religious TV program enjoys the Constitutions guarantee
of freedom of religion,1CONST., Art. III, sec. 5. and of
speech and expression,2CONST., Art. III, sec. 4. and

cannot be subject to prior restraint by the Board by virtue
of its powers and functions under Section 3 of P.D. 1986
which provides as follows:
Sec. 3. Powers and Functions.The BOARD shall have the
following functions, powers and duties:
xxx
xxx
xxx

for theatrical or non-theatrical distribution, for television
the Philippines, and in the latter case, whether they be
for local viewing or for export.
c) To approve or disapprove, delete objectionable portion
from and/or prohibit the importation, exportation,
production, copying, distribution, sale, lease, exhibition
and/or television broadcast of the motion pictures,
television programs and
_______________
1 CONST., Art. III, sec. 5.
2 CONST., Art. III, sec. 4.
558

publicity materials subject of the preceding paragraph,

which, in the judgment of the BOARD applying
contemporary Filipino cultural values as standard, are
objectionable for being immoral, indecent, contrary to law
and/or good customs, injurious to the prestige of the
Republic of the Philippines or its people, or with a
violence or of a wrong or crime, such as but not limited
to:
State;
market for violence and pornography;
prohibited drugs;

dead; and,
subjudice in nature.
Under the aforequoted provisions, the MTRCB, while
nominally a classification board, is granted the power not
only to classify, but also to approve or disapprove/prohibit
exhibition of film or television broadcasts of motion
pictures and TV programs.
The freedom to disseminate religious information is a
right protected by the free exercise clause of the
Constitution. It encompasses a wide range of ideas and
takes many forms. In the process of enlightening the
adherents or convincing non-believers of the truth of its
beliefs, a religious sect or denomination is allowed the
free choice of utilizing various media, including pulpit or
podium, print, television, film, and the electronic mail.
559
VOL. 259, JULY 26, 1996 559
The broad latitude of freedom afforded by the free

exercise clause is an historic outgrowth of our countrys
twin colonial experiences: our forefathers aversion

against the Spanish colonial governments interference
with religious belief and practice and the transplantation
of American Constitutional thinking into the mainstream
of our political life, which brought with it the ideas of
Protestant dissent and humanistic rationalism dominant
in the debates of the American Constitutional Convention.
These two poles conjoined to place the individual
conscience beyond the coercive power of government.
Involving as it does the relationship of man to his Creator,
respect for the inviolability of conscience lay at the core
of the free exercise clauses in our Constitutions from
1935 to 1987.3The 1987 Constitution provides:Section 5.
No law shall be made respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and
worship, without discrimination or preferen...It is,
therefore, settled that religious freedom is a fundamental
right entitled to the highest priority and amplest
protection among human rights. Because of its exalted
position in our hierarchy of civil rights, the realm of
religious belief is generally insulated from state action,
and state interference with such belief is allowed only in
extreme cases.
Free exercise encompasses all shades of expression of
religious belief. It includes the right to preach, proselyte
and to perform other similar functions.4Mc Daniel v.
Patty, 435 U.S. 618, 626 (1978); Clearly, freedom of
belief protected by the free exercise clause embraces
freedom to profess or practice that belief. Id., at 631

(Brennan, J., concurring). As oftentimes these aspects of
the free exercise clause fall within areas affected by
government regulation, the importance of religious
freedom is
_______________
3 The 1987 Constitution provides:
Section 5. No law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession and worship, without discrimination or
preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test
shall be required for the exercise of civil or political
rights.
This provision retains the wording of both the 1935 and
1973 Constitution.
4 Mc Daniel v. Patty, 435 U.S. 618, 626 (1978); Clearly,
freedom of belief protected by the free exercise clause
embraces freedom to profess or practice that belief. Id.,
at 631 (Brennan, J., concurring).
560
such that the state must make special provisions to

relieve religious liberty from restrictions imposed by
generally legitimate government regulations.5Sherbert v.
Vener, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). Commenting on religious
freedom and other freedoms of conscience, this Court
held in Reyes v. Bagatsing6125 SCRA 553 (1983). that:
[O]n the judiciaryeven more so than on the other
departmentsrests the grave and delicate responsibility
of assuring respect for and deference to such preferred
rights. No verbal formula, no sanctifying phrase can, of
course dispense with what has been felicitously termed
by Justice Holmes as the sovereign prerogative of
judgment. Nonetheless, the presumption must be to
incline the weight of the scales of justice on the side of
such rights.7Id., at 570.Even before film and television
achieved the power and influence it has gained in the last
few decades, the U.S. Supreme Court, in the case of
Burtsyn v. Wilson,8343 U.S. 495 (1952). conceded that
movies were a significant medium for the dissemination
of ideas, affecting public attitudes and behavior in a
variety of ways, ranging from the direct espousal of a
political or social doctrine to the subtle shaping of
thought which characterizes artistic expression.9Id., at
501. The U.S. Supreme Court emphasized that the
significance of motion pictures as an organ of public
opinion is not diluted by the fact that films are designed
to entertain as well as to inform,10Id. thus, recognizing
that motion pictures fell within the sphere of
constitutionally protected speech and expression.
Responding to the question of censorship in the context

of film as protected expression, the U.S. Supreme Court,
in the case of Freedman v. Maryland11380 U.S. 51 (1965).
held that:
_______________
5 Sherbert v. Vener, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
6 125 SCRA 553 (1983).
7 Id., at 570.
8 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
9 Id., at 501.
10 Id.
11 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
561
VOL. 259, JULY 26, 1996 561
The administration of a censorship system for motion

pictures presents peculiar dangers to constitutionally
protected speech. Unlike a prosecution for obscenity, a
censorship proceeding puts the initial burden on the
exhibitor or distributor. Because the censors business is
to censor, there is an inherent danger that he may be less
responsive than a courtpart of an independent branch

of governmentto constitutionally protected interests in
free expression.12Id., at 57.In American Bible Society v.
City of Manila,13101 Phil. 386 (1957). this Court held that
any restraint on the right to disseminate religious
information can only be justified like other restraints of
freedom of expression on the grounds that there is a clear
and present danger of any substantive evil which the
State has the right to prevent.14Id., at 398. Affirming
the use of this clear and present danger standard in
cases involving religious freedom and worship, the late
Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee warned that [t]he sole
justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the
exercise of religious freedom is the existence of a grave
and present danger of a character both grave and
imminent of a serious evil to public safety, public morals,
public health or any other legitimate public interest, that
the State has a right (and duty) to prevent.15Supra,
note 11, at 534. (Dissenting).Religious freedom is not of
course an absolute right. However, given its exalted
position in our hierarchy of civil rights, the essence of all
that has been said and written about the subject is that
only those interests of the highest order and those not
otherwise served can overbalance claims to free exercise
of religion.16The dichotomy between the freedom to
believe and the freedom to act upon ones beliefs was
succinctly summed up by this Court in its flag ceremony
decision. See Ebralinag v. Division Superintendent of
Schools of Cebu, 219 SCRA 270 (1993). In a highly
sensitive constitutional area, only the gravest situation
endangering paramount governmental interests give

occasion for permissible limitation. And
_______________
12 Id., at 57.
13 101 Phil. 386 (1957).
14 Id., at 398.
15 Supra, note 11, at 534. (Dissenting).
16 The dichotomy between the freedom to believe and
the freedom to act upon ones beliefs was succinctly
summed up by this Court in its flag ceremony decision.
See Ebralinag v. Division Superintendent of Schools of
Cebu, 219 SCRA 270 (1993).
562
even in such rare cases, government may justify an

inroad into religious liberty only by showing that it is the
least restrictive means of achieving the compelling state
interest. A facially neutral regulation apparently
evenhandedly applied to all religious sects and
denominations would be constitutionally suspect when it
imposes an undue burden on the exercise of religious
freedom. Rules are rules is not by itself a sufficient

justification for infringing religious liberty.17Goldman v.
Weinberger, 54 LW 4298 (1986).It is my submission that
the government, under the guise of its regulatory powers
in the censorship law (P.D. 1986 and its corresponding
implementing rules and regulations), does not have the
power to interfere with the exercise of religious
expression in film or television by requiring the
submission of the video tapes of petitioners religious
program before their public viewing, absent a showing of
a compelling state interest that overrides the
constitutional protection of the freedom of expression and
worship. Even if government can demonstrate a
compelling state interest, it would only burden such
fundamental right like the free exercise of religion by the
least intrusive means possible.18Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 333 [1963]. There is no demonstration here of any
sufficient state interest to justify the infringement.
In any case, petitioners religious programs, which in their
very essence and characterization are the exercise of
religious freedom, cannot possibly come under the
category of the objectionable matters enumerated in
Section 3(c) of P.D. 1986 or analogous thereto. It is not
likely that propagation of religion which has been spoken
of as a profession of faith that binds and elevates man to
his Creator19Aglipay v. Ruiz, 64 Phil. 201. will involve
pornography, excessive violence or danger to national
security.
Significantly, the enumeration in Section 3(c) does not

include the standard attack against any religion as
among those considered objectionable and subject to
censorship. Respondents justify this omission by stating
that any form of
_______________
17 Goldman v. Weinberger, 54 LW 4298 (1986).
18 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 333 [1963].
19 Aglipay v. Ruiz, 64 Phil. 201.
563
VOL. 259, JULY 26, 1996 563
expression contrary to law could be subject to

regulation because the enumeration is in any case not
exclusive, and that the phrase contrary to law should,
in the Solicitor Generals words in behalf of respondents,
be construed in relation to Article 201 of the Revised
Penal Code which proscribes the exhibition of shows that
offend any race or religion. 20Rollo, p. 130.
Respondents moreover argue that the Rules and
Regulations of the MTRCB issued pursuant to P.D. 1986 in
any case explicitly furnish the standard left out in the
enumeration when it provides:
SECTION 4. GOVERNING STANDARD.a) The BOARD shall

judge the motion pictures and television programs and
publicity materials submitted to it for review, using as
standard contemporary Filipino cultural values to abate
what are legally objectionable for being immoral,
indecent, contrary to law and good customs, injurious to
the prestige of the Republic of the Philippines or its
people, or with a dangerous tendency to encourage the
commission of violence or of a wrong or crime such as
but not limited to:
xxx
vii) Those which clearly constitute an attack against any
members thereof; x x x.
There are several reasons why I cannot agree with
respondent Boards contention that it may add the
standard attack against any religion among those
enumerated by P.D. 1986. While the laws enumeration is
concededly not exclusive, inclusion of other standards
should be made in the strict context of the words
immoral, indecent, contrary to law and/or good
customs. Specific standards following a general
enumeration cannot go beyond the scope of the latter.
In the first place, the word indecent in censorship law
has a narrow meaning, confined to obscenity
regulation.21See, Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973);
Roth v. U.S., 354 U.S. 476 (1957); Memoirs vs.
Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966). It can
_______________
20 Rollo, p. 130.
21 See, Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Roth v.
U.S., 354 U.S. 476 (1957); Memoirs vs. Massachusetts,
383 U.S. 413 (1966).
564
not be conveniently employed as a catch-all term

embracing all forms of expression considered noxious by
the Board. On the other hand, contrary to law, had
particular significance in the old censorship laws because
those laws explicitly included anything offensive to other
religions among their enumerated standards. In the light
of what the Solicitor General describes as the
transitional nature of P.D. 1986, the better view would
be that the omission of attack against any religion
among the enumerated standards was intentional and
part of the evolving process of fashioning a system of
strict classification of films and television programs as
opposed to censorship. As this phrase was ubiquitous in
the old censorship laws (particularly E.O. 868 and E.O.
876), its elimination in P.D. 1986 expresses the manifest
intention of the law-making authority to do away with the
standard. This view is supported by the Executive Branch

itself, through the Opinion of then Minister of Justice
Neptali Gonzales who stated, when the case came up
before his office for review, that:
[T]he question whether the BRMPT (now MTRCB) may
preview and censor the subject television program of INC
should be viewed in the light of the provision of Section 3,
paragraph (c) of P.D. 1986, which is substantially the
same as the provision of Section 3, paragraph (c) of E.O.
No. 876-A, which prescribes the standards for censorship,
to wit: immoral, indecent, contrary to law and/or good
customs, injurious to the prestige of the Republic of the
Philippines or its people, or with dangerous tendency to
encourage the commission of violence, or a wrong as
determined by the Board, applying contemporary Filipino
cultural values as standard. As stated, the intention of
the Board to subject the INCs television program to
previewing and censorship is prompted by the fact that
its religious program makes mention of beliefs and
practices of other religion. On the face of the law itself,
there can conceivably be no basis for censorship of said
program by the Board asmuch as the alleged reason cited
by the Board does not appear to be within the
contemplation of the standards of censorship set by
law.22Rollo, p. 42. (Emphasis supplied)._______________
22 Rollo, p. 42. (Emphasis supplied).
565
VOL. 259, JULY 26, 1996 565

Additionally, the phrase contrary to law cannot and

should not be understood to refer to Article 20123Article
201 provides:ART. 201. Immoral doctrines, obscene
publications and exhibitions, and indecent shows. The
penalty of prision mayor or a fine ranging from six
thousand to twelve thousand pesos, or both such
imprisonment and fine, shall be imposed upon... of the
Revised Penal Code, as respondents mistakenly suggest.
Article 201 deals with the subject of subsequent
punishment; P.D. 1986 clearly treats with an altogether
different matterprior restraint and censorship. The two
laws stand at opposite poles in the continuum of
regulation and punishment.
Thus, the censors cut poses a peculiar danger because it
altogether skirts time-honored judicial tests and
standards utilized in determining those forms of
expression that fall within the area of protected speech or
expression, and because, as between prior restraints and
the subsequent sanctions meted after proof of violation of
specific penal statutes, the former prevents the speech or
expression from entering the marketplace of ideas.24See
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). That is exactly
the effect of the orders assailed by petitioner in the
instant case. More significantly, under the specific facts
and circumstances of the case confronting us, what is
sought to be kept out of the marketplace of ideas is not

only ordinary speech or expression, two constitutional
values which already enjoy primacy among our civil
rights, but also religious speech or expression utilizing the
medium of television.
It is claimed that the provisions of P.D. 1986 in any case
provide for a neutral standard applicable to all religious
sects and denominations. I cannot agree. The neutrality
standard has been raised in numerous free exercise cases
before the courts, the most recent having been the Flag
Salute cases.25Supra, note 15. See also Motion for
Reconsideration, G.R. No. 95770, December 29, 1995.
However, a regulation neutral on its face poses free
exercise
_______________
23 Article 201 provides:
ART. 201. Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and
exhibitions, and indecent shows. The penalty of prision
mayor or a fine ranging from six thousand to twelve
thousand pesos, or both such imprisonment and fine,
shall be imposed upon:
xxx
24 See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
25 Supra, note 15. See also Motion for Reconsideration,
G.R. No. 95770, December 29, 1995.
566
problems when it creates or has the potential of imposing

undue burdens on religion. Democratic government acts
to reinforce the generally accepted values of a given
society and not merely the fundamental ones which
relate to its political structure.26Gianella, Religious
Liberty, Nonestablishment and Doctrinal Development:
Part I The Religious Liberty Guarantee, 80 Harvard L.R.
1381 (1967). Facially neutral standards are a facet of
prevailing consensus. The old flag salute cases are
testaments to the natural preference for the prevailing
political and social morality over the religious liberty of
minorities. The prevalent view tends to impose its idea of
what is religious and what is not over and above the
protests of the other religions, sects and
denominations.27In any society, the most acculturated
religion is that which exists in full harmony with societys
values and institutions. Normally, the acculturated
religion rarely comes at odds with societys legal norms in
as much as those norms themselves... Applying
contemporary Filipino standards and values (the
general test in P.D. 1986) to religious thought and
expression allows an overarching into a constitutionally
protected area and potentially would simply provide the
Board with a veiled excuse for clamping down against
unorthodox religious thought and expression. Measured in

terms of the historic purpose of the guarantee, the free
exercise provision in our Constitution not only insulates
religion against governmental power, but when taken
together with the Establishment clause, affords protection
to religious minorities by preventing the use of that power
in imposing the majoritys will.
_______________
26 Gianella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment and
Doctrinal Development: Part I The Religious Liberty
Guarantee, 80 Harvard L.R. 1381 (1967).
27 In any society, the most acculturated religion is that
which exists in full harmony with societys values and
institutions. Normally, the acculturated religion rarely
comes at odds with societys legal norms in as much as
those norms themselves are directly or indirectly
influenced by the acculturated or dominant religion. The
thorniest legal issues arise when a particular religion or
sect advocates ideas separate from mainstream culture,
or urges a radical deviation from dominant thought which
clashes with orthodox norms or expectations.
Notwithstanding the acceptable variety of expression
which falls under the rubric of bona fide religious dogma,
cross cultural religious clashes are bound to be mediated
from the standpoint of the dominant religion. See, H.
RICHARD NEIBHUR, CHRIST AND CULTURE (1951).
567
VOL. 259, JULY 26, 1996 567

We are faced with a case of censorship and restraint

which, I stated earlier, touches upon one of the most
private and sensitive of domains: the realm of religious
freedom, thought and expression. In this domain, sharp
differences may arise such that the tenets of one
individual may seem the rankest error to his
neighbor.28Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, at 310
(1939). In the process of persuading others about the
validity of his point of view, the preacher sometimes
resorts to exaggeration and vilification. However, the
determination of the question as to whether or not such
vilification, exaggeration or fabrication falls within or lies
outside the boundaries of protected speech or expression
is a judicial function which cannot be arrogated by an
administrative body such as a Board of
Censors.29Whether or not administrative bodies might be
more effective (and as suggested liberal as opposed to
the traditional con-servatism of courts) in this regard or
in terms of protecting the constitutional rights of speech
and expre... Even if the exercise of the liberties protected
by the speech, expression and religion clauses of our
Constitution are regarded as neither absolute nor
unlimited, there are appropriate laws which deal with
such excesses. The least restrictive alternative would be
to impose subsequent sanctions for proven violations of
laws, rather than inflict prior restraints on religious

expression.
Our penal law punishes libel, or acts or speeches
offensive to other religions, and awards damages
whenever warranted. In our legal scheme, courts
essentially remain the arbiters of the controversies
affecting the civil and political rights of persons. It is our
courts which determine whether or not certain forms of
speech and expression have exceeded the bounds of
correctness, propriety or decency as to fall outside the
area of protected speech. In the meantime, the liberties
protected by the speech and expression and free exercise
clauses are so essential to our society that they should be
allowed to flourish
_______________
28 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, at 310 (1939).
29 Whether or not administrative bodies might be more
effective (and as suggested liberal as opposed to the
traditional con-servatism of courts) in this regard or in
terms of protecting the constitutional rights of speech
and expression, the process of assaying the constitutional
validity of the Boards acts with respect to these
guarantees is a function ultimately reposed by the
Constitution in the courts.
568
unobstructed and unmolested.30Id., at 310.The majority

opinion professes fealty to freedom of religion which, it
openly admits, has been accorded a preferred status by
the framers of our fundamental laws, and affirms that
(D)eeply ensconced in our fundamental law is its
hostility against all prior restraints on speech, including
religious speech.31Majority opinion, pp. 13, 19. The
majority then adds pointedly that acts of prior restraint
are hobbled by the presumption of invalidity and should
be greeted with furrowed brows. It is the burden of the
respondent Board to overthrow this presumption. If it fails
to discharge this heavy burden, its acts of censorship will
be struck down. It failed in the case at bar.32Id., at
17.And yet, the majority at the same time would grant
MTRCB the power to review the TV religious programs
because with its expertise, it can determine whether
its sulphur will bring about the substantive evil feared by
the law.33Id., at 24. The majority thus would uphold the
power of the Board as an administrative body with quasijudicial power to preview and classify TV programs, citing
with favor the 1921 decision of this Court in Sotto vs.
Ruiz3441 Phil. 468. wherein it was held that:
As has been said, the performance of the duty of
determining whether a publication contains printed
matter of a libelous character rests with the Director of
Posts and involves the exercise of his judgment and
discretion. Every intendment of the law is in favor of the
correctness of his action. The rule is (and we go only to

those cases coming from the United States Supreme
Court and pertaining to the United States PostmasterGeneral), that the courts will not interfere with the
decision of the Director of Posts unless clearly of opinion
that it was wrong.
I share with Justice Mendozas view that the majoritys
pronouncement would in effect place on the producer or
ex_______________
30 Id., at 310.
31 Majority opinion, pp. 13, 19.
32 Id., at 17.
33 Id., at 24.
34 41 Phil. 468.
569
VOL. 259, JULY 26, 1996 569
hibitor the burden of going to court and of showing that

his film or program is constitutionally protected. This
throws overboard the fundamental tenet that any act that
restrains speech is presumed invalid and it is the burden
of the censor to overthrow this presumption. In the

context of the present case, if the Board disapproves a TV
religious program or deletes a portion thereof, it is the
exhibitor or producer who will go to court to prove that
the Board is wrong and the court will not interfere with
the Boards decision unless it can be clearly shown that it
is wrong, following the ruling in Sotto vs. Ruiz.
The majoritys ruling, I am afraid, constitutes a threat to
constitutionally protected speech and expression and
supplants a judicial standard for determining
constitutionally protected speech and expression with the
censors standard. The heavy burden on the imposition of
prior restraints is shifted away from the state by imposing
upon the exhibitor the obligation of proving that the
religious programs fall within the realm of protected
expression. This leaves the exhibitor with only two
unwanted options: either 1) he himself deletes the
portions which he anticipates the Board might possibly
object to prior to submission to that body and thereby
obtains the censors nod, or 2) submits the Video tapes in
their entirety and risks disapproval or deletion, in which
case he may go to court and show that the Video tapes
contain constitutionally protected speech and expression.
In the first situation, the message loses its essence and
substance. The second scenario may entail tremendous
amount of money, time and effort in a prolonged
litigation. Either case constitutes grievous assault on the
freedom of speech and religion.
The ruling in Sotto vs. Ruiz cannot be invoked as

authority to allow MTRCB to review petitioners TV
programs. In that case, the Court held that the Acting
Director of the Bureau of Posts is vested with authority to
determine what mail matter is obscene, lewd, filthy or
libelous, pursuant to Section 1954 of the old
Administrative Code which provides, among others, that
no lewd, lascivious, filthy, indecent or libelous character
shall be deposited in, or carried by, the mails of the
Philippine Island, or be delivered to its addressee by any
officer or em-
570
ployee of the Bureau of Posts. Petitioners programs

which are televised in the exercise of freedom of worship
cannot be placed in the category of the printed matter
proscribed in the old Administrative Code. Freedom of
worship is such a precious commodity in our hierarchy of
civil liberties that it cannot be derogated peremptorily by
an administrative body or officer who determines, without
judicial safeguards, whether or not to allow the exercise
of such freedom.
The rights of free expression and free exercise of religion
occupy a unique and special place in our constellation of
civil rights. The primacy our society accords these

freedoms determines the mode it chooses to regulate
their expression. But the idea that an ordinary statute or
decree could, by its effects, nullify both the freedom of
religion and the freedom of expression puts an ominous
gloss on these liberties. Censorship law as a means of
regulation and as a form of prior restraint is anathema to
a society which places high significance to these values.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, I vote to grant the
petition.
SEPARATE OPINION
MENDOZA, J.:
I concur in the decision to allow the showing of certain
video tapes of petitioners program, Ang Iglesia ni
Cristo, and for this purpose to reverse the contrary ruling
of the Court of Appeals. I am constrained to file this
separate opinion, however, because, while the majority
opinion invokes general principles of free speech and
religion to which I subscribe, it regrettably fails to apply
these principles to the law (P.D. No. 1986 and its
implementing rules) under which the Board has acted.
My position will be spelled out presently but, in brief, it is
this: Censorship may be allowed only in a narrow class of
cases involving pornography, excessive violence, and
danger to national security. Even in these cases, only
courts can pro-
571
VOL. 259, JULY 26, 1996 571
hibit the showing of a film or the broadcast of a program.

In all other cases, the only remedy against speech which
creates a clear and present danger to public interests is
through subsequent punishment. Considering the
potentiality for harm which motion pictures and TV
programs may have especially on the young, all materials
may validly be required to be submitted for review before
they may be shown or broadcast. However, the final
determination of the character of the materials cannot be
left to an administrative agency. That judicial review of
administrative action is available does not obviate the
constitutional objection to censorship. For these reasons, I
would hold 3(b) of P.D. No. 1986, which gives to the
Board limited time for review, to be valid, while finding
3(c), under which the Board acted in this case in
censoring petitioners materials, to be, on its face and as
applied, unconstitutional.
I. At the very least, free speech and free press may be
identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully
any matter of public interest without censorship or
punishment. There is to be . . . no previous restraint on
the communication of views or subsequent liability
whether in libel suits, prosecution for sedition, or action
for damages, or contempt proceedings, unless there be a
clear and present danger of substantive evil that

Congress has a right to prevent.1Gonzales v. COMELEC,
27 SCRA 835, 856 (1969); accord, Reyes v. Bagatsing,
125 SCRA 553 (1983); Gonzales v. Kalaw Katigbak, 137
SCRA 717 (1985). Because of the preferred character of
the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and
expression, a weighty presumption of invalidity vitiates
measures of prior restraint upon the exercise of such
freedoms.2Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. v. Capulong, 160
SCRA 861, 873 (1988).Authoritative interpretations of the
free speech clause consider as invalid two types of prior
restraints, namely, those which are imposed prior to the
dissemination of any matter and those imposed prior to
an adequate determination that
_______________
1 Gonzales v. COMELEC, 27 SCRA 835, 856 (1969);
accord, Reyes v. Bagatsing, 125 SCRA 553 (1983);
Gonzales v. Kalaw Katigbak, 137 SCRA 717 (1985).
2 Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. v. Capulong, 160 SCRA 861,
873 (1988).
572
the expression is not constitutionally protected. As the

Wisconsin Supreme Court put the matter, [A] prohibited
prior restraint is not limited to the suppression of a thing
before it is released to the public. Rather, an invalid prior
restraint is an infringement upon the constitutional right
to disseminate matters that are ordinarily protected by
the first amendment without there first being a judicial
determination that the material does not qualify for first
amendment protection.3State v. I, a WomanPart II, 53
Wis. 102, 191 N.W.2d 897, 902-903 (1971); See also
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
1041-42 (1988).Our own cases furnish illustrations of
these types of prior restraints. In Ayer Productions Pty.
Ltd. v. Capulong,4160 SCRA 861 (1988). we held that an
injunction stopping the production of a documentary film
was an invalid prior restraint on freedom of speech and of
expression. In Mutuc v. COMELEC,536 SCRA 228 (1970).
we struck down, also as an invalid prior restraint, a
COMELEC rule prohibiting the use in political campaigns
of taped jingles blared through loudspeakers which were
mounted on mobile units. [T]he constitutional guarantee
is not to be emasculated by confining it to a speaker
having his say, but not perpetuating what is uttered by
him through tape or other mechanical contrivances.6Id.,
at 234.On the other hand, the fact that the material may
have seen print or been taped, as in the case of the TV
series in question, cannot justify restriction on its
circulation in the absence of a judicial determination that
the material does not constitute protected expression. In
Sotto v. Ruiz,741 Phil. 468 (1921). we denied finality to
the authority of the Director of Posts to exclude

newspapers and other publications from the mails since
whether an article is or is not libelous, is fundamentally a
legal question. In order for there to be due process of law,
the action of the Director of Posts must be subject to
revision by
_______________
3 State v. I, a WomanPart II, 53 Wis. 102, 191 N.W.2d
897, 902-903 (1971); See also LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1041-42 (1988).
4 160 SCRA 861 (1988).
5 36 SCRA 228 (1970).
6 Id., at 234.
7 41 Phil. 468 (1921).
573
VOL. 259, JULY 26, 1996 573
the courts in case he has abused his discretion or

exceeded his authority.8Id. at 470.II. P.D. No. 1986, 3(b)
requires motion pictures, television programs and
publicity materials to be submitted to the Board for
review, while 7 makes it unlawful for any person or
entity to exhibit or cause to be exhibited in any

moviehouse, theater or public place or by television any
motion picture, television program or publicity material
unless it has been approved by the Board. Anyone who
violates the prohibition is liable to prosecution and, in
case of conviction, to punishment by imprisonment
ranging from 3 months and 1 day to 1 year, plus a fine of
not less than P50,000.00 but not more than P100,000.00.
In addition, the moviehouse, theater or television station
violating the provision faces a revocation of its
license.911.In Burstyn v. Wilson,10343 U.S. 495, 96 L.Ed.
1098 (1952). it was held that expression by means of
motion picturesand, it may be added, by means of
television broadcastsis included in the free speech and
free press guarantee of the Constitution. This ruling is
now part of our constitutional law, which has assimilated
into the constitutional guarantee not only motion pictures
but also radio and television shows because of the
importance of movie, radio and television both as a
vehicle of communication and as a medium of
expression.11See Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. v. Capulong,
160 SCRA at 869; Gonzales v. Kalaw Katigbak, 137 SCRA
at 723; Eastern Broadcasting Corp. (DYRE) v. Dans, Jr.,
137 SCRA 628, 635 (1985).Does 3(b) impermissibly
impose a prior restraint because of its requirement that
films and TV programs must be submitted to the Board
for review before they can be shown or broadcast? In my
view it does not. The Burstyn case, in declaring motion
pictures to be protected under the free expression clause,
was careful to add: It does not follow that the
Constitution requires absolute freedom to exhibit every

mo________________
8 Id. at 470.
9 11.
10 343 U.S. 495, 96 L.Ed. 1098 (1952).
11 See Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. v. Capulong, 160 SCRA
at 869; Gonzales v. Kalaw Katigbak, 137 SCRA at 723;
Eastern Broadcasting Corp. (DYRE) v. Dans, Jr., 137 SCRA
628, 635 (1985).
574
tion picture of every kind at all times and all places . . . .

Nor does it follow that motion pictures are necessarily
subject to the precise rules governing any other particular
method of expression. Each method tends to present its
own peculiar problems.12Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. at
502-503, 96 L.Ed. at 1106. With reference to television,
this Court is on record that a less liberal approach calls
for observance. This is so because unlike motion pictures
where patrons have to pay their way, television reaches
every home where there is a [TV] set. Children then will
likely be among the avid viewers of programs therein

shown. . . . [T]he State as parens patriae is called upon to
manifest an attitude of caring for the welfare of the
young.13Gonzales v. Kalaw Katigbak, 137 SCRA at
729.While newspapers may not be required to submit
manuscripts for review as a condition for their
publication, except during wartime, such a requirement is
justified when applied to motion pictures or television
programs (other than newsreels and commentaries)
because of unique considerations involved in their
operation. First, broadcast media have established a
uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all citizens.
Material presented over the airwaves confronts the
citizen, not only in public, but in the privacy of his home.
Second, broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children.
Bookstores and motion picture theaters may be
prohibited from making certain material available to
children, but the same selectivity cannot be done in radio
or television, where the listener or viewer is constantly
tuning in and out.14Eastern Broadcasting Corp. (DYRE)
v. Dans, Jr., 137 SCRA at 635. The State may thus
constitutionally require the advance submission of all
films and TV programs as a means of enabling it
effectively to bar the showing of unprotected films and TV
programs.15Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 13
L.Ed.2d 649 (1965).For these reasons, I hold 3(b) to be a
valid exercise of the States power to protect legitimate
public interests. The purpose of this restrainttemporary
in characteris to allow the
______________________________
12 Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. at 502-503, 96 L.Ed. at
1106.
13 Gonzales v. Kalaw Katigbak, 137 SCRA at 729.
14 Eastern Broadcasting Corp. (DYRE) v. Dans, Jr., 137
SCRA at 635.
15 Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 13 L.Ed.2d 649
(1965).
575
VOL. 259, JULY 26, 1996 575
Board time to screen materials and to seek an injunction

from the courts against those which it believes to be
harmful.
III. I reach a different conclusion, however, with respect to
3(c). This provision authorizes the Board to prohibit,
among other things, the exhibition or broadcast of motion
pictures, television programs and publicity materials
which, in its opinion, are immoral, indecent, contrary to
law and/or good customs, injurious to the prestige of the
Republic of the Philippines or its people, or [which have] a
violence or of a wrong or crime, such as the following:

State;
confidence of the people in their government and/or the
duly constituted authorities;
market for violence or pornography;
prohibited drugs;
dead; and
sub judice in nature.
Under this authority, the Board can determine what can
be shown or broadcast and what cannot. It is not true, as
the Board claims, that under P.D. No. 1986 its power is
limited to the classification of motion pictures and TV
programs. The power to classify includes the power to
censor. The Board can x-rate films and TV programs and
thus ban their public exhibition or broadcast. And once it
declares that a motion picture or television program is,
for example, indecent or contrary to law, as in the case of
the INC program in question, its declaration becomes the

law. Unless the producer or exhibitor is
576
willing to go to court, shouldering not only the burden of

showing that his movie or television program is
constitutionally protected but also the cost of litigation,
the ban stays.16PAUL A. FREUND, THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES 66 (1961). This is censorship in its
baldest form. This is contrary to the fundamental tenet of
our law that until and unless speech is found by the
courts to be unprotected its expression must be allowed.
In an effort to save this provision from constitutional
attack, it is alleged that the TV program in question was
disallowed pursuant to the rules of the Board which
prohibit the showing of motion pictures or TV programs
containing malicious attack[s] against any race, creed or
religion. It is contended that this rule impermissibly
broadens the prohibition in 3(c), because this ground
(malicious attack[s] against any race, creed or religion)
is not among those provided therein.
However, 3(c) gives the Board authority to stop the
showing of motion pictures, television programs and
publicity materials which are contrary to law, and Art.

201(2) (b) (3) of the Revised Penal Code makes it a crime
for anyone to exhibit shows which offend any race or
religion. It is true that Art. 201(2) (b) (3) refers to
subsequent punishment, whereas we are dealing here
with prior restraint. However, by authorizing the
censorship of materials which in the opinion of the Board
are contrary to law, 3(c) makes what is only a ground
for subsequent punishment also a ground for prior
restraint on expression. It is 3(c) of P.D. No. 1986, and
not only the rules implementing it, which is
unconstitutional.17Thanks to Rule 4(VII) of the Board,
shows which offend any race or religion, as a ground for
prosecution, is translated into clearly . . . malicious
attack against a race, creed or religion, as a ground for
censorship, thus limi...
_______________
16 PAUL A. FREUND, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES 66 (1961).
17 Thanks to Rule 4(VII) of the Board, shows which
offend any race or religion, as a ground for prosecution,
is translated into clearly . . . malicious attack against a
race, creed or religion, as a ground for censorship, thus
limiting the Boards discretion in censoring films and TV
programs. This does not of course make the grant of
censorial powers to the Board any less invalid. There was
a time when I thought that the problem was with
overboard standards. I am now convinced that the
problem is with censorship per se.
577
VOL. 259, JULY 26, 1996 577
While I think the Board may be granted the power to

preview materials, it is only for the purpose of enabling
the Board to decide whether to seek their prohibition by
the court in the interest of safeguarding morality, good
order and public safety, considering the pervasive
influence of broadcast media compared to that of the
print media. But concern with possible deleterious effects
of movies and television shows cannot and should not be
allowed to overshadow the equally important concern for
freedom of expression and blind us to the danger of
leaving the ultimate determination of what expression is
protected and what is not to a board of censors. The
protection of the youth should be in the first place the
concern of parents, schools and other institutions. I do
not think that society is so morally impoverished that we
have to draw on a group of censors for ultimate moral
lesson and leading.
If we have to call on the assistance of any agency at all, it
must be the courts.18See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S.
51, 13 L.Ed.2d 649 (1965); Teitel Film Corp. v. Cusak, 390
U.S. 139, 19 L.Ed.2d 966 (1968); Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S.
410, 428 L.Ed.2d 498 (1971). There are many reasons
why a system of prior restraint (in those cases where it

may validly be imposed) may only be administered by
judges. First is that the censors bias is to censor. Second
is that only a judicial determination in an adversary
proceeding ensures the necessary sensitivity to freedom
of expression.19Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. at 58,
13 L.Ed.2d at 654. For a discussion of the vices of
administrative censorship as opposed to judicial
determination, see generally John Jeffries, Jr., Rethinking
Prior Restraint, 92 YALE L.J. 409, 421-426 ... As has been
observed, Central to the first amendment due process is
the notion that a judicial rather than an administrative
determination of the character of the speech is necessary.
. . . [C]ourts alone are competent to decide whether
speech is constitutionally protected.20Henry Monaghan,
First Amendment Due Process, 83 HARV. L. REV. 518,
520 (1970). Third, the members of the Board do not have
the security of tenure and of fiscal autonomy necessary
to secure their independence.
_______________
18 See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 13 L.Ed.2d
649 (1965); Teitel Film Corp. v. Cusak, 390 U.S. 139, 19
L.Ed.2d 966 (1968); Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 428
L.Ed.2d 498 (1971).
19 Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. at 58, 13 L.Ed.2d at
654. For a discussion of the vices of administrative
censorship as opposed to judicial determination, see
generally John Jeffries, Jr., Rethinking Prior Restraint, 92
YALE L.J. 409, 421-426 (1983).
20 Henry Monaghan, First Amendment Due Process, 83

HARV. L. REV. 518, 520 (1970).
578
Indeed, I cannot understand why, after ruling that the

valuation of property in eminent domain is essentially a
judicial function which cannot be vested in administrative
agencies,21EPZA v. Dulay, 149 SCRA 305 (1987);
Sumulong v. Guerrero, 154 SCRA 461 (1987). this Court
should be willing to leave the valuation of that priceless
commodityexpression, whether by means of motion
picture or televisionto administrative agencies with only
occasional review by the courts. The trend may be toward
greater delegation of judicial authority to administrative
agencies in matters requiring technical knowledge and as
a means of relieving courts of cases which such agencies
can very well attend to.22E.g., Antipolo Realty v. NHA,
153 SCRA 399 (1987); Tropical Homes, Inc. v. NHA, 152
SCRA 540 (1987). There is no justification, however, for
such delegation in the area of our essential freedoms,
particularly freedom of expression, where only a judicial
determination in an adversary proceeding [can] ensure
the necessary sensitivity to freedom of
expression.23Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. at 58, 13
L.Ed.2d at 654.We have witnessed such distinct possibility

in the past to need any more lesson in the future to make
us realize the danger of leaving freedom of expression
and religionthe essential freedom of the mindin the
care of an administrative agency.
To the extent therefore that P.D. No. 1986, 3(c) vests in
the Board the final authority to determine whether
expression by motion picture or television is
constitutionally protected, I find it unconstitutional.
IV. The majority limit themselves to a determination of
the correctness of the Boards finding that the video
tapes in question contain attacks on the Catholic religion.
I find it difficult to pass upon this question because the
contents of the tapes are not in the record of this
case.24Compare the following: Knowledge is essential to
understanding; and understanding should precede
judging, Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504,
520, 68 L.Ed. 813, 829 (1924) The trial court ruled
________________
21 EPZA v. Dulay, 149 SCRA 305 (1987); Sumulong v.
Guerrero, 154 SCRA 461 (1987).
22 E.g., Antipolo Realty v. NHA, 153 SCRA 399 (1987);
Tropical Homes, Inc. v. NHA, 152 SCRA 540 (1987).
23 Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. at 58, 13 L.Ed.2d at
654.
24 Compare the following: Knowledge is essential to
understanding; and understanding should precede
judging, Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504,

520, 68 L.Ed. 813, 829 (1924)
579
VOL. 259, JULY 26, 1996 579
that the tapes contain no attack against any religion but

only a discussion of the doctrines which the Iglesia Ni
Cristo believes embody superior and self evident truth.
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals, in reversing the
trial court, found that the tapes offend by verbal abuse
other religions and are for that reason indecent and
contrary to good customs within the meaning of P.D. No.
1986, 3(c). Neither court, however, had any evidence to
support its conclusions, because this case was submitted
by the parties solely on the basis of memoranda. What
the majority of this Court call facts (pp. 16-17) are simply
the opinions of members of the Board that the video
tapes contain attacks on the Catholic religion.
There are no facts on which to base judgment on this
question. Even if there are, the clear and present danger
test is inapplicable. To be sure, in Gonzales v. Kalaw
Katigbak this Court said:
[W]here the movies, theatrical, productions, radio scripts,
television programs, and other such media of expression
are concernedincluded as they are in freedom of

expressioncensorship, especially so if an entire
production is banned, is allowable only under the clearest
proof of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil
to public safety, public morals, public health or any other
legitimate public interest.25137 SCRA at 725.The clear
and present danger test has been devised for use in
criminal prosecutions for violations of laws punishing
certain types of utterances.26See, e.g., Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47, 63 L.Ed. 470 (1919); Primicias v.
Fugoso, 80 Phil. 71 (1948); Cabansag v. Fernandez, 102
Phil. 152 (1957); Vera v. Arca, 28 SCRA 351 (1969). While
the test has been applied to the regulation of the use of
streets and parks27E.g., Reyes v. Bagatsing, 125 SCRA
553 (1983); Navarro v. Villegas, 31 SCRA 731 (1970); see
also the Public Assembly Act of 1985 (B.P. Blg. 880), 6(a)
of which makes it mandatory for mayorssurely a form
_______________
(Brandeis, J., dissenting), which Professor Freund says was
central to the thought of Justice Brandeis. ON
UNDERSTANDING THE SUPREME COURT 50 (1949).
25 137 SCRA at 725.
26 See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 63
L.Ed. 470 (1919); Primicias v. Fugoso, 80 Phil. 71 (1948);
Cabansag v. Fernandez, 102 Phil. 152 (1957); Vera v.
Arca, 28 SCRA 351 (1969).
27 E.g., Reyes v. Bagatsing, 125 SCRA 553 (1983);
Navarro v. Villegas, 31 SCRA 731 (1970); see also the
Public Assembly Act of 1985 (B.P. Blg. 880), 6(a) of which

makes it mandatory for mayors
580
of prior restraintits use in such context of the speech is

not the issue. But when the regulation concerns not the
time, place or manner of speech but its content (i.e., it is
contentbased) the clear and present danger test simply
cannot be applied. This is because a determination
whether an utterance has created a clear and present
danger to public interests requires a factual record.
The test itself states that the question in every case is
whether the words used are used in such circumstances
and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present
danger that they will bring about the substantive evil that
Congress has a right to prevent.28Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. at 52, 63 L.Ed at 473-74. However it may
have been reformulated in later cases, the test
essentially requires that the causal connection between
the speech and the evil apprehended be
evident.29ENRIQUE M. FERNANDO, CONSTITUTION OF
THE PHILIPPINES 569 (1977). But how can this be shown
unless the speech is first allowed? It is not enough that
the tapes have been made and only their broadcast
banned. What about the audience reaction to the tapes?

Even if we know what the tapes in this case contain, we
cannot determine whether their public broadcast would
create a clear and present danger to public interests. The
censorship board, trying to determine whether to issue a
permit, must necessarily speculate on the impact which
the words will have since the context in which they will be
utteredthe audience, the occasion, and the placeis
totally lacking in the record. It is then forced to apply a
lesser standard of proof in deciding whether to impose a
restraint on speech.
The majority claim that there is no need for a factual
record in order to find that the Board in this case
exceeded its powers in disallowing the TV series in
question. They argue that acts of prior restraint are
hobbled by the presumption of
________________
to grant permits for the use of parks and streets unless
there is clear and convincing evidence that the public
assembly will create a clear and present danger to public
order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or
public health.
28 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. at 52, 63 L.Ed at
473-74.
29 ENRIQUE M. FERNANDO, CONSTITUTION OF THE
PHILIPPINES 569 (1977).
581
VOL. 259, JULY 26, 1996 581
invalidity and should be greeted with furrowed brows. It is

the burden of the respondent Board to overthrow this
presumption. If it fails to discharge this heavy burden, its
act of censorship will be struck down. . . . In the case at
bar, respondent board did nothing to rebut the
presumption. (p. 17).
That, however, is precisely the problem with the
censorship law. It in effect places on the producer or
exhibitor the burden of going to court and of showing that
his film or program is constitutionally protected. To
paraphrase Sotto v. Ruiz, which the majority cite as
authority for sustaining the validity of 3(c), Every
intendment of the law is in favor of the correctness of
[the agencys] action.3041 Phil. at 470. The Board would
have this burden of justification if, as I believe it should, it
is made to go to court instead and justify the banning of a
film or TV program. That is why 3(c) should be
invalidated. One cannot defend the validity of the law and
at the same time contend that in any court proceeding for
the review of the Boards decision the burden of justifying
the ban should be on the Board.
The teaching of Gonzales v. Kalaw Katigbak simply comes
down to this: that the standard for judging the validity of
prior restraint on political expression is stricter than that

for adjudging restraints on materials alleged to be
obscene, but not that the test of clear and present danger
is applicable in determining whether or not a permit may
be granted.
In Gonzales v. Kalaw Katigbak31137 SCRA at 725, quoting

Justice Douglass concurring opinion in Superior Films v.
Department of Education, 346 U.S. 587, 589, 98 L.Ed.
330, 331 (1954). this Court echoed Justice Douglass plea
that every writer, actor, or producer, no matter what
medium of expression he may use, should be freed from
the censor. For indeed the full flowering of local artistic
talents and the development of the national intelligence
can take place only in a climate of free expression. A film
pro_______________
30 41 Phil. at 470.
31 137 SCRA at 725, quoting Justice Douglass concurring
opinion in Superior Films v. Department of Education, 346
U.S. 587, 589, 98 L.Ed. 330, 331 (1954).
582
ducer, faced with the prospect of losing on his investment

as a result of the banning of his movie production, may
well find himself compelled to submit to the wishes of the
Board or practice self-censorship. The expression of
unpopular opinions, whether religious, political or
otherwise is imperilled under such a system.
We have long ago done away with controls on the print
media, it is time we did the same with the control on
broadcast media, which for so long has operated under
restraints,32The first film censorship law, Act No. 3582 of
the Philippine Legislature, was enacted on November 29,
1929. leaving the punishment for violations of laws to be
dealt with by subsequent prosecution.
For the foregoing reasons, I vote to declare 3(c) of P.D.
No. 1986 unconstitutional and to reverse the decision of
the Court of Appeals, except in so far as it sustains the
grant of power to the Board to preview materials for
showing or broadcast, consistent with my view that 3(b)
is valid.
SEPARATE (CONCURRING) OPINION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
I think the basic issues in this case are:
A. What is the statutory extent and the constitutional
limitation of the powers of the Movies and Television
Review and Classification Board (MTRCB)? More
specifically, does the MTRCB have the power to

prohibit/censor television shows?
B. In banning the television showing of the Iglesia ni
Cristo videotape series, did the respondent Board
exercise its powers correctly and properly?
The first question deals with the general legal concepts
and principles underlying the functions and prerogatives
of the MTRCB while the second calls for a juridical
evaluation of the specific act of the Board in classifying as
X (or not for public
________________
32 The first film censorship law, Act No. 3582 of the
Philippine Legislature, was enacted on November 29,
1929.
583
VOL. 259, JULY 26, 1996 583
viewing) specific pre-taped or canned programs,

identified as Series 115, 119, 121 and 128, for the reason
that they allegedly constituted an attack against another
religion. The first involves doctrine; the second,
application.
A. EXTENT AND LIMIT OF MTRCBS POWERS
The statutory powers of the MTRCB are set forth in Sec. 3

of P.D. 1986.1Sec. 3. Powers and Functions.The BOARD
shall have the following functions, powers and duties:x x
x
xxx
x x xb) To screen, review and examine all
motion pictures as herein defined, ...
_______________
1 Sec. 3. Powers and Functions.The BOARD shall have
the following functions, powers and duties:
xxx
xxx
xxx

for theatrical or non-theatrical distribution, for television
the Philippines, and in the latter case, whether they be
for local viewing or for export.
c) To approve or disprove, delete objectionable portion
from and/or prohibit the importation, exportation,
production, copying, distribution, sale, lease exhibition
and/or television broadcast of the motion pictures,
television programs and publicity materials subject of the
preceding paragraph, which, in the judgment of the
BOARD applying contemporary Filipino cultural values as
standard, are objectionable for being immoral, indecent,
prestige of the Republic of the Philippines or its people, or
with a dangerous tendency to encourage the commission
of violence or of a wrong or crime, such as but not limited

to:
State;
market for violence and pornography;
584
In implementing P.D. 1986, the MTRCB issued its own

Rules and Regulations. At issue in this case is Section
42Section 4. GOVERNING STANDARD.a) The BOARD
shall judge the motion pictures and television programs
and publicity materials submitted to it for review, using
as standard contemporary Filipino cultural values to
abate what are legally objection... of such Rules.
On the other hand, these statutory powers and internally

generated regulations are limited by the Bill of Rights.
Art. III of the 1987 Constitution, particularly the rights to
free speech and religion.3Sec. 4. No law shall be passed
abridging the freedom of speech, of expression x x
x.Sec. 5. No law shall be made respecting an
p...Mr. Justice Mendoza connects the above constitutional
rights with the present controversy by saying that
expression x x x by means of television broadcast is
included in the free speech and free press guarantee of
the Constitution and by Mr. Justice Kapunan by writing
that this case uniquely interphases questions of religious
expression and censorship
_______________
prohibited drugs;
dead; and,
subjudice in nature.
2 Section 4. GOVERNING STANDARD.a) The BOARD
shall judge the motion pictures and television programs
and publicity materials submitted to it for review, using
as standard contemporary Filipino cultural values to
abate what are legally objectionable for being immoral,

indecent, contrary to law and good customs, injurious to
people, or with a dangerous tendency to encourage the
commission of violence or of a wrong or crime such as
but not limited to:
xxx
xxx
xxx
vii) Those which clearly constitute an attack against any

members thereof; x x x.
3 Sec. 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom
of speech, of expression x x x.
Sec. 5. No law shall be made respecting an
profession and worship, without discrimination or
preference, shall forever be allowed. x x x.
585
VOL. 259, JULY 26, 1996 585
laws in the context of the constitutions guarantees of

freedom of religion and of speech and expression.
Here before us therefore is a classic constitutional law

case wherein the inherent power of the state to safeguard
the peace, well-being and general welfare of the people
collide and clash with the constitutional rights of
individuals and religious institutions to evangelize,
preach, promote, teach, and even proselytize.
Religious FreedomA Cherished Right
First. I agree with the ponencia that (f)reedom of religion
has been accorded a preferred status by the framers of
our fundamental laws, past and present. Religious
freedom is absolute when it is confined within the realm
of thought to a private, personal relationship between a
mans conscience and his God, but it is subject to
regulation when religious belief is transformed into
external acts that affect or afflict others. The mere
MTRCBs Power to Review and to Censor is Valid
Second. I believe that as an agency of the State created
to promote the general welfare, the MTRCB under P.D.
1986 has the basic initiatory authority and power to
approve or disapprove,
delete objectionable portion from
and/or prohibit
the importation, exportation, production, copying,

distribution, sale, lease, exhibition and/or television
broadcast of pre-taped or canned (as contradistinguished from live) video-audio/film/television
programs and publicity materials. I regret I cannot go
along with Mr. Justice Mendozas avante garde thesis that
Section 3-c of P.D. 1986, from where the above-quoted
words were taken, is upon its face and as applied,
unconstitutional. I note the extensive materials, par-
586
ticularly from American cases, buttressing his cogent

stand, but, after reflection, prayer and discernment, I am
thoroughly convinced that the situation in our country,
particularly the totality of our cultural and religious
milieu, is far different from that in America.
Petitioner INC contends that the MTRCBs authority
extends only to non-religious video materials but not to
religious programs, particularly those of INC, which it
claims are neither immoral nor indecent. This position
presents more problems than solutions. For who will
determine whether a given canned material is religious or
not, and therefore whether it can be publicly exhibited or
not without its passing through the Board? I would prefer
that the State, which is constitutionally mandated to be

neutral, continue to exercise the power to make such
determination, rather than leave it up to the producer,
maker or exhibitor of such material, who/which, because
of vested interests would, in the normal course, be
understandably biased in his/its own favor. I feel less
discomfort with the idea of maintaining the censors
quasi-judicial authority to review such film materials,
subject to appeal to the proper courts by aggrieved
parties, than with the prospect and consequences of
doing away with such power altogether. I agree with Mr.
Justice Vitug in finding it more prudent to have a
deferment of an exhibition that may be perceived (by the
Board) to be contrary to decency, morality, good custom
or the law until, at least, the courts are given an
opportunity to pass upon the matter x x x. A contrary
ruling would most regrettably remove meaningful and
necessary safeguards against a veritable floodtide of
prurient, violence-prone and values-eroding television
shows and programs.
In Gonzales vs. Kalaw Katigbak4137 SCRA 717 (July 22,
1985). and Eastern Broadcasting Corp. (DYRE) vs. Dans,
Jr.,5137 SCRA 628 (July 19, 1985). this Court early on
acknowledged the uniquely pervasive presence of
broadcast and electronic media in the lives of everyone,
and the easy accessibility of television and radio to just
about anyone, especially children.
_______________
4 137 SCRA 717 (July 22, 1985).
5 137 SCRA 628 (July 19, 1985).
587
VOL. 259, JULY 26, 1996 587
Everyone is susceptible to their influence, even the

indifferent or unwilling who happen to be within reach of
a blaring radio or television set.6Eastern, supra, at p.
636. And these audiences have less opportunity to
cogitate, analyze and reject the utterances, compared to
readers of printed material.7Id. It is precisely because the
State as parens patriae is called upon to manifest an
attitude of caring for the welfare of the young8Gonzales,
supra, at p. 729. that I vote for the retention of the
States power of review and prohibition via the MTRCB.
High-minded idealism in the staunch defense of the
much-vaunted freedoms cannot but be admired. Yet, no
matter how devoutly we may wish it, not all the people
share the same mindset and views nor, needless to say,
the same viewpoint, i.e., the ivory tower window. Hence,
we must prudently anticipate that abuses against the
public weal are likely to be committed where absolute
permissiveness is the norm. Would that, with the total
absence of censorship or review, there occur a significant
increase in religious, spiritual or morally uplifting primetime programming! But realistically and pragmatically
speaking, we see mostly the prospect of more explicit

sex-oriented advertising, unadulterated violence and
outright pandering to phone-sex addicts and the simply
curious. The fact that even the Net is not free of
pornographic slime is no excuse to let down all
reasonable barriers against broadcast media offerings of
muck, moral depravity and mayhem. And definitely, there
is no good and sensible reason for the State to abdicate
its vital role as parens patriae, in the guise of copying
American constitutional precedents, which I respectfully
submit, are inapplicable in our factual context and time.
MTRCB Must Use Constitutional Standard.
THIRD. In exercising its prerogatives, the MTRCB cannot
act absolutely or whimsically. It must act prudently. And it
________________
6 Eastern, supra, at p. 636.
7 Id.
8 Gonzales, supra, at p. 729.
588
can do so ONLY if it exercises its powers of review and

prohibition according to a standard and/or a limit.
I believe that the phrase with a dangerous tendency in
Sec. 3-c of P.D. 1986 should be struck down as an
unconstitutional standard. This is martial law vintage and
should be replaced with the more libertarian clear and
present danger rule which is eloquently explained by JJ.
Kapunan, Puno and Mendoza (and which explanation I
shall not repeat here).
Having said that, may I respectfully point out however
that there is an even more appropriate standard in the
Philippine context proffered by the law itself, and that is
contemporary Philippine cultural values. This standard
under the law, should be used in determining whether a
film or video program is (a) immoral, (b) indecent, (c)
contrary to law and/or good customs, and (d) injurious to
people. On the other hand, when the question is whether
the material being reviewed encourages the commission
of violence or of a wrong or crime per the enumeration
contained in Sec. 3-c, the clear and present danger
principle should be applied as the standard in place of the
dangerous tendency rule.
Just a word edgewise about cultural values. Our cultural
ideals and core values of galang, pagbabahala,
pananagutan, balikatan, malasakit, asal, halaga, diwa,
damdamin, dangal, kapwa, pakikitungo, hiya, delikadesa,
awa, tiwala, makaDiyos, maka-tao, maka-buhay and so
forth, define us as a people, as Filipinos. We are who and
what we are because of these values and ideals. They

delimit the areas of individual and social behavior and
conduct deemed acceptable or tolerable, and ultimately
they determine the way we as individuals uniquely
conduct our relationships and express ourselves.
According to Mr. Justice Kapunan, applying contemporary
Filipino values to religious thought and expression will
permit an overarching into a constitutionally protected
area, and provides the MTRCB with a veiled excuse for
clamping down against unorthodox religious thought and
expression. But such fear is highly speculative and totally
unsupported by empirical evidence. I would like to add
that where a mode of
589
VOL. 259, JULY 26, 1996 589
religious expression runs counter to such core values,

serious questions have to be raised about the ultimate
redeeming worth of such expression. An example is in
order. Not too long ago, the so-called Children of God
blew into town, and, under the guise of proselytizing,
practised flirty-fishing (free sex). I wonder how many of
us will simply sit on our hands if these Children were to
telecast their religious programs for OUR children to
watch, or conduct seminars over the airwaves on the
hows of free sex . . . Another example: satanic cults

involve blood sacrifices . . . In brief, I am in agreement
with the ponencia that the practice of religion cannot be
totally abandoned to the market place and governed by
the policy of laissez faire.
Validity of MTRCBs Internal Rule
FOURTH. Anent the validity of Sec. 4 of the Boards Rules
and Regulations authorizing MTRCB to prohibit the
showing of materials which clearly constitute an attack
against any race, creed or religion x x x, I agree with Mr.
Justice Vitug that the phrase contrary to law in Sec. 3-c
should be read together with other existing laws such as,
for instance, the provisions of the Revised Penal Code,
particularly Article 201, which prohibit the exhibition of
shows that offend another race or religion. Indeed,
where it can be shown that there is a clear and present
danger that a religious program could agitate or spark a
religious strife of such extent and magnitude as to be
injurious to the general welfare, the Board may X-rate it
or delete such portions as may reasonably be necessary.
The debilitating armed conflicts in Bosnia, Northern
Ireland and in some Middle East countries due to
exacerbated religious antagonisms should be enough
lesson for all of us. Religious wars can be more ravaging
and damaging than ordinary crimes. If it is legal and in
fact praiseworthy to prevent the commission of, say, the
felony of murder in the name of public welfare, why
should the prevention of a crime punishable by Art. 201
of the Penal Code be any less legal and less

praiseworthy?
590
I note, in this connection, the caveat raised by the

ponencia that the MTRCB Rule bans shows which attack
a religion, whereas Art. 201 merely penalizes those who
exhibit programs which offend such religion. Subject to
changing the word attack with the more accurate
offend, I believe Section 4 of the Rules can stand.
In sum, I respectfully submit (1) that P.D. 1986 is
constitutional, subject to the substitution (or
interpretation) of the words dangerous tendency with
the phrase (or as meaning) clear and present danger in
Sec. 3-c; and (2) that Sec. 4 of the Boards Rules would be
likewise valid, provided the words constitute an attack
are changed with offend.
B. WAS THE BANNING OF THE IGLESIA PROGRAMS
PROPER?
We now come to the immediate question: Did the
respondent Board correctly apply Section 3 of P.D. 1986 in
prohibiting the public telecasting of the Iglesia program?
In short, did the INC series offend a religion? Juridically
stated, did the respondent MTRCB use contemporary

Filipino cultural values in determining that said series
offended another religion such as to constitute a clear
and present danger of a religious strife which is injurious
to public welfare? [Note: I advisedly used both the
values and clear and present, standards in framing
the question because the INC program was apparently xrated for being both contrary to law and violative of
Art. 201, a crime.]
Unfortunately, we cannot answer this question directly
because the tape in question was never submitted to the
Court for viewing. Neither was there a detailed
description of its objectionable contents in the assailed
Decision of the Court of Appeals or Regional Trial Court.
Nor is there extant a detailed justification prepared by
respondent Board on why it banned the programother
than its bare conclusion that the material constituted an
attack against the Catholic and Protestant religions.
591
VOL. 259, JULY 26, 1996 591
In no wise can the remarks in the voting slips presented

before the trial court be considered sufficient justification
for banning the showing of any material.
In the face of such inadequacy of evidence and basis, I

see no way that this Court could authorize a suppression
of a species of the freedom of speech on the say-so of
anyonenot even of the MTRCB. Paraphrasing People vs.
Fernando,9145 SCRA 151, 159 (October 24, 1986). the
disputable presumption (which is of statutory origin) that
official duties have been regularly performed must yield
to the constitutionally enshrined freedoms of expression
and of religion. If courts are required to state the factual
and legal bases of their conclusions and judicial
dispositions, with more reason must quasi-judicial officers
such as censors, especially when they curtail a
fundamental right which is entitled to the highest
priority and amplest protection.
FOR THIS REASON AND THIS REASON ALONE, i.e., that
the respondent Board failed to justify its conclusion thru
the use of the proper standards that the tapes in question
offended another religion, I vote to GRANT the petition
insofar as it prays for the showing of said programs.
However, I vote to DENY the petition insofar as allowing
the INC to show its pretaped programs without first
submitting them for review by the MTRCB.
SEPARATE OPINION
VITUG, J.:
I agree with those who support the view that religious
freedom occupies an exalted position in our hierarchy of
rights and that the freedom to disseminate religious
information is a constitutionally-sanctioned prerogative
that allows any legitimate religious denomination a free

choice of media in the propagation of its credo. Like any
other right, however, the exercise of religious belief is not
without inherent and statutory limitations.
________________
9 145 SCRA 151, 159 (October 24, 1986).
592
The Board disapproved the exhibition of a series of

television programs of petitioner on the ground that they
tend to offend and constitute an attack against other
religions. An opinion has been expressed that the noninclusion in Section 3 of P.D. 1986 of an attack against
any religion, as a standard for classification, and so the
deletion of the phrase offensive to other religions found
in the old censorship law (Executive Order No. 876),
should be clear enough to manifest a legislative intent to
do away with the standard. A reading of Section 3 of P.D.
1986 shows that the Board is empowered to screen,
review and examine all x x x television programs and to
approve or disprove, delete objectionable portion from
and/or prohibit the x x x television broadcast of x x x
television programs x x x which, in the judgment of the
BOARD (so) applying contemporary Filipino cultural

values as standard, are objectionable for being immoral,
indecent, contrary to law and/or good customs x x x. I
believe that the phrase contrary to law should be read
together with other existing laws such as, for instance,
the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, particularly
Article 201, which prohibits the exhibition of shows that
offend another race or religion. I see in this provision a
good and sound standard. Recent events indicate
recurrent violent incidents between and among
communities with diverse religious beliefs and dogma.
The danger is past mere apprehension; it has become a
virtual reality and now prevalent in some parts of the
world.
In order not to infringe constitutional principles, any
restriction by the Board must, of course, be for legitimate
and valid reasons. I certainly do not think that prior
censorship should altogether be rejected just because
sanctions can later be imposed. Regulating the exercise
of a right is not necessarily an anathema to it; in fact, it
can safeguard and secure that right.
When I particularly ponder on the magnitude of the power
of a television set, I find it more prudent to have a
deferment of an exhibition that may be perceived to be
contrary to decency, morality, good customs or the law
until, at least, the courts are given an opportunity to pass
upon the matter than
593
VOL. 259, JULY 26, 1996 593
rely merely on the availability of retribution for actual

injury sustained. A delay is not too high a price to pay for
a possible damage to society that may well turn out to be
incalculable and lasting.
In this instance, I vote for the dismissal of the petition.
Judgment sustaining jurisdiction of MTRCB over
petitioners TV program affirmed while reversed and set
aside as to the x-rating of said program.
Note.Even the exercise of religion may be regulated at
some slight inconvenience in order that the State may
protect its citizens from injury. (Centeno vs. VillalonPornillos, 236 SCRA 197 [1994])
[Iglesia Ni Cristo vs. Court of Appeals, 259 SCRA
529(1996)]
...Page Edit Line Top

726PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Calalang vs. Williams et al.
se ha descrito, de modo que una persona, extendiendo el

brazo en toda extension, puede tocar uno de sus
alambres. Segun el Electricista de la Ciudad parece que
aun un alambre de triple trenza a prueba de las
inclemencias del tiempo, si se toca por una persona,
pondr en peligro la vida de esta por electrocucin."
Como se habr observado, este caso de Astudillo difiere
mucho del de autos.
Por todo lo expuesto, fallamos confirmando en todas sus
partes la sentencia del Tribunal de Apelaciones objeto del
presente recurso, sin expresa condena en costas. As se
ordena.
Avancea, Pres., Imperial, Diaz, y Laurel, MM., estan
conformes.
Se confirma la sentencia.
[No. 47800.December 2, 1940]

Maximo Calalang, petitioner, vs. A. D. Williams, et al.,
respondents.
1.Constitutional Law; Constitutionality of Commonwealth

Act No. 548; Delegation op Legislative Power; Authority of
Director of Public Works and Secretary of Public Works
and Communications to Promulgate Rules and Regulations.The provisions of section 1 of Commonwealth
Act No. 548 do not confer legislative power upon the
Director of Public Works and the Secretary of Public Works
and Communications. The authority therein conferred
upon them and under which they promulgated the rules
and regulations now complained of is not to determine
what public policy demands but merely to carry out the
legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly in
said Act, to wit, "to promote safe transit upon, and avoid
obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national
roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive
orders of the President of the Philippines" and to close
them temporarily to any or all classes of traffic "whenever
the condition of the road or the traffic thereon makes
such action necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest." The delegated power, if at all,
therefore, is not the determination of what the law shall
be, but
727
VOL. 70, DECEMBER 2, 1940727
merely the ascertainment of the facts and

circumstances upon which the application of said law is to
be predicated. To promulgate rules and regulations on the
use of national roads and to determine when and how
long a national road should be closed to traffic, in view of
the condition of the road or the traffic thereon and the
requirements of public convenience and interest, is an
administrative function which cannot be directly
discharged by the National Assembly. It must depend on
the discretion of some other government official to whom
is confided the duty of determining whether the proper
occasion exists for executing the law. But it cannot be
said that the exercise of such discretion is the making of
the law.
2.Id.; Id.; Police Power; Personal Liberty; Governmental
Authority.Commonwealth Act No. 548 was passed by
the National Assembly in the exercise of the paramount
police power of the state. Said Act, by virtue of which the
rules and regulations complained of were promulgated,
aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions
on national roads, in the interest and convenience of the
public. In enacting said law, therefore, the National
Assembly was prompted by considerations of public
convenience and welfare. It was inspired by a desire to
relieve congestion of traffic, which is, to say the least, a
menace to public safety. Public welfare, then, lies at the
bottom of the enactment of said law, and the state in
order to promote the general welfare may interfere with
personal liberty, with property, and with business and
occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to

all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the
general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state (U. S.
vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil., 218). To this fundamental aim
of our Government the rights of the individual are
subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a
misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over
authority because then society will fall into anarchy.
Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty
because then the individual will fall into slavery. The
citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and
authority in his mind through education and, personal
discipline, so that there may be established the resultant
equilibrium, which means peace and order and happiness
for all. The moment greater authority is conferred upon
the government, logically so much is withdrawn from the
residuum of liberty which resides in the people. The
paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of
liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its
preservation.
3.Id.; Id.; Social Justice.Social justice is "neither
communism,
728
nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the

humanization of laws and the equalization of social and
economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational
and objectively secular conception may at least be
approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the
welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government
of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all
the competent elements of society, through the
maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium
in the interrelations of the members of the community,
constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally
justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise
of powers underlying the existence of all governments on
the time-honored principle of salus populi est supremo,
lex. Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the
recognition of the necessity of interdependence among
divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection
that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups
as a combined force in our social and economic life,
consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective
of the state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of
all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to
the greatest number."
Maximo Calalang in his own behalf.
Solicitor-General Ozaeta and Assistant Solicitor-General
Amparo for respondents Williams, Fragante and Bayan.
City Fiscal Mabanag for the other respondents.

Laurel,J.:
Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private citizen and
as a taxpayer of Manila, brought before this court this petition for a writ of prohibition against the respondents, A.
D. Williams, as Chairman of the National Traffic Commission; Vicente Fragante, as Director of Public Works; Sergio
Bayan, as Acting Secretary of Public Works and Communications; Eulogio Rodriguez, as Mayor of the City of
Manila; and Juan Dominguez, as Acting Chief of Police of
Manila.
It is alleged in the petition that the National Traffic
Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to
729
VOL. 70, DECEMBER 2, 1940729
recommend to the Director of Public Works and to the

Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along
Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca
to Dasmarinas Street, from 7:30 a. m. to 12:30 p. m. and
from 1:30 p. m. to 5:30 p. m.; and along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to
Echague Street, from 7 a. m. to 11 p.m., for a period of
one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante
Bridge to traffic; that the Chairman of the National Traffic

Commission, on July 18, 1940, recommended to the
Director of Public Works the adoption of the measure
proposed in the resolution aforementioned, in pursuance
of the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 548 which
authorizes said Director of Public Works, with the
approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, to promulgate rules and regulations to
regulate and control the use of and traffic on national
roads; that on August 2, 1940, the Director of Public
Works, in his first endorsement to the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications, recommended to the latter
the approval of the recommendation made by the
Chairman of the National Traffic Commission as aforesaid,
with the modification that the closing of Rizal Avenue to
traffic of animal-drawn vehicles be limited to the portion
thereof extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo
Street to Azcarraga Street; that on August 10, 1940, the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications, in his
second indorsement addressed to the Director of Public
Works, approved the recommendation of the latter that
Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue be closed to traffic of
animal-drawn vehicles, between the points and during
the hours as above indicated, for a period of one year
from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to
traffic; that the Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of
Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced
the rules and regulations thus adopted; that as a
consequence of such enforcement, all animal-drawn
vehicles are not now allowed to pass and pick up passen-
730
gers in the places above-mentioned to the detriment not

only of their owners but of the riding public as well.
It is contended by the petitioner that Commonwealth Act
No. 548 by which the Director of Public Works, with the
approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, is authorized to promulgate rules and regulations for the regulation and control of the use of and
traffic on national roads and streets is unconstitutional
because it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative
power. This contention is untenable. As was observed by
this court in Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro (39 Phil,
660, 700), "The rule has nowhere been better stated than
in the early Ohio case decided by Judge Ranney, and
since followed in a multitude of cases, namely: 'The true
distinction therefore is between the delegation of power
to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion
as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in
pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the
latter no valid objection can be made.' (Cincinnati, W. &
Z. R. Co. vs. Comm'rs. Clinton County, 1 Ohio St., 88.)
Discretion, as held by Chief Justice Marshall in Wayman
vs. Southard (10 Wheat., 1) may be committed by the Legislature to an executive department or official. The
Legislature may make decisions of executive departments

or subordinate officials thereof, to whom it has committed
the execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact.
(U. S. vs. Kinkead, 248 Fed., 141.) The growing tendency
in the decisions is to give prominence to the 'necessity' of
the case."
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 548 reads as follows:
"Section 1.To promote safe transit upon, and avoid
obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national
roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive
orders of the President of the Philippines, the Director of
Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications, shall promulgate the nee731
VOL. 70, DECEMBER 2, 1940731
essary rules and regulations to regulate and control the

use of and traffic on such roads and streets. Such rules
and regulations, with the approval of the President, may
contain provisions controlling or regulating the construction of buildings or other structures within a reasonable
distance from along the national roads. Such roads may
be temporarily closed to any or all classes of traffic by the
Director of Public Works and his duly authorized representatives whenever the condition of the road or the traffic
thereon makes such action necessary or advisable in the
public convenience and interest, or for a specified period,

with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications."
The above provisions of law do not confer legislative
power upon the Director of Public Works and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. The authority
therein conferred upon them and under which they
promulgated the rules and regulations now complained of
is not to determine what public policy demands but
merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the
National Assembly in said Act, to wit, "to promote safe
transit upon and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets
designated as national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the Philippines" and to close them temporarily to any or all
classes of traffic "whenever the condition of the road or
the traffic makes such action necessary or advisable in
the public convenience and interest." The delegated
power, if at all, therefore, is not the determination of what
the law shall be, but merely the ascertainment of the
facts and circumstances upon which the application of
said law is to be predicated. To promulgate rules and
regulations on the use of national roads and to determine
when and how long a national road should be closed to
traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the traffic
thereon and the requirements of public convenience and
interest, is an administrative function which cannot be
directly discharged by the National Assembly. It must
depend on the discre-
732
tion of some other government official to whom is

confided the duty of determining whether the proper
occasion exists for executing the law. But it cannot be
said that the exercise of such discretion is the making of
the law. As was said in Locke's Appeal (72 Pa. 491): "To
assert that a law is less than a law, because it is made to
depend on a future event or act, is to rob the Legislature
of the power to act wisely for the public welfare whenever
a law is passed relating to a state of affairs not yet
developed, or to things future and impossible to fully
know." The proper distinction the court said was this:
"The Legislature cannot delegate its power to make the
law; but it can make a law to delegate a power to
determine some fact or state of things upon which the
law makes, or intends to make, its own action depend. To
deny this would be to stop the wheels of government.
There are many things upon which wise and useful
legislation must depend which cannot be known to the
law-making power, and, must, therefore, be a subject of
inquiry and determination outside of the halls of
legislation." (Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 694; 36 L. Ed.
294.)
In the case of People vs. Rosenthal and Osmena, G. R.
Nos. 46076 and 46077, promulgated June 12, 1939, and
in Pangasinan Transportation vs. The Public Service Commission, G. R. No. 47065, promulgated June 26, 1940, this
Court had occasion to observe that the principle of separation of powers has been made to adapt itself to the
complexities of modern governments, giving rise to the
adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of "subordinate legislation," not only in the United States and
England but in practically all modern governments. Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the
multiplication of the subjects of governmental
regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering
the laws, the rigidity of the theory of separation of
governmental powers has, to a large extent, been relaxed
by permitting the delegation of greater powers by the
legislative and vesting a larger amount of discretion in
administrative and execu733
VOL. 70, DECEMBER 2, 1940733
tive officials, not only in the execution of the laws, but

also in the promulgation of certain rules and regulations
calculated to promote public interest.
The petitioner further contends that the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents pursuant to the
provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 548 constitute an
unlawful interference with legitimate business or trade
and abridge the right to personal liberty and freedom of

locomotion. Commonwealth Act No. 548 was passed by
the National Assembly in the exercise of the paramount
police power of the state.
Said Act, by virtue of which the rules and regulations
complained of were promulgated, aims to promote safe
transit upon and avoid obstructions on national roads, in
the interest and convenience of the public. In enacting
said law, therefore, the National Assembly was prompted
by considerations of public convenience and welfare. It
was inspired by a desire to relieve congestion of traffic.
which is, to say the least, a menace to public safety. Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of
said law, and the state in order to promote the general
welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property,
and with business and occupations. Persons and property
may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in
order to secure the general comfort, health, and
prosperity of the state (U. S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil.,
218). To this fundamental aim of our Government the
rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a
blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should
not be made to prevail over authority because then
society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be
made to prevail over liberty because then the individual
will fall into slavery. The citizen should achieve the
required balance of liberty and authority in his mind
through education and personal discipline, so that there
may be established the resultant equilibrium, which
means peace and order and happiness for all. The

moment greater authority is conferred upon the
government, lo734
gically so much is withdrawn from the residuum of liberty

which resides in the people. The paradox lies in the fact
that the apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the
very means of insuring its preservation.
The scope of police power keeps expanding as civilization
advances. As was said in the case of Dobbins vs. Los
Angeles (195 U. S. 223, 238; 49 L. ed. 169), "the right to
exercise the police power is a continuing one, and a business lawful today may in the future, because of the
changed situation, the growth of population or other
causes, become a menace to the public health and
welfare, and be required to yield to the public good." And
in People vs. Pomar (46 Phil., 440), it was observed that
"advancing civilization is bringing within the police power
of the state today things which were not thought of as
being within such power yesterday. The development of
civilization, the rapidly increasing population, the growth
of public opinion, with an increasing desire on the part of
the masses and of the government to look after and care
for the interests of the individuals of the state, have
brought within the police power many questions for regulation which formerly were not so considered."
The petitioner finally avers that the rules and regulations
complained of infringe upon the constitutional precept
regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the
well-being and economic security of all the people. The
promotion of social justice, however, is to be achieved not
through a mistaken sympathy towards any given group.
Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor
atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization of laws and
the equalization of social and economic forces by the
State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular
conception may at least be approximated. Social justice
means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the
adoption by the Government of measures calculated to
insure economic stability of all the competent elements of
society, through the maintenance of a proper economic
and social equilibrium in the interrelations of
...Page Edit Line Bottom [Calalang vs. Williams et al., 70
Phil., 726(1940)]

Almeda vs. Court of Appeals
No. L-43800. July 29, 1977.*FIRST DIVISION.LEONILA

LAUREL ALMEDA and VENANCIO ALMEDA petitioners, vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and EULOGIO
GONZALES, respondents.
Agrarian Law; Right of redemption is available to tenants
of sugar and coconut lands.In the precedential case of
Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, this right was held applicable to both
leasehold tenants and share tenants. Presently, We are
faced with an intricate question: is this right of
redemption available to tenants in sugar and coconut
lands? We answer yes. x x x But, there is nothing
readable or even discernible in the law denying to tenants
in sugar lands the right of pre-emption and redemption
under the Code. The exemption is purely limited to the
tenancy system; it does not exclude the other rights
conferred by the Code, such as the right of pre-emption
and redemption. In the same manner, coconut lands are
exempted from the Code only with respect to the
consideration and tenancy system prevailing, implying
that in other mattersthe right of pre-emption and
redemption which does not refer to the consideration of
the tenancythe provision of the Code apply.
Same; Constitutional law; Under the new Constitution,

property ownership is impressed with a social function.
It is to be noted that under the new Constitution, property
ownership is impressed with social function. Property use
must not only be for the benefit of the owner but of
society as well. The State, in the promotion of social
justice, may regulate the acquisition, ownership, use,
enjoyment and disposition of private property, and
equitably diffuse property . . . . . . ownership and profits.
One governmental policy of recent date projects the
emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil and
the transfer to them of the ownership of the land they till.
Same; Right of redemption by a tenant of agricultural
land must be exercised in accordance with law.In the
case before Us, neither
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
195
VOL. 78, JULY 29, 1977 195
prior tender nor judicial consignation of the redemption

price accompanied the filing of the redemption suit. In
fact, the Agrarian Court had yet to order, when it
rendered its decision on October 10, 1973 (complaint was
filed on March 27, 1971), respondent-tenant to deposit
the amount of P24,000.00 as redemption price with the

Clerk of Court within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the
decision. The absence of such tender or consignation
leaves Us, therefore, with no alternative but to declare
that respondent-tenant had failed to exercise his right of
redemption in accordance with law.
Same; Jurisdiction; Courts of agrarian relations have
jurisdiction over suits for redemption of coconut and
sugar lands.Since this case involves a matter,
controversy or dispute arising from agrarian relations
whether respondent-tenant on sugar and coconut lands
has the right of redemptionit is definite that the
Agrarian Court has jurisdiction to hear and decide the
same.
PETITION for review of the decision of the Court of
Appeals.
Dizon & Vitug and Cornell S. Valdez for petitioners.
Dennis B. Recon, Juanito Hernandez and Oseas A.
Martin for private respondent.
MARTIN, J.:
This is an agrarian case. Three questions of consequential
effects are raised: first, is there a tenants right of
redemption in sugar and coconut lands; second, is prior
tender or judicial consignation of the redemption price a
condition precedent for the valid exercise of the right of
redemption; and third, does the Court of Agrarian
Relations have jurisdiction over complaints for

redemption of sugar and coconut lands.
Respondent Eulogio Gonzales is an agricultural share
tenant of Glicerio, Sinfroso, Susana, Maria, Sebastian,
Rufina, Bienvenido, Besmark and Cesar, all surnamed
Angeles, on their 46,529-square land situated in Tanauan,
Batangas, and devoted to sugar cane and coconuts. On
September 30, 1968, the landowners sold the property to
petitioners-spouses Leonila Laurel Almeda and Venancio
Almeda without notifying respondent-tenant in writing of
the sale. The document of sale was registered with the
Register of Deeds of Tanauan, Batangas on March 27,
1969. Respondent-tenant thus seeks the redemption of
the land in a complaint filed on March 27, 1971,
196
pursuant to the provisions of Sections 11 and 12 of the

Code of Agrarian Reforms, with the Court of Agrarian
Relations at Lipa City.
Answering the complaint, petitioners-spouses state,
among other things, that long before the execution of the
deed of sale, Glicerio Angeles and his nephew Cesar
Angeles first offered the sale of the land to respondent
Gonzales, but the latter said that he had no money; that

respondent-tenant, instead, went personally to the house
of petitioners-spouses and implored them to buy the land
for fear that if someone else would buy the land, he may
not be taken in as tenant; that respondent-tenant is a
mere dummy of someone deeply interested in buying the
land; that respondent-tenant made to tender of payment
or any valid consignation in court at the time he filed the
complaint for redemption.
At the hearing of May 29, 1973 the parties waived their
right to present evidence and, instead, agreed to file
simultaneous memoranda upon which the decision of the
court would be based.
On October 10, 1973, the Agrarian Court rendered
judgment authorizing, the respondent-tenant, Eulogio
Gonzales, to redeem the tenanted land for P24,000.00,
the said amount to be deposited by him with the Clerk of
Court within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the decision.
Petitioners-spouses excepted to the ruling of the Agrarian
Court and appealed the ease to the Court of Appeals. On
January 30, 1976, the Appellate Court, however, affirmed
the decision of the Agrarian Court. Denied of their
motions for reconsideration, petitioners-spouses
instituted the present petition for review.
We find the appeal to be impressed with merits.
1. Prior to the enactment of the Agricultural Land Reform
Code (RA 3844), no right of preference in the sale of the
land under cultivation was enjoyed by the tenant-farmer.
The absence of this right freely opened the way to the

landlords to ease out their tenants from the land by
ostensible conveyance of said land to another tenant
who, in turn, sues for the ejectment of the first tenant on
ground of personal cultivation. While many of these sales
were simulated, the tenant is oftenly evicted from the
land because of the formal transfer of
197
VOL. 78, JULY 29, 1977 197
ownership in the land.1Montemayor, Labor, Agrarian and

Social Legislation, Vol. 3, 1967 ed., at 246. On August 8,
1963, the Agricultural Land Reform Code was passed,
impressed with the policy of the State, among other
things, (t)o establish owner-cultivatorship and the
economic family-size farm as the basis of Philippine
agriculture; to achieve a dignified existence of the small
farmers free from pernicious institutional restraints and
practices; to make the small farmers more independent,
self-reliant and responsible citizens, and a source of
genuine strength in our democratic society.2Sec. 2,
Agricultural Land Reform Code, as amended. More
importantly, a new right was given to the tenantsfarmers: the right of pre-emption and redemption. It
bolsters their security of tenure and further encourages
them to become owner-cultivators.3Op. Cit. Thus, Section

II provides: In case the agricultural lessor decides to sell
the landholding, the agricultural lessee shall have the
preferential right to buy the same under reasonable
terms and conditions. * * * * The right of pre-emption
under this Section may be exercised within one hundred
eighty days from notice in writing, which shall be served
by the owner on all lessees affected and the Department
of Agrarian Reform. If the agricultural lessee agrees with
the terms and conditions of the sale, he must give notice
in writing to the agricultural lessor of his intention to
exercise his right of pre-emption within the balance of
one hundred eighty days period still available to him, but
in any case not less than thirty days. He must either
tender payment of, or present a certificate from the land
bank that it shall, make payment pursuant to section
eighty of this Code on the price of the landholding to the
agricultural lessor. If the. latter refuses to accept such
tender or presentment, he may consign it with the court.
As protection of this right, Section 12 was inserted: In
case the landholding is sold to a third person without the
knowledge of the agricultural lessee, the latter shall have
the right to redeem the same at a reasonable price and
consideration. * * * *. The right of redemption under this
section may be exercised within one hundred eighty days
from notice in writing which shall be served by the
vendee on all lessees affected and the Department of
Agrarian Reform upon the registration of the sale, and
shall have priority over any other right of legal
redemption. The redemption price shall be
________________
1 Montemayor, Labor, Agrarian and Social Legislation,
Vol. 3, 1967 ed., at 246.
2 Sec. 2, Agricultural Land Reform Code, as amended.
3 Op. Cit.
198
the reasonable price of the land at the time of the

sale.4Agricultural Land Reform Code, as amended, now
known as Code of Agrairan Reforms.... In the
precedential case of Hidalgo v. Hidalgo,5L-25327-28, May
29, 1970, 33 SCRA 105. this right was held applicable to
both leasehold tenants and share tenants.
Presently, We are faced with an intricate question: is this
right of redemption available to tenants in sugar and
coconut lands? We answer yes. Among those exempted
from the automatic conversion to agricultural leasehold
upon the effectivity of the Agricultural Land Reform Code
in 1963 or even after its amendments (Code of Agrarian
Reforms) are sugar lands. Section 4 thereof states:
Agricultural share tenancy throughout the country, as
herein defined, is hereby declared contrary to public
policy and shall be automatically converted to agricultural

leasehold upon the effectivity of this section. * * * *.
Provided, That in order not to jeopardize international
commitments, lands devoted to crops covered by
marketing allotments shall be made the subject of a
separate proclamation by the President upon
recommendation of the department head that adequate
provisions, such as the organization of cooperatives
marketing agreement, or similar other workable
arrangements, have been made to insure efficient
management on all matters requiring synchronization of
the agricultural with the processing phases of such crops
* * * *. Sugar is, of course, one crop covered by
marketing allotments. In other words, this section
recognizes share tenancy in sugar lands until after a
special proclamation is made, which proclamation shall
have the same effect of an executive proclamation of the
operation of the Department of Agrarian Reform in any
region or locality; the share tenants in the lands affected
will become agricultural lessees at the beginning of the
agricultural year next succeeding the year in which the
proclamation is made.6See Montemayor, Labor Agrarian
and Social Legislation, Vol 3 1967 ed., at 230. But, there
is nothing readable or even discernible in the law denying
to tenants in sugar lands the right of pre-emption and
redemption under the Code. The exemption is purely
limited to the tenancy system; it does not exclude the
other rights conferred by the Code, such as the right of
pre-emption and redemption. In the same manner,
coconut lands are exempted from the Code only with

respect to the
________________
4 Agricultural Land Reform Code, as amended, now
known as Code of Agrairan Reforms.
5 L-25327-28, May 29, 1970, 33 SCRA 105.
6 See Montemayor, Labor Agrarian and Social Legislation,
Vol 3 1967 ed., at 230.
199
VOL. 78, JULY 29, 1977 199
consideration and tenancy system prevailing, implying

that in other mattersthe right of pre-emption and
redemption which does not refer to the consideration of
the tenancythe provisions of the Code apply. Thus,
Section 35 states: Notwithstanding the provisions of the
preceding Sections, in the case of fishponds, saltbeds and
lands principally planted to citrus, coconuts, cacao,
coffee, durian, and other similar permanent trees at the
time of the approval of this Code, the consideration, as
well as the tenancy system prevailing, shall be governed
by the provisions of Republic Act Numbered Eleven
Hundred and Ninety-Nine, as amended.
It is to be noted that under the new Constitution, property

ownership is impressed with social function. Property use
must not only be for the benefit of the owner but of
society as well. The State, in the promotion of social
justice, may regulate the acquisition, ownership, use,
enjoyment and disposition of private property, and
equitably diffuse property . . . . . . ownership and
profits.7Art. II, Sec. 6, 1973 Constitution; Alfanta v. Noe,
L-32362, September 19, 1973, 53 SCRA 84. One
governmental policy of recent date projects the
emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil and
the transfer to them of the ownership of the land they till.
This is Presidential Decree No. 27 of October 21, 1972,
ordaining that all tenant farmers of private agricultural
lands devoted to rice and corn under a system of
sharecrop or lease-tenancy, whether classified as landed
estates or not shall be deemed owner of a portion
constituting a family-size farm of five (5) hectares if not
irrigated and three (3) hectares if irrigated.8Villanueva v.
Court of Appeals, L-37653, June 28, 1974, 57 SCRA 724.2.
Nevertheless, while the Code secures to the tenantfarmer this right of redemption, in particular, the exercise
thereof must be in accordance with law in order to be
valid. The timely exercise of the right of legal
redemption, said the Court in Basbas v. Entena,9L26255, June 30, 1969, 28 SCRA 669-672. requires either
tender of the price or valid consignation thereof. The
statutory periods within which the right must be
exercised would be rendered meaningless and of easy
evasion unless the redemptioner is required to make an

actual tender in good faith of what he
________________
7 Art. II, Sec. 6, 1973 Constitution; Alfanta v. Noe, L32362, September 19, 1973, 53 SCRA 84.
8 Villanueva v. Court of Appeals, L-37653, June 28, 1974,
57 SCRA 724.
9 L-26255, June 30, 1969, 28 SCRA 669-672.
200
believed to be reasonable price of the land sought to be

redeemed. The existence of the right of redemption
operates to depress the market value of the land until the
period expires, and to render that period indefinite by
permitting the tenant to file a suit for redemption, with
either party unable to foresee when final judgment will
terminate the action, would render nugatory the period of
two years (180 days under the new law) fixed by the
statute for making the redemption and virtually paralyze
any efforts of the landowner to realize the value of his
iand. No buyer can be expected to acquire it without any
certainty as to the amount for which least his investment
in case of redemption. In the meantime, the landowners

needs and obligations cannot be met. It is doutful if any
such result was intended by the statute, absent clear
wording to that effect.10Idem. Bona-fide redemption
necessarily imports a seasonable and valid tender of the
entire repurchase price. The right of a redemptioner to
pay a reasonable price does not excuse him from the
duty to make proper tender of the price that can be
honestly deemed reasonable under the circumstances,
without prejudice to final arbitration by the courts. It is
not difficult to discern why the redemption price should
either be fully offered in legal tender or else validly
consigned in court. Only by such means can the buyer
become certain that the offer to redeem is one made
seriously and in good faith. A buyer cannot be expected
to entertain an offer of redemption without attendant
evidence that the redemptioner can, and is willing to
accomplish the repurchase immediately. A different rule
would leave the buyer open to harassment by speculators
or crackpots, as well as to unnecessary prolongation of
the redemption period, contrary to the policy of the law.
While consignation of the tendered price is not always
necessary because legal redemption is not made to
discharge a pre-existing debt (Asturias Sugar Central v.
Cane Molasses Co., 60 Phil. 253), a valid tender is
indispensable, for the reasons already stated. Of course,
consignation of the price would remove all controversy as
to the redemptioners ability to pay at the proper
time.11Conejero v. Court of Appeals, L-21812, April 29,
1966, 16 SCRA 775.In the case before Us, neither prior
tender nor judicial consignation of the redemption price

accompanied the filing of
________________
10 Idem.
11 Conejero v. Court of Appeals, L-21812, April 29, 1966,
16 SCRA 775.
201
VOL. 78, JULY 29, 1977 201
the redemption suit. In fact, the Agrarian Court had yet to

order, when it rendered its decision on October 10, 1973
(complaint was filed on March 27, 1971; respondenttenant to deposit the amount of P24,000.00 as
redemption price with the Clerk of Court within fifteen
(15) days from receipt of the decision. The absence of
such tender or consignation leaves Us, therefore, with no
alternative but to declare that respondent-tenant had
failed to exercise his right of redemption in accordance
with law.
3. Reliance cannot be placed upon the case of Hidalgo v.
Hidalgo12L-25327-28 May 29, 1970, 33 SCRA 105. as
excuse for the failure to make the requisite tender or
consignation in court, became the Court did not rule
therein that prior tender or judicial consignation of the

redemption price is not required for the valid exercise of
the right of redemption. In that case, the spouses Igmidio
Hidalgo and Martina Rosales were the share tenants of
Policarpio Hidalgo on his 22, 876-sqaure meter
agricultural land in Lumil, San Jose, Batangas, while the
spouses Hilario Aguila and Adela Hidalgo were his tenants
on a 7,688-square meter land. Policarpio Hidalgo sold
these lands without notifying his tenants; and so, the
tenants filed petitions before the Court of Agrarian
Relations seeking the redemption of the lands under
Section 12 of the Code. The Agrarian Court dismissed the
petitioners for the reason that the right of redemption is
available to leasehold tenants only but not to share
tenants. On review, the Court ruled that while the Agralan
Court correctly focused on the sole issue of law-
whether the right of redemption granted 12 of Republic
Act No. 3844 is applicable to share tenantsit (Agrarian
Court) arrived at its erroneous conclusion that the right
of redemption granted by Section 12 of the Land Reform
Code is available to leasehold tenants only but not to
share tenants. The Court said that (t)he Code intended
* * * * to afford the farmers who transitionally continued
to be share tenants after its enactment but who
inexorably would be agricultural lessees by virtue of the
Codes proclaimed abolition of tenancy, the same priority
and preferential right as those other share tenants, who
upon the enactment of the Code or soon thereafter were
earlier converted by fortuitous circumstance into
agricultural lessees, to acquire the lands under their

cultivation in the event of their voluntary
________________
12 L-25327-28 May 29, 1970, 33 SCRA 105.
202
sale by the owner or of their acquisition, by expropriation

or otherwise, by the Land Authority. But, the Court did
not rule that tender of payment or consignation of the
redemption price in court is not a requisite in the valid
exercise of the right of redemption. In fact, it said that
(i)n the absence of any provision in the Code as to the
manner of and amounts payable on redemption, the
pertinent provisions of the Civil Code apply in a
suppletory character which, of course, imposes tender of
payment or judicial consignation of the repurchase price
as condition for valid redemption. Besides, it is
noteworthy that in that case petitioners-tenants
possession of funds and compliance with the
requirements of redemption were not questioned, the
case having been submitted and decided on the sole
legal issue of the right of redemption being available to
them as share tenants.
4. As a consequence, the Court of Agrarian Relations has

jurisdiction over suits for redemption, like the present
case, of sugar and coconut lands. Section 154 of the
Agricultural Land Reform Code, as amended, states: The
Court of Agrarian Relations shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction over (1) all cases or actions
involving matter, controversies, disputes, or money
claims arising from agrarian relations * * * *. Since this
case involves a matter, controversy or dispute arising
from agrarian relationswhether respondent-tenant on
sugar and coconut lands has the right of redemptionit is
definite that the Agrarian Court has jurisdiction to hear
and decide the same.13Lacson v. Pineda, L-28523, July
16, 1971, 40 SCRA 30; Ferrer v. Villamor, L-33293, Sept.
30, 1974, 60 SCRA 106. The Court of Agrarian Relations
came into being for the enforcement of all laws and
regulations governing the relations between capital and
labor on all agricultural lands under any system of
cultivation with original and exclusive jurisdiction over the
entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide and
settle all questions, matters, controversies, or disputes
involving or arising from such relationship.14Salandanan
v. Tizon, L-30290, February 24, 1975, 62 SCRA
388.ACCORDINGLY, the appealed decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby reversed and set aside. Respondent
Eulogio Gonzales is hereby held not to have validly
exercised his right of redemption over his tenanted
agricultural land. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
_______________
13 Lacson v. Pineda, L-28523, July 16, 1971, 40 SCRA 30;
Ferrer v. Villamor, L-33293, Sept. 30, 1974, 60 SCRA 106.
14 Salandanan v. Tizon, L-30290, February 24, 1975, 62
SCRA 388.
203
VOL. 78, JULY 29, 1977 203
Guballa vs. Caguioa
Teehankee (Chairman), Muoz-Palma, Fernandez and

Guerrero, JJ., concur.
Makasiar, J., reserved his vote.
Decision reversed and set aside.
Notes.A tenant can exercise the right of redemption and
pre-emption with his own resources, notwithstanding that
the National Land Reform Council has not yet proclaimed
that all government machineries and agencies in the
region or locality envisioned in the Code are operating
which machineries and agencies, particularly, the Land
Bank were precisely created to finance the acquisition
by the Government of landed estates for division and
resale to small landholders, as well as the purchase of the
landholding by the agricultural lessee from the
landowner. (Spouses Lacson & Basilio vs. Pineda, 40

SCRA 22).
The term agrarian relations embraces every situation
where an individual provides his personal labor over a
parcel of agricultural land belonging to another for the
purpose principally of agricultural production, and where
the former, for his labor input and other sundry
contributions, is compensated either in wages or a share
in the produce, or is obliged to pay lease rentals to the
land owner. (Bicol Federation of Labor vs. Cuyugan, 65
SCRA 195).
Upon admission by a party of voluntary surrender of his
landholding for a consideration in a sworn affidavit, he
can no longer be allowed to spurn them or undo what he
had done. (Dequito vs. Llamas, 66 SCRA 504). [Almeda
vs. Court of Appeals, 78 SCRA 194(1977)]
No. L-47178. May 16, 1980.*SECOND DIVISIONESTRELLA

B. ONDOY, petitioner vs. VIRGILIO IGNACIO, Proprietor
M/B LADY ESTRELLITA and/or IMPERIAL FISHING
ENTERPRISES and/or THE SECRETARY OF LABOR and/or
THE COMPENSATION APPEALS AND REVIEW STAFF,
Department of Labor, respondents.
Labor Law; Workmens Compensation; Controversion;
Effect of failure to timely controvert claim for
compensation.In La Mallorca v. Workmens
Compensation Commission, this Court explicitly held that
the failure to controvert its fatal to any defense that
petitioner could interpose. So we have held in a host of

decisions in compliance with the clear and express
language of the Workmens Compensation Act. Any
assertion to the contrary is doomed to futility. The
opinion noted thirty decisions starting from Backrach
Motor Co. v. Workmens Compensation Commission to
Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc. v. Workmens
Compensation Commission. Thereafter, in Regal Auto
Works, Inc. v. Workmens Compensation Commission,
such a doctrine was reaffirmed. It was further noted that
nine more decisions had been rendered by this Court
starting from Republic v. Workmens Compensation
Commission to Abong v. Workmens Compensation
Commission.
Same; Same; Drowning; Claim for compensation due to
drowning of the deceased while in the actual performance
of his duty is compensable; Reasons.The deceased in
this case met his death because of drowning. In Camotes
Shipping Corporation v. Otadoy, there was not even any
direct testimony that the deceased was drowned while in
the performance of his duty. All that could be alleged was
that he was lost at sea while in the employ of petitioner.
Nonetheless, the award for compensation was sustained.
Likewise, the ruling in Caltex (Phil.) Inc. v. Villanueva was
cited with approval Thus: The fact that the employee
was found missing while on board the petitioners vessel
MV Caltex Mindanao became known to the captain of
the vessel on 10 October 1956 but it was only on 6
November 1956 when the petitioner transmitted to the

respondent Commission WCC Form
___________
* SECOND DIVISION
612
Ondoy vs. Ignacio
No. 3 stating that the employee was lost at sea and

presumed dead as of October 10, 1956, and that it was
controverting the respondents claim. In the present
case, there is evidence of the fact of death due to
drowning. That was not controverted. Under the
circumstances, the failure to grant the claim finds no
justification in law. It bears repeating that there is
evidence, direct and categorical, to the effect that the
deceased was drowned while in the actual performance
of his work with the shipping enterprise of private
respondent.
Same; Same; Presumption of compensability, death of
victim having arisen in the course of employment;
Leaving of vessel by the deceased for a drinking spree is
not a valid defense against the presumption of
compensability.Even without such evidence, the
petitioner could have relied on the presumption of
compensability under the Act once it is shown that the
death or disability arose in the course of employment,

with the burden of overthrowing it being cast on the
person or entity resisting the claim. Time and time again
this Court has stressed such statutory provision. It
suffices to mention cases decided from January to April of
this year. An appraisal of the counter-affidavits submitted
by two employees of private respondent and thereafter
beholden to him to the effect that the deceased left the
vessel for a drinking spree certainly cannot meet the
standard required to negate the force of the presumption
of compensability.
Same; Same; Findings of facts; Findings of facts of
administrative agencies accorded weight.Nor is an
affirmance of the finding of the referee adverse to the
claim warranted because of the doctrine that the findings
of facts of an administrative agency must be accorded
due weight and consideration. An excerpt from the recent
case of Uy v. Workmens Compensation Commission finds
pertinence: The claim merits scant consideration for this
Court is authorized to inquire into the facts when the
conclusions are not supported by substantial or credible
evidence.
Same; Same; Workmens Compensation Act;
Constitutional Law; Constitutional provisions on social
justice and protection to labor; Doubts in the
interpretation of the Workmens Compensation Act are
resolved in favor of the claimant under the constitutional
scheme of social justice and protection to labor.This
Court, in recognizing the right of petitioner to the award,

merely adheres to
613
VOL. 97, MAY 16, 1980 613
Ondoy vs. Ignacio
the interpretation uninterruptedly followed by this Court

resolving all doubts in favor of the claimants. So it has
been since the first leading case of Francisco v. Conching,
decided a year after the 1935 Constitution took effect.
What was said in Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Workmens
Compensation Commission is not amiss: There is need, it
seems, even at this late date, for [private respondent]
and other employers to be reminded of the high estate
accorded the Workmens Compensation Act in the
constitutional scheme of social justice and protection to
labor. Further: No other judicial attitude may be
expected in the face of a clearly expressed legislative
determination which antedated the constitutionally
avowed concern for social justice and protection to labor.
It is easily understandable why the judiciary frowns on
resort to doctrines, which even if deceptively plausible,
would result in frustrating such a national policy. Lastly,
to quote from the opinion therein rendered: To be more
specific, the principle of social justice is in this sphere
strengthened and vitalized.
PETITION for review of the judgment of the Ministry of

Labor.
Felizardo R. Moreno for petitioner.
Feliciano Tumale for private respondents.
E. V. Espaol for public respondent.
FERNANDO, C.J.:
The undisputed facts argue strongly for the granting of
the claim for compensation filed by petitioner, the mother
of one Jose Ondoy, who was drowned while in the employ
of private respondent, Virgilio Ignacio. Whatever be the
cause for the failure to do so, it is admitted that there
was no controversion. Such omission, fatal in character,
was sought to be minimized by the filing of a motion to
dismiss based on the alleged absence of an employment
relationship. What cannot be ignored, however, is that
subsequently, in the hearing of such claim, private
respondent submitted affidavits executed by the chief
engineer and oiler of the fishing vessel that the
614
Ondoy vs. Ignacio
deceased, a fisherman, was in that ship, undeniably a

member of the working force, but after being invited by
friends to a drinking spree, left the vessel, and thereafter
was found dead. The referee summarily ignored the
affidavit of the chief-mate of respondent employer to the
effect that sometime in October, 1968, while Jose
Ondoy, my co-worker, was in the actual performance of
his work with said fishing enterprises, he was drowned
and died on October 22, 1968. That the deceased died in
line of Duty.1Annex C-1. The hearing officer or referee
dismissed the claim for lack of merit.2Petition, par. 8. A
motion for reconsideration was duly filed, but in an order
dated August 29, 1977, the then Secretary of Labor, now
Minister Bias F. Ople, denied such motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit.3Ibid, par. 11. Hence this
petition for review.
1. In La Mallorca v. Workmens Compensation
Commission,4L-29315, November 28, 1969, 30 SCRA 613.
this Court explicitly held that the failure to controvert is
fatal to any defense that petitioner could interpose. So we
have held in a host of decisions in compliance with the
clear and express language of the Workmens
Compensation Act. Any Assertion to the contrary is
doomed to futility.5Ibid, 619-620. The opinion noted
thirty decisions starting from Bachrach Motor Co. v.
Workmens Compensation Commission699 Phil. 238
(1956). to Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc. v. Workmens
Compensation Commission.7L-25274, July 29, 1969, 28
SCRA 877. Thereafter, in Regal Auto Works, Inc. v.
Workmens Compensation Commission,8L-29455,

September 30, 1975, 67 SCRA 207. such a doctrine was
reaffirmed. It was further noted that nine more decisions
had been rendered by this Court starting from Republic v.
Workmens Compensation Commission9L-26763,
December 26, 1969, 30 SCRA 811. to Abong v.
Workmens Compensation Commission.10L-32347,
December 26, 1973, 54 SCRA 379. By the time
respondent Secretary of
_____________
1 Annex C-1.
2 Petition, par. 8.
3 Ibid, par. 11.
4 L-29315, November 28, 1969, 30 SCRA 613.
5 Ibid, 619-620.
6 99 Phil. 238 (1956).
7 L-25274, July 29, 1969, 28 SCRA 877.
8 L-29455, September 30, 1975, 67 SCRA 207.
9 L-26763, December 26, 1969, 30 SCRA 811.
10 L-32347, December 26, 1973, 54 SCRA 379.
615
VOL. 97, MAY 16, 1980 615
Ondoy vs. Ignacio
Labor denied the motion for reconsideration, a host of

decisions that speaks to the same effect had been
promulgated.11Cf. Security Services v. Workmens
Compensation Commission, L-40739, Jan. 30, 1976, 69
SCRA 269; Dinaro v. Workmens Compensation
Commission, L-42457, March 31, 1976, 70 SCRA 292;
Talip v. Workmens Compensation Commission L-42574,
May 31... It clearly, appears, therefore, that the failure of
the referee to grant the award ought to have been
remedied and the motion for reconsideration granted.
2. The deceased in this case met his death because of
drowning. In Camotes Shipping Corporation v.
Otadoy,12L-27699, October 24, 1970, 35 SCRA 456. there
was not even any direct testimony that the deceased was
drowned while in the performance of his duty. All that
could be alleged was that he was lost at sea while in the
employ of petitioner.13Ibid, 456. Nonetheless, the award
for compensation was sus_______________
11 Cf. Security Services v. Workmens Compensation
Commission, L-40739, Jan. 30, 1976, 69 SCRA 269; Dinaro
v. Workmens Compensation Commission, L-42457, March
31, 1976, 70 SCRA 292; Talip v. Workmens Compensation
Commission L-42574, May 31, 1976, 71 SCRA 218;
Reynaldo v. Republic, L-43108, June 30, 1976, 71 SCRA
650; Laude v. Moderna, L-43009, Aug. 31, 1976, 72 SCRA
569; Vda. de Lauron, v. Workmens Compensation

Commission, L-43344; Sept. 29, 1976, 73 SCRA 84; Pros v.
Workmens Compensation Commission, L-43348, Sept.
29, 1976, 73 SCRA 92; Camarillo v. Workmens
Compensation Commission, L-42831, Oct. 21, 1976, 73
SCRA 497; Vallo v. Workmens Compensation
Commission, L-41816, Oct. 29, 1976, 73 SCRA 623;
Dometita v. Workmens Compensation Commission, L43612, Nov. 29, 1976, 74 SCRA 217; Arzadon v.
Workmens Compensation Commission, L-42404, Dec. 8,
1976, 74 SCRA 238; Delgado Brothers v. Workmens
Compensation Commission, L-42753, Feb. 28, 1977, 75
SCRA 343; Deope v. Workmens Compensation
Commission, L-42828, Feb. 28, 1977, 75 SCRA 350; Bihag
v. Workmens Compensation Commission, L-43162, Feb.
28, 1977, 75 SCRA 357; Gomez v. Workmens
Compensation Commission, L-43617, Feb. 28, 1977, 75
SCRA 395; Baterna v. Workmens Compensation
Commission, L-43932, Feb. 28, 1977, 75 SCRA 409;
Buenaventura v. Workmens Compensation Commission,
L-42835, April 22, 1977, 76 SCRA 485, Romero v.
Workmens Compensation Commission, L-42617, June 30,
1977, 77 SCRA 482; Evangelista v. Workmens
Compensation Commission, L-43572, June 30, 1977, 77
SCRA 497.
12 L-27699, October 24, 1970, 35 SCRA 456.
13 Ibid, 456.
616
Ondoy vs. Ignacio
tained. Likewise, the ruling in Caltex (Phil.) Inc. v.

Villanueva14112 Phil. 897 (1961). was cited with
approval. Thus: The fact that the employee was found
missing while on board the petitioners vessel MV Caltex
Mindanao became known to the captain of the vessel on
10 October 1956 but it was only on 6 November 1956
when the petitioner transmitted to the respondent
Compensation WCC Form No. 3 stating that the employee
was Lost at sea and presumed dead as of October 10,
1956, and that it was controverting the respondents
claim.15Ibid, 905-906. In the present case, there is
evidence of the fact of death due to drowning. That was
not controverted. Under the circumstances, the failure to
grant the claim finds no justification in law.
3. It bears repeating that there is evidence, direct and
categorical to the effect that the deceased was drowned
while in the actual performance of his work with the
shipping enterprise of private respondent. Even without
such evidence, the petitioner could have relied on the
presumption of compensability under the Act once it is
shown that the death or disability arose in the course of
employment, with the burden of overthrowing it being
cast on the person or entity resisting the claim. Time and
time again this Court has stressed such statutory
provision. It suffices to mention cases decided from

January to April of this year.16Cf. Guzman v. Workmens
Compensation Commission, G. R. No. L-38911, Jan. 28,
1980; Pajarillo v. Workmens Compensation Commission,
L-42927, Jan. 28, 1980; Villones v. Employees
Compensation Commission, L-44301, Feb. 14, 1980;
Cabriera v. Workme... An appraisal of the counter____________
14 112 Phil. 897 (1961).
15 Ibid, 905-906.
16 Cf. Guzman v. Workmens Compensation Commission,
G. R. No. L-38911, Jan. 28, 1980; Pajarillo v. Workmens
Compensation Commission, L-42927, Jan. 28, 1980;
Villones v. Employees Compensation Commission, L44301, Feb. 14, 1980; Cabriera v. Workmens
Compensation Commission, L-43363, Feb. 21, 1980; Del
Rosario v. Workmens Compensation Commission, L44114, Feb. 21, 1980; Macatol v. Workmens
Compensation Commission, L-43127, Feb. 28, 1980;
Barga v. Employees Compensation Commission, G. R. No.
L-49227, April 25, 1980; Reyes v. Workmens
Compensation Commission, G.R. No. L-46579, April 28,
1980; Guillen v. Workmens Compensation Commission,
G. R. No. L-46692, April 28, 1980; Cenabre v. Employees
Compensation Commission, G.R. No. L-46802, April 28,
1980; Avendao v. Employees Compensation
Commission, G.R. No. L-48593, April 30, 1980.
617
VOL. 97, MAY 16, 1980 617
Ondoy vs. Ignacio
affidavits submitted by two employees of private

respondent and thereafter beholden to him to the effect
that the deceased left the vessel for a drinking spree
certainly cannot meet the standard required to negate
the force of the presumption of compensability.
4. Nor is an affirmance of the finding of the referee
adverse to the claim warranted because of the doctrine
that the findings of facts of an administrative agency
must be accorded due weight and consideration. An
excerpt from the recent case of Uy v. Workmens
Compensation Commission17L-43389, April 28, 1980.
finds pertinence: The claim merits scant consideration
for this Court is authorized to inquire into the facts when
the conclusions are not supported by substantial or
credible evidence.18Ibid, 15. The opinion of Justice
Makasiar cited the following cases: International Factory
v. Vda. de Doria and WCC, 109 Phil. 553 (1960); Abong v.
WCC, L-32347-53, Dec. 28, 1973, 54 SCRA 379;
Mulingtapang v. WCC & Marcelo Steel Corporation, L42483, ...5. This Court, in recognizing the right of
petitioner to the award, merely adheres to the
interpretation uninterruptedly followed by this Court
resolving all doubts in favor of the claimant. So it has
been since the first leading case of Francisco v.
Conching,1963 Phil. 354. decided a year after the 1935

Constitution took effect. What was said in Victorias Milling
Co., Inc. v. Workmens Compensation Commission20L25665, May 22, 1969, 28 SCRA 285. is not amiss: There
is need, it seems, even at this late date, for [private
respondent] and other employers to be reminded of the
high estate accorded the Workmens Compensation Act in
the constitutional scheme of social justice and protection
to labor.21Ibid, 296. Further: No other judicial attitude
may be expected in the face of a clearly expressed
legislative determination which antedated the
constitutionally avowed concern for social justice and
protection to labor. It is easily understandable why the
judiciary
____________
17 L-43389, April 28, 1980.
18 Ibid, 15. The opinion of Justice Makasiar cited the
following cases: International Factory v. Vda. de Doria and
WCC, 109 Phil. 553 (1960); Abong v. WCC, L-32347-53,
Dec. 28, 1973, 54 SCRA 379; Mulingtapang v. WCC &
Marcelo Steel Corporation, L-42483, Dec. 21, 1977, 80
SCRA 610; Yutuc v. Republic of the Philippines, L-43270,
Dec. 29, 1978, 87 SCRA 436.
19 63 Phil. 354.
20 L-25665, May 22, 1969, 28 SCRA 285.
21 Ibid, 296.
618
Ondoy vs. Ignacio
frowns on resort to doctrines, which even if deceptively

plausible, would result in frustrating such a national
policy.22Ibid, 297-298. Lastly, to quote from the opinion
therein rendered: To be more specific, the principle of
social justice is in this sphere strengthened and vitalized.
A realistic view is that expressed in Agustin v. Workmens
Compensation Commission: As between a laborer,
usually poor and unlettered, and the employer, who has
resources to secure able legal advice, the law has reason
to demand from the latter stricter compliance. Social
justice in these cases is not equality but protection.
23Ibid, 298. Agustin v. Workmens Compensation
Commission is reported in 120 Phil. 846 (1964). The
ponente is Justice J.B.L. Reyes. It must be stressed that
the present Constitution has expanded and made more
specific the principles of social justice a...WHEREFORE,
the petition for review is granted and petitioner Estrella B.
Ondoy is awarded the sum of P6,000.00 as compensation
for the death of her son, Jose Ondoy; P300.00 for burial
expenses; and P600.00 as attorneys fees. This decision is
immediately executory. Costs against private respondent
Virgilio Ignacio.
Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion Jr., Abad Santos and De
Castro, JJ., concur.
Barredo, J., is on official leave.

Petition granted.
Notes.The rule that only final orders and judgments of
the Workmens Compensation Commission are reviewable
by the Supreme Court may be relaxed where to do so
would be consistent with substantial justice. (Castro vs.
Workmens Compensation Commission, 75 SCRA 173).
An evaluation report not presented during the trial should
not prevail over substantial evidence established during
the hearing of the case. (Monsale vs. Republic, 80 SCRA
448).
______________
22 Ibid, 297-298.
23 Ibid, 298. Agustin v. Workmens Compensation
Commission is reported in 120 Phil. 846 (1964). The
ponente is Justice J.B.L. Reyes. It must be stressed that
the present Constitution has expanded and made more
specific the principles of social justice and protection to
labor.
619
VOL. 97, MAY 16, 1980 619
De Guzman vs. Escalona
The Bureau of Public School is considered the employer

that must controvert the claim for workmens
compensation. (Evangelista vs. Workmens Compensation

Commission, 77 SCRA 497).
Acting on an employees sick leave application is
tantamount to notice to employer of employees sickness.
(Gallemit vs. Republic, 75 SCRA 382).
See annotations on Workmens Compensation Law, 32
SCRA 560; Significant Factors in the Adjudication of
Workmens Compensation Cases, 48 SCRA 206;
Workmens Compensation Cases and the Requirements of
Due Process, 51 SCRA 401; Employers Failure to
Controvert Claim, 20 SCRA 195; Attorneys Fees in
Workmens Compensation Cases, 10 SCRA 701; Death
Claim Prescriptive Period and Employers Right to
Controvert, 75 SCRA 415; Vital Issues to be Resolved as
to the Compensability or Non-compensability of claims,
76 SCRA 163; The Presumption of Compensability, 76
SCRA 498; Physical Disability of Claimant Must be
Service-Connected, 47 SCRA 509; and Wrong Workmens
Compensation Commission Decisions Inflict Suffering, 81
SCRA 688. [Ondoy vs. Ignacio, 97 SCRA 611(1980)]

Tondo Medical Center Employees Association vs. Court of
Appeals
G.R. No. 167324. July 17, 2007.*EN BANC.TONDO

MEDICAL CENTER EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, RESEARCH
INSTITUTE FOR TROPICAL MEDICINE EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION, NATIONAL ORTHOPEDIC WORKERS UNION,
DR. JOSE R. REYES MEMORIAL HOSPITAL EMPLOYEES
UNION, SAN LAZARO HOSPITAL EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION,
ALLIANCE OF HEALTH WORKERS, INC., HEALTH ALLIANCE
FOR DEMOCRACY, COUNCIL FOR HEALTH DEVELOPMENT,
NETWORK OPPOSED TO PRIVATIZATION, COMMUNITY
MEDICINE DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION INC., PHILIPPINE
SOCIETY OF SANITARY ENGINEERS INC., KILUSANG MAYO
UNO, GABRIELA, KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS,
KALIPUNAN NG DAMAYAN NG MGA MARALITA, ELSA O.
GUEVARRA, ARCADIO B. GONZALES, JOSE G. GALANG,
DOMINGO P. MANAY, TITO P. ESTEVES, EDUARDO P.
GALOPE, REMEDIOS M. YSMAEL, ALFREDO BACUATA,
EDGARDO J. DAMICOG, REMEDIOS M. MALTU AND
REMEGIO S. MERCADO, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF
APPEALS, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO G. ROMULO,
SECRETARY OF HEALTH MANUEL M. DAYRIT, SECRETARY
OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT EMILIA T. BONCODIN,
respondents.
_______________
* EN BANC.
747
VOL. 527, JULY 17, 2007 747
Appeals
Constitutional Law; While as a general rule, the provisions

of the Constitution are considered self-executing, and do
not require future legislation for their enforcement, some
provisions have already been categorically declared by
the Supreme Court as non selfexecuting.As a general
rule, the provisions of the Constitution are considered
self-executing, and do not require future legislation for
their enforcement. For if they are not treated as selfexecuting, the mandate of the fundamental law can be
easily nullified by the inaction of Congress. However,
some provisions have already been categorically declared
by this Court as non self-executing. In Taada v. Angara,
272 SCRA 18 (1997), the Court specifically set apart the
sections found under Article II of the 1987 Constitution as
non selfexecuting and ruled that such broad principles
need legislative enactments before they can be
implemented: By its very title, Article II of the
Constitution is a declaration of principles and state
policies. x x x. These principles in Article II are not
intended to be selfexecuting principles ready for

enforcement through the courts. They are used by the
judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power
of judicial review, and by the legislature in its enactment
of laws. In Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation, 197 SCRA 52 (1991), this Court declared that
Sections 11, 12, and 13 of Article II; Section 13 of Article
XIII; and Section 2 of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution
are not self-executing provisions. In Tolentino v. Secretary
of Finance, 235 SCRA 630 (1994), the Court referred to
Section 1 of Article XIII and Section 2 of Article XIV of the
Constitution as moral incentives to legislation, not as
judicially enforceable rights. These provisions, which
merely lay down a general principle, are distinguished
from other constitutional provisions as non selfexecuting
and, therefore, cannot give rise to a cause of action in the
courts; they do not embody judicially enforceable
constitutional rights.
Same; Constitutional provisions which are statements of
principles and policies are mere directives addressed to
the executive and the legislative departmentsif
unheeded, the remedy will not lie with the courts but
rather, the electorates displeasure may be manifested in
their votes.In the remaining provisions, Sections 11 and
14 of Article XIII and Sections 1 and 3 of Article XV, the
State accords recognition to the protection of working
women and the provision for safe and healthful working
conditions; to the adoption of an integrated and
comprehensive approach to health; to the Filipino family;
and to the right of children to assistance and special

protection,
748
Appeals
including proper care and nutrition. Like the provisions

that were declared as non self-executory in the cases of
Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation,
197 SCRA 52 (1991), and Tolentino v. Secretary of
Finance, 235 SCRA 630 (1994), they are mere statements
of principles and policies. As such, they are mere
directives addressed to the executive and the legislative
departments. If unheeded, the remedy will not lie with
the courts; but rather, the electorates displeasure may
be manifested in their votes. The rationale for this is
given by Justice Dante Tinga in his Separate Opinion in
the case of Agabon v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 442 SCRA 573 (2004): x x x However, to
declare that the constitutional provisions are enough to
guarantee the full exercise of the rights embodied
therein, and the realization of the ideals therein
expressed, would be impractical, if not unrealistic. The
espousal of such view presents the dangerous tendency
of being overbroad and exaggerated. x x x Subsequent
legislation is still needed to define the parameters of
these guaranteed rights. x x x Without specific and
pertinent legislation, judicial bodies will be at a loss,

formulating their own conclusion to approximate at least
the aims of the Constitution. The HSRA cannot be nullified
based solely on petitioners bare allegations that it
violates the general principles expressed in the non selfexecuting provisions they cite herein. There are two
reasons for denying a cause of action to an alleged
infringement of broad constitutional principles: basic
considerations of due process and the limitations of
judicial power.
Presidency; Power of Control; Reorganizations; Health
Sector Reform Agenda (HSRA); The President may, by
executive or administrative order, direct the
reorganization of government entities under the
Executive Department.This Court has already ruled in a
number of cases that the President may, by executive or
administrative order, direct the reorganization of
government entities under the Executive Department.
This is also sanctioned under the Constitution, as well as
other statutes. Section 17, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution, clearly states: [T]he president shall have
control of all executive departments, bureaus and
offices. Section 31, Book III, Chapter 10 of Executive
Order No. 292, also known as the Administrative Code of
1987 reads: SEC. 31. Continuing Authority of the
President to Reorganize his Office.The President,
subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order
to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have
continuing authority to reorgan-
749
VOL. 527, JULY 17, 2007 749
Appeals
ize the administrative structure of the Office of the

President. For this purpose, he may take any of the
following actions: (1) Restructure the internal
organization of the Office of the President Proper,
including the immediate offices, the Presidential Special
Assistants/Advisers System and the Common Staff
Support System, by abolishing consolidating or merging
units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to
another; (2) Transfer any function under the Office of the
President to any other Department or Agency as well as
transfer functions to the Office of the President from other
Departments or Agencies; and (3) Transfer any agency
under the Office of the President to any other department
or agency as well as transfer agencies to the Office of the
President from other Departments or agencies.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The law grants the President
the power to reorganize the Office of the President in
recognition of the recurring need of every President to
reorganize his or her office to achieve simplicity,
economy and efficiency.In Domingo v. Zamora, 397
SCRA 56 (2003), this Court explained the rationale behind
the Presidents continuing authority under the
Administrative Code to reorganize the administrative
structure of the Office of the President. The law grants the

President the power to reorganize the Office of the
President in recognition of the recurring need of every
President to reorganize his or her office to achieve
simplicity, economy and efficiency. To remain effective
and efficient, it must be capable of being shaped and
reshaped by the President in the manner the Chief
Executive deems fit to carry out presidential directives
and policies.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Department of Health (DOH);
Indubitably, the Department of Health (DOH) is an agency
which is under the supervision and control of the
President and, thus, part of the Office of the President.
The Administrative Code provides that the Office of the
President consists of the Office of the President Proper
and the agencies under it. The agencies under the Office
of the President are identified in Section 23, Chapter 8,
Title II of the Administrative Code: Sec. 23. The Agencies
under the Office of the President.The agencies under
the Office of the President refer to those offices placed
under the chairmanship of the President, those under the
supervision and control of the President, those under the
administrative supervision of the Office of the President,
750
Appeals
those attached to it for policy and program coordination,

and those that are not placed by law or order creating
them under any specific department. (Emphasis
provided.) Section 2(4) of the Introductory Provisions of
the Administrative Code defines the term agency of the
government as follows: Agency of the Government refers
to any of the various units of the Government, including a
department, bureau, office, instrumentality, or
government-owned or controlled corporation, or a local
government or a distinct unit therein. Furthermore, the
DOH is among the cabinet-level departments enumerated
under Book IV of the Administrative Code, mainly tasked
with the functional distribution of the work of the
President. Indubitably, the DOH is an agency which is
under the supervision and control of the President and,
thus, part of the Office of the President. Consequently,
Section 31, Book III, Chapter 10 of the Administrative
Code, granting the President the continued authority to
reorganize the Office of the President, extends to the
DOH.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Separation of Powers;
Executive Order No. 102 which effected the
reorganization of the Department of Health (DOH) is well
within the constitutional power of the President to issue
it is an exercise of the Presidents constitutional power of
control over the executive department, supported by the
provisions of the Administrative Code, recognized by
other statutes, and consistently affirmed by this Court.
Clearly, Executive Order No. 102 is well within the
constitutional power of the President to issue. The

President did not usurp any legislative prerogative in
issuing Executive Order No. 102. It is an exercise of the
Presidents constitutional power of control over the
executive department, supported by the provisions of the
Administrative Code, recognized by other statutes, and
consistently affirmed by this Court.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Doctrine of Qualified
Political Agency; The acts of the Department of Health
(DOH) Secretary, as an alter ego of the President, are
presumed to be the acts of the Presidentthe acts of the
members of the Cabinet, performed and promulgated in
the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved
by the President, presumptively acts of the President.
Petitioners also maintain that the Office of the President
should have issued an administrative order to carry out
the streamlining, but that it failed to do so. Such objection
cannot be given any weight considering that the acts of
the DOH Secretary, as an alter ego of the President, are
751
VOL. 527, JULY 17, 2007 751
Appeals
presumed to be the acts of the President. The members

of the Cabinet are subject at all times to the disposition of
the President since they are merely his alter egos. Thus,
their acts, performed and promulgated in the regular

course of business, are, unless disapproved by the
President, presumptively acts of the President.
Significantly, the acts of the DOH Secretary were clearly
authorized by the President, who, thru the PCEG, issued
the aforementioned Memorandum Circular No. 62,
sanctioning the implementation of the RSP.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Public Officers;
Reorganizations of government units or departments are
valid, for so long as they are pursued in good faiththat
is, for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy
more efficient; While the Supreme Court recognizes the
inconvenience suffered by public servants in their
deployment to distant areas, the executive departments
finding of a need to make health services available to
these areas and to make delivery of health services more
efficient and more compelling is far from being
unreasonable or arbitrary, a determination which is well
within its authority.In several cases, this Court regarded
reorganizations of government units or departments as
valid, for so long as they are pursued in good faiththat
is, for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy
more efficient. On the other hand, if the reorganization is
done for the purpose of defeating security of tenure or for
illmotivated political purposes, any abolition of position
would be invalid. None of these circumstances are
applicable since none of the petitioners were removed
from public service, nor did they identify any action taken
by the DOH that would unquestionably result in their
dismissal. The reorganization that was pursued in the

present case was made in good faith. The RSP was clearly
designed to improve the efficiency of the department and
to implement the provisions of the Local Government
Code on the devolution of health services to local
governments. While this Court recognizes the
inconvenience suffered by public servants in their
deployment to distant areas, the executive departments
finding of a need to make health services available to
these areas and to make delivery of health services more
efficient and more compelling is far from being
unreasonable or arbitrary, a determination which is well
within its authority. In all, this Court finds petitioners
contentions to be insufficient to invalidate Executive
Order No. 102.
752
Appeals
Judicial Review; Settled is the rule that courts are not at

liberty to declare statutes invalid, although they may be
abused or misabused, and may afford an opportunity for
abuse in the manner of applicationthe validity of a
statute or ordinance is to be determined from its general
purpose and its efficiency to accomplish the end desired,
not from its effects in a particular case.Even granting
that these alleged errors were adequately proven by the
petitioners, they would still not invalidate Executive Order

No. 102. Any serious legal errors in laying down the
compensation of the DOH employees concerned can only
invalidate the pertinent provisions of Department Circular
No. 312, Series of 2000. Likewise, any questionable
appointments or transfers are properly addressed by an
appeal process provided under Administrative Order No.
94, series of 2000; and if the appeal is meritorious, such
appointment or transfer may be invalidated. The validity
of Executive Order No. 102 would, nevertheless, remain
unaffected. Settled is the rule that courts are not at
liberty to declare statutes invalid, although they may be
abused or misabused, and may afford an opportunity for
abuse in the manner of application. The validity of a
statute or ordinance is to be determined from its general
purpose and its efficiency to accomplish the end desired,
not from its effects in a particular case.
Same; Locus Standi; Present substantial interest, which
will enable a party to question the validity of the law,
requires that a party sustained or will sustain direct injury
as a result of its enforcementit is distinguished from a
mere expectancy or future, contingent, subordinate, or
inconsequential interest.In a number of cases, the Court
upheld the standing of citizens who filed suits, wherein
the transcendental importance of the constitutional
question justified the granting of relief. In spite of these
rulings, the Court, in Domingo v. Carague, 456 SCRA 450
(2005), dismissed the petition when petitioners therein
failed to show any present substantial interest. It
demonstrated how even in the cases in which the Court

declared that the matter of the case was of
transcendental importance, the petitioners must be able
to assert substantial interest. Present substantial interest,
which will enable a party to question the validity of the
law, requires that a party sustained or will sustain direct
injury as a result of its enforcement. It is distinguished
from a mere expectancy or future, contingent,
subordinate, or inconsequential interest.
753
VOL. 527, JULY 17, 2007 753
Appeals
Same; Same; The rule on constitutional questions which

are of transcendental importance cannot be invoked
where a partys substantive claim is without merita
partys standing is determined by the substantive merit
of his case or a preliminary estimate thereof.In the
same way, the Court, in Telecommunications & Broadcast
Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. v. Comelec, 289 SCRA
337 (1998), ruled that a citizen is allowed to raise a
constitutional question only when he can show that he
has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury
as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
government; the injury is fairly traceable to the
challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed
by a favorable action. This case likewise stressed that the
rule on constitutional questions which are of

transcendental importance cannot be invoked where a
partys substantive claim is without merit. Thus, a partys
standing is determined by the substantive merit of his
case or a preliminary estimate thereof. After a careful
scrutiny of the petitioners substantive claims, this Court
finds that the petitioners miserably failed to show any
merit to their claims.
Court of Appeals.
E.B. Francisco, Jr. Law Office for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision,1Penned by
Associate Justice Celia C. Librea-Leagogo with Associate
Justices Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and Lucas P. Bersamin,
concurring; Rollo, pp. 214-254. promulgated by the Court
of Appeals on 26 November 2004, denying a petition for
the nullification of the Health Sector Reform Agenda
(HSRA) Philippines 1999-2004 of the Department of
Health (DOH); and Executive Order No. 102, Redirecting
the Functions and Operations of the Department of
Health, which
_______________
1 Penned by Associate Justice Celia C. Librea-Leagogo

with Associate Justices Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and Lucas P.
Bersamin, concurring; Rollo, pp. 214-254.
754
Appeals
was issued by then President Joseph Ejercito Estrada on

24 May 1999.
Prior hereto, petitioners originally filed a Petition for
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus under Rule 65 of
the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure before the
Supreme Court on 15 August 2001. However, the
Supreme Court, in a Resolution dated 29 August 2001,
referred the petition to the Court of Appeals for
appropriate action.
HEALTH SECTOR REFORM AGENDA (HSRA)
In 1999, the DOH launched the HSRA, a reform agenda
developed by the HSRA Technical Working Group after a
series of workshops and analyses with inputs from
several consultants, program managers and technical
staff possessing the adequate expertise and experience
in the health sector. It provided for five general areas of
reform: (1) to provide fiscal autonomy to government
hospitals; (2) secure funding for priority public health

programs; (3) promote the development of local health
systems and ensure its effective performance; (4)
strengthen the capacities of health regulatory agencies;
and (5) expand the coverage of the National Health
Insurance Program (NHIP).2Id., at pp. 294-296.Petitioners
questioned the first reform agenda involving the fiscal
autonomy of government hospitals, particularly the
collection of socialized user fees and the corporate
restructuring of government hospitals. The said provision
under the HSRA reads:
Provide fiscal autonomy to government hospitals.
Government hospitals must be allowed to collect
socialized user fees so they can reduce the dependence
on direct subsidies from the government. Their critical
capacities like diagnostic equipment, laboratory facilities
and medical staff capability must be upgraded to
effectively exercise fiscal autonomy. Such investment
must be cognizant of complimentary capacity provided by
public-private networks. More_______________
2 Id., at pp. 294-296.
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over such capacities will allow government hospitals to

supplement priority public health programs. Appropriate
institutional arrangement must be introduced such as
allowing them autonomy towards converting them into
government corporations without compromising their
social responsibilities. As a result, government hospitals
are expected to be more competitive and responsive to
health needs.
Petitioners also assailed the issuance of a draft
administrative order issued by the DOH, dated 5 January
2001, entitled Guidelines and Procedure in the
Implementation of the Corporate Restructuring of
Selected DOH Hospitals to Achieve Fiscal Autonomy, and
Managerial Flexibility to Start by January 2001;3The
rationale for this draft administrative order reads: In line
with the goal of the Health Sector Reform Agenda (HSRA)
of providing equitable quality health services, the hospital
reforms were initiated to complement the other HSRA
components. The object... and Administrative Order No.
172 of the DOH, entitled Policies and Guidelines on the
Private Practice of Medical and Paramedical Professionals
in Government Health Facilities,4The rationale for this
administrative order reads:The Department of Health
encourages the employment of physicians and
paramedical personnel who are experts in their field of
practice in various government hospitals and other
government health facilities. ... dated 9 January 2001, for
imposing an
_______________
3 The rationale for this draft administrative order reads:
In line with the goal of the Health Sector Reform Agenda
(HSRA) of providing equitable quality health services, the
hospital reforms were initiated to complement the other
HSRA components. The objectives of the Hospital Reform
component include among others, the following to
promote efficiency in hospital operations and
management; to enhance the capabilities through
facilities and human resource upgrading; and to attain
fiscal autonomy and managerial flexibility while maintain
the governments social responsibility for the indigent
patients.
With this framework, the corporate restructuring of DOH
Hospitals into government owned and controlled
corporations (GOCC) was identified as the most effective
means to attain the above objectives.
4 The rationale for this administrative order reads:
The Department of Health encourages the employment of
physicians and paramedical personnel who are experts in
their field of practice in various government hospitals and
other government health facilities. It is envisioned to
attract the best and the brightest professionals for
medical and paramedical positions, in order to 1) provide
adequate quality
756

Appeals
added burden to indigent Filipinos, who cannot afford to

pay for medicine and medical services.5Rollo, pp. 9698.Petitioners alleged that the implementation of the
aforementioned reforms had resulted in making free
medicine and free medical services inaccessible to
economically disadvantaged Filipinos. Thus, they alleged
that the HSRA is void for being in violation of the
following constitutional provisions:6Id., at pp. 98-102.ART.
III, SEC. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law, nor shall any person
be denied the equal protection of the law.
ART. II, SEC. 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the
protection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion
of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment of
all the people of the blessings of democracy.
ART. II, SEC. 9. The State shall promote a just and
dynamic social order that will ensure the prosperity and
independence of the nation and free the people from
poverty through policies that provide adequate social
services, promote full employment, a rising standard of
living and an improved quality of life for all.
ART. II, SEC. 10. The State shall promote social justice in
all phases of national development.
ART. II, SEC. 11. The State values the dignity of every
human person and guarantees full respect for human
rights.
_______________
medical care to patients especially the indigent; 2) teach,
train and interact with the other medical and paramedical
professionals and; 3) Conduct relevant studies and
research thereby enhancing the quality of medical and
health care delivery systems.
As an incentive and in recognition for their commitment
to remain as Members of the hospital staff for a longer
period for continuous improvement of the health care
delivery service of the facility, private practice is allowed.
5 Rollo, pp. 96-98.
6 Id., at pp. 98-102.
757
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ART. II, SEC. 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the
youth in nation-building and shall promote and protect
their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual and social wellbeing x x x.
ART. II, SEC. 18. The State affirms labor as a primary

social economic force. It shall protect the rights of
workers and promote their welfare.
ART. XV, SEC. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family
as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall
strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total
development.
ART. XV, SEC. 3. The State shall defend:
xxxx
(2) the right of children to assistance, including proper
care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms
of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation and other
conditions prejudicial to their development.
xxxx
ART. XIII, SEC. 14. The State shall protect working women
by providing safe and healthful working conditions, taking
into account their maternal functions, and such facilities
and opportunities that will enhance their welfare and
enable them to realize their full potential in the service of
the nation.
ART. II, SEC. 15. The State shall protect and promote the
right to health of the people and instill health
consciousness among them.
ART. XIII, SEC. 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and
comprehensive approach to health development which
shall endeavor to make essential goods, health and other
social services available to all people at affordable cost.

There shall be priority for the needs of the
underprivileged sick, elderly, disabled, women, and
children. The State shall endeavor to provide free medical
care to paupers.
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 102
On 24 May 1999, then President Joseph Ejercito Estrada
issued Executive Order No. 102, entitled Redirecting the
Functions and Operations of the Department of Health,
which provided for the changes in the roles, functions,
and
758
Appeals
organizational processes of the DOH. Under the assailed

executive order, the DOH refocused its mandate from
being the sole provider of health services to being a
provider of specific health services and technical
assistance, as a result of the devolution of basic services
to local government units. The provisions for the
streamlining of the DOH and the deployment of DOH
personnel to regional offices and hospitals read:
Sec. 4. Preparation of a Rationalization and Streamlining

Plan.In view of the functional and operational
redirection in the DOH, and to effect efficiency and
effectiveness in its activities, the Department shall
prepare a Rationalization and Streamlining Plan (RSP)
which shall be the basis of the intended changes. The RSP
shall contain the following:
a) the specific shift in policy directions, functions,
programs and activities/strategies;
b) the structural and organizational shift, stating the
specific functions and activities by organizational unit and
the relationship of each units;
c) the staffing shift, highlighting and itemizing the
existing filled and unfilled positions; and
d) the resource allocation shift, specifying the effects of
the streamline set-up on the agency budgetary allocation
and indicating where possible, savings have been
generated.
The RSP shall [be] submitted to the Department of
Budget and Management for approval before the
corresponding shifts shall be affected (sic) by the DOH
Secretary.
Sec. 5. Redeployment of Personnel.The redeployment of
officials and other personnel on the basis of the approved
RSP shall not result in diminution in rank and
compensation of existing personnel. It shall take into
account all pertinent Civil Service laws and rules.
Section 6. Funding.The financial resources needed to

implement the Rationalization and Streamlining Plan shall
be taken from funds available in the DOH, provided that
the total requirements for the implementation of the
revised staffing pattern shall not exceed available funds
for Personnel Services.
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VOL. 527, JULY 17, 2007 759
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Section 7. Separation Benefits.Personnel who opt to be

separated from the service as a consequence of the
implementation of this Executive Order shall be entitled
to the benefits under existing laws. In the case of those
who are not covered by existing laws, they shall be
entitled to separation benefits equivalent to one month
basic salary for every year of service or proportionate
share thereof in addition to the terminal fee benefits to
which he/she is entitled under existing laws.
Executive Order No. 102 was enacted pursuant to Section
17 of the Local Government Code (Republic Act No.
7160), which provided for the devolution to the local
government units of basic services and facilities, as well
as specific healthrelated functions and
responsibilities.7SEC. 17. Basic Services and Facilities.
(a) Local government units shall endeavor to be selfreliant and shall continue exercising the powers and
discharging the duties and functions currently vested
upon them. They shall also discharge the functions...
_______________
7 SEC. 17. Basic Services and Facilities.(a) Local
government units shall endeavor to be self-reliant and
shall continue exercising the powers and discharging the
duties and functions currently vested upon them. They
shall also discharge the functions and responsibilities of
national agencies and offices devolved to them pursuant
to this Code. Local government units shall likewise
exercise such other powers and discharge such other
functions and responsibilities as are necessary,
appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective
provision of the basic services and facilities enumerated
herein.
(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not
limited to, the following:
(1) For a Barangay:
xxxx
(ii) Health and social welfare services which include
maintenance of barangay health center and day-care
center;
xxxx
(2) For a municipality:
xxxx
(iii) Subject to the provisions of Title Five, Book I of this
Code, health services which include the implementation
of programs and projects on primary health care,
maternal and child care, and communicable and noncommunicable disease control services; access to
secondary and tertiary health services; pur
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Appeals
Petitioners contended that a law, such as Executive Order

No. 102, which effects the reorganization of the DOH,
should be enacted by Congress in the exercise of its
legislative function. They argued that Executive Order No.
102 is void, having been issued in excess of the
Presidents authority.8Rollo, pp. 131-151.Moreover,
petitioners averred that the implementation of the
Rationalization and Streamlining Plan (RSP) was not in
accordance with law. The RSP was allegedly implemented
even before the Department of Budget and Management
(DBM) approved it. They also maintained that the Office
of the President should have issued an administrative
order to carry out the streamlining, but that it failed to do
so.9Id.Furthermore, petitioners Elsa O. Guevarra, Arcadio
B. Gonzales, Jose G. Galang, Domingo P. Manay, Eduardo

P. Galope, Remedios M. Ysmael, Alfredo U. Bacuata and
Edgardo J. Damicog, all DOH employees, assailed the
validity of Executive Order No. 102 on the ground that
they were likely to lose their jobs, and that some of them
were suffering from the inconvenience of having to travel
a longer distance to get to their new place of work, while
other DOH employees had to relocate to far-flung
areas.10Id., at pp. 114-122.
_______________
chase of medicines, medical supplies, and equipment
needed to carry out the services herein enumerated;
xxxx
(3) For a Province:
xxxx
(iv) Subject to the provisions of Title Five, Book I of this
Code, health services which include hospitals and other
tertiary health services;
xxxx
(4) For a City:
All the services and facilities of the municipality and
province, and in addition thereto, the following:
8 Rollo, pp. 131-151.
9 Id.
10 Id., at pp. 114-122.
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Appeals
Petitioners also pointed out several errors in the

implementation of the RSP. Certain employees allegedly
suffered diminution of compensation,11Id., at pp. 109110. while others were supposedly assigned to positions
for which they were neither qualified nor suited.12Id., at
p. 105. In addition, new employees were purportedly
hired by the DOH and appointed to positions for which
they were not qualified, despite the fact that the
objective of the ongoing streamlining was to cut back on
costs.13Id., at p. 111. It was also averred that DOH
employees were deployed or transferred even during the
three-month period before the national and local
elections in May 2001,14Id., at pp. 125-126. in violation
of Section 2 of the Republic Act No. 7305, also known as
Magna Carta for Public Health Workers.15Section 2 of
Republic Act No. 7305 reads:SEC. 2. No transfer nor
reassignment shall be made three months before any
local or national elections. Petitioners, however, failed to
identify the DOH employees referred to above, much less
include them as parties to the petition.
The Court of Appeals denied the petition due to a number

of procedural defects, which proved fatal: 1) Petitioners
failed to show capacity or authority to sign the
certification of nonforum shopping and the verification; 2)
Petitioners failed to show any particularized interest for
bringing the suit, nor any direct or personal injury
sustained or were in the immediate danger of sustaining;
3) the Petition, brought before the Supreme Court on 15
August 1999, was filed out of time, or beyond 60 days
from the time the reorganization methods were
implemented in 2000; and 4) certiorari, Prohibition and
Mandamus will not lie where the President, in issuing the
assailed Executive Order, was not acting as a tribunal,
board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions.
_______________
11 Id., at pp. 109-110.
12 Id., at p. 105.
13 Id., at p. 111.
14 Id., at pp. 125-126.
15 Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7305 reads:
SEC. 2. No transfer nor reassignment shall be made three
months before any local or national elections.
762

Appeals
In resolving the substantial issues of the case, the Court

of Appeals ruled that the HSRA cannot be declared void
for violating Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15, 18 of Article II;
Section 1 of Article III; Sections 11 and 14 of Article XIII;
and Sections 1 and 3(2) of Article XV, all of the 1987
Constitution, which directly or indirectly pertain to the
duty of the State to protect and promote the peoples
right to health and wellbeing. It reasoned that the
aforementioned provisions of the Constitution are not
self-executing; they are not judicially enforceable
constitutional rights and can only provide guidelines for
legislation.
Moreover, the Court of Appeals held that the petitioners
assertion that Executive Order No. 102 is detrimental to
the health of the people cannot be made a justiciable
issue. The question of whether the HSRA will bring about
the development or disintegration of the health sector is
within the realm of the political department.
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals decreed that the
President was empowered to issue Executive Order No.
102, in accordance with Section 17 Article VII of the 1987
Constitution. It also declared that the DOH did not
implement Executive Order No. 102 in bad faith or with
grave abuse of discretion, as alleged by the petitioners,
as the DOH issued Department Circular No. 275-C, Series

of 2000, which created the different committees tasked
with the implementation of the RSP, only after both the
DBM and Presidential Committee on Effective Governance
(PCEG) approved the RSP on 8 July 2000 and 17 July
2000, respectively.
Petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Decision rendered on 26
November 2004, but the same was denied in a Resolution
dated 7 March 2005.
Hence, the present petition, where the following issues
are raised:
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VOL. 527, JULY 17, 2007 763
Appeals
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
MANIFEST ERROR IN RULING THAT ANY QUESTION ON
THE WISDOM AND EFFICACY OF THE HEALTH SECTOR
REFORM AGENDA IS NOT A JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY
AND THAT THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
PROTECTING THE HEALTH OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE ARE
NOT JUDICIALLY ENFORCEABLE;
II.
MANIFEST ERROR IN RULING THAT PETITIONERS
COMPLAINT THAT EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 102 IS
DETRIMENTAL TO THE FILIPINO IS LIKEWISE NOT A
JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY AND THAT THE PRESIDENT
HAS THE AUTHORITY TO ISSUE SAID ORDER; AND
III.
MANIFEST ERROR IN UPHOLDING TECHNICALITIES OVER
AND ABOVE THE ISSUES OF TRANSCENDENTAL
IMPORTANCE RAISED IN THE PETITION BELOW.16Rollo, p.
78.The Court finds the present petition to be without
merit.
Petitioners allege that the HSRA should be declared void,
since it runs counter to the aspiration and ideals of the
Filipino people as embodied in the Constitution.17Id., at
pp. 98-102. They claim that the HSRAs policies of fiscal
autonomy, income generation, and revenue
enhancement violate Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15 and 18
of Article II, Section 1 of Article III; Sections 11 and 14 of
Article XIII; and Sections 1 and 3 of Article XV of the 1987
Constitution. Such policies allegedly resulted in making
inaccessible free medicine and free medical services. This
contention is unfounded.
As a general rule, the provisions of the Constitution are
considered self-executing, and do not require future
legisla-
_______________
16 Rollo, p. 78.
17 Id., at pp. 98-102.
764
Appeals
tion for their enforcement. For if they are not treated as

selfexecuting, the mandate of the fundamental law can
be easily nullified by the inaction of Congress.18Manila
Prince Hotel v. Government Service Insurance System,
G.R. No. 122156, 3 February 1997, 267 SCRA 408, 473;
Agabon v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No.
158693, 17 November 2004, 442 SCRA 573, 684.
However, some provisions have already been
categorically declared by this Court as non self-executing.
In Taada v. Angara,19338 Phil. 546, 580-581; 272 SCRA
18, 54 (1997). the Court specifically set apart the sections
found under Article II of the 1987 Constitution as non selfexecuting and ruled that such broad principles need
legislative enactments before they can be implemented:
By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a
declaration of principles and state policies. x x x. These
principles in Article II are not intended to be selfexecuting principles ready for enforcement through the
courts. They are used by the judiciary as aids or as guides
in the exercise of its power of judicial review, and by the
legislature in its enactment of laws.
In Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation,20274 Phil. 323; 197 SCRA 52 (1991). this
Court declared that Sections 11, 12, and 13 of Article II;
Section 13 of Article XIII; and Section 2 of Article XIV of
the 1987 Constitution are not self-executing provisions. In
Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance,21G.R. No. 115455, 25
August 1994, 235 SCRA 630, 685. the Court referred to
Section 1 of Article XIII and Section 2 of Article XIV of the
Constitution as moral incentives to legislation, not as
judicially enforceable rights. These provisions, which
merely lay down a general principle, are distinguished
from other constitutional provisions as non self-executing
and, therefore, cannot give
_______________
18 Manila Prince Hotel v. Government Service Insurance
System, G.R. No. 122156, 3 February 1997, 267 SCRA
408, 473; Agabon v. National Labor Relations
Commission, G.R. No. 158693, 17 November 2004, 442
SCRA 573, 684.
19 338 Phil. 546, 580-581; 272 SCRA 18, 54 (1997).
20 274 Phil. 323; 197 SCRA 52 (1991).
21 G.R. No. 115455, 25 August 1994, 235 SCRA 630, 685.
765
VOL. 527, JULY 17, 2007 765
Tondo Medical Center Employees Associationvs . Court of
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rise to a cause of action in the courts; they do not

embody judicially enforceable constitutional
rights.22Kilosbayan v. Morato, 316 Phil. 652, 697-698;
246 SCRA 540 (1995); and Manila Prince Hotel v.
Government Service Insurance System, 335 Phil. 82, 102103; 267 SCRA 408, 434 (1997).Some of the
constitutional provisions invoked in the present case were
taken from Article II of the Constitutionspecifically,
Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15 and 18the provisions of
which the Court categorically ruled to be non
selfexecuting in the aforecited case of Taada v.
Angara.23Supra note 19.Moreover, the records are devoid
of any explanation of how the HSRA supposedly violated
the equal protection and due process clauses that are
embodied in Section 1 of Article III of the Constitution.
There were no allegations of discrimination or of the lack
of due process in connection with the HSRA. Since they
failed to substantiate how these constitutional
guarantees were breached, petitioners are unsuccessful
in establishing the relevance of this provision to the
petition, and consequently, in annulling the HSRA.
In the remaining provisions, Sections 11 and 14 of Article

XIII and Sections 1 and 3 of Article XV, the State accords
recognition to the protection of working women and the
provision for safe and healthful working conditions; to the
adoption of an integrated and comprehensive approach
to health; to the Filipino family; and to the right of
children to assistance and special protection, including
proper care and nutrition. Like the provisions that were
declared as non self-executory in the cases of Basco v.
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation 24274
Phil. 323; 197 SCRA 52 (1991). and Tolentino v. Secretary
of Finance,25Supra note 21. they are mere statements of
principles and policies. As such, they are mere directives
addressed to the executive and the legislative
departments. If unheeded, the remedy will not lie with
the
_______________
22 Kilosbayan v. Morato, 316 Phil. 652, 697-698; 246
SCRA 540 (1995); and Manila Prince Hotel v. Government
Service Insurance System, 335 Phil. 82, 102-103; 267
SCRA 408, 434 (1997).
23 Supra note 19.
24 274 Phil. 323; 197 SCRA 52 (1991).
25 Supra note 21.
766

Appeals
courts; but rather, the electorates displeasure may be

manifested in their votes.
The rationale for this is given by Justice Dante Tinga in his
Separate Opinion in the case of Agabon v. National Labor
Relations Commission:26Supra note 18 at p. 686.x x x
However, to declare that the constitutional provisions are
enough to guarantee the full exercise of the rights
embodied therein, and the realization of the ideals
therein expressed, would be impractical, if not unrealistic.
The espousal of such view presents the dangerous
tendency of being overbroad and exaggerated. x x x
Subsequent legislation is still needed to define the
parameters of these guaranteed rights. x x x Without
specific and pertinent legislation, judicial bodies will be at
a loss, formulating their own conclusion to approximate at
least the aims of the Constitution.
The HSRA cannot be nullified based solely on petitioners
bare allegations that it violates the general principles
expressed in the non self-executing provisions they cite
herein. There are two reasons for denying a cause of
action to an alleged infringement of broad constitutional
principles: basic considerations of due process and the
limitations of judicial power.27Taada, v. Angara, supra
note 19 at p. 581; p. 55.Petitioners also claim that
Executive Order No. 102 is void on the ground that it was

issued by the President in excess of his authority. They
maintain that the structural and functional reorganization
of the DOH is an exercise of legislative functions, which
the President usurped when he issued Executive Order
No. 102.28Rollo, p. 132. This line of argument is without
basis.
This Court has already ruled in a number of cases that the
President may, by executive or administrative order,
direct the reorganization of government entities under
the Execu_______________
26 Supra note 18 at p. 686.
27 Taada, v. Angara, supra note 19 at p. 581; p. 55.
28 Rollo, p. 132.
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VOL. 527, JULY 17, 2007 767
Appeals
tive Department.29Bagaoisan v. National Tobacco

Administration, 455 Phil. 761, 774-775; 408 SCRA 337,
343 (2003); Domingo v. Zamora, 445 Phil. 7, 12-13; 397
SCRA 56, 60 (2003); Secretary of the Department of
Transportation and Communications v. Mabalot, 428 Phil.

154, 164-1... This is also sanctioned under the
Constitution, as well as other statutes.
Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, clearly
states: [T]he president shall have control of all executive
departments, bureaus and offices. Section 31, Book III,
Chapter 10 of Executive Order No. 292, also known as the
Administrative Code of 1987 reads:
SEC. 31. Continuing Authority of the President to
Reorganize his Office.The President, subject to the
policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve
simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have continuing
authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the
Office of the President. For this purpose, he may take any
of the following actions:
(1) Restructure the internal organization of the Office of
the President Proper, including the immediate offices, the
Presidential Special Assistants/Advisers System and the
Common Staff Support System, by abolishing
consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring
functions from one unit to another;
(2) Transfer any function under the Office of the President
to any other Department or Agency as well as transfer
functions to the Office of the President from other
Departments or Agencies; and
(3) Transfer any agency under the Office of the President
to any other department or agency as well as transfer
agencies to the Office of the President from other

Departments or agencies.
In Domingo v. Zamora,30Id. this Court explained the
rationale behind the Presidents continuing authority
under the Administrative Code to reorganize the
administrative structure of the Office of the President.
The law grants the President the
_______________
29 Bagaoisan v. National Tobacco Administration, 455
Phil. 761, 774-775; 408 SCRA 337, 343 (2003); Domingo
v. Zamora, 445 Phil. 7, 12-13; 397 SCRA 56, 60 (2003);
Secretary of the Department of Transportation and
Communications v. Mabalot, 428 Phil. 154, 164-165; 378
SCRA 128, 135 (2002); Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v.
Zamora, 413 Phil. 281, 291; 360 SCRA 718, 726 (2001);
Larin v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 112745, 280 SCRA
713, 729-730.
30 Id.
768
Appeals
power to reorganize the Office of the President in

recognition of the recurring need of every President to
reorganize his or her office to achieve simplicity,
economy and efficiency. To remain effective and
efficient, it must be capable of being shaped and
reshaped by the President in the manner the Chief
Executive deems fit to carry out presidential directives
and policies.
The Administrative Code provides that the Office of the
President consists of the Office of the President Proper
and the agencies under it.31Section 21, Chapter 8, Title II
of the Administrative Code. The agencies under the Office
of the President are identified in Section 23, Chapter 8,
Title II of the Administrative Code:
Sec. 23. The Agencies under the Office of the President.
The agencies under the Office of the President refer to
those offices placed under the chairmanship of the
President, those under the supervision and control of the
President, those under the administrative supervision of
the Office of the President, those attached to it for policy
and program coordination, and those that are not placed
by law or order creating them under any specific
department. (Emphasis provided.)
Section 2(4) of the Introductory Provisions of the
Administrative Code defines the term agency of the
government as follows:
Agency of the Government refers to any of the various
units of the Government, including a department, bureau,
office, instrumentality, or government-owned or

controlled corporation, or a local government or a distinct
unit therein.
Furthermore, the DOH is among the cabinet-level
departments enumerated under Book IV of the
Administrative Code, mainly tasked with the functional
distribution of the work of the President.32Section 1,
Chapter 1, Book IV of the Administrative Code reads:
Indubitably, the DOH is an agency which is
_______________
31 Section 21, Chapter 8, Title II of the Administrative
Code.
32 Section 1, Chapter 1, Book IV of the Administrative
Code reads:
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VOL. 527, JULY 17, 2007 769
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under the supervision and control of the President and,

thus, part of the Office of the President. Consequently,
Section 31, Book III, Chapter 10 of the Administrative
Code, granting the President the continued authority to
reorganize the Office of the President, extends to the

DOH.
The power of the President to reorganize the executive
department is likewise recognized in general
appropriations laws. As early as 1993, Sections 48 and 62
of Republic Act No. 7645, the General Appropriations Act
for Fiscal Year 1993, already contained a provision
stating that:
Sec. 48. Scaling Down and Phase Out of Activities Within
the Executive Branch.The heads of departments,
bureaus and offices and agencies are hereby directed to
identify their respective activities which are no longer
essential in the delivery of public services and which may
be scaled down, phased out, or abolished, subject to civil
service rules and regulations. x x x. Actual scaling down,
phasing out, or abolition of activities shall be effected
pursuant to Circulars or Orders issued for the purpose by
the Office of the President. (Emphasis provided.)
Sec. 62. Unauthorized Organizational Changes.Unless
otherwise created by law or directed by the President of
the Philippines, no organizational unit or changes in key
positions in any department or agency shall be
authorized in their respective organizational structures
and be funded from appropriations by this Act.
Again, in the year when Executive Order No. 102 was
issued, The General Appropriations Act of Fiscal Year
1999 (Republic Act No. 8745) conceded to the President
the power to make any changes in any of the key
positions and organizational units in the executive

department thus:
Sec. 77. Organized Changes.Unless otherwise provided
by law or directed by the President of the Philippines, no
changes in key
_______________
SECTION 1. Purpose and Number of Departments.The
Executive Branch shall have Departments as are
necessary for the functional distribution of the work of
the President and for the performance of their functions.
770
Appeals
positions or organizational units in any department or

agency shall be authorized in their respective
organizational structures and funded from appropriations
provided by this Act.
Clearly, Executive Order No. 102 is well within the
constitutional power of the President to issue. The
President did not usurp any legislative prerogative in
issuing Executive Order No. 102. It is an exercise of the
Presidents constitutional power of control over the
executive department, supported by the provisions of the

Administrative Code, recognized by other statutes, and
consistently affirmed by this Court.
Petitioners also pointed out several flaws in the
implementation of Executive Order No. 102, particularly
the RSP. However, these contentions are without merit
and are insufficient to invalidate the executive order.
The RSP was allegedly implemented even before the DBM
approved it. The facts show otherwise. It was only after
the DBM approved the Notice of Organization, Staffing
and Compensation Action on 8 July 2000,33Rollo, pp. 384388. and after the Presidential Committee on Effective
Governance (PCEG) issued on 17 July 2000 Memorandum
Circular No. 62,34Id., at pp. 389-390. approving the RSP,
that then DOH Secretary Alberto G. Romualdez issued on
28 July 2000 Department Circular No. 275-C, Series of
2000,35Id., at pp. 384-398. creating the different
committees to implement the RSP.
Petitioners also maintain that the Office of the President
should have issued an administrative order to carry out
the streamlining, but that it failed to do so. Such objection
cannot be given any weight considering that the acts of
the DOH Secretary, as an alter ego of the President, are
presumed to be the acts of the President. The members
of the Cabinet are subject at all times to the disposition of
the President since
_______________
33 Rollo, pp. 384-388.
34 Id., at pp. 389-390.

35 Id., at pp. 384-398.
771
VOL. 527, JULY 17, 2007 771
Appeals
they are merely his alter egos.36Secretary of the

Department of Transportation and Communications v.
Mabalot, supra note 29 at pp. 166-167; p. 137. Thus, their
acts, performed and promulgated in the regular course of
business, are, unless disapproved by the President,
presumptively acts of the President.37Villena v. Secretary
of Interior, 67 Phil. 451, 463-465 (1939). Significantly, the
acts of the DOH Secretary were clearly authorized by the
President, who, thru the PCEG, issued the aforementioned
Memorandum Circular No. 62, sanctioning the
implementation of the RSP.
Petitioners Elsa Odonzo Guevarra, Arcadio B. Gonzales,
Jose G. Galang, Domingo P. Manay, Eduardo P. Galope,
Remedios M. Ysmael, Alfredo U. Bacuata, and Edgardo
Damicog, all DOH employees, assailed the validity of
Executive Order No. 102 on the ground that they were
likely to lose their jobs, and that some of them were
suffering from the inconvenience of having to travel a
longer distance to get to their new place of work, while

other DOH employees had to relocate to far-flung areas.
In several cases, this Court regarded reorganizations of
government units or departments as valid, for so long as
they are pursued in good faiththat is, for the purpose of
economy or to make bureaucracy more
efficient.38Secretary of the Department of Transportation
and Communications v. Mabalot, supra note 29 at p. 170;
p. 140; Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora, supra note 29
at p. 294; p. 730; and Larin v. Executive Secretary, supra
note 29. On the other hand, if the reorganization is done
for the purpose of defeating security of tenure or for illmotivated political purposes, any abolition of position
would be invalid. None of these circumstances are
applicable since none of the petitioners were removed
from public service, nor did they identify any action taken
by the DOH that would unquestionably result in their
dismissal. The reorganization that was pursued in the
present case was made in good faith. The RSP was clearly
designed to improve the efficiency of the department and
to implement the provi_______________
36 Secretary of the Department of Transportation and
Communications v. Mabalot, supra note 29 at pp. 166167; p. 137.
37 Villena v. Secretary of Interior, 67 Phil. 451, 463-465
(1939).
38 Secretary of the Department of Transportation and

Communications v. Mabalot, supra note 29 at p. 170; p.
140; Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora, supra note 29
at p. 294; p. 730; and Larin v. Executive Secretary, supra
note 29.
772
Appeals
sions of the Local Government Code on the devolution of

health services to local governments. While this Court
recognizes the inconvenience suffered by public servants
in their deployment to distant areas, the executive
departments finding of a need to make health services
available to these areas and to make delivery of health
services more efficient and more compelling is far from
being unreasonable or arbitrary, a determination which is
well within its authority. In all, this Court finds petitioners
contentions to be insufficient to invalidate Executive
Order No. 102.
Without identifying the DOH employees concerned, much
less including them as parties to the petition, petitioners
went on identifying several errors in the implementation
of Executive Order No. 102. First, they alleged that
unidentified DOH employees suffered from a diminution
of compensation by virtue of the provision on Salaries

and Benefits found in Department Circular No. 312, Series
of 2000, issued on 23 October 2000, which reads:
2. Any employee who was matched to a position with
lower salary grade (SG) shall not suffer a reduction in
salary except where his/her current salary is higher than
the maximum step of the SG of the new position, in which
case he/she shall be paid the salary corresponding to the
maximum step of the SG of the new position. RATA shall
no longer be received, if employee was matched to a
NonDivision Chief Position.
Incidentally, the petition shows that none of the
petitioners, who are working in the DOH, were entitled to
receive RATA at the time the petition was filed. Nor was it
alleged that they suffered any diminution of
compensation. Secondly, it was claimed that certain
unnamed DOH employees were matched with
unidentified positions for which they were supposedly
neither qualified nor suited. New employees, again
unnamed and not included as parties, were hired by the
DOH and appointed to unidentified positions for which
they were purportedly not qualified, despite the fact that
the objective of the ongoing streamlining was to cut back
on costs. Lastly, un-
773
VOL. 527, JULY 17, 2007 773

Appeals
specified DOH employees were deployed or transferred

during the three-month period before the national and
local elections in May 2001, in violation of Section 2 of
the Republic Act No. 7305, also known as Magna Carta
for Public Health Workers.
Petitioners allegations are too general and
unsubstantiated by the records for the Court to pass
upon. The persons involved are not identified, details of
their appointments and transferssuch as position,
salary grade, and the date they were appointedare not
given; and the circumstances which attended the alleged
violations are not specified.
Even granting that these alleged errors were adequately
proven by the petitioners, they would still not invalidate
Executive Order No. 102. Any serious legal errors in
laying down the compensation of the DOH employees
concerned can only invalidate the pertinent provisions of
Department Circular No. 312, Series of 2000. Likewise,
any questionable appointments or transfers are properly
addressed by an appeal process provided under
Administrative Order No. 94, series of 2000;39The
procedure for appeals, as provided under Administrative
Order No. 94, series of 2000, reads:General Guidelines on
AppealsIn order to properly and immediately address the
appeals, issues and concerns of personnel, the following
rules shall apply:1. Appe... and if the appeal is

meritorious, such appointment or
_______________
39 The procedure for appeals, as provided under
Administrative Order No. 94, series of 2000, reads:
General Guidelines on Appeals
In order to properly and immediately address the appeals,
issues and concerns of personnel, the following rules shall
apply:
1. Appeals, oversights, issues and concerns related to
personnel selection and placement shall be handled by
an Appeals Committee.
2. For proper documentation, all appeals shall be made in
writing. An Appeals Form shall be made available for all
personnel.
3. All personnel concerned shall be given opportunity to
present their side to assure utmost objectivity and
impartiality. If and when necessary, hearings shall be
conducted.
774
Appeals
transfer may be invalidated. The validity of Executive

Order No. 102 would, nevertheless, remain unaffected.
Settled is the rule that courts are not at liberty to declare
statutes invalid, although they may be abused or
misabused, and may afford an opportunity for abuse in
the manner of application. The validity of a statute or
ordinance is to be determined from its general purpose
and its efficiency to accomplish the end desired, not from
its effects in a particular case.40David v. MacapagalArroyo, G.R. Nos. 171396, 171409, 171485, 171483,
171400, 171489, 171424, 3 May 2006, 489 SCRA 160,
258.In a number of cases,41Agan, Sr. v. Philippine
International Air Terminals Co., Inc., 450 Phil. 744, 803804; 402 SCRA 612, 644 (2003); Chavez v. Public Estates
Authority, 433 Phil. 506, 526-528; 384 SCRA 152, 182
(2002); and Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, G.R. 113375, 5
May 1994... the Court upheld the standing of citizens who
filed suits, wherein the transcendental importance of
the constitutional question justified the granting of relief.
In spite of these rulings, the Court, in Domingo v.
Carague,42G.R. No. 161065, 15 April 2005, 456 SCRA
450, 454-456. dismissed the petition when petitioners
therein failed to show any present substantial interest. It
demonstrated how even in the cases in which the Court
declared that the matter of the case was of
transcendental importance, the petitioners must be able
to assert substantial interest. Present substantial interest,
which will enable a party to question the validity of the
law, requires that a party sustained or will sustain direct

injury as a result of its enforce_______________
4. The Appeals Committee shall be expected to resolve
issues, recommend options to the EXECOM or the
concerned personnel within 15 working days upon receipt
of the said appeal.
40 David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. Nos. 171396, 171409,
171485, 171483, 171400, 171489, 171424, 3 May 2006,
489 SCRA 160, 258.
41 Agan, Sr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co.,
Inc., 450 Phil. 744, 803-804; 402 SCRA 612, 644 (2003);
Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, 433 Phil. 506, 526528; 384 SCRA 152, 182 (2002); and Kilosbayan, Inc. v.
Guingona, G.R. 113375, 5 May 1994, 232 SCRA 110, 139.
42 G.R. No. 161065, 15 April 2005, 456 SCRA 450, 454456.
775
VOL. 527, JULY 17, 2007 775
Appeals
ment.43National Economic Protectionism Association v.

Ongpin, G.R. No. 67752, 10 April 1989, 171 SCRA 657,
665. It is distinguished from a mere expectancy or future,

contingent, subordinate, or inconsequential
interest.44Montesclaros v. Commission on Elections, 433
Phil. 620, 635636; 384 SCRA 269, 282 (2002).In the same
way, the Court, in Telecommunications & Broadcast
Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. v. Comelec,45352 Phil.
153, 168-169; 289 SCRA 337, 343 (1998). ruled that a
citizen is allowed to raise a constitutional question only
when he can show that he has personally suffered some
actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly
illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly
traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely
to be redressed by a favorable action. This case likewise
stressed that the rule on constitutional questions which
are of transcendental importance cannot be invoked
where a partys substantive claim is without merit. Thus,
a partys standing is determined by the substantive merit
of his case or a preliminary estimate thereof. After a
careful scrutiny of the petitioners substantive claims, this
Court finds that the petitioners miserably failed to show
any merit to their claims.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is
DENIED. This Court AFFIRMS the assailed Decision of the
Court of Appeals, promulgated on 26 November 2004,
declaring both the HSRA and Executive Order No. 102 as
valid. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno (C.J.), Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,
SandovalGutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona,
Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, Tinga, Garcia and Velasco, Jr., JJ.,

concur.
Nachura, J., No Part. Signed pleading as Solicitor
General.
_______________
43 National Economic Protectionism Association v.
Ongpin, G.R. No. 67752, 10 April 1989, 171 SCRA 657,
665.
44 Montesclaros v. Commission on Elections, 433 Phil.
620, 635636; 384 SCRA 269, 282 (2002).
45 352 Phil. 153, 168-169; 289 SCRA 337, 343 (1998).
776
Gandarosa vs. Flores
Petition denied, assailed decision affirmed.

Notes.A Medical Specialists insistence on being
reverted back to the status quo prior to the
reorganizations made pursuant to Executive Order No.
119as a senior resident physicianwould be akin to a
college student asking to be sent back to high school and
staying there. (Felix vs. Buenaseda, 240 SCRA 139
[1995])
The Merit System Protection Board (MSPB) was intended

to be an office of the Civil Service Commission, a part of
the internal structure and organization of the CSC, and
thus a proper subject of organizational change which the
CSC is authorized to undertake under Sec. 17 of the
present Civil Service Law. (Rubenecia vs. Civil Service
Commission, 244 SCRA 640 [1995]) [Tondo Medical
Center Employees Association vs. Court of Appeals, 527
SCRA 746(2007)]
VOL. 82, MARCH 21, 1978 191

Virtuoso, Jr. vs. Municipal Judge of Mariveles, Bataan
No. L-47841. March 21, 1978.*SECOND

DIVISION.FRANCISCO VIRTOUSO, JR., petitioner, vs.
MUNICIPAL JUDGE OF MARIVELES, BATAAN, and CHIEF OF
POLICE OF MARIVELES, BATAAN, respondents.
Habeas corpus; Youthful offenders; Who are included in
the term youthful offender; A person charged with an
offense but found to be a youthful offender could be
provisionally released on recognizance at courts
discretion; courts whenever appropriate should give
vitality and force to the Youth and Welfare Code to
implement the constitutional mandate recognizing the
vital role of the youth in nationbuilding.Petitioners
counsel and respondent Municipal Judge orally argued the
case on March 15, 1978. In the course of intensive
questioning by the members of this Court, especially
Justices Barredo, Aquino and Santos, it was ascertained
that petitioner is a seventeenyear old minor entitled to
the protection and benefits of the Child and Youth Welfare
Code, a youthful offender being defined as one who is
over nine years but under eighteen years of age at the
time of the commission of the offense. As such, he could
be provisionally released on recognizance in the
discretion of a court. x x x This Court, should, whenever

appropriate, give vitality and force to the Youth and
Welfare Code, which is an implementation of this specific
con_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
192
stitutional mandate: The State recognizes the vital role

of the youth in nation-building and shall promote their
physical, intellectual and social well-being.
Same; Constitutional Law; Excessive Bail; Judges duty to
protect the constitutional rights of the accused and to
observe the constitutional ban against the requirement of
excessive bail upon an accused; Under martial law,
immunities of the individuals are given much more
importance.It must ever be kept in mind by occupants
of the bench that they should always be on the alert lest
by sloth or indifference or due to the economic or social
standing of the alleged offended party, as was intimated
in this petition, the rights of an accused, instead of being
honored, are disregarded. There is much more
importance attached to the immunities of an individual
during a period of martial law, which in itself is a creature
of the Constitution as a mode of coping with grave

emergency situations. It is equally pertinent to state that
there should be fealty to the constitutional ban against
excessive bail being required. There is relevance to this
excerpt from De la Camara v. Enage: Where, however,
the right to bail exists, it should not be rendered nugatory
by requiring a sum that is excessive. So the Constitution
commands. It is understandable why. If there were no
such prohibition, the right to bail becomes meaningless. It
would have been more forthright if no mention of such a
guarantee were found in the fundamental law. It is not to
be lost sight of that the United States Constitution limits
itself to a prohibition against excessive bail. As construed
in the latest American decision, the sole permissible
function of money bail is to assure the accuseds
presence at trial, and declared that bail set at a higher
figure than an amount reasonably calculated to fulfill this
purpose is excessive under the Eighth Amendment.
RESOLUTION
FERNANDO, J.:
Petitioner Francisco Virtouso, Jr., who filed an application
for the writ of habeas corpus on February 23, 1973,
premised his plea for liberty primarily on the ground that
the preliminary examination which led to the issuance of
a warrant of arrest against him was a useless formality as
respondent
193
VOL. 82, MARCH 21, 1978 193

Municipal Judge of Mariveles, Bataan,1The Chief of Police

of Mariveles, Bataan was named as the other respondent.
failed to meet the strict standard required by the
Constitution to ascertain whether there was a probable
cause.2According to Article IV, Section 3 of the
Constitution: The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall not be violated, and n... He
likewise alleged that aside from the constitutional
infirmity that tainted the procedure followed in the
preliminary examination, the bail imposed was clearly
excessive.3According to Article IV, Section 18 of the
Constitution: All persons, except those charged with
capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong, shall,
before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties.
Excessive bail shall not be required.... It was in the
amount of P16,000.00, the alleged robbery of a TV set
being imputed to petitioner. As prayed for, the Court
issued a writ of habeas corpus, returnable to it on
Wednesday, March 15, 1978. Respondent Judge, in his
return filed on March 8, 1978, justified the issuance of the
warrant of arrest, alleging that there was no impropriety
in the way the preliminary examination was conducted.
As to the excessive character of the bail, he asserted that
while it was fixed in accordance with the Revised Bail
Bond Guide issued by the Executive Judge of Bataan in

1977, he nevertheless reduced the amount to P8,000.00.
Petitioners counsel and respondent Municipal Judge
orally argued the matter on March 15, 1978. In the course
of intensive questioning by the members of this Court,
especially Justices Barredo, Aquino and Santos, it was
ascertained that petitioner is a seventeen-year old minor
entitled to the protection and benefits of the Child and
Youth Welfare Code.4Presidential Decree 603 (1974). a
youthful offender being defined therein as one who is
over
_______________
1 The Chief of Police of Mariveles, Bataan was named as
the other respondent.
2 According to Article IV, Section 3 of the Constitution:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall not be violated, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause
to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible
officer as may be authorized by law, after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produced, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
3 According to Article IV, Section 18 of the Constitution:
All persons, except those charged with capital offenses
when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction,

be bailable by sufficient sureties. Excessive bail shall not
be required.
4 Presidential Decree 603 (1974).
194
nine years but under eighteen years of age at the time of

the commission of the offense.5The Child and Youth
Welfare Code, Article 189, as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 1179 (1977). As such, he could be
provisionally released on recognizance in the discretion of
a court.6Ibid, Article 191. Accordingly, after the hearing,
the Court issued the following resolution: Acting on the
verbal petition of counsel for petitioner Francisco
Virtouso, Jr., the Court Resolved pursuant to section 191
of Presidential Decree No. 603, petitioner being a 17-year
old minor, to [order] the release of the petitioner on the
recognizance of his parents Francisco Virtouso, Sr. and
Manuela Virtouso and his counsel, Atty. Guillermo B.
Bandonil, who, in open court, agreed to act in such
capacity, without prejudice to further proceedings in a
pending case against petitioner being taken in
accordance with law.7Resolution of March 15, 1978. This
Court should, whenever appropriate, give vitality and
force to the Youth and Welfare Code, which is an

implementation of this specific constitutional mandate:
The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nationbuilding and shall promote their physical, intellectual, and
social well-being.8Article II, Section 5 of the
Constitution.Thus was the petition resolved, without the
need of passing upon the issue of whether or not the
procedure by respondent Judge in ascertaining the
existence of probable cause was constitutionally
deficient. Nonetheless, it must ever be kept in mind by
occupants of the bench that they should always be on the
alert lest by sloth or indifference or due to the economic
or social standing of the alleged offended party, as was
intimated in this petition, the rights of an accused,
instead of being honored, are disregarded. There is much
more importance attached to the immunities of an
individual during a period of martial law, which in itself is
a creature of the Constitution as a mode of coping with
grave emergency situations. It is equally pertinent to
state that there should be fealty to the constitutional ban
against excessive bail being required. There is relevance
to this excerpt from De la Camara v. Enage:9L-32951-2,
September 17, 1971, 41 SCRA 1.
_______________
5 The Child and Youth Welfare Code, Article 189, as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 1179 (1977).
6 Ibid, Article 191.
7 Resolution of March 15, 1978.
8 Article II, Section 5 of the Constitution.

9 L-32951-2, September 17, 1971, 41 SCRA 1.
195
VOL. 82, MARCH 21, 1978 195
rendered nugatory by requiring a sum that is excessive.

So the Constitution commands. It is understandable why.
If there were no such prohibition, the right to bail
becomes meaningless. It would have been more
forthright if no mention of such a guarantee were found in
the fundamental law. It is not to be lost sight of that that
United States Constitution limits itself to a prohibition
against excessive bail. As construed in the latest
American decision, the sole permissible function of
money bail is to assure the accuseds presence at trial,
and declared that bail set at a higher figure than an
amount reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose is
excessive under the Eighth Amendment. 10Ibid,
8.WHEREFORE, the petition is granted in accordance with
the terms of the Resolution of this Court of March 15,
1978 as set forth above.
Barredo, Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion Jr. and Santos,
JJ., concur.
Petition granted.
Notes.The reduction of the bail bond by the trial court

will be justified when the accused is only of tender age.
(Balantakbo vs. Tengco, 57 SCRA 489).
Any irregularity in the issuance of the order of arrest is
waived by the posting of a bail bond. (Bermejo vs.
Barrios, 31 SCRA 764).
The authority to order the release on bail or recognizance
of an accused springs from the jurisdiction of the court
over the accused and over the party detaining him.
(Galang vs. Court of Appeals, 2 SCRA 234).
The trial court cannot require the accused to post a cash
bond. (Almeda vs. Villaluz, 66 SCRA 38). [Virtuoso, Jr. vs.
Municipal Judge of Mariveles, Bataan, 82 SCRA
191(1978)]

Angeles vs. Sison
No. L-45551. February 16, 1982.*SECOND DIVISIONJOSE

S. ANGELES and GILBERTO G. MERCADO, in his capacity
as Dean of Institute of Technology, FEU, petitioners, vs.
HON. RAFAEL S. SISON, as Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, EDGARDO PICAR and WILFREDO
PATAWARAN, represented by his father WENCESLAO
PATAWARAN, respondents.
Schools; Colleges and Universities; Administrative Law; A
school may investigate off-campus acts of its students if
such off________________
* SECOND DIVISION
27
VOL. 112, FEBRUARY 16, 1982 27
Angeles vs. Sison
campus act has an effect upon the morale and efficiency

of the school and may be adversed to the schools good
order, welfare and advancement of its students.The
respondent judge correctly stated that the general rule is

that the authority of the school is co-extensive with its
territorial jurisdiction, or its school grounds, so that any
action taken for acts committed outside the school
premises should, in general, be left to the police
authorities, the courts of justice, and the family
concerned.
Same; Same; Same.However, this rule is not rigid or
one without exceptions. It is the better view that there
are instances when the school might be called upon to
exercise its power over its student or students for acts
committed outside the school and beyond school hours in
the following: a) In cases of violations of school policies or
regulations occurring in connection with a schoolsponsored activity off-campus; or b) In cases where the
misconduct of the student involves his status as a
student or affects the good name or reputation of the
school.
Same; Same; Same.Common sense dictates that the
school retains its power to compel its students in or offcampus to a norm of conduct compatible with their
standing as members of the academic community. Hence,
when as in the case at bar, the misconduct complained of
directly affects the suitability of the alleged violators as
students, there is no reason why the school can not
impose the same disciplinary action as when the act took
place inside the campus.
Same; Same; Same.Furthermore, the true test of a
schools right to investigate, or otherwise, suspend or
expel a student for a misconduct committed outside the

school premises and beyond school hours is not the time
or place of the offense, but its effect upon the morale and
efficiency of the school and whether it, in fact, is adverse
to the schools good order welfare and the advancement
of its students. Likewise the power of the school over its
students does not cease absolutely when they leave the
school premises, and that conduct outside of school hours
may subject a student to school discipline if it directly
affects the good order and welfare of the school or has a
direct and immediate effect on the discipline or general
welfare of the school.
Same; Same; A student who mauls a professor offcampus in connection with his having received a failing
grade may be investigated by the school for disciplinary
purposes.There is a showing from the
28
Angeles vs. Sison
records of this case that the proximate cause of the

alleged mauling incident, subject of the administrative
investigation in question, is attributable to the professorstudent relationship of the parties concerned.
Same; Same; Criminal Procedure; Dismissal of criminal
case on complainants desistance no bar for school to
investigate a student for disciplinary purposes.The
private respondents averment that the dismissal of the

criminal case against private respondent Picar upon the
filing of the affidavit of desistance of petitioner Jose
Angeles has the effect of rendering this instant petition
moot and academic is unmeritorious. The pendency or
the dismissal of the criminal action does not abate the
administrative proceeding which involves the same cause
of action. The administrative action before the school
authorities can proceed independently of the criminal
action because these two actions are based on different
considerations. In the former, the private respondents
suitability or propriety as a student which is the
paramount concern and interest of the school is involved,
while in the latter, what is at stake is his being a citizen
who is subject to the penal statutes and is the primary
concern of the State.
PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the Court
of First Instance of Manila, Br. XXVII. Sison, J.
FERNANDEZ, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision of
the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXVII, dated
December 29, 1976 in Civil Case No. 101222 entitled,
Edgar-do Picar and Wilfredo Patawaran, represented by
his father, Wenceslao Patawaran, Plaintiffs, versus Jose S.
Angeles, Dean Gilberto G. Mercado in his capacity as
Dean of the Institute of Technology, Defendants, the
dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition prayed for by the plaintiffs is

hereby GRANTED, and the defendants are hereby
perpetually en-
29
VOL. 112, FEBRUARY 16, 1982 29
Angeles vs. Sison
joined from further proceeding with the administrative

investigation against the plaintiffs.
So ordered.1Annex L, Petition, p. 7; Rollo, p. 110.The
records disclose that sometime in November 1975 the
petitioner, Jose Angeles, initiated an administrative case
before the Office of the Dean, Gilberto G. Mercado, of the
Institute of Technology, Far Eastern University, by filing a
complaint2Annex A, Complaint with Petition for
Preliminary Injunction, Original Record in CFI, Manila, p. 6.
against the private respondents Edgardo Picar and
Wilfredo Patawaran for alleged breach of the universitys
rules and regulations. In the said complaint, it is alleged
that on October 20, 1975, Jose Angeles, a professor in the
Institute of Technology of Far Eastern University (FEU),
was assaulted by Edgardo Picar and Wilfredo Patawaran,
both students in mechanical engineering in the said
institute at the Oak Barrel Restaurant located at P. Gomez
Street, Quiapo, Manila on the occasion of the birthday
party of Professor Alfonso Bernabe, the Secretary of the

Institute of Technology of FEU.
The same incident became also the subject of a criminal
complaint for assault against a person in authority
instituted by the petitioner Jose Angeles in the Office of
the City Fiscal of Manila against the private respondents
Picar and Patawaran. Later, the complaint was amended
to assault and/or physical injuries. The case was
dismissed as against private respondent Wilfredo
Patawaran but an information for slight physical injuries
was filed against private respondent Edgardo Picar in the
City Court of Manila.3Petition, p. 5; Rollo, p. 12. However,
during the pendency of this case, on July 8, 1977, the
criminal case for slight physical injuries against Edgardo
Picar was dismissed on the basis of an affidavit of
desistance4Annex A, Memorandum for Respondents,
Rollo, p. 203. submitted by petitioner Jose Angeles before
the City Court of Manila, Branch VIII, stating among
others, that the subject incident was only a result of a
misunderstanding and nobody is to be blamed.
________________
1 Annex L, Petition, p. 7; Rollo, p. 110.
2 Annex A, Complaint with Petition for Preliminary
Injunction, Original Record in CFI, Manila, p. 6.
3 Petition, p. 5; Rollo, p. 12.
4 Annex A, Memorandum for Respondents, Rollo, p. 203.
30
Angeles vs. Sison
Acting on the administrative complaint filed before his

Office by the petitioner Jose Angeles, the Dean of the
Institute, petitioner Gilberto Mercado, immediately
created a committee headed by him to investigate the
complaint. The private respondents Picar and Patawaran
questioned the authority of the Dean and his committee
to conduct the administrative investigation because the
act complained ofthe alleged assault of Professor
Angeles at the Oak Barrel Restaurantis not within his
authority to investigate. They contend that the Deans
authority to investigate under the Code of Conduct of FEU
(as amended) from where he derives that power, is
limited to acts done or committed within the premises of
the compound of the University. The Dean proceeded to
conduct the challenged administrative investigation. Thus
the private respondents, Picar and Patawaran, the latter
being then a minor, was represented by his father,
Wenceslao Patawaran, filed on February 13, 1976 in the
Court of First Instance of Manila a complaint5Annex A,
Petition; Rollo, p. 34. with petition for issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction to restrain the petitioners from
proceeding with the administrative investigation against
the private respondents.
Forthwith, the respondent judge issued on the same day,

February 13, 1976, an Order6Annex B, Petition; Rollo, p.
40. temporarily restraining the petitioners from further
proceeding with the administrative investigation against
the private respondents, and setting the motion for the
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction for hearing.
On March 10, 1976, the petitioners filed their answer to
the complaint and an opposition to the petition for
injunction.7Annexes C and D, Petition; Rollo, pp. 41
and 49, respectively.Over the opposition of the
petitioners, the respondent Judge issued an Order8Annex
F, Petition; Rollo, p. 60. on June 7, 1976 granting the
writ of preliminary injunction and enjoining the petitioners
from proceeding with the administrative investigation of
private respondents until further orders from the Court.
________________
5 Annex A, Petition; Rollo, p. 34.
6 Annex B, Petition; Rollo, p. 40.
7 Annexes C and D, Petition; Rollo, pp. 41 and 49,
respectively.
8 Annex F, Petition; Rollo, p. 60.
31
VOL. 112, FEBRUARY 16, 1982 31
Angeles vs. Sison
On July 13, 1976, the petitioners moved for a

reconsideration of the order of the respondent judge and
to lift the order granting plaintiffs petition for preliminary
injunction.9Annex G, Petition; Rollo, p. 61. The private
respondents opposed the said motion for reconsideration
on August 10, 1976.10Annex H, Petition; Rollo, 71.On
October 11, 1976, the respondent Judge issued an order
denying the petitioners motion for
reconsideration.11Annex I, Petition; Rollo, p.
72.Consequently, the petitioners filed on November 17,
1976, a motion for summary judgment stating, among
others, that since the issue before this Court is one of
law and not of fact, and therefore, there exists no genuine
controversy as to any material fact, summary judgment
will lie to effectuate the prompt disposition of this
case.12Annex J, par. 7, Petition; Rollo, p. 73.Finding no
objection to the rendition of a summary judgment, the
private respondents filed to that effect a
manifestation13Annex K, Petition; Rollo, p. 103. on
December 8, 1976.
On December 29, 1976, the respondent judge rendered
the decision under review, perpetually enjoining the
petitioners from further proceeding with the
administrative investigation against the private
respondents.
From this decision, the petitioners interposed an appeal
to this Court, assigning the following as errors:
I
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN FINDING THAT FAR
EASTERN UNIVERSITY (FEU, FOR BREVITY), THROUGH
PETITIONER GILBERTO G. MERCADO WHO IS THE DEAN OF
THE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, IS NOT AUTHORIZED TO
INVESTIGATE AND DISCIPLINE THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS, WHO ARE STUDENTS OF SAID
UNIVERSITY, FOR THEIR CONDUCT OUTSIDE OF SCHOOL
HOURS AND NOT WITHIN THE SCHOOL PREMISES WHICH
________________
9 Annex G, Petition; Rollo, p. 61.
10 Annex H, Petition; Rollo, 71.
11 Annex I, Petition; Rollo, p. 72.
12 Annex J, par. 7, Petition; Rollo, p. 73.
13 Annex K, Petition; Rollo, p. 103.
32
Angeles vs. Sison
DIRECTLY AFFECTS THE GOOD ORDER AND WELFARE OF

THE SCHOOL.
II
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE

SERVICE MANUAL FOR PUBLIC SCHOOLS APPLIES TO, AND
OVERRIDES THE RULES AND REGULATIONS OF FEU A
PRIVATE SCHOOL, UPON THE GROUND THAT THERE IS NO
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A PRIVATE SCHOOL AND A PUBLIC
SCHOOL.
III
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
CONDUCT OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS IN MAULING
PETITIONER JOSE S. ANGELES, A FACULTY MEMBER OF
FEU, OUTSIDE THE PREMISES OF THE SCHOOL IS NOT
PRESCRIBED BY THE RULES AND REGULATIONS
CONTAINED IN THE SERVICE MANUAL FOR PUBLIC
SCHOOLS.
IV
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN FINDING THAT FEU,
THROUGH PETITIONER GILBERTO G. MERCADO, IS
LEGALLY INHIBITED FROM INVESTIGATING PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS FOR CONDUCT PRESCRIBED BY ITS RULES
AND REGULATIONS BECAUSE OF THE PENDENCY OF
CRIMINAL CHARGES AGAINST SAID
RESPONDENTS.14Petition, pp. 8-9; Rollo, pp. 15-16.The
main legal issue presented in this petition is whether a
school through its duly authorized representative has the
jurisdiction to investigate its student or students for an
alleged misconduct committed outside the school
premises and beyond school hours.
The petitioners contend that the mauling incident, subject

matter of this case, was sought to be investigated under
and pursuant to the following rules and regulations of the
Manual of Registration for Private Schools.15Manual of
Regulations for Private Schools 1970, Seventh Edition
Annotated, pp. 109-111.
________________
14 Petition, pp. 8-9; Rollo, pp. 15-16.
15 Manual of Regulations for Private Schools 1970,
Seventh Edition Annotated, pp. 109-111.
33
VOL. 112, FEBRUARY 16, 1982 33
Angeles vs. Sison
(1) Paragraph 145, Section IX:

Every private school is required to maintain good school
discipline. No cruel or physically harmful punishment shall
be imposed nor shall corporal punishment be
countenanced. The school rules governing discipline and
the corresponding sanctions therefor must be clearly
specified and defined in writing and made known to the
students and/or their parents or guardians. Schools shall
have the authority and prerogative to promulgate such
rules and regulations as they may deem necessary from
time to time effective as of the promulgation unless

otherwise specified.
No penalty shall be imposed upon any student, except
for cause as defined in this Manual and/or in the schools
rules and regulations duly promulgated and only after
due investigation shall have been conducted.
(2) Paragraph 146, Section IX:
The three categories of disciplinary administrative
sanctions which may be imposed upon erring students,
commensurate with the nature and gravity of the
violation of school rules and regulations committed, are:
a. Droppinga school may drop from its rolls during the
school year or term a student who is considered
undesirable. The student who is dropped should be issued
immediately his transfer credentials.
b. Suspensiona school may suspend an erring student
during the school year or term for a maximum period not
exceeding 20% of the prescribed school days. Suspension
which will involve the loss of the entire year or term shall
not be effective unless approved by the Director of
Private Schools.
c. Expulsionthe penalty of expulsion is an extreme
form of administrative sanction which debars the student
from all public and private schools. To be valid and
effective the penalty of expulsion requires the approval of
the Secretary of Education. Expulsion is usually
considered proper punishment for gross misconduct or
dishonesty and/or such offenses as hazing, carrying

deadly weapons, immorality, drunkenness, vandalism,
hooliganism, assaulting a teacher or any other school
authority, or his agent or student, instigating, leading or
participating in concerted activities leading to a stoppage
of classes, preventing or threatening students or faculty
members or school authorities from discharging their
duties, or from
34
Angeles vs. Sison
attending classes or entering the school premises, forging

or tampering (with) school records or transfer forms, or
securing or using such forged transfer credentials.
In accordance with the above-quoted provision, the
Advisory Council of FEU approved on December 2, 1971,
the Code of Conduct16Petition, pp. 12-13; Rollo, pp. 1920; Annex J-6, Petition, pp. 50-55; Rollo, p. 96. for all
students to observe. The pertinent articles provide:
Article 1General Behavior
Section 2. Students shall not use language or commit
acts which are disrespectful, vulgar, or indecent, or which
in any manner may cause or tend to cause molestation or
injury to other members of the university community.
xxx
Article VPenalties
Section 1. Violation of any of the provisions of this Code
of Conduct shall be punished, after due investigation, by
reprimand, dropping, suspension or expulsion in
accordance with the Manual of Regulation for Private
Schools taking into account the following factors:
a) previous record of the student;
b) inherent gravity of the offense committed;
c) position of the aggrieved person;
d) established precedents; and
e) other related circumstances, such as the pertinent and
applicable mitigating and aggravating circumstances
found in the Revised Penal Code.
Section 2. In cases not covered by this Code, the
categories of disciplinary administrative sanctions
contained in the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools
shall apply upon the ground provided in said Manual.
xxx
Article VIEnforcement
Section 1. The Deans and Principals shall enforce the
provi________________
16 Petition, pp. 12-13; Rollo, pp. 19-20; Annex J-6,

Petition, pp. 50-55; Rollo, p. 96.
35
VOL. 112, FEBRUARY 16, 1982 35
Angeles vs. Sison
sions of this Code of Conduct.

There shall be created in each Institute and School a
committee on Discipline, Manners and Morals, composed
of two faculty members and one student, all appointed by
the Dean or Principal, as the case may be, to investigate
cases of violations of this Code of Conduct referred to it
by the corresponding Dean or Principal.
Section 4. In cases involving a student and a faculty
member, the Dean or the Principal concerned shall
conduct the hearing. Where the case involves a student
and an administrative personnel, the President may
appoint a Committee to investigate the same which shall
submit its findings and recommendations to the President
for decision.
Thus, the petitioner Mercado contends that in his capacity
as Dean of the Institute of Technology, he is charged
under Sections 1 and 4 of Article VI of the Code of
Conduct of FEU with the duty of conducting a hearing in
cases involving a student and a faculty member in
furtherance of the universitys legally recognized right to

discipline its students.
On the other hand, the private respondents submit that
to apply the above-quoted rules to the instant case would
be capricious, malicious, palpably unreasonable,
arbitrary or a clear abuse of discretion17Memorandum
for Private Respondents, p. 6, Rollo, p. 196. and that any
investigation by the school of the said incident will be
violative of the private respondents right to privacy and
peace of mind.18Ibid.The respondent judge opined that
the instant case falls under the general rule that the
power of the school ends at the border of its
campus.19CFI Decision, p. 5; Annex L, Petition, Rollo, p.
108. His basis is Section 9, paragraph 145 of the Manual
of Regulations for Private Schools the opening paragraph
of which states: Every private school is required to
maintain good school discipline. He explains thus:
What other interpretation could be placed on the phrase
school discipline except that it is a norm of action that
must be observed within a school. If the rules and
regulations provided by school authorities shall be
deemed to extend outside of school
_________________
17 Memorandum for Private Respondents, p. 6, Rollo, p.
196.
18 Ibid.
19 CFI Decision, p. 5; Annex L, Petition, Rollo, p. 108.
36
Angeles vs. Sison
premises and activities, the term school discipline would

be a misnomer. We must consider the fact that FEU as an
institution can exercise only such powers expressly
conferred, so that any authority not so given shall be
deemed to be withheld. In the absence of an express
provision on this matter, this Court could not see any
reason why paragraph 155 of the Service Manual relative
to public schools should not be applied by way of analogy
considering that there is actually no difference between a
private and a public school. The objective for the
promulgation of rules and regulations with respect to both
institutions are one and the same. Section 155, among
others, states:
School authorities are not, under ordinary circumstances,
warranted in applying school punishment of pupils for
acts committed outside of the jurisdiction of the school
building and grounds x x x As a rule x x x the authority
and responsibility of the school stop at the border of the
school grounds, and any action taken for acts committed
without these boundaries should in general be left to the
police authorities, the courts of justice and the family

concerned.
Of course, there are certain exceptions as correctly
pointed out by the defendants, which are also provided in
the same Section 155, but then, considering that
defendants moved for a summary judgment without
presenting any evidence to prove that the case of the
plaintiffs fall under any of the aforequoted exceptions, the
Court has no other alternative except to apply the
general rule.20Id., pp. 5-7; Rollo, pp. 108-110.Implicit in
Paragraph 155 of the Service Manual, Fourth Revision
quoted by the respondent judge and reproduced as
follows:
A pupil who has committed an immoral act outside of
the school jurisdiction would be a source of danger to
other pupils in the school building, and such pupil might
with reason be excluded from the school. There are
certain borderline cases, however, which are hard to
decide, and for which no definite rules can be laid down.
Should pupils in a concerted effort attempt to run a
teacher out of town or try to make life outside of school
unbearable for him, such action might well be taken as
having a direct and vital effect on the school and
therefore as coming under school discipline. Pupils
________________
20 Id., pp. 5-7; Rollo, pp. 108-110.
37
VOL. 112, FEBRUARY 16, 1982 37
Angeles vs. Sison
engaged in school matters elsewhere than on the school

grounds, such as school athletic affairs and trips,
parades, literary contests, etc., are considered under the
jurisdiction of the school.
is the recognition of the schools authority and power to
expel a pupil who has committed an immoral act outside
of the school premises since the latter would be a source
of danger to other pupils in the school building.
If the power to expel or to punish an immoral act
committed outside the school premises is recognized in
this provision, why is the power to investigate the act of a
student in mauling a faculty member outside the school
premises not be accorded the same recognition?
It is thus error for respondent judge to state that there is
nothing in the authorities relied upon by the defendants,
petitioners herein, which compels any school authority to
administratively discipline students for incidents
committed outside the school compound on an occasion
which is not school-sponsored or connected with any
activity of the school.
A college, or any school for that matter, has a dual
responsibility to its students. One is to provide
opportunities for learning and the other is to help them

grow and develop into mature, responsible, effective and
worthy citizens of the community. Discipline is one of the
means to carry out the second responsibility.
Thus, there can be no doubt that the establishment of an
educational institution requires rules and regulations
necessary for the maintenance of an orderly educational
program and the creation of an educational environment
conducive to learning. Such rules and regulations are
equally necessary for the protection of the students,
faculty, and property. The power of school officials to
investigate, an adjunct of its power to suspend or expel,
is a necessary corollary to the enforcement of such rules
and regulations and the maintenance of a safe and
orderly educational environment conducive to learning.
The respondent judge correctly stated that the general
rule is that the authority of the school is co-extensive
with its ter-
38
Angeles vs. Sison
ritorial jurisdiction, or its school grounds, so that any

action taken for acts committed outside the school
premises should, in general, be left to the police
authorities, the courts of justice, and the family

concerned.21Paragraph 155, Service Manual, 4th
Revision.However, this rule is not rigid or one without
exceptions. It is the better view that there are instances
when the school might be called upon to exercise its
power over its student or students for acts committed
outside the school and beyond school hours in the
following:
a) In cases of violations of school policies or regulations
occurring in connection with a school-sponsored activity
off-campus22Ibid.; or
b) In cases where the misconduct of the student involves
his status as a student or affects the good name or
reputation of the school.
Common sense dictates that the school retains its power
to compel its students in or off-campus to a norm of
conduct compatible with their standing as members of
the academic community. Hence, when as in the case at
bar, the misconduct complained of directly affects the
suitability of the alleged violators as students, there is no
reason why the school can not impose the same
disciplinary action as when the act took place inside the
campus.
There is a showing from the records of this case that the
proximate cause of the alleged mauling incident, subject
of the administrative investigation in question, is
attributable to the professor-student relationship of the
parties concerned.
The sworn statement23Annex A, Complaint, Original

Record, p. 6. of the petitioner Jose Angeles submitted to
the petitioner Dean Gilberto Mercado, as Head of the
Investigating Committee states, inter alia:
4. That sometime after the end of this first semester
mentioned earlier, Eduardo Picar under the influence of
liquor accosted me along the corridor of the Institute
building and asked for an ex________________
21 Paragraph 155, Service Manual, 4th Revision.
22 Ibid.
23 Annex A, Complaint, Original Record, p. 6.
39
VOL. 112, FEBRUARY 16, 1982 39
Angeles vs. Sison
planation why Mr. Garcia gave him a failing grade in Shop

302. I told him I had no idea.
5. That from this time on, said Picar stopped being
cordial to me and sometimes would look daggers at me
whenever we meet on the campus.
6. That also sometime last July 1975, Wilfredo Patawaran
accosted me along the corridors of the Technology
building and asked me to enroll him in my class. But I told

him that I had already enough students for one section.
7. That from this time on, this Patawaran avoided me
and together with Picar they would show their contempt
of me, by facial expressions, whenever we met on the
corridors of the Technology building or in the campus.
These statements clearly establish the necessity for an
administrative investigation of the alleged mauling
incident because it cannot be denied that the same is a
violation of the norms of decency and good taste which is
antithetical to one of the schools duties vis-a-vis the
family, that of developing the moral character of the
youth.24This even receives the aid and support of the
Government, see Section 4, Art. II, 1973
Constitution.Moreover, from the facts of record, the
alleged mauling of petitioner Jose Angeles at the Oak
Barrel Restaurant in Quiapo, Manila can be regarded as a
continuation or the climax of the alleged display of
animosities by private respondents Picar and Patawaran
towards Angeles which began at the corridors of the FEU
Institute of Technology building.
Precisely, the administrative investigation in question is
proper in order that the duly authorized school officials
can determine whether the continued presence of private
respondents, Picar and Patawaran, as students of FEU
and/or petitioner, Jose Angeles, as faculty member, within
the university premises is detrimental to the maintenance
of a moral climate conducive to learning.
Furthermore, the true test of a schools right to

investigate, or otherwise, suspend or expel a student for
a misconduct committed outside the school premises and
beyond school hours is not the time or place of the
offense, but its effect upon the
________________
24 This even receives the aid and support of the
Government, see Section 4, Art. II, 1973 Constitution.
40
Angeles vs. Sison
morale and efficiency of the school and whether it, in

fact, is adverse to the schools good order welfare and
the advancement of its students.
Likewise the power of the school over its students does
not cease absolutely when they leave the school
premises, and that conduct outside of school hours may
subject a student to school discipline if it directly affects
the good order and welfare of the school or has a direct
and immediate effect on the discipline or general welfare
of the school.
The private respondents averment that the dismissal of
the criminal case against private respondent Picar upon
the filing of the affidavit of desistance of petitioner Jose

Angeles has the effect of rendering this instant petition
moot and academic25Memorandum for Private
Respondents, p. 11; Rollo, p. 201. is unmeritorious. The
pendency or the dismissal of the criminal action does not
abate the administrative proceeding which involves the
same cause of action.26cf., Gonzales vs. Almodovar, 53
SCRA 124, 131 and Festejo vs. Crisologo, et. al., 17 SCRA
868. The administrative action before the school
authorities can proceed independently of the criminal
action because these two actions are based on different
considerations. In the former, the private respondents
suitability or propriety as a student which is the
paramount concern and interest of the school is involved,
while in the latter, what is at stake is his being a citizen
who is subject to the penal statutes and is the primary
concern of the State.
Hence, there being no withdrawal of the complaint filed
by petitioner Jose Angeles before the petitioner Dean
Gilberto Mercado, the administrative investigation should
proceed.
Therefore, as aptly stated by the petitioners27Petition, p.
3; Rollo, p. 10. to affirm the decision of the respondent
Judge would give nothing less than a license to students
of a school, public or private, to assault and maul their
teachers or professors without fear of being subjected to
discipline by the school as long as the assault takes place
off-campus or beyond school hours.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of First Instance of

Manila sought to be reviewed is hereby set aside and the
________________
25 Memorandum for Private Respondents, p. 11; Rollo, p.
201.
26 cf., Gonzales vs. Almodovar, 53 SCRA 124, 131 and
Festejo vs. Crisologo, et. al., 17 SCRA 868.
27 Petition, p. 3; Rollo, p. 10.
41
VOL. 112, FEBRUARY 16, 1982 41
Patricio vs. Bayog
writ of preliminary injunction issued by the respondent

judge is hereby dissolved, without pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Guerrero, MelencioHerrera and Plana, JJ., concur.
Decision set aside.
Notes.The Director of Private Schools is authorized to
publish the list of courses disapproved and the schools
offering them. (Yap vs. Carreon, 14 SCRA 100).
The Director of Private Schools has no liability for

publishing the list of disapproved courses and the schools
offering them. (Yap vs. Carreon, 14 SCRA 100).
A professor who fails to return to work with the College
where she is teaching within a reasonable time after
expiration of his leave of absence without pay, during
which she worked in another government agency upon
the latters request, is deemed to have abandoned his
teaching post. (Ramo vs. Elefao, 106 SCRA 236).
A college dean holding an appointment with a fixed term
cannot without his consent, be transferred before the end
of his term. He cannot be asked to accept an
appointment to another post even if it be dignified
[Angeles vs. Sison, 112 SCRA 26(1982)]

People vs. Ritter
G.R. No. 88582. March 5, 1991.*THIRD DIVISION.PEOPLE

OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. HEINRICH S.
RITTER, accused-appellant.
Criminal Law; Statutory Rape; Evidence; The evidence on
record consisting of the victims baptismal certificate
which shows that she was more than 12 years old at the
time of the alleged rape, is more convincing and worthy
of belief, than the oral declarations of witnesses
establishing the victims age to be less than 12 years old.
All the evidence presented by the prosecution showing
that Rosario Baluyot was less than 12 years old at the
time of the alleged incident are not adequate to establish
the exact date of birth, much less offset a documentary
record showing a different date. The defense presented
Rosario Baluyots baptismal certificate which the trial
court rejected as being hearsay and of no value. As
against the oral declarations made by interested
witnesses establishing Rosarios age to be less than 12
years old, the evidence on record is more convincing and
worthy of belief. (See Filinvest Land, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, 183 SCRA 664, 673 [1990]).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Where the victim was not

established to have been under 12 years of age at the
time of the alleged sexual violation, the usual elements of
rape must be proved.Since Rosario was not established
to have been under 12 years of age at the time of the
alleged sexual violation, it was necessary to prove that
the usual elements of rape were present; i.e. that there
was force or intimidation or that she was deprived of
reason or otherwise unconscious in accordance with
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. We agree with the
defense that there was no proof of such facts. On the
contrary, the evidence shows that Rosario submitted
herself to the sexual advances of the appellant. In fact,
she appears to have consented to the act as she was paid
P300.00 the next morning while her companion, Jessie
Ramirez was paid P200.00 (T.S.N. p. 50, January 6, 1988).
The environmental circumstances coupled with the
testimonies and evidence presented in court clearly give
the impression that Rosario Baluyot, a poor street child,
was a prostitute inspite of her tender age. Circumstances
in life may have forced her to submit to sex at such a
young age but the circumstances do not come under the
purview of force or intimidation needed to convict for
rape.
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
691
VOL. 194, MARCH 5, 1991 691
People vs. Ritter
Same; Same; Same; Same; Circumstantial Evidence;

Before conviction can be had upon circumstantial
evidence, the circumstances proved should constitute an
unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable
conclusion pointing to the defendant, to the exclusion of
all others, as the author of the crime.The evidence for
the accused may be numerically less as against the
number of witnesses and preponderance of evidence
presented by the prosecution but there is no direct and
convincing proof that the accused was responsible for the
vibrator left inside the victims vagina which caused her
death seven (7) months after its insertion. What the
prosecution managed to establish were mere
circumstances which were not sufficient to overcome the
constitutional presumption of innocence. While
circumstantial evidence may suffice to support a
conviction it is imperative, though, that the following
requisites should concur: (a) There is more than one
circumstance; (b) The facts from which the inferences are
derived are proven; and (c) The combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt. (Rule 133, Sec. 4 Revised Rules of
Court) For the well-entrenched rule in evidence is that
before conviction can be had upon circumstantial
evidence, the circumstances proved should constitute an
unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable
conclusion pointing to the defendant, to the exclusion of
all others, as the author of the crime (People v. Subano,

73 Phil. 692 [1942]; Italics supplied). It must fairly
exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence
(Dorado v. Court of Appeals, 153 SCRA 420, 433 [1987]).
In this case the circumstantial evidence presented by the
prosecution does not conclusively point to the liability of
the appellant for the crime charged. (People vs. Tolentino,
supra)
Same; Same; Same; Same; Suspicions and possibilities
are not evidence, and therefore should not be taken
against the accused.The established facts do not
entirely rule out the possibility that the appellant could
have inserted a foreign object inside Rosarios vagina.
This object may have caused her death. It is possible that
the appellant could be the guilty person. However, the
Court cannot base an affirmance of conviction upon mere
possibilities. Suspicions and possibilities are not evidence
and therefore should not be taken against the accused.
(People v. Tolentino, supra) Well-established is the rule
that every circumstance favorable to the accused should
be duly taken into account. This rule applies even to
hardened criminals or those whose bizarre behaviour
violates the mores of civilized society. The evidence
against the accused must survive the test of reason. The
strongest suspicion must not be allowed to sway
judgment. (See Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593
[1986]). As stated in the case of People v. Ng,
692
People vs. Ritter
(142 SCRA 615 [1986]): x x x [F]rom the earliest years of

this Court, it has emphasized the rule that reasonable
doubt in criminal cases must be resolved in favor of the
accused. The requirement of proof beyond reasonable
doubt calls for moral certainty of guilt. It has been
defined as meaning such proof to the satisfaction of the
court, keeping in mind the presumption of innocence, as
precludes every reasonable hypothesis except that which
it is given to support. It is not sufficient for the proof to
establish a probability, even though strong, that the fact
charged is more likely to be true than the contrary. It
must establish the truth of the fact to a reasonable and
moral certainty___a certainty that convinces and satisfies
the reason and the conscience of those who are to act
upon it. (Moreno, Philippine Law Dictionary, 1972 Edition,
p. 379, citing U.S. v. Reyes, 3 Phil. 3). x x x In the instant
case, since there are circumstances which prevent our
being morally certain of the guilt of the appellant, he is,
therefore, entitled to an acquittal.
Same; Same; Damages; Moral and exemplary damages
awarded to the victims heirs despite acquittal of accused
on grounds of reasonable doubt.Furthermore, it does
not necessarily follow that the appellant is also free from
civil liability which is impliedly instituted with the criminal
action. (Rule III, Section 1) The well-settled doctrine is
that a person while not criminally liable, may still be
civilly liable. We reiterate what has been stated in Urbano
v. IAC, supra. x x x While the guilt of the accused in a

criminal prosecution must be established beyond
reasonable doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is
required in a civil action for damages. (Article 29, Civil
Code). The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil
liability of the accused only when it includes a declaration
that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did
not exist. (Padilla v. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 559). x x
x Rosario Baluyot is a street child who ran away from her
grandmothers house. Circumstances forced her to
succumb and enter this unfortunate profession.
Nonetheless, she has left behind heirs who have certainly
suffered mental anguish, anxiety and moral shock by her
sudden and incredulous death as reflected in the records
of the case. Though we are acquitting the appellant for
the crime of rape with homicide, we emphasize that we
are not ruling that he is innocent or blameless. It is only
the constitutional presumption of innocence and the
failure of the prosecution to build an airtight case for
conviction which saved him, not that the facts of unlawful
conduct do not exist. As earlier stated, there is the
likelihood that he did insert the vibrator whose end was
left inside Rosarios vaginal canal and that the vibrator
may have caused her death. True, we cannot convict on
probabilities or possibilities but civil liability does not
require proof
693
VOL. 194, MARCH 5, 1991 693
People vs. Ritter
beyond reasonable doubt. The Court can order the

payment of indemnity on the facts found in the records of
this case.
APPEAL from the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of
Olongapo City, Br. 73.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Esteban B. Bautista for accused-appellant.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The appellant challenges his conviction of the crime
involving a young girl of about 12 years old who had been
allegedly raped and who later died because of a foreign
object left inside her vaginal canal.
Heinrich Stefan Ritter was charged with the crime of rape
with homicide under an information which reads:
That on or about the tenth (10th) day of October, 1986
in the City of Olongapo, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused with lewd design and with intent to kill one
Rosario Baluyot, a woman under twelve (12) years of age,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have carnal knowledge of said Rosario Baluyot and
inserted a foreign object into the vaginal canal of said
Rosario Baluyot which caused her death shortly
thereafter, to the damage and prejudice of her relatives.

(66)
When arraigned, the accused pleaded Not Guilty.
Thereafter, the case was set for trial on the merits.
To prove the guilt of the accused, the prosecutor
presented the following witnesses, namely: (1) Jessie
Ramirez, (2) Maria Burgos y Turla, (3) P/Cpl. Mariano
Victoria, (4) Policarpio Baluyot, (5) Dr. Reino Rosete, (6)
Sumulong Daniel, (7) Jessica Herrera, (8) Sister Eva
Palencia, (9) Conrado Salonga, (10) Dr. Devonne Loop,
(11) Dr. Leo Cruz, (12) Paul Maclor, (13) Aida Sarmiento,
(14) Patricia Prollamanta, (15) Mel Santos, (16) Lorna
Limos, (17) Eduard Lee Bungarner, (18) Ronaldo Marquez,
(19) Tom Bonte, (20) 2nd Asst. City Fiscal Nini Alcala, (21)
1st Asst. City Fiscal Dorentino Z. Floresta, (22) Corazon
Caber, (23) Rodolfo Mercurio and (24) Fe Israel.
On the other hand, the defense offered in evidence
Exhibits
694
People vs. Ritter
1 to 24 and the testimonies of (1) Heinrich S. Ritter,

(2) Father Roque Villanueva, (3) Angelita Amulong, (4)
Gaspar Alcantara, (5) Dr. Val Barcinal and (6) Dr. Pedro C.
Solis.
The facts of the case upon which the lower court based
its finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt are
summarized in its decision, as follows:
The peoples evidence show that on October 10, 1986
about midnight, accused Heinrich Stefan Ritter brought a
boy and girl namely: Jessie Ramirez and Rosario Baluyot
inside his hotel room at MGM Hotel along Magsaysay
Drive, Olongapo City. These two (2) children were chosen
from among a bunch of street children. Once inside the
hotel room accused told them to take a bath. Jessie
Ramirez, alias Egan, was the first to take a bath and
when he came out Rosario Baluyot went to the bathroom
to do the same. While Rosario Baluyot was inside the
bathroom, accused Ritter took out some pictures
depicting dressed up young boys, and put them on top of
the table. Other things which were taken out and placed
on top of a table were three (3) other objects which he
described as like that of a vicks inhaler. One of these
objects the accused played with his hands and placed it
on his palms. The color of which is grayish blue which
turned out later to be the foreign object which was
inserted inside the vagina of Rosario Baluyot. The other
objects were later established to be anti-nasal inhalers
against pollution purchased by the accused in Bangkok
when he went there as a tourist. While Rosario was in the
bathroom, accused told Ramirez to lay down on bed, and
so did the accused. He then started masturbating the
young boy and also guided the boys hand for him to be
masturbated, so that they masturbated each other, while
they were both naked, and he gave Jessie Ramirez an
erection. When Rosario Baluyot came out of the
bathroom, she was told to remove her clothes by accused
and to join him in bed. The accused then placed himself
between the two (2) children and accused started
fingering Rosario.
At this time, Ramirez was already sleepy, but Rosario
touched him to call his attention. He looked, and he saw
accused placing his penis against the vagina of Rosario
and that he was trying to penetrate the vagina but it
would not fit. After what he saw, Ramirez did not anymore
bother to look because he was sleepy and fell asleep.
The following morning, the accused, whom the juveniles
described as an American, paid Ramirez alias Egan
P200.00 and Rosario P300.00. He then left them in the
hotel. After the American left, they went downstairs, and
Rosario told Egan that the American inserted something
in her vagina. But they could not do anything anymore,
695
VOL. 194, MARCH 5, 1991 695
People vs. Ritter
because the American had already left, and neither did

they report the matter to the police. Sometime the
following day, Jessie saw Rosario and he asked her
whether the object was already removed from her body
and Rosario said Yes. However, Jessie Ramirez claimed
that on the evening of that same date, he saw Rosario
and she was complaining of pain in her vagina and when
Egan asked her, she said that the foreign object was not
yet removed. Then there was another occasion wherein
Jessie was summoned and when he came he saw Rosario
writhing in pain and when he tried to talk to Rosario she
scolded him with defamatory remarks. Thereafter, he did
not see Rosario anymore because he already went home
to his aunts house who resided at Barrio Barretto and
resumed his studies in the primary grades.
On May 14, 1987, Gaspar Alcantara, a defense witness,
while garbage scavenging at Lot 21, near the gate of the
U.S. Naval Base saw Rosario at Magsaysay Drive near the
Happy Bake Shop near Lot 21, being ogled by people
because Rosarios skirt was bloodied and she was
unconscious and foul smelling. Since nobody helped
Rosario, he took pity on her condition and brought her to
the Olongapo City General Hospital in an unconscious
condition, via jeepney. He went to the Information desk
and he was the one who gave the personal circumstances
of Rosario as to her name, age, her residence as
Nagbakulaw, Lower Kalaklan, and Gaspar Alcantara
signed as guardian of Rosario, while Rosario was already
in the emergency room. Although Gaspar Alcantara
denied that he did not know the name of Rosario Baluyot

when he brought her to the hospital, this is belied by the
testimony of the Information clerk Lorna Limos, who was
then on duty. Limos testified that it was Alcantara who
supplied the personal circumstances of Rosario. The Court
gives more credence to the testimony of Miss Limos as
against Gaspar Alcantara who became a defense witness,
for the reason that through his own testimony, Gaspar
Alcantara claimed that even prior to May 14, 1987, he
had already known Rosario Baluyot for more than one (1)
year, because he has seen the said girl go to the house of
his twin brother, Melchor Alcantara, who is his immediate
neighbor. Rosario used to visit a girl by the name of Nora
who was then in the custody of his brother. His brother
Melchor was also living with their mother, brother and
sister-in-law and their two (2) children in his house.
Rosario as per Gaspars testimony even stays for one
week or a few days at his brothers house when she visits
Nora. So the Court can safely assume that of all the more
than one (1) year that he had regularly seen Rosario at
his brothers house, he must have already did come to
know the name of Rosario Baluyot including her age. In
his testimony in Court he stated that he even asked
Rosario for movie and softdrinks money which can safely
be concluded that he knows her very well. It is against
normal
696
People vs. Ritter
behavior especially to a Filipino who have a characteristic

of curiosity not to have found out the real name of the girl
he claims to know only as Tomboy.
While Rosario Baluyot was confined at the Olongapo City
General Hospital, nobody was attending to her since she
is a street child, having stowed away from the custody of
her grandmother. Three (3) good samaritans who belong
to religious and civic organizations, in the persons of
Jessica Herrera, Fe Israel and Sr. Eva Palencia, in one of
their missions in the hospital chanced upon Rosario
Baluyot who was all alone with no relatives attending to
her and after finding out that she was only 12 years old
decided to help her. After a short interview with Rosario,
regarding her name and age only because she clamped
up about her residence and her relatives, they decided to
help her by providing her the medicine she needed during
her confinement in readiness for an operation. It was Fe
Israel who was able to get the name and age of Rosario
Baluyot from Rosario Baluyot herself when she saw her
for the first time. For Fe Israel, the age of Rosario Baluyot
was an important factor because their program assisted
only indigent patients from infants up to 13 years old.
Rosarios first ailment at the Olongapo City General
Hospital was loose bowel movement and vomiting, which
was first suspected as gastro-enteritis, but which came
out later as symptoms of peritonitis due to a massive
infection in the abdominal cavity. Subsequently, on May

17, 1987, after she was examined by the physicians at
the hospital, it was found out that there was a foreign
object lodged in her vaginal canal and she had vaginal
discharge tinged with blood and foul smelling odor
emanating from her body. One of the doctors who
attended to her was Dr. Barcinal, an OB-GYNE. Dr.
Barcinal tried to extract the foreign object by means of a
forceps, but several attempts proved futile because said
object was deeply embedded in the vaginal canal and
was covered by tissues. Her abdomen was enlarged,
tender and distended, symptoms of peritonitis. The
patient was feverish and incoherent when she was
scheduled for operation on May 19, 1987, after the first
attempt for an operation on May 17 was aborted
allegedly because the consent of Dr. Reino Rosete, the
hospital director was not obtained. The surgeon who
operated on her was Dr. Rosete himself. He testified that
Rosario had to be operated even in that condition in order
to save her life. Her condition was guarded. This was
corroborated by Dr. Leo Cruz, the anesthesiologist during
Rosarios operation. It was in the evening of May 19 at
about 7:00 p.m. when Dr. Rosete opened her abdomen by
making a 5 inch incision on her stomach. He found out
that the fallopian tubes were congested with pus, and so
with the peritonieum, and the pelvic cavity, and patches
of pus in the liver, although the gallbladder and kidney
697
VOL. 194, MARCH 5, 1991 697

People vs. Ritter
appeared to have septicemia, poisoning of the blood. The

peritonitis and septicemia were traced to have been
caused through infection by the foreign object which has
been lodged in the intra-vaginal canal of Rosario. The
foreign object which was already agreed upon by both
parties that it is a portion of a sexual vibrator was
extracted from the vagina of Rosario while under
anesthesia. Said object was coated with tissues, pus and
blood. Dr. Rosete gave it to the assisting surgical nurse
for safekeeping and gave instructions to release it to the
authorized person. This object was shown by the nurse to
Dr. Leo Cruz. Dr. Rosete considered the operation
successful and the patient was alive when he left her
under Dr. Cruz. Dr. Cruz stayed with said patient in the
ward for about 30 minutes and thereafter he left. The
following day, Rosario got serious and it was Dr. Leo Cruz
who pronounced her death at 2:00 to 2:15 in the
afternoon of May 20, 1987.
Thereafter, a death certificate was prepared under the
direction of Dr. Cruz which was indicated therein that the
cause of death was cardio-respiratory arrest, secondary
to septicemia caused by the foreign object lodged in the
intra uteral vaginal canal of Rosario Baluyot.
The foreign object was washed by nurse Obedina, then
placed it in a transparent small jar and labelled Rosario
Baluyot. Jessica Herrera asked the nurse for the foreign

object, and it was given to her under proper receipt.
Herrera then showed the same to the persons who helped
financially Rosarios case, and afterwards she gave it to
Sister Eva Palencia. Sis. Palencia was in custody of the
said object until Mr. Salonga came and asked her for the
object.
After Rosario Baluyot died, Sis. Palencia and a companion
went to Gaspar Alcantara to ask him in locating the
relatives of Rosario. They were able to trace Rosarios
grandmother, Mrs. Maria Burgos Turla, and informed her
that her granddaughter was already dead and lying in
state at St. Martin Funeral Parlor. Mrs. Turla went there
with her son, who shouldered all the burial expenses for
Rosario.
Subsequently, Sis. Palencia, Fr. Cullens and Mr. Salonga
came to her residence at Sta. Rita and asked her if she
was interested in filing a case against the person who
caused the death of her granddaughter. Of course she
agreed. Hence, she was brought to the Fiscals (City)
Office to file the same.
After the case was filed against the herein accused, Atty.
Edmundo Legaspi with his messenger came to her house
and told her that the accused was willing to settle the
case, but that accused Ritter had only P15,000.00. The
old woman did not accept it because she knows that the
accused is liable to pay damages anyway. After that, she
received a letter from Atty. Legaspi telling her to get a
lawyer for her case. By this time, Mrs. Turla, who wanted
to have the case settled once and for all giving the
reason that she can no longer bear the situation, sent her
698
People vs. Ritter
nephew, Conrado Marcelo to Atty. Legaspi. Her nephew

obliged and told her that she will be paid at the office of
Atty. Legaspi. On a date not clear in the records, she went
with her nephew Conrado Marcelo, and Roberto Sundiam,
an assistant barangay tanod of Sta. Rita, and while they
were there, she saw Ritter arrive at the law office. Ritter
and Atty. Legaspi talked at the office near the bathroom,
and thereafter Ritter left. After he left, Atty. Legaspi told
Rosarios grandmother that they are willing to settle for
P20,000.00, but that Ritter left only P15,000.00, so she
received the money with the understanding that there
was a balance of P5,000.00 yet. She was made to sign a
statement, and she was asked to change the age of her
granddaughter Rosario. With the document prepared, she
and the lawyers messenger went to the Fiscals office to
have it subscribed, and was subscribed before an
assistant city fiscal. But the balance of P5,000.00 was not
paid, because later on Atty. Legaspi became the OIC of
Olongapo City and he could no longer attend to it. Atty.
Legaspi, during one of the hearings before the Court even

apologized to her.
As to the case, P/Cpl Marino Victoria, as criminal
investigator of Station A, was directed by Col. Daos,
Station Commander of the Olongapo Police Department
to make a follow up of the case of Rosario Baluyot. On the
other hand, since the suspect who inserted the foreign
object inside Rosarios vagina was said to be an
American, the NISRA, Subic Naval Base also conducted its
investigation headed by criminal investigator Agent
Conrado Salonga. Coordinating with the local police and
with Sister Eva Palencia, since Rosario was a street child
at Magsaysay Drive, they rounded up about 43 street
children and from some of them they learned that Rosario
Baluyot was with Jessie Ramirez with an American at the
MGM Hotel when the foreign object was inserted in her
vagina. After finding Jessie Ramirez, they asked him about
Rosario Baluyot. They found out that indeed he was with
Rosario Baluyot sometime before Christmas of 1986 with
an American, who brought them to the said hotel. Jessie
Ramirez was taken inside the U.S. Naval Base, Olongapo
City and took his statement. Then he was brought to Mr.
Edward Lee Bungarner, a cartographer, and out of the
description supplied by Ramirez, a composite drawing
was photocopied and copies thereof were distributed to
the local police and to the sentries at the gate of the U.S.
Naval Base. Some American servicemen who had
resemblance to the composite drawing were
photographed and these were shown to Jessie Ramirez,
but the result was negative. Aside from the physical

description by Ramirez about the appearance of the
suspect, he also described him as having the mannerisms
of a homo-sexual.
After obtaining information that foreign homo-sexuals
frequented Ermita, Manila, and thinking that the so-called
American may be
699
VOL. 194, MARCH 5, 1991 699
People vs. Ritter
European or Australian national, the team composed of

Agent Salonga, Mr. Heinsell, P/Cpl Marino Victoria and
P/Cpl Andres Montaon, Jessie Ramirez and Michael
Johnson, another juvenile, proceeded to Manila. They first
went to the Manila NISRA Office, and thereafter checked
in a hotel. That was on September 23, 1987. On the first
night, they went to Luneta Park where foreign homosexuals were said to be frequenting, but the result was
negative. Then on September 25, at about 11:00 p.m.,
while they were standing at the corner of A. Mabini and
M.H. del Pilar Street, a male caucasian who looked like a
homo-sexual stopped by admiringly infront of the two (2)
juveniles, Ramirez and Johnson. Jessie Ramirez then
reported to Mr. Salonga that this foreigner had a similarity
with the American suspect, so the two minors were
instructed to follow the foreigner and to strike a

conversation. They did, and when they returned, Jessie
Ramirez told them that indeed the said foreigner was the
one who brought him and Rosario Baluyot to the MGM
Hotel. Bobby Salonga told Ramirez that this foreigner had
no beard while the one previously described by Ramirez
had a beard. Jessie Ramirez told them that maybe he
have just shaved it off. The said caucasian then entered a
bar, and after several minutes he came out, and Jessie
Ramirez upon his signal with his thumbs up, as a signal to
confirm that the said foreigner is the suspect, arrested
Ritter and brought him to the Manila Western Police
District. It could be mentioned at this stage that in this
operation they were accompanied by two (2) policemen
from the Western Police District. The foreigner was hand
cuffed and was told that he was a suspect for Rape with
Homicide. After the arrest, they first went to the pension
house of the suspect in Ermita, Manila to get his shoulder
bag which contained his personal belongings, and from
there they brought him to the Western Police Department.
At the said police headquarters, they were allowed a
permissive search by the foreigner of his clutch bag and
his small shoulder bag and confiscated his passport, I.D.,
3 inhalers, money in the form of dollars and travellers
checks amounting about $1,500.00 and about P100.00,
all duly receipted for. From the passport they learned that
the suspects name was Heinrich Stefan Ritter, an
Austrian national. During the questioning of Ritter,
Salonga and his team already left the headquarters and
went to their hotel, because at this time Jessie Ramirez
was already shaking with fear after he identified the

accused.
The following day, they brought the accused to Olongapo
and was detained at the Olongapo City Jail. The case for
Rape with Homicide was filed against him at the City
Fiscal of Olongapo. At the preliminary investigation,
accused was assisted by his own counsel. The private
complainant was Maria Burgos Turla because it was she
who
700
People vs. Ritter
had custody of Rosario Baluyot after her mother Anita

Burgos died on January 12, 1982, and their father
Policarpio Baluyot had left them under her custody. When
this case was filed, the fathers whereabouts was
unknown, and he only appeared when the trial of this
case before the Court was already in progress. And upon
his (Policarpio Baluyot) own admission, he only learned
about the death of his daughter Rosario Baluyot from the
newspaper, long after Rosario was already gone.
The defense tried to dislodge the case by claiming that
there could be no crime of Rape with Homicide because
the suspect was described as an American while Ritter is
an Austrian. Also advanced by the defense is that, it is a

case of mistaken identity. That Rosario Baluyot was at the
time of the commission of the offense, already more than
13 years old, she having been born on December 26,
1973 as per baptismal certificate, wherein it appears that
Rosario Baluyot was baptized on December 25, 1974 and
was born on December 26, 1973 as testified to by Fr.
Roque Villanueva of St. James Parish Church who issued
the Baptismal Certificate, having custody and possession
of the book of baptism for the year 1975, but admitted
that he had no personal knowledge about the matters or
entries entered therein. Likewise, the defenses stand is
that the accused cannot be liable for Homicide because a
vibrator is not a weapon of death but it is a thing for the
purpose of giving sexual pleasure, and that the death of
Rosario Baluyot was due to the incompetence of Dr.
Rosete, the surgeon and Director of the Olongapo City
General Hospital, who operated on her. (Rollo, pp. 109116)
On March 29, 1989, the trial court rendered its decision.
The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the
Court holds, that the prosecution has established the
GUILT of the accused beyond reasonable doubt for the
crime of Rape with Homicide as defined and penalized in
Art. 335 No. 3 of the Revised Penal Code, and hereby
sentences HEINRICH STEFAN RITTER to a penalty of
RECLUSION PERPETUA, to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased in the sum of SIXTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P60,000.00) Philippine Currency, and TEN THOUSAND

PESOS (P10,000.00) by way of attorneys fees to the
private prosecutors and to pay the costs. (Rollo, p. 126)
The accused now comes to this Court on the following
assigned errors allegedly committed by the court:
701
VOL. 194, MARCH 5, 1991 701
People vs. Ritter
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT THE ALLEGED OFFENSE
WAS COMMITTED ON OCTOBER 10, 1986 AND THAT IT
WAS ACCUSED-APPELLANT WHO COMMITTED IT.
II
DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT ROSARIO BALUYOT WAS
LESS THAN TWELVE (12) YEARS OLD WHEN THE ALLEGED
OFFENSE WAS COMMITTED AND IN HOLDING THAT THERE
WAS RAPE WITH HOMICIDE.
III
DISCRETION IN GIVING CREDENCE TO AND NOT
REJECTING THE PROSECUTIONS EVIDENCE AND IN NOT

UPHOLDING THAT OF THE DEFENSE AND ACQUITTING THE
ACCUSED.
Inasmuch as it is the bounden duty of this Court to affirm
a judgment of conviction only if the guilt of the accused
has been proved beyond reasonable doubt, it behooves
us to exert the most painstaking effort to examine the
records in the light of the arguments of both parties if
only to satisfy judicial conscience that the appellant
indeed committed the criminal act (See People v.
Villapaa,161 SCRA 73 [1988]).
The appellant was convicted by the trial court of the
crime of rape with homicide of a young girl who died after
the rape because of a foreign object, believed to be a
sexual vibrator, left inside her vagina.
As stated by the trial court one crucial issue in this case is
the age of the victimwhether or not Rosario Baluyot
was less than twelve (12) years old at the time the
alleged incident happened on October 10, 1986. The age
is important in determining whether or not there was
statutory rape. Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code
defines the third type of rape as having carnal knowledge
of a woman under 12 years of age, in which case force,
intimidation, deprivation of reason or unconscious state
do not have to be present.
702

People vs. Ritter
The trial court found that Rosario was below 12 years old
when she was sexually abused by the accused and,
therefore, rape was committed inspite of the absence of
force or intimidation.
In resolving the issue, the trial court put great weight on
the testimonies of the victims grandmother and father
who testified that she was born on December 22, 1975.
These oral declarations were admitted pursuant to then
Rule 130, Section 33 of the Rules of Court where, in the
absence of a birth certificate, the act or declaration about
pedigree may be received in evidence on any notable fact
in the life of a member of the family. Since birth is a
matter of pedigree within the rule which permits the
admission of hearsay evidence, oral declarations are
therefore admissible as proof of birth (Decision, p. 54).
The grandmother, Maria Burgos Turla, testified that she
remembered Rosarios birth date because her brother
died in Pampanga and her daughter, Anita (Rosarios
mother) was the only one who failed to attend the funeral
because the latter has just given birth allegedly to
Rosario (T.S.N. p. 8, Jan. 13, 1988).
The father likewise testified that as far as he could
remember, Rosario was born on December 22, 1975
(T.S.N., p. 4, Jan. 27, 1988) and he was certain that
Rosario was more than one (1) year old when she was
baptized (T.S.N., p. 45, Jan. 27, 1988). The trial court
further added that their testimony is supported by the
clinical record and the death certificate indicating that
she was 12 years old when she was admitted at the
Olongapo City General Hospital for treatment. The age
was supplied by Rosarios alleged guardian, Gaspar
Alcantara to the hospitals clinical record clerk, Lorna
Limos. Fe Israel, a social worker who interviewed Rosario
Baluyot also testified that she was told by Rosario that
she was 12 years old. The trial court accepted this as
adequate evidence of the truth. Moreover, Jessie Ramirez,
the principal witness in this case declared that he was
born on September 5, 1973 and that he was older than
Rosario Baluyot. Therefore, since he was 13 years old in
1986, Rosario must have been less than 12 yeas old in
1986. (Decision, p. 55)
The trial court concluded that the oral declarations of the
grandmother and father supported by other independent
evidence such as the clinical record, death certificate and
the
703
VOL. 194, MARCH 5, 1991 703
People vs. Ritter
testimonies of Fe Israel and Jessie Ramirez, rendered the

baptismal certificate presented by the defense without
any probative or evidentiary value. (Decision, p. 55)
The findings of the trial court with respect to Rosario
Baluyots age cannot stand the application of evidentiary
rules.
The trial court relied on Section 33, Rule 130 (now Section
40 of Rule 130 of the 1989 Revised Rules of Court).
For oral evidence to be admissible under this Rule, the
requisites are:
(1) That the declarant must be dead or outside of the
Philippines or unable to testify;
(2) That pedigree is in issue;
(3) That the person whose pedigree is in question must
be related to the declarant by birth or marriage;
(4) That the declaration must be made before the
controversy occurred or ante litem motam; and
(5) That the relationship between the declarant and the
person whose pedigree is in question must as a general
rule be shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration.
These requirements were not satisfied by the evidence
for the prosecution nor do the declarations fall within the
purview of the rule.
The victims grandmother and father whose declarations

regarding Rosarios age were admitted by the trial court
are both alive, in the Philippines and able to testify as
they both did testify in court. Their declarations were
made at the trial which is certainly not before the
controversy arose. The other witnesses who testified on
Rosarios age are not members of the victims family. The
testimonies of Rosarios relatives must be weighed
according to their own personal knowledge of what
happened and not as hearsay evidence on matters of
family history.
At this point, we find the evidence regarding Rosarios
age of doubtful value.
The trial court justified the admissibility of the
grandmothers testimony pursuant to the ruling laid down
in U.S. v. Bergantino, (3 Phil., 118 [1903]) where the
Court accepted the testimony of the mother that her
daughter was 14 years old and 4 months old. The mother
stated that she knew the age because
704
People vs. Ritter
the child was born about the time of the cholera epidemic
of 1889. This was not hearsay, but came from one who
had direct knowledge of the childs birth.
It is however, equally true that human memory on dates
or days is frail and unless the day is an extraordinary or
unusual one for the witness, there is no reasonable
assurance of its correctness. (People v. Dasig, 93 Phil.
618, 632 [1953])
With respect to the grandmothers testimony, the date of
the brothers death or funeral was never established,
which indicates that the day was rather insignificant to be
remembered. The fathers declaration is likewise not
entirely reliable. His testimony in court does not at all
show that he had direct knowledge of his daughters
birth. He was certain though that she was more than one
(1) year old at the time she was baptized.
The other witnesses are not at all competent to testify on
the victims age, nor was there any basis shown to
establish their competence for the purpose. The clinical
records were based on Gaspar Alcantaras incompetent
information given when he brought the victim to the
hospital. Alcantara came to know her only about a year
before her death. He had absolutely no knowledge about
the circumstances of Rosarios birth. The death certificate
relied upon by the trial court was merely based on the
clinical records. It is even less reliable as a record of birth.
All the evidence presented by the prosecution showing
that Rosario Baluyot was less than 12 years old at the
time of the alleged incident are not adequate to establish

the exact date of birth, much less offset a documentary
record showing a different date.
The defense presented Rosario Baluyots baptismal
certificate which the trial court rejected as being hearsay
and of no value. As against the oral declarations made by
interested witnesses establishing Rosarios age to be less
than 12 years old, the evidence on record is more
convincing and worthy of belief. (See Filinvest Land, Inc.
v. Court of Appeals, 183 SCRA 664, 673 [1990]).
By virtue of a subpoena duces tecum and ad
testificandum, issued by the lower court to the St. James
Parish Church, Subic, Zambales, Fr. Roque Villanueva a
Roman Catholic priest testified and stated that he is the
head of said parish. He brought with him Baptismal
Register No. 9 entitled Liber Baptisno-
705
VOL. 194, MARCH 5, 1991 705
People vs. Ritter
rum, a latin term for baptismal book or record. On page

151, No. 3 of the said Registry Book, there appears the
name of Rosario Baluyot who was baptized on December
25, 1974, and born on December 26, 1973. Parents are
Policarpio Baluyot and Anita Burgos, residents of Subic,
Zambales. Edita R. Milan appears as the only sponsor

with Olongapo City as her address.
In the case of Macadangdang v. Court of Appeals (100
SCRA 73 [1980]), we held that:
xxx
xxx
xxx
In our jurisprudence, this Court has been more definite

in its pronouncements on the value of baptismal
certificates. It thus ruled that while baptismal and
marriage certificates may be considered public
documents, they are evidence only to prove the
administration of the sacraments on the dates therein
specifiedbut not the veracity of the status or
declarations made therein with respect to his kinsfolk
and/or citizenship (Paa v. Chan, L-25945, Oct. 31, 1967).
Again, in the case of Fortus v. Novero (L-22378, 23 SCRA
1331 [1968]), this Court held that a baptismal certificate
is conclusive proof only of the baptism administered, in
conformity with the rites of the Catholic Church by the
priest who baptized the child, but it does not prove the
veracity of the declarations and statements contained in
the certificate that concern the relationship of the person
baptized. Such declarations and statements, in order that
their truth may be admitted, must indispensably be
shown by proof recognized by law. (At pp. 84-85)
In the same light, the entries made in the Registry Book
may be considered as entries made in the course of
business under Section 43 of Rule 130, which is an
exception to the hearsay rule. The baptisms administered
by the church are one of its transactions in the exercise of

ecclesiastical duties and recorded in a book of the church
during the course of its business. (U.S. v. de Vera, 28 Phil.
105 [1914] Hence, the certificate (Exhibit 22) presented
by the defense that Rosario Baluyot was baptized on
December 25, 1974 may be admitted in evidence as
proof of baptism. Policarpio Baluyot, the victims father
testified that he had in his possession a baptismal
certificate different from the one presented in court.
However, no other baptismal record was ever presented
to prove a date different from that brought by the official
custodian. Since the baptismal certificate states that
Rosario was baptized on December 25, 1974, it is
therefore
706
People vs. Ritter
highly improbable that Rosario could have been born on

December 22, 1975. She could not have been baptized
before she was born. Exhibit 22 may be proof only of
baptism but it puts a lie to the declaration that Rosario
was born in 1975. With the fathers assertion that Rosario
was more than one (1) year old when she was baptized,
we are then more inclined to agree that Rosario was born
in 1973 as stated in the Baptismal Registry. In the case of
People v. Rebancos (172 SCRA 425 [1989]), the Court

stated:
xxx
xxx
xxx
x x x Although no birth certificate was presented

because her birth had allegedly not been registered, her
baptismal certificate, coupled by her mothers testimony,
was sufficient to establish that Mary Rose was below
twelve years old when she was violated by Rebancos.
(At. p. 426)
Unfortunately, in the instant case, nobody could
corroborate the date on a more reliable document as to
Rosarios birth which could serve as sufficient proof that
she was born on December 26, 1973. Therefore, she was
more than 12 years old at the time of the alleged incident
on October 10, 1986.
Moreover, it is not incumbent upon the defense to prove
Rosarios age. The burden of proof lies on the prosecution
to prove that Rosario was less than 12 years old at the
time of the alleged incident in a charge of statutory rape.
The prosecution failed in this respect.
Since Rosario was not established to have been under 12
years of age at the time of the alleged sexual violation, it
was necessary to prove that the usual elements of rape
were present; i.e. that there was force of intimidation or
that she was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious
in accordance with Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code.
We agree with the defense that there was no proof of

such facts. On the contrary, the evidence shows that
Rosario submitted herself to the sexual advances of the
appellant. In fact, she appears to have consented to the
act as she was paid P300.00 the next morning while her
companion, Jessie Ramirez was paid P200.00 (T.S.N. p.
50, January 6, 1988). The environmental circumstances
coupled with the testimonies and evidence presented in
court clearly give the impression that Ro-
707
VOL. 194, MARCH 5, 1991 707
People vs. Ritter
sario Baluyot, a poor street child, was a prostitute inspite

of her tender age. Circumstances in life may have forced
her to submit to sex at such a young age but the
circumstances do not come under the purview of force or
intimidation needed to convict for rape.
In view of these clear facts which the prosecution failed to
refute, no rape was committed. But was Ritter guilty of
homicide?
The trial court justified its ruling by saying that the death
of the victim was a consequence of the insertion of the
foreign object into the victims vagina by the appellant.
We now ask Was the appellant responsible for the sexual

vibrator left inside Rosarios vagina which led to her
death?
The trial court convicted the accused based on
circumstantial evidence. Unfortunately, the
circumstances are capable of varying interpretations and
are not enough to justify conviction.
Jessie Ramirez, the principal witness did not actually see
the object inserted in Rosarios vagina. Neither could he
identify the object (Exhibit C-2) taken from Rosario as
the same object which the appellant was holding at that
time of the alleged incident.
In his sworn statement given to the police investigator on
September 4, 1987, he answered that:
xxx
xxx
xxx
T Habang kayo ay nasa loob ng kuwarto ng otel,

mayroon ka bang napansin na inilabas ng kano sa
kanyang dala- dalahan kung mayroon man?
S Ang Amerikano ay may dala-dalang shoulder bag na
kulay itim, at napansin ko na may inilabas siya sa
kanyang bag na parang vicks inhaler, na kanyang
inamoy-amoy habang nasa otel kami at pagkatapos niya
ay inilapag niya sa lamiseta.
T Ilarawan mo nga sa akin ang bagay na nakita mong
inilabas ng Amerikano?
S Ito ay may habang tatlong pulgada at ang takip nito ay

may habang dalawang pulgada. Iyong takip ay bilog na
patulis at may tabang mga kalahating pulgada. Hindi ko
napansin ang hugis ng dulo ng bagay na may takip dahil
natatakpan ng kamay at ilong ng Amerikano.
T Ipinakikita ko sa iyo ang isang larawan. Tignan mong
708
People vs. Ritter
mabuti ang larawang ito at sabihin mo nga sa akin kung

makikilala mo ang mga bagay na nasa larawang ito, na
may kinalaman sa nakita mong kinuha ng Amerikano sa
kanyang bag?
S Napansin ko na ang kulay asul na bagay sa larawan ay
katulad na katulad noong takip ng bagay na inilabas ng
Amerikano sa kanyang bag. Kaya lang ay bakit naging
kulay asul gayong ng makita ko ito ay kulay puti?
(ExhibitA, p. 2; Italics Supplied)
Presumably, what Jessie Ramirez saw was merely the

Vicks inhaler which the appellant does not deny having
possessed at that time. He was certain that the object

was white. (T.S.N. p. 91, January 6, 1988)
Later, Ramirez retracted and corrected himself. He said
that it was grayish in color with color blue (Medyo kulay
abo na may kulay na parang blue). (T.S.N. p. 92, January
6, 1988) The inconsistency of the witness testimony
casts doubt as to the veracity of the statements made
especially when he answered on additional crossexamination that the reason why he concluded that
Exhibit C-2 was the same object being held by Ritter
was because it was the only one shown to him by the
prosecution (T.S.N. pp. 109-110, January 6, 1988). Jessie
Ramirez was not all certain about the sexual vibrator
because he did not actually see it in the possession of the
appellant.
What he merely remembers is the revelation made by
Rosario the next morning that the foreigner inserted
something inside her vagina. The trial court admitted
such statement as part of the res gestae. In a strained
effort to accept such statement as part of res gestae, the
trial court focused the test of admissibility on the lapse of
time between the event and the utterance. For the
average 13 years old, the insertion of a mechanical
device or anything for that matter into the vagina of a
young girl is undoubtedly startling. For Rosario and Jessie,
however, there must be more evidence to show that the
statement, given after a nights sleep had intervened,
was given instinctively because the event was so
startling. Res gestae does not apply. (Section 42, Rule

130, Rules of Court)
Even if it were established that the appellant did insert
something inside Rosarios vagina, the evidence is still
not adequate to impute the death of Rosario to the
appellants alleged act.
709
VOL. 194, MARCH 5, 1991 709
People vs. Ritter
Jessie Ramirez testified that Rosario was able to remove

the object inserted in her vagina. We quote:
Q Now, you also stated on direct examination that later
on Rosario even categorically admitted to you that she
wasalready able to remove the object allegedly inserted
inside her vagina, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
xxx
xxx
xxx
ATTY. CARAAN:
Q Will you kindly tell to this Honorable Court the exact
words used by Rosario Baluyot later on when you met her
when you asked her and when she told you that she
wasalready able to remove that object from her vagina?
A Oy, Jessie, natanggal na, she told me that. I asked

her, Was it already removed? And she answered, Yes, it
was removed. But the same night, she again complained
of pain of her stomach. She sent one of her friends to call
for me. And as a matter of fact, Tomboy was uttering
defamatory words against me as she was groaning in
pain. (TSN, Jan. 6, 1988, pp. 72-73)
This encounter happened on the night of the day

following the day after both children were invited by the
foreigner to the hotel. (T.S.N. p. 73, January 6, 1988).
Rosario was said to be groaning in pain so we can just
imagine the distress she was undergoing at this point in
time. If the device inserted by the appellant caused the
pain, it is highly inconceivable how she was able to
endure the pain and discomfort until May, 1987, seven
(7) months after the alleged incident. Evidence must not
only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but it
must be credible in itself such as the common experience
and observation of mankind can approve as probable
under the circumstances. (People vs. Patog, 144 SCRA
429 [1986]).
At this juncture, we find Dr. Pedro Solis testimony rather
significant. Dr. Pedro Solis, a witness for the defense is
considered an expert witness. (A Doctor of Medicine and
a graduate of the State University in 1940, a degree of
Bachelor of Laws and member of the Bar 1949, and a
graduate of the Institute of Criminology University. He
was awarded Post Graduate Diploma in Criminology in

1963, and also a graduate of United
710
People vs. Ritter
Nations Asia and Far East Asia Institute on the Prevention

of Crimes in Tokyo Japan 1965. He was appointed Medico
Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation in
1940 until 1944. He became Chief Medico Legal Officer in
1970 and became the Deputy Director of the NBI up to
1984. He is at present a Professorial Lecturer on Legal
Medicine at the UP, FEU, UE, and Fatima College of
Medicine; a Medico Legal Consultant of the PGH Medical
Center, Makati Medical Center, UERM Medical Center,
MCU Medical Center. He has been with the NBI for 43
years. He has attended no less than 13 conferences
abroad. He is the author of the textbooks entitled Legal
Medicine and Medical Jurisprudence.) With his
impressive legal and medical background, his testimony
is too authoritative to ignore. We quote the pertinent
portions of his testimony:
Q Now Dr. Solis, would you kindly go over this object
marked as Exh. C-2 which object was described as a part
of a sexual vibrator battery operated. Now, given this
kind of object, would you kindly tell us what would be the
proba ble effect upon a 12 years old girl when it is

inserted into her vagina?
A Well, this vibrator must be considered a foreign body
placed into a human being and as such be considered a
foreign object. As a foreign object, the tendency of the
body may be: No. 1expel the foreign bodyNo. 2.The
tendency of thebody is to react to that foreign body. One
of the reactions that maybe manifested by the person
wherein such foreign body is concerned is to cover the
foreign body with human tissue, in a way to avoid its
further injury to the body.
Now, the second reaction is irritation thereby producing
certain manifest symptoms and changes in the area
where theforeign body is located.
In severe cases, the symptoms manifestation might not
only be localized but may be felt all over the body, we
call it systemic reaction. Now, considering the fact that
this fore ign body as shown to me is already not
complete, this shows exposure of its different parts for
the body to react. If there is mechanism to cause the
foreign body to vibrate, there must be some sort of power
from within and thatpower must be a dry cell battery.
[The] composition of the battery are, manganese dioxide
ammonium, salts, water
711
VOL. 194, MARCH 5, 1991 711

People vs. Ritter
and any substance that will cause current flow. All of

these substances are irritants including areas of the
container and as such, the primary reaction of the body is
to cause irritation on the tissues, thereby inflammatory
changes develop and in all likelihood, aside from those
inflammatory changes would be a supervening infection
in a way that the whole generative organ of the woman
will suffer from diseased process causing her the
systemic reaction like fever, swelling of the area, and
other systemic symptoms. x x x. (TSN., pp. 13-15,
October 19, 1988)
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q Now, given this object, how long would it take, Doctor

before any reaction such as an infection would set in, how
many days after the insertion of this object in the vagina
of a 12 year old girl?
A In the example given to me, considering that one of the
ends is exposed, in a way that vaginal secretion has more
chance to get in, well, liberation of this irritant chemicals
would be enhanced and therefore in a shorter period of
time, there being this vaginal reaction.
Q How many days or weeks would you say would that
follow after the insertion?
A As I said, with my experience at the NBI, insertion of

any foreign body in the vaginal canal usually developed
within a period of two (2) weeks xxx.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q x x x [T]he subject in this case was allegedly raped,

and a sexual vibrator was inserted in her vagina on
October 10, 1986 and she was operated on, on May 19,
1987 the following year, so it took more than 7 months
before this was extracted, would you say that it will take
that long before any adverse infection could set-in inside
the vagina?
A Infection and inflamatory changes will develop in a
shorter time. (TSN., Oct. 19, 1988, p. 18)
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q When you said shorter, how long would that be,

Doctor?
A As I said, in my personal experience, hair pins,
cottonballs and even this lipstick of women usually, there
are only about two (2) weeks time that the patient suffer
some abnormal symptoms.
Q Now, considering that this is a bigger object to the
object that you mentioned, this object has a shorter time?
A Yes, Sir shorter time. (TSN., Oct. 19, 1988, p. 20)
712
People vs. Ritter
The trial court, however, ruled that there is no hard and

fast rule as to the time frame wherein infection sets in
upon insertion of a foreign body in the vagina canal. For
Dr. Solis, the time frame is not more than 10 months, and
this case is still within the said time frame.
A more generous time interval may be allowed in noncriminal cases. But where an accused is facing a penalty
of reclusion perpetua, the evidence against him cannot
be based on probabilities which are less likely than those
probabilities which favor him.
It should be clarified that the time frame depends upon
the kind of foreign body lodged inside the body. An
examination of the object gave the following results:
(1) Color: Blue
Size: (a) Circumference3.031
inches (b) Lengthapproximately
2.179 inches.
Composition: Showed the general
characteristics of a styrene-butadiene plastic.
(2) The specimen can be electrically operated by means

of a battery as per certification dated 01 June 1988,
signed by Mr. Rodolfo D. Mercurio, Shipboard Electrical
Systems Mechanics, Foreman II, SRF Shop 51, Subic (see
attached certification).
(3) No comparative examination was made on specimen
#1 and vibrator depicted in the catalog because no
actual physical dimensions and/or mechanical
characteristics were shown in the catalog. (Exhibit LL)
The vibrator end was further subjected to a macrophotographic examination on the open end portion which
revealed the following:
Result of Examination
Macro-photographic examination on the open end portion
of specimen #1 shows the following inscription:
MABUCHI MOTOR JAPAN RE 14 PAT (Exhibit MM)
From the above results, the subject object is certainly not
considered as inert and based on Dr. Solis testimony, it is
more likely that infection should set in much earlier.
Considering
713
VOL. 194, MARCH 5, 1991 713
People vs. Ritter
also that the object was inserted inside the vagina which
is part of the generative organ of a woman, an organ
which is lined with a very thin layer of membrane with
plenty of blood supply, this part of the body is more
susceptible to infection. (T.S.N. p. 34, October 19, 1988)
The truth of Dr. Solis testimony is more probable under
the circumstances of the case. We see no reason why his
opinions qualified by training and experience should not
be controlling and binding upon the Court in the
determination of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. (People
v. Tolentino, 166 SCRA 469 [1988]).
Dr. Barcinal, another witness for the defense also testified
that he examined Rosario Baluyot on May 17, 1986 as a
referral patient from the Department of Surgery to give
an OB-GYN clearance to the patient prior to operation.
(T.S.N. p. 6, September 28, 1988)
Q And how many times did you examine this patient
Rosario Baluyot on that day?
A I examined her twice on that day.
Q The first time that you examined her, what is the result
of your findings, if any?
A My first examination, I examined the patient inside the
delivery room. The patient was brought to the delivery
room wheel-chaired then from the wheel chair, the
patient was ambigatory (sic). She was able to walk from
the door to the examining table. On examination, the
patient is cons cious, she was fairly nourished, fairly
developed, she had fever, she was uncooperative at that

time and examination deals more on the abdomen which
shows slightly distended abdomen with muscle guarding
with tenderness all over, with maximum tenderness over
the hypogastric area. (T.S.N. p. 5, September 28, 1988)
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q What about your second examination to the patient,

what was your findings, if any?
A In my second examination, I repeated the internal
examin ation wherein I placed my index finger and middle
finger inside the vagina of the patient and was able to
palpate a hard object. After which, I made a speculum
examination wherein I was able to visualize the inner
portion of the vaginal canal, there I saw purulent foul
smelling, blood
714
People vs. Ritter
tints, discharge in the vaginal canal and a foreign body

invaded on the posterior part of the vaginal canal.
xxx
xxx
xxx
A I referred back to Dr. Fernandez about my findings and

he asked me to try to remove the said foreign object by
the use of forceps which I tried to do so also but I failed to
extract the same.
Q All this time that you were examining the patient
Rosario Baluyot both in the first and second instance,
Rosario Baluyot was conscious and were you able to talk
to her when you were examining her?
A Yes, sir.
Q And did you ask her why there is a foreign object lodge
inside her vagina?
A Yes, Sir I asked her.
Q And what did she tell you, if any?
A She said in her own words that GINAMIT AKO NG NEGRO AT SIYA ANG NAGLAGAY NITO.
Q Did she also tell you when, this Negro who used her
and who inserted and placed the foreign object on her
vagina?
A Yes, Sir I asked her and she said he used me three (3)
months ago from the time I examined her.
Q Now, you said that you referred the patient to the ward,
what happened next with your patient?
A To my knowledge, the patient is already scheduled on
operation on that date.
Q Meaning, May 17, 1987?
A Yes, Sir I was presuming that the patient would undergo

surgery after that?
(TSN, Sept. 28, 1988, pp. 8-9; Emphasis supplied)
The trial court debunked Dr. Barcinals testimony

considering Rosarios condition at that time. It ruled that
it is inconceivable that she would be striking a normal
conversation with the doctors and would be sitting on the
examination table since Gaspar Alcantara stated that
when he brought Rosario Baluyot to the hospital, she was
unconscious and writhing in pain.
It was not improbable for Rosario Baluyot to still be
conscious and ambulant at that time because there were
several instances testified to by different witnesses that
she was still able to talk prior to her operation:
(1) Fe Israel, a witness for the prosecution and a member
of
715
VOL. 194, MARCH 5, 1991 715
People vs. Ritter
the Olongapo Catholic Charismatic Renewal Movement

testified that as a member of this group she visits
indigent children in the hospital every Saturday and after

office hours on working days.
On the Saturday prior to Rosarios death which was May
17, she was still able to talk to Rosario Baluyot. In fact,
one of her groupmates helped Rosario go to the comfort
room to urinate. (T.S.N., pp. 16-19, May 25, 1988)
(2) Angelita Amulong, a witness for the defense is
another para social worker who worked at Pope John 23rd
Community Center under Sister Eva Palencia. In one of
her hospital visits, she encountered Rosario Baluyot in the
month of May, 1987. She actually saw a child who
happened to be Rosario Baluyot seated on the cement
floor and when she asked why she was seated there, she
was told that it was too hot in the bed. She saw Rosario
Baluyot for about 2 or 3 days successively. (T.S.N. pp. 1013, September 7, 1988)
(3) Gaspar Alcantara, the person who brought Rosario to
the hospital actually testified that she was conscious
(T.S.N. p. 36, September 14, 1988) but writhing in pain.
He took pity on her so he brought her to the hospital
(T.S.N. p. 12, September 14, 1988)
From the above testimonies, it is clear that Rosario was
still conscious and could still answer questions asked of
her although she was complaining of stomach pains.
Unfortunately, the medical attention given to her failed to
halt the aggravation of her condition. The operation on
May 19 was too late.
Rosario died because of septicemia, which in laymans

language is blood poisoning, and peritonitis, which is
massive infection, in the abdominal cavity caused by the
foreign object or the cut sexual vibrator lodged in the
vagina of the victim. This led to the infection from the
uterus to the fallopian tubes and into the peritoneum and
the abdominal cavity.
The trial court convicted the accused citing the rationale
of Article 4 of the RPC.
He who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil
caused.
But before the conviction is affirmed, we must first follow
the rule as stated in the case of Urbano vs. Intermediate
Appellate
716
People vs. Ritter
Court (157 SCRA 1 [1988]) to wit:

The rule is that the death of the victim must be the
direct, natural and logical consequence of the wounds
inflicted upon him by the accused. And since we are
dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the
accused caused the victims death must convince a

rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. (Italics supplied)
In People v. Tempongko, Jr., (144 SCRA 583, 592 [1986]),
we explained that:
xxx
xxx
xxx
The basic principle in every criminal prosecution is that

accusation is not synonymous with guilt. The accused is
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved by the
prosecution. If the prosecution fails, it fails utterly, even if
the defense is weak or, indeed, even if there is no
defense at all. The defendant faces the full panoply of
state authority with all The People of the Philippines
arrayed against him. In a manner of speaking, he goes to
bat with all the bases loaded. The odds are heavily
against him. It is important, therefore, to equalize the
positions of the prosecution and the defense by
presuming the innocence of the accused until the state is
able to refute the presumption by proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. (At. p. 592)
The evidence for the accused maybe numerically less as
against the number of witnesses and preponderance of
evidence presented by the prosecution but there is no
direct and convincing proof that the accused was
responsible for the vibrator left inside the victims vagina
which caused her death seven (7) months after its
insertion. What the prosecution managed to establish
were mere circumstances which were not sufficient to
overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence.
While circumstantial evidence may suffice to support a

conviction it is imperative, though, that the following
requisites should concur:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. (Rule
133, Sec. 4 Revised Rules of Court)
For the well-entrenched rule in evidence is that before
con-
717
VOL. 194, MARCH 5, 1991 717
People vs. Ritter
viction can be had upon circumstantial evidence, the

circumstances proved should constitute an unbroken
chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion
pointing to the defendant, to the exclusion of all others,
as the author of the crime (People v. Subano, 73 Phil. 692
[1942]; Italics supplied). It must fairly exclude every
reasonable hypothesis of innocence (Dorado v. Court of
Appeals, 153 SCRA 420, 433 [1987]). In this case the
circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution
does not conclusively point to the liability of the appellant

for the crime charged. (People v. Tolentino, supra)
We are aware of the wide publicity given to the plight of
Rosario Baluyot and how her death exemplified starkly
the daily terrors that most street children encounter as
they sell their bodies in order to survive. At an age when
innocence and youthful joys should preponderate in their
lives, they experience life in its most heartless and
inhuman form. Instead of nothing more than gentle
disappointments occupying their young minds, they daily
cope with tragedies that even adults should never be
made to carry.
It is with distressing reluctance that we have to seemingly
set back the efforts of Government to dramatize the
death of Rosario Baluyot as a means of galvanizing the
nation to care for its street children. It would have meant
a lot to social workers and prosecutors alike if one
pedophile-killer could be brought to justice so that his
example would arouse public concern, sufficient for the
formulation and implementation of meaningful remedies.
However, we cannot convict on anything less than proof
beyond reasonable doubt. The protections of the Bill of
Rights and our criminal justice system are as much, if not
more so, for the perverts and outcasts of society as they
are for normal, decent, and law-abiding people.
The requirement of proof which produces in an
unprejudiced mind moral certainty or conviction that the
accused did commit the offense has not been satisfied.
By way of emphasis, we reiterate some of the factors

arousing reasonable doubt:
1. The evidence on Rosario Baluyots baptism creates
reasonable doubt about her being less than 12 years old
when the carnal knowledge took place. If the evidence for
the prosecution is to be believed, she was not yet born on
the date she was
718
People vs. Ritter
baptized.
2. Since the proof of Rosarios being under 12 years of
age is not satisfactory, the prosecution has to prove
force, intimidation, or deprivation of reason in order to
convict for rape. There is no such proof. In fact, the
evidence shows a willingness to submit to the sexual act
for monetary considerations.
3. The only witness to the fact of Ritters placing a
vibrator inside the vagina of Rosario was Jessie Ramirez.
This witness did not see Ritter insert the vibrator. The
morning after the insertion, he was only told by Rosario
about it. Two days later, he allegedly met Rosario who
informed him that she was able to remove the object. And
yet, Ramirez testified that on the night of that second
encounter, he saw Rosario groaning because of pain in

her stomach. She was even hurling invectives. Ramirez
testimony is not only hearsay, it is also contradictory.
4. It was improbable, according to expert medical
testimony, for a foreign object with active properties to
cause pain, discomfort, and serious infection only after
seven months inside a young girls vaginal canal.
Infection would have set in much earlier. Jessie Ramirez
recalled that the incident happened in December of 1986.
(TSN., January 6, 1988, pp. 15-17) The evidence, however
shows that the appellant was not here in the Philippines
that December. As per the Commission on Immigration
Arrival and Departure Report, Heinrich Ritter arrived in
the Philippines on October 7, 1986 and left on October
12, 1986. He never returned until September 23, 1987
(Exhibits DD and EE). The incident could have
happened only in October, but then it would have been
highly improbable for the sexual vibrator to stay inside
the vagina for seven (7) months with the kind of serious
complications it creates.
5. The gynecologist who attended to Rosario during her
hospital confinement testified that she told him Ginamit
ako ng Negro at siya ang naglagay nito. The accused is
not a black.
Noteworthy is the fact that nothing was mentioned about
Rosarios activities after the hotel incident. Considering
Dr. Barcinals testimony indicating that she was used by
a Negro three (3) months prior to admission in the
hospital and Rosarios unfortunate profession, there is
always the possibility that she could have allowed herself

to be violated by this perverse kind of sexual behavior
where a vibrator or vibrators
719
VOL. 194, MARCH 5, 1991 719
People vs. Ritter
were inserted into her vagina between October, 1986 and

May, 1987.
Moreover, the long delay of seven (7) months after the
incident in reporting the alleged crime renders the
evidence for the prosecution insufficient to establish
appellants guilty connection with the requisite moral
certainty. (See People v. Mula Cruz, 129 SCRA 156
[1984]).
The established facts do not entirely rule out the
possibility that the appellant could have inserted a
foreign object inside Rosarios vagina. This object may
have caused her death. It is possible that the appellant
could be the guilty person. However, the Court cannot
base an affirmance of conviction upon mere possibilities.
Suspicions and possibilities are not evidence and
therefore should not be taken against the accused.
(People v. Tolentino, supra)
Well-established is the rule that every circumstance

favorable to the accused should be duly taken into
account. This rule applies even to hardened criminals or
those whose bizarre behaviour violates the mores of
civilized society. The evidence against the accused must
survive the test of reason. The strongest suspicion must
not be allowed to sway judgment. (See Sacay v.
Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593 [1986]). As stated in the
case of People v. Ng, (142 SCRA 615 [1986]):
x x x [F]rom the earliest years of this Court, it has
emphasized the rule that reasonable doubt in criminal
cases must be resolved in favor of the accused. The
requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt calls for
moral certainty of guilt. It has been defined as meaning
such proof to the satisfaction of the court, keeping in
mind the presumption of innocence, as precludes every
reasonable hypothesis except that which it is given to
support. It is not sufficient for the proof to establish a
probability, even though strong, that the fact charged is
more likely to be true than the contrary. It must establish
the truth of the fact to a reasonable and moral certainty
a certainty that convinces and satisfies the reason and
the conscience of those who are to act upon it. (Moreno,
Philippine Law Dictionary, 1972 Edition, p. 379, citing U.S.
v. Reyes, 3 Phil. 3). x x x
In the instant case, since there are circumstances which
prevent our being morally certain of the guilt of the
appellant, he is, therefore, entitled to an acquittal.
720
People vs. Ritter
This notwithstanding, the Court can not ignore the acts of

the appellant on the children, Jessie Ramirez and Rosario
Baluyot in October, 1986 at the MGM Hotel. Inspite of his
flat denials, we are convinced that he comes to this
country not to look at historical sights, enrich his intellect
or indulge in legitimate pleasures but in order to satisfy
the urgings of a sick mind.
With the positive identification and testimony by Jessie
Ramirez that it was the appellant who picked him and
Rosario from among the children and invited them to the
hotel; and that in the hotel he was shown pictures of
young boys like him and the two masturbated each other,
such actuations clearly show that the appellant is a
pedophile. When apprehended in Ermita, he was sizing up
young children. Dr. Solis defined pedophilia in his book
entitled Legal Medicine, 1987 edition, as follows:
PedophiliaA form of sexual perversion wherein a
person has the compulsive desire to have sexual
intercourse with a child of either sex. Children of various
ages participate in sexual activities, like fellatio,
cunnilingus, fondling with sex organs, or anal sexual
intercourse. Usually committed by a homosexual between
a man and a boy the latter being a passive partner.
Ritter was prosecuted for rape with homicide and not

pedophilia, assuming this is a crime by itself. Pedophilia is
clearly a behavior offensive to public morals and violative
of the declared policy of the state to promote and protect
the physical, moral, spiritual and social well-being of our
youth. (Article II, Section 13, 1987 Constitution) (Harvey
v. Defensor Santiago, 162 SCRA 840, 848 [1989]).
Pedophiles, especially thrill seeking aliens have no place
in our country.
In this case, there is reasonable ground to believe that
the appellant committed acts injurious not only to Rosario
Baluyot but also to the public good and domestic
tranquility of the people. The state has expressly
committed itself to defend the right of children to
assistance and special protection from all forms of
neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation and other conditions
prejudicial to their development. (Art. XV, Section 3 [2] x
x x (Harvey v. Santiago, supra). The appellant has abused
Filipino children, enticing them with money. The appellant
721
VOL. 194, MARCH 5, 1991 721
People vs. Ritter
should be expelled from the country. Furthermore, it does

not necessarily follow that the appellant is also free from
civil liability which is impliedly instituted with the criminal
action. (Rule III, Section 1) The well-settled doctrine is

that a person while not criminally liable, may still be
civilly liable. We reiterate what has been stated in Urbano
v. IAC, supra.
x x x While the guilt of the accused in a criminal
prosecution must be established beyond reasonable
doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is required in a
civil action for damages. (Article 29, Civil Code). The
judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the
accused only when it includes a declaration that the facts
from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.
(Padilla v. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 559).
The reason for the provisions of Article 29 of the Civil
Code, which provides that the acquittal of the accused on
the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt does not necessarily exempt him from
civil liability for the same act or omission, has been
explained by the Code Commission as follows:
The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a
criminal case also releases him from civil liability is one of
the most serious flaws in the Philippine legal system. It
has given rise to numberless instances of miscarriage of
justice, where the acquittal was due to a reasonable
doubt in the mind of the court as to the guilt of the
accused. The reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the
civil responsibility is derived from the criminal offense,
when the latter is not proved, civil liability cannot be
demanded.
This is one of those causes where confused thinking leads

to unfortunate and deplorable consequences. Such
reasoning fails to draw a clear line of demarcation
between criminal liability and civil responsibility, and to
determine the logical result of the distinction. The two
liabilities are separate and distinct from each other. One
affects the social order and the other, private rights. One
is for the punishment or correction of the offender while
the other is for the reparation of damages suffered by the
aggrieved party. The two responsibilities are so different
from each other that article 1813 of the present (Spanish)
Civil Code reads thus: There may be a compromise upon
the civil action arising from a crime; but the public action
for the imposition of the legal penalty shall not thereby
be extinguished. It is just and proper that, for the
purposes of the imprisonment of or fine
722
People vs. Ritter
upon the accused, the offense should be proved beyond

reasonable doubt. But for the purpose of indemnifying the
complaining party, why should the offense also be proved
beyond reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion or violation
of every private right to be proved only by a
preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved
person any less private because the wrongful act is also

punishable by the criminal law?
For these reasons, the Commission recommends the
adoption of the reform under discussion. It will correct a
serious defect in our law. It will close up an inexhaustible
source of injusticea cause for disillusionment on the
part of the innumerable persons injured or wronged.
Rosario Baluyot is a street child who ran away from her
grandmothers house. Circumstances forced her to
succumb and enter this unfortunate profession.
Nonetheless, she has left behind heirs who have certainly
suffered mental anguish, anxiety and moral shock by her
sudden and incredulous death as reflected in the records
of the case. Though we are acquitting the appellant for
the crime of rape with homicide, we emphasize that we
are not ruling that he is innocent or blameless. It is only
the constitutional presumption of innocence and the
failure of the prosecution to build an airtight case for
conviction which saved him, not that the facts of unlawful
conduct do not exist. As earlier stated, there is the
likelihood that he did insert the vibrator whose end was
left inside Rosarios vaginal canal and that the vibrator
may have caused her death. True, we cannot convict on
probabilities or possibilities but civil liability does not
require proof beyond reasonable doubt. The Court can
order the payment of indemnity on the facts found in the
records of this case.
The appellant certainly committed acts contrary to
morals, good customs, public order or public policy (see
Article 21 Civil Code). As earlier mentioned, the appellant

has abused Filipino children, enticing them with money.
We can not overstress the responsibility for proper
behavior of all adults in the Philippines, including the
appellant towards young children. The sexual exploitation
committed by the appellant should not and can not be
condoned. Thus, considering the circumstances of the
case, we are awarding damages to the heirs of Rosario
Baluyot in the amount of P30,000.00.
723
VOL. 194, MARCH 5, 1991 723
People vs. Ritter
And finally, the Court deplores the lack of criminal laws

which will adequately protect street children from
exploitation by pedophiles, pimps, and, perhaps, their
own parents or guardians who profit from the sale of
young bodies. The provisions on statutory rape and other
related offenses were never intended for the relatively
recent influx of pedophiles taking advantage of rampant
poverty among the forgotten segments of our society.
Newspaper and magazine articles, media exposes,
college dissertations, and other studies deal at length
with this serious social problem but pedophiles like the
appellant will continue to enter the Philippines and
foreign publications catering to them will continue to
advertise the availability of Filipino street children unless

the Government acts and acts soon. We have to acquit
the appellant because the Bill of Rights commands us to
do so. We, however, express the Courts concern about
the problem of street children and the evils committed
against them. Something must be done about it.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Appellant HEINRICH STEFAN RITTER is
ACQUITTED on grounds of reasonable doubt. The
appellant is ordered to pay the amount of P30,000.00 by
way of moral and exemplary damages to the heirs of
Rosario Baluyot. The Commissioner of Immigration and
Deportation is hereby directed to institute proper
deportation proceedings against the appellant and to
immediately expel him thereafter with prejudice to
reentry into the country.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan (C.J., Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin and Davide,
Jr., JJ, concur.
Judgment reversed and set aside.
Note.The force employed by appellant on 12-year old
complainant was sufficient to instill fear in her to submit
to his lustful desires. (People vs. Alamo, 130 SCRA 46.)
[People vs. Ritter, 194 SCRA 690(1991)]

Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr.
G.R. No. 101083. July 30, 1993.*EN BANC.JUAN ANTONIO,

ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA,
minors, and represented by their parents ANTONIO and
RIZALINA OPOSA, ROBERTA NICOLE SADIUA, minor,
represented by her parents CALVIN and ROBERTA SADIUA,
CARLO, AMANDA SALUD and PATRISHA, all surnamed
FLORES, minors and represented by their parents ENRICO
and NIDA FLORES, GIANINA DITA R. FORTUN, minor,
represented by her parents SIGFRID and DOLORES
FORTUN, GEORGE II and MA. CONCEPCION, all surnamed
MISA, minors and represented by their parents GEORGE
and MYRA MISA, BENJAMIN ALAN V. PESIGAN, minor,
represented by his parents ANTONIO and ALICE PESIGAN,
JOVIE MARIE ALFARO, minor, represented by her parents
JOSE and MARIA VIOLETA ALFARO, MARIA CONCEPCION T.
CASTRO, minor, represented by her parents FREDENIL
and JANE CASTRO, JOHANNA DESAMPARADO, minor,
represented by her parents JOSE and ANGELA
DESAMPARADO, CARLO JOAQUIN T. NARVASA, minor,
represented by his parents GREGORIO II and CRISTINE
CHARITY NARVASA, MA. MARGARITA, JESUS IGNACIO, MA.
ANGELA and MARIE GABRIELLE, all surnamed SAENZ,
minors, represented by their parents ROBERTO and
AURORA SAENZ, KRISTINE, MARY ELLEN, MAY, GOLDA

MARTHE and DAVID IAN, all surnamed KING, minors,
represented by their parents MARIO and HAYDEE KING,
DAVID, FRANCISCO and THERESE VICTORIA, all surnamed
ENDRIGA, minors, represented by their parents BALTAZAR
and TERESITA ENDRIGA, JOSE MA. and REGINA MA., all
surnamed ABAYA, minors, represented by their parents
ANTONIO and MARICA ABAYA, MABILIN, MARIO, JR. and
MARIETTE, all surnamed CARDAMA, minors, represented
by their parents MARIO and LINA CARDAMA, CLARISSA,
ANN MARIE, NAGEL and IMEE LYN, all surnamed OPOSA,
minors and represented by their parents RICARDO and
MARISSA OPOSA, PHILIP JOSEPH, STEPHEN JOHN and
ISAIAH JAMES, all surnamed QUIPIT,
_______________
* EN BANC.
793
VOL. 224, JULY 30, 1993 793
minors, represented by their parents JOSE MAX and VILMI

QUIPIT, BUGHAW CIELO, CRISANTO, ANNA, DANIEL and
FRANCISCO, all surnamed BIBAL, minors, represented by
their parents FRANCISCO, JR. and MILAGROS BIBAL, and
THE PHILIPPINE ECOLOGICAL NETWORK, INC., petitioners,
vs. THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his

capacity as the Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, and THE
HONORABLE ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of
the RTC, Makati, Branch 66, respondents.
Remedial Law; Actions; Class Suit; The subject matter of
the complaint is of common and general interest not just
to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines; All the
requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under Section
12 Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present.
Petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 90-777 as a class suit.
The original defendant and the present respondents did
not take issue with this matter. Nevertheless, We hereby
rule that the said civil case is indeed a class suit. The
subject matter of the complaint is of common and
general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of
the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so
numerous, it becomes impracticable, if not totally
impossible, to bring all of them before the court. We
likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are numerous
and representative enough to ensure the full protection of
all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the
filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the
Revised Rules of Court are present both in the said civil
case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an
incident to the former.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Petitioners personality to sue
in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be
based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility
insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is

concerned.This case, however, has a special and novel
element. Petitioners minors assert that they represent
their generation as well as generations yet unborn. We
find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves,
for others of their generation and for the succeeding
generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in
behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based
on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar
as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded,
considers the rhythm and harmony of nature.
794
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The minors assertion

of their right to a sound environment constitutes at the
same time the performance of their obligation to ensure
the protection of that right for the generation to come.
Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to
the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full
enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little
differently, the minors assertion of their right to a sound
environment constitutes, at the same time, the
performance of their obligation to ensure the protection
of that right for the generations to come.
Constitutional Law; The complaint focuses on one specific

fundamental legal right; The right to a balanced and
healthful ecology.The complaint focuses on one specific
fundamental legal rightthe right to a balanced and
healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nations
constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the
fundamental law.
Same; Same; The right to a balanced and healthful
ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from
impairing the environment.The right to a balanced and
healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to
refrain from impairing the environment.
Same; Same; The right of the petitioners to a balanced
and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENRs duty to
protect and advance the said right.Thus, the right of the
petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced
and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENRs duty
under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and
functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code
of 1987to protect and advance the said right.
Same; Political Question; The political question doctrine is
no longer the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of
judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects
executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or
review.The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777
cannot be said to raise a political question. Policy
formulation or determination by the executive or
legislative branches of Government is not squarely put in
issue. What is principally involved is the enforcement of a
right vis-a-vis policies already formulated and expressed

in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that
the political question doctrine is no longer the
insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power
or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and
legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review.
795
VOL. 224, JULY 30, 1993 795
Same; Contracts; Non-impairment Clause; A timber

license is not a contract, property or a property right
protected by the due process clause of the Constitution.
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or
rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract,
property or a property right protected by the due process
clause of the Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The granting of license does
not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or
property rights.A license is merely a permit or privilege
to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a
contract between the authority, federal, state, or
municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is
granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor
does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation (37 C.J.
168). Thus, this Court held that the granting of license
does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or

property rights.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Timber licenses are not
contracts, the non-impairment clause cannot be invoked.
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the nonimpairment clause, cannot be invoked.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The non-impairment
clause must yield to the police power of the state.In
short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police
power of the state.
FELICIANO, J., Concurring Opinion:
Constitutional Law; The protection of the environment
including the forest cover of our territory is of extreme
importance for the country.I vote to grant the Petition
for Certiorari because the protection of the environment,
including the forest cover of our territory, is of extreme
importance for the country.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION for certiorari of the dismissal order
of the RTC of Makati, Br. 66.
Oposa Law Office for petitioners.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of

Filipinos to a balanced and healthful ecology which the
petition-
796
ers dramatically associate with the twin concepts of

inter-generational responsibility and inter-generational
justice. Specifically, it touches on the issue of whether
the said petitioners have a cause of action to prevent
the misappropriation or impairment of Philippine
rainforests and arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the
countrys vital life-support systems and continued rape of
Mother Earth.
The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-777
which was filed before Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila)
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial
Region. The principal plaintiffs therein, now the principal
petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by
their respective parents. Impleaded as an additional
plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a
domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized
for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted
action geared for the protection of our environment and
natural resources. The original defendant was the
Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the

Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR). His substitution in this petition by the new
Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was
subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the
petitioners.1Rollo, 164; 186. The complaint2Id., 62-65,
exclusive of annexes. was instituted as a taxpayers class
suit3Under Section 12, Rule 3, Revised Rules of Court.
and alleges that the plaintiffs are all citizens of the
Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the
full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource
treasure that is the countrys virgin tropical rainforests.
The same was filed for themselves and others who are
equally concerned about the preservation of said
resource but are so numerous that it is impracticable to
bring them all before the Court. The minors further
asseverate that they represent their generation as well
as generation yet unborn.4Rollo, 67. Consequently, it is
prayed for that judgment be rendered:
x x x ordering defendant, his agents, representatives
and other persons acting in his behalf to
_______________
1 Rollo, 164; 186.
2 Id., 62-65, exclusive of annexes.
3 Under Section 12, Rule 3, Revised Rules of Court.
4 Rollo, 67.
797
VOL. 224, JULY 30, 1993 797
(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the

country;
(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing or approving new timber license
agreements.
and granting the plaintiffs x x x such other reliefs just
and equitable under the premises.5Id., 74.The complaint
starts off with the general averments that the Philippine
archipelago of 7,100 islands has a land area of thirty
million (30,000.00) hectares and is endowed with rich,
lush and verdant rainforests in which varied, rare and
unique species of flora and fauna may be found; these
rainforests contain a genetic, biological and chemical pool
which is irreplaceable; they are also the habitat of
indigenous Philippine cultures which have existed,
endured and flourished since time immemorial; scientific
evidence reveals that in order to maintain a balanced and
healthful ecology, the countrys land area should be
utilized on the basis of a ratio of fifty-four per cent (54%)
for forest cover and forty-six per cent (46%) for
agricultural, residential, industrial, commercial and other
uses; the distortion and disturbance of this balance as a
consequence of deforestation have resulted in a host of
environmental tragedies, such as (a) water shortages

resulting from the drying up of the water table, otherwise
known as the aquifer, as well as of rivers, brooks and
streams, (b) salinization of the water table as a result of
the intrusion therein of salt water, incontrovertible
examples of which may be found in the island of Cebu
and the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive
erosion and the consequential loss of soil fertility and
agricultural productivity, with the volume of soil eroded
estimated at one billion (1,000,000,000) cubic meters per
annumapproximately the size of the entire island of
Catanduanes, (d) the endangering and extinction of the
countrys unique, rare and varied flora and fauna, (e) the
disturbance and dislocation of cultural communities,
including the disappearance of the Filipinos indigenous
cultures, (f) the siltation of rivers and seabeds and
consequential destruction of corals and other aquatic life
leading to a critical reduction in marine resource
productivity, (g) recurrent spells of drought as is presently
experienced by the entire
_______________
5 Id., 74.
798
country, (h) increasing velocity of typhoon winds which

result from the absence of windbreakers, (i) the flooding
of lowlands and agricultural plains arising from the
absence of the absorbent mechanism of forests, (j) the
siltation and shortening of the lifespan of multi-billion
peso dams constructed and operated for the purpose of
supplying water for domestic uses, irrigation and the
generation of electric power, and (k) the reduction of the
earths capacity to process carbon dioxide gases which
had led to perplexing and catastrophic climatic changes
such as the phenomenon of global warming, otherwise
known as the greenhouse effect.
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental
consequences of continued and deforestation are so
capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same
may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice. This
notwithstanding, they expressed their intention to
present expert witnesses as well as documentary,
photographic and film evidence in the course of the trial.
As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:
CAUSE OF ACTION
7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing
allegations.
8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some
sixteen (16) million hectares of rainforests constituting
roughly 53% of the countrys land mass.
9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there

remained no more than 1.2 million hectares of said
rainforests or four per cent (4.0%) of the countrys land
area.
10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000
hectares of virgin old-growth rainforests are left, barely
2.8% of the entire land mass of the Philippine archipelago
and about 3.0 million hectares of immature and
uneconomical secondary growth forests.
11. Public records reveal that defendants predecessors

have granted timber license agreements (TLAs) to
various corporations to cut the aggregate area of 3.89
million hectares for commercial logging purposes.
A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas
covered is hereto attached as Annex A.
12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about
200,000 hectares per annum or 25 hectares per hour
nighttime, Saturdays, Sundays and holidays included
the Philippines will be bereft of forest resources after the
end of this ensuing decade, if not earlier.
799
VOL. 224, JULY 30, 1993 799
13. The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious

injury and irreparable damage of this continued trend of
deforestration to the plaintiff minors generation and to
generations yet unborn are evident and incontrovertible.
As a matter of fact, the environmental damages
enumerated in paragraph 6 hereof are already being felt,
experienced and suffered by the generation of plaintiff
adults.
14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders
to cut and deforest the remaining forest stands will work
great damage and irreparable injury to plaintiffs
especially plaintiff minors and their successorswho may
never see, use, benefit from and enjoy this rare and
unique natural resource treasure.
This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation
and/or impairment of the natural resource property he
holds in trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors and
succeeding generations.
15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a
balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to
protection by the State in its capacity as the parens
patriae.
16. Plaintiffs have exhausted all administrative remedies
with the defendants office. On March 2, 1990, plaintiffs
served upon defendant a final demand to cancel all
logging permits in the country.
A copy of the plaintiffs letter dated March 1, 1990 is

hereto attached as Annex B.
17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the
existing TLAs, to the continuing serious damage and
extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.
18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant to
cancel the TLAs is an act violative to the rights of
plaintiffs, especially plaintiff minors who may be left with
a country that is desertified (sic), bare, barren and devoid
of the wonderful flora, fauna and indigenous cultures
which the Philippines has been abundantly blessed with.
19. Defendants refusal to cancel the aforementioned
TLAs is manifestly contrary to the public policy
enunciated in the Philippine Environmental Policy which,
in pertinent part, states that it is the policy of the State
(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions
under which man and nature can thrive in productive and
enjoyable harmony with each other;
(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements
of present and future generations of Filipinos and;
(c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality
that is conducive to a life of dignity and well being. (P.D.
1151, 6 June 1977)
20. Furthermore, defendants continued refusal to cancel
the aforementioned TLAs is contradictory to the
Constitutional policy of
800
the State to
a. effect a more equitable distribution of opportunities,
income and wealth and make full and efficient use of
natural resources (sic). (Section 1, Article XII of the
Constitution);
b. protect the nations marine wealth. (Section 2, ibid);
c. conserve and promote the nations cultural heritage
and resources (sic). (Section 14, Article XIV, id.);
d. protect and advance the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm
and harmony of nature. (Section 16, Article II. id.)
21. Finally, defendants act is contrary to the highest law
of humankindthe natural lawand violative of plaintiffs
right to self-preservation and perpetuation.
22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in law other than the instant action to arrest the
unabated hemorrhage of the countrys vital life-support
systems and continued rape of Mother Earth.6Rollo, 7073.On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary
Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint
based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have

no cause of action against him and (2) the issue raised by
the plaintiffs is a political question which properly
pertains to the legislative or executive branches of
Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the
Motion, the petitioners maintain that (1) the complaint
shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action, (2) the
motion is dilatory and (3) the action presents a justiciable
question as it involves the defendants abuse of
discretion.
On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order
granting the aforementioned motion to dismiss.7Annex
B of Petition; Id., 43-44. In the said order, not only was
the defendants claimthat the complaint states no
cause of action against him and that it raises a political
questionsustained, the respondent Judge further ruled
that the granting of the reliefs prayed for would result in
the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the
fundamental law of the land.
Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court and
ask this
_______________
6 Rollo, 70-73.
7 Annex B of Petition; Id., 43-44.
801
VOL. 224, JULY 30, 1993 801

Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the

ground that the respondent Judge gravely abused his
discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the parents of
the plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but
have also joined the latter in this case.8Paragraph 7,
Petition, 6; Rollo, 20.On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give
due course to the petition and required the parties to
submit their respective Memoranda after the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment in behalf of the
respondents and the petitioners filed a reply thereto.
Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and
unmistakably states a cause of action as it contains
sufficient allegations concerning their right to a sound
environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil
Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order
(E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR, Section 3 of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine
Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987
Constitution recognizing the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of
generational genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of
mans inalienable right to self-preservation and selfperpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners likewise
rely on the respondents correlative obligation, per
Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the peoples right

to a healthful environment.
It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent
Secretarys alleged grave abuse of discretion in granting
Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas
for logging than what is available involves a judicial
question.
Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the
Constitutions non-impairment clause, petitioners
maintain that the same does not apply in this case
because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise submit that
even if TLAs may be considered protected by the said
clause, it is well settled that they may still be revoked by
the State when public interest so requires.
On the other hand, the respondents aver that the
petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific
legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which
any relief is provided by law. They see nothing in the
complaint but vague and nebulous
_______________
8 Paragraph 7, Petition, 6; Rollo, 20.
802
allegations concerning an environmental right which

supposedly entitles the petitioners to the protection by
the state in its capacity as parens patriae. Such
allegations, according to them, do not reveal a valid
cause of action. They then reiterate the theory that the
question of whether logging should be permitted in the
country is a political question which should be properly
addressed to the executive or legislative branches of
Government. They therefore assert that the petitioners
recourse is not to file an action to court, but to lobby
before Congress for the passage of a bill that would ban
logging totally.
As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs,
respondents submit that the same cannot be done by the
State without due process of law. Once issued, a TLA
remains effective for a certain period of timeusually for
twenty-five (25) years. During its effectivity, the same
can neither be revised nor cancelled unless the holder
has been found, after due notice and hearing, to have
violated the terms of the agreement or other forestry
laws and regulations. Petitioners proposition to have all
the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite
hearing would be violative of the requirements of due
process.
Before going any further, We must first focus on some
procedural matters. Petitioners instituted Civil Case No.
90-777 as a class suit. The original defendant and the

present respondents did not take issue with this matter.
Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said civil case is
indeed a class suit. The subject matter of the complaint is
of common and general interest not just to several, but to
all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the
parties are so numerous, it becomes impracticable, if not
totally impossible, to bring all of them before the court.
We likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are
numerous and representative enough to ensure the full
protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the
requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under Section
12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present both
in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter
being but an incident to the former.
This case, however, has a special and novel element.
Petitioners minors assert that they represent their
generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find no
difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for
others of their generation and for the succeeding
generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue
803
VOL. 224, JULY 30, 1993 803
in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be

based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility
insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded,
considers the rhythm and harmony of nature. Nature
means the created world in its entirety.9Websters Third
New International Dictionary, unabridged, 1986, 1508.
Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter
alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management,
renewal and conservation of the countrys forest, mineral,
land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other
natural resources to the end that their exploration,
development and utilization be equitably accessible to
the present as well as future generations.10Title XIV
(Environment and Natural Resources), Book IV of the
Administrative Code of 1987, E.O. No. 292. Needless to
say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to
preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment
of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little
differently, the minors assertion of their right to a sound
environment constitutes, at the same time, the
performance of their obligation to ensure the protection
of that right for the generations to come.
The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been
addressed, We shall now proceed to the merits of the
petition.
After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a
meticulous consideration and evaluation of the issues
raised and arguments adduced by the parties, We do not
hesitate to find for the petitioners and rule against the

respondent Judges challenged order for having been
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction. The pertinent portions of the said order
read as follows:
xxx
After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the
Complaint, the Court cannot help but agree with the
defendant. For although we believe that plaintiffs have
but the noblest of all intentions, it (sic) feel short of
alleging, with sufficient definiteness, a specific legal right
they are seeking to enforce and protect, or a specific
legal wrong they are seeking to prevent and redress (Sec.
1, Rule 2, RRC). Furthermore, the Court notes that the
Complaint is replete with vague assumptions and
_______________
9 Websters Third New International Dictionary,
unabridged, 1986, 1508.
10 Title XIV (Environment and Natural Resources), Book IV
of the Administrative Code of 1987, E.O. No. 292.
804
vague conclusions based on unverified data. In fine,

plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action in its Complaint
against the herein defendant.
Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter
before it, being impressed with political color and
involving a matter of public policy, may not be taken
cognizance of by this Court without doing violence to the
sacred principle of Separation of Powers of the three (3)
co-equal branches of the Government.
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no
matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs
prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing
timber license agreements in the country and to cease
and desist from receiving, accepting, processing renewing
or approving new timber license agreements. For to do
otherwise would amount to impairment of contracts
abhored (sic) by the fundamental law.11Annex B of
Petition; Rollo, 43-44.We do not agree with the trial
courts conclusion that the plaintiffs failed to allege with
sufficient definiteness a specific legal right involved or a
specific legal wrong committed, and that the complaint is
replete with vague assumptions and conclusions based
on unverified data. A reading of the complaint itself belies
these conclusions.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal
rightthe right to a balanced and healthful ecology
which, for the first time in our nations constitutional
history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law.
Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly

provides:
SEC. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of
the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord
with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
This right unites with the right to health which is provided
for in the preceding section of the same article:
SEC. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to
health of the people and instill health consciousness
among them.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to
be found under the Declaration of Principles and State
Policies and
_______________
11 Annex B of Petition; Rollo, 43-44.
805
VOL. 224, JULY 30, 1993 805
not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is

less important than any of the civil and political rights
enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a
different category of rights altogether for it concerns
nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation

aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitionersthe
advancement of which may even be said to predate all
governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these
basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution
for they are assumed to exist from the inception of
humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the
fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded
fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced
and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as
state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby
highlighting their continuing importance and imposing
upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first
and protect and advance the second, the day would not
be too far when all else would be lost not only for the
present generation, but also for those to come
generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched
earth incapable of sustaining life.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with
it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the
environment. During the debates on this right in one of
the plenary sessions of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, the following exchange transpired between
Commissioner Wilfrido Villacorta and Commissioner
Adolfo Azcuna who sponsored the section in question:
MR. VILLACORTA:
Does this section mandate the State to provide sanctions
against all forms of pollutionair, water and noise
pollution?
MR. AZCUNA:
Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic)
environment necessarily carries with it the correlative
duty of not impairing the same and, therefore, sanctions
may be prov ided for impairment of environmental
balance.12Record of the Constitutional Commission, vol.
4, 913.
The said right implies, among many other things, the

judicious management and conservation of the countrys
forests.
_______________
12 Record of the Constitutional Commission, vol. 4, 913.
806
Without such forests, the ecological or environmental

balance would be irreversibly disrupted.
Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and
healthful ecology and the right to health, as well as the
other related provisions of the Constitution concerning
the conservation, development and utilization of the
countrys natural resources,13For instance, the Preamble

and Article XII on the National Economy and Patrimony.
then President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on 10 June
1987 E.O. No. 192,14The Reorganization Act of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources.
Section 4 of which expressly mandates that the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources shall
be the primary government agency responsible for the
conservation, management, development and proper use
of the countrys environment and natural resources,
specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral resources,
including those in reservation and watershed areas, and
lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and
regulation of all natural resources as may be provided for
by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits
derived therefrom for the welfare of the present and
future generations of Filipinos. Section 3 thereof makes
the following statement of policy:
SEC. 3. Declaration of Policy.It is hereby declared the
policy of the State to ensure the sustainable use,
development, management, renewal, and conservation of
the countrys forest, mineral, land, offshore areas and
other natural resources, including the protection and
enhancement of the quality of the environment, and
equitable access of the different segments of the
population to the development and use of the countrys
natural resources, not only for the present generation but
for future generations as well. It is also the policy of the
state to recognize and apply a true value system
including social and environmental cost implications

relative to their utilization, development and conservation
of our natural resources.
This policy declaration is substantially re-stated in Title
XIV, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987,15E.O.
No. 292. specifically in Section 1 thereof which reads:
_______________
13 For instance, the Preamble and Article XII on the
National Economy and Patrimony.
14 The Reorganization Act of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources.
15 E.O. No. 292.
807
VOL. 224, JULY 30, 1993 807
SEC. 1. Declaration of Policy.(1) The State shall ensure,

for the benefit of the Filipino people, the full exploration
and development as well as the judicious disposition,
utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the
countrys forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife,
off-shore areas and other natural resources, consistent
with the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological
balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the
environment and the objective of making the exploration,

development and utilization of such natural resources
equitably accessible to the different segments of the
present as well as future generations.
(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true
value system that takes into account social and
environmental cost implications relative to the utilization,
development and conservation of our natural resources.
The above provision stresses the necessity of
maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting
and enhancing the quality of the environment. Section 2
of the same Title, on the other hand, specifically speaks
of the mandate of the DENR; however, it makes particular
reference to the fact of the agencys being subject to law
and higher authority. Said section provides:
SEC. 2. Mandate.(1) The Department of Environment
and Natural Resources shall be primarily responsible for
the implementation of the foregoing policy.
(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in
charge of carrying out the States constitutional mandate
to control and supervise the exploration, development,
utilization, and conservation of the countrys natural
resources.
Both E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987
have set the objectives which will serve as the bases for
policy formulation, and have defined the powers and
functions of the DENR.
It may, however, be recalled that even before the

ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific statutes
already paid special attention to the environmental
right of the present and future generations. On 6 June
1977, P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) and
P.D. No. 1152 (Philippine Environment Code) were issued.
The former declared a continuing policy of the State (a)
to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions
under which man and nature can thrive in productive and
enjoyable harmony with each other, (b) to fulfill the
social,
808
economic and other requirements of present and future

generations of Filipinos, and (c) to insure the attainment
of an environmental quality that is conducive to a life of
dignity and well-being.16Section 1. As its goal, it speaks
of the responsibilities of each generation as trustee and
guardian of the environment for succeeding
generations.17Section 2. The latter statute, on the other
hand, gave flesh to the said policy.
Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they
represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear
as the DENRs dutyunder its mandate and by virtue of
its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the
Administrative Code of 1987to protect and advance the
said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the
correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect the
same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain
that the granting of the TLAs, which they claim was done
with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a
balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full protection
thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed
or granted.
A cause of action is defined as:
x x x an act or omission of one party in violation of the
legal right or rights of the other; and its essential
elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative
obligation of the defendant, and act or omission of the
defendant in violation of said legal right.18Ma-ao Sugar
Central Co. vs. Barrios, 79 Phil. 666 [1947]; Community
Investment and Finance Corp. vs. Garcia, 88 Phil. 215
[1951]; Remitere vs. Vda. de Yulo, 16 SCRA 251 [1966];
Caseas vs. Rosales, 19 SCRA 462 [1967]; Virata vs.
Sandiganbayan, 202 SCR...It is settled in this jurisdiction
that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the
complaint fails to state a cause of action,19Section 1(q),
Rule 16, Revised Rules of Court. the question submitted
to the court for resolution involves the sufficiency of the
facts alleged in the complaint itself. No other matter
should be considered; furthermore, the truth of
_______________
16 Section 1.
17 Section 2.
18 Ma-ao Sugar Central Co. vs. Barrios, 79 Phil. 666
[1947]; Community Investment and Finance Corp. vs.
Garcia, 88 Phil. 215 [1951]; Remitere vs. Vda. de Yulo, 16
SCRA 251 [1966]; Caseas vs. Rosales, 19 SCRA 462
[1967]; Virata vs. Sandiganbayan, 202 SCRA 680 [1991];
Madrona vs. Rosal, 204 SCRA 1 [1991].
19 Section 1(q), Rule 16, Revised Rules of Court.
809
VOL. 224, JULY 30, 1993 809
falsity of the said allegations is beside the point for the

truth thereof is deemed hypothetically admitted. The only
issue to be resolved in such a case is: admitting such
alleged facts to be true, may the court render a valid
judgment in accordance with the prayer in the complaint?
20Adamos vs. J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. 25 SCRA 529
[1968]; Virata vs. Sandiganbayan, supra; Madrona vs.
Rosal, supra. In Militante vs. Edrosolano,2139 SCRA 473,
479 [1971]. this Court laid down the rule that the
judiciary should exercise the utmost care and
circumspection in passing upon a motion to dismiss on

the ground of the absence thereof [cause of action] lest,
by its failure to manifest a correct appreciation of the
facts alleged and deemed hypothetically admitted, what
the law grants or recognizes is effectively nullified. If that
happens, there is a blot on the legal order. The law itself
stands in disrepute.
After a careful examination of the petitioners complaint,
We find the statements under the introductory affirmative
allegations, as well as the specific averments under the
sub-heading CAUSE OF ACTION, to be adequate enough
to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights.
On the basis thereof, they may thus be granted, wholly or
partly, the reliefs prayed for. It bears stressing, however,
that insofar as the cancellation of the TLAs is concerned,
there is the need to implead, as party defendants, the
grantees thereof for they are indispensable parties.
The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 cannot
be said to raise a political question. Policy formulation or
determination by the executive or legislative branches of
Government is not squarely put in issue. What is
principally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis
policies already formulated and expressed in legislation.
It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the political
question doctrine is no longer the insurmountable
obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the
impenetrable shield that protects executive and
legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review. The
second paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of the

Constitution states that:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice
to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave
_______________
20 Adamos vs. J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. 25 SCRA 529
[1968]; Virata vs. Sandiganbayan, supra; Madrona vs.
Rosal, supra.
21 39 SCRA 473, 479 [1971].
810
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of

jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the Government.
Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine
Political Law,221991 ed., 226-227. Mr. Justice Isagani A.
Cruz, a distinguished member of this Court, says:
The first part of the authority represents the traditional
concept of judicial power, involving the settlement of
conflicting rights as conferred as law. The second part of

the authority represents a broadening of judicial power to
enable the courts of justice to review what was before
forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the political
departments of the government.
As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and
particularly the Supreme Court, the power to rule upon
even the wisdom of the decisions of the executive and
the legislature and to declare their acts invalid for lack or
excess of jurisdiction because tainted with grave abuse of
discretion. The catch, of course, is the meaning of grave
abuse of discretion, which is a very elastic phrase that
can expand or contract according to the disposition of the
judiciary.
In Daza vs. Singson,23180 SCRA, 496, 501-502 [1989].
See also, Coseteng vs. Mitra, 187 SCRA 377 [1990];
Gonzales vs. Macaraig, 191 SCRA 452 [1990]; Llamas vs.
Orbos, 202 SCRA 844 [1991]; Bengzon vs. Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee, 203 SCRA 767 [1991]. Mr. Justice
Cruz, now speaking for this Court, noted:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection
becomes even less tenable and decisive. The reason is
that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented
before us was political in nature, we would still not be
precluded from resolving it under the expanded
jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper
cases, even the political question. Article VII, Section 1, of
the Constitution clearly provides: x x x.
The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing

the complaint is the non-impairment of contracts clause
found in the Constitution. The court a quo declared that:
_______________
22 1991 ed., 226-227.
23 180 SCRA, 496, 501-502 [1989]. See also, Coseteng
vs. Mitra, 187 SCRA 377 [1990]; Gonzales vs. Macaraig,
191 SCRA 452 [1990]; Llamas vs. Orbos, 202 SCRA 844
[1991]; Bengzon vs. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, 203
SCRA 767 [1991].
811
VOL. 224, JULY 30, 1993 811
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no

matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs
prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing
timber license agreements in the country and to cease
and desist from receiving, accepting, processing,
renewing or approving new timber license agreements.
For to do otherwise would amount to impairment of
contracts abhored (sic) by the fundamental law.24Rollo,
44.We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are
amazed, if not shocked, by such a sweeping
pronouncement. In the first place, the respondent
Secretary did not, for obvious reasons, even invoke in his

motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he had
done so, he would have acted with utmost infidelity to the
Government by providing undue and unwarranted
benefits and advantages to the timber license holders
because he would have forever bound the Government to
strictly respect the said licenses according to their terms
and conditions regardless of changes in policy and the
demands of public interest and welfare. He was aware
that as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, into every
timber license must be read Section 20 of the Forestry
Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides:
x x x Provided, That when the national interest so
requires, the President may amend, modify, replace or
rescind any contract, concession, permit, licenses or any
other form of privilege granted herein x x x.
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or
rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract,
property or a property right protected by the due process
clause of the Constitution. In Tan vs. Director of
Forestry,25125 SCRA 302, 325 [1983]. this Court held:
x x x A timber license is an instrument by which the
State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest
resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A
timber license is not a contract within the purview of the
due process clause; it is only a license or privilege, which
can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public
interest or public welfare as in this case.
_______________
24 Rollo, 44.
25 125 SCRA 302, 325 [1983].
812
A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what

otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract
between the authority, federal, state, or municipal,
granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither
is it property or a property right, nor does it create a
vested right; nor is it taxation (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this
Court held that the granting of license does not create
irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights
(People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576). x x x
We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. &
Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary:26190 SCRA 673,
684 [1990].x x x Timber licenses, permits and license
agreements are the principal instruments by which the
State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest
resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And
it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a
privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do
not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to
the particular concession area and the forest products

therein. They may be validly amended, modified,
replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when
national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed
contracts within the purview of the due process of law
clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No.
705, as amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R.
No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the nonimpairment clause, which reads:
SEC. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts
shall be passed.27Article III, 1987 Constitution.cannot be
invoked.
In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the
same are contracts, the instant case does not involve a
law or even an executive issuance declaring the
cancellation or modification of existing timber licenses.
Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be
invoked. Nevertheless, granting further that a law has
actually been passed mandating cancellations or
modifications, the same cannot still be stigmatized as a
violation of the
_______________
26 190 SCRA 673, 684 [1990].
27 Article III, 1987 Constitution.
813
VOL. 224, JULY 30, 1993 813
non-impairment clause. This is because by its very nature

and purpose, such a law could have only been passed in
the exercise of the police power of the state for the
purpose of advancing the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology, promoting their health
and enhancing the general welfare. In Abe vs. Foster
Wheeler Corp.,28110 Phil. 198, 203 [1960]; footnotes
omitted. this Court stated:
The freedom of contract, under our system of
government, is not meant to be absolute. The same is
understood to be subject to reasonable legislative
regulation aimed at the promotion of public health, moral,
safety and welfare. In other words, the constitutional
guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is
limited by the exercise of the police power of the State, in
the interest of public health, safety, moral and general
welfare.
The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs.
New York,29291 U.S. 502, 523, 78 L. ed. 940, 947-949.
quoted in Philippine American Life Insurance Co. vs.
Auditor General,3022 SCRA 135, 146-147 [1968]. to wit:
Under our form of government the use of property and
the making of contracts are normally matters of private
and not of public concern. The general rule is that both

shall be free of governmental interference. But neither
property rights nor contract rights are absolute; for
government cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his
property to the detriment of his fellows, or exercise his
freedom of contract to work them harm. Equally
fundamental with the private right is that of the public to
regulate it in the common interest.
In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the
police power of the state.31Ongsiako vs. Gamboa, 86
Phil. 50 [1950]; Abe vs. Foster Wheeler Corp., supra.; Phil.
American Life Insurance Co. vs. Auditor General, supra.;
Alalayan vs. NPC, 24 SCRA 172 [1968]; Victoriano vs.
Elizalde Rope Workers Union, 59 SCRA 54 1[974];
Kabili...Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court
did, how the non-impairment clause could apply with
respect to the prayer to
_______________
28 110 Phil. 198, 203 [1960]; footnotes omitted.
29 291 U.S. 502, 523, 78 L. ed. 940, 947-949.
30 22 SCRA 135, 146-147 [1968].
31 Ongsiako vs. Gamboa, 86 Phil. 50 [1950]; Abe vs.
Foster Wheeler Corp., supra.; Phil. American Life
Insurance Co. vs. Auditor General, supra.; Alalayan vs.
NPC, 24 SCRA 172 [1968]; Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope
Workers Union, 59 SCRA 54 1[974]; Kabiling vs. National
Housing Authority, 156 SCRA 623 [1987].
814
enjoin the respondent Secretary from receiving,

accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber
licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no contract would
have as of yet existed in the other instances. Moreover,
with respect to renewal, the holder is not entitled to it as
a matter of right.
WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant
Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of
respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case
No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The petitioners may
therefore amend their complaint to implead as
defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned
timber license agreements.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Regalado, Romero,
Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ., concur.
Narvasa (C.J.), No part; related to one of the parties.
Feliciano, J., Please see separate opinion concurring in
the result.
Puno, J., No part in the deliberations.

Vitug, J., No part; I was not yet with the Court when
the case was deliberated upon.
FELICIANO, J.: Concurring in the result
I join in the result reached by my distinguished brother in
the Court, Davide, Jr., J., in this case which, to my mind, is
one of the most important cases decided by this Court in
the last few years. The seminal principles laid down in
this decision are likely to influence profoundly the
direction and course of the protection and management
of the environment, which of course embraces the
utilization of all the natural resources in the territorial
base of our polity. I have therefore sought to clarify,
basically to myself, what the Court appears to be saying.
The Court explicitly states that petitioners have the locus
standi necessary to sustain the bringing and maintenance
of this suit (Decision, pp. 11-12). Locus standi is not a
function of petitioners claim that their suit is properly
regarded as a class suit. I understand locus standi to refer
to the legal interest which
815
VOL. 224, JULY 30, 1993 815
a plaintiff must have in the subject matter of the suit.

Because of the very broadness of the concept of class
here involvedmembership in this class appears to
embrace everyone living in the country whether now or in
the futureit appears to me that everyone who may be
expected to benefit from the course of action petitioners
seek to require public respondents to take, is vested with
the necessary locus standi. The Court may be seen
therefore to be recognizing a beneficiaries right of action
in the field of environmental protection, as against both
the public administrative agency directly concerned and
the private persons or entities operating in the field or
sector of activity involved. Whether such a beneficiaries
right of action may be found under any and all
circumstances, or whether some failure to act, in the first
instance, on the part of the governmental agency
concerned must be shown (prior exhaustion of
administrative remedies), is not discussed in the
decision and presumably is left for future determination in
an appropriate ca se.
The Court has also declared that the complaint has
alleged and focused upon one specific fundamental legal
rightthe right to a balanced and healthful ecology
(Decision, p. 14). There is no question that the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is fundamental and
that, accordingly, it has been constitutionalized. But
although it is fundamental in character, I suggest, with
very great respect, that it cannot be characterized as
specific, without doing excessive violence to language.
It is in fact very difficult to fashion language more

comprehensive in scope and generalized in character
than a right to a balanced and healthful ecology. The
list of particular claims which can be subsumed under this
rubric appears to be entirely open-ended: prevention and
control of emission of toxic fumes and smoke from
factories and motor vehicles; of discharge of oil, chemical
effluents, garbage and raw sewage into rivers, inland and
coastal waters by vessels, oil rigs, factories, mines and
whole communities; of dumping of organic and inorganic
wastes on open land, streets and thoroughfares; failure to
rehabilitate land after stripmining or open-pit mining;
kaingin or slash-and-burn farming; destruction of
fisheries, coral reefs and other living sea resources
through the use of dynamite or cyanide and other
chemicals; contamination of ground water resources; loss
of certain species of fauna and flora; and so on. The other
statements pointed out
816
by the Court: Section 3, Executive Order No. 192 dated 10

June 1987; Section 1, Title XIV, Book IV of the 1987
Administrative Code; and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6 June
1977all appear to be formulations of policy, as general
and abstract as the constitutional statements of basic

policy in Article II, Sections 16 (the rightto a balanced
and healthful ecology) and 15 (the right to health).
P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977, entitled The
Philippine Environment Code, is, upon the other hand, a
compendious collection of more specific environment
management policies and environment quality
standards (fourth Whereas clause, Preamble) relating
to an extremely wide range of topics:
(a) air quality management;
(b) water quality management:
(c) land use management;
(d) natural resources management and conservation
embracing:
(i) fisheries and aquatic resources;
(ii) wild life;
(iii) forestry and soil conservation;
(iv) flood control and natural calamities;
(v) energy development;
(vi) conservation and utilization of surface and ground
water
(vii) mineral resources
Two (2) points are worth making in this connection.
Firstly, neither petitioners nor the Court has identified the
particular provision or provisions (if any) of the Philippine

Environment Code which give rise to a specific legal right
which petitioners are seeking to enforce. Secondly, the
Philippine Environment Code identifies with notable care
the particular government agency charged with the
formulation and implementation of guidelines and
programs dealing with each of the headings and subheadings mentioned above. The Philippine Environment
Code does not, in other words, appear to contemplate
action on the part of private persons who are
beneficiaries of implementation of that Code.
As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners cause of
action as anchored on a legal right comprised in the
constitutional state-
817
VOL. 224, JULY 30, 1993 817
ments above noted, the Court is in effect saying that

Section 15 (and Section 16) of Article II of the
Constitution are self-executing and judicially enforceable
even in their present form. The implications of this
doctrine will have to be explored in future cases; those
implications are too large and far-reaching in nature even
to be hinted at here.
My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the

trial court, show a more specific legal righta right cast
in language of a significantly lower order of generality
than Article II (15) of the Constitutionthat is or may be
violated by the actions, or failures to act, imputed to the
public respondent by petitioners so that the trial court
can validly render judgment granting all or part of the
relief prayed for. To my mind, the Court should be
understood as simply saying that such a more specific
legal right or rights may well exist in our corpus of law,
considering the general policy principles found in the
Constitution and the existence of the Philippine
Environment Code, and that the trial court should have
given petitioners an effective opportunity so to
demonstrate, instead of aborting the proceedings on a
motion to dismiss.
It seems to me important that the legal right which is an
essential component of a cause of action be a specific,
operable legal right, rather than a constitutional or
statutory policy, for at least two (2) reasons. One is that
unless the legal right claimed to have been violated or
disregarded is given specification in operational terms,
defendants may well be unable to defend themselves
intelligently and effectively; in other words, there are due
process dimensions to this matter.
The second is a broader-gauge considerationwhere a
specific violation of law or applicable regulation is not
alleged or proved, petitioners can be expected to fall
back on the expanded conception of judicial power in the
second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the

Constitution which reads:
Section 1. x x x
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
(Emphases supplied)
818
When substantive standards as general as the right to a

balanced and healthy ecology and the right to health
are combined with remedial standards as broad ranging
as a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, the result will be, it is respectfully
submitted, to propel courts into the uncharted ocean of
social and economic policy making. At least in respect of
the vast area of environmental protection and
management, our courts have no claim to special
technical competence and experience and professional
qualification. Where no specific, operable norms and
standards are shown to exist, then the policy making

departmentsthe legislative and executive departments
must be given a real and effective opportunity to
fashion and promulgate those norms and standards, and
to implement them before the courts should intervene.
My learned brother Davide, Jr., J., rightly insists that the
timber companies, whose concession agreements or
TLAs petitioners demand public respondents should
cancel, must be impleaded in the proceedings below. It
might be asked that, if petitioners entitlement to the
relief demanded is not dependent upon proof of breach
by the timber companies of one or more of the specific
terms and conditions of their concession agreements (and
this, petitioners implicitly assume), what will those
companies litigate about? The answer I suggest is that
they may seek to dispute the existence of the specific
legal right petitioners should allege, as well as the reality
of the claimed factual nexus between petitioners specific
legal rights and the claimed wrongful acts or failures to
act of public respondent administrative agency. They may
also controvert the appropriateness of the remedy or
remedies demanded by petitioners, under all the
circumstances which exist.
I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari because the
protection of the environment, including the forest cover
of our territory, is of extreme importance for the country.
The doctrines set out in the Courts decision issued today
should, however, be subjected to closer examination.
Petition granted. Challenged order set aside. [Oposa vs.

Factoran, Jr., 224 SCRA 792(1993)]

Laguna Lake Development Authority vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 110120. March 16, 1994.*THIRD

DIVISION.LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY,
petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUEL JN.
SERAPIO, Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 127, Caloocan
City, HON. MACARIO A. ASISTIO, JR., City Mayor of
Caloocan and/or THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF CALOOCAN,
respondents.
Administrative Law; Sec. 16 E.O. 192; A Pollution
Adjudication Board (PAB) under the office of DENR
Secretary now assumes the powers and functions of the
National Pollution Control Commission with respect to
adjudication of pollution cases.The matter of
determining whether there is such pollution of the
environment that requires control, if not prohibition, of
the operation of a business establishment is essentially
addressed to the Environmental Management Bureau
(EMB) of the DENR which, by virtue of Section 16 of
Executive Order No. 192, series of 1987, has assumed the
powers and functions of the defunct National Pollution
Control Commission created under Republic Act No. 3931.
Under said Executive Order, a Pollution Adjudication
Board (PAB) under the Office of the DENR Secretary now
assumes the powers and functions of the National

Pollution Control Commission with respect to adjudication
of pollution cases.
Same; Same; Adjudication of pollution cases generally
pertains to the PAB except where the special law provides
for another forum; LLDA as a special charter has
responsibility to protect the inhabitants of the Laguna
Lake region from the deleterious effects of pollutants
emanating from the discharge of wastes from the
surrounding areas.As a general rule, the adjudication of
pollution cases generally pertains to the Pollution
Adjudication Board (PAB), except in cases where the
special law provides for another forum. It must be
recognized in this regard that the LLDA, as a specialized
administrative agency, is specifically mandated under
Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws to carry
out and make effective the declared national policy of
promoting and accelerating the development and
balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the
surrounding provinces of Rizal and Laguna and the cities
of San Pablo, Manila, Pasay, Quezon and Caloocan with
due regard and adequate provisions for environmental
management and control, preservation of the quality of
human life and ecological systems, and the prevention of
undue ecological disturbances, deterioration and
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
293
VOL. 231, MARCH 16, 1994 293

pollution. Under such a broad grant of power and

authority, the LLDA, by virtue of its special charter,
obviously has the responsibility to protect the inhabitants
of the Laguna Lake region from the deleterious effects of
pollutants emanating from the discharge of wastes from
the surrounding areas. In carrying out the aforementioned
declared policy, the LLDA is mandated, among others, to
pass upon and approve or disapprove all plans, programs,
and projects proposed by local government
offices/agencies within the region, public corporations,
and private persons or enterprises where such plans,
programs and/or projects are related to those of the LLDA
for the development of the region.
Same; Same; LLDA has the power and authority to issue a
cease and desist order under RA. 4850 and its
amendatory laws.Having thus resolved the threshold
question, the inquiry then narrows down to the following
issue: Does the LLDA have the power and authority to
issue a cease and desist order under Republic Act No.
4850 and its amendatory laws, on the basis of the facts
presented in this case, enjoining the dumping of garbage
in Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City. The
irresistible answer is in the affirmative.
Same; Same; Same.The cease and desist order issued
by the LLDA requiring the City Government of Caloocan to
stop dumping its garbage in the Camarin open dumpsite

found by the LLDA to have been done in violation of
Republic Act No. 4850, as amended, and other relevant
environment laws, cannot be stamped as an unauthorized
exercise by the LLDA of injunctive powers. By its express
terms, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No.
813 and Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983,
authorizes the LLDA to make, alter or modify orders
requiring the discontinuance of pollution. (Italics for
emphasis) Section 4, par. (d) explicitly authorizes the
LLDA to make whatever order may be necessary in the
exercise of its jurisdiction.
Same; Same; Same; The power to make, alter or modify
orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution is also
expressly bestowed upon LLDA by E.O. No. 927, series of
1983.To be sure, the LLDA was not expressly conferred
the power to issue an ex-parte cease and desist order
in a language, as suggested by the City Government of
Caloocan, similar to the express grant to the defunct
National Pollution Control Commission under Section 7 of
P.D. No. 984 which, admittedly was not reproduced in P.D.
No. 813 and E.O. No. 927, series of 1983. However, it
would be a mistake to draw therefrom the conclusion that
there is a denial of the power to issue the order in
question when the power to make, alter or modify orders
requiring the discontinuance of pollution is expressly and
clearly bestowed upon the LLDA by Executive Order No.
927, series of 1983.
294

Same; While it is a fundamental rule that an

administrative agency has only such powers as are
expressly granted to it by law, it is likewise a settled rule
that an administrative agency has also such powers as
are necessarily implied in the exercise of its express
powers.Assuming arguendo that the authority to issue a
cease and desist order were not expressly conferred by
law, there is jurisprudence enough to the effect that the
rule granting such authority need not necessarily be
express. While it is a fundamental rule that an
powers In the exercise, therefore, of its express powers
under its charter, as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body
with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region,
the authority of the LLDA to issue a cease and desist
order is, perforce, implied Otherwise, it may well be
reduced to a toothless paper agency.
Same; Same; PAB has the power to issue an ex-parte
cease and desist order when there is prima facie
evidence of an establishment exceeding the allowable
standards set by the anti-pollution laws of the country.
In this connection, it must be noted that in Pollution
Adjudication Board v. Court of Appeals, et al., the Court

ruled that the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) has the
power to issue an ex-parte cease and desist order when
there is prima facie evidence of an establishment
exceeding the allowable standards set by the antipollution laws of the country.
Same; Same; The relevant Pollution control statute and
implementing regulations were enacted and promulgated
in the exercise of that pervasive sovereign power to
protect the safety, health and general welfare and
comfort of the public, as well as the protection of plant
and animal life commonly designated as the police power.
Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law
and regulations in situations like that here presented
precisely because stopping the continuous discharge of
pollutive and untreated effluents into the rivers and other
inland waters of the Philippines cannot be made to wait
until protracted litigation over the ultimate correctness or
propriety of such orders has run its full course, including
multiple and sequential appeals such as those which
Solar has taken, which of course may take several years.
The relevant pollution control statute and implementing
regulations were enacted and promulgated in the
exercise of that pervasive, sovereign power to protect the
safety, health, and general welfare and comfort of the
public, as well as the protection of plant and animal life,
commonly designated as the police power. It is a constitu295
VOL. 231, MARCH 16, 1994 295
tional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of

procedural due process yield to the necessities of
protecting vital public interests like those here involved,
through the exercise of police power. x x x
Same; International Law; The Philippines is a party to the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and The Alma
Conference Declaration of 1978 which recognize health
as a fundamental human right.As a constitutionally
guaranteed right of every person, it carries the correlative
duty of non-impairment. This is but in consonance with
the declared policy of the state to protect and promote
the right to health of the people and instill health
consciousness among them. It is to be borne in mind
that the Philippines is party to the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights and the Alma Conference Declaration of
1978 which recognize health as a fundamental human
right.
Same; The issuance of cease and desist order by the
LLDA is the proper exercise of its power and authority
under its charter and its amendatory laws.The issuance,
therefore, of the cease and desist order by the LLDA, as a
practical matter of procedure under the. circumstances of
the case, is a proper exercise of its power and authority
under its charter and its amendatory laws. Had the cease
and desist order issued by the LLDA been complied with
by the City Government of Caloocan as it did in the first
instance, no further legal steps would have been

necessary.
Court of Appeals.
Alberto N. Hidalgo and Ma. Teresa T. Oledan for
petitioner.
The City Legal Officer & Chief Law Department for
Mayor Macario A. Asistio, Jr. and the City Government of
Caloocan.
ROMERO, J.:
The clash between the responsibility of the City
Government of Caloocan to dispose of the 350 tons of
garbage it collects daily and the growing concern and
sensitivity to a pollution-free environment of the residents
of Barangay Camarin, Tala Estate, Caloocan City where
these tons of garbage are dumped everyday is the hub of
this controversy elevated by the protagonists to the
296
Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) for

adjudication.
The instant case stemmed from an earlier petition filed
with this Court by Laguna Lake Development Authority
(LLDA for short) docketed as G.R. No. 107542 against the
City Government of Caloocan, et al. In the Resolution of
November 10, 1992, this Court referred G.R. No. 107542
to the Court of Appeals for appropriate disposition.
Docketed therein as CA-G.R. SP No. 29449, the Court of
Appeals, in a decision1Jorge S. Imperial, J., ponente,
Vicente V. Mendoza and Quirino D. Abad Santos, Jr., JJ.,
concurring. promulgated on January 29, 1993 ruled that
the LLDA has no power and authority to issue a cease and
desist order enjoining the dumping of garbage in
Barangay Camarin, Tala Estate, Caloocan City. The LLDA
now seeks, in this petition, a review of the decision of the
Court of Appeals.
The facts, as disclosed in the records, are undisputed.
On March 8, 1991, the Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of
Our Lady of Lourdes Parish, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan
City, filed a letter-complaint2Annex C, Petition, G.R. No.
107542, Rollo, pp. 47-51. with the Laguna Lake
Development Authority seeking to stop the operation of
the 8.6-hectare open garbage dumpsite in Tala Estate,
Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City due to its harmful
effects on the health of the residents and the possibility
of pollution of the water content of the surrounding area.
On November 15, 1991, the LLDA conducted an on-site

investigation, monitoring and test sampling of the
leachate3Websters Third International Dictionary (1986)
defines leachate as the liquid that has percolated
through soil or other medium. that seeps from said
dumpsite to the nearby creek which is a tributary of the
Marilao River. The LLDA Legal and Technical personnel
found that the City Government of Caloocan was
maintaining an open dumpsite at the Camarin area
without first securing an Environmental Compliance
Certificate (ECC) from the Environmental Management
Bureau (EMB) of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources, as required under Presidential Decree
_______________
1 Jorge S. Imperial, J., ponente, Vicente V. Mendoza and
Quirino D. Abad Santos, Jr., JJ., concurring.
2 Annex C, Petition, G.R. No. 107542, Rollo, pp. 47-51.
3 Websters Third International Dictionary (1986) defines
leachate as the liquid that has percolated through soil
or other medium.
297
VOL. 231, MARCH 16, 1994 297
No. 1586,4Establishing An Environment Impact Statement

System, Including Other Environmental Management
Related Measures and For Other Purposes (June 11,
1978). and clearance from LLDA as required under
Republic Act No. 4850,5An Act Creating The Laguna Lake
Development Authority, Prescribing Its Powers, Functions
And Duties, Providing Funds Therefor, And For Other
Purposes (July 18, 1966). as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927, series of
1983.6Annex D, Petition, G.R. No. 107542, Rollo, pp. 5254.After a public hearing conducted on December 4,
1991, the LLDA, acting on the complaint of Task Force
Camarin Dumpsite, found that the water collected from
the leachate and the receiving streams could
considerably affect the quality, in turn, of the receiving
waters since it indicates the presence of bacteria, other
than coliform, which may have contaminated the sample
during collection or handling.7Ibid. On December 5, 1991,
the LLDA issued a Cease and Desist Order8Annex G,
Petition, G.R. No. 107542, Rollo, pp. 58-63. ordering the
City Government of Caloocan, Metropolitan Manila
Authority, their contractors, and other entities, to
completely halt, stop and desist from dumping any form
or kind of garbage and other waste matter at the Camarin
dumpsite.
The dumping operation was forthwith stopped by the City
Government of Caloocan. However, sometime in August
1992 the dumping operation was resumed after a
meeting held in July 1992 among the City Government of
Caloocan, the representatives of Task Force Camarin

Dumpsite and LLDA at the Office of Environmental
Management Bureau Director Rodrigo U. Fuentes failed to
settle the problem.
After an investigation by its team of legal and technical
personnel on August 14, 1992, the LLDA issued another
order reiterating the December 5, 1991 order and issued
an Alias Cease and Desist Order enjoining the City
Government of Caloocan from continuing its dumping
operations at the Camarin area.
On September 25, 1992, the LLDA, with the assistance of
the Philippine National Police, enforced its Alias Cease
and Desist Order by prohibiting the entry of all garbage
dump trucks into
_______________
4 Establishing An Environment Impact Statement System,
Including Other Environmental Management Related
Measures and For Other Purposes (June 11, 1978).
5 An Act Creating The Laguna Lake Development
Authority, Prescribing Its Powers, Functions And Duties,
Providing Funds Therefor, And For Other Purposes (July
18, 1966).
6 Annex D, Petition, G.R. No. 107542, Rollo, pp. 52-54.
7 Ibid.
8 Annex G, Petition, G.R. No. 107542, Rollo, pp. 58-63.
298
the Tala Estate, Camarin area being utilized as a

dumpsite.
Pending resolution of its motion for reconsideration earlier
filed on September 17, 1992 with the LLDA, the City
Government of Caloocan filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Caloocan City an action for the declaration of
nullity of the cease and desist order with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of injunction, docketed as Civil Case No.
C-15598. In its complaint, the City Government of
Caloocan sought to be declared as the sole authority
empowered to promote the health and safety and
enhance the right of the people in Caloocan City to a
balanced ecology within its territorial jurisdiction.9Annex
M, Petition, G.R. No. 107542, Rollo, pp. 77-81.On
September 25, 1992, the Executive Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Caloocan City issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining the LLDA from enforcing its
cease and desist order. Subsequently, the case was
raffled to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 126 of Caloocan
which, at the time, was presided over by Judge Manuel Jn.
Serapio of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 127, the
pairing judge of the recently-retired presiding judge.
The LLDA, for its part, filed on October 2, 1992 a motion

to dismiss on the ground, among others, that under
Republic Act No. 3931, as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 984, otherwise known as the Pollution Control
Law, the cease and desist order issued by it which is the
subject matter of the complaint is reviewable both upon
the law and the facts of the case by the Court of Appeals
and not by the Regional Trial Court.10Annex O, Petition,
G.R. No. 107542, Rollo, pp. 83-90.On October 12, 1992
Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio issued an order consolidating
Civil Case No. C-15598 with Civil Case No. C-15580, an
earlier case filed by the Task Force Camarin Dumpsite
entitled Fr. John Moran, et al. vs. Hon. Macario Asistio.
The LLDA, however, maintained during the trial that the
foregoing cases, being independent of each other, should
have been treated separately.
On October 16, 1992, Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio, after
hearing the motion to dismiss, issued in the consolidated
cases an order11
_______________
9 Annex M, Petition, G.R. No. 107542, Rollo, pp. 77-81.
10 Annex O, Petition, G.R. No. 107542, Rollo, pp. 83-90.
11 Annex A, Petition, G.R. No. 107542, Rollo, pp. 29-37.
299
VOL. 231, MARCH 16, 1994 299
denying LLDAs motion to dismiss and granting the

issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the
LLDA, its agent and all persons acting for and on its
behalf, from enforcing or implementing its cease and
desist order which prevents plaintiff City of Caloocan from
dumping garbage at the Camarin dumpsite during the
pendency of this case and/or until further orders of the
court.
On November 5, 1992, the LLDA filed a petition for
certiorari, prohibition and injunction with prayer for
restraining order with the Supreme Court, docketed as
G.R. No. 107542, seeking to nullify the aforesaid order
dated October 16, 1992 issued by the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 127 of Caloocan City denying its motion to
dismiss.
The Court, acting on the petition, issued a
Resolution12G.R. No. 107542, Rollo, pp. 93-95. on
November 10, 1992 referring the case to the Court of
Appeals for proper disposition and at the same time,
without giving due course to the petition, required the
respondents to comment on the petition and file the
same with the Court of Appeals within ten (10) days from
notice. In the meantime, the Court issued a temporary
restraining order, effective immediately and continuing
until further orders from it, ordering the respondents: (1)
Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 127, Caloocan City to cease and desist

from exercising jurisdiction over the case for declaration
of nullity of the cease and desist order issued by the
Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA); and (2) City
Mayor of Caloocan and/or the City Government of
Caloocan to cease and desist from dumping its garbage
at the Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City.
Respondents City Government of Caloocan and Mayor
Macario A. Asistio, Jr. filed on November 12, 1992 a
motion for reconsideration and/or to quash/recall the
temporary restraining order and an urgent motion for
reconsideration alleging that . . . in view of the
calamitous situation that would arise if the respondent
city government fails to collect 350 tons of garbage daily
for lack of a dumpsite (i)t is therefore, imperative that the
issue be resolved with dispatch or with sufficient leeway
to allow the
_______________
12 G.R. No. 107542, Rollo, pp. 93-95.
300
respondents to find alternative solutions to this garbage

problem.
On November 17, 1992, the Court issued a

Resolution13G.R. No. 107542, Rollo, pp. 98-99. directing
the Court of Appeals to immediately set the case for
hearing for the purpose of determining whether or not the
temporary restraining order issued by the Court should be
lifted and what conditions, if any, may be required if it is
to be so lifted or whether the restraining order should be
maintained or converted into a preliminary injunction.
The Court of Appeals set the case for hearing on
November 27, 1992, at 10:00 in the morning at the
Hearing Room, 3rd Floor, New Building, Court of
Appeals.14Ibid, p. 97. After the oral argument, a
conference was set on December 8, 1992 at 10:00 oclock
in the morning where the Mayor of Caloocan City, the
General Manager of LLDA, the Secretary of DENR or his
duly authorized representative and the Secretary of DILG
or his duly authorized representative were required to
appear.
It was agreed at the conference that the LLDA had until
December 15, 1992 to finish its study and review of
respondents technical plan with respect to the dumping
of its garbage and in the event of a rejection of
respondents technical plan or a failure of settlement, the
parties will submit within 10 days from notice their
respective memoranda on the merits of the case, after
which the petition shall be deemed submitted for
resolution.15G.R. No. 107542, Rollo, pp. 129-130.
Notwithstanding such efforts, the parties failed to settle
the dispute.
On April 30, 1993, the Court of Appeals promulgated its

decision holding that: (1) the Regional Trial Court has no
jurisdiction on appeal to try, hear and decide the action
for annulment of LLDAs cease and desist order, including
the issuance of a temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction in relation thereto, since appeal
therefrom is within the exclusive and appellate
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals under Section 9, par.
(3), of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129; and (2) the Laguna Lake
Development Authority has no power and authority to
issue a
_______________
13 G.R. No. 107542, Rollo, pp. 98-99.
14 Ibid, p. 97.
15 G.R. No. 107542, Rollo, pp. 129-130.
301
VOL. 231, MARCH 16, 1994 301
cease and desist order under its enabling law, Republic

Act No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive
Order No. 927, series of 1983.
The Court of Appeals thus dismissed Civil Case No. 15598
and the preliminary injunction issued in the said case was
set aside; the cease and desist order of the LLDA was
likewise set aside and the temporary restraining order
enjoining the City Mayor of Caloocan and/or the City
Government of Caloocan to cease and desist from
dumping its garbage at the Tala Estate, Barangay
Camarin, Caloocan City was lifted, subject, however, to
the condition that any future dumping of garbage in said
area, shall be in conformity with the procedure and
protective works contained in the proposal attached to
the records of this case and found on pages 152-160 of
the Rollo, which was thereby adopted by reference and
made an integral part of the decision, until the
corresponding restraining and/or injunctive relief is
granted by the proper Court upon LLDAs institution of
the necessary legal proceedings.
Hence, the Laguna Lake Development Authority filed the
instant petition for review on certiorari, now docketed as
G.R. No. 110120, with prayer that the temporary
restraining order lifted by the Court of Appeals be reissued until after final determination by this Court of the
issue on the proper interpretation of the powers and
authority of the LLDA under its enabling law.
On July 19, 1993, the Court issued a temporary
restraining order16G.R. No. 110120, Rollo, p. 70.
Government of Caloocan to cease and desist from
dumping its garbage at the Tala Estate, Barangay
Camarin, Caloocan City, effective as of this date and
continuing until otherwise ordered by the Court.
It is significant to note that while both parties in this case

agree on the need to protect the environment and to
maintain the ecological balance of the surrounding areas
of the Camarin open dumpsite, the question as to which
agency can lawfully exercise jurisdiction over the matter
remains highly open to question.
The City Government of Caloocan claims that it is within
its
_______________
16 G.R. No. 110120, Rollo, p. 70.
302
power, as a local government unit, pursuant to the

general welfare provision of the Local Government
Code,17Section 16, Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise
known as The Local Government Code of 1991.... to
determine the effects of the operation of the dumpsite on
the ecological balance and to see that such balance is
maintained. On the basis of said contention, it
questioned, from the inception of the dispute before the
Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, the power and
authority of the LLDA to issue a cease and desist order
enjoining the dumping of garbage in the Barangay
Camarin over which the City Government of Caloocan has

territorial jurisdiction.
The Court of Appeals sustained the position of the City of
Caloocan on the theory that Section 7 of Presidential
Decree No. 984, otherwise known as the Pollution Control
Law, authorizing the defunct National Pollution Control
Commission to issue an ex-parte cease and desist order
was not incorporated in Presidential Decree No. 813 nor
in Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983. The Court of
Appeals ruled that under Section 4, par. (d), of Republic
Act No. 4850, as amended, the LLDA is instead required
to institute the necessary legal proceeding against any
person who shall commence to implement or continue
implementation of any project, plan or program within the
Laguna de Bay region without previous clearance from
the Authority.
The LLDA now assails, in this petition for review, the
abovementioned ruling of the Court of Appeals,
contending that, as an administrative agency which was
granted regulatory and adjudicatory powers and functions
by Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws,
Presidential Decree No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927,
series of 1983, it is invested with the power and authority
to issue a cease and desist order pursuant to Section 4
par. (c), (d), (e), (f), and (g) of Executive Order No. 927
series of 1983 which provides, thus:
SECTION 4. Additional Powers and Functions.The
Authority shall have the following powers and functions:
xxx
xxx
xxx
(c) Issue orders or decisions to compel compliance with

the provisions of this Executive Order and its
implementing rules and regulations only after proper
notice and hearing.
_______________
17 Section 16, Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as
The Local Government Code of 1991.
303
VOL. 231, MARCH 16, 1994 303
(d) Make, alter or modify orders requiring the

discontinuance of pollution specifying the conditions and
the time within which such discontinuance must be
accomplished.
(e) Issue, renew, or deny permits, under such conditions
as it may determine to be reasonable, for the prevention
and abatement of pollution, for the discharge of sewage,
industrial waste, or for the installation or operation of
sewage works and industrial disposal system or parts
thereof: x x x
(f) After due notice and hearing, the Authority may also
revoke, suspend or modify any permit issued under this
Order whenever the same is necessary to prevent or

abate pollution.
(g) Deputize in writing or request assistance of
appropriate government agencies or instrumentalities for
the purpose of enforcing this Executive Order and its
implementing rules and regulations and the orders and
decisions of the Authority.
The LLDA claims that the appellate court deliberately
suppressed and totally disregarded the above provisions
of Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983, which granted
administrative quasi-judicial functions to LLDA on
pollution abatement cases.
In light of the relevant environmental protection laws
cited which are applicable in this case, and the
corresponding overlapping jurisdiction of government
agencies implementing these laws, the resolution of the
issue of whether or not the LLDA has the authority and
power to issue an order which, in its nature and effect
was injunctive, necessarily requires a determination of
the threshold question: Does the Laguna Lake
Development Authority, under its Charter and its
amendatory laws, have the authority to entertain the
complaint against the dumping of garbage in the open
dumpsite in Barangay Camarin authorized by the City
Government of Caloocan which is allegedly endangering
the health, safety, and welfare of the residents therein
and the sanitation and quality of the water in the area
brought about by exposure to pollution caused by such
open garbage dumpsite?
The matter of determining whether there is such pollution

of the environment that requires control, if not
prohibition, of the operation of a business establishment
is essentially addressed to the Environmental
Management Bureau (EMB) of the DENR which, by virtue
of Section 16 of Executive Order No. 192, series
304
of 1987,18Providing For The Reorganization Of The

Department of Environment, Energy and Natural
Resources, Renaming It As The Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, And For Other
Purposes (June 10, 1987). has assumed the powers and
functions of the defunct National Pollution Control
Commission created under Republic Act No. 3931. Under
said Executive Order, a Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB)
under the Office of the DENR Secretary now assumes the
powers and functions of the National Pollution Control
Commission with respect to adjudication of pollution
cases.19Section 19, Executive Order No. 192, series of
1987.As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution cases
generally pertains to the Pollution Adjudication Board
(PAB), except in cases where the special law provides for
another forum. It must be recognized in this regard that
the LLDA, as a specialized administrative agency, is

specifically mandated under Republic Act No. 4850 and
its amendatory laws to carry out and make effective the
declared national policy20Section 1, Republic Act No.
4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order
No. 927, series of 1983. of promoting and accelerating
the development and balanced growth of the Laguna
Lake area and the surrounding provinces of Rizal and
Laguna and the cities of San Pablo, Manila, Pasay, Quezon
and Caloocan21Section 41, par. (4), Republic Act No.
No. 927, series of 1983. with due regard and adequate
provisions for environmental management and control,
preservation of the quality of human life and ecological
systems, and the prevention of undue ecological
disturbances, deterioration and pollution. Under such a
broad grant of power and authority, the LLDA, by virtue of
its special charter, obviously has the responsibility to
protect the inhabitants of the Laguna Lake region from
the deleterious effects of pollutants emanating from the
discharge of wastes from the surrounding areas. In
carrying out the aforementioned declared policy, the
LLDA is mandated, among others, to pass upon and
approve or disapprove all plans, programs, and projects
proposed by local government offices/agencies within the
region, public corporations, and private persons or
enterprises where such plans,
_______________
18 Providing For The Reorganization Of The Department

of Environment, Energy and Natural Resources, Renaming
It As The Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, And For Other Purposes (June 10, 1987).
19 Section 19, Executive Order No. 192, series of 1987.
20 Section 1, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by P.D.
No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983.
21 Section 41, par. (4), Republic Act No. 4850, as
amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927,
series of 1983.
305
VOL. 231, MARCH 16, 1994 305
programs and/or projects are related to those of the LLDA

for the development of the region.22Section 4, par. (d),
Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813 and
Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983. (Italics
supplied).In the instant case, when complainant Task
Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady of Lourdes Parish,
Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City, filed its lettercomplaint before the LLDA, the latters jurisdiction under
its charter was validly invoked by complainant on the
basis of its allegation that the open dumpsite project of
the City Government of Caloocan in Barangay Camarin
was undertaken without a clearance from the LLDA, as

required under Section 4, par. (d), of Republic Act No.
No. 927. While there is also an allegation that the said
project was without an Environmental Compliance
Certificate from the Environmental Management Bureau
(EMB) of the DENR, the primary jurisdiction of the LLDA
over this case was recognized by the Environmental
Management Bureau of the DENR when the latter acted
as intermediary at the meeting among the
representatives of the City Government of Caloocan, Task
Force Camarin Dumpsite and LLDA sometime in July 1992
to discuss the possibility of reopening the open dumpsite.
Having thus resolved the threshold question, the inquiry
then narrows down to the following issue: Does the LLDA
have the power and authority to issue a cease and
desist order under Republic Act No. 4850 and its
amendatory laws, on the basis of the facts presented in
this case, enjoining the dumping of garbage in Tala
Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City.
The irresistible answer is in the affirmative.
The cease and desist order issued by the LLDA requiring
the City Government of Caloocan to stop dumping its
garbage in the Camarin open dumpsite found by the
LLDA to have been done in violation of Republic Act No.
4850, as amended, and other relevant environment
laws,23Sections 45 and 48, Presidential Decree No. 1152,
otherwise known as Philippine Environment Code which
requires that solid waste disposal shall be by sanitary
landfill, incineration, composting and other methods as

may be approved by competent government a... cannot
be stamped as an unautho_______________
22 Section 4, par. (d), Republic Act No. 4850, as amended
by P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927, series of
1983. (Italics supplied).
23 Sections 45 and 48, Presidential Decree No. 1152,
otherwise known as Philippine Environment Code which
requires that solid waste disposal shall be by sanitary
landfill, incineration, composting and other methods as
may be approved by competent government authority
and, that the sites shall conform with existing zoning,
land
306
rized exercise by the LLDA of injunctive powers. By its

express terms, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by
P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983,
authorizes the LLDA to make, alter or modify orders
requiring the discontinuance of pollution.24Section 4,
par. (d), Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983. (Italics
for emphasis) Section 4, par. (d) explicitly authorizes the
LLDA to make whatever order may be necessary in the

exercise of its jurisdiction.
To be sure, the LLDA was not expressly conferred the
power to issue an ex-parte cease and desist order in a
language, as suggested by the City Government of
Caloocan, similar to the express grant to the defunct
National Pollution Control Commission under Section 7 of
P.D. No. 984 which, admittedly was not reproduced in P.D.
No. 813 and E.O. No. 927, series of 1983. However, it
would be a mistake to draw therefrom the conclusion that
there is a denial of the power to issue the order in
question when the power to make, alter or modify orders
requiring the discontinuance of pollution is expressly and
clearly bestowed upon the LLDA by Executive Order No.
927, series of 1983.
Assuming arguendo that the authority to issue a cease
and desist order were not expressly conferred by law,
there is jurisprudence enough to the effect that the rule
granting such authority need not necessarily be
express.25Motor Transit Co. v. Railroad Com. 189 CAl 573,
209 P. 586. While it is a fundamental rule that an
powers.26Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 90482,
August 5, 1991, 200 SCRA 266; Guerzon v. Court of
Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 77707, August 8, 1988, 164 SCRA
182. In the exercise, therefore, of its express powers
under its charter, as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body

with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region,
the authority of the LLDA to issue a cease and desist
order is, perforce, implied. Otherwise, it may well be
reduced to a toothless paper agency.
_______________
use standards, and pollution control regulations,
respectively; Section 4, Presidential Decree No. 1586.
24 Section 4, par. (d), Executive Order No. 927, series of
1983.
25 Motor Transit Co. v. Railroad Com. 189 CAl 573, 209 P.
586.
26 Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 90482, August 5,
1991, 200 SCRA 266; Guerzon v. Court of Appeals, et al.,
G.R. No. 77707, August 8, 1988, 164 SCRA 182.
307
VOL. 231, MARCH 16, 1994 307
In this connection, it must be noted that in Pollution

Adjudication Board v. Court of Appeals, et al.,27G.R. No.
93891, March 11, 1991, 195 SCRA 112. the Court ruled
that the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) has the power
to issue an ex-parte cease and desist order when there is
prima facie evidence of an establishment exceeding the

allowable standards set by the anti-pollution laws of the
country. The ponente, Associate Justice Florentino P.
Feliciano, declared:
Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law
and regulations in situations like that here presented
precisely because stopping the continuous discharge of
pollutive and untreated effluents into the rivers and other
inland waters of the Philippines cannot be made to wait
until protracted litigation over the ultimate correctness or
propriety of such orders has run its full course, including
multiple and sequential appeals such as those which
Solar has taken, which of course may take several years.
The relevant pollution control statute and implementing
regulations were enacted and promulgated in the
exercise of that pervasive, sovereign power to protect the
safety, health, and general welfare and comfort of the
public, as well as the protection of plant and animal life,
commonly designated as the police power. It is a
constitutional commonplace that the ordinary
requirements of procedural due process yield to the
necessities of protecting vital public interests like those
here involved, through the exercise of police power. x x x
The immediate response to the demands of the
necessities of protecting vital public interests gives
vitality to the statement on ecology embodied in the
Declaration of Principles and State Policies of the 1987
Constitution. Article II, Section 16 which provides:
The State shall protect and advance the right of the

people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with
the rhythm and harmony of nature.
As a constitutionally guaranteed right of every person, it
carries the correlative duty of non-impairment. This is but
in consonance with the declared policy of the state to
protect and promote the right to health of the people and
instill health
_______________
27 G.R. No. 93891, March 11, 1991, 195 SCRA 112.
308
consciousness among them.28Art. II, Section 15, 1987

Constitution. It is to be borne in mind that the Philippines
is party to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
the Alma Conference Declaration of 1978 which recognize
health as a fundamental human right.29Record of the
Constitutional Commission, Proceedings and Debates, Vol.
III, p. 119.The issuance, therefore, of the cease and desist
order by the LLDA, as a practical matter of procedure
under the circumstances of the case, is a proper exercise
of its power and authority under its charter and its
amendatory laws. Had the cease and desist order issued
by the LLDA been complied with by the City Government

of Caloocan as it did in the first instance, no further legal
steps would have been necessary.
The charter of LLDA, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended,

instead of conferring upon the LLDA the means of directly
enforcing such orders, has provided under its Section 4
(d) the power to institute necessary legal proceeding
against any person who shall commence to implement or
continue implementation of any project, plan or program
within the Laguna de Bay region without previous
clearance from the LLDA.
Clearly, said provision was designed to invest the LLDA
with sufficiently broad powers in the regulation of all
projects initiated in the Laguna Lake region, whether by
the government or the private sector, insofar as the
implementation of these projects is concerned. It was
meant to deal with cases which might possibly arise
where decisions or orders issued pursuant to the exercise
of such broad powers may not be obeyed, resulting in the
thwarting of its laudable objective. To meet such
contingencies, then the writs of mandamus and injunction
which are beyond the power of the LLDA to issue, may be
sought from the proper courts.
Insofar as the implementation of relevant anti-pollution
laws in the Laguna Lake region and its surrounding
provinces, cities and towns are concerned, the Court will
not dwell further on the related issues raised which are
more appropriately addressed to an administrative

agency with the special knowledge and expertise of the
LLDA.
_______________
28 Art. II, Section 15, 1987 Constitution.
29 Record of the Constitutional Commission, Proceedings
and Debates, Vol. III, p. 119.
309
VOL. 231, MARCH 16, 1994 309
Vda. de Alvarez vs. Court of Appeals
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The temporary

restraining order issued by the Court on July 19, 1993
Government of Caloocan from dumping their garbage at
the Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City is
hereby made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano (Chairman), Bidin, Melo and Vitug, JJ., concur.
Petition granted.
Note.The ex-parte cease and desist orders issued by
the Pollution Adjudication Board are permitted under the
Police Power of the State (Pollution Adjudication Board vs.
Court of Appeals, 195 SCRA 112). [Laguna Lake

Development Authority vs. Court of Appeals, 231 SCRA
292(1994)]

Philippine Merchant Marine School, Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals
G.R. No. 112844. June 2, 1995.*EN BANC.PHILIPPINE

MERCHANT MARINE SCHOOL, INC., represented by JUAN
O. NOLASCO III, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, THE
OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, EDELMIRO
AMANTE, RENATO CORONA, and the DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS, respondents.
Administrative Law; Due Process; Assertion of petitioner
that it was deprived of its right to a hearing and any
opportunity whatsoever to correct the alleged
deficiencies readily collapses.Set against the records of
the case, the assertion of petitioner that it was deprived
of its right to a hearing and any opportunity whatsoever
to correct the alleged deficiencies readily collapses. The
earlier narration of facts clearly demonstrates that before
the DECS issued the phase-out and closure orders,
petitioner was duly notified, warned and given several
opportunities to correct its deficiencies and to comply
with pertinent orders and regulations.
Same; Same; Petitioner has no reason to complain of lack
of opportunity to explain its side as well as to comply with
the alleged deficiencies.Petitioner has gone all the way
up to the Office of the President to seek a reversal of the

phase-out and closure orders. There is thus no reason to
complain of lack of opportunity to explain its side as well
as to comply with the alleged deficiencies.
Same; Evidence; Findings of fact of administrative
departments are generally accorded respect, if not
finality, by the courts.By reason of the special
knowledge and expertise of administrative departments
over matters falling under their jurisdiction, they are in a
better position to pass judgment thereon and their
findings of fact in that regard are generally accorded
respect, if not finality, by the courts.
PETITION for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
Ponce Enrile, Cayetano, Reyes & Manalastas for
petitioner.
_______________
* EN BANC.
771
VOL. 244, JUNE 2, 1995 771
Appeals
BELLOSILLO, J.:
PHILIPPINE MERCHANT MARINE SCHOOL, INC. (PMMSI),
was established in Manila in 1950 to train and produce
competent marine officers. It offers a two-year course in
Marine Engineering (A.M.E.) and a four-year course in
Marine Transportation (B.S.M.T.). In 1978 it established a
branch in Talon, Las Pias, Metro Manila. But we are here
concerned only with the main school in Manila.
For several times prior to 1985 respondent Department of
Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) disapproved
petitioners requests for renewal permit/recognition.
However, on 11 March 1986 the DECS issued petitioner a
renewal permit for SY 1985-1986. Later, petitioner
applied for a summer permit for 1986 which the DECS
favorably indorsed to the Minister of Education in
consideration of the graduating students for summer.
Thereafter the application was returned to Director
Modesta Boquiren of the DECS for evaluation and
decision pursuant to the authority delegated to the
Regions under Department Order No. 22, series of 1975.
Director Boquiren issued petitioner the summer permit for
1986 based on the previously stated humanitarian reason
but subject to the condition that petitioner should not
enroll students for the first semester of SY 1986-1987
until a permit therefor was granted and that the
enrollment list for the summer term be submitted
immediately.
Sometime in 1986 the DECS received a complaint from
Felixberto B. Galvez, president of petitioners Faculty
Association, NAFLU-KMU, concerning the issuance of

summer permit to petitioner and of its holding of classes
for courses not recognized by the Government. Galvez
requested that the matter be looked into as well as the
possible revocation of petitioners authority due to
persistent violation of the orders of the DECS.
In response, the DECS through Director Boquiren
recommended that petitioners summer permit be
revoked and that the school be closed effective SY 19861987 on the ground that: (a) petitioner did not have a
renewal permit/recognition for SY 1986-1987; (b) several
communications were sent to petitioners head telling
him not to operate without permit and to explain within
seventy-two (72) hours from receipt of Director
Boquirens letter
772
Appeals
dated 9 July 1986 why no drastic action should be taken

against it but said communication was never answered;
and, (c) petitioner did not correct the deficiencies
indicated in the renewal permit for 1985-1986.
Accordingly, in a 3rd Indorsement dated 23 September

1986 the DECS through then Minister Lourdes R.
Quisumbing approved the following courses of action for
petitioner: (a) the students in the two courses who were
graduating for SY 1986-1987 would be allowed to
graduate even without permit for said courses as a
special case provided that they completed the
requirements for graduation and subject to prior issuance
of Special Order; and, (b) the remaining students should
be allowed to transfer to other authorized schools.
In a letter dated 30 September 1986 Director Boquiren
informed petitioner of the aforementioned courses of
action and directed immediate implementation thereof.
On 9 April 1987 the DECS Inter-Agency Technical
Committee (IATCOM) recommended renewal of permits
for the maritime courses offered by petitioner provided
that a development plan for the improvement of its
buildings, classrooms, laboratory rooms, library offices
and other rooms be formulated and implemented before
the start of school year 1987-1988.
Despite lack of permit, petitioner continued to enroll
students and offer courses in Marine Engineering and
Marine Transportation for SY 1987-1988. This prompted
the DECS through Director Hernando Dizon to write
petitioner on 4 August 1988 directing it not to operate
without permit and inviting its attention to the provisions
of the Private School Law1Act No. 2706 of 1917. as
reiterated in the Education Act of 19822B.P. Blg. 232.
which prohibits operation of unauthorized schools/

courses.
On 28 October 1988 petitioner sent a letter to Director
Dizon applying for permit/recognition to conduct classes
for the two (2) maritime courses retroactive from summer
of 1987 up to SY 1988-1989 and informing him of its
transfer to the 5th Floor of the Republic Supermarket
Building, corner Rizal Avenue and Soler St., Sta. Cruz,
Manila.
_______________
1 Act No. 2706 of 1917.
2 B.P. Blg. 232.
773
VOL. 244, JUNE 2, 1995 773
Appeals
On the basis of the favorable report of a supervisor of the

Bureau of Higher Education who visited the premises of
petitioner on 14 November 1988, a director of said
Bureau recommended renewal of petitioners permit.
However, in a DECS-PAMI survey conducted by the DECS
technical staff in 1988, petitioner scored only 32 points
out of a possible 1,026 points for requirements in Nautical
Engineering, and only 207 points out of 905 points in

Marine Engineering, way below the DECS requirements.
Subsequent inspection of petitioners premises by the
Bureau of Higher Education-DECS Technical Panel for
Maritime Education (TPME) affirmed the findings of the
DECS-PAMI survey. It found petitioner deficient in terms of
the minimum requirements as provided in DECS Order
No. III, series of 1987, which refers to the policies and
standards for Maritime Education Plan. In a memorandum
dated 19 January 1989 addressed to DECS Director Nilo
Rosas, it set forth the following recommendations:
1. The PMMS administration may be given a last chance
to put up at least 60% of the minimum standard
equipment for a period of about two months (JanuaryMarch 1989).
2. The DECS with TPME will conduct a reinspection
sometime the first week of April to monitor the progress
of the requirements.
3. No new and old students will be allowed to enroll
during summer of 1989 and the subsequent semesters
pending issuance of a permit.
4. Therefore, issuance of a school permit for 1987-1988 to
1988-89 shall be held in abeyance pending compliance of
at least 60% of the requirements.
5. DECS higher authorities shall decide whether the
graduating students for the second semester 1988-89 will
be allowed to graduate and a retroactive school permit
for the school years 1987-88, 1988-89 can be

granted.3Rollo, pp. 207-208.As recommended, the TPME
Secretariat conducted a reinspection of petitioners
premises, then submitted a report dated 18 April 1989
with the following new recommenda-tions
_______________
3 Rollo, pp. 207-208.
774
Appeals
1. Gradual phasing out of the BSMT Nautical Studies and

Associate in Marine Engineering programs. Under this
scheme, no new enrollees should be accepted anymore
for the 1st year BSMT Nautical Studies and AME starting
1st semester of school year 1989-90.
2. If the school can come up with the DECS minimum
standard within the phasing out period, suspension order
may be lifted.
3. If the school fails to meet the DECS minimum standard
at the end of the phasing out period, closure order will be
issued.
4. No special permit for the BSMT Nautical Studies and

AME courses should be granted as a special case.
However, during the phasing out period students may be
allowed to graduate under PMMS, Talon, Las Pias,
based on these considerations
1. PMMS, Manila, has inadequate training facilities and
equipment for BSMT Nautical Studies and AME programs.
2. The school has not acquired its own school site and
building. The present school campus is not conducive for
training and is found to be very limited in space so that
there is difficulty for school development and expansion.
3. On 23 September 1986, the Secretary of Education,
Culture and Sports already issued a cease to operate
order to the school head of PMMS. The said indorsement
letter also provided humanitarian decision (reason?)
which granted permit to PMMS as a special case, just to
allow BSMT and AME students to graduate and the
remaining students were advised to transfer to
authorized/recognized schools.
4. Labor dispute occurred in 1987. The conflict between
the employees and employer is a manifestation of
mismanagement of school.4Id., pp. 208-209.In a letter
dated 27 April 1989 Director Rosas informed petitioner of
the TPME report and recommendations and invited it for a
conference on 2 May 1989 before any major decision and
action would be made.
On 2 May 1989, the TPME Secretariat submitted another

memorandum on its reinspection of petitioners premises
made on 28 April 1989. Based on its findings that no
substantial improvement in terms of minimum
requirements, equipment and training facilities since the
January 1989 inspection was
_______________
4 Id., pp. 208-209.
775
VOL. 244, JUNE 2, 1995 775
Appeals
made, it reiterated the recommendations it submitted to

the DECS Bureau of Higher Education. For this reason, in
the letter dated 25 May 1989 Director Rosas notified
petitioner about the aforementioned report and the DECS
decision that:
1. The BSMT Nautical Studies and Associate in Marine
Engineering courses be gradually phased out. Such being
the case, the school shall no longer be allowed to accept
1st year students and new enrollees starting 1st
semester of school year 1989-90.
2. The second year and third year students may be

allowed to remain until they graduate. However, the
school may opt to transfer these students to PMMS, Talon,
Las Pias,
due to the following considerations:
1. The schools training equipment and instructional
facilities are very far below the standards set by DECS.
2. The school site and building are not owned by the
school but only leased with contract of renewal to be
made annually.
3. The present location of the school does not warrant for
expansion, development and improvement.
4. The present location of the school is not conducive for
learning, it being located on the 5th floor of a
supermarket in the downtown section of the city.
5. A cease to operate order was issued by Secretary
Lourdes R. Quisumbing sometime in 1986, which order
was violated by the school.5Id., pp. 209-210.In a letter
dated 11 July 1989 the DECS through Secretary
Quisumbing informed petitioner that it had received
reports that petitioner enrolled freshmen for its maritime
programs which were ordered phased out effective SY
1989-1990 per letter of Director Rosas dated 25 May
1989; called petitioners attention to the provision of Sec.
1, Rule 1, Part V, of the Implementing Rules of the
Education Act of 1982 which makes it punishable and
subject to penalties the operation of a school through the
conduct or offering of Educational Programs or Courses of

Studies/Training, without prior government authorization
and/or in violation of any of the terms and conditions of
said permit or recognition; directed that in accordance
with the phase-out order, petitioners
_______________
5 Id., pp. 209-210.
776
Appeals
Manila campus is allowed to operate only the 2nd, 3rd

and 4th years of the authorized maritime programs which
shall be gradually phased out; and, required petitioner to
comment on the reported unauthorized enrollment.
In its letter to the DECS dated 26 July 1989, petitioner
moved for reconsideration stating that the finding that it
had not complied with the minimum requirements was
due to the following: that as early as 21 June 1989 it filed
a letter requesting reconsideration of the letter dated 25
May 1989 of Director Rosas; that since there was no reply
it believed that the 25 May 1989 order was reconsidered
sub-silencio and that petitioner was allowed to enroll 1st
year students for SY 1989-1990; and, that it had
undertaken improvements in all of its facilities in

compliance with DECS requirements. In this regard, it
requested another inspection of its premises.
Pursuant to petitioners request, another inspection of the
Manila premises was conducted by the TPME-Secretariat
on 8 August 1989. However, petitioner only obtained a
general rating of 31.17% for Nautical Studies and 28.53%
for Marine Engineering. Consequently, the inspection
team reiterated its previous recommendation to gradually
phase out the maritime programs of petitioners Manila
campus effective SY 1990-1991 and that no new
freshman students be accepted beginning SY 1990-1991.
Accordingly, in a letter dated 25 September 1989 the
DECS through Secretary Quisumbing ordered petitioner to
discontinue its Maritime Program in the Manila campus
effective school year 1990-1991 and suggested that
efforts be made towards the development of PMMS, Las
Pias, which has a great potential of being a good
Maritime School.6Id., p. 211. The phase-out order was
reiterated in subsequent letters dated 19 February 1990
and 9 May 1990 of Director Rosas and then DECS
Secretary Isidro D. Cario, respectively.
Subsequently, petitioner moved to reconsider the phaseout order in its letter of 21 May 1990, which request was
denied by the DECS through Undersecretary Benjamin
Tayabas in his letter of 1 June 1990. The letter reads
_______________
6 Id., p. 211.
777
VOL. 244, JUNE 2, 1995 777
Appeals
With reference to your request to rescind an order to

phase-out the maritime courses at PMMS, Manila, please
be informed that this Department sees no reason for such
action as the conditions obtaining in the school when the
phase-out order was issued havent shown any significant
improvement inspite of the fact that the PMMS had been
given reasonable period to comply with the minimum
standard requirements prescribed by the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports.
Maritime Education courses are highly specialized and
require adequate training facilities and equipment in
order to ensure quality. However, the series of visits made
by the staff of the BHE, NCR, and members of the
Technical Panel on Maritime Education revealed the
following findings:
(a) On April 9, 1987 the Inter-Agency Technical
Committee (IATCOM) recommended the renewal of
permits of the maritime courses, provided, that a
development plan for the improvement of the buildings,
classrooms, laboratory rooms, library offices and other
rooms shall be formulated and implemented before the

start of SY 1987-1988.
(b) In 1988, the DECS-PAMI survey conducted by
technical persons, revealed that PMMS, then located at
the 5th floor of the Republic Supermarket, obtained a
general score of 32 out of 1,026 points for requirements
in the Nautical course and 207 out of 905 points for the
Marine Engineering course. It is needless to say that
these findings are way below the DECS requirements.
Above all, the school site was described as not conducive
for offering maritime program due to its limited area.
Furthermore, the lease on the premises is not a long term
lease (2 years), a condition which would deter the school
from fully developing the school site.
(c) In January of 1989, the findings of the Secretariat for
the Technical Panel for Maritime Education (TPME)
reaffirmed the findings of the DECS-PAMI Survey. Very few
equipment were found for the Maritime courses. You
concurred with these findings in a dialogue with the
Director of the Bureau of Higher Education Secretariat.
You appealed for another chance and requested for reinspection before the opening of SY 1989-1990.
(d) As per agreement, on April 28, 1989 another reinspection was made and it showed that the school did
not show any substantial improvement.
Then on May 25, 1989, Secretary Lourdes Quisumbing
issued the phase-out order of your maritime programs in
Manila campus.
However, the Department again allowed PMMS, Manila, to

operate the maritime courses for SY 1989-1990 despite
the
778
Appeals
above phase-out order.

(e) Another evaluation of your school was conducted by
technical people on August 8, 1989, as requested. The
findings revealed that your school obtained a general
rating of 31.17% for Nautical Studies and 28.53% for
Marine Engineering.
The PMMS has been provided with the Policies and
Standards for Maritime Education and, as revealed by the
foregoing facts, the series of inspection and evaluation
were (sic) done by technical persons who have expertise
in the field of maritime education. Therefore, the requests
relative to these are not valid.
It is therefore with regrets that this Department cannot
re-scind its order to phase-out the Maritime courses at
PMMS, Manila and the school is admonished not to accept
incoming first year students starting school year 19901991. So that by school year 1992-1993, the maritime
courses at the Manila campus would be fully phased-out

xxxx7
It is suggested that PMMS concentrate its development
plans in the Las Pias Campus which has a great potential
of being a good maritime school.
Not satisfied therewith, petitioner appealed the matter to
respondent Office of the President. During the pendency
of the appeal the DECS thru Secretary Cario issued a
Closure Order dated 27 August 1991
In view of the report which was confirmed by the
evaluation team from the National Capital Region DECS
Regional Office, that Philip-pine Merchant Marine School
(PMMS), Manila, has been accepting freshman students of
the maritime programs despite the phase-out order which
was issued last September 28, (sic) 1989 by former
Secretary Lourdes R. Quisumbing and further reiterated
by the undersigned, dated May 9, 1990, the Department,
hereby orders Closure of your maritime programs of your
school effective second semester school year 1991-1992,
otherwise this Department shall be constrained to
institute the appropriate administrative, civil and criminal
proceedings against you and the other responsible
officers of your school pursuant to Section 68, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 232 x x x x
The transfer of the affected students shall be facilitated
by the National Capital Region in accordance with our
Memorandum dated August 16, 1991, xerox copy of
which is hereto attached for your
_______________
7 Id., pp. 212-214.
779
VOL. 244, JUNE 2, 1995 779
Appeals
information.
For your guidance and strict compliance.8Id., p. 215.In a
letter dated 24 August 1992 petitioner sought
reconsideration of the 27 August 1991 Closure Order and
at the same time requested that special orders be issued
to its graduates for SY 1991-1992. In letters filed with the
Office of the President dated 2 and 3 October 1992
petitioner alleged compliance with DECS requirements.
The letters were referred to the DECS for consideration.
On 10 November 1992 the Office of the President through
respondent Executive Secretary Edelmiro Amante
rendered a Resolution dismissing petitioners appeal.9Id.,
p. 73. It found no plausible reason to disturb the action of
the DECS Secretary in the light of the conspicuous fact
that petitioner had repeatedly failed to comply with the
phase-out order since 1986. Moreover, the grounds
advanced by petitioner have already been passed upon
by the DECS.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration praying that the

case be remanded to the DECS for another ocular
inspection and evaluation of its alleged improved
facilities. Petitioner anchored its motion on the
proposition that since it had made substantial
improvements on school equipment and facilities there
existed no valid ground to deny them a permit to offer
maritime courses. After another circumspect review of the
case, the Office of the President found no cogent reason
to set aside its previous resolution. It opined that
Mere alleged efforts to improve the facilities and
equipments (sic) which were long due since 1986, do not
warrant the reversal of our previous resolution. It bears
stressing as the records may show, that the phase-out
order of DECS was based not only on PMMSIs failure to
provide adequate equipment and facilities but also on
PMMSIs failure to comply with the standard requirements
prescribed for a school site.
xxxx
Apart from these, PMMSIs adamant refusal to comply
with the orders of the DECS to phase out its unauthorized
courses is sufficient
_______________
8 Id., p. 215.
9 Id., p. 73.
780
Appeals
ground to uphold the order appealed from. Since 1986,

PMMSI has been applying for a permit to offer maritime
courses but has been invariably denied for failure to
comply with the minimum requirements prescribed by
DECS. Notwithstanding these denials, PMMSI continues to
offer maritime courses and to admit freshmen students in
clear violation of Section 1, Rule 1, of the Education Act of
1982 x x x x
xxxx
PMMSIs refusal to comply with the phase-out order on
the ground that the same is not yet final and executory is
untenable. While said phase-out may not be final and
executory, there was no reason for PMMSI to offer
maritime courses without the requisite prior authority of
the DECS. PMMSI possessed no valid permit prior to the
issuance of the phase-out. There was no authority to
speak of.10Id., pp. 74-76.Thus the motion was denied in
the Resolution dated 12 January 1993 through respondent
Assistant Executive Secretary Renato Corona.11Id., p.
76.Petitioner assailed both resolutions of the Office of the
President before respondent Court of Appeals by way of
certiorari. It alleged that the resolutions failed to meet
the constitutional requirement of due process because

the basis for affirming the DECS phase-out and closure
orders was not sufficiently disclosed. Furthermore, its
letters dated 2 and 3 October 1992 which presented
incontrovertible proof that it had introduced substantial
improvements on its facilities for the past two and a half
years while its appeal was pending were not taken into
account, thereby gravely abusing its discretion.
Respondent Court of Appeals brushed aside the
allegations of petitioner since
[T]he Office of the President, in the resolution dated
November 10, 1992, appears to have restated the report
of the respondent DECS, meaning, that it adopted as its
own the DECS report, but that is not a violation of the
Constitution and the Rules of Court, in line with Alba Patio
De Makati vs. Alba Patio De Makati Employees
Association, 128 SCRA 253, 264-265 x x x x Petitioners
latest attempt at improving its facilities does not warrant
a reversal of the phase-out order. For, in spite of the claim
that it spent on improvements, the basic problem
_______________
10 Id., pp. 74-76.
11 Id., p. 76.
781
VOL. 244, JUNE 2, 1995 781

Appeals
remained as it still occupies the fifth floor of the William

Liao building, which is not conducive to learning, and has
a limited area for expansion and development.12Id., pp.
218-219.On 22 July 1993 the petition was
dismissed.13Id., p. 227. On 26 November 1993 the
motion for reconsideration was denied.14Id., p.
231.Petitioner imputes error on respondent court: (1) in
not setting aside the questioned resolutions and orders of
public respondents which were rendered without due
process of law since (a) petitioner was not afforded the
right to fully present its case and submit evidence in
support thereof; (b) public respondents did not consider
the evidence presented by petitioner; (c) public respondents decisions have no substantial evidence to support
them; (d) public respondents decisions did not disclose
the bases therefor; and, (2) in implementing the closure
orders which had not become final and executory.
Petitioner asseverates that the DECS denied its right to a
hearing on the supposed deficiencies which allegedly
justified denial of its request for issuance of a renewal
permit. Likewise, the DECS denied petitioner the
opportunity to correct such deficiencies. The Office of the
President totally ignored supervening events properly
brought to its attention in the letters of petitioner dated 2
and 3 October 1992. It issued resolutions strictly on the
basis of the DECS representations which do not amount
to substantial evidence. The 10 November 1992

Resolution failed to sufficiently disclose the basis for
affirmation of the DECS phaseout and closure orders. The
12 January 1993 Resolution still refused to take into
consideration petitioners compliance with the DECS
requirements. Petitioner did not violate the Education Act
of 1992 because it was authorized to operate by virtue of
the provisional authorities issued by the DECS. The DECS
orders were not final and executory because petitioner
challenged them and appropriately availed itself of the
remedies available to it under the law.
Before proceeding to resolve the merits of this case, we
shall state briefly the concept regarding establishment of
schools. The
______________
12 Id., pp. 218-219.
13 Id., p. 227.
14 Id., p. 231.
782
Appeals
educational operation of schools is subject to prior

authorization of the government and is effected by
recognition. In the case of government-operated schools,
whether local, regional or national, recognition of
educational programs and/or operations is deemed
granted simultaneously with establishment. In all other
cases the rules and regulations governing recognition are
prescribed and enforced by the DECS, defining therein
who are qualified to apply, providing for a permit system,
stating the conditions for the grant of recognition and for
its cancellation and withdrawal, and providing for related
matters.15Sec. 27, Education Act of 1982. The
requirement on prior government authorization is
pursuant to the State policy that educational programs
and/or operations shall be of good quality and therefore
shall at least satisfy minimum standards with respect to
curricula, teaching staff, physical plant and facilities and
of administrative or management viability.16Sec. 5, Rule
III, Rules Implementing the Education Act of 1982.Set
against the records of the case, the assertion of petitioner
that it was deprived of its right to a hearing and any
opportunity whatsoever to correct the alleged
deficiencies readily collapses. The earlier narration of
facts clearly demonstrates that before the DECS issued
the phase-out and closure orders, petitioner was duly
notified, warned and given several opportunities to
correct its deficiencies and to comply with pertinent
orders and regulations.
Petitioner has gone all the way up to the Office of the

President to seek a reversal of the phase-out and closure
orders. There is thus no reason to complain of lack of
opportunity to explain its side as well as to comply with
the alleged deficiencies.17See Board of Medical
Education v. Alfonso, G.R. No. 88259, 10 August 1989,
176 SCRA 304. We agree with the observation of the
Office of the Solicitor General that
As long as the parties were given opportunity to be heard
before judgment was rendered, the demands of due
process were sufficiently met (Lindo v. COMELEC, 194
SCRA 25). It should also be noted that petitioner herein
repeatedly sought reconsideration of the various orders of
respondent DECS and its motions were duly considered
by respondent DECS to the extent of allowing and
granting its request for
_______________
15 Sec. 27, Education Act of 1982.
16 Sec. 5, Rule III, Rules Implementing the Education Act
of 1982.
17 See Board of Medical Education v. Alfonso, G.R. No.
88259, 10 August 1989, 176 SCRA 304.
783
VOL. 244, JUNE 2, 1995 783

Appeals
re-inspection of its premises. In connection therewith, it

has been ruled that the opportunity to be heard is the
essence of procedural due process and that any defect is
cured by the filing of a motion for reconsideration
(Medenilla v. Civil Service Commission, 194 SCRA
278).18Rollo, p. 424.Furthermore, the Office of the
President properly ignored (in the sense that it did not
find worthy of consideration) the alleged supervening
events, i.e., substantial improvements on school
equipment and facilities during the pendency of the case
before said Office because the improvements should have
been undertaken starting 1986. Moreover, the phase-out
and closure orders were based not only on petitioners
deficiencies as a maritime institute but also on its
continued operation without the requisite authorization
from the DECS and acceptance of freshman students in
blatant violation of the latters orders and/or persistent
warnings not to do so. Verily, there are sufficient grounds
to uphold the phase-out and closure orders of the DECS
which were issued conformably with Sec. 28 of the
Education Act of 1982 which provides:
Sec. 28. x x x x Punishable Violations.x x x x Operation
of schools and educational programs without
authorization, and/or operation thereof in violation of the
terms of recognition, are hereby declared punishable
violations subject to the penalties provided in this Act.

Secs. 68 and 69 of the same Act provide the penalties:
Sec. 68. Penalty Clause.Any person upon conviction for
an act in violation of Section 28, Chapter 3, Title III, shall
be punished with a fine of not less than two thousand
pesos (P2,000.00) nor more than ten thousand pesos
(P10,000.00) or imprisonment for a maximum period of
two (2) years, or both, in the discretion of the court. If the
act is committed by a school corporation, the school head
together with the person or persons responsible for the
offense or violation shall be equally liable.
Sec. 69. Administrative Sanction.The Minister
(Secretary) of Education, Culture and Sports may
prescribe and impose such administrative sanction as he
may deem reasonable and appropriate in the
implementing rules and regulations promulgated
pursuant to this Act for any of the following causes x x x x
5. Unauthorized operation of a school, or course, or any
component thereof x x x x
_______________
18 Rollo, p. 424.
784
Appeals
The corresponding rules implementing Secs. 68 and 69

read
Sec. 1.Punishable Acts and Penalties.The operation of
a school, through the conduct or offering of educational
programs or courses of studies/training without prior
government authorization in the form of permit or
recognition as provided for in Rule III, PART III of these
Rules, and/or in violation of any of the terms and
conditions of the said permit or recognition, have been
declared punishable violations of the Act, subject to the
penalties provided therein.
Any person, therefore, upon conviction for an act
constituting any of the foregoing punishable violations,
shall be punished with a fine of not less than Two
Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) nor more than Ten Thousand
Pesos (P10,000.00), or imprisonment for a maximum
period of two (2) years, or both, in the discretion of the
Court: Provided, however, that when the act is committed
by a school corporation, the school head together with
the person or persons responsible for the violation or
offense shall be deemed equally liable.
Sec. 2.Administrative Sanction.Without prejudice to
the interest of students, teachers and employees, and
independently of the penalty imposed in Sec. 1 under this
Rule, the Minister may withdraw, suspend, revoke or
cancel a schools authority to operate as an educational
institution or to conduct educational programs or courses
of studies/training, for any of the following causes, viz: x

x x x e. Unauthorized operation of a school, or program or
course of studies or component thereof, or any violation
of the prescribed rules governing advertisements or
announcements of educational institutions.
Substantial evidence has been defined to be such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.19Velasquez v. Nery,
G.R. No. 64284, 3 July 1992, 211 SCRA 28. A perusal of
the questioned resolutions of the Office of the President
reveals that they are based on the records of the case
which constitute substantial evidence, proving distinctly
not only petitioners consistent failure to meet the DECS
minimum standards for maritime institutes and correct its
deficiencies but also its continued operation and offering
of maritime courses despite the lack of permit.
Contrary to the claim of petitioner, the 10 November
1992 Resolution of the Office of the President sufficiently
disclosed the
_______________
19 Velasquez v. Nery, G.R. No. 64284, 3 July 1992, 211
SCRA 28.
785
VOL. 244, JUNE 2, 1995 785

Appeals
basis for its affirmance of the DECS phase-out and

closure orders:
After a careful study, we are constrained to resolve that
there exists no sufficient justification to modify, alter or
reverse the appealed order. We find no plausible reason
to disturb the action of the Secretary of Education,
Culture and Sports, more so in light of the conspicuous
fact that PMMS has repeatedly failed to comply with the
phase out order since 1986. What is more, the grounds
advanced by PMMS have already been passed upon, and
separately resolved by the office a quo.20Rollo, p.
72.Petitioners persistent refusal to comply with the
phase-out orders on the ground that the same were not
yet final and executory is untenable. As correctly held by
the Office of the President
x x x x While said phase-out (orders) may not be final and
executory, there was no reason for PMMSI to offer
maritime courses without the requisite prior authority of
the DECS. PMMSI possessed no valid permit prior to the
issuance of the phase-out. There was no authority to
speak of.21Rollo, p. 76.By reason of the special
knowledge and expertise of administrative departments
over matters falling under their jurisdiction, they are in a
better position to pass judgment thereon and their
findings of fact in that regard are generally accorded
respect, if not finality, by the courts. In the case at bench,

it is not the function of this Court nor any other court for
that matter
x x x to review the decisions and orders of the Secretary
on the issue of whether or not an educational institution
meets the norms and standards required for permission
to operate and to continue operating as such. On this
question, no Court has the power or prerogative to
substitute its opinion for that of the Secretary. Indeed, it
is obviously not expected that any Court would have the
competence to do so.
The only authority reposed in the Courts on the matter is
the determination of whether or not the Secretary of
Education, Culture and Sports has acted within the scope
of powers granted him by law
_______________
20 Rollo, p. 72.
21 Rollo, p. 76.
786
Appeals
and the Constitution. As long as it appears that he has

done so, any decision rendered by him should not and will
not be subject to review and reversal by any court.
Of course, if it should be made to appear to the Court
that those powers were in a case exercised so
whimsically, capriciously, oppressively, despotically or
arbitrarily as to call for peremptory correctionor stated
otherwise, that the Secretary had acted with grave abuse
of discretion, or had unlawfully neglected the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins
as a duty, or excluded another from the use or enjoyment
of a right or office to which such other is entitledit
becomes the Courts duty to rectify such action through
the extraordinary remedies of certiorari, prohibition, or
mandamus, whichever may properly apply. Yet even in
these extreme instances, where a Court finds that there
has been abuse of powers by the Secretary and
consequently nullifies and/or forbids such an abuse of
power, or commands whatever is needful to keep its
exercise within bounds, the Court, absent any compelling
reason to do otherwise, should still leave to the Secretary
the ultimate determination of the issue of the satisfaction
of fulfillment by an educational institution of the
standards set down for its legitimate operation, as to
which it should not ordinarily substitute its own judgment
for that of said office.22See Note 15.There being no grave
abuse of discretion committed by respondents
representing the Office of the President in issuing the
Resolutions of 10 November 1992 and 12 January 1993,
respondent Court of Appeals did not err in sustaining the

resolutions in question.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The questioned
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 22 July 1993, as
well as its Resolution of 26 November 1993, is AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (C.J.), Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr.,
Romero, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and
Francisco, JJ., concur.
Quiason, J., On official leave.
Petition denied. Judgment affirmed.
_______________
22 See Note 15.
787
VOL. 244, JUNE 2, 1995 787
Vinzons-Chato vs. Natividad
Note.Factual finding of quasi-judicial tribunals will not

be examined by Supreme Court. (Zagada vs. Civil Service
Commission, 222 SCRA 681 [1993]) [Philippine Merchant
Marine School, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 244 SCRA
770(1995)]

Garcia vs. Board of Investments
G.R. No. 88637. September 7, 1989.*EN

BANC.CONGRESSMAN ENRIQUE T. GARCIA, Second
District of Bataan, petitioner, vs. THE BOARD OF
INVESTMENTS, THE DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND
INDUSTRY, BATAAN PETROCHEMICAL CORPORATION and
PILIPINAS SHELL CORPORATION, respondents.
Courts; The Supreme Court is not to delve into the
economics and politics of this case.This Court is not
concerned with the economic,
_______________
* EN BANC.
375
VOL.177,SEPTEMBER7,1989 375
social, and political aspects of this case for it does not

possess the necessary technology and scientific expertise
to determine whether the transfer of the proposed BPC
petrochemical complex from Bataan to Batangas and the
change of fuel from naphtha only to naphtha and/or

LPG will be best for the project and for our country. This
Court is not about to delve into the economics and
politics of this case. It is concerned simply with the
alleged violation of due process and the alleged extra
limitation of power and discretion on the part of the
public respondents in approving the transfer of the
project to Batangas without giving due notice and an
opportunity to be heard to the vocal opponents of that
move.
Constitutional Law; Administrative Law; Due Process;
Abuse of Discretion; BOIs failure to publish notice and to
hold a hearing on the amended application of BPC,
deprived the oppositors of due process and amounted to
a grave abuse of discretion.Since the BPCs amended
application (particularly the change of location from
Bataan to Batangas) was in effect a new application, it
should have been published so that whoever may have
any objection to the transfer may be heard. The BOIs
failure to publish such notice and to hold a hearing on the
amended application deprived the oppositors, like the
petitioner, of due process and amounted to a grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the BOI.
Same; Same; Public respondents contention that the
petitioner has no legal interest in the matter is without
merit; The proposed investment or new industry is a
matter of public concern on which the public has the right
to be heard; Reasons.There is no merit in the public
respondents contention that the petitioner has no legal
interest in the matter of the transfer of the BPC

petrochemical plant from the province of Bataan to the
province of Batangas. The provision in the Investments
Code requiring publication of the investors application for
registration in the BOI is implicit recognition that the
proposed investment or new industry is a matter of public
concern on which the public has a right to be heard. And,
when the BOI approved BPCs application to establish its
petrochemical plant in Limay, Bataan, the inhabitants of
that province, particularly the affected community in
Limay, and the petitioner herein as the duly elected
representative of the Second District of Bataan acquired
an interest in the project which they have a right to
protect. Their interest in the establishment of the
petrochemical plant in their midst is actual, real, and vital
because it will affect not only their economic life but even
the air they will breathe.
376
Same; Same; The Supreme Court may require the BOI to

comply with the law.Hence, they have a right to be
heard or be consulted on the proposal to transfer it to
another site for the Investments Code does require that
the affected communities should be consulted. While
this Court may not require BOI to decide that controversy
in a particular way, we may require the Board to comply
with the law and its own rules and regulations prescribing
such notice and hearing. Same; Right of a citizen to have
access to information on matters of public concern;
Confidentiality of the records of BPCs applications is not
absolute.The petitioners request for xerox copies of
certain documents filed by BPC together with its original
application, and its amended application for registration
with BOI, may not be denied, as it is the constitutional
right of a citizen to have access to information on matters
of public concern under Article III, Section 7 of the 1987
Constitution. The confidentiality of the records on BPCs
applications is not absolute for Article 81 of the Omnibus
Investments Code provides that they may be disclosed
upon the consent of the applicant, or on orders of a
court of competent jurisdiction.
Same; Same; The Constitution does not open every door
to any and all information; Case at bar.However, just as
the confidentiality of an applicants records in the BOI is
not absolute, neither is the petitioners right of access to
them unlimited. The Constitution does not open every
door to any and all information. Under the Constitution,
access to official records, papers, etc. is subject to
limitations as may be provided by law (Art. III, Sec. 7,
second sentence). The law may exempt certain types of
information from public scrutiny (Legaspi vs. Civil
Service Commission, 150 SCRA 530). The trade secrets
and confidential, commercial and financial information of
the applicant BPC, and matters affecting national security
are excluded from the privilege.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting

Constitutional Law; Administrative Law; Due Process;
Omnibus Investments Code; No grave abuse of discretion
on the part of BOI nor denial of due process; Reasons.
With all due respect, I find no grave abuse of discretion
on the part of BOI, nor denial by it to petitioner of due
process. As regards publication, Article 54 of the Omnibus
Investments Code provides: Art. 54. Publication and
Posting of Notices.Immediately after the application has
been given due course by the Board, the Secretary of the
Board or any official designated by the Board shall require
the applicant to publish the notice of the action of
377
VOL. 177, SEPTEMBER 7, 1989 377
circulation in the province or city where the applicant has

its principal office, and post copies of said notice in
conspicuous places, in the office of the Board or in the
building where said office is located; setting forth in such
copies the name of the applicant, the business in which it
is engaged or proposes to engage or invest, and such
other data and information as may be required by the
Board. No approval or certificate shall be valid without
the publication and posting of notices as herein
provided.
Same; Same; Same; The application is not required to be

published.Clearly, it is not the application itself that is
required to be published but notice of the action of the
Board plus the specified data. Thus, the Notice of
Publication, which appeared in the Inquirer, simply read:
Notice is hereby given that the application of BATAAN
PETROCHEMICAL CORPORATION x x x for registration with
the Board of Investments under Book I of the Omnibus
Investment Code of 1987, otherwise known as Executive
Order No. 226 as new export producer of ethylene,
polyethylene and polypropylene has been officially
accepted on December 17, 1987 and is currently being
processed. Any person with valid objections to or
pertinent comments on the above-mentioned application
may file his/her comments/objections in writing with the
BOI within one (1) week from the date of this publication.
Same; Same; Same; No need to publish the amendments
to the application; Reasons.Absent the requirement of
publication of the application itself, there should be no
need either to publish the amendments to the
application. The statement in the majority opinion that
the amended application is considered a new application
does not find support in the Omnibus Investments Code.
After all, the amendment did not change the essence or
nature of the petrochemical project but only the site and
the feedstock.
Same; Same; Same; Applications and amendments
thereto are confidential and are not to be disclosed to any
person; Rea-sons.Specially significant, too, is the fact
that the confidentiality of applications is specifically

provided for in the Omnibus Investments Code. Thus:
Art. 81. Confidentiality of Applications.All applications
and their supporting documents filed under this Code
shall be confidential and shall not be disclosed to any
person, except with the consent of the applicant or on
orders of a court of competent jurisdiction. Considering
that all applications and their supporting documents are
confidential and are not to be disclosed to any person, it
378
follows that amendments thereto should also be

considered confidential and need no publication.
Same; Same; Same; The Omnibus Investments Code does
not require BOI to hold hearings before approving
applications for registration or amendments thereto.The
Omnibus Investments Code, however, does not require
the BOI to hold hearings before approving applications for
registration or amendments thereto. In fact, hearings
would contravene Codal provisions on confidentiality.
Article 7, paragraph 4, cited in the majority opinion
neither supports the necessity of hearings. It reads: Art.
7. Powers and Duties of the Board. x x x (4) After due
hearing, decide controversies concerning the
implementation of this Code that may arise between
registered enterprises or investors therein and

government agencies, within thirty (30) days after the
controversy has been submitted for decision: x x x
Same; Same; Same; Due hearing required only in
connection with controversies between registered
enterprises and agencies.In other words, due hearing is
required only in connection with controversies between
government agencies concerning the implementation of
the Omnibus Investments Code. It does not speak at all of
a hearing on applications for registration or amendments
thereto.
Same; Same; Same; Courts; Absent a clear, manifest and
grave abuse of discretion, findings of an administrative
agency will not be disturbed; Case at bar.In fine, it is
my view that the BOI did not commit any grave abuse of
discretion in approving the amendments to BPCs
application. Nor had it failed to observe due process in
approving the same without a formal hearing, petitioner
having, in fact, been fully heard. The matter of
determining whether the transfer of the plant site and
change of feedstock will be best for the project and the
country lies with the BOI as the administrative body
specifically tasked with such matters. It is well-settled
that absent a clear, manifest and grave abuse of
discretion amounting to want of jurisdiction, the decision
and findings of an administrative agency on matters
falling within its competence will not be disturbed by the
Courts (Sagun vs. Peoples Homesite and Housing Corp.,
G.R. No. 44738, June 22, 1988, 162 SCRA 411) as the
same falls within that agencys special knowledge and
expertise gained by it from handling the specific matters
falling under its jurisdiction (Mapa vs. Arroyo et al., G.R.
No. 78565, July 5, 1989).
379
VOL. 177, SEPTEMBER 7, 1989 379
PETITION for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary

injunction to review the decision of the Board of
Investments.
GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
In this petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer
for preliminary injunction, the petitioner, as congressman
for the second district of Bataan, assails the approval by
the Board of Investments (BOI) and the Department of
Trade and Industry (DTI) of the amended application for
registration of the Bataan Petrochemical Corporation,
which seeks to transfer the site of its petrochemical
complex from Bataan, the original situs of choice, to the
province of Batangas.
Since the case presents purely legal issues, and the

subject of the controversy vitally affects the economic
interests of the country which should not pend for too
long, the Court, after hearing the parties extensive oral
and written arguments on the petitioners application for
preliminary injunction, believes that it may now decide
the merits of the petition as well.
Proclamation No. 361 dated March 6, 1968, as amended
by Proclamation No. 630 dated November 29, 1969,
reserved a 388-hectare parcel of land of the public
domain located at Lamao, Limay, Bataan for industrial
estate purposes, in line with the State policy of
promoting and rationalizing the industrialization of the
Philippines. P.D. No. 1803, dated January 16, 1981,
enlarged the area by 188 hectares, making it a total of
576 hectares, reserved for the Petrochemical Industrial
Zone under the administration, management and
ownership of the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC).
The Bataan Refining Corporation (BRC for short) is a
wholly government-owned corporation, located in Bataan.
It produces 60% of the national output of naphtha.
Taiwanese investors in a petrochemical project formed
the Bataan Petrochemical Corporation (BPC) and applied
with BOI for registration as a new domestic producer of
petrochemicals. Its application specified Bataan as the
plant site. One of the terms and conditions for the
registration of the project was the use of naphtha
cracker and naphtha as feedstock or fuel for its
petrochemical plant. The petrochemical project was to be

a
380
joint venture with PNOC. BPC was issued a Certificate of

Registration on February 24, 1988 by BOI.
BPC was accorded pioneer status and was given fiscal
and other incentives by BOI, like, (1) exemptions from tax
on raw materials, (2) repatriation of the entire proceeds
of liquidation of investments in currency originally made
and at the exchange rate obtaining at the time of
repatriation; and (3) remittance of earnings on
investments. As additional incentive, the House of
Representatives approved a bill, introduced by the
petitioner, Congressman Garcia, eliminating the 48% ad
valorem tax on naphtha if and when it would be used as
raw material in the petrochemical plant. The chairman of
BPC, Tomas T.N. Hsi, profusely welcomed the bill, stating:
This project is aiming at a boon not only to the province
of Bataan, but to the country of the Philippines in general.
It will support the development of the Philippine
petrochemical industry by providing an ability to compete
in the world market for manufactured petrochemical
derivatives such as polyethylene and polypropylene

products . . . (p. 7, Rollo.)
However, in February 1989, A. T. Chong, chairman of USI
Far East Corporation, the major investor in BPC,
personally delivered to Trade Secretary Jose Concepcion a
letter dated January 25, 1989, advising him of BPCs
desire to amend the original registration certificate of its
project by changing the job site from Limay, Bataan, to
Batangas (Annex F, p. 51, Rollo). News of the shift was
published by one of the major Philippine dailies which
disclosed that the cause of the relocation of the project is
the insurgency and unstable labor situation in Bataan.
The presence in Batangas of a huge liquefied petroleum
gas (LPG) depot owned by the Pilipinas Shell Corporation
was another consideration.
The congressmen of Bataan vigorously opposed the
transfer of the proposed petrochemical plant to Batangas.
At a conference of the Taiwanese investors with President
Aquino and her Secretary of Defense and Chief of Staff of
the Army, the President expressed her preference that
the Bataan petrochemical plant be established in Bataan.
However, despite speeches in the Senate and in the
House opposing the transfer of the project to Batangas,
BPC filed in
381
VOL. 177, SEPTEMBER 7, 1989 381
the BOI on April 11, 1989 a request for approval of an

amendment of its investment application x x x for
establishing a petrochemical complex in the Philippines.
(Annex F, p. 51, Rollo.) The amendments consisted of: (1)
increasing the investment amount from US$220 million to
US$320 million; (2) increasing the production capacity of
its naphtha cracker, polyetheylene plant and
polypropylene plant; (3) changing the feedstock from
naphtha only to naphtha and/or liquefied petroleum
gas; (4) transferring the job site from Limay, Bataan to
Batangas (Annex F, p. 51, Rollo).
Senator Ernesto Maceda, Antonio Francisco, vicepresident and general manager of the Bataan Refining
Corporation, Congressman Felicito C. Payumo of the 1st
District of Bataan, herein petitioner Congressman Enrique
Garcia of the Second District, the provincial Governor of
Bataan, the League of Mayors and various civic and
professional organizations all opposed the transfer of the
project to Batangas (pp. 10, 11, 12, Rollo; Annex Q, p. 81,
Rollo).
On May 4, 1989, petitioner addressed a letter to
Secretary Concepcion of the Department of Trade and
Industry (DTI), through BOI vice-chairman and manager
Tomas Alcantara, requesting for a copy of the
amendment reportedly submitted by Taiwanese investors,
to their original application for the installation of the
Bataan Petrochemical Plant, as well as the original

application itself together with any and all attachments to
said original application and the amendment thereto.
(Annex K, p. 70, Rollo.)
On May 21, 1989, BOI vice-chairman Alcantara informed
petitioner that the Taiwanese investors declined to give
their consent to the release of the documents requested
(Annex O). On May 25, 1989, the BOI approved the
revision of the registration of BPCs petrochemical project
(Annex S, p. 84, Rollo).
On June 26, 1989, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari
and prohibition in this Court, with a prayer for preliminary
injunction, alleging that the BOI and DTI gravely abused
their discretion:
(a) in not observing due process in approving without a
hearing, the revisions in the registration of the BPCs
petrochemical project;
(b) in refusing to furnish the petitioner with copies of
BPCs
382
tion of the Governments policy of transparency;
(c) in approving the change in the site of BPCs

petrochemical plant from Bataan to Batangas in violation
of PD Nos. 949 and 1803 which establishes Lamao,
Limay, Bataan as the petrochemical industrial zone;
(d) in approving the change in feedstock from naphtha
only, to naphtha and/or lpg; and
(e) in showing gross partiality for BPC.
This Court is not concerned with the economic, social,
and political aspects of this case for it does not possess
the necessary technology and scientific expertise to
determine whether the transfer of the proposed BPC
petrochemical complex from Bataan to Batangas and the
change of fuel from naphtha only to naphtha and/or
LPG will be best for the project and for our country. This
Court is not about to delve into the economics and
politics of this case. It is concerned simply with the
alleged violation of due process and the alleged extra
limitation of power and discretion on the part of the
public respondents in approving the transfer of the
project to Batangas without giving due notice and an
opportunity to be heard to the vocal opponents of that
move.
The Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 (Executive Order
No. 226) of July 16, 1987 expressly declares it to be the
policy of the State to accelerate the sound development
of the national economy x x x by encouraging private
Filipino and foreign investments in industry, agriculture,
forestry, mining, tourism and other sectors of the
economy. For this purpose, the Code mandates the

holding of consultations with affected communities
whenever necessary (Art. 2, subpar. 2 of the Omnibus
Investments Code). Correspondingly, Art. 33 provides
that: Whenever necessary, the Board, through the
Peoples Economic Councils, shall consult the
communities affected on the acceptability of locating the
registered enterprise within their community.
The Code also requires the publication of applications for
registration, hence, the payment of publication and
other necessary fees x x x prior to the processing and
approval of such applications (Art. 7, subpar. 3, Omnibus
Investments Code). As provided by the law, the BPCs
application for registration
383
VOL. 177, SEPTEMBER 7, 1989 383
as a new export producer of ethylene, polyethylene and

polypropylene was published in the Philippine Daily
Inquirer issue of December 21, 1987. The notice invited
any person with valid objections to or pertinent
comments on the above-mentioned application x x x (to
file) his/her comments/objections in writing with the BOI
within one (1) week from the date of this publication
(Annex 1, public respondents Comment).
Since the BPCs amended application (particularly the

change of location from Bataan to Batangas) was in effect
a new application, it should have been published so that
whoever may have any objection to the transfer may be
heard. The BOIs failure to publish such notice and to hold
a hearing on the amended application deprived the
oppositors, like the petitioner, of due process and
amounted to a grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the BOI.
There is no merit in the public respondents contention
that the petitioner has no legal interest in the matter of
the transfer of the BPC petrochemical plant from the
province of Bataan to the province of Batangas. The
provision in the Investments Code requiring publication of
the investors application for registration in the BOI is
implicit recognition that the proposed investment or new
industry is a matter of public concern on which the public
has a right to be heard. And, when the BOI approved
BPCs application to establish its petrochemical plant in
Limay, Bataan, the inhabitants of that province,
particularly the affected community in Limay, and the
petitioner herein as the duly elected representive of the
Second District of Bataan acquired an interest in the
project which they have a right to protect. Their interest
in the establishment of the petrochemical plant in their
midst is actual, real, and vital because it will affect not
only their economic life but even the air they will breathe.
Hence, they have a right to be heard or be consulted on
the proposal to transfer it to another site for the
Investments Code does require that the affected

communities should be consulted. While this Court may
not require BOI to decide that controversy in a particular
way, we may require the Board to comply with the law
and its own rules and regulations prescribing such notice
and hearing.
This Court in the cases of Taada vs. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27
384
and Legaspi vs. Civil Service Commission, 150 SCRA 530,

has recognized a citizens interest and personality to
procure the enforcement of a public duty and to bring an
action to compel the performance of that duty. In this
case, what the petitioner seeks is for the Board of
Investments to hold a hearing where he may present
evidence in support of his opposition to the BPCs
amended application for registration (which amounts to a
new application) since one of the effects of the
amendment is to change the site of its petrochemical
plant from Bataan to Batangas.
The petitioners request for xerox copies of certain
documents filed by BPC together with its original
application, and its amended application for registration
with BOI, may not be denied, as it is the constitutional

right of a citizen to have access to information on matters
of public concern under Article III, Section 7 of the 1987
Constitution. The confidentiality of the records on BPCs
applications is not absolute for Article 81 of the Omnibus
Investments Code provides that they may be disclosed
upon the consent of the applicant, or on orders of a
court of competent jurisdiction. As a matter of fact, a
xerox copy of BPCs position paper dated April 10, 1989,
in support of its request for the transfer of its
petrochemical plant to Batangas, has been submitted to
this Court as Annex A of its memorandum.
However, just as the confidentiality of an applicants
records in the BOI is not absolute, neither is the
petitioners right of access to them unlimited. The
Constitution does not open every door to any and all
information. Under the Constitution, access to official
records, papers, etc. is subject to limitations as may be
provided by law (Art. III, Sec. 7, second sentence). The
law may exempt certain types of information from public
scrutiny (Legaspi vs. Civil Service Commission, 150 SCRA
530). The trade secrets and confidential, commercial and
financial information of the applicant BPC, and matters
affecting national security are excluded from the
privilege.
At the oral argument on the petitioners application for a
preliminary injunction on July 4, 1989, the Court was
informed that if the BOI will hold a hearing on the BPCs
amended application, the petitioner will be able to
present his evidence in opposition to the transfer of the

project to Batangas within a
385
VOL. 177, SEPTEMBER 7, 1989 385
period of one week. After such hearing, the BOI shall

render its decision which the petitioner may appeal to the
President as provided in Article 36 of the Investments
Code. Her decision will be final and unappealable.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted. The
Board of Investments is ordered: (1) to publish the
amended application for registration of the Bataan
Petrochemical Corporation, (2) to allow the petitioner to
have access to its records on the original and amended
applications for registration, as a petrochemical
manufacturer, of the respondent Bataan Petrochemical
Corporation, excluding, however, privileged papers
containing its trade secrets and other business and
financial information, and (3) to set for hearing the
petitioners opposition to the amended application in
order that he may present at such hearing all the
evidence in his possession in support of his opposition to
the transfer of the site of the BPC petrochemical plant to
Batangas province. The hearing shall not exceed a period
of ten (10) days from the date fixed by the BOI, notice of
which should be served by personal service to the

petitioner through counsel, at least three (3) days in
advance. The hearings may be held from day to day for a
period of ten (10) days without postponements. The
petition for a writ of prohibition or preliminary injunction
is denied. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento, Corts, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Fernan, C.J., No partformerly Cebu counsel for
Pilipinas Shell Corporation.
Melencio-Herrera, J., Please see attached dissent.
Paras, J., No part. Son is with lawyer.
Feliciano, J., No part. One of respondents represented
by my former firm.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting
On 17 December 1987, a group of Taiwanese investors,
doing business under the name of Bataan Petrochemical
Corporation (BPC), filed with the Board of Investments
(BOI) an application for registration as a new export
producer of petrochemicals. The
386
notice of application was duly published in the Philippine

Daily
Inquirer on 21 December 1987. The application, as
submitted, specified that the amount of the investment
for the establishment of a petrochemical complex in the
Philippines was $220 million and that the plant was to be
located in Bataan using naphta as feedstock.
On 14 January 1988, after compliance with other legal
requirements, the BOI approved the application, and
issued the corresponding Certificate of Registration on 24
February 1988. BPC was accorded pioneer status and
became entitled to the incentives provided for in the
Omnibus Investments Code.
In February 1989, BPC sought to amend its application by
proposing the change of plant site from Bataan to
Batangas and the feedstock from naphta only to
naphta and/or LPG, and increasing its investment to
$320 million, making the project the single biggest
foreign investment in the Philippines to date.
On 11 April 1989, BPC formally asked the BOI for approval
of the proposed amendments. Petitioner, the legislative
representative of the Second District of Bataan, opposed
the change of the plant site in a privilege speech before
Congress. He also sent letters to the BOI and the
Department of Trade and Industry setting forth his
objections to the transfer. In a hearing conducted by the

Senate Committee on Ways and Means, petitioner
appeared and expounded on his position.
On 25 May 1989, the BOI approved the revisions to the
registered petrochemical project. Earlier, or on 21 May
1989, citing Article 81 of the Omnibus Investments Code
of 1987, the BOI denied petitioners request for a copy of
the revisions submitted by the investors because the
latter had declined to give their consent to the disclosure.
On 27 May 1989, a meeting was called by President
Aquino in Malacaang to discuss the transfer of the
project site. Present at the meeting were BOI officials, the
petitioner and the other Congressman from Bataan.
Petitioner requested the President to reconsider the BOI
decision approving the transfer. On 24 June 1989, the
President again called a meeting with the Bataan
Congressmen, the Governor, and the Mayors of the
province. She asked the Bataan officials to withdraw their
objections to the transfer of the plant site to Batangas,
lest the investors pack up and leave for, after all,
Batangas is also in the
387
VOL. 177, SEPTEMBER 7, 1989 387
Philippines and some of the downstream industries

which would spring from a petrochemical complex may
later be located in Bataan. The Bataan officials agreed to
drop their objections, except for petitioner who instituted
this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition before this Court
(p. 11, Opposition by public respondents).
In his Petition, petitioner alleges that the BOI committed
grave abuse of discretion and denied him due process
when it approved, without a hearing, the amendments to
the registration of the BPC petrochemical project; when it
denied petitioners request for a copy of the
amendments; and when it approved the change of the
plant site and feedstock of the plant.
As stated in the majority opinion, the Court is not
concerned with the economic, social and political aspects
of the case.
In ruling in favor of petitioner, the majority faults the BOI
with grave abuse of discretion and has ordered it (1) to
publish the amended application for registration; (2) to
allow petitioner to have access to its records on the
original and amended applications for registration,
excluding trade secrets; and (3) to set for hearing
petitioners opposition to the amended application.
With all due respect, I find no grave abuse of discretion
on the part of BOI, nor denial by it to petitioner of due
process.
As regards publication, Article 54 of the Omnibus
Investments Code provides:
Art.54. Publication and Posting of Notices.Immediately

after the application has been given due course by the
Board, the Secretary of the Board or any official
designated by the Board shall require the applicant to
publish the notice of the action of the Board thereon at
his expense once in a newspaper of general circulation in
the province or city where the applicant has its principal
office, and post copies of said notice in conspicuous
places, in the office of the Board or in the building where
said office is located; setting forth in such copies the
name of the applicant, the business in which it is engaged
or proposes to engage or invest, and such other data and
information as may be required by the Board. No approval
or certificate shall be valid without the publication and
posting of notices as herein provided. (Italics supplied)
Clearly, it is not the application itself that is required to
be
388
published but notice of the action of the Board plus the

specified data. Thus, the Notice of Publication, which
appeared in the Inquirer, simply read:
Notice is hereby given that the application of BATAAN

PETROCHEMICAL CORPORATION x x x for registration with
the Board of Investments under Book I of the Omnibus
Investment Code of 1987, otherwise known as Executive
Order No. 226 as new export producer of ethylene,
polyethylene and polypropylene has been officially
accepted on December 17, 1987 and is currently being
processed.
Any person with valid objections to or pertinent
comments on the above-mentioned application may file
his/her comments/objections in writing with the BOI
within one (1) week from the date of this publication.
Let this notice be published at the expense of the
applicant. x x x (Annex 1, Opposition).
Absent the requirement of publication of the application
itself, there should be no need either to publish the
amendments to the application. The statement in the
majority opinion that the amended application is
considered a new application does not find support in the
Omnibus Investments Code. After all, the amendment did
not change the essence or nature of the petrochemical
project but only the site and the feedstock.
Specially significant, too, is the fact that the
confidentiality of applications is specifically provided for
in the Omnibus Investments Code. Thus:
Art.81. Confidentiality of Applications.All applications
and their supporting documents filed under this Code
shall be confidential and shall not be disclosed to any
person, except with the consent of the applicant or on

orders of a court of competent jurisdiction.
Considering that all applications and their supporting
documents are confidential and are not to be disclosed to
any person, it follows that amendments thereto should
also be considered confidential and need no publication.
Which brings us to the second part of the majority
disposition requiring BOI to allow petitioner to have
access to its records.
If BOI did not furnish petitioner with copy of the original
application and amendments thereto, it was because it
had
389
VOL. 177, SEPTEMBER 7, 1989 389
received a reply from the project proponents advising us

not to release the subject documents in view of the
sensitive information contained therein which includes
the accumulation of the proponents business experience
and know-how (Annex O, Petition). No grave abuse of
discretion can be attributed to the BOI, therefore, for not
acceding to petitioners request that he be furnished with
copies of the original application with its amendments
and attachments (Annex K, Petition).
Of course, pursuant to Article 81 of the Omnibus

Investments Code, the Court, as it does now, can order
the BOI to allow petitioner to have access to its records
on the original and amended applications for registration.
There seems to be no longer any necessity therefor,
however. Attached to public respondents Opposition is
BPCs Position Paper, dated 10 April 1989, wherein BPC
discoursed on the significant benefits to be achieved by
the transfer and why using LPG as alternative feedstock
will be very advantageous to the project (Annex
2,Opposition). In addition, petitioner already has in his
possession: (a) the approval by the BOI of the BPC
application for registration, which includes the preregistration and registration conditions (Annex A,
Petition); (b) the post-registration specific terms and
conditions, which the BOI imposed for the project (Annex
B, ibid.); (c) the BPC letter to the BOI requesting
approval of the amendment of its investment application
for registration for the establishment of a petrochemical
complex in the Philippines (Annex F, ibid.); and (d) the
approval by the BOI on 25 May 1989 of the revisions to
the project, subject to additional conditions (Annex S,
ibid.). Moreover, in the Supplemental Opposition filed by
BPC it has attached a summary of the considerations that
guided it in proposing the amendments. Virtually all the
data petitioner needs, therefore, are now of record.
The majority ruling also requires the BOI to set for
hearing petitioners opposition to the amended
application so that he may present at such hearing all the
evidence in his possession in support of his opposition to

the transfer of the site of the project to Batangas.
The Omnibus Investments Code, however, does not
require the BOI to hold hearings before approving
applications for registration or amendments thereto. In
fact, hearings would
390
contravene Codal provisions on confidentiality. Article 7,

paragraph 4, cited in the majority opinion neither
supports the necessity of hearings. It reads:
Art.7.Powers and Duties of the Board.
xxx
(4)After due hearing, decide controversies concerning
the implementation of this Code that may arise between
government agencies, within thirty (30) days after the
controversy has been submitted for decision: x x x
In other words, due hearing is required only in connection
with controversies between registered enterprises or
investors therein and government agencies concerning
the implementation of the Omnibus Investments Code. It
does not speak at all of a hearing on applications for

registration or amendments thereto.
Additionally, Article 34 of the Omnibus Investments Code,
in providing that applications not acted upon by the
Board within twenty (20) days from official acceptance
thereof shall be considered automatically approved
implies that a hearing is not at all indispensable in the
matter of registration of enterprises. The intention of the
law to make BOI proceedings non-adversarial and as
expeditious as possible consistent with the Codal policy
to encourage investments, is clearly discernible.
Besides, a hearing, as ordained, will serve no practical
purpose for petitioner has already fully presented his
case, the BOI has given it due consideration and has
acted accordingly. This is concretely shown by the
following exchange of communications:
(1) In his letter to the Secretary of Trade and Industry,
who is concurrently Chairman of the Board of
Investments, petitioner reiterate(d) his most vehement
protest against the maneuver to transfer the Bataan
Petrochemical project from Bataan to Batangas which, if
successful, would greatly prejudice not only the people of
Bataan, but more importantly, our country and
government (Annex E, Petition);
(2) Petitioners letter, dated 2 May 1989, to the Secretary
of Trade and Industry protested the latters official
position that The final choice (of site) is still with the
proponent (the Taiwanese), who would, in the final

analysis, provide the funding
391
VOL. 177, SEPTEMBER 7, 1989 391
or risk capital for the project (Annex J, ibid.);

(3) Attached to said communication was petitioners
letter, dated 24 April 1989, addressed to the Senate
Committee on Ways and Means giving fourteen (14)
reasons why the project should not be transferred to
Batangas (Annex I, ibid.);
(4) The reply-letter of the BOI to petitioner, dated 11 May
1989, took exception to petitioners claim that the BOI
and the DTI, by not vigorously opposing the transfer, had
violated the Constitution, the Omnibus Investments Code
and P.D. 949 as amended by PD 1803, and urged
petitioner not to proceed with his planned court action as
it would only serve to discourage foreign investors and
derail efforts at economic recovery (Annex M, ibid.);
(5) Petitioners letter to the BOI of 16 May 1989 rebutted
point by point the arguments in the BOI letter of 11 May
1989 and argued that PD No. 949, as amended by P.D.
No. 1803, as well as related issuances, have chosen

Bataan as the site of the petrochemical project Annex
N, ibid.);
(6) Petitioners letter to the BOI of 29 May 1989
formalized his motion for reconsideration of the BOI
decision approving the transfer of the project from
Bataan to Batangas, and contended that President Aquino
had set it aside (Annex P, ibid.);
(7) Petitioners follow-up letter to the BOI, dated 19 June
1989, claimed that the BOI decision to approve the
transfer of the project had, in effect, been reversed by the
President herself and that the BOI should refrain from
taking any step to execute said defunct decision (Annex
Q, ibid.);
(8) In the BOI letter of 21 June 1989 to petitioner, the
former denied that there had been a reversal by the
President of the BOI decision; and that, as far as
petitioners motion for reconsideration of the BOI decision
is concerned, since you are not submitting any new
cause of action for BOI to reconsider its decision, we
believe that we have sufficiently answered the questions
you have raised in your letter dated 2 May 1989, which
has been replied to by the Managing Head of the BOI on
11 May 1989 (Annex R, ibid.).
All told, there can be no question that petitioner has been
fully heard on his original petition to the BOI to
disapprove the transfer of the project site and on his
motion for reconsideration. No further purpose will be

served by setting petitioners
392
opposition for hearing.

Neither do I think that affected communities have a
right to be consulted, as opined by the majority. The
provision pertinent thereto reads:
Art.33. Application.Applications shall be filed with the
Board, recorded in a registration book and the date
appearing therein and stamped on the application shall
be considered the date of official acceptance.
Whenever necessary, the Board, through the Peoples
Economic Councils, shall consult the communities
affected on the acceptability of locating the registered
enterprise within their community.
In other words, the requirement on consultation is
qualified by the phrase whenever necessary. The clear
implication is that the BOI may dispense with such
consultations if it believes that it can decide applications
for registration by itself without consultation.
In fine, it is my view that the BOI did not commit any

grave abuse of discretion in approving the amendments
to BPCs application. Nor had it failed to observe due
process in approving the same without a formal hearing,
petitioner having, in fact, been fully heard. The matter of
determining whether the transfer of the plant site and
change of feedstock will be best for the project and the
country lies with the BOI as the administrative body
specifically tasked with such matters. It is wellsettled that
absent a clear, manifest and grave abuse of discretion
amounting to want of jurisdiction, the decision and
findings of an administrative agency on matters falling
within its competence will not be disturbed by the Courts
(Sagun vs. Peoples Homesite and Housing Corp., G.R. No.
44738, June 22, 1988, 162 SCRA 411) as the same falls
within that agencys special knowledge and expertise
gained by it from handling the specific matters falling
under its jurisdiction (Mapa vs. Arroyo et al., G.R. No.
78565, July 5, 1989). I vote, therefore, for the dismissal of
the petition for lack of
merit, which dismissal should be immediately executory.
The holding of hearings will serve no purpose other than
unnecessarily delay the implementation of the
Philippines biggest foreign project, representing a major
step towards industrialization. Further delay can only
produce a chilling effect on
393
VOL. 177, SEPTEMBER 8, 1989 393

Market Developers, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
foreign investments in the country.

Petition for certiorari granted. Writ of prohibition or
preliminary injunction denied.
Notes.Avoidance of technicalities of law or procedure
should not cause a denial of due process. (First Asian
Transport & Shipping Agency, Inc. vs. Ople, 142 SCRA
542).
No denial of due process where all requirements of
administrative due process were met by the school and
the student given the opportunity to be heard. (Ateneo
vs. CA, 145 SCRA 100). [Garcia vs. Board of Investments,
177 SCRA 374(1989)]

Taada vs. Angara
G.R. No. 118295. May 2, 1997.*EN BANC.WIGBERTO E.

TAADA and ANNA DOMINIQUE COSETENG, as members
of the Philippine Senate and as taxpayers; GREGORIO
ANDOLANA and JOKER ARROYO as members of the House
of Representatives and as taxpayers; NICANOR P. PERLAS
and HORACIO R. MORALES, both as taxpayers; CIVIL
LIBERTIES UNION, NATIONAL ECONOMIC PROTECTIONISM
ASSOCIATION, CENTER FOR ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT
INITIATIVES, LIKAS-KAYANG KAUNLARAN FOUNDATION,
INC., PHILIPPINE RURAL RECONSTRUCTION MOVEMENT,
DEMOKRATIKONG KILUSAN NG MAGBUBUKID NG
PILIPINAS, INC., and PHILIPPINE PEASANT INSTITUTE, in
representation of various taxpayers and as nongovernmental organizations, petitioners, vs. EDGARDO
ANGARA, ALBERTO ROMULO, LETICIA RAMOS-SHAHANI,
HEHERSON ALVAREZ, AGAPITO AQUINO, RODOLFO
BIAZON, NEPTALI
______________
* EN BANC.
19
VOL. 272, MAY 2, 1997 19

Taada vs. Angara
GONZALES, ERNESTO HERRERA, JOSE LINA, GLORIA

MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, ORLANDO MERCADO, BLAS OPLE,
JOHN OSMEA, SANTANINA RASUL, RAMON REVILLA,
RAUL ROCO, FRANCISCO TATAD and FREDDIE WEBB, in
their respective capacities as members of the Philippine
Senate who concurred in the ratification by the President
of the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization; SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, in his capacity
as Secretary of Budget and Management; CARIDAD
VALDEHUESA, in her capacity as National Treasurer;
RIZALINO NAVARRO, in his capacity as Secretary of Trade
and Industry; ROBERTO SEBASTIAN, in his capacity as
Secretary of Agriculture; ROBERTO DE OCAMPO, in his
capacity as Secretary of Finance; ROBERTO ROMULO, in
his capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs; and TEOFISTO
T. GUINGONA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary,
respondents.
Constitutional Law; Judicial Review; Separation of Powers;
Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously
alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becom es
not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to
settle the dispute.In seeking to nullify an act of the
Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the
Constitution, the petition no doubt rais es a justiciable
controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is
seriously alleged to have infringed the Cons titution, it

becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the
judiciary to settle the dispute. The question thus posed
is judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate)
remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution
is upheld. Once a controvers y as to the application or
interpretation of a constitutional provision is raised before
this Court (as in the instant case), it becomes a legal
issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate
to decide.
Same; Same; Actions; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus are appropriate remedies to
raise constitutional issues and to review and/or
prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and
executive officials.As the petition alleges grave abuse
of discretion and as there is no other pl ain, speedy or
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, we have
no hesitation at all in holding that this petition should be
given due course and the
20
Taada vs. Angara
vital questions raised therein ruled upon under Rule 65 of

the Rules of Court. Indeed, certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus are appropriate remedies to raise
constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify,
when proper, acts of legislative and executive officials.

On this, we have no equivocation.
Same; Same; Same; Same; In deciding to take jurisdiction
over this petition, the Supreme Court does not review the
wisdom of the decision of the President and the Senate in
enlisting the country in the WTO, or pass upon the merits
of trade liberalization as a policy espoused by said
international body, rather, it only exercises its
constitutional duty to determine whether or not there
had been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Senate in
ratifying the WTO Agreement and its three annexes.We
should stres s that, in deciding to take jurisdiction over
this petition, this Court will not review the wisdom of the
decision of the President and the Senate in enlisting the
country into the WTO, or pass upon the m erits of trade
liberalization as a policy espoused by said international
body. Neither will it rule on the propriety of the
governments economic policy of reducing/removing
tariffs, taxes, subsidies, quantitative restrictions, and
other import/trade barriers. Rather, it will only exercise its
ratifying the WTO Agreement and its three annexes.
Same; Constitutional Principles and State Policies; The
principles and state policies enumerated in Article II and
some sections of Article XII are not self-executing
provisions, the disregard of which can give rise to a cause
of action in the courts.By its very title, Article II of the

Constitution is a declaration of principles and state
policies. The counterpart of this article in the 1935
Constitution is called the bas ic political creed of the
nation by Dean Vicente Sinco. These principles in Article
II are not intended to be self-executing principles ready
for enforcement through the courts. They are used by the
judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power
of laws. As held in the leading case of Kilosbayan,
Incorporated vs. Morato, the principles and state policies
enumerated in Article II and some sections of Article XII
are not self-executing provis ions, the disregard of which
can give rise to a cause of action in the courts. They do
not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights
but guidelines for legislation.
21
VOL. 272, MAY 2, 1997 21
Taada vs. Angara
Same; Same; Separation of Powers; Due Process.The

reasons for denying a cause of action to an alleged
infringement of broad constitutional principles are
sourced from basic considerations of due process and the
lack of judicial authority to wade into the uncharted
ocean of social and economic policy making.
Same; Same; Trade Liberalization; Filipino First Policy;

While the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of
Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, at the
same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange
with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and
reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises
only against foreign competition and trade practices that
are unfairthe Constitution did not intend to pursue an
isolationist policy.All told, while the Constitution indeed
mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor
and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need
for business exchange with the rest of the world on the
bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of
Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and
trade practices that are unfair. In other words, the
Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy.
It did not shut out foreign investments, goods and
services in the development of the Philippine economy.
While the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited
entry of foreign goods, services and investments into the
country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows
an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity,
frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair.
Same; Same; Same; Same; World Trade Organization
(WTO); General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT);
There is hardly any basis for the statement that under the
WTO, local industries and enterprises will all be wiped out
and that Filipinos will be deprived of control of the
economy, for, quite to the contrary, the weaker situations
of developing nations like the Philippines have been taken

into account.Moreover, GATT itself has provided built-in
protection from unfair foreign competition and trade
practices including anti-dumping measures,
countervailing measures and safeguards against import
surges. Where local business are jeopardized by unfair
foreign competition, the Philippines can avail of these
measures. There is hardly therefore any basis for the
statement that under the WTO, local industries and
enterprises will all be wiped out and that Filipinos will be
deprived of control of the economy. Quite the contrary,
the weaker situations of developin g na ti on s like the
Philippines have been taken into account; thus, there
would be no basis to say
22
Taada vs. Angara
that in joining the WTO, the respondents have gravely

abused their discretion. True, they have made a bold
decision to steer the ship of state into the yet uncharted
sea of economic liberalization. But such decision cannot
be set aside on the ground of grave abuse of discretion,
simply because we disagree with it or simply because we
believe only in other economic policies. As earlier stated,
the Court in taking jurisdiction of this case will not pass
upon the advantages and disadvantages of trade
liberalization as an economic policy. It will only perform
its constitutional duty of determining whether the Senate

committed grave abuse of discretion.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The
fundamental law encourages industries that are
competitive in both domestic and foreign markets,
thereby demonstrating a clear policy against a sheltered
domestic trade environment, but one in favor of the
gradual developm ent of robust industries that can
compete with the best in the foreign markets.The WTO
reliance on most favored nation, national treatment,
and trade without discrimination cannot be struck down
as unconstitutional as in fact they are rules of equality
and reciprocity that apply to all WTO members. Aside
from envisioning a trade policy based on equality and
reciprocity, the fundamental law encourages industries
that are competitive in both domestic and foreign
markets, thereby demonstrating a clear policy against a
sheltered domestic trade environment, but one in favor of
the gradual development of robust industries that can
compete with the best in the foreign markets. Indeed,
Filipino managers and Filipino enterprises have shown
capability and tenacity to compete internationally. And
given a free trade environment, Filipino entrepreneurs
and managers in Hongkong have demonstrated the
Filipino capacity to grow and to prosper against the best
offered under a policy of laissez faire.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Political
Questions; The responses to questions on whether
WTO/GATT will favor the general welfare of the public at
large involve judgment calls by our policy makers, for

which they are answerable to our people during
appropriate electoral exercisessuch questions and the
answers thereto are not subject to judicial
pronouncements based on grave abuse of discretion.
Consequently, the question boils down to whether
large. Will adherence to the W TO treaty bring this ideal
(of favoring the general welfare) to reality? Will
WTO/GATT succeed in promoting the Filipinos general
welfare because it willas promised by its
23
VOL. 272, MAY 2, 1997 23
Taada vs. Angara
promotersexpand the countrys exports and generate

more employment? Will it bring more prosperity,
employment, purchasing power and quality products at
the most reasonable rates to the Filipino public? The
responses to these questions involve judgment calls by
our policy makers, for which they are answerable to our
people during appropriate electoral exercises. Such
questions and the answers thereto are not subject to
judicial pronouncements based on grave abuse of
discretion.
Same; It is to the credit of its drafters that the
Constitution can withstand the assaults of bigots and
infidels but at the same time bend with the refreshing

winds of change necessitated by unfolding events.It is
not difficult to answer this question. Constitutions are
designed to meet not only the vagaries of contemporary
events. They should be interpreted to cover even future
and unknown circumstances. It is to the credit of its
drafters that a Constitution can withstand the assaults of
bigots and infidels but at the same time bend with the
refreshing winds of change necessitated by unfolding
events. As one eminent political law writer and respected
jurist explains: The Constitution must be quintessential
rather than superficial, the root and not the blossom, the
base and framework only of the edifice that is yet to rise.
It is but the core of the dream that must take shape, not
in a twinkling by mandate of our delegates, but slowly in
the crucible of Filipino minds and hearts, where it will in
time develop its sinews and gradually gather its strength
and finally achieve its substance. In fine, the Constitution
cannot, like the goddess Athena, rise full-grown from the
brow of the Constitutional Convention, nor can it conjure
by mere fiat an instant Utopia. It must grow with the
society it seeks to re-structure and march apace with the
progress of the race, drawing from the vicissitudes of
history the dynamism and vitality that will keep it, far
from becoming a petrified rule, a pulsing, living law
attuned to the heartbeat of the nation.
Same; International Law; While sovereignty has
traditionally been deemed absolute and all
encompassing on the domestic level, it is however
subject to restrictions and limi tation s vol un tari ly

agreed to by the Philippines, expressly or impliedly, as a
mem ber of the family of nations.This Court notes and
appreciates the ferocity and passion by which petitioners
stressed their arguments on this issue. However, while
sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and
all-encompassing on the domestic level, it is however
subject to restrictions and limitations voluntarily agreed
to by the
24
Taada vs. Angara
Philippines, expressly or impliedly, as a member of the

family of nations. Unquestionably, the Constitution did
not envision a hermit-type isolation of the country from
the rest of the world.
Same; Same; Doctrine of I ncorporation; Words and
Phrases; By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is
bound by generally accepted principles of international
law, which are considered automatically part of our own
laws.In its Declaration of Principles and State Policies,
the Constitution adopts the generally accepted
land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice,
freedom, cooperation and amity, with all nations. By the
doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by
generally accepted principles of international law, which

are considered to be autom atically part of our own laws.
One of the oldest and most fundamental rules in
international law is pacta sunt servandainternational
agreements must be performed in good faith. A treaty
engagement is not a mere moral obligation but creates a
legally binding obligation on the parties x x x. A state
which has contracted valid international obligations is
bound to make in its legislations such modifications as
may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the
obligations undertaken.
Same; Same; Treaties; By their voluntary act, nations may
surrender some aspects of their state power in exchange
for greater benefits granted by or derived from a
convention or pact.By their inherent nature, treaties
really limit or restrict the absoluteness of sovereignty. By
their voluntary act, nations may surrender some aspects
of their state power in exchange for greater benefits
granted by or derived from a convention or pact. After all,
states, like individuals, live with coequals, and in pursuit
of mutually covenanted objectives and benefits, they also
commonly agree to limit the exercise of their otherwise
absolute rights.
Same; Same; Same; World Trade Organization; Pleadings
and Practice; Article 34 of the General Provisions and
Basic Principles of the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) does not
contain an unreasonable burden, consistent as it is with
due process and the concept of adversarial dispute
settlement inherent in Philippine judicial system.

Petitioners aver that paragraph 1, Article 34 of the
General Provisions and Basic Principles of the Agreement
on T ra de-Rel a ted A s pects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS) intrudes on the power of the Supreme
Court to prom ulgate rules concerning pleading, practice
and proce25
VOL. 272, MAY 2, 1997 25
Taada vs. Angara
dures. x x x By and large, the arguments adduced in

connection with our dis position of the third issue
derogation of legislative powerwill apply to this fourth
issue also. Suffice it to say that the reciprocity clause
more than justifies such intrusion, if any actually exists.
Besides, Article 34 does not contain an unreasonable
burden, consistent as it is with due process and the
concept of adversarial dispute settlement inherent in our
judicial system. So too, since the Philippines is a signatory
to most international conventions on patents, trademarks
and copyrights, the adjus tment in legislation and rules of
procedure will not be substantial.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Patents; Evidence;
Words and Phrases; Burden of Proof; Burden of Evidence;
The burden of proof contemplated by Article 34 should
actually and properly be understood as referring to the
burden of evidence (burden of going forward) placed on

the producer of identical (or fake) product to show that
his product was produced without the use of the patented
processthe patent owner still has the burden of proof
since he still has to introduce evidence of the existence of
the alleged identical product, the fact that it is identical
to the genuine one produced by the patented process and
the fact of newness of the genuine product or the fact
of substantial likelihood that the identical product was
made by the patented process.From the above, a WTO
Member is required to provide a rule of dis putable (note
the words in the absence of proof to the contrary)
presumption that a product shown to be identical to one
produced with the use of a patented process shall be
deemed to have been obtained by the (illegal) use of the
said patented process, (1) where such product obtained
by the patented product is new, or (2) where there is
substantial likelihood that the identical product was
made with the use of the said patented process but the
owner of the patent could not determine the exact
process used in obtaining such identical product. Hence,
the burden of proof contemplated by Article 34 should
actually be understood as the duty of the alleged patent
infringer to overthrow such presumption. Such burden,
properly understood, actually refers to the burden of
evidence (burden of going forward) placed on the
producer of the identical (or fake) product to show that
his product was produced without the use of the patented
process. The foregoing notwithstanding, the patent owner
still has the burden of proof since, regardles s of the
presumption provided under paragraph 1 of Article 34,

such owner still has to introduce evidence of the
existence of the alleged identical product, the fact that it
is identical to the genuine one produced by the
patented process and the fact of
26
Taada vs. Angara
newness of the genuine product or the fact of

substantial likelihood that the identical product was
made by the patented process.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Final
Act, Explained.A final act, sometimes called protocol
de clture, is an instrument which records the winding up
of the proceedings of a diplomatic conference and usually
includes a reproduction of the texts of treaties,
conventions, recommendations and other acts agreed
upon and s igned by the plenipotentiaries attending the
conference. It is not the treaty itself. It is rather a
summary of the proceedings of a protracted conference
which may have taken place over several years .
Same; Judicial Review; Words and Phrases; Certiorari; By
grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction, and mere abuse of discretion is not enough
it must be grave.By grave abuse of discretion is meant
such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is

equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion
is not enough. It mus t be grave abuse of discretion as
when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and
must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation
of law. Failure on the part of the petitioner to show grave
abus e of discretion will result in the dismissal of the
petition.
Same; Same; Separation of Powers; In rendering this
Decision, the Supreme Court never forgets that the
Senate, whose act is under review, is one of two
sovereign houses of Congress and is thus entitled to great
respect in its actions.In rendering this Decision, this
Court never forgets that the Senate, whose act is under
review, is one of two sovereign houses of Congress and is
thus entitled to great respect in its actions. It is itself a
constitutional body independent and coordinate, and thus
its actions are presumed regular and done in good faith.
Unless convincing proof and persuasive arguments are
presented to overthrow such presumptions, this Court will
resolve every doubt in its favor. Using the foregoing wellaccepted definition of grave abuse of discretion and the
presumption of regularity in the Senates processes, this
Court cannot find any cogent reason to impute grave
abuse of discretion to the Senates exercise of its power
of concurrence in the WTO Agreement granted it by Sec.

21 of Article VII of the Constitution.
27
VOL. 272, MAY 2, 1997 27
Taada vs. Angara
Same; Same; Same; Treaties; World Trade Organization;

The Senate Act, after deliberation and voting, of
voluntarily and overwhelmingly giving its consent to the
WTO Agreement thereby making it a part of the law of
the land, is a legitimate exercise of its sovereign duty
and power.That the Senate, after deliberation and
voting, voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave its consent
to the WTO Agreement thereby making it a part of the
law of the land is a legitimate exercise of its sovereign
duty and power. W e find no patent and gross
arbitrariness or des potism by reas on of passion or
personal hostility in such exercise. It is not impossible to
surmise that this Court, or at least some of its members,
may even agree with petitioners that it is more
advantageous to the national interest to strike down
Senate Resolution No. 97. But that is not a legal reason to
attribute grave abuse of dis cretion to the Senate and to
nullify its decision. To do so would constitute grave abuse
in the exercise of our own judicial power and duty.
Ineludably, what the Senate did was a valid exercise of its
authority. As to whether such exercise was wise,
beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry
and review. That is a matter between the elected policy

makers and the people. As to whether the nation should
join the worldwide march toward trade liberalization and
economic globalization is a matter that our people should
determine in electing their policy makers. After all, the
WTO Agreement allows withdrawal of membership,
should this be the political desire of a member.
World Trade Organization; Trade Liberalization; I
nternational Law; Notwithstanding objections against
possible limitations on national sovereignty, the WTO
remains as the only viable structure for multilateral
trading and the veritable forum for the development of
international trade law.The eminent futurist John
Naisbitt, author of the best seller Megatrends, predicts an
Asian Renaissance where the East will become the
dominant region of the world economically, politically and
culturally in the next century. He refers to the free
market espoused by WTO as the catalyst in this
coming Asian ascendancy. There are at present about 31
countries including China, Russia and Saudi Arabia
negotiating for membership in the WTO. Notwithstanding
objections against possible limitations on national
sovereignty, the WTO remains as the only viable structure
for multilateral trading and the veritable forum for the
development of international trade law. The alternative to
WTO is isolation, stagnation, if not economic selfdestruction. Duly enriched with original membership,
keenly aware of the advantages and disadvantages of
globalization with its on-line experience, and endowed

with
28
Taada vs. Angara
a vision of the future, the Philippines now straddles the

crossroads of an international strategy for economic
prosperity and stability in the new millennium. Let the
people, through their duly authorized elected officers ,
make their free choice.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
The facts are stated in the Opinion of the Court.
Abelardo F. Domondon for petitioners.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The emergence on January 1, 1995 of the World Trade
Organization, abetted by the membership thereto of the
vast majority of countries, has revolutionized
international business and economic relations amongst
states. It has irreversibly propelled the world towards
trade liberalization and economic globalization.
Liberalization, globalization, deregulation and
privatization, the third-millennium buzz words, are
ushering in a new borderless world of business by
sweeping away as mere historical relics the heretofore

traditional modes of promoting and protecting national
economies like tariffs, export subsidies, import quotas,
quantitative restrictions, tax exemptions and currency
controls. Finding market niches and becoming the best in
specific industries in a market-driven and export-oriented
global scenario are replacing age-old beggar-thyneighbor policies that unilaterally protect weak and
inefficient domestic producers of goods and services. In
the words of Peter Drucker, the well-known management
guru, Increased participation in the world economy has
become the key to domestic economic growth and
prosperity.
Brief Historical Background
To hasten worldwide recovery from the devastation
wrought by the Second World War, plans for the
establishment of three multilateral institutionsinspired
by that grand political body, the United Nationswere
discussed at
29
VOL. 272, MAY 2, 1997 29
Taada vs. Angara
Dumbarton Oaks and Bretton Woods. The first was the

World Bank (WB) which was to address the rehabilitation
and reconstruction of war-ravaged and later developing

countries; the second, the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) which was to deal with currency problems; and the
third, the International Trade Organization (ITO), which
was to foster order and predictability in world trade and
to minimize unilateral protectionist policies that invite
challenge, even retaliation, from other states. However,
for a variety of reasons, including its non-ratification by
the United States, the ITO, unlike the IMF and WB, never
took off. What remained was only GATTthe General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. GATT was a collection of
treaties governing access to the economies of treaty
adherents with no institutionalized body administering
the agreements or dependable system of dispute
settlement.
After half a century and several dizzying rounds of
negotiations, principally the Kennedy Round, the Tokyo
Round and the Uruguay Round, the world finally gave
birth to that administering bodythe World Trade
Organizationwith the signing of the Final Act in
Marrakesh, Morocco and the ratification of the WTO
Agreement by its members.1In Annex A of her
Memorandum, dated August 8, 1996, received by this
Court on August 12, 1996, Philippine Ambassador to the
United Nations , World Trade Organization and other
international organizations Lilia R. Bautista (hereafter
referred ...
______________
1 In Annex A of her Memorandum, dated August 8,

1996, received by this Court on August 12, 1996,
Philippine Ambassador to the United Nations , World
Trade Organization and other international organizations
Lilia R. Bautista (hereafter referred to as Bautista Paper)
submitted a 46-year Chronology of GATT as follows:
1947 The birth of GATT. On 30 October 1947, the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was
signed by 23 nations at the Palais des Nations in Geneva.
The Agreement contained tariff concessions agreed to in
the first multilateral trade negotiations and a set of rules
designed to prevent these concessions from being
frustrated by restrictive trade measures.
The 23 founding contracting parties were members of the
Preparatory Committee established by the United Nations
Economic and Social Council in 1946 to draft the charter
of the International Trade Organization (ITO). The ITO was
envis-
30
Taada vs. Angara
Like many other developing countries, the Philippines

joined WTO as a founding member with the goal, as
articu-
_______________
aged as the final leg of a triad of post-War economic
agencies (the other two were the International Monetary
Fund and the International Bank for Reconstructionlater
the World Bank).
In parallel with this task, the Committee members
decided to negotiate tariff conces sions among
themselves. From April to October 1947, the participants
completed some 123 negotiations and established 20
schedules containing the tariff reductions and bindings
which became an integral part of GATT. These schedules
resulting from the first Round covered some 45,000 tariff
concessions and about $10 billion in trade.
GATT was conceived as an interim measure that put into
effect the commercial-policy provisions of the ITO. In
November, delegations from 56 countries met in Havana,
Cuba, to consider the ITO draft as a whole. After long and
difficult negotiations, s ome 53 countries signed the Final
Act authenticating the text of the Havana Charter in
March 1948. There was no commitment, however, from
governments to ratification and, in the end, the ITO was
stillborn, leaving GATT as the only international
instrument governing the conduct of world trade.
1948 Entry into force. On 1 January 1948, GATT entered
into force. The 23 founding mem bers were: Australia,
Belgium, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, China,
Cuba, Czechoslovakia, France, India, Lebanon,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Pakistan, Southern Rhodesia, Syria, South Africa, United

Kingdom and the United States. The firs t Session of the
Contracting Parties was held from February to March in
Havana, Cuba. The secretariat of the Interim Commiss ion
for the ITO, which served as the ad hoc secretariat of
GATT, moved from Lake Placid, New York, to Geneva. The
Contracting Parties held their second session in Geneva
from August to September.
1949 Second Round at Annecy. During the second Round
of trade negotiations, held from April to August at
Annecy, France, the contracting parties exchanged some
5,000 tariff concess ions. At their third Session, they also
dealt with the access ion of ten more countries.
31
VOL. 272, MAY 2, 1997 31
Taada vs. Angara
lated by President Fidel V. Ramos in two letters to the

Senate (infra), of improving Philippine access to foreign
markets, especially its major trading partners, through
the reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly
agricultural and industrial products. The President also
saw in the WTO the opening of
_______________
1950 Third Round at Torquay. From September 1950 to

April 1951, the contracting parties exchanged some
8,700 tariff concessions in the English town, yielding tariff
reduction of about 25 per cent in relation to the 1948
level. Four more countries acceded to GATT. During the
fifth Session of the Contracting Parties, the United States
indicated that the ITO Charter would not be re-submitted
to the US Congress; this, in effect, meant that ITO would
not come into operation.
1956 Fourth Round at Geneva. The fourth Round was
completed in May and produced some $2.5 billion worth
of tariff reductions . At the beginning of the year, the
GATT commercial policy course for officials of developing
countries was inaugurated.
1958 The Haberler Report. GATT published Trends in
International Trade in October. Known as the Haberler
Report in honour of Professor Gottfried Haberler, the
chairman of the panel of eminent economists, it provided
initial guidelines for the work of GATT. The Contracting
Parties at their 13th Session, attended by Ministers,
subsequently established three committees in GATT:
Committee I to convene a further tariff negotiating
conference; Committee II to review the agricultural
policies of member governments; and Committee III to
tackle the problems facing developing countries in their
trade. The establishment of the European Economic
Community during the previous year also demanded
large-scale tariff negotiations under Article XXIV:6 of the
General Agreement.
1960 The Dillon Round. The fifth Round opened in

September and was divided into two phases: the first was
concerned with negotiations with EEC member s tates for
the creation of a single schedule of concessions for the
Community based on its Common External Tariff; and the
second was a further general round of tariff negotiations.
Named in honour of US UnderSecretary of State Douglas
Dillon who proposed the negotiations, the Round was
concluded in July 1962 and resulted in about 4,400 tariff
concessions covering $4.9 billion of trade.
32
Taada vs. Angara
new opportunities for the services sector x x x, (the

reduction of) costs and uncertainty associated with
exporting x x x, and
_______________
1961 The Short-Term Arrangement covering cotton
textiles was agreed as an exception to the GATT rules.
The arrangement permitted the negotiation of quota
restrictions affecting the exports of cotton-producing
countries. In 1962 the Short Term Arrangement became
the Long term Arrangement, lasting until 1974 when
the Multifibre Arrangement entered into force.
1964 The Kennedy Round. Meeting at Ministerial level, a

Trade Negotiations Committee formally opened the
Kennedy Round in May. In June 1967, the Rounds Final
Act was signed by some 50 participating countries which
together accounted for 75 per cent of world trade. For the
first time, negotiations departed from the product-byproduct approach used in the previous Rounds to an
across-the-board or linear method of cutting tariffs for
industrial goods. The working hypothesis of a 50 per cent
target cut in tariff levels was achieved in many areas.
Concessions covered an estimated total value of trade of
about $40 billion. Separate agreements were reached on
grains, chemical products and a Code on Anti-Dumping.
1965 A New Chapter. The early 1960s marked the
accession to the General Agreement of many newlyindependent developing countries. I n February, the
Contracting Parties, meeting in a special session, adopted
the text of Part IV on Trade and Development. The
additional chapter to the GATT required developed
countries to accord high priority to the reduction of trade
barriers to products of developing countries. A Committee
on Trade and Development was established to oversee
the functioning of the new GATT provisions. In the
preceding year, GATT had established the International
Trade Centre (ITC) to help developing countries in trade
promotion and identification of potential markets. Since
1968, the ITC had been jointly operated by GATT and the
UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).
1973 The Tokyo Round. The seventh Round was launched
by Ministers in September at the Japanese capital. Some

99 countries participated in negotiating a comprehensive
body of agreements covering both tariff and non-tariff
matters.
33
VOL. 272, MAY 2, 1997 33
Taada vs. Angara
(the attraction of) more investments into the country.

Although the Chief Executive did not expressly mention it
in his
_______________
At the end of the Round in November 1979, participants
exchanged tariff reductions and bindings which covered
more than $300 billion of trade. As a result of these cuts,
the weighted average tariff on manufactured goods in the
worlds nine major industrial markets declined from 7.0 to
4.7 per cent. Agreements were reached in the following
areas: subsidies and countervailing measures, technical
barriers to trade, import licensing procedures,
government procurement, customs valuation, a revised
anti-dumping code, trade in bovine meat, trade in dairy
products and trade in civil aircraft. The first concrete
result of the Round was the reduction of import duties
and other trade barriers by industrial countries on tropical

products exported by developing countries.
1974 On 1 January 1974, the Arrangement Regarding
International Trade in Textiles, otherwise known as the
Multi-fibre Arrangement (MFA), entered into force. I t
superseded the arrangements that had been governing
trade in cotton textiles since 1961. The MFA seeks to
promote the expansion and progressive liberalization of
trade in textile products while at the same time avoiding
disruptive effects in individual markets and lines of
production. The MFA was extended in 1978, 1982, 1986,
1991 and 1992. MFA members account for most of the
world exports of textiles and clothing which in 1986
amounted to US$128 billion.
1982 Ministerial Meeting. Meeting for the first time in
nearly ten years, the GATT Ministers in November at
Geneva reaffirmed the validity of GATT rules for the
conduct of international trade and committed themselves
to combating protectionist pressures. They also
established a wide-ranging work programme for the GATT
which was to lay down the groundwork for a new Round.
1986 The Uruguay Round. The GATT Trade Mi ni sters
meeting at Punta del Este, Uruguay, launched the eighth
Round of trade negotiations on 20 September. The Punta
del Este Declaration, while representing a single political
undertaking, was divided into two sections. The first
covered negotiations on trade in goods and the second
initiated negotiation on trade in s ervices. In the area of
trade in goods, the Minis
34
Taada vs. Angara
letter, the Philippinesand this is of special interest to

the legal professionwill benefit from the WTO system of
dispute settlement by judicial adjudication through the
independent WTO settlement bodies called (1) Dispute
Settlement Panels and (2) Appellate Tribunal. Heretofore,
trade disputes were settled mainly through negotiations
where solutions were arrived at frequently on the basis of
relative bargaining strengths, and where naturally, weak
and underdeveloped countries were at a disadvantage.
The Petition in Brief
Arguing mainly (1) that the WTO requires the Philippines
to place nationals and products of member-countries on
the same footing as Filipinos and local products and (2)
that the WTO intrudes, limits and/or impairs the
constitutional powers of both Congress an d th e Su
preme Court, the instant petition before this Court assails
the WTO Agreement for
________________
ters committed themselves to a standstill on new trade
measures inconsis tent with their GATT obligations and to
a rollback programme aimed at phasing out existing
inconsistent measures. Envisaged to last four years,

negotiations started in early February 1987 in the
following areas: tariffs, non-tariff measures, tropical
products, natural resource-based products, textiles and
clothing, agriculture, subsidies, safeguards, trade-related
aspects of intellectual property rights including trade in
counterfeit goods, and trade-related investment meas
ures . The work of other groups included a review of GATT
articles, the GATT dispute-settlement procedure, the
Tokyo Round agreements, as well as the functioning of
the GATT system as a whole.
1994 GATT 1994 is the updated version of GATT 1947
and takes into account the substantive and institutional
changes negotiated in the Uruguay Round. GATT 1994 is
an integral part of the World Trade Organization
established on 1 January 1995. It is agreed that there be
a one year transition period during which certain GATT
1947 bodies and commitments would co-exist with those
of the World Trade Organization.
35
VOL. 272, MAY 2, 1997 35
Taada vs. Angara
violating the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to

develop a self-reliant and independent national economy
effectively controlled by Filipinos x x x (to) give
preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the

preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and
locally produced goods.
Simply stated, does the Philippine Constitution prohibit
Philippine participation in worldwide trade liberalization
and economic globalization? Does it proscribe Philippine
integration into a global economy that is liberalized,
deregulated and privatized? These are the main
questions raised in this petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
praying (1) for the nullification, on constitutional grounds,
of the concurrence of the Philippine Senate in the
ratification by the President of the Philippines of the
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization
(WTO Agreement, for brevity) and (2) for the prohibition
of its implementation and enforcement through the
release and utilization of public funds, the assignment of
public officials and employees, as well as the use of
government properties and resources by respondentheads of various executive offices concerned therewith.
This concurrence is embodied in Senate Resolution No.
97, dated December 14, 1994.
The Facts
On April 15, 1994, Respondent Rizalino Navarro, then
Secretary of the Department of Trade and Industry
(Secretary Navarro, for brevity), representing the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in
Marrakesh, Morocco, the Final Act Embodying the Results
of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations (Final

Act, for brevity).
By signing the Final Act,2The Final Act was signed by
repres entatives of 125 entities, namely Algeria, Angola,
Antigua and Barbuda, Argentine Republic, Australia,
Republic of Austria, State of Bahrain, Peoples Republic of
Bangladesh, Barbados, The Kingdom of Belgium, Belize...
Secretary Navarro on behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines, agreed:
_______________
2 The Final Act was signed by repres entatives of 125
entities, namely Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda,
Argentine Republic, Australia, Republic of Austria, State of
Bahrain, Peoples Republic of Bangladesh, Barbados, The
Kingdom of Belgium, Belize, Republic of
36
Taada vs. Angara
(a) to submit, as appropriate, the WTO Agreement for

the consideration of their respective competent
authorities, with a view to seeking approval of the
Agreement in accordance with their procedures; and
(b) to adopt the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions.
On August 12, 1994, the members of the Philippine

Senate received a letter dated August 11, 1994 from the
President of
_______________
Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam,
Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Central African
Republic, Chad, Chile, Peoples Republic of China,
Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Republic of Cote dIvoire,
Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Kingdom of Denmark,
Commonwealth of Dominica, Dominican Republic, Arab
Republic of Egypt, El Salvador, European Communities,
Republic of Fiji, Finland, French Republic, Gabonese
Republic, Gambia, Federal Republic of Germany, Ghana,
Hellenic Republic, Grenada, Guatemala, Republic of
Guinea-Bissau, Republic of Guyana, Haiti, Honduras,
Hongkong, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland,
State of Israel, Italian Republic, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya,
Korea, State of Kuwait, Kingdom of Lesotho, Principality of
Liechtenstein, Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, Macau,
Republic of Madagascar, Republic of Malawi, Malaysia,
Republic of Maldives, Republic of Mali, Republic of Malta,
Islamic Republic of Mauritania, Republic of Mauritius,
United Mexican States, Kingdom of Morocco, Republic of
Mozambique, Union of Myanmar, Republic of Namibia,
Kingdom of the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua,
Republic of Niger, Federal Republic of Nigeria, Kingdom of
Norway, Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru,
Philippines, Poland, Portuguese Republic, State of Qatar,
Romania, Rwandese Republic, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint
Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Senegal, Sierra

Leone, Singapore, Slovak Republic, South Africa, Kingdom
of Spain, Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka,
Republic of Surinam, Kingdom of Swaziland, Kingdom of
Sweden, Swiss Confederation, United Republic of
Tanzania, Kingdom of Thailand, Togolese Republic,
Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda,
United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern I reland, United States of America, Eastern
Republic of Uruguay, Venezuela, Republic of Zaire,
Republic of Zambia, Republic of Zimbabwe; see pp. 6-25,
Vol. 1, Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations.
37
VOL. 272, MAY 2, 1997 37
Taada vs. Angara
the Philippines,311 August 1994The Honorable

MembersSenateThrough Senate President Edgardo
AngaraManilaLadies and Gentlemen:I have the honor to
forward herewith an authenticated copy of the Uruguay
Round Final Act signed by Department of Trade and
Industry Secretary Rizali... stating among others that the
Uruguay Round Final Act is hereby submitted to the
Senate for its
________________
3
11 August 1994
The Honorable Members
Senate
Through Senate President Edgardo Angara
Manila
Ladies and Gentlemen:
I have the honor to forward herewith an authenticated
copy of the Uruguay Round Final Act signed by
Department of Trade and Industry Secretary Rizalino S.
Navarro for the Philippines on 15 April 1994 in Marrakesh,
Morocco.
The Uruguay Round Final Act aims to liberalize and
expand world trade and strengthen the interrelationship
between trade and economic policies affecting growth
and development.
The Final Act will improve Philippine access to foreign
markets, especially its major trading partners through the
reduction of tariffs on its exports particularly agricultural
and industrial products. These concessions may be
availed of by the Philippines, only if it is a member of the
World Trade Organization. By GATT estimates, the
Philippines can acquire additional export revenues from
$2.2 to $2.7 Billion annually under Uruguay Round. This
will be on top of the normal increase in exports that the

Philippines may experience.
The Final Act will also open up new opportunities for the
services sector in such areas as the movement of
personnel, (e.g., professional services and construction
services), cross-border supply (e.g., computer-related
services), consumption abroad (e.g., tourism, convention
services, etc.) and commercial presence.
The clarified and improved rules and disciplines on antidumping and countervailing measures will also benefit
Philippine exporters by reducing the costs and
uncertainty associated with exporting while at the same
time providing a means for domestic industries to
safeguard themselves against unfair imports.
Likewise, the provision of adequate protection for
intellectual property rights is expected to attract more
inves tments into the country and to make it less
vulnerable to unilateral actions by its trading partners
(e.g., Sec. 301 of the United States Omnibus Trade Law).
38
Taada vs. Angara
concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the

Constitution.
On August 13, 1994, the members of the Philippine

Senate received another letter from the President of the
Philippines411 August 1994The Honorable
MembersSenateThrough Senate President Edgardo
AngaraManilaLadies and Gentlemen:I have the honor to
forward herewith an authenticated copy of the Uruguay
Round Final Act signed by Department of Trade and
Industry Secretary Rizali...
_______________
In view of the foregoing, the Uruguay Round Final Act is
hereby submitted to the Senate for its concurrence
pursuant to Section 21, Article VI I of the Constitution.
A draft of a proposed Resolution giving its concurrence to
the afores aid Agreement is enclosed.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) FIDEL V. RAMOS
4
11 August 1994
The Honorable Members
Senate
Through Senate President Edgardo Angara
Manila
Ladies and Gentlemen:
I have the honor to forward herewith an authenticated

copy of the Uruguay Round Final Act signed by
Department of Trade and Industry Secretary Rizalino S.
Navarro for the Philippines on 13 April 1994 in Marrakech
(sic), Morocco.
Members of the trade negotiations committee, which
included the Philippines, agreed that the Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, the Ministerial
Declarations and Decisions, and the Understanding on
Commitments in Financial Services embody the results of
their negotiations and form an integral part of the
Uruguay Round Final Act.
By signing the Uruguay Round Final Act, the Philippines,
through Secretary Navarro, agreed:
(a) To submit the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization to the Senate for its concurrence pursuant
to Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution; and
(b) To adopt the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions.
The Uruguay Round Final Act aims to liberalize and
expand world trade and strengthen the interrelationship
between trade and economic policies affecting growth
and development.
39
VOL. 272, MAY 2, 1997 39
Taada vs. Angara
likewise dated August 11, 1994, which stated among

others that the Uruguay Round Final Act, the Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, the Ministerial
Declarations and Decisions, and the Understanding on
Commitments in Financial Services are hereby submitted
to the Sen______________
The Final Act will improve Philippine access to foreign
markets, especially its major trading 0partners through
the reduction of tariffs on its exports particularly
agricultural and industrial products. These concessions
may be availed of by the Philippines, only if it is a
member of the World Trade Organization. By GATT
estimates, the Philippines can acquire additional export
revenues from $2.2. to $2.7 Billion annually under
Uruguay Round. This will be on top of the normal increase
in the exports that the Philippines may experience.
The Final Act will also open up new opportunities for the
services sector in such areas as the movement of
personnel, (e.g., professional services and construction
services), cross-border supply (e.g., computer-related
services), consumption abroad (e.g., tourism, convention
services, etc.) and commercial presence.
The clarified and improved rules and disciplines on antidumping and countervailing measures will also benefit
Philippine exporters by reducing the costs and
uncertainty associated with exporting while at the same
time providing a means for domestic industries to

safeguard themselves against unfair imports.
Likewise, the provision of adequate protection for
intellectual property rights is expected to attract more
inves tments into the country and to make it less
vulnerable to unilateral actions by its trading partners
(e.g., Sec. 301 of the United States Omnibus Trade Law).
In view of the foregoing, the Uruguay Round Final Act, the
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, the
Ministerial Declarations and Decisions, and the
Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services, as
embodied in the Uruguay Round Final Act and forming an
integral part thereof are hereby submitted to the Senate
for its concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of
the Constitution.
A draft of a proposed Resolution giving its concurrence to
the aforesaid Agreement is enclosed.
Very truly yours,
40
Taada vs. Angara
ate for its concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII

of the Constitution.
On December 9, 1994, the President of the Philippines
certified the necessity of the immediate adoption of P.S.
1083, a resolution entitled Concurring in the Ratification
of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade O
rganization.5December 9, 1994HON. EDGARDO J.
ANGARA Senate President Senate, ManilaDear Senate
President Angara:Pursuant to the provis ions of Sec.
26(2), Article VI of the Constitution, I hereby certify to the
necessity of the immediate adoption of P.S. 1083,
entitled...On December 14, 1994, the Philippine Senate
adopted Resolution No. 97 which Resolved, as it is
hereby resolved, that the Senate concur, as it hereby
concurs, in the ratification by the President of the
Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization.6Attached as Annex A; Petition; rollo, p. 52.
P.S. 1083 is the forerunner of assailed Senate Resolution
No. 97. It was prepared by the Committee of the Whole
on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade chaired by
Sen. Blas F. Ople and co-chaired by Sen. G... The text of
the WTO Agreement is written on pages 137 et seq. of
Volume I of the 36-volume Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations and includes various agreements and
associated legal
_______________
5
December 9, 1994
HON. EDGARDO J. ANGARA

Senate President
Senate, Manila
Dear Senate President Angara:
Pursuant to the provis ions of Sec. 26(2), Article VI of the
Constitution, I hereby certify to the necessity of the
immediate adoption of P.S. 1083, entitled:
CONCURRING IN THE RATIFICATION OF THE AGREEMENT
ESTABLISHING THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
to meet a public emergency consisting of the need for
immediate membership in the WTO in order to assure the
benefits to the Philippine economy arising from such
membership.
Very truly yours,
6 Attached as Annex A; Petition; rollo, p. 52. P.S. 1083 is
the forerunner of assailed Senate Resolution No. 97. It
was prepared by the Committee of the Whole on the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade chaired by Sen.
Blas F. Ople and co-chaired by Sen. Gloria MacapagalArroyo; see Annex C, Compliance of petitioners dated
January 28, 1997.
41
VOL. 272, MAY 2, 1997 41

Taada vs. Angara
instruments (identified in the said Agreement as Annexes

1, 2 and 3 thereto and collectively referred to as
Multilateral Trade Agreements, for brevity) as follows:
ANNEX 1
Annex 1A: Multilateral Agreement on Trade in Goods
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
Agreement on Agriculture
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Meas ures
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade
Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the
Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the
Agreement on Pre-Shipment Inspection
Agreement on Rules of Origin
Agreement on Imports Licensing Procedures

Agreement on Subsidies and Coordinating Measures
Agreement on Safeguards
Annex 1B: General Agreement on Trade in Services and
Annexes
Annex 1C: Agreement on Trade-Related As pects of
Intellectual Property Rights
ANNEX 2
Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes
ANNEX 3
Trade Policy Review Mechanism
On December 16, 1994, the President of the Philippines
signed7The Philippines is thus considered an original or
founding member of WTO, which as of July 26, 1996 had
123 members as follows: Antigua and Barbuda,
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh,
Barbados, Belguim, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Br...
the Instrument of Ratification, declaring:
_______________
7 The Philippines is thus considered an original or
founding member of WTO, which as of July 26, 1996 had
123 members as follows: Antigua and Barbuda,
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh,

Barbados, Belguim, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana,
Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Camer
42
Taada vs. Angara
NOW THEREFORE, be it known that I, FIDEL V. RAMOS,

President of the Republic of the Philippines, after having
seen and considered the aforementioned Agreem ent
Establishing the World Trade Organization and the
agreements and associated legal instruments included in
Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that Agreement
which are integral parts thereof, signed at Marrakesh,
Morocco on 15 April 1994, do hereby ratify and confirm
the same and every Article and Clause thereof.
To emphasize, the WTO Agreement ratified by the
President of the Philippines is composed of the
Agreement Proper and the associated legal instruments
included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that
Agreement which are integral parts thereof.
On the other hand, the Final Act signed by Secretary
Navarro embodies not only the WTO Agreement (and its
integral annexes aforementioned) but also (1) the
Ministerial Declarations and Decisions and (2) the
Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services. In

his Memorandum
______________
oon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chili, Colombia,
Costa Rica, Cote dIvoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, European Community, Fiji,
Finland, France, Gabon, Germany, Ghana, Greece,
Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Guyana,
Haiti, Honduras, Hongkong, Hungary, Iceland, India,
Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya,
Korea, Kuwait, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg,
Macau, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali,
Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco,
Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Netherlandsfor the
Kingdom in Europe and for the Netherlands Antilles, New
Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Papua
New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland,
Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis ,
Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent & the Grenadines, Senegal, Si
erra Leone, Si ngapore, Sl ovak Republ ic, Sl oveni a,
Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Surinam,
Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Tanzania, Thailand,
Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda,
United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States,
Uruguay, Venezuela, Zambia and Zimbabwe. See Annex
A, Bautista Paper, infra.
43
VOL. 272, MAY 2, 1997 43
Taada vs. Angara
dated May 13, 1996,8Page 6; rollo p. 261. the Solicitor

General describes these two latter documents as follows:
The Ministerial Decisions and Declarations are twentyfive declarations and decisions on a wide range of
matters, such as measures in favor of least developed
countries, notification procedures, relationship of WTO
with the International Monetary Fund (I MF), and
agreements on technical barriers to trade and on dispute
settlement.
The Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services
dwell on, among other things, standstill or limitations and
qualifications of commitments to existing non-conforming
measures, market access, national treatment, and
definitions of non-resident supplier of financial services,
commercial presence and new financial service.
On December 29, 1994, the present petition was filed.
After careful deliberation on respondents comment and
petitioners reply thereto, the Court resolved on
December 12, 1995, to give due course to the petition,
and the parties thereafter filed their respective
memoranda. The Court also requested the Honorable Lilia
R. Bautista, the Philippine Ambassador to the United
Nations stationed in Geneva, Switzerland, to submit a
paper, hereafter referred to as Bautista Paper,9I n

compliance, Ambassador Bautista submitted to the Court
on August 12, 1996, a Memorandum (the Bautista
Paper) consisting of 56 pages excluding annexes. This is
the same document mentioned in footnote No. 1. for
brevity, (1) providing a historical background of and (2)
summarizing the said agreements.
During the Oral Argument held on August 27, 1996, the
Court directed:
(a) the petitioners to submit the (1) Senate Committee
Report on the matter in controversy and (2) the transcript
of proceedings/hearings in the Senate; and
(b) the Solicitor General, as cou n s el for res ponden ts ,
to file (1) a list of Philippine treaties signed prior to the
Philippine adher
______________
8 Page 6; rollo p. 261.
9 I n compliance, Ambassador Bautista submitted to the
Court on August 12, 1996, a Memorandum (the Bautista
Paper) consisting of 56 pages excluding annexes. This is
the same document mentioned in footnote No. 1.
44
Taada vs. Angara
ence to the WTO Agreement, which derogate from

Philippine sovereignty and (2) copies of the multi-volume
WTO Agreement and other documents mentioned in the
Final Act, as soon as possible.
After receipt of the foregoing documents, the Court said it
would consider the case subm itted for resolution. In a
Compliance dated September 16, 1996, the Solicitor
General submitted a printed copy of the 36-volume
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, and in
another Compliance dated October 24, 1996, he listed
the various bilateral or multilateral treaties or
international instruments involving derogation of
Philippine sovereignty. Petitioners, on the other hand,
submitted their Compliance dated January 28, 1997, on
January 30, 1997.
The Issues
In their Memorandum dated March 11, 1996, petitioners
summarized the issues as follows:
A. Whether the petition presents a political question or is
otherwise not justiciable.
B. Whether the petitioner members of the Senate who
participated in the deliberations and voting leading to the
concurrence are estopped from impugning the validity of
the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization
or of the validity of the concurrence.
C. Whether the provisions of the Agreement Establishing

the World Trade Organization contravene the provisions of
Sec. 19, Article II, and Secs. 10 and 12, Article XII, all of
the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
D. Whether provisions of the Agreement Establis hing the
World Trade Organization unduly limit, res trict and impair
Philippine sovereignty specifically the legislative power
which, under Sec. 2, Article VI, 1987 Philippine
Constitution is vested in the Congress of the Philippines.
E. Whether provisions of the Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization interfere with the exercise of
judicial power.
F. Whether the respondent members of the Senate acted
in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction
45
VOL. 272, MAY 2, 1997 45
Taada vs. Angara
when they voted for concurrence in the ratification of the

constitutionally-infirm Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization.
G. Whether the respondent members of the Senate acted
in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction when they concurred only in the ratification

of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, and not with the Presidential submission
which included the Final Act, Ministerial Declaration and
Decisions, and the Understanding on Commitments in
Financial Services.
On the other hand, the Solicitor General as counsel for
respondents synthesized the several issues raised by
petitioners into the following:10Memorandum for
Respondents, p. 13; rollo, p. 268.1. Whether or not the
provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization and the Agreements and Associated Legal
Instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and
three (3) of that agreement cited by petitioners directly
contravene or undermine the letter, spirit and intent of
Section 19, Article II and Sections 10 and 12, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution.
2. Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement
unduly limit, restrict or impair the exercise of legislative
power by Congress.
3. Whether or not certain provis ions of the Agreement
impair the exercise of judicial power by this Honorable
Court in promulgating the rules of evidence.
4. Whether or not the concurrence of the Senate in the
ratification by the President of the Philippines of the
Agreement establishing the W orld Trade Organization
implied rejection of the treaty embodied in the Final Act.
By raising and arguing only four issues against the seven

presented by petitioners, the Solicitor General has
effectively ignored three, namely: (1) whether the petition
presents a political question or is otherwise not
justiciable; (2) whether petitioner-members of the Senate
(Wigberto E. Taada and Anna Dominique Coseteng) are
estopped from joining this
_______________
10 Memorandum for Respondents, p. 13; rollo, p. 268.
46
Taada vs. Angara
suit; and (3) whether the respondent-members of the

Senate acted in grave abuse of discretion when they
voted for concurrence in the ratification of the WTO
Agreement. The foregoing notwithstanding, this Court
resolved to deal with these three issues thus:
(1) The political question issuebeing very
fundamental and vital, and being a matter that probes
into the very jurisdiction of this Court to hear and decide
this casewas deliberated upon by the Court and will
thus be ruled upon as the first issue;
(2) The matter of estoppel will not be taken up because

this defense is waivable and the respondents have
effectively waived it by not pursuing it in any of their
pleadings; in any event, this issue, even if ruled in
respondents favor, will not cause the petitions dismissal
as there are petitioners other than the two senators, who
are not vulnerable to the defense of estoppel; and
(3) The issue of alleged grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the respondent senators will be taken up as an
integral part of the disposition of the four issues raised by
the Solicitor General.
During its deliberations on the case, the Court noted that
the respondents did not question the locus standi of
petitioners. Hence, they are also deemed to have waived
the benefit of such issue. They probably realized that
grave constitutional issues, expenditures of public funds
and serious international commitments of the nation are
involved here, and that transcendental public interest
requires that the substantive issues be met head on and
decided on the merits, rather than skirted or deflected by
procedural matters.11Cf. Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs.
Morato, 246 SCRA 540, July 17, 1995 for a discussion on
locus standi. See also the Concurring Opinion of Mr.
Justice Vicente V. Mendoza in Tatad vs. Garcia, Jr., 243
SCRA 473, April 6, 1995, as well as Kilusang Mayo Uno
Lab...To recapitulate, the issues that will be ruled upon
shortly are:
______________
11 Cf. Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs. Morato, 246 SCRA

540, July 17, 1995 for a discussion on locus standi. See
also the Concurring Opinion of Mr. Justice Vicente V.
Mendoza in Tatad vs. Garcia, Jr., 243 SCRA 473, April 6,
1995, as well as Kilusang Mayo Uno Labor Center vs.
Garcia, Jr., 239 SCRA 386, 414, December 23, 1994.
47
VOL. 272, MAY 2, 1997 47
Taada vs. Angara
(1) DOES THE PETITION PRESENT A JUSTICIABLE

CONTROVERSY? OTHERWISE STATED, DOES THE PETITION
INVOLVE A POLITI CAL QUESTION OVER WHICH THIS
COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION?
(2) DO THE PROVI SI ONS OF THE WTO AGREEM ENT AND
ITS THREE ANNEXES CONTRAVENE SEC. 19, ARTICLE II,
AND SECS. 10 AND 12, ARTICLE XII, OF THE PHILIPPINE
CONSTITUTION?
(3) DO THE PROVISIONS OF SAID AGREEMENT AND ITS
ANNEXES LIMIT, RESTRICT, OR IMPAIR THE EXERCISE OF
LEGISLATIVE POWER BY CONGRESS?
(4) DO SAID PROVISIONS UNDULY IMPAIR OR INTERFERE
WITH THE EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL POWER BY THIS COURT
IN PROMULGATING RULES ON EVIDENCE?
(5) WAS THE CONCURRENCE OF THE SENATE IN THE WTO

AGREEMENT AND ITS ANNEXES SUFFICIENT AND/OR
VALID, CONSIDERING THAT I T DID NOT INCLUDE THE FI
NAL ACT, MINISTERIAL DECLARATIONS AND DECISIONS,
AND THE UNDERSTANDING ON COMMITMENTS IN
FINANCIAL SERVICES?
The First Issue: Does the Court
Have Jurisdiction Over the Controversy?
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the
ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the petition
no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action
of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have
infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right
but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute.
The question thus posed is judicial rather than political.
The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the
supremacy of the Constitution is upheld.12Aquino, Jr. vs.
Ponce Enrile, 59 SCRA 183, 196, September 17, 1974,
cited in Bondoc vs. Pineda, 201 SCRA 792, 795,
September 26, 1991. Once a controversy as to the
application or interpretation of a constitutional provision
is raised before this
_______________
12 Aquino, Jr. vs. Ponce Enrile, 59 SCRA 183, 196,
September 17, 1974, cited in Bondoc vs. Pineda, 201
SCRA 792, 795, September 26, 1991.
48
Taada vs. Angara
Court (as in the instant case), it becomes a legal issue

which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to
decide.13Guingona, Jr. vs. Gonzales, 219 SCRA 326, 337,
March 1, 1993.The jurisdiction of this Court to adjudicate
the matters14See Tanada and Macapagal vs. Cuenco, et
al., 103 Phil. 1051 for a discussion on the scope of
political question.... raised in the petition is clearly set
out in the 1987 Constitution,15Section 1, Article VIII, (par.
2). as follow s:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice
to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
any branch or instrumentality of the government.
The foregoing text emphasizes the judicial departments
duty and power to strike down grave abuse of discretion
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
government including Congress. It is an innovation in our
political law.16In a privilege speech on May 17, 1993,
entitled Supreme CourtPotential Tyrant? Senator
Arturo Tolentino concedes that this new provision gives
the Supreme Court a duty to intrude into the jurisdiction
of the Congress or the Pres... As explained by former

Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion,17I Record of the
Constitutional Commission 436. the judiciary is the final
arbiter on the question of whether or not a branch of
government or any of its officials has acted without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or so capriciously
as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to
excess of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial pow er but
a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.
As this Court has repeatedly and firmly emphasized in
many cases,18Cf. Daza vs. Singson, 180 SCRA 496,
December 21, 1989. it w ill not shirk, digress from or
abandon its sacred duty and authority to uphold the
Constitution in matters that involve grave abuse of
discretion brought before it in
________________
13 Guingona, Jr. vs. Gonzales, 219 SCRA 326, 337, March
1, 1993.
14 See Tanada and Macapagal vs. Cuenco, et al., 103 Phil.
1051 for a discussion on the scope of political question.
15 Section 1, Article VIII, (par. 2).
16 In a privilege speech on May 17, 1993, entitled
Supreme CourtPotential Tyrant? Senator Arturo
Tolentino concedes that this new provision gives the
Supreme Court a duty to intrude into the jurisdiction of
the Congress or the President.
17 I Record of the Constitutional Commission 436.
18 Cf. Daza vs. Singson, 180 SCRA 496, December 21,

1989.
49
VOL. 272, MAY 2, 1997 49
Taada vs. Angara
appropriate cases, committed by any officer, agency,

instrumentality or department of the government.
As the petition alleges grave abuse of discretion and as
there is no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, we have no hesitation at all in
holding that this petition should be given due course and
the vital questions raised therein ruled upon under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court. Indeed, certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus are appropriate remedies to raise
constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify,
w hen proper, acts of legislative and executive officials.
On this, we have no equivocation.
We should stress that, in deciding to take jurisdiction over
this petition, this Court w ill not review the wisdom of the
decision of the President and the Senate in enlisting the
country into the WTO, or pass upon the merits of trade
liberalization as a policy espoused by said international
body. Neither will it rule on the propriety of the
governments economic policy of reducing/removing
tariffs, taxes, subsidies, quantitative restrictions, and

other import/trade barriers. Rather, it will only exercise its
ratifying the WTO Agreement and its three annexes.
Second Issue: The WTO Agreement
and Economic Nationalism
This is the lis mota, the main issue, raised by the petition.
Petitioners vigorously argue that the letter, spirit and
intent of the Constitution mandating economic
nationalism are violated by the so-called parity
provisions and national treatment clauses scattered in
various parts not only of the WTO Agreement and its
annexes but also in the Ministerial Decisions and
Declarations and in the Understanding on Commitments
in Financial Services.
Specifically, the flagship constitutional provisions
referred to are Sec. 19, Article II, and Secs. 10 and 12,
Article XII, of the Constitution, which are worded as
follows:
50
Taada vs. Angara
Article II
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES
AND STATE POLICI ES
xx
xx
xx
xx
Sec. 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and

independent national economy effectively controlled by
Filipinos.
xx
xx
xx
xx
Article XII
NATIONAL ECONOM Y AND PATRIMONY
xx
xx
xx
xx
Sec. 10. x x x. The Congress shall enact measures that

will encourage the formation and operation of enterprises
whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos.
In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions
covering the national economy and patrimony, the State
shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.
xx
xx
xx
xx
Sec. 12. The State shall promote the preferential use of

Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced
goods, and adopt measures that help make them
competitive.
Petitioners aver that these sacred constitutional principles

are desecrated by the following WTO provisions quoted in
their memorandum:19Memorandum for Petitioners, pp.
14-16; rollo, pp. 204-206.a) In the area of investment
measures related to trade in goods (TRIMS, for brevity):
Article 2
National Treatment and Quantitative Restrictions.
1. Without prejudice to other rights and obligations under
GATT 1994, no Member shall apply any TRIM that is
inconsistent with the provisions of Article III or Article XI
of GATT 1994.
2. An Illustrative list of TRIMS that are inconsistent with
the obligations of general elimination of quantitative re
_______________
19 Memorandum for Petitioners, pp. 14-16; rollo, pp. 204206.
51
VOL. 272, MAY 2, 1997 51
Taada vs. Angara
strictions provided for in paragraph I of Article XI of GATT

1994 is contained in the Annex to this Agreement.
(Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Vol.
27, Uru-guay Round, Legal Instruments, p. 22121,

emphasis supplied). The Annex referred to reads as
follows:
ANNEX
Illustrative List
1. TRIMS that are inconsistent with the obligation of
national treatment provided for in paragraph 4 of Article
III of GATT 1994 include those which are mandatory or
enforceable under domestic law or under administrative
rulings, or compliance with which is necessary to obtain
an advantage, and which require:
(a) the purchase or use by an enterprise of products of
domestic origin or from any domestic source, whether
specified in terms of particular products, in terms of
volume or value of products, or in terms of proportion of
volume or value of its local production; or
(b) that an enterprises purchases or use of im-ported
products be limited to an amount related to the volume
or value of local products that it exports.
2. TRIMS that are inconsistent with the obligations of
general elimination of quantitative restrictions provided
for in paragraph 1 of Article XI of GATT 1994 include
those which are mandatory or enforceable under
domestic laws or under administrative rulings, or
compliance with which is necessary to obtain an
advantage, and which restrict:
(a) the importation by an enterprise of products used in

or related to the local production that it exports;
(b) the importation by an enterprise of products used in
or related to its local production by restricting its access
to foreign exchange inflows attributable to the enterprise;
or
(c) the exportation or sale for export specified in terms of
particular products, in terms of volume or value of
products, or in terms of a preparation of volume or value
of its local production. (Annex to the Agreement on
Trade-Related Investment Measures, Vol. 27, Uru-
52
Taada vs. Angara
guay Round Legal Documents, p. 22125, emphasis

supplied).
The paragraph 4 of Article III of GATT 1994 referred to is
quoted as follows:
The products of the territory of any contracting party
imported into the territory of any other contracting party
shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that
accorded to like products of national origin in respect of
laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal
sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation,

distribution or use. The provisions of this paragraph shall
not prevent the application of differential internal
transportation charges which are based exclusively on
the economic operation of the means of transport and not
on the nationality of the product. (Article III , GATT 1947,
as amended by the Protocol Modifying Part II, and Article
XXVI of GATT, 14 September 1948, 62 UMTS 82-84 in
relation to paragraph 1(a) of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade 1994, Vol. 1, Uruguay Round, Legal
Instruments, p. 177, emphasis supplied).
b) In the area of trade related aspects of intellectual
property rights (TRIPS, for brevity):
Each Mem ber shall accord to the nationals of other
Members treatment no less favourable than what it
accords to its own nationals with regard to the protection
of intellectual property . . . (par. 1, Article 3, Agreement
on Trade-Related Aspect of Intellectual Property Rights,
Vol. 31, Uruguay Round, Legal Instruments, p. 25432,
emphasis supplied).
(c) In the area of the General Agreement on Trade in
Services:
National Treatment
1. In the sectors inscribed in its schedule, and subject to
any conditions and qualifications set out therein, each
Member shall accord to services and service suppliers of
any other Member, in res pect of all measures affecting
the supply of services, treatment no less favourable than

it accords to its own like services and service suppliers.
53
VOL. 272, MAY 2, 1997 53
Taada vs. Angara
2. A Member may meet the requirement of paragraph I by

according to services and service suppliers of any other
Member, either formally identical treatment or formally
different treatment to that it accords to its own like
services and service suppliers.
3. Formally identical or formally different treatment shall

be considered to be less favourable if it modifies the
conditions of completion in favour of services or service
suppliers of the Member compared to like s ervices or
service suppliers of any other Member. (Article XVII,
General Agreement on Trade in Services, Vol. 28, Uruguay
Round, Legal Instruments, p. 22610 emphasis supplied).
It is petitioners position that the foregoing national
treatment and parity provisions of the WTO Agreement
place nationals and products of member countries on
the same footing as Filipinos and local products, in
contravention of the Filipino First policy of the
Constitution. They allegedly render meaningless the
phrase effectively controlled by Filipinos. The

constitutional conflict becomes more manifest when
viewed in the context of the clear duty imposed on the
Philippines as a WTO member to ensure the conformity of
its laws, regulations and administrative procedures with
its obligations as provided in the annexed
agreements.20Par. 4, Article XVI, WTO Agreement,
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Vol. 1,
p. 146. Petitioners further argue that these provisions
contravene constitutional limitations on the role exports
play in national development and negate the preferential
treatment accorded to Filipino labor, domestic materials
and locally produced goods.
On the other hand, respondents through the Solicitor
General counter (1) that such Charter provisions are not
self-executing and m erely set out general policies; (2)
that these nationalistic portions of the Constitution
invoked by petitioners should not be read in isolation but
should be related to other relevant provisions of Art. XII,
particularly Secs. 1 and 13 thereof; (3) that read properly,
the cited WTO clauses do not conflict with the
Constitution; and (4) that the WTO
_______________
20 Par. 4, Article XVI, WTO Agreement, Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Vol. 1, p. 146.
54

Taada vs. Angara
Agreement contains sufficient provisions to protect

developing countries like the Philippines from the
harshness of sudden trade liberalization.
We shall now discuss and rule on these arguments.
Declaration of Principles Not Self-Executing
By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a
declaration of principles and state policies. The
counterpart of this article in the 1935 Constitution21Also
entitled Declaration of Principles . The nomenclature in
the 1973 Charter is identical with that in the 1987... is
called the basic political creed of the nation by Dean
Vicente Sinco.22Philippine Political Law, 1962 Ed., p. 116.
These principles in Article II are not intended to be selfexecuting principles ready for enforcement through the
courts.23Bernas, The Constitution of the Philippines: A
Comm entary, Vol. II, 1988 Ed., p. 2. In the very recent
case of Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156,
February 3, 1997, p. 8, it was held that A provision which
lays down a general principle, ... They are used by the
judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its pow er
of laws. As held in the leading case of Kilosbayan,
Incorporated vs. Morato,24246 SCRA 540, 564, July 17,
1995. See also Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance, G.R. No.
115455 and consolidated cases, August 25, 1995. the

principles and state policies enumerated in Article II and
some sections of Article XII are not self-executing
provisions, the disregard of which can give rise to a cause
of action in the courts. They do not embody judicially
enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for
legislation.
In the same light, we held in Basco vs. Pagcor 25197
SCRA 52, 68, May 14, 1991. that broad constitutional
principles need legislative enactments to implement
them, thus:
_______________
21 Also entitled Declaration of Principles . The
nomenclature in the 1973 Charter is identical with that in
the 1987s.
22 Philippine Political Law, 1962 Ed., p. 116.
23 Bernas, The Constitution of the Philippines: A Comm
entary, Vol. II, 1988 Ed., p. 2. In the very recent case of
Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, February 3,
1997, p. 8, it was held that A provision which lays down a
general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the
1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing.
24 246 SCRA 540, 564, July 17, 1995. See also Tolentino
vs. Secretary of Finance, G.R. No. 115455 and
consolidated cases, August 25, 1995.
25 197 SCRA 52, 68, May 14, 1991.
55
VOL. 272, MAY 2, 1997 55
Taada vs. Angara
On petitioners allegation that P.D. 1869 violates

Sections 11 (Personal Dignity) 12 (Family) and 13 (Role of
Youth) of Article II; Section 13 (Social Justice) of Article XIII
and Section 2 (Educational Values) of Article XIV of the
1987 Constitution, suffice it to state also that these are
merely statements of principles and policies. As such,
they are basically not self-executing, meaning a law
should be passed by Congress to clearly define and
effectuate such principles.
In general, therefore, the 1935 provisions were not
intended to be self-executing principles ready for
enforcement through the courts. They were rather
directives addressed to the executive and to the
legislature. If the executive and the legislature failed to
heed the directives of the article, the available rem edy
was not judicial but political. The electorate could express
their displeasure with the failure of the executive and the
legislature through the language of the ballot. (Bernas,
Vol. II, p. 2).
The reasons for denying a cause of action to an alleged
infringement of broad constitutional principles are
sourced from basic considerations of due process and the
lack of judicial authority to wade into the uncharted

ocean of social and economic policy making. Mr. Justice
Florentino P. Feliciano in his concurring opinion in Oposa
vs. Factoran, Jr.,26224 SCRA 792, 817, July 30, 1993.
explained these reasons as follow s:
My s uggestion is simply that petitioners must, before
the trial court, show a more specific legal righta right
cast in language of a significantly lower order of
generality than Article II (15) of the Constitutionthat is
or may be violated by the actions, or failures to act,
imputed to the public res pondent by petitioners so that
the trial court can validly render judgment granting all or
part of the relief prayed for. To my mind, the court should
be understood as simply saying that such a more specific
legal right or rights may well exist in our corpus of law,
considering the general policy principles found in the
Constitution and the existence of the Philippine
Environment Code, and that the trial court should have
given petitioners an effective opportunity so to
demonstrate, instead of aborting the proceedings on a
motion to dismiss.
_______________
26 224 SCRA 792, 817, July 30, 1993.
56
Taada vs. Angara
It seems to me important that the legal right which is an

essential component of a cause of action be a specific,
operable legal right, rather than a constitutional or
statutory policy, for at least two (2) reasons. One is that
unless the legal right claimed to have been violated or
disregarded is given specification in operational terms,
defendants may well be unable to defend themselves
intelligently and effectively; in other words, there are due
process dimensions to this matter.
The second is a broader-gauge considerationwhere a
specific violation of law or applicable regulation is not
alleged or proved, petitioners can be expected to fall
back on the expanded conception of judicial power in the
second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the
Constitution which reads:
Section 1. x x x
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are
amounting to lack or excess of juris diction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
(Emphases supplied)
When substantive standards as general as the right to a
balanced and healthy ecology and the right to health
are combined with remedial standards as broad ranging
as a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, the result will be, it is respectfully

submitted, to propel courts into the uncharted ocean of
social and economic policy making. At leas t in respect of
the vast area of environmental protection and
management, our courts have no claim to special
technical competence and experience and professional
qualification. Where no specific, operable norms and
standards are shown to exis t, then the policy making
departmentsthe legislative and executive departments
must be given a real and effective opportunity to
fashion and promulgate those norms and standards, and
to implement them before the courts should intervene.
Economic Nationalism Should Be Read with
Other Constitutional Mandates to Attain
Balanced Development of Economy
On the other hand, Secs. 10 and 12 of Article XII, apart
from merely laying down general principles relating to the
57
VOL. 272, MAY 2, 1997 57
Taada vs. Angara
national economy and patrimony, should be read and

understood in relation to the other sections in said article,
especially Secs. 1 and 13 thereof which read:
Section 1. The goals of the national economy are a more

equitable distribution of opportunities, income, and
wealth; a sustained increase in the amount of goods and
services produced by the nation for the benefit of the
people; and an expanding productivity as the key to
raising the quality of life for all, especially the
underprivileged.
The State shall promote indus trialization and full
employment based on sound agricultural development
and agrarian reform, through industries that make full
and efficient use of human and natural resources, and
which are competitive in both domestic and foreign
markets. However, the State shall protect Filipino
enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade
practices.
In the pursuit of these goals, all sectors of the economy
and all regions of the country shall be given optimum
opportunity to develop. x x x
xxx
xxx
xxx
Sec. 13. The State shall pursue a trade policy that serves
the general welfare and utilizes all forms and
arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and
reciprocity.
As pointed out by the Solicitor General, Sec. 1 lays down
the basic goals of national economic development, as
follows:
1. A more equitable distribution of opportunities, income

and wealth;
2. A sustained increase in the amount of goods and
services provided by the nation for the benefit of the
people; and
3. An expanding productivity as the key to raising the
quality of life for all especially the underprivileged.
With these goals in context, the Constitution then ordains
the ideals of economic nationalism (1) by expressing
preference in favor of qualified Filipinos in the grant of
rights, privileges and concessions covering the national
economy and patrimony27Sec. 10, Article XI I. and in the
use of Filipino labor, domestic mate_______________
27 Sec. 10, Article XI I.
58
Taada vs. Angara
rials and locally-produced goods; (2) by mandating the

State to adopt measures that help make them
competitive28Sec. 12, Article XI I.; and (3) by requiring
the State to develop a self-reliant and independent
national economy effectively controlled by
Filipinos.29Sec. 19, Art. I I. In similar language, the

Constitution takes into account the realities of the outside
world as it requires the pursuit of a trade policy that
serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and
arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and
reciprocity30Sec. 13, Art. XII.; and speaks of industries
which are competitive in both dom estic and foreign
markets as w ell as of the protection of Filipino
enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade
practices.
It is true that in the recent case of Manila Prince Hotel vs.
Government Service Insurance System, et al.,31G.R. No.
122156, February 3, 1997, pp.13-14. this Court held that
Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a
mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself
and which needs no further guidelines or implementing
laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the
provision does not require any legislation to put it in
operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. However, as
the constitutional provision itself states, it is enforceable
only in regard to the grants of rights, privileges and
concessions covering national economy and patrimony
and not to every aspect of trade and commerce. It refers
to exceptions rather than the rule. The issue here is not
whether this paragraph of Sec. 10 of Art. XII is selfexecuting or not. Rather, the issue is whether, as a rule,
there are enough balancing provisions in the Constitution
to allow the Senate to ratify the Philippine concurrence in
the WTO Agreement. And we hold that there are.
All told, while the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in

favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, at
the same tim e, it recognizes the need for business
exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of
equality and reciprocity
_______________
28 Sec. 12, Article XI I.
29 Sec. 19, Art. I I.
30 Sec. 13, Art. XII.
31 G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997, pp.13-14.
59
VOL. 272, MAY 2, 1997 59
Taada vs. Angara
and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against

foreign competition and trade practices that are
unfair.32Sec. 1, Art. XII. In other words, the Constitution
did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not
shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the
development of the Philippine economy. While the
Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of
foreign goods, services and investments into the country,
it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an
exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity,

frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair.
WTO Recognizes Need to
Protect Weak Economies
Upon the other hand, respondents maintain that the WTO
itself has some built-in advantages to protect weak and
developing economies, which comprise the vast majority
of its members. Unlike in the UN where major states have
permanent seats and veto pow ers in the Security
Council, in the WTO, decisions are made on the basis of
sovereign equality, with each members vote equal in
weight to that of any other. There is no WTO equivalent of
the UN Security Council.
WTO decides by consensus whenever possible,
otherwise, decisions of the Ministerial Conference and the
General Council shall be taken by the majority of the
votes cast, except in cases of interpretation of the
Agreement or waiver of the obligation of a member which
would require three fourths vote. Amendments would
require two thirds vote in general. Amendments to MFN
provisions and the Amendments provision will require
assent of all members. Any member may withdraw from
the Agreement upon the expiration of six months from
the date of notice of withdrawals.33Bautista Paper, p.
19.Hence, poor countries can protect their common
interests more effectively through the WTO than through
one-on-one negotiations with developed countries. Within
the WTO, developing countries can form powerful blocs to

push their eco______________
32 Sec. 1, Art. XII.
33 Bautista Paper, p. 19.
60
Taada vs. Angara
nomic agenda more decisively than outside the

Organization. This is not merely a matter of practical
alliances but a negotiating strategy rooted in law. Thus,
the basic principles underlying the WTO Agreement
recognize the need of developing countries like the
Philippines to share in the growth in international trade
commensurate with the needs of their economic
development. These basic principles are found in the
preamble34Preamble, WTO Agreement p. 137, Vol. 1,
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. Italics
supplied. of the WTO Agreements as follows:
The Parties to this Agreement,
Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and
economic endeavour should be conducted with a view to
raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and
a large and steadily growing volume of real income and

effective demand, and expanding the production of and
trade in goods and services, while allowing for the
optimal use of the worlds resources in accordance with
the objective of sustainable development, seeking both to
protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the
means for doing so in a manner consistent with their
respective needs and concerns at different levels of
economic development,
Recognizing further that there is need for positive efforts
designed to ensure that developing countries, and
especially the least developed among them, secure a
share in the growth in international trade commensurate
with the needs of their economic developm ent,
Being des irous of contributing to these objectives by
entering into reciprocal and mutually advantageous
arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of
tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of
discriminatory treatment in international trade relations,
Resolved, therefore, to develop an integrated, more
viable and durable multilateral trading system
encompassing the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, the results of pas t trade liberalization efforts, and
all of the results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations,
Determined to preserve the basic principles and to
further the objectives underlying this multilateral trading
system, x x x. (italics supplied.)
_______________
34 Preamble, WTO Agreement p. 137, Vol. 1, Uruguay
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. Italics supplied.
61
VOL. 272, MAY 2, 1997 61
Taada vs. Angara
Specific WTO Provisos

Protect Developing Countries
So too, the Solicitor General points out that pursuant to
and consistent with the foregoing basic principles, the
WTO Agreement grants developing countries a more
lenient treatment, giving their domestic industries some
protection from the rush of foreign competition. Thus,
with respect to tariffs in general, preferential treatment is
given to developing countries in terms of the amount of
tariff reduction and the period within which the reduction
is to be spread out. Specifically, GATT requires an average
tariff reduction rate of 36% for developed countries to be
effected within a period of six (6) years while developing
countriesincluding the Philippinesare required to
effect an average tariff reduction of only 24% within ten
(10) years.
In respect to domestic subsidy, GATT requires developed

countries to reduce domestic support to agricultural
products by 20% over six (6) years, as compared to only
13% for developing countries to be effected within ten
(10) years.
In regard to export subsidy for agricultural products, GATT
requires developed countries to reduce their budgetary
outlays for export subsidy by 36% and export volumes
receiving export subsidy by 21% within a period of six (6)
years. For developing countries, however, the reduction
rate is only two-thirds of that prescribed for developed
countries and a longer period of ten (10) years within
which to effect such reduction.
Moreover, GATT itself has p rov id ed bu il t-in protection
from unfair foreign competition and trade practices
including anti-dumping measures, countervailing
measures and safeguards against import surges. Where
local businesses are jeopardized by unfair foreign
competition, the Philippines can avail of these measures.
There is hardly therefore any basis for the statement that
under the WTO , local industries and enterprises will all
be w iped out and that Filipinos w ill be deprived of
control of the economy. Quite the contrary, the weaker
situations of developing nations like the Philippines have
been taken into account; thus, there would be no basis to
62
Taada vs. Angara
say that in joining the WTO, the respondents have

gravely abused their discretion. True, they have made a
bold decision to steer the ship of state into the yet
uncharted sea of economic liberalization. But such
decision cannot be set aside on the ground of grave
abuse of discretion, simply because we disagree with it or
simply because we believe only in other economic
policies. As earlier stated, the Court in taking jurisdiction
of this case will not pass upon the advantages and
disadvantages of trade liberalization as an economic
policy. It will only perform its constitutional duty of
determining whether the Senate committed grave abuse
of discretion.
Constitution Does Not
Rule Out Foreign Competition
Furthermore, the constitutional policy of a self-reliant
and independent national economy35Sec. 19, Article II,
Constitution. does not necessarily rule out the entry of
foreign investments, goods and services. It contemplates
neither economic seclusion nor mendicancy in the
international community. As explained by Constitutional
Comm issioner Bernardo Villegas, sponsor of this
constitutional policy:
Economic self-reliance is a primary objective of a
developing country that is keenly aware of
overdependence on external assistance for even its most

basic needs. It does not mean autarky or economic
seclusion; rather, it means avoiding mendicancy in the
international community. Independence refers to the
freedom from undue foreign control of the national
economy, especially in such strategic industries as in the
development of natural resources and public utilities.36II
I Records of the Constitutional Commission 252.The WTO
reliance on most favored nation, national treatment,
and trade without discrimination cannot be struck down
as unconstitutional as in fact they are rules of equality
and reciprocity that apply to all WTO members. Aside
from envisioning a trade policy based on equality and
_______________
35 Sec. 19, Article II, Constitution.
36 II I Records of the Constitutional Commission 252.
63
VOL. 272, MAY 2, 1997 63
Taada vs. Angara
reciprocity,37Sec. 13, Article XI I, Constitution. the

fundamental law encourages industries that are
competitive in both domestic and foreign markets,
thereby demonstrating a clear policy against a sheltered
domestic trade environment, but one in favor of the
gradual development of robust industries that can

compete with the best in the foreign markets. Indeed,
Filipino managers and Filipino enterprises have shown
capability and tenacity to compete internationally. And
given a free trade environment, Filipino entrepreneurs
and managers in Hongkong have demonstrated the
Filipino capacity to grow and to prosper against the best
offered under a policy of laissez faire.
Constitution Favors Consumers,
Not Industries or Enterprises
The Constitution has not really shown any unbalanced
bias in favor of any business or enterprise, nor does it
contain any specific pronouncement that Filipino
companies should be pampered with a total proscription
of foreign competition. On the other hand, respondents
claim that WTO/GATT aims to make available to the
Filipino consumer the best goods and services obtainable
anywhere in the world at the most reasonable prices.
Consequently, the question boils down to whether
large.
Will adherence to the WTO treaty bring this ideal (of
favoring the general welfare) to reality?
Will WTO/GATT succeed in promoting the Filipinos
general welfare because it willas promised by its
promotersexpand the countrys exports and generate
more employment?
Will it bring more prosperity, employment, purchasing

power and quality products at the most reasonable rates
to the Filipino public?
The responses to these questions involve judgment
calls by our policy makers, for which they are
answerable to our people during appropriate electoral
exercises. Such questions
______________
37 Sec. 13, Article XI I, Constitution.
64
Taada vs. Angara
and the answers thereto are not subject to judicial

pronouncements based on grave abuse of discretion.
Constitution Designed to Meet
Future Events and Contingencies
No doubt, the WTO Agreement was not yet in existence
when the Constitution w as drafted and ratified in 1987.
That does not mean however that the Charter is
necessarily flawed in the sense that its framers might not
have anticipated the advent of a borderless world of
business. By the same token, the United Nations was not
yet in existence when the 1935 Constitution became

effective. Did that necessarily mean that the then
Constitution might not have contemplated a diminution of
the absoluteness of sovereignty when the Philippines
signed the UN Charter, thereby effectively surrendering
part of its control over its foreign relations to the
decisions of various UN organs like the Security Council?
It is not difficult to answer this question. Constitutions are
designed to meet not only the vagaries of contemporary
events. They should be interpreted to cover even future
and unknown circumstances. It is to the credit of its
drafters that a Constitution can withstand the assaults of
bigots and infidels but at the same time bend with the
refreshing winds of change necessitated by unfolding
events. As one eminent political law writer and respected
jurist38Justice Isagani A. Cruz, Philippine Political Law,
1995 Ed., p. 13, quoting his own article entitled, A
Quintessential Constitution earlier published in the San
Beda Law Journal, April 1972; Italics supplied. explains:
The Constitution must be quintessential rather than
superficial, the root and not the blossom, the base and
framework only of the edifice that is yet to rise. It is but
the core of the dream that must take shape, not in a
twinkling by mandate of our delegates, but s lowly in the
crucible of Filipino minds and hearts, where it will in time
develop its sinews and gradually gather its strength and
finally achieve its substance. In fine, the Constitution
cannot, like the goddess Athena, rise full-grown from the
brow of the Constitu-
______________
38 Justice Isagani A. Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1995
Ed., p. 13, quoting his own article entitled, A
Quintessential Constitution earlier published in the San
Beda Law Journal, April 1972; Italics supplied.
65
VOL. 272, MAY 2, 1997 65
Taada vs. Angara
tional Convention, nor can it conjure by mere fiat an ins

tant Utopia. It must grow with the society it seeks to restructure and march apace with the progress of the race,
drawing from the vicissitudes of history the dynamism
and vitality that will keep it, far from becoming a petrified
rule, a pulsing, living law attuned to the heartbeat of the
nation.
Third Issue: The WTO Agreement and Legislative Power
The WTO Agreement provides that (e)ach Member shall
ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and
administrative procedures with its obligations as provided
in the annexed Agreements.39Par. 4, Article XVI (M
iscellaneous Provisions), WTO Agreement, p. 146, Vol. 1,
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations.
Petitioner s maintain that this undertaking unduly limits,
restricts and impairs Philippine sovereignty, specifically
the legislative power which under Sec. 2, Article VI of the

1987 Philippine Constitution is vested in the Congress of
the Philippines. It is an assault on the sovereign powers of
the Philippines because this means that Congress could
not pass legislation that will be good for our national
interest and general welfare if such legislation will not
conform with the WTO Agreement, which not only relates
to the trade in goods x x x but also to the flow of
investments and money x x x as well as to a whole slew
of agreements on socio-cultural matters x x
x .40Memorandum for the Petitioners, p. 29; rollo, p.
219.More specifically, petitioners claim that said WTO
proviso derogates from the power to tax, which is lodged
in the Congress.41Sec. 24, Article VI, Constitution. And
while the Constitution allows Congress to authorize the
President to fix tariff rates, import and export quotas,
tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts,
such authority is subject to specified limits and x x x
such limitations and restrictions as Congress may
provide,42Subsection (2), Sec. 28, Article VI, Constitution.
as in fact it did under Sec. 401 of the Tariff and Customs
Code.
_______________
39 Par. 4, Article XVI (M iscellaneous Provisions), WTO
Agreement, p. 146, Vol. 1, Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations.
40 Memorandum for the Petitioners, p. 29; rollo, p. 219.
41 Sec. 24, Article VI, Constitution.
42 Subsection (2), Sec. 28, Article VI, Constitution.
66
Taada vs. Angara
Sovereignty Limited by
International Law and Treaties
This Court notes and appreciates the ferocity and passion
by which petitioners stressed their arguments on this
issue. However, while sovereignty has traditionally been
deemed absolute and all-encompassing on the domestic
level, it is however subject to restrictions and limitations
voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines, expressly or
impliedly, as a member of the family of nations.
Unquestionably, the Constitution did not envision a
hermit-type isolation of the country from the rest of the
world. In its Declaration of Principles and State Policies,
the Constitution adopts the generally accepted
land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice,
freedom, cooperation and am ity, w ith all
nations.43Sec. 2, Article II, Cons titution. By the doctrine
of incorporation, the country is bound by generally
accepted principles of international law, which are
considered to be automatically part of our own
laws.44Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1995 Ed., p. 55. One

of the oldest and most fundamental rules in international
law is pacta sunt servandainternational agreements
must be performed in good faith. A treaty engagement is
not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding
obligation on the parties x x x. A state which has
contracted valid international obligations is bound to
make in its legislations such modifications as may be
necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations
undertaken.45Salonga and Yap, op cit., 305.By their
inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the
absoluteness of sovereignty. By their voluntary act,
nations may surrender some aspects of their state power
in exchange for greater benefits granted by or derived
from a convention or pact. After all, states, like
individuals, live w ith coequals, and in pursuit of mutually
covenanted objectives and benefits, they also commonly
agree to limit the exercise of their other______________
43 Sec. 2, Article II, Cons titution.
44 Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1995 Ed., p. 55.
45 Salonga and Yap, op cit., 305.
67
VOL. 272, MAY 2, 1997 67
Taada vs. Angara
wise absolute rights. Thus, treaties have been used to

record agreements between States concerning such
widely diverse matters as, for example, the lease of naval
bases, the sale or cession of territory, the termination of
war, the regulation of conduct of hostilities, the formation
of alliances, the regulation of commercial relations, the
settling of claims, the laying down of rules governing
conduct in peace and the establishment of international
organizations.46Salonga, op cit., p. 287. The sovereignty
of a state therefore cannot in fact and in reality be
considered absolute. Certain restrictions enter into the
picture: (1) limitations imposed by the very nature of
membership in the family of nations and (2) limitations
imposed by treaty stipulations. As aptly put by John F.
Kennedy, Today, no nation can build its destiny alone.
The age of self-sufficient nationalism is over. The age of
interdependence is here.47Quoted in Paras and Paras,
Jr., International Law and World Politics, 1994 Ed., p.
178.UN Charter and Other Treaties
Limit Sovereignty
Thus, when the Philippines joined the United Nations as
one of its 51 charter members, it consented to restrict its
sovereign rights under the concept of sovereignty as
autolimitation.47aReagan vs. Commission of I nternal
Revenue, 30 SCRA 968, 973, December 27, 1969. Under
Article 2 of the UN Charter, (a)ll members shall give the
United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in
accordance w ith the present Charter, and shall refrain
from giving assistance to any state against which the

United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement
action. Such assistance includes payment of its
corresponding share not merely in administrative
expenses but also in expenditures for the peace-keeping
operations of the organization. In its advisory opinion of
July 20, 1961, the International Court of Justice held that
money used by the United Nations Emergency Force in
the Middle East and in the Congo were
______________
46 Salonga, op cit., p. 287.
47 Quoted in Paras and Paras, Jr., International Law and
World Politics, 1994 Ed., p. 178.
47a Reagan vs. Commission of I nternal Revenue, 30
SCRA 968, 973, December 27, 1969.
68
Taada vs. Angara
expenses of the United Nations under Article 17,

paragraph 2, of the UN Charter. Hence, all its m embers
must bear their corresponding share in such expenses. In
this sense, the Philippine Congress is restricted in its
power to appropriate. It is compelled to appropriate funds
whether it agrees with such peace-keeping expenses or

not. So too, under Article 105 of the said Charter, the UN
and its representatives enjoy diplomatic privileges and
immunities, thereby limiting again the exercise of
sovereignty of members within their own territory.
Another example: although sovereign equality and
domestic jurisdiction of all members are set forth as
underlying principles in the UN Charter, such provisos are
however subject to enforcement measures decided by the
Security Council for the maintenance of international
peace and security under Chapter VII of the Charter. A
final example: under Article 103, (i)n the event of a
conflict between the obligations of the Members of the
United Nations under the present Charter and their
obligations under any other international agreement,
their obligation under the present charter shall prevail,
thus unquestionably denying the Philippinesas a
memberthe sovereign power to make a choice as to
which of conflicting obligations, if any, to honor. Apart
from the UN Treaty, the Philippines has entered into many
other international pactsboth bilateral and multilateral
that involve limitations on Philippine sovereignty. These
are enumerated by the Solicitor General in his
Compliance dated October 24, 1996, as follows:
(a) Bilateral convention with the United States regarding
taxes on income, where the Philippines agreed, among
others , to exempt from tax, income received in the
Philippines by, among others, the Federal Reserve Bank
of the United States, the Export/Import Bank of the United
States, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation of

the United States. Likewise, in said convention, wages ,
salaries and similar remunerations paid by the United
States to its citizens for labor and personal services
performed by them as employees or officials of the
United States are exempt from income tax by the
Philippines.
69
VOL. 272, MAY 2, 1997 69
Taada vs. Angara
(b) Bilateral agreement with Belgium, providing, among

others, for the avoidance of double taxation with respect
to taxes on income.
(c) Bilateral convention with the Kingdom of Sweden for
the avoidance of double taxation.
(d) Bilateral convention with the French Republic for the
avoidance of double taxation.
(e) Bilateral air transport agreement with Korea where the
Philippines agreed to exempt from all customs duties,
inspection fees and other duties or taxes aircrafts of
South Korea and the regular equipment, spare parts and
supplies arriving with said aircrafts.
(f) Bilateral air service agreement with Japan, where the

Philippines agreed to exempt from customs duties, excise
taxes, inspection fees and other similar duties, taxes or
charges fuel, lubricating oils, spare parts, regular
equipment, stores on board Japanese aircrafts while on
Philippine soil.
(g) Bilateral air service agreement with Belgium where
the Philippines granted Belgian air carriers the same
privileges as those granted to Japanese and Korean air
carriers under separate air service agreements.
(h) Bilateral notes with Israel for the abolition of transit
and vis itor visas where the Philippines exempted Israeli
nationals from the requirement of obtaining transit or
visitor visas for a sojourn in the Philippines not exceeding
59 days.
(i) Bilateral agreement with France exempting French
nationals from the requirement of obtaining transit and
visitor visa for a sojourn not exceeding 59 days.
(j) Multilateral Convention on Special Missions , where the
Philippines agreed that premises of Special Missions in
the Philippines are inviolable and its agents can not enter
said premis es without consent of the Head of Mission
concerned. Special Missions are also exempted from cus
toms duties, taxes and related charges.
(k) Multilateral Convention on the Law of Treaties. In this
convention, the Philippines agreed to be governed by the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
(l) Declaration of the President of the Philippines

accepting com puls ory jurisdiction of the International
Court of Jus tice. The International Court of Justice has
jurisdiction in all legal disputes concerning the
interpretation of a treaty, any question of interna
70
Taada vs. Angara
tional law, the existence of any fact which, if established,

would constitute a breach of international obligation.
In the foregoing treaties, the Philippines has effectively
agreed to limit the exercise of its sovereign powers of
taxation, eminent domain and police power. The
underlying consideration in this partial surrender of
sovereignty is the reciprocal commitment of the other
contracting states in granting the same privilege and
immunities to the Philippines, its officials and its citizens.
The same reciprocity characterizes the Philippine
commitments under WTO-GATT.
International treaties , whether relating to nuclear
disarmament, human rights, the environment, the law of
the sea, or trade, constrain domestic political sovereignty
through the assumption of external obligations. But
unless anarchy in international relations is preferred as an
alternative, in most cases we accept that the benefits of

the reciprocal obligations involved outweigh the costs
associated with any loss of political s overeignty. (T)rade
treaties that structure relations by reference to durable,
well-defined substantive norms and objective dispute
resolution procedures reduce the risks of larger countries
exploiting raw economic power to bully smaller countries,
by subjecting power relations to some form of legal
ordering. In addition, smaller countries typically stand to
gain disproportionately from trade liberalization. This is
due to the simple fact that liberalization will provide
access to a larger set of potential new trading
relationship than in case of the larger country gaining
enhanced success to the smaller countrys
market.48Trebilcock and Howse. The Regulation of
International Trade, p. 14, London, 1995, cited on pp. 5556, Bautista Paper.The point is that, as shown by the
foregoing treaties, a portion of sovereignty may be
waived without violating the Constitution, based on the
rationale that the Philippines adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law
of the land and adheres to the policy of x x x cooperation
and amity with all nations.
_______________
48 Trebilcock and Howse. The Regulation of International
Trade, p. 14, London, 1995, cited on pp. 55-56, Bautista
Paper.
71
VOL. 272, MAY 2, 1997 71
Taada vs. Angara
Fourth Issue: The WTO Agreement and Judicial Power

Petitioners aver that paragraph 1, Article 34 of the
General Provisions and Basic Principles of the Agreement
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS)49Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, Vol. 31, p. 25445. intrudes on the power of
the Supreme Court to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedures.50Item 5, Sec. 5,
Article VII I, Constitution.To understand the scope and
meaning of Article 34, TRIPS,51Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Vol. 31, p. 25445. it will
be fruitful to restate its full text as follows:
Article 34
Process Patents: Burden of Proof
1. For the purposes of civil proceedings in respect of the
infringement of the rights of the owner referred to in
paragraph 1(b) of Article 28, if the subject matter of a
patent is a process for obtaining a product, the judicial
authorities shall have the authority to order the
defendant to prove that the process to obtain an identical
product is different from the patented process. Therefore,
Members shall provide, in at least one of the following
circumstances, that any identical product when produced

without the consent of the patent owner shall, in the
absence of proof to the contrary, be deemed to have
been obtained by the patented process:
(a) if the product obtained by the patented process is
new;
(b) if there is a substantial likelihood that the identical
product was made by the process and the owner of the
patent has been unable through reasonable efforts to
determine the process actually used.
2. Any Member shall be free to provide that the burden of
proof indicated in paragraph 1 shall be on the alleged
infringer only if the condition referred to in subparagraph
(a) is fulfilled or only if the condition referred to in
subparagraph (b) is fulfilled.
3. In the adduction of proof to the contrary, the legitimate
interests of defendants in protecting their manufacturing
and business
_______________
49 Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Vol.
31, p. 25445.
50 Item 5, Sec. 5, Article VII I, Constitution.
31, p. 25445.
72
Taada vs. Angara
secrets shall be taken into account.

From the above, a WTO Member is required to provide a
rule of disputable (note the words in the absence of
proof to the contrary) presumption that a product shown
to be identical to one produced with the use of a patented
process shall be deemed to have been obtained by the
(illegal) use of the said patented process, (1) where such
product obtained by the patented product is new, or (2)
where there is substantial likelihood that the identical
product was made with the use of the said patented
process but the owner of the patent could not determine
the exact process used in obtaining such identical
product. Hence, the burden of proof contemplated by
Article 34 should actually be understood as the duty of
the alleged patent infringer to overthrow such
presumption. Such burden, properly understood, actually
refers to the burden of evidence (burden of going
forward) placed on the producer of the identical (or fake)
product to show that his product was produced without
the use of the patented process.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the patent owner still has
the burden of proof since, regardless of the
presumption provided under paragraph 1 of Article 34,
such owner still has to introduce evidence of the

existence of the alleged identical product, the fact that it
is identical to the genuine one produced by the
patented process and the fact of newness of the
genuine product or the fact of substantial likelihood
that the identical product was made by the patented
process.
The foregoing should really present no problem in
changing the rules of evidence as the present law on the
subject, Republic Act No. 165, as amended, otherwise
known as the Patent Law, provides a similar presumption
in cases of infringement of patented design or utility
model, thus:
Sec. 60. Infringement.Infringement of a design patent
or of a patent for utility model shall consist in
unauthorized copying of the patented design or utility
model for the purpose of trade or industry in the article or
product and in the making, using or selling of the article
or product copying the patented design or utility model.
Identity or substantial identity with the patented design
or utility model shall constitute evidence of copying.
(italics supplied)
73
VOL. 272, MAY 2, 1997 73
Taada vs. Angara
Moreover, it should be noted that the requirement of

Article 34 to provide a disputable presumption applies
only if (1) the product obtained by the patented process
is NEW or (2) there is a substantial likelihood that the
identical product w as made by the process and the
process owner has not been able through reasonable
effort to determine the process used. Where either of
these two provisos does not obtain, members shall be
free to determine the appropriate method of
implementing the provisions of TRIPS within their own
internal systems and processes.
By and large, the arguments adduced in connection with
our disposition of the third issuederogation of
legislative powerwill apply to this fourth issue also.
Suffice it to say that the reciprocity clause more than
justifies such intrusion, if any actually exists. Besides,
Article 34 does not contain an unreasonable burden,
consistent as it is with due process and the concept of
adversarial dispute settlement inherent in our judicial
system.
So too, since the Philippines is a signatory to most
international conventions on patents, trademarks and
copyrights, the adjustment in legislation and rules of
procedure will not be substantial.52Bautista Paper, p.
13.Fifth Issue: Concurrence Only in the WTO Agreement
and
Not in Other Documents Contained in the Final Act
Petitioners allege that the Senate concurrence in the WTO

Agreement and its annexesbut not in the other
documents referred to in the Final Act, namely the
Ministerial Declaration and Decisions and the
Understanding on Commitments in Financial Servicesis
defective and insufficient and thus constitutes abuse of
discretion. They submit that such concurrence in the WTO
Agreement alone is flawed because it is in effect a
rejection of the Final Act, which in turn was the document
signed by Secretary Navarro, in representation of the
Republic upon authority of the President. They contend
that the second letter of the President to the
Senate53See footnote 3 of the text of this letter. which
________________
53 See footnote 3 of the text of this letter.
74
Taada vs. Angara
enumerated what constitutes the Final Act should have

been the subject of concurrence of the Senate.
A final act, sometimes called protocol de clture, is an
instrument which records the winding up of the
proceedings of a diplomatic conference and usually

includes a reproduction of the texts of treaties,
conventions, recommendations and other acts agreed
upon and signed by the plenipotentiaries attending the
conference.54Salonga and Yap, op cit., pp. 289-290. It is
not the treaty itself. It is rather a summary of the
proceedings of a protracted conference which may have
taken place over several years. The text of the Final Act
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations is contained in just one
page55The full text, without the signatures, of the Final
Act is as follows:Final Act Embodying the Results of the
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations1.
Having met in order to conclude the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, rep... in Vol. I of the 36volum e Uruguay Round of Multilat______________
54 Salonga and Yap, op cit., pp. 289-290.
55 The full text, without the signatures, of the Final Act is
as follows:
Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round
of Multilateral Trade Negotiations
1. Having met in order to conclude the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, representatives of the
governments and of the European Comm unities,
members of the Trade Negotiations Committee, agree
that the Agreement Establis hing the World Trade
Organization (referred to in the Final Act as the WTO

Agreement), the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions,
and the Understanding on Commitments in Financial
Services, as annexed hereto, embody the results of their
negotiations and form an integral part of this Final Act.
2. By signing to the present Final Act, the representatives
agree.
(a) to subm it, as appropriate, the WTO Agreement for
authorities with a view to seeking approval of the
3. The representative agree on the desirability of
acceptance of the WTO Agreement by all participants in
the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations
(hereinafter referred to as partici
75
VOL. 272, MAY 2, 1997 75
Taada vs. Angara
eral Trade Negotiations. By signing said Final Act,

Secretary Navarro as representative of the Republic of the
Philippines undertook:
(a) to submit, as appropriate, the WTO Agreement for

The assailed Senate Resolution No. 97 expressed
concurrence in exactly what the Final Act required from
its signatories, namely, concurrence of the Senate in the
WTO Agreement.
_______________
pants) with a view to its entry into force by 1 January
1995, or as early as possible thereafter. Not later than
late 1994, Ministers will meet, in accordance with the
final paragraph of the Punta del Este Ministerial
Declarations, to decide on the international
implementation of the results, including the timing of
their entry into force.
4. The representatives agree that the WTO Agreem ent
shall be open for acceptance as a whole, by signature or
otherwise, by all participants pursuant to Article XIV
thereof. The acceptance and entry into force of a
Plurilateral Trade Agreement included in Annex 4 of the
WTO Agreement shall be governed by the provisions of
that Plurilateral Trade Agreement.
5. Before accepting the WTO Agreement, participants
which are not contracting parties to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade must first have concluded
negotiations for their acces sion to the General

Agreement and become contracting parties thereto. For
participants which are not contracting parties to the
General Agreement as of the date of the Final Act, the
Schedules are not definitive and shall be subsequently
completed for the purpose of their accession to the
General Agreement and acceptance of the WTO
Agreement.
6. This Final Act and the texts annexed hereto shall be
deposited with the Director-General to the CONTRACTING
PARTIES to the General Agreem ent on Tariffs and Trade
who shall promptly furnish to each participant a certified
copy thereof. DONE at Marrakesh this fifteenth day of
April one thousand nine hundred and ninety-four, in a
single copy, in the English, French and Spanish
languages, each text being authentic.
76
Taada vs. Angara
The Ministerial Declarations and Decisions were deemed

adopted without need for ratification. They were
approved by the ministers by virtue of Article XXV: 1 of
GATT which provides that representatives of the members
can meet to give effect to those provisions of this
Agreement which invoke joint action, and generally with a
view to facilitating the operation and furthering the

objectives of this Agreement.56Bautista Paper, p. 16.The
Understanding on Com mitments in Financial Services
also approved in Marrakesh does not apply to the
Philippines. It applies only to those 27 Members which
have indicated in their respective schedules of
commitments on standstill, elimination of monopoly,
expansion of operation of existing financial service
suppliers, temporary entry of personnel, free transfer and
processing of information, and national treatment with
respect to access to payment, clearing systems and
refinancing available in the normal course of
business.57Bautista Paper, p. 16.On the other hand, the
WTO Agreement itself expresses what multilateral
agreements are deemed included as its integral
parts,58Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations,
Vol. I, pp. 137-138. as follow s:
Article II
Scope of the WTO
1. The WTO shall provide the common institutional
framework for the conduct of trade relations among its
Members in matters to the agreements and associated
legal instruments included in the Annexes to this
Agreement.
2. The Agreements and associated legal instruments
included in Annexes 1, 2, and 3 (hereinafter referred to as
Multilateral Agreements) are integral parts of this
Agreement, binding on all Members.
3. The Agreements and associated legal instruments

included in Annex 4 (hereinafter referred to as
Plurilateral Trade Agreements) are also part of this
Agreement for those Members that have accepted them,
and are binding on those Members. The Plurilateral
_______________
I, pp. 137-138.
77
VOL. 272, MAY 2, 1997 77
Taada vs. Angara
Trade Agreements do not create either obligation or rights

for Members that have not accepted them.
4. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 as
specified in Annex 1A (hereinafter referred to as GATT
1994) is legally distinct from the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, dated 30 October 1947, annexed to the
Final Act adopted at the conclusion of the Second Session
of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Employment, as subsequently
rectified, amended or modified (hereinafter referred to as

GATT 1947).
It should be added that the Senate was well-aware of w
hat it was concurring in as shown by the members
deliberation on August 25, 1994. After reading the letter
of President Ramos dated August 11, 1994,59See
footnote 3 for complete text. the senators of the Republic
minutely dissected w hat the Senate was concurring in,
as follow s:60Taken from pp. 63-85, Respondent
Memorandum.THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. Now, the question of
the validity of the submission came up in the first day
hearing of this Committee yesterday. Was the observation
made by Senator Taada that what was submitted to the
Senate was not the agreement on es tablishing the World
Trade Organization by the final act of the Uruguay Round
which is not the same as the agreement establishing the
World Trade Organization? And on that basis, Senator
Tolentino raised a point of order which, however, he
agreed to withdraw upon understanding that his
suggestion for an alternative solution at that time was
acceptable. That suggestion was to treat the proceedings
of the Committee as being in the nature of briefings for
Senators until the question of the submission could be
clarified. And so, Secretary Romulo, in effect, is the
President submitting a new. . . is he making a new
submission which improves on the clarity of the first
submission?
MR. ROMULO: Mr. Chairman, to make sure that it is clear

cut and there should be no misunderstanding, it was his
intention to clarify all matters by giving this letter.
THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.
_______________
59 See footnote 3 for complete text.
60 Taken from pp. 63-85, Respondent Memorandum.
78
Taada vs. Angara
Can this Comm ittee hear from Senator Taada and later
on Senator Tolentino since they were the ones that raised
this question yesterday?
Senator Taada, please.
SEN. TAADA: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Based on what Secretary Romulo has read, it would now
clearly appear that what is being submitted to the Senate
for ratification is not the Final Act of the Uruguay Round,
but rather the Agreement on the World Trade
Organization as well as the Ministerial Declarations and
Decisions, and the Understanding and Comm itm ents in
Financial Services.
I am now satisfied with the wording of the new

submission of President Ramos.
SEN. TAADA. . . . of President Ramos, Mr. Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Taada. Can we hear
from Senator Tolentino? And after him Senator Neptali
Gonzales and Senator Lina.
SEN. TOLENTI NO. MR. Chairman, I have not seen the new
submission actually transmitted to us but I saw the draft
of his earlier, and I think it now complies with the
provisions of the Constitution, and with the Final Act itself.
The Constitution does not require us to ratify the Final
Act. It requires us to ratify the Agreement which is now
being submitted. The Final Act itself specifies what is
going to be submitted to with the governments of the
participants.
In paragraph 2 of the Final Act, we read and I quote:
By signing the present Final Act, the representatives
agree: (a) to submit as appropriate the WTO Agreement
for the consideration of the respective competent
Agreement in accordance with their procedures.
In other words, it is not the Final Act that was agreed to
be submitted to the governments for ratification or
acceptance as whatever their constitutional procedures
may provide but it is the World Trade Organization
Agreement. And if that is the one that is being submitted
now, I think it satisfies both the Constitution and the Final

Act itself.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Tolentino, May I call
on Senator Gonzales.
79
VOL. 272, MAY 2, 1997 79
Taada vs. Angara
SEN. GONZALES. Mr. Chairman, my views on this matter

are already a matter of record. And they had been
adequately reflected in the journal of yesterdays session
and I dont see any need for repeating the same.
Now, I would consider the new submission as an act ex
abudante cautela.
THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Gonzales. Senator
Lina, do you want to make any comment on this?
SEN. LINA. Mr. President, I agree with the observation just
made by Senator Gonzales out of the abundance of
question. Then the new submission is, I believe, stating
the obvious and therefore I have no further comment to
make.
Epilogue
In praying for the nullification of the Philippine ratification

of the WTO Agreement, petitioners are invoking this
Courts constitutionally imposed duty to determine
whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion
the Senate in giving its concurrence therein via Senate
Resolution No. 97. Procedurally, a writ of certiorari
grounded on grave abuse of discretion may be issued by
the Court under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court when it is
amply shown that petitioners have no other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction.61Zarate vs. Olegario, G.R. No. 90655,
October 7, 1996. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough.
It must be grave abuse of discretion as when the power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and
so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or
to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act
at all in contemplation of law.62San Sebastian College vs.
Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA 138, 144, May 15, 1991;
Comm issioner of Internal Revenue vs. Court of Tax
Appeals, 195 SCRA 444, 458 March 20, 1991; Simon vs.
Civil Failure on the part of the petitioner to show grave
_______________
61 Zarate vs. Olegario, G.R. No. 90655, October 7, 1996.
62 San Sebastian College vs. Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA

138, 144, May 15, 1991; Comm issioner of Internal
Revenue vs. Court of Tax Appeals, 195 SCRA 444, 458
March 20, 1991; Simon vs. Civil
80
Taada vs. Angara
abuse of discretion will result in the dismissal of the

petition.63Paredes vs. Civil Service Commission, 192
SCRA 84, 94, December 4, 1990.In rendering this D
ecision, this Court never forgets that the Senate, whose
act is under review, is one of two sovereign houses of
Congress and is thus entitled to great respect in its
actions. It is itself a constitutional body independent and
coordinate, and thus its actions are presumed regular and
done in good faith. Unless convincing proof and
persuasive arguments are presented to overthrow such
presumptions, this Court will resolve every doubt in its
favor. Using the foregoing well-accepted definition of
grave abuse of discretion and the presumption of
regularity in the Senates processes, this Court cannot
find any cogent reason to impute grave abuse of
discretion to the Senates exercise of its power of
concurrence in the WTO Agreement granted it by Sec. 21
of Article VII of the Constitution.64Sec. 21. No treaty or
international agreement shall be valid and effective

unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the
Members of the Senate....It is true, as alleged by
petitioners, that broad constitutional principles require
the State to develop an independent national economy
effectively controlled by Filipinos; and to protect and/or
prefer Filipino labor, products, dom estic materials and
locally produced goods. But it is equally true that such
principleswhile serving as judicial and legislative guides
are not in themselves sources of causes of action.
Moreover, there are other equally fundamental
constitutional principles relied upon by the Senate which
mandate the pursuit of a trade policy that serves the
general welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements
of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity and
the promotion of industries w hich are competitive in
both domestic and foreign markets, thereby justifying its
acceptance of said treaty. So too, the alleged impairment
of sovereignty in the exercise of legisla_______________
Service Commission, 215 SCRA 410, November 5, 1992;
Bustamante vs. Commissioner on Audit, 216 SCRA 134,
136, November 27, 1992.
63 Paredes vs. Civil Service Commission, 192 SCRA 84,
94, December 4, 1990.
64 Sec. 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be
valid and effective unless concurred in by at least twothirds of all the Members of the Senate.
81
VOL. 272, MAY 2, 1997 81
Taada vs. Angara
tive and judicial powers is balanced by the adoption of

the generally accepted principles of international law as
part of the law of the land and the adherence of the
Constitution to the policy of cooperation and amity with
all nations.
That the Senate, after deliberation and voting, voluntarily
and overwhelmingly gave its consent to the WTO
Agreement thereby making it a part of the law of the
land is a legitimate exercise of its sovereign duty and
power. We find no patent and gross arbitrariness or
despotism by reason of passion or personal hostility in
such exercise. It is not impossible to surmise that this
Court, or at least some of its members, may even agree
with petitioners that it is more advantageous to the
national interest to strike down Senate Resolution No. 97.
But that is not a legal reason to attribute grave abuse of
discretion to the Senate and to nullify its decision. To do
so would constitute grave abuse in the exercise of our
own judicial power and duty. Ineludably, what the Senate
did was a valid exercise of its authority. As to whether
such exercise was wise, beneficial or viable is outside the
realm of judicial inquiry and review. That is a matter
between the elected policy makers and the people. As to

whether the nation should join the worldwide march
toward trade liberalization and economic globalization is
a m atter that our people should determine in electing
their policy makers. After all, the WTO Agreement allows
withdrawal of membership, should this be the political
desire of a member.
The eminent futurist John Naisbitt, author of the best
seller Megatrends, predicts an Asian
Renaissance65Readers Digest, December 1996 issue, p.
28. where the East will become the dominant region of
the world economically, politically and culturally in the
next century. He refers to the free market espoused by
WTO as the catalyst in this com in g A sian ascend ancy
. There are at present about 31 countries including China,
Russia and Saudi Arabia negotiating for membership in
the WTO. Notwithstanding objections against possible l
imitation s on n at ional sovereignty, the WTO remains as
the only viable structure for multilateral
_______________
65 Readers Digest, December 1996 issue, p. 28.
82
Taada vs. Angara
trading and the veritable forum for the development of

international trade law. The alternative to WTO is
isolation, stagnation, if not economic self-destruction.
Duly enriched with original membership, keenly aware of
the advantages and disadvantages of globalization with
its on-line experience, and endowed with a vision of the
future, the Philippines now straddles the crossroads of an
international strategy for economic prosperity and
stability in the new millennium. Let the people, through
their duly authorized elected officers, make their free
choice.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (C.J.), Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero,
Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco,
Hermosisima, Jr. and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Padilla and Vitug, JJ., In the result.
Petition dismissed.
Notes.The primary purpose of the commissioners in
expanding the concept of judicial power is to eliminate
the defense of political question which in the past
deprived the Supreme Court of the jurisdiction to strike
down abuses of power by government. (Arroyo vs. House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 246 SCRA 384
[1995])
When the Constitution mandates that in the grant of
rights, privileges, and concessions covering national
economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference

to qualified Filipinos, it means just thatqualified Filipinos
shall be preferred. (Manila Prince Hotel vs. Government
Service Insurance System, 267 SCRA [1997]) [Taada vs.
Angara, 272 SCRA 18(1997)]
VOL. 175, JULY 14, 1989 343

Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc.
vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform
G.R. No. 78742. July 14, 1989.*EN BANC.ASSOCIATION OF

SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIP-PINES, INC., JUANITO
D. GOMEZ, GERARDO B. ALARCIO, FELIPE A. GUICO, JR.,
BERNARDO M. ALMONTE, CANUTO RAMIR B. CABRITO,
ISIDRO T. GUICO, FELISA I. LLAMIDO, FAUSTO J. SALVA,
REYNALDO G. ESTRADA, FELISA C. BAUTISTA, ESMENIA J.
CABE, TEODORO B. MADRIAGA, AUREA J. PRESTOSA,
EMERENCIANA J. ISLA, FELICISIMA C. APRESTO,
CONSUELO M. MORALES, BENJAMIN R. SEGISMUNDO,
CIRILA A. JOSE & NAPOLEON S. FERRER, petitioners, vs.
HONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM,
respondent.
G.R. No. 79310. July 14, 1989.*EN BANC.ARSENIO AL.
ACUA, NEWTON JISON, VICTORINO FER-RARIS, DENNIS
JEREZA, HERMINIGILDO GUSTILO, PAULINO D. TOLENTINO
and PLANTERS COMMITTEE, INC., Victorias Mill District,
Victorias, Negros Occidental, petitioners, vs. JOKER
ARROYO, PHILIP E. JUICO and PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN
REFORM COUNCIL, respondents.
G.R. No. 79744. July 14, 1989.*EN BANC.INOCENTES
PABICO, petitioner, vs. HON. PHILIP E. JUICO, SECRETARY
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, HON. JOKER

ARROYO, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, and Messrs. SALVADOR TALENTO, JAIME
ABOGADO, CONRADO AVANCEA, and ROBERTO TAAY,
respondents.
G.R. No. 79777. July 14, 1989.*EN BANC.NICOLAS S.
MANAAY and AGUSTIN HERMANO, JR., petitioners, vs.
HON. PHILIP ELLA JUICO, as Secretary of Agra_______________
* EN BANC.
344
rian Reform, and LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,

respondents.
Constitutional Law; Elements of judicial inquiry.In
addition, the Constitution itself lays down stringent
conditions for a declaration of unconstitutionality,
requiring therefor the concurrence of a majority of the
members of the Supreme Court who took part in the
deliberations and voted on the issue during their session
en banc. And as established by judge-made doctrine, the
Court will assume jurisdiction over a constitutional

question only if it is shown that the essential requisites of
a judicial inquiry into such a question are first satisfied.
Thus, there must be an actual case or controversy
involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial
determination, the constitutional question must have
been opportunely raised by the proper party, and the
resolution of the question is unavoidably necessary to the
decision of the case itself.
Same; Agrarian Law; Powers of the President; Power of
President Aquino to promulgate Proclamation No. 131 and
E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, the same authorized under
Section 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987
Constitution.The promulgation of P.D. No. 27 by
President Marcos in the exercise of his powers under
martial law has already been sustained in Gonzales v.
Estrella and we find no reason to modify or reverse it on
that issue. As for the power of President Aquino to
promulgate Proc. No. 131 and E.O Nos. 228 and 229, the
same was authorized under Section 6 of the Transitory
Provisions of the 1987 Constitution, quoted above.
Same; Same; Pres. Aquinos loss of legislative powers did
not have the effect of invalidating all the measures
enacted by her when she possessed it; Reasons.The
said measures were issued by President Aquino before
July 27, 1987, when the Congress of the Philippines was
formally convened and took over legislative power from
her. They are not midnight enactments intended to preempt the legislature because E.O. No. 228 was issued on
July 17, 1987, and the other measures, i.e., Proc. No. 131
and E.O. No. 229, were both issued on July 22, 1987.
Neither is it correct to say that these measures ceased to
be valid when she lost her legislative power for, like any
statute, they continue to be in force unless modified or
repealed by subsequent law or declared invalid by the
courts. A statute does not ipso facto become inoperative
simply because of the dissolution of the legislature
345
VOL. 175, JULY 14, 1989 345
that enacted it. By the same token, President Aquinos

loss of legislative power did not have the effect of
invalidating all the measures enacted by her when and as
long as she possessed it.
Same; Same; Same; Appropriation Law, defined; Proc. No.
131 is not an appropriation measure; Reasons.That
fund, as earlier noted, is itself being questioned on the
ground that it does not conform to the requirements of a
valid appropriation as specified in the Constitution.
Clearly, however, Proc. No. 131 is not an appropriation
measure even if it does provide for the creation of said
fund, for that is not its principal purpose. An appropriation
law is one the primary and specific purpose of which is to
authorize the release of public funds from the treasury.
The creation of the fund is only incidental to the main

objective of the proclamation, which is agrarian reform.
Same; Same; Same; Section 6 of Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program of 1988 (R.A. No. 6657) provides for
retention limits.The argument of some of the petitioners
that Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 should be invalidated
because they do not provide for retention limits as
required by Article XIII, Section 4, of the Constitution is no
longer tenable. R.A. No. 6657 does provide for such limits
now in Section 6 of the law, which in fact is one of its
most controversial provisions. This section declares:
Retention Limits.Except as otherwise provided in this
Act, no person may own or retain, directly or indirectly,
any public or private agricultural land, the size of which
shall vary according to factors governing a viable familysized farm, such as commodity produced, terrain,
infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by the
Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) created
hereunder, but in no case shall retention by the
landowner exceed five (5) hectares. Three (3) hectares
may be awarded to each child of the landowner, subject
to the following qualifications: (1) that he is at least
fifteen (15) years of age; and (2) that he is actually tilling
the land or directly managing the farm; Provided, That
landowners whose lands have been covered by
Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the
area originally retained by them thereunder, further, That
original homestead grantees or direct compulsory heirs
who still own the original homestead at the time of the
approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as

they continue to cultivate said homestead.
346
Same; Same; Same; Rule that the title of the bill does not
have to be a catalogue of its contents.The argument
that E.O. No. 229 violates the constitutional requirement
that a bill shall have only one subject, to be expressed in
its title, deserves only short attention. It is settled that
the title of the bill does not have to be a catalogue of its
contents and will suffice if the matters embodied in the
text are relevant to each other and may be inferred from
the title.
Same; Same; Same; Mandamus; Rule that mandamus can
issue to require action only but not specific action.
Finally, there is the contention of the public respondent in
G.R. No. 78742 that the writ of mandamus cannot issue to
compel the performance of a discretionary act, especially
by a specific department of the government. That is true
as a general proposition but is subject to one important
qualification. Correctly and categorically stated, the rule
is that mandamus will lie to compel the dischrage of the
discretionary duty itself but not to control the discretion
to be exercised. In other words, mandamus can issue to
require action only but not specific action. Whenever a

duty is imposed upon a public official and an unnecessary
and unreasonable delay in the exercise of such duty
occurs, if it is a clear duty imposed by law, the courts will
intervene by the extraordinary legal remedy of
mandamus to compel action. If the duty is purely
ministerial, the courts will require specific action. If the
duty is purely discretionary, the courts by mandamus will
require action only. For example, if an inferior court,
public official, or board should, for an unreasonable
length of time, fail to decide a particular question to the
great detriment of all parties concerned, or a court should
refuse to take jurisdiction of a cause when the law clearly
gave it jurisdiction, mandamus will issue, in the first case
to require a decision, and in the second to require that
jurisdiction be taken of the cause.
Same; Same; Same; Eminent Domain; Police Power;
Property condemned under Police Power is noxious or
intended for a noxious purpose is not compensable.
There are traditional distinctions between the police
power and the power of eminent domain that logically
preclude the application of both powers at the same time
on the same subject. In the case of City of Baguio v.
NAWASA, for example, where a law required the transfer
of all municipal waterworks systems to the NAWASA in
exchange for its assets of equivalent value, the Court
held that the power being exercised was eminent domain
because the property involved was wholesome and
intended for a public use.
347
VOL. 175, JULY 14, 1989 347
Property condemned under the police power is noxious or

intended for a noxious purpose, such as a building on the
verge of collapse, which should be demolished for the
public safety, or obscene materials, which should be
destroyed in the interest of public morals. The
confiscation of such property is not compensable, unlike
the taking of property under the power of expropriation,
which requires the payment of just compensation to the
owner.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Cases at bar: The extent,
retention limits, police power, deprivation, excess of the
maximum area under power of eminent domain.The
cases before us present no knotty complication insofar as
the question of compensable taking is concerned. To the
extent that the measures under challenge merely
prescribe retention limits for landowners, there is an
exercise of the police power for the regulation of private
property in accordance with the Constitution. But where,
to carry out such regulation, it becomes necessary to
deprive such owners of whatever lands they may own in
excess of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a
taking under the power of eminent domain for which
payment of just compensation is imperative. The taking
contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the

land. What is required is the surrender of the title to and
the physical possession of the said excess and all
beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the
farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an exercise not of the
police power but of the power of eminent domain.
Same; Same; Same; Equal Protection of the Law;
Classification defined; Requisites of a valid classification.
Classification has been defined as the grouping of
persons or things similar to each other in certain
particulars and different from each other in these same
particulars. To be valid, it must conform to the following
requirements: (1) it must be based on substantial
distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purposes of
the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions
only; and (4) it must apply equally to all the members of
the class. The Court finds that all these requisites have
been met by the measures here challenged as arbitrary
and discriminatory.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Definition of Equal Protection.
Equal protection simply means that all persons or
things similarly situated must be treated alike both as to
the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed. The
petitioners have not shown that they belong to a differ348
ent class and entitled to a different treatment. The

argument that not only landowners but also owners of
other properties must be made to share the burden of
implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a
substantial distinction between these two classes of
owners that is clearly visible except to those who will not
see. There is no need to elaborate on this matter. In any
event, the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing
for a valid classification. Its decision is accorded
recognition and respect by the courts of justice except
only where its discretion is abused to the detriment of the
Bill of Rights.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutes; A statute may be
sustained under the police power only if there is a
concurrence of the lawful subject and method.It is
worth remarking at this juncture that a statute may be
sustained under the police power only if there is a
concurrence of the lawful subject and the lawful method.
Put otherwise, the interests of the public generally as
distinguished from those of a particular class require the
interference of the State and, no less important, the
means employed are reasonably necessary for the
attainment of the purpose sought to be achieved and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals. As the subject and
purpose of agrarian reform have been laid down by the
Constitution itself, we may say that the first requirement
has been satisfied. What remains to be examined is the
validity of the method employed to achieve the

Constitutional goal.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Eminent Domain, defined.
Eminent domain is an inherent power of the State that
enables it to forcibly acquire private lands intended for
public use upon payment of just compensation to the
owner. Obviously, there is no need to expropriate where
the owner is willing to sell under terms also acceptable to
the purchaser, in which case an ordinary deed of sale
may be agreed upon by the parties. It is only where the
owner is unwilling to sell, or cannot accept the price or
other conditions offered by the vendee, that the power of
eminent domain will come into play to assert the
paramount authority of the State over the interests of the
property owner. Private rights must then yield to the
irresistible demands of the public interest on the timehonored justification, as in the case of the police power,
that the welfare of the people is the supreme law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Requirements for a proper
exercise of power of eminent domain.But for all its
primacy and urgency, the
349
VOL. 175, JULY 14, 1989 349
power of expropriation is by no means absolute (as

indeed no power is absolute). The limitation is found in
the constitutional injunction that private property shall
not be taken for public use without just compensation
and in the abundant jurisprudence that has evolved from
the interpretation of this principle. Basically, the
requirements for a proper exercise of the power are: (1)
public use and (2) just compensation.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Concept of political question.
A becoming courtesy admonishes us to respect the
decisions of the political departments when they decide
what is known as the political question. As explained by
Chief Justice Concepcion in the case of Taada v. Cuenco:
The term political question connotes what it means in
ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers
to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to
be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or
in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the
government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon
the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Just Compensation, defined.
Just compensation is defined as the full and fair
equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator. It has been repeatedly stressed by this
Court that the measure is not the takers gain but the
owners loss. The word just is used to intensify the
meaning of the word compensation to convey the idea
that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be

taken shall be real, substantial, full, ample.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Requirements of compensable
taking.As held in Republic of the Philippines v. Castellvi,
there is compensable taking when the following
conditions concur: (1) the expropriator must enter a
private property; (2) the entry must be for more than a
momentary period; (3) the entry must be under warrant
or color of legal authority; (4) the property must be
devoted to public use or otherwise informally
appropriated or injuriously affected; and (5) the utilization
of the property for public use must be in such a way as to
oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment
of the property. All these requisites are envisioned in the
measures before us.
350
Same; Same; Same; Same; Determination of Just

Compensation, addressed to the courts of justice and
may not be usurped by any other branch.To be sure,
the determination of just compensation is a function
addressed to the courts of justice and may not be
usurped by any other branch or official of the
government. EPZA v. Dulay resolved a challenge to
several decrees promulgated by President Marcos

providing that the just compensation for property under
expropriation should be either the assessment of the
property by the government or the sworn valuation
thereof by the owner, whichever was lower.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Court declares that the
content and manner of the just compensation provided
for in the CARP Law is not violative of the Constitution.
With these assumptions, the Court hereby declares that
the content and manner of the just compensation
provided for in the afore-quoted Section 18 of the CARP
Law is not violative of the Constitution. We do not mind
admitting that a certain degree of pragmatism has
influenced our decision on this issue, but after all this
Court is not a cloistered institution removed from the
realities and demands of society or oblivious to the need
for its enhancement. The Court is as acutely anxious as
the rest of our people to see the goal of agrarian reform
achieved at last after the frustrations and deprivations of
our peasant masses during all these disappointing
decades. We are aware that invalidation of the said
section will result in the nullification of the entire
program, killing the farmers hopes even as they
approach realization and resurrecting the spectre of
discontent and dissent in the restless countryside. That is
not in our view the intention of the Constitution, and that
is not what we shall decree today.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Theory that payment of the
just compensation is not always required to be made fully
in money; Other modes of payment.Accepting the

theory that payment of the just compensation is not
always required to be made fully in money, we find
further that the proportion of cash payment to the other
things of value constituting the total payment, as
determined on the basis of the areas of the lands
expropriated, is not unduly oppressive upon the
landowner. It is noted that the smaller the land, the
bigger the payment in money, primarily because the
small landwoner will be needing it more than the big
landowners, who can afford a bigger balance in bonds
and other things of value. No less importantly, the
351
VOL. 175, JULY 14, 1989 351
government financial instruments making up the balance

of the payment are negotiable at any time. The other
modes, which are likewise available to the landowner at
his option, are also not unreasonable because payment is
made in shares of stock, LBP bonds, other properties or
assets, tax credits, and other things of value equivalent
to the amount of just compensation.
Same; Same; Same; Same; CARP Law repeats the
requisites of registration but does not provide that in case
of failure or refusal to register the land, the valuation
thereof shall be that given by the provincial or city

assessor for tax purposes.The complaint against the
effects of non-registration of the land under E.O. No. 229
does not seem to be viable any more as it appears that
Setion 4 of the Order has been superseded by Section 14
of the CARP Law. This repeats the requisites of
registration as embodied in the earlier measure but does
not provide, as the latter did, that in case of failure or
refusal to register the land, the valuation thereof shall be
that given by the provincial or city assessor for tax
purposes. On the contrary, the CARP Law says that the
just compensation shall be ascertained on the basis of
the factors mentioned in its Section 17 and in the manner
provided for in Section 16.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Recognized rule that title to
the property expropriated shall pass from the owner to
the expropriator only upon full payment of the just
compensation.The recognized rule, indeed, is that title
to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner to
the expropriator only upon full payment of the just
compensation. Jurisprudence on this settled principle is
consistent both here and in other democratic
jurisdictions.
Same; Same; Same; Same; CARP Law (R.A. 6657) is more
liberal than those granted by P.D. No. 27 as to retention
limits; Case at bar.In connection with these retained
rights, it does not appear in G.R. No. 78742 that the
appeal filed by the petitioners with the Office of the
President has already been resolved. Although we have
said that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative

remedies need not preclude immediate resort to judicial
action, there are factual issues that have yet to be
examined on the administrative level, especially the
claim that the petitioners are not covered by LOI 474
because they do not own other agricultural lands than the
subjects of their petition. Obviously, the Court cannot
resolve these issues. In any event, assum352
ing that the petitioners have not yet exercised their

retention rights, if any, under P.D. No. 27, the Court holds
that they are entitled to the new retention rights provided
for by R.A. No. 6657, which in fact are on the whole more
liberal than those granted by the decree.
PETITIONS to review the decisions of the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform.
CRUZ, J.:
In ancient mythology, Antaeus was a terrible giant who
blocked and challenged Hercules for his life on his way to
Mycenae after performing his eleventh labor. The two
wrestled mightily and Hercules flung his adversary to the
ground thinking him dead, but Antaeus rose even

stronger to resume their struggle. This happened several
times to Hercules increasing amazement. Finally, as they
continued grappling, it dawned on Hercules that Antaeus
was the son of Gaea and could never die as long as any
part of his body was touching his Mother Earth. Thus
forewarned, Hercules then held Antaeus up in the air,
beyond the reach of the sustaining soil, and crushed him
to death.
Mother Earth. The sustaining soil. The giver of life,
without whose invigorating touch even the powerful
Antaeus weakened and died.
The cases before us are not as fanciful as the foregoing
tale. But they also tell of the elemental forces of life and
death, of men and women who, like Antaeus, need the
sustaining strength of the precious earth to stay alive.
Land for the Landless is a slogan that underscores the
acute imbalance in the distribution of this precious
resource among our people. But it is more than a slogan.
Through the brooding centuries, it has become a
battlecry dramatizing the increasingly urgent demand of
the dispossessed among us for a plot of earth as their
place in the sun.
Recognizing this need, the Constitution in 1935 mandated
the policy of social justice to insure the well-being and
eco-
353
VOL. 175, JULY 14, 1989 353
nomic security of all the people,1Art. II, Sec. 5.

especially the less privileged. In 1973, the new
Constitution affirmed this goal, adding specifically that
the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use,
enjoyment and disposition of private property and
equitably diffuse property ownership and profits.21973
Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 6. Significantly, there was also
the specific injunction to formulate and implement an
agrarian reform program aimed at emancipating the
tenant from the bondage of the soil.3Ibid., Art. XIV, Sec.
12.The Constitution of 1987 was not to be outdone.
Besides echoing these sentiments, it also adopted one
whole and separate Article XIII on Social Justice and
Human Rights, containing grandiose but undoubtedly
sincere provisions for the uplift of the common people.
These include a call in the following words for the
adoption by the State of an agrarian reform program:
SEC. 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian
reform program founded on the right of farmers and
regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or
collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other
farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof.
To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the
just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such

priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress
may prescribe, taking into account ecological,
developmental, or equity considerations and subject to
the payment of just compensation. In determining
retention limits, the State shall respect the right of small
landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for
voluntary land-sharing.
Earlier, in fact, R.A. No. 3844, otherwise known as the
Agricultural Land Reform Code, had already been enacted
by the Congress of the Philippines on August 8, 1963, in
line with the above-stated principles. This was
substantially superseded almost a decade later by P.D.
No. 27, which was promulgated on October 21, 1972,
along with martial law, to provide for the compulsory
acquisition of private lands for distribution among
_______________
1 Art. II, Sec. 5.
2 1973 Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 6.
3 Ibid., Art. XIV, Sec. 12.
354
tenant-farmers and to specify maximum retention limits

for landowners.
The people power revolution of 1986 did not change and
indeed even energized the thrust for agrarian reform.
Thus, on July 17, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino
issued E.O. No. 228, declaring full land ownership in favor
of the beneficiaries of P.D. No. 27 and providing for the
valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the decree as
well as the manner of their payment. This was followed
on July 22, 1987 by Presidential Proclamation No. 131,
instituting a comprehensive agrarian reform program
(CARP), and E.O. No. 229, providing the mechanics for its
implementation.
Subsequently, with its formal organization, the revived
Congress of the Philippines took over legislative power
from the President and started its own deliberations,
including extensive public hearings, on the improvement
of the interests of farmers. The result, after almost a year
of spirited debate, was the enactment of R.A. No. 6657,
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law of 1988, which President Aquino signed on June 10,
1988. This law, while considerably changing the earlier
mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives them
suppletory effect insofar as they are not inconsistent with
its provisions.4R.A. No. 6657, Sec. 15.The abovecaptioned cases have been consolidated because they
involve common legal questions, including serious
challenges to the constitutionality of the several
measures mentioned above. They will be the subject of

one common discussion and resolution. The different
antecedents of each case will require separate treatment,
however, and will first be explained hereunder.
G.R. No. 79777
Squarely raised in this petition is the constitutionality of
P.D. No. 27, E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, and R.A. No. 6657.
_______________
4 R.A. No. 6657, Sec. 15.
355
VOL. 175, JULY 14, 1989 355
The subjects of this petition are a 9-hectare riceland

worked by four tenants and owned by petitioner Nicolas
Manaay and his wife and a 5-hectare riceland worked by
four tenants and owned by petitioner Augustin Hermano,
Jr. The tenants were declared full owners of these lands
by E.O. No. 228 as qualified farmers under P.D. No. 27.
The petitioners are questioning P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos.
228 and 229 on grounds inter alia of separation of
powers, due process, equal protection and the
constitutional limitation that no private property shall be

taken for public use without just compensation.
They contend that President Aquino usurped legislative
power when she promulgated E.O. No. 228. The said
measure is invalid also for violation of Article XIII, Section
4, of the Constitution, for failure to provide for retention
limits for small landowners. Moreover, it does not conform
to Article VI, Section 25(4) and the other requisites of a
valid appropriation. In connection with the determination
of just compensation, the petitioners argue that the same
may be made only by a court of justice and not by the
President of the Philippines. They invoke the recent cases
of EPZA v. Dulay5149 SCRA 305. and Manotok v. National
Food Authority.6150 SCRA 89. Moreover, the just
compensation contemplated by the Bill of Rights is
payable in money or in cash and not in the form of bonds
or other things of value.
In considering the rentals as advance payment on the
land, the executive order also deprives the petitioners of
their property rights as protected by due process. The
equal protection clause is also violated because the order
places the burden of solving the agrarian problems on the
owners only of agricultural lands. No similar obligation is
imposed on the owners of other properties.
The petitioners also maintain that in declaring the
beneficiaries under P.D. No. 27 to be the owners of the
lands occupied by them, E.O. No. 228 ignored judicial
prerogatives and so violated due process. Worse, the
measure would not solve the
_______________
5 149 SCRA 305.
6 150 SCRA 89.
356
agrarian problem because even the small farmers are

deprived of their lands and the retention rights
guaranteed by the Constitution.
In his Comment, the Solicitor General stresses that P.D.
No. 27 has already been upheld in the earlier cases of
Chavez v. Zobel,755 SCRA 26. Gonzales v. Estrella,891
SCRA 294. and Association of Rice and Corn Producers of
the Philippines, Inc. v. the National Land Reform
council.9113 SCRA 798. The determination of just
compensation by the executive authorities conformably
to the formula prescribed under the questioned order is
at best initial or preliminary only. It does not foreclose
judicial intervention whenever sought or warranted. At
any rate, the challenge to the order is premature because
no valuation of their property has as yet been made by
the Department of Agrarian Reform. The petitioners are
also not proper parties because the lands owned by them

do not exceed the maximum retention limit of 7 hectares.
Replying, the petitioners insist they are proper parties
because P.D. No. 27 does not provide for retention limits
on tenanted lands and that in any event their petition is a
class suit brought in behalf of landowners with
landholdings below 24 hectares. They maintain that the
determination of just compensation by the administrative
authorities is a final ascertainment. As for the cases
invoked by the public respondent, the constitutionality of
P.D. No. 27 was merely assumed in Chavez, while what
was decided in Gonzales was the validity of the
imposition of martial law.
In the amended petition dated November 22, 1988, it is
contended that P.D. No. 27, E.O. Nos. 228 and 229
(except Sections 20 and 21) have been impliedly
repealed by R.A. No. 6657. Nevertheless, this statute
should itself also be declared unconstitutional because it
suffers from substantially the same infirmities as the
earlier measures.
A petition for intervention was filed with leave of court on
_______________
7 55 SCRA 26.
8 91 SCRA 294.
9 113 SCRA 798.
357
VOL. 175, JULY 14, 1989 357
June 1, 1988 by Vicente Cruz, owner of a 1.83-hectare

land, who complained that the DAR was insisting on the
implementation of P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228 despite a
compromise agreement he had reached with his tenant
on the payment of rentals. In a subsequent motion dated
April 10, 1989, he adopted the allegations in the basic
amended petition that the above-men-tioned enactments
have been impliedly repealed by R.A. No. 6657.
G.R. No. 79310
The petitioners herein are landowners and sugar planters
in the Victorias Mill District, Victorias, Negros Occidental.
Co-petitioner Planters Committee, Inc. is an organization
composed of 1,400 planter-members. This petition seeks
to prohibit the implementation of Proc. No. 131 and E.O.
No. 229.
The petitioners claim that the power to provide for a
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program as decreed by
the Constitution belongs to Congress and not the
President. Although they agree that the President could
exercise legislative power until the Congress was
convened, she could do so only to enact emergency
measures during the transition period. At that, even
assuming that the interim legislative power of the

President was properly exercised, Proc. No. 131 and E.O.
No. 229 would still have to be annulled for violating the
constitutional provisions on just compensation, due
process, and equal protection.
They also argue that under Section 2 of Proc. No. 131
which provides:
Agrarian Reform Fund.There is hereby created a special
fund, to be known as the Agrarian Reform Fund, an initial
amount of FIFTY BILLION PESOS (P50,000,000,000.00) to
cover the estimated cost of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program from 1987 to 1992 which shall be
sourced from the receipts of the sale of the assets of the
Asset Privatization Trust and Receipts of sale of ill-gotten
wealth received through the Presidential Commission on
Good Government and such other sources as government
may deem appropriate. The amounts collected and
accruing to this special fund shall be consid-
358
ered automatically appropriated for the purpose

authorized in this Proclamation.
the amount appropriated is in futuro, not in esse. The

money needed to cover the cost of the contemplated
expropriation has yet to be raised and cannot be
appropriated at this time.
Furthermore, they contend that taking must be
simultaneous with payment of just compensation as it is
traditionally understood, i.e., with money and in full, but
no such payment is contemplated in Section 5 of the E.O.
No. 229. On the contrary, Section 6, thereof provides that
the Land Bank of the Philippines shall compensate the
landowner in an amount to be established by the
government, which shall be based on the owners
declaration of current fair market value as provided in
Section 4 hereof, but subject to certain controls to be
defined and promulgated by the Presidential Agrarian
Reform Council. This compensation may not be paid fully
in money but in any of several modes that may consist of
part cash and part bond, with interest, maturing
periodically, or direct payment in cash or bond as may be
mutually agreed upon by the beneficiary and the
landowner or as may be prescribed or approved by the
PARC.
The petitioners also argue that in the issuance of the two
measures, no effort was made to make a careful study of
the sugar planters situation. There is no tenancy problem
in the sugar areas that can justify the application of the
CARP to them. To the extent that the sugar planters have
been lumped in the same legislation with other farmers,
although they are a separate group with problems
exclusively their own, their right to equal protection has

been violated.
A motion for intervention was filed on August 27, 1987 by
the National Federation of Sugarcane Planters (NASP)
which claims a membership of at least 20,000 individual
sugar planters all over the country. On September 10,
1987, another motion for intervention was filed, this time
by Manuel Barcelona, et al., representing coconut and
riceland owners. Both motions were granted by the Court.
NASP alleges that President Aquino had no authority to
fund
359
VOL. 175, JULY 14, 1989 359
the Agrarian Reform Program and that, in any event, the

appropriation is invalid because of uncertainty in the
amount appropriated. Section 2 of Proc. No. 131 and
Sections 20 and 21 of E.O No. 229 provide for an initial
appropriation of fifty billion pesos and thus specifies the
minimum rather than the maximum authorized amount.
This is not allowed. Furthermore, the stated initial amount
has not been certified to by the National Treasurer as
actually available.
Two additional arguments are made by Barcelona, to wit,

the failure to establish by clear and convincing evidence
the necessity for the exercise of the powers of eminent
domain, and the violation of the fundamental right to own
property.
The petitioners also decry the penalty for non-registration
of the lands, which is the expropriation of the said land
for an amount equal to the government assessors
valuation of the land for tax purposes. On the other hand,
if the landowner declares his own valuation, he is unjustly
required to immediately pay the corresponding taxes on
the land, in violation of the uniformity rule.
In his consolidated Comment, the Solicitor General first
invokes the presumption of constitutionality in favor of
Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229. He also justifies the
necessity for the expropriation as explained in the
whereas clauses of the Proclamation and submits that,
contrary to the petitioners contention, a pilot project to
determine the feasibility of CARP and a general survey on
the peoples opinion thereon are not indispensable
prerequisites to its promulgation.
On the alleged violation of the equal protection clause,
the sugar planters have failed to show that they belong to
a different class and should be differently treated. The
Comment also suggests the possibility of Congress first
distributing public agricultural lands and scheduling the
expropriation of private agricultural lands later. From this
viewpoint, the petition for prohibition would be
premature.
The public respondent also points out that the

constitutional prohibition is against the payment of public
money without the corresponding appropriation. There is
no rule that only money already in existence can be the
subject of an appropriation law.
360
Finally, the earmarking of fifty billion pesos as Agrarian

Reform Fund, although denominated as an initial amount,
is actually the maximum sum appropriated. The word
initial simply means that additional amounts may be
appropriated later when necessary.
On April 11, 1988, Prudencio Serrano, a coconut planter,
filed a petition on his own behalf, assailing the
constitutionality of E.O. No. 229. In addition to the
arguments already raised, Serrano contends that the
measure is unconstitutional because:
(1) Only public lands should be included in the CARP;
(2) E.O. No. 229 embraces more than one subject which is
not expressed in the title;
(3) The power of the President to legislate was terminated

on July 2, 1987; and
(4) The appropriation of a P50 billion special fund from
the National Treasury did not originate from the House of
Representatives.
G.R. No. 79744
The petitioner alleges that the then Secretary of
Department of Agrarian Reform, in violation of due
process and the requirement for just compensation,
placed his landholding under the coverage of Operation
Land Transfer. Certificates of Land Transfer were
subsequently issued to the private respondents, who then
refused payment of lease rentals to him.
On September 3, 1986, the petitioner protested the
erroneous inclusion of his small landholding under
Operation Land Transfer and asked for the recall and
cancellation of the Certificates of Land Transfer in the
name of the private respondents. He claims that on
December 24, 1986, his petition was denied without
hearing. On February 17, 1987, he filed a motion for
reconsideration, which had not been acted upon when
E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 were issued. These orders
rendered his motion moot and academic because they
directly effected the transfer of his land to the private
respondents.
The petitioner now argues that:
(1) E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 were invalidly issued by the
Presi-
361
VOL. 175, JULY 14, 1989 361
dent of the Philippines.

(2) The said executive orders are violative of the
constitutional provision that no private property shall be
taken without due process or just compensation.
(3) The petitioner is denied the right of maximum
retention provided for under the 1987 Constitution.
The petitioner contends that the issuance of E.O Nos. 228
and 229 shortly before Congress convened is anomalous
and arbitrary, besides violating the doctrine of separation
of powers. The legislative power granted to the President
under the Transitory Provisions refers only to emergency
measures that may be promulgated in the proper
exercise of the police power.
The petitioner also invokes his rights not to be deprived
of his property without due process of law and to the
retention of his small parcels of riceholding as guaranteed
under Article XIII, Section 4 of the Constitution. He
likewise argues that, besides denying him just

compensation for his land, the provisions of E.O. No. 228
declaring that:
Lease rentals paid to the landowner by the farmerbeneficiary after October 21, 1972 shall be considered as
advance payment for the land.
is an unconstitutional taking of a vested property right. It
is also his contention that the inclusion of even small
landowners in the program along with other landowners
with lands consisting of seven hectares or more is
undemocratic.
In his Comment, the Solicitor General submits that the
petition is premature because the motion for
reconsideration filed with the Minister of Agrarian Reform
is still unresolved. As for the validity of the issuance of
E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, he argues that they were enacted
pursuant to Section 6, Article XVIII of the Transitory
Provisions of the 1987 Constitution which reads:
The incumbent president shall continue to exercise
legislative powers until the first Congress is convened.
On the issue of just compensation, his position is that
when P.D. No. 27 was promulgated on October 21, 1972,
the tenant-
362

farmer of agricultural land was deemed the owner of the

land he was tilling. The leasehold rentals paid after that
date should therefore be considered amortization
payments.
In his Reply to the public respondents, the petitioner
maintains that the motion he filed was resolved on
December 14, 1987. An appeal to the Office of the
President would be useless with the promulgation of E.O.
Nos. 228 and 229, which in effect sanctioned the validity
of the public respondents acts.
G.R. No. 78742
The petitioners in this case invoke the right of retention
granted by P.D. No. 27 to owners of rice and corn lands
not exceeding seven hectares as long as they are
cultivating or intend to cultivate the same. Their
respective lands do not exceed the statutory limit but are
occupied by tenants who are actually cultivating such
lands.
According to P.D. No. 316, which was promulgated in
implementation of P.D. No. 27:
No tenant-farmer in agricultural lands primarily devoted
to rice and corn shall be ejected or removed from his
farmholding until such time as the respective rights of the
tenant-farmers and the landowner shall have been
determined in accordance with the rules and regulations

implementing P.D. No. 27.
The petitioners claim they cannot eject their tenants and
so are unable to enjoy their right of retention because the
Department of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the
implementing rules required under the above-quoted
decree. They therefore ask the Court for a writ of
mandamus to compel the respondent to issue the said
rules.
In his Comment, the public respondent argues that P.D.
No. 27 has been amended by LOI 474 removing any right
of retention from persons who own other agricultural
lands of more than 7 hectares in aggregate area or lands
used for residential, commercial, industrial or other
purposes from which they derive adequate income for
their family. And even assuming that
363
VOL. 175, JULY 14, 1989 363
vs.Secretary of Agrarian Reform
the petitioners do not fall under its terms, the regulations

implementing P.D. No. 27 have already been issued, to
wit, the Memorandum dated July 10, 1975 (Interim
Guidelines on Retention by Small Landowners, with an
accompanying Retention Guide Table), Memorandum

Circular No. 11 dated April 21, 1978, (Implementation
Guidelines of LOI No. 474), Memorandum Circular No. 1881 dated December 29, 1981 (Clarificatory Guidelines on
Coverage of P.D. No. 27 and Retention by Small
Landowners), and DAR Administrative Order No. 1, series
of 1985 (Providing for a Cut-off Date for Landowners to
Apply for Retention and/or to Protest the Coverage of
their Landholdings under Operation Land Transfer
pursuant to P.D. No. 27). For failure to file the
corresponding applications for retention under these
measures, the petitioners are now barred from invoking
this right.
The public respondent also stresses that the petitioners
have prematurely initiated this case notwithstanding the
pendency of their appeal to the President of the
Philippines. Moreover, the issuance of the implementing
rules, assuming this has not yet been done, involves the
exercise of discretion which cannot be controlled through
the writ of mandamus. This is especially true if this
function is entrusted, as in this case, to a separate
department of the government.
In their Reply, the petitioners insist that the above-cited
measures are not applicable to them because they do not
own more than seven hectares of agricultural land.
Moreover, assuming arguendo that the rules were
intended to cover them also, the said measures are
nevertheless not in force because they have not been
published as required by law and the ruling of this Court
in Taada v. Tuvera.10136 SCRA 27; 146 SCRA 446. As for

LOI 474, the same is ineffective for the additional reason
that a mere letter of instruction could not have repealed
the presidential decree.
I
Although holding neither purse nor sword and so
regarded as
_______________
10 136 SCRA 27; 146 SCRA 446.
364
the weakest of the three departments of the government,

the judiciary is nonetheless vested with the power to
annul the acts of either the legislative or the executive or
of both when not conformable to the fundamental law.
This is the reason for what some quarters call the
doctrine of judicial supremacy. Even so, this power is not
lightly assumed or readily exercised. The doctrine of
separation of powers imposes upon the courts a proper
restraint, born of the nature of their functions and of their
respect for the other departments, in striking down the
acts of the legislative and the executive as

unconstitutional. The policy, indeed, is a blend of
courtesy and caution. To doubt is to sustain. The theory is
that before the act was done or the law was enacted,
earnest studies were made by Congress or the President,
or both, to insure that the Constitution would not be
breached.
In addition, the Constitution itself lays down stringent
conditions for a declaration of unconstitutionality,
requiring therefor the concurrence of a majority of the
members of the Supreme Court who took part in the
deliberations and voted on the issue during their session
en banc.11Art. VIII, Sec. 4(2). And as established by
judge-made doctrine, the Court will assume jurisdiction
over a constitutional question only if it is shown that the
essential requisities of a judicial inquiry into such a
question are first satisfied. Thus, there must be an actual
case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights
susceptible of judicial determination, the constitutional
question must have been opportunely raised by the
proper party, and the resolution of the question is
unavoidably necessary to the decision of the case
itself.12Dumlao v. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 392.With particular
regard to the requirement of proper party as applied in
the cases before us, we hold that the same is satisfied by
the petitioners and intervenors because each of them has
sustained or is in danger of sustaining an immediate
injury as a result of the acts or measures complained
of.13Ex Parte Levitt, 303 US 633. And even if,
_______________
11 Art. VIII, Sec. 4(2).
12 Dumlao v. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 392.
13 Ex Parte Levitt, 303 US 633.
365
VOL. 175, JULY 14, 1989 365
strictly speaking, they are not covered by the definition, it

is still within the wide discretion of the Court to waive the
requirement and so remove the impediment to its
addressing and resolving the serious constitutional
questions raised.
In the first Emergency Powers Cases,14Araneta v.
Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368. ordinary citizens and taxpayers
were allowed to question the constitutionality of several
executive orders issued by President Quirino although
they were invoking only an indirect and general interest
shared in common with the public. The Court dismissed
the objection that they were not proper parties and ruled
that the transcendental importance to the public of
these cases demands that they be settled promptly and
definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of
procedure. We have since then applied this exception in

many other cases.15Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works,
110 Phil. 331; PHILCONSA v. Gimenez, 15 SCRA 479;
Sanidad v. COMELEC, 73 SCRA 333.The other abovementioned requisites have also been met in the present
petitions.
In must be stressed that despite the inhibitions pressing
upon the Court when confronted with constitutional
issues like the ones now before it, it will not hesitate to
declare a law or act invalid when it is convinced that this
must be done. In arriving at this conclusion, its only
criterion will be the Constitution as God and its
conscience give it the light to probe its meaning and
discover its purpose. Personal motives and political
considerations are irrelevancies that cannot influence its
decision. Blandishment is as ineffectual as intimidation.
For all the awesome power of the Congress and the
Executive, the Court will not hesitate to make the
hammer fall, and heavily, to use Justice Laurels pithy
language, where the acts of these departments, or of any
public official, betray the peoples will as expressed in the
Constitution.
It need only be added, to borrow again the words of
Justice Laurel, that
_______________
14 Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368.
15 Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works, 110 Phil. 331;

PHILCONSA v. Gimenez, 15 SCRA 479; Sanidad v.
COMELEC, 73 SCRA 333.
366
x x x when the judiciary mediates to allocate

constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any
superiority over the other departments; it does not in
reality nullify or invalidate an act of the Legislature, but
only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to
it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of
authority under the Constitution and to establish for the
parties in an actual controversy the rights which that
instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in
truth all that is involved in what is termed judicial
supremacy which properly is the power of judicial review
under the Constitution.16Angara v. Electoral Commission,
63 Phil. 139.The cases before us categorically raise
constitutional questions that this Court must categorically
resolve. And so we shall.
II
We proceed first to the examination of the preliminary

issues before resolving the more serious challenges to the
constitutionality of the several measures involved in
these petitions.
The promulgation of P.D. No. 27 by President Marcos in
the exercise of his powers under martial law has already
been sustained in Gonzales v. Estrella and we find no
reason to modify or reverse it on that issue. As for the
power of President Aquino to promulgate Proc. No. 131
and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, the same was authorized
under Section 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987
Constitution, quoted above.
The said measures were issued by President Aquino
before July 27, 1987, when the Congress of the
Philippines was formally convened and took over
legislative power from her. They are not midnight
enactments intended to pre-empt the legislature because
E.O. No. 228 was issued on July 17, 1987, and the other
measures, i.e., Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229, were both
issued on July 22, 1987. Neither is it correct to say that
these measures ceased to be valid when she lost her
legislative power for, like any statute, they continue to be
in force unless
_______________
16 Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139.
367
VOL. 175, JULY 14, 1989 367

modified or repealed by subsequent law or declared

invalid by the courts. A statute does not ipso facto
become inoperative simply because of the dissolution of
the legislature that enacted it. By the same token,
President Aquinos loss of legislative power did not have
the effect of invalidating all the measures enacted by her
when and as long as she possessed it.
Significantly, the Congress she is alleged to have
undercut has not rejected but in fact substantially
affirmed the challenged measures and has specifically
provided that they shall be suppletory to R.A. No. 6657
whenever not inconsistent with its provisions.17R.A. No.
6657, Sec. 75. Indeed, some portions of the said
measures, like the creation of the P50 billion fund in
Section 2 of Proc. No. 131, and Sections 20 and 21 of E.O.
No. 229, have been incorporated by reference in the
CARP Law.18Ibid., Sec. 63.That fund, as earlier noted, is
itself being questioned on the ground that it does not
conform to the requirements of a valid appropriation as
specified in the Constitution. Clearly, however, Proc. No.
131 is not an appropriation measure even if it does
provide for the creation of said fund, for that is not its
principal purpose. An appropriation law is one the primary
and specific purpose of which is to authorize the release
of public funds from the treasury.19Bengzon v. Secretary

of Justice, 299 US 410. The creation of the fund is only
incidental to the main objective of the proclamation,
which is agrarian reform.
It should follow that the specific constitutional provisions
invoked, to wit, Section 24 and Section 25(4) of Article VI,
are not applicable. With particular reference to Section
24, this obviously could not have been complied with for
the simple reason that the House of Representatives,
which now has the exclusive power to initiate
appropriation measures, had not yet been convened
when the proclamation was issued. The legislative power
was then solely vested in the President of the Philippines,
who embodied, as it were, both houses of Congress.
_______________
17 R.A. No. 6657, Sec. 75.
18 Ibid., Sec. 63.
19 Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice, 299 US 410.
368
The argument of some of the petitioners that Proc. No.

131 and E.O. No. 229 should be invalidated because they
do not provide for retention limits as required by Article
XIII, Section 4 of the Constitution is no longer tenable.
R.A. No. 6657 does provide for such limits now in Section
6 of the law, which in fact is one of its most controversial
provisions. This section declares:
Retention Limits.Except as otherwise provided in this
Act, no person may own or retain, directly or indirectly,
any public or private agricultural land, the size of which
shall vary according to factors governing a viable familysized farm, such as commodity produced, terrain,
infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by the
Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) created
hereunder, but in no case shall retention by the
landowner exceed five (5) hectares. Three (3) hectares
may be awarded to each child of the landowner, subject
to the following qualifications: (1) that he is at least
fifteen (15) years of age; and (2) that he is actually tilling
the land or directly managing the farm; Provided, That
The argument that E.O. No. 229 violates the
constitutional requirement that a bill shall have only one
subject, to be expressed in its title, deserves only short

attention. It is settled that the title of the bill does not
have to be a catalogue of its contents and will suffice if
the matters embodied in the text are relevant to each
other and may be inferred from the title.20Alalayan v.
NPC, 24 SCRA 172; Sumulong v. COMELEC, 73 Phil. 288;
Tio v. Videogram Regulatory Board, 151 SCRA 208.The
Court wryly observes that during the past dictatorship,
every presidential issuance, by whatever name it was
called, had the force and effect of law because it came
from President Marcos. Such are the ways of despots.
Hence, it is futile to argue, as the petitioners do in G.R.
No. 79744, that LOI 474
_______________
20 Alalayan v. NPC, 24 SCRA 172; Sumulong v. COMELEC,
73 Phil. 288; Tio v. Videogram Regulatory Board, 151
SCRA 208.
369
VOL. 175, JULY 14, 1989 369
could not have repealed P.D. No. 27 because the former

was only a letter of instruction. The important thing is
that it was issued by President Marcos, whose word was

law during that time.
But for all their peremptoriness, these issuances from the
President Marcos still had to comply with the requirement
for publication as this Court held in Taada v.
Tuvera.21Supra. Hence, unless published in the Official
Gazette in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code,
they could not have any force and effect if they were
among those enactments successfully challenged in that
case. (LOI 474 was published, though, in the Official
Gazette dated November 29, 1976.)
Finally, there is the contention of the public respondent in
G.R. No. 78742 that the writ of mandamus cannot issue to
compel the performance of a discretionary act, especially
by a specific department of the government. That is true
as a general proposition but is subject to one important
qualification. Correctly and categorically stated, the rule
is that mandamus will lie to compel the discharge of the
discretionary duty itself but not to control the discretion
to be exercised. In other words, mandamus can issue to
require action only but not specific action.
Whenever a duty is imposed upon a public official and an
unnecessary and unreasonable delay in the exercise of
such duty occurs, if it is a clear duty imposed by law, the
courts will intervene by the extraordinary legal remedy of
mandamus to compel action. If the duty is purely
ministerial, the courts will require specific action. If the
duty is purely discretionary, the courts by mandamus will
require action only. For example, if an inferior court,
public official, or board should, for an unreasonable

length of time, fail to decide a particular question to the
great detriment of all parties concerned, or a court should
refuse to take jurisdiction of a cause when the law clearly
gave it jurisdiction, mandamus will issue, in the first case
to require a decision, and in the second to require that
jurisdiction be taken of the cause.22Lamb v. Phipps, 22
Phil. 456._______________
21 Supra.
22 Lamb v. Phipps, 22 Phil. 456.
370
And while it is true that as a rule the writ will not be

proper as long as there is still a plain, speedy and
adequate remedy available from the administrative
authorities, resort to the courts may still be permitted if
the issue raised is a question of law.23Malabanan v.
Ramento, 129 SCRA 359; Espaol v. Chairman, Philippine
Veterans Administration, 137 SCRA 314.III
There are traditional distinctions between the police
power and the power of eminent domain that logically
preclude the application of both powers at the same time
on the same subject. In the case of City of Baguio v.

NAWASA,24106 Phil. 144. for example, where a law
required the transfer of all municipal waterworks systems
to the NAWASA in exchange for its assets of equivalent
value, the Court held that the power being exercised was
eminent domain because the property involved was
wholesome and intended for a public use. Property
condemned under the police power is noxious or intended
for a noxious purpose, such as a building on the verge of
collapse, which should be demolished for the public
safety, or obscene materials, which should be destroyed
in the interest of public morals. The confiscation of such
property is not compensable, unlike the taking of
property under the power of expropriation, which requires
the payment of just compensation to the owner.
In the case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,25260 US
393. Justice Holmes laid down the limits of the police
power in a famous aphorism: The general rule at least is
that while property may be regulated to a certain extent,
if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a
taking. The regulation that went too far was a law
prohibiting mining which might cause the subsidence of
structures for human habitation constructed on the land
surface. This was resisted by a coal company which had
earlier granted a deed to the land over its mine but
reserved all mining
_______________
23 Malabanan v. Ramento, 129 SCRA 359; Espaol v.

Chairman, Philippine Veterans Administration, 137 SCRA
314.
24 106 Phil. 144.
25 260 US 393.
371
VOL. 175, JULY 14, 1989 371
rights thereunder, with the grantee assuming all risks and

waiving any damage claim. The Court held the law could
not be sustained without compensating the grantor.
Justice Brandeis filed a lone dissent in which he argued
that there was a valid exercise of the police power. He
said:
Every restriction upon the use of property imposed in the
exercise of the police power deprives the owner of some
right theretofore enjoyed, and is, in that sense, an
abridgment by the State of rights in property without
making compensation. But restriction imposed to protect
the public health, safety or morals from dangers
threatened is not a taking. The restriction here in
question is merely the prohibition of a noxious use. The
property so restricted remains in the possession of its
owner. The state does not appropriate it or make any use

of it. The state merely prevents the owner from making a
use which interferes with paramount rights of the public.
Whenever the use prohibited ceases to be noxiousas it
may because of further changes in local or social
conditionsthe restriction will have to be removed and
the owner will again be free to enjoy his property as
heretofore.
Recent trends, however, would indicate not a polarization
but a mingling of the police power and the power of
eminent domain, with the latter being used as an
implement of the former like the power of taxation. The
employment of the taxing power to achieve a police
purpose has long been accepted.26Powell v.
Pennsylvania, 127 US 678; Lutz v. Araneta, 98 Phil. 148;
Tio v. Videogram Regulatory Board, supra. As for the
power of expropriation, Prof. John J. Costonis of the
University of Illinois College of Law (referring to the
earlier case of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 US 365,
which sustained a zoning law under the police power)
makes the following significant remarks:
Euclid, moreover, was decided in an era when judges
located the police and eminent domain powers on
different planets. Generally speaking, they viewed
eminent domain as encompassing public acquisition of
private property for improvements that would be
available for public use, literally construed. To the
police power, on the other
_______________
26 Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 US 678; Lutz v. Araneta,

98 Phil. 148; Tio v. Videogram Regulatory Board, supra.
372
hand, they assigned the less intrusive task of preventing

harmful externalities, a point reflected in the Euclid
opinions reliance on an analogy to nuisance law to
bolster its support of zoning. So long as suppression of a
privately authored harm bore a plausible relation to some
legitimate public purpose, the pertinent measure need
have afforded no compensation whatever. With the
progressive growth of governments involvement in land
use, the distance between the two powers has contracted
considerably. Today government often employs eminent
domain interchangeably with or as a useful complement
to the police powera trend expressly approved in the
Supreme Courts 1954 decision in Berman v. Parker,
which broadened the reach of eminent domains public
use test to match that of the police powers standard of
public purpose.27John J. Costonis, The Disparity Issue:
A Context for the Grand Central Terminal Decision,
Harvard Law Review, Vol. 91:40, 1977, p. 404.The
Berman case sustained a redevelopment project and the
improvement of blighted areas in the District of Columbia

as a proper exercise of the police power. On the role of
eminent domain in the attainment of this purpose, Justice
Douglas declared:
If those who govern the District of Columbia decide that
the Nations Capital should be beautiful as well as
sanitary, there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment that
stands in the way.
Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the
right to realize it through the exercise of eminent domain
is clear.
For the power of eminent domain is merely the means to
the end.28348 US 1954.In Penn Central Transportation
Co. v. New York City,29438 US 104. decided by a 6-3 vote
in 1978, the U.S Supreme Court sustained the
respondents Landmarks Preservation Law under which
the owners of the Grand Central Terminal had not been
allowed to construct a multi-story office building over the
Terminal,
_______________
27 John J. Costonis, The Disparity Issue: A Context for the
Grand Central Terminal Decision, Harvard Law Review,
Vol. 91:40, 1977, p. 404.
28 348 US 1954.
29 438 US 104.
373
VOL. 175, JULY 14, 1989 373
which had been designated a historic landmark.

Preservation of the landmark was held to be a valid
objective of the police power. The problem, however, was
that the owners of the Terminal would be deprived of the
right to use the airspace above it although other
landowners in the area could do so over their respective
properties. While insisting that there was here no taking,
the Court nonetheless recognized certain compensatory
rights accruing to Grand Central Terminal which it said
would undoubtedly mitigate the loss caused by the
regulation. This fair compensation, as he called it, was
explained by Prof. Costonis in this wise:
In return for retaining the Terminal site in its pristine
landmark status, Penn Central was authorized to transfer
to neighboring properties the authorized but unused
rights accruing to the site prior to the Terminals
designation as a landmarkthe rights which would have
been exhausted by the 59-story building that the city
refused to countenance atop the Terminal. Prevailing bulk
restrictions on neighboring sites were proportionately
relaxed, theoretically enabling Penn Central to recoup its
losses at the Terminal site by constructing or selling to
others the right to construct larger, hence more profitable
buildings on the transferee sites.30See note 27.The cases

before us present no knotty complication insofar as the
question of compensable taking is concerned. To the
extent that the measures under challenge merely
prescribe retention limits for landowners, there is an
exercise of the police power for the regulation of private
property in accordance with the Constitution. But where,
to carry out such regulation, it becomes necessary to
deprive such owners of whatever lands they may own in
excess of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a
taking under the power of eminent domain for which
payment of just compensation is imperative. The taking
contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the
land. What is required is the surrender of the title to and
the physical possession of the said excess and all
beneficial rights accruing
_______________
30 See note 27.
374
to the owner in favor of the farmer-beneficiary. This is

definitely an exercise not of the police power but of the
power of eminent domain.
Whether as an exercise of the police power or of the
power of eminent domain, the several measures before
us are challenged as violative of the due process and
equal protection clauses.
The challenge to Proc. No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 299
on the ground that no retention limits are prescribed has
already been discussed and dismissed. It is noted that
although they excited many bitter exchanges during the
deliberation of the CARP Law in Congress, the retention
limits finally agreed upon are, curiously enough, not
being questioned in these petitions. We therefore do not
discuss them here. The Court will come to the other
claimed violations of due process in connection with our
examination of the adequacy of just compensation as
required under the power of expropriation.
The argument of the small farmers that they have been
denied equal protection because of the absence of
retention limits has also become academic under Section
6 of R.A. No. 6657. Significantly, they too have not
questioned the area of such limits. There is also the
complaint that they should not be made to share the
burden of agrarian reform, an objection also made by the
sugar planters on the ground that they belong to a
particular class with particular interests of their own.
However, no evidence has been submitted to the Court
that the requisites of a valid classification have been

violated.
Classification has been defined as the grouping of
persons or things similar to each other in certain
particulars and different from each other in these same
particulars.31International Harvester Co. v. Missouri, 234
US 199. To be valid, it must conform to the following
requirements: (1) it must be based on substantial
distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purposes of
the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions
only; and (4) it must apply equally to all the members of
the class.32People v. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12. The Court finds
that all these requisites have been met by the measures
here challenged as arbitrary and discriminatory.
________________
31 International Harvester Co. v. Missouri, 234 US 199.
32 People v. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12.
375
VOL. 175, JULY 14, 1989 375
Equal protection simply means that all persons or things

similarly situated must be treated alike both as to the
rights conferred and the liabilities imposed.33Ichong v.

Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155. The petitioners have not
shown that they belong to a different class and entitled to
a different treatment. The argument that not only
landowners but also owners of other properties must be
made to share the burden of implementing land reform
must be rejected. There is a substantial distinction
between these two classes of owners that is clearly
visible except to those who will not see. There is no need
to elaborate on this matter. In any event, the Congress is
allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid
classification. Its decision is accorded recognition and
respect by the courts of justice except only where its
discretion is abused to the detriment of the Bill of Rights.
It is worth remarking at this juncture that a statute may
be sustained under the police power only if there is a
concurrence of the lawful subject and the lawful method.
Put otherwise, the interests of the public generally as
distinguished from those of a particular class require the
interference of the State and, no less important, the
means employed are reasonbly necessary for the
attainment of the purpose sought to be achieved and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals.34US v. Toribio, 15
Phil. 85; Fabie v. City of Manila, 21 Phil. 486; Case v.
Board of Health, 24 Phil. 256. As the subject and purpose
of agrarian reform have been laid down by the
Constitution itself, we may say that the first requirement
has been satisfied. What remains to be examined is the
validity of the method employed to achieve the

constitutional goal.
One of the basic principles of the democratic system is
that where the rights of the individual are concerned, the
end does not justify the means. It is not enough that
there be a valid objective; it is also necessary that the
means employed to pursue it be in keeping with the
Constitution. Mere expediency will not excuse
constitutional shortcuts. There is no question that not
even the strongest moral conviction or the most urgent
public need, subject only to a few notable exceptions, will
excuse
________________
33 Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155.
34 US v. Toribio, 15 Phil. 85; Fabie v. City of Manila, 21
Phil. 486; Case v. Board of Health, 24 Phil. 256.
376
the bypassing of an individuals rights. It is no

exaggeration to say that a, person invoking a right
guaranteed under Article III of the Constitution is a
majority of one even as against the rest of the nation who

would deny him that right.
That right covers the persons life, his liberty and his
property under Section 1 of Article III of the Constitution.
With regard to his property, the owner enjoys the added
protection of Section 9, which reaffirms the familiar rule
that private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation.
This brings us now to the power of eminent domain.
IV
Eminent domain is an inherent power of the State that
enables it to forcibly acquire private lands intended for
public use upon payment of just compensation to the
owner. Obviously, there is no need to expropriate where
the owner is willing to sell under terms also acceptable to
the purchaser, in which case an ordinary deed of sale
may be agreed upon by the parties.35Noble v. City of
Manila, 67 Phil. 1. It is only where the owner is unwilling
to sell, or cannot accept the price or other conditions
offered by the vendee, that the power of eminent domain
will come into play to assert the paramount authority of
the State over the interests of the property owner. Private
rights must then yield to the irresistible demands of the
public interest on the time-honored justification, as in the
case of the police power, that the welfare of the people is
the supreme law.
But for all its primacy and urgency, the power of
expropriation is by no means absolute (as indeed no
power is absolute). The limitation is found in the

constitutional injunction that private property shall not
be taken for public use without just compensation and in
the abundant jurisprudence that has evolved from the
interpretation of this principle. Basically, the
requirements for a proper exercise of the power are: (1)
public use and (2) just compensation.
________________
35 Noble v. City of Manila, 67 Phil. 1.
377
VOL. 175, JULY 14, 1989 377
Let us dispose first of the argument raised by the

petitioners in G.R. No. 79310 that the State should first
distribute public agricultural lands in the pursuit of
agrarian reform instead of immediately disturbing
property rights by forcibly acquiring private agricultural
lands. Parenthetically, it is not correct to say that only
public agricultural lands may be covered by the CARP as
the Constitution calls for the just distribution of all
agricultural lands. In any event, the decision to
redistribute private agricultural lands in the manner
prescribed by the CARP was made by the legislative and
executive departments in the exercise of their discretion.

We are not justified in reviewing that discretion in the
absence of a clear showing that it has been abused.
A becoming courtesy admonishes us to respect the
decisions of the political departments when they decide
what is known as the political question. As explained by
Chief Justice Concepcion in the case of Taada v.
Cuenco:36100 Phil. 1101.The term political question
connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a
question of policy. It refers to those questions which,
under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in
their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government. It is
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not
legality, of a particular measure.
It is true that the concept of the political question has
been constricted with the enlargement of judicial power,
which now includes the authority of the courts to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.371987 Constitution, Art. VIII, Sec. 1. Even
so, this should not be construed as a license for us to
reverse the other departments simply because their
views may not coincide with ours.
The legislature and the executive have been seen fit, in
their
_______________
36 100 Phil. 1101.
37 1987 Constitution, Art. VIII, Sec. 1.
378
wisdom, to include in the CARP the redistribution of

private landholdings (even as the distribution of public
agricultural lands is first provided for, while also
continuing apace under the Public Land Act and other
cognate laws). The Court sees no justification to interpose
its authority, which we may assert only if we believe that
the political decision is not unwise, but illegal. We do not
find it to be so.
In U.S. v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Company,3857 L
ed. 1063. it was held:
Congress having determined, as it did by the Act of March
3, 1909 that the entire St. Marys river between the
American bank and the international line, as well as all of
the upland north of the present ship canal, throughout its
entire length, was necessary for the purpose of
navigation of said waters, and the waters connected
therewith, that determination is conclusive in

condemnation proceedings instituted by the United
States under that Act, and there is no room for judicial
review of the judgment of Congress x x x.
As earlier observed, the requirement for public use has
already been settled for us by the Constitution itself. No
less than the 1987 Charter calls for agrarian reform,
which is the reason why private agricultural lands are to
be taken from their owners, subject to the prescribed
maximum retention limits. The purposes specified in P.D.
No. 27, Proc. No. 131 and R.A. No. 6657 are only an
elaboration of the constitutional injuction that the State
adopt the necessary measures to encourage and
undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands to
enable farmers who are landless to own directly or
collectively the lands they till. That public use, as
pronounced by the fundamental law itself, must be
binding on us.
The second requirement, i.e., the payment of just
compensation, needs a longer and more thoughtful
examination.
Just compensation is defined as the full and fair
equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator.39Manila Railroad Co. v. Velasquez, 32 Phil.
286. It has
_______________
38 57 L ed. 1063.
39 Manila Railroad Co. v. Velasquez, 32 Phil. 286.
379
VOL. 175, JULY 14, 1989 379
been repeatedly stressed by this Court that the measure

is not the takers gain but the owners loss.40Province of
Tayabas v. Perez, 66 Phil. 467; J.M. Tuazon & Co., Inc. v.
Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413; Municipality of
Daet v. Court of Appeals, 93 SCRA 503; Manotok v.
National Housing Authority, 150 SCRA 89. The word just
is used to intensify the meaning of the word
compensation to convey the idea that the equivalent to
be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real,
substantial, full, ample.41City of Manila v. Estrada, 25
Phil. 208.It bears repeating that the measures challenged
in these petitions contemplate more than a mere
regulation of the use of private lands under the police
power. We deal here with an actual taking of private
agricultural lands that has dispossessed the owners of
their property and deprived them of all its beneficial use
and enjoyment, to entitle them to the just compensation
mandated by the Constitution.
As held in Republic of the Philippines v. Castellvi,4258
SCRA 336. there is compensable taking when the
following conditions concur: (1) the expropriator must

enter a private property; (2) the entry must be for more
than a momentary period; (3) the entry must be under
warrant or color of legal authority; (4) the property must
be devoted to public use or otherwise informally
appropriated or injuriously affected; and (5) the utilization
of the property for public use must be in such a way as to
oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment
of the property. All these requisites are envisioned in the
measures before us.
Where the State itself is the expropriator, it is not
necessary for it to make a deposit upon its taking
possession of the condemned property, as the
compensation is a public charge, the good faith of the
public is pledged for its payment, and all the resources of
taxation may be employed in raising the
amount.43Lewis, Law of Eminent Domain, 3rd Edition,
pp. 1166-1167. Nevertheless, Section 16(e) of the CARP
Law provides that:
Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding
payment or, in case of rejection or no response from the
landowner, upon the
_______________
40 Province of Tayabas v. Perez, 66 Phil. 467; J.M. Tuazon
& Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413;
Municipality of Daet v. Court of Appeals, 93 SCRA 503;
Manotok v. National Housing Authority, 150 SCRA 89.
41 City of Manila v. Estrada, 25 Phil. 208.
42 58 SCRA 336.
43 Lewis, Law of Eminent Domain, 3rd Edition, pp. 11661167.
380
deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of

the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in accordance
with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of
the land and shall request the proper Register of Deeds to
issue a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of
the Republic of the Philippines. The DAR shall thereafter
proceed with the redistribution of the land to the qualified
beneficiaries.
Objection is raised, however, to the manner of fixing the
just compensation, which it is claimed is entrusted to the
administrative authorities in violation of judicial
prerogatives. Specific reference is made to Section 16(d),
which provides that in case of the rejection or disregard
by the owner of the offer of the government to buy his
land
x x x the DAR shall conduct summary administrative
proceedings to determine the compensation for the land
by requiring the landowner, the LBP and other interested

parties to submit evidence as to the just compensation
for the land, within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of
the notice. After the expiration of the above period, the
matter is deemed submitted for decision. The DAR shall
decide the case within thirty (30) days after it is
submitted for decision.
To be sure, the determination of just compensation is a
function addressed to the courts of justice and may not
be usurped by any other branch or official of the
government. EPZA v. Dulay44149 SCRA 305. resolved a
challenge to several decrees promulgated by President
Marcos providing that the just compensation for property
under expropriation should be either the assessment of
the property by the government or the sworn valuation
thereof by the owner, whichever was lower. In declaring
these decrees unconstitutional, the Court held through
Mr. Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr.:
The method of ascertaining just compensation under the
aforecited decrees constitutes impermissible
encroachment on judicial prerogatives. It tends to render
this Court inutile in a matter which under
_______________
44 149 SCRA 305.
381
VOL. 175, JULY 14, 1989 381

this Constitution is reserved to it for final determination.

Thus, although in an expropriation proceeding the court
technically would still have the power to determine the
just compensation for the property, following the
applicable decrees, its task would be relegated to simply
stating the lower value of the property as declared either
by the owner or the assessor. As a necessary
consequence, it would be useless for the court to appoint
commissioners under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.
Moreover, the need to satisfy the due process clause in
the taking of private property is seemingly fulfilled since
it cannot be said that a judicial proceeding was not had
before the actual taking. However, the strict application
of the decrees during the proceedings would be nothing
short of a mere formality or charade as the court has only
to choose between the valuation of the owner and that of
the assessor, and its choice is always limited to the lower
of the two. The court cannot exercise its discretion or
independence in determining what is just or fair. Even a
grade school pupil could substitute for the judge insofar
as the determination of constitutional just compensation
is concerned.
xxx
In the present petition, we are once again confronted with
the same question of whether the courts under P.D. No.
1533, which contains the same provision on just

compensation as its predecessor decrees, still have the
power and authority to determine just compensation,
independent of what is stated by the decree and to this
effect, to appoint commissioners for such purpose.
This time, we answer in the affirmative.
xxx
It is violative of due process to deny the owner the
opportunity to prove that the valuation in the tax
documents is unfair or wrong. And it is repulsive to the
basic concepts of justice and fairness to allow the
haphazard work of a minor bureaucrat or clerk to
absolutely prevail over the judgment of a court
promulgated only after expert commissioners have
actually viewed the property, after evidence and
arguments pro and con have been presented, and after
all factors and considerations essential to a fair and just
determination have been judiciously evaluated.
A reading of the aforecited Section 16(d) will readily show
that it does not suffer from the arbitrariness that
rendered the challenged decrees constitutionally
objectionable. Although the proceedings are described as
summary, the landowner and
382

other interested parties are nevertheless allowed an

opportunity to submit evidence on the real value of the
property. But more importantly, the determination of the
just compensation by the DAR is not by any means final
and conclusive upon the landowner or any other
interested party, for Section 16(f) clearly provides:
Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the
matter to the court of proper jurisdiction for final
determination of just compensation.
The determination made by the DAR is only preliminary
unless accepted by all parties concerned. Otherwise, the
courts of justice will still have the right to review with
finality the said determination in the exercise of what is
admittedly a judicial function.
The second and more serious objection to the provisions
on just compensation is not as easily resolved.
This refers to Section 18 of the CARP Law providing in full
as follows:
SEC. 18. Valuation and Mode of Compensation.The LBP
shall compensate the landowner in such amount as may
be agreed upon by the landowner and the DAR and the
LBP, in accordance with the criteria provided for in
Sections 16 and 17, and other pertinent provisions
hereof, or as may be finally determined by the court, as

the just compensation for the land.
The compensation shall be paid in one of the following
modes, at the option of the landowner:
(1) Cash payment, under the following terms and
conditions:
(a) For lands above fifty (50) hectares, insofar as the
excess hectarage is concernedTwenty-five percent
(25%) cash, the balance to be paid in government
financial instruments negotiable at any time.
(b) For lands above twenty-four (24) hectares and up to
fifty (50) hectaresThirty percent (30%) cash, the
balance to be paid in government financial instruments
negotiable at any time.
(c) For lands twenty-four (24) hectares and belowThirtyfive percent (35%) cash, the balance to be paid in
government
383
VOL. 175, JULY 14, 1989 383
financial instruments negotiable at any time.
(2) Shares of stock in government-owned or controlled

corporations, LBP preferred shares, physical assets or
other qualified investments in accordance with guidelines
set by the PARC;
(3) Tax credits which can be used against any tax liability;
(4) LBP bonds, which shall have the following features:
(a) Market interest rates aligned with 91-day treasury bill
rates. Ten percent (10%) of the face value of the bonds
shall mature every year from the date of issuance until
the tenth (10th) year: Provided, That should the
landowner choose to forego the cash portion, whether in
full or in part, he shall be paid correspondingly in LBP
bonds;
(b) Transferability and negotiability. Such LBP bonds may
be used by the landowner, his successors-in-interest or
his assigns, up to the amount of their face value, for any
of the following:
(i) Acquisition of land or other real properties of the
government, including assets under the Asset
Privatization Program and other assets foreclosed by
government financial institutions in the same province or
region where the lands for which the bonds were paid are
situated;
(ii) Acquisition of shares of stock of government-owned or
controlled corporations or shares of stock owned by the
government in private corporations;
(iii) Substitution for surety or bail bonds for the

provisional release of accused persons, or for
performance bonds;
(iv) Security for loans with any government financial
institution, provided the proceeds of the loans shall be
invested in an economic enterprise, preferably in a small
and medium-scale industry, in the same province or
region as the land for which the bonds are paid;
(v) Payment for various taxes and fees to government:
Provided, That the use of these bonds for these purposes
will be limited to a certain percentage of the outstanding
balance of the financial instruments; Provided, further,
That the PARC shall determine the percentages
mentioned above;
(vi) Payment for tuition fees of the immediate family of
the original bondholder in government universities,
colleges, trade schools, and other institutions;
384
(vii) Payment for fees of the immediate family of the

original bondholder in goverment hospitals; and
(viii) Such other uses as the PARC may from time to time
allow.
The contention of the petitioners in G.R. No. 79777 is that
the above provision is unconstitutional insofar as it
requires the owners of the expropriated properties to
accept just compensation therefor in less than money,
which is the only medium of payment allowed. In support
of this contention, they cite jurisprudence holding that:
The fundamental rule in expropriation matters is that the
owner of the property expropriated is entitled to a just
compensation, which should be neither more nor less,
whenever it is possible to make the assessment, than the
money equivalent of said property. Just compensation has
always been understood to be the just and complete
equivalent of the loss which the owner of the thing
expropriated has to suffer by reason of the
expropriation.45Manila Railroad Co. v. Velasquez, 32 Phil.
286; Province of Tayabas v. Perez, supra, at note 40.
(Emphasis supplied.)
In J.M. Tuazon Co. v. Land Tenure Administration,4631
SCRA 413. this Court held:
It is well-settled that just compensation means the
equivalent for the value of the property at the time of its
taking. Anything beyond that is more, and anything short
of that is less, than just compensation. It means a fair and
full equivalent for the loss sustained, which is the
measure of the indemnity, not whatever gain would
accrue to the expropriating entity. The market value of
the land taken is the just compensation to which the

owner of condemned property is entitled, the market
value being that sum of money which a person desirous,
but not compelled to buy, and an owner, willing, but not
compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given
and received for such property. (Emphasis supplied.)
_______________
45 Manila Railroad Co. v. Velasquez, 32 Phil. 286; Province
of Tayabas v. Perez, supra, at note 40.
46 31 SCRA 413.
385
VOL. 175, JULY 14, 1989 385
In the United States, where much of our jurisprudence on

the subject has been derived, the weight of authority is
also to the effect that just compensation for property
expropriated is payable only in money and not otherwise.
Thus
The medium of payment of compensation is ready money
or cash. The condemnor cannot compel the owner to
accept anything but money, nor can the owner compel or
require the condemnor to pay him on any other basis
than the value of the property in money at the time and

in the manner prescribed by the Constitution and the
statutes. When the power of eminent domain is resorted
to, there must be a standard medium of payment, binding
upon both parties, and the law has fixed that standard as
money in cash.47Mandl v. City of Phoenix, 18 p 2d 273.
Part cash and deferred payments are not and cannot, in
the nature of things, be regarded as a reliable and
constant standard of compensation.48Sacremento
Southern R. Co. v. Heilbron, 156 Cal. 408, 104 pp. 979,
980.Just compensation for property taken by
condemnation means a fair equivalent in money, which
must be paid at least within a reasonable time after the
taking, and it is not within the power of the Legislature
tosubstitute for such payment future obligations, bonds,
or other valuable advantage.49City of Waterbury v. Platt
Bros. & Co., 56 A 856, 76 Conn, 435 citing Butler v.
Ravine Road Sewer Comrs, 39 N.J.L. 665; Bloodgood v.
Mohawk v. H.R.R. Co., N.Y. 18 Wend. 9 35, 31 Am. Dec.
313; Sanborn v. Helden, 51 Cal 266; Burlington & C.R...
It cannot be denied from these cases that the traditional
medium for the payment of just compensation is money
and no other. And so, conformably, has just compensation
been paid in the past solely in that medium. However, we
do not deal here with the traditional excercise of the
power of eminent domain. This is not an ordinary
expropriation where only a specific property of relatively
limited area is sought to be taken by the State from its

owner for a specific and perhaps local purpose.
_______________
47 Mandl v. City of Phoenix, 18 p 2d 273.
48 Sacremento Southern R. Co. v. Heilbron, 156 Cal. 408,
104 pp. 979, 980.
49 City of Waterbury v. Platt Bros. & Co., 56 A 856, 76
Conn, 435 citing Butler v. Ravine Road Sewer Comrs, 39
N.J.L. 665; Bloodgood v. Mohawk v. H.R.R. Co., N.Y. 18
Wend. 9 35, 31 Am. Dec. 313; Sanborn v. Helden, 51 Cal
266; Burlington & C.R. Co. v. Schweikart, 14 p. 329, 10
Colo, 178; 23 Words and Phrases, pl. 460.
386
What we deal with here is a revolutionary kind of

expropriation.
The expropriation before us affects all private agricultural
lands whenever found and of whatever kind as long as
they are in excess of the maximum retention limits
allowed their owners. This kind of expropriation is
intended for the benefit not only of a particular
community or of a small segment of the population but of

the entire Filipino nation, from all levels of our society,
from the impoverished farmer to the land-glutted owner.
Its purpose does not cover only the whole territory of this
country but goes beyond in time to the foreseeable
future, which it hopes to secure and edify with the vision
and the sacrifice of the present generation of Filipinos.
Generations yet to come are as involved in this program
as we are today, although hopefully only as beneficiaries
of a richer and more fulfilling life we will guarantee to
them tomorrow through our thoughtfulness today. And,
finally, let it not be forgotten that it is no less than the
Constitution itself that has ordained this revolution in the
farms, calling for a just distribution among the farmers
of lands that have heretofore been the prison of their
dreams but can now become the key at least to their
deliverance.
Such a program will involve not mere millions of pesos.
The cost will be tremendous. Considering the vast areas
of land subject to expropriation under the laws before us,
we estimate that hundreds of billions of pesos will be
needed, far more indeed than the amount of P50 billion
initially appropriated, which is already staggering as it is
by our present standards. Such amount is in fact not even
fully available at this time.
We assume that the framers of the Constitution were
aware of this difficulty when they called for agrarian
reform as a top priority project of the government. It is a
part of this assumption that when they envisioned the
expropriation that would be needed, they also intended

that the just compensation would have to be paid not in
the orthodox way but a less conventional if more practical
method. There can be no doubt that they were aware of
the financial limitations of the government and had no
illusions that there would be enough money to pay in
cash and in full for the lands they wanted to be
distributed among the
387
VOL. 175, JULY 14, 1989 387
farmers. We may therefore assume that their intention

was to allow such manner of payment as is now provided
for by the CARP Law, particularly the payment of the
balance (if the owner cannot be paid fully with money), or
indeed of the entire amount of the just compensation,
with other things of value. We may also suppose that
what they had in mind was a similar scheme of payment
as that prescribed in P.D. No. 27, which was the law in
force at the time they deliberated on the new Charter and
with which they presumably agreed in principle.
The Court has not found in the records of the
Constitutional Commission any categorial agreement
among the members regarding the meaning to be given
the concept of just compensation as applied to the

comprehensive agrarian reform program being
contemplated. There was the suggestion to fine tune
the requirement to suit the demands of the project even
as it was also felt that they should leave it to Congress
to determine how payment should be made to the
landowner and reimbursement required from the farmerbeneficiaries. Such innovations as progressive
compensation and State-subsidized compensation
were also proposed. In the end, however, no special
definition of the just compensation for the lands to be
expropriated was reached by the Commission.50Record
of the Cosntitutional Commission, Vol. 2, pp. 647, 704;
Vol. 3, pp. 16-20, 243-247.On the other hand, there is
nohing in the records either that militates against the
assumptions we are making of the general sentiments
and intention of the members on the content and manner
of the payment to be made to the landowner in the light
of the magnitude of the expenditure and the limitations of
the expropriator.
With these assumptions, the Court hereby declares that
the content and manner of the just compensation
provided for in the afore-quoted Section 18 of the CARP
Law is not violative of the constitution. We do not mind
admitting that a certain degree of pragmatism has
influenced our decision on this issue, but after all this
Court is not a cloistered institution removed
_______________
50 Record of the Cosntitutional Commission, Vol. 2, pp.

647, 704; Vol. 3, pp. 16-20, 243-247.
388
from the realities and demands of society or oblivious to

the need for its enhancement. The Court is as acutely
anxious as the rest of our people to see the goal of
agrarian reform achieved at last after the frustrations and
deprivations of our peasant masses during all these
disappointing decades. We are aware that invalidation of
the said section will result in the nullification of the entire
program, killing the farmers hopes even as they
approach realization and resurrecting the spectre of
discontent and dissent in the restless countryside. That is
not in our view the intention of the Constitution, and that
is not what we shall decree today.
Accepting the theory that payment of the just
compensation is not always required to be made fully in
money, we find further that the proportion of cash
payment to the other things of value constituting the
total payment, as determined on the basis of the areas of
the lands expropriated, is not unduly oppressive upon the
landowner. It is noted that the smaller the land, the
bigger the payment in money, primarily because the

small landowner will be needing it more than the big
landowners, who can afford a bigger balance in bonds
and other things of value. No less importantly, the
government financial instruments making up the balance
of the payment are negotiable at any time. The other
modes, which are likewise available to the landowner at
his option, are also not unreasonable because payment is
made in shares of stock, LBP bonds, other properties or
assets, tax credits, and other things of value equivalent
to the amount of just compensation.
Admittedly, the compensation contemplated in the law
will cause the landowners, big and small, not a little
inconvenience. As already remarked, this cannot be
avoided. Nevertheless, it is devoutly hoped that these
countrymen of ours, conscious as we know they are of
the need for their forebearance and even sacrifice, will
not begrudge us their indispensable share in the
attainment of the ideal of agrarian reform. Otherwise, our
pursuit of this elusive goal will be like the quest for the
Holy Grail.
The complaint against the effects of non-registration of
the land under E.O. No. 229 does not seem to be viable
any more as
389
VOL. 175, JULY 14, 1989 389

it appears that Section 4 of the said Order has been

superseded by Section 14 of the CARP Law. This repeats
the requisites of registration as embodied in the earlier
measure but does not provide, as the latter did, that in
case of failure or refusal to register the land, the
valuation thereof shall be that given by the provincial or
city assessor for tax purposes. On the contrary, the CARP
Law says that the just compensation shall be ascertained
on the basis of the factors mentioned in its Section 17
and in the manner provided for in Section 16.
The last major challenge to CARP is that the landowner is
divested of his property even before actual payment to
him in full of just compensation, in contravention of a
well-accepted principle of eminent domain.
The recognized rule, indeed, is that title to the property
expropriated shall pass from the owner to the
expropriator only upon full payment of the just
compensation. Jurisprudence on this settled principle is
consistent both here and in other democratic
jurisdictions. Thus:
Title to property which is the subject of condemnation
proceedings does not vest the condemnor until the
judgment fixing just compensation is entered and paid,
but the condemnors title relates back to the date on
which the petition under the Eminent Domain Act, or the
commissioners report under the Local Improvement Act,

is filed.51Chicago Park Dist. v. Downey Coal Co., 1 Ill. 2d
54.x x x although the right to appropriate and use land
taken for a canal is complete at the time of entry, title to
the property taken remains in the owner until payment is
actually made.52Kennedy v. Indianapolis, 103 US 599, 26
L ed 550. (Emphasis supplied.)
In Kennedy v. Indianapolis,53Ibid. the US Supreme Court
cited several cases holding that title to property does not
pass to the condemnor until just compensation had
actually been made. In fact, the decisions appear to be
uniformly to this effect. As early
_______________
51 Chicago Park Dist. v. Downey Coal Co., 1 Ill. 2d 54.
52 Kennedy v. Indianapolis, 103 US 599, 26 L ed 550.
53 Ibid.
390
as 1838, in Rubottom v. McLure,544 Blkf., 508. it was held

that actual payment to the owner of the condemned
property was a condition precedent to the investment of
the title to the property in the State albeit not to the

appropriation of it to public use. In Rexford v.
Knight,5511 NY 314. the Court of Appeals of New York
said that the construction upon the statutes was that the
fee did not vest in the State until the payment of the
compensation although the authority to enter upon and
appropriate the land was complete prior to the payment.
Kennedy further said that both on principle and authority
the rule is x x x that the right to enter on and use the
property is complete, as soon as the property is actually
appropriated under the authority of law for a public use,
but that the title does not pass from the owner without
his consent, until just compensation has been made to
him.
Our own Supreme Court has held in Visayan Refining Co.
v. Camus and Paredes,5640 Phil. 550. that:
If the laws which we have exhibited or cited in the
preceding discussion are attentively examined it will be
apparent that the method of expropriation adopted in this
jurisdiction is such as to afford absolute reassurance that
no piece of land can be finally and irrevocably taken from
an unwilling owner until compensation is paid x x x.
It is true that P.D. No. 27 expressly ordered the
emancipation of tenant-farmer as October 21, 1972 and
declared that he shall be deemed the owner of a
portion of land consisting of a family-sized farm except
that no title to the land owned by him was to be actually
issued to him unless and until he had become a full-
fledged member of a duly recognized farmers

cooperative. It was understood, however, that full
payment of the just compensation also had to be made
first, conformably to the constitutional requirement.
When E.O. No. 228, categorically stated in its Section 1
that:
_______________
54 4 Blkf., 508.
55 11 NY 314.
56 40 Phil. 550.
391
VOL. 175, JULY 14, 1989 391
All qualified farmer-beneficiaries are now deemed full

owners as of October 21, 1972 of the land they acquired
by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 27. (Emphasis
supplied.)
it was obviously referring to lands already validly
acquired under the said decree, after proof of full-fledged
membership in the farmers cooperatives and full
payment of just compensation. Hence, it was also
perfectly proper for the Order to also provide in its

Section 2 that the lease rentals paid to the landowner by
the farmer-beneficiary after October 21, 1972 (pending
transfer of ownership after full payment of just
compensation), shall be considered as advance payment
for the land.
The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of
possession and ownership of the land to the government
on receipt by the landowner of the corresponding
payment or the deposit by the DAR of the compensation
in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then,
title also remains with the land-owner.57Sec. 16(d). No
outright change of ownership is contemplated either.
Hence, the argument that the assailed measures violate
due process by arbitrarily transferring title before the
land is fully paid for must also be rejected.
It is worth stressing at this point that all rights acquired
by the tenant-farmer under P.D. No. 27, as recognized
under E.O. No. 228, are retained by him even now under
R.A. No. 6657. This should counterbalance the express
provision in Section 6 of the said law that the
In connection with these retained rights, it does not

appear in G.R. No. 78742 that the appeal filed by the
petitioners with the
________________
57 Sec. 16(d).
392
Office of the President has already been resolved.

Although we have said that the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies need not preclude immediate
resort to judicial action, there are factual issues that have
yet to be examined on the administrative level, especially
the claim that the petitioners are not covered by LOI 474
because they do not own other agricultural lands than the
subjects of their petition.
Obviously, the Court cannot resolve these issues. In any
event, assuming that the petitioners have not yet
exercised their retention rights, if any, under P.D. No. 27,
the Court holds that they are entitled to the new retention
rights provided for by R.A. No. 6657, which in fact are on
the whole more liberal than those granted by the decree.
V
The CARP Law and the other enactments also involved in
these cases have been the subject of bitter attack from
those who point to the shortcomings of these measures
and ask that they be scrapped entirely. To be sure, these
enactments are less than perfect; indeed, they should be
continuously re-examined and rehoned, that they may be
sharper instruments for the better protection of the
farmers rights. But we have to start somewhere. In the
pursuit of agrarian reform, we do not tread on familiar
ground but grope on terrain fraught with pitfalls and
expected difficulties. This is inevitable. The CARP Law is
not a tried and tested project. On the contrary, to use
Justice Holmess words, it is an experiment, as all life is
an experiment, and so we learn as we venture forward,
and, if necessary, by our own mistakes. We cannot expect
perfection although we should strive for it by all means.
Meantime, we struggle as best we can in freeing the
farmer from the iron shackles that have unconscionably,
and for so long, fettered his soul to the soil.
By the decision we reach today, all major legal obstacles
to the comprehensive agrarian reform program are
removed, to clear the way for the true freedom of the
farmer. We may now glimpse the day he will be released
not only from want but also from the exploitation and
disdain of the past and from his own
393
VOL. 175, JULY 14, 1989 393

feelings of inadequacy and helplessness. At last his

servitude will be ended forever. At last the farm on which
he toils will be his farm. It will be his portion of the Mother
Earth that will give him not only the staff of life but also
the joy of living. And where once it bred for him only deep
despair, now can he see in it the fruition of his hopes for a
more fulfilling future. Now at last can he banish from his
small plot of earth his insecurities and dark resentments
and rebuild in it the music and the dream.
WHEREFORE, the Court holds as follows:
1. R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O. Nos.
228 and 229 are SUSTAINED against all the constitutional
objections raised in the herein petitions.
2. Title to all expropriated properties shall be transferred
to the State only upon full payment of compensation to
their respective owners.
3. All rights previously acquired by the tenant-farmers
under P.D. No. 27 are retained and recognized.
4. Landowners who were unable to exercise their rights of
retention under P.D. No. 27 shall enjoy the retention
rights granted by R.A. No. 6657 under the conditions
therein prescribed.
5. Subject to the above-mentioned rulings, all the

petitions are DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez,
Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento,
Corts, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Petitions dismissed.
Notes.Action for recognition as a lessee and to fix
rentals not similar to action to determine if lessee had not
been given his full share of harvest (Calderon vs. de la
Cruz, 138 SCRA 173).
Denial of referral of case to the Ministry of Agrarian
Reform is in violation of the express mandate of P.D. No.
316. (Erfe vs. Fortun, 136 SCRA 552). [Association of
Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of
Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343(1989)]

Basco vs. Phil. Amusements and Gaming Corporation
6
ATTORNEYS HUMBERTO BASCO, EDILBERTO BALCE,
SOCRATES MARANAN AND LORENZO SANCHEZ,
petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENTS AND GAMING
CORPORATION (PAGCOR), respondent.
Constitutional Law; Taxation; Municipal Corporations;
Municipal corporations have no inherent power to tax;
their power to tax must always yield to a legislative act.
The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation
has no inherent right to impose taxes (Icard v. City of
Baguio, 83 Phil. 870; City of Iloilo v. Villanueva, 105 Phil.
337; Santos v. Municipality of Caloocan, 7 SCRA 643).
Thus, the Charter or statute must plainly show an intent
to confer that power or the municipality cannot assume
it (Medina v. City of Baguio, 12 SCRA 62). Its power to
tax therefore must always yield to a legislative act which
is superior having been passed upon by the state itself
which has the inherent power to tax (Bernas, the
Revised [1973] Philippine Constitution, Vol. 1, 1983 ed. p.
445).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Congress has the power of
control over local governments; if Congress can grant a
municipal corporation the power to tax certain matters, it
can also provide for exemptions or even take back the

power.The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to
control by Congress. It should be stressed that municipal
corporations are mere creatures of Congress (Unson v.
Lacson, G.R. No. 7909, January 18, 1957) which has the
power to create and abolish municipal corporations due
to its general legislative powers (Asuncion v. Yriantes,
28 Phil. 67; Merdanillo v. Orandia, 5 SCRA 541). Congress,
therefore, has the power of control over local
governments (Hebron v. Reyes, G.R. No. 9124, July 2,
1950). And if Congress can grant the City of Manila the
power to tax certain matters, it can also provide for
exemptions or even take back the power.
Same; Same; Same; License Fees; The power of local
governments to regulate gambling thru the grant of
franchises, licenses or permits was withdrawn by PD 771,
it is now vested exclusively on the National Government.
The City of Manilas power to impose license fees on
gambling, has long been revoked. As early as 1975, the
power of local
________________
* EN BANC.
53
VOL. 197, MAY 14, 1991 53
governments to regulate gambling thru the grant of

franchise, licenses or permits was withdrawn by P.D. No.
771 and was vested exclusively on the National
Government. xxx xxx Therefore, only the National
Government has the power to issue licenses or permits
for the operation of gambling. Necessarily, the power to
demand or collect license fees which is a consequence of
the issuance of licenses or permits is no longer vested
in the City of Manila.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Local governments have no
power to tax instrumentalities of the National
Government; PAGCOR, being an instrumentality of the
Government, is therefore exempt from local taxes.Local
governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of
the National Government. PAGCOR is a government
owned or controlled corporation with an original charter,
PD 1869. All of its shares of stocks are owned by the
National Government. xxx xxx PAGCOR has a dual role, to
operate and to regulate gambling casinos. The latter role
is governmental, which places it in the category of an
agency or instrumentality of the Government. Being an
instrumentality of the Government, PAGCOR should be
and actually is exempt from local taxes. Otherwise, its
operation might be burdened, impeded or subjected to
control by a mere Local government. The states have no
power by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden
or in any manner control the operation of constitutional
laws enacted by Congress to carry into execution the
powers vested in the federal government. (MC Culloch v.
Maryland, 4 Wheat 316, 4 L Ed. 579) This doctrine

emanates from the supremacy of the National
Government over local governments. Justice Holmes,
speaking for the Supreme Court, made reference to the
entire absence of power on the part of the States to
touch, in that way (taxation) at least, the
instrumentalities of the United States (Johnson v.
Maryland, 254 US 51) and it can be agreed that no state
or political subdivision can regulate a federal
instrumentality in such a way as to prevent it from
consummating its federal responsibilities, or even to
seriously burden it in the accomplishment of them.
(Antieau, Modern Constitutional Law, Vol. 2, p. 140, italics
supplied). Otherwise, mere creatures of the State can
defeat National policies thru extermination of what local
authorities may perceive to be undesirable activities or
enterprise using the power to tax as a tool for
regulation (U.S. v. Sanchez, 340 US 42). The power to
tax which was called by Justice Marshall as the power to
destroy (Mc Culloch v. Maryland, supra) cannot be
allowed to defeat an instrumentality or creation of the
very entity which has the inherent power to wield it.
54
Same; Same; Same; Same; The power of local

government to impose taxes and fees is always subject to
limitations which Congress may provide by law.The

power of local government to impose taxes and fees is
always subject to limitations which Congress may
provide by law. Since PD 1869 remains an operative law
until amended, repealed or revoked (Sec. 3, Art. XVIII,
1987 Constitution), its exemption clause remains as an
exception to the exercise of the power of local
governments to impose taxes and fees. It cannot
therefore be violative but rather is consistent with the
principle of local autonomy.
Same; Same; Same; Local Autonomy; The principle of
local autonomy does not make local governments
sovereign within the state, it simply means
decentralization.Besides, the principle of local
autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means
decentralization (III Records of the 1987 Constitutional
Commission, pp. 435-436, as cited in Bernas, the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Vol. II, First
Ed., 1988, p. 374). It does not make local governments
sovereign within the state or an imperium in imperio.
Local Government has been described as a political
subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by
law and has substantial control of local affairs. In a
unitary system of government, such as the government
under the Philippine Constitution, local governments can
only be an intra sovereign subdivision of one sovereign
nation, it cannot be an imperium in imperio. Local
government in such a system can only mean a measure
of decentralization of the function of government. (italics

supplied)
Same; Equal Protection Clause; The equal protection
clause does not preclude classification of individuals who
may be accorded different treatment under the law as
long as the classification is not unreasonable or arbitrary.
Petitioners next contend that P.D. 1869 violates the
equal protection clause of the Constitution, because it
legalized PAGCORconducted gambling, while most
gambling are outlawed together with prostitution, drug
trafficking and other vices (p. 82, Rollo). We, likewise,
find no valid ground to sustain this contention. The
petitioners posture ignores the well-accepted meaning of
the clause equal protection of the laws. The clause does
not preclude classification of individuals who may be
accorded different treatment under the law as long as the
classification is not unreasonable or arbitrary (Itchong v.
Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155). A law does not have to
operate in equal force on all persons or things to be
conformable to Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution
(DECS v. San Diego, G.R. No. 89572, December 21, 1989).
The equal protection
55
VOL. 197, MAY 14, 1991 55
clause does not prohibit the Legislature from

establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which
different rules shall operate (Laurel v. Misa, 43 O.G.
2847). The Constitution does not require situations which
are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as
though they were the same (Gomez v. Palomar, 25 SCRA
827). Just how P.D. 1869 in legalizing gambling conducted
by PAGCOR is violative of the equal protection is not
clearly explained in the petition. The mere fact that some
gambling activities like cockfighting (P.D. 449) horse
racing (R.A. 306 as amended by RA 983), sweepstakes,
lotteries and races (RA 1169 as amended by B.P. 42) are
legalized under certain conditions, while others are
prohibited, does not render the applicable laws, P.D. 1869
for one, unconstitutional. If the law presumably hits the
evil where it is most felt, it is not to be overthrown
because there are other instances to which it might have
been applied. (Gomez v. Palomar, 25 SCRA 827) The
equal protection clause of the 14 th Amendment does not
mean that all occupations called by the same name must
be treated the same way; the state may do what it can to
prevent which is deemed as evil and stop short of those
cases in which harm to the few concerned is not less than
the harm to the public that would insure if the rule laid
down were made mathematically exact. (Dominican
Hotel v. Arizana, 249 U.S. 2651).
Same; Statutes; Every law has in its favor the
presumption of constitutionality, for a law to be nullified,
it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution.Every law has in its favor the

presumption of constitutionality (Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad,
47 Phil. 387; Salas v. Jarencio, 48 SCRA 734; Peralta v.
Comelec, 82 SCRA 30; Abbas v. Comelec, 179 SCRA 287).
Therefore, for PD 1869 to be nullified, it must be shown
that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, not merely a doubtful and equivocal one. In
other words, the grounds for nullity must be clear and
beyond reasonable doubt. (Peralta v. Comelec, supra)
Those who petition this Court to declare a law, or parts
thereof, unconstitutional must clearly establish the basis
for such a declaration. Otherwise, their petition must fail.
Based on the grounds raised by petitioners to challenge
the constitutionality of P.D. 1869, the Court finds that
petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption. The
dismissal of this petition is therefore, inevitable. But as to
whether P.D. 1869 remains a wise legislation considering
the issues of morality, monopoly, trend to free
enterprise, privatization as well as the state principles on
social justice, role of youth and educational values being
raised, is up for Congress to determine.
56
PADILLA, J., Concurring
Constitutional Law; Legislative Department; The

legislative department must outlaw all forms of gambling,
as a fundamental policy.Gambling is reprehensible
whether maintained by government or privatized. The
revenues realized by the government out of legalized
gambling will, in the long run, be more than offset and
negated by the irreparable damage to the peoples moral
values. Also, the moral standing of the government in its
repeated avowals against illegal gambling is fatally
flawed and becomes untenable when it itself engages in
the very activity it seeks to eradicate. One can go
through the Courts decision today and mentally replace
the activity referred to therein as gambling, which is legal
only because it is authorized by law and run by the
government, with the activity known as prostitution.
Would prostitution be any less reprehensible were it to be
authorized by law, franchised, and regulated by the
government, in return for the substantial revenues it
would yield the government to carry out its laudable
projects, such as infrastructure and social amelioration?
The question, I believe, answers itself. I submit that the
sooner the legislative department outlaws all forms of
gambling, as a fundamental state policy, and the sooner
the executive implements such policy, the better it will be
for the nation.
H.B. Basco & Associates for petitioners.
Valmonte Law Offices collaborating counsel for
petitioners.
Aguirre, Laborte and Capule for respondent PAGCOR.
PARAS, J.:
A TV ad proudly announces:
The new PAGCORresponding through responsible
gaming.
But the petitioners think otherwise, that is why, they filed
the instant petition seeking to annul the Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) Charter
PD 1869, because it is allegedly contrary to morals, public
policy and order, and because
A. It constitutes a waiver of a right prejudicial to a third
person with a right recognized by law. It waived the
Manila City governments right to impose taxes and
license fees, which is recognized by law;
57
VOL. 197, MAY 14, 1991 57
B. For the same reason stated in the immediately

preceding paragraph, the law has intruded into the local
governments right to impose local taxes and license
fees. This, in contravention of the constitutionally
enshrined principle of local autonomy;
C. It violates the equal protection clause of the
constitution in that it legalizes PAGCORconducted
gambling, while most other forms of gambling are

outlawed, together with prostitution, drug trafficking and
other vices;
C. It violates the avowed trend of the Cory government
away from monopolistic and crony economy, and toward
free enterprise and privatization. (p. 2, Amended
Petition; p. 7, Rollo)
In their Second Amended Petition, petitioners also claim
that PD 1869 is contrary to the declared national policy of
the new restored democracy and the peoples will as
expressed in the 1987 Constitution. The decree is said to
have a gambling objective and therefore is contrary to
Sections 11, 12 and 13 of Article II, Sec. 1 of Article VIII
and Section 3 (2) of Article XIV, of the present
Constitution (p. 3, Second Amended Petition; p. 21, Rollo).
The procedural issue is whether petitioners, as taxpayers
and practicing lawyers (petitioner Basco being also the
Chairman of the Committee on Laws of the City Council of
Manila), can question and seek the annulment of PD 1869
on the alleged grounds mentioned above.
The Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation
(PAGCOR) was created by virtue of P.D. 1067-A dated
January 1, 1977 and was granted a franchise under P.D
1067-B also dated January 1, 1977 to establish, operate
and maintain gambling casinos on land or water within
the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines. Its operation
was originally conducted in the well known floating casino
Philippine Tourist. The operation was considered a
success for it proved to be a potential source of revenue

to fund infrastructure and socioeconomic projects, thus,
P.D. 1399 was passed on June 2, 1978 for PAGCOR to fully
attain this objective.
Subsequently, on July 11, 1983, PAGCOR was created
under P.D. 1869 to enable the Government to regulate
and centralize all games of chance authorized by existing
franchise or permitted by law, under the following
declared policy
58
Section 1 . Declaration of Policy.It is hereby declared to

be the policy of the State to centralize and integrate all
games of chance not heretofore authorized by existing
franchises or permitted by law in order to attain the
following objectives:
(a) To centralize and integrate the right and authority to
operate and conduct games of chance into one corporate
entity to be controlled, administered and supervised by
the Government.
(b) To establish and operate clubs and casinos, for
amusement and recreation, including sports gaming
pools, (basketball, football, lotteries, etc.) and such other
forms of amusement and recreation including games of

chance, which may be allowed by law within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Philippines and which will: (1) generate
sources of additional revenue to fund infrastructure and
socio-civic projects, such as flood control programs,
beautification, sewerage and sewage projects, Tulungan
ng Bayan Centers, Nutritional Programs, Population
Control and such other essential public services; (2)
create recreation and integrated facilities which will
expand and improve the countrys existing tourist
attractions; and (3) minimize, if not totally eradicate, all
the evils, malpractices and corruptions that are normally
prevalent on the conduct and operation of gambling clubs
and casinos without direct government involvement.
(Section 1, P.D. 1869)
To attain these objectives PAGCOR is given territorial
jurisdiction all over the Philippines. Under its Charters
repealing clause, all laws, decrees, executive orders, rules
and regulations, inconsistent therewith, are accordingly
repealed, amended or modified.
It is reported that PAGCOR is the third largest source of
government revenue, next to the Bureau of Internal
Revenue and the Bureau of Customs. In 1989 alone,
PAGCOR earned P3.43 Billion, and directly remitted to the
National Government a total of P2.5 Billion in form of
franchise tax, governments income share, the
Presidents Social Fund and Host Cities share. In addition,
PAGCOR sponsored other sociocultural and charitable
projects on its own or in cooperation with various
governmental agencies, and other private associations

and organizations. In its 3 1/2 years of operation under
the present administration, PAGCOR remitted to the
government a total of P6.2 Billion. As of December 31,
1989, PAGCOR was employing 4,494 employees in its
nine (9) casinos nationwide, directly supporting the
livelihood of Four Thousand Four Hun-
59
VOL. 197, MAY 14, 1991 59
dred Ninety-Four (4,494) families.

But the petitioners, are questioning the validity of P.D No.
1869. They allege that the same is null and void for
being contrary to morals, public policy and public order,
monopolistic and tends toward crony economy, and is
violative of the equal protection clause and local
autonomy as well as for running counter to the state
policies enunciated in Sections 11 (Personal Dignity and
Human Rights), 12 (Family) and 13 (Role of Youth) of
Article II, Section 1 (Social Justice) of Article XIII and
Section 2 (Educational Values) of Article XIV of the 1987
Constitution.
This challenge to P.D. No. 1869 deserves a searching and
thorough scrutiny and the most deliberate consideration
by the Court, involving as it does the exercise of what has

been described as the highest and most delicate
function which belongs to the judicial department of the
government. (State v. Manuel, 20 N.C. 144; Lozano v.
Martinez, 146 SCRA 323).
As We enter upon the task of passing on the validity of an
act of a co-equal and coordinate branch of the
government We need not be reminded of the timehonored principle, deeply ingrained in our jurisprudence,
that a statute is presumed to be valid. Every presumption
must be indulged in favor of its constitutionality. This is
not to say that We approach Our task with diffidence or
timidity. Where it is clear that the legislature or the
executive for that matter, has over-stepped the limits of
its authority under the constitution, We should not
hesitate to wield the axe and let it fall heavily, as fall it
must, on the offending statute (Lozano v. Martinez,
supra).
In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, et al, 59
SCRA 54, the Court thru Mr. Justice Zaldivar underscored
the
x x x thoroughly established principle which must be
followed in all cases where questions of constitutionality
as obtain in the instant cases are involved. All
presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality;
one who attacks a statute alleging unconstitutionality
must prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt; that
a law may work hardship does not render it
unconstitutional; that if any reasonable basis may be
conceived which supports the statute, it will be upheld

and the challenger must negate all possible basis; that
the courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice,
policy or expediency of a statute and that a liberal
interpretation of the constitution in favor of
60
the constitutionality of legislation should be adopted.

(Danner v. Hass, 194 N.W. 2nd 534, 539; Spurbeck v.
Statton, 106 N.W. 2 nd 660, 663; 59 SCRA 66; see also
e.g. Salas v. Jarencio, 46 SCRA 734, 739 [1970]; Peralta v.
Commission on Elections, 82 SCRA 30, 55 [1978]; and
Heirs of Ordona v. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220, 241-242 [1983]
cited in Citizens Alliance for Consumer Protection v.
Energy Regulatory Board, 162 SCRA 521, 540)
Of course, there is first, the procedural issue. The
respondents are questioning the legal personality of
petitioners to file the instant petition.
Considering however the importance to the public of the
case at bar, and in keeping with the Courts duty, under
the 1987 Constitution, to determine whether or not the
other branches of government have kept themselves
within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that
they have not abused the discretion given to them, the

Court has brushed aside technicalities of procedure and
has taken cognizance of this petition. (Kapatiran ng mga
Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas Inc. v. Tan, 163
SCRA 371)
With particular regard to the requirement of proper party
as applied in the cases before us, We hold that the same
is satisfied by the petitioners and intervenors because
each of them has sustained or is in danger of sustaining
an immediate injury as a result of the acts or measures
complained of. And even if, strictly speaking they are not
covered by the definition, it is still within the wide
discretion of the Court to waive the requirement and so
remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving
the serious constitutional questions raised.
In the first Emergency Powers Cases, ordinary citizens
and taxpayers were allowed to question the
constitutionality of several executive orders issued by
President Quirino although they were involving only an
indirect and general interest shared in common with the
public. The Court dismissed the objection that they were
not proper parties and ruled that the transcendental
importance to the public of these cases demands that
they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if
we must technicalities of procedure. We have since then
applied the exception in many other cases. (Association
of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Sec. of
Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343).
61
VOL. 197, MAY 14, 1991 61
Having disposed of the procedural issue, We will now

discuss the substantive issues raised.
Gambling in all its forms, unless allowed by law, is
generally prohibited. But the prohibition of gambling does
not mean that the Government cannot regulate it in the
exercise of its police power.
The concept of police power is well-established in this
jurisdiction. It has been defined as the state authority to
enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty
or property in order to promote the general welfare. (Edu
v. Ericta, 35 SCRA 481, 487) As defined, it consists of (1)
an imposition or restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in
order to foster the common good. It is not capable of an
exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general
terms to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace.
(Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon,
163 SCRA 386).
Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the
times, even to anticipate the future where it could be
done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible
response to conditions and circumstances thus assuming
the greatest benefits. (Edu v. Ericta, supra)
It finds no specific Constitutional grant for the plain

reason that it does not owe its origin to the charter. Along
with the taxing power and eminent domain, it is inborn in
the very fact of statehood and sovereignty. It is a
fundamental attribute of government that has enabled it
to perform the most vital functions of governance.
Marshall, to whom the expression has been credited,
refers to it succinctly as the plenary power of the state
to govern its citizens. (Tribe, American Constitutional
Law, 323, 1978). The police power of the State is a power
coextensive with self-protection and is most aptly termed
the law of overwhelming necessity. (Rubi v. Provincial
Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660, 708) It is the most
essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers. (Smith Bell
& Co. v. National, 40 Phil. 136) It is a dynamic force that
enables the state to meet the exigencies of the winds of
change.
What was the reason behind the enactment of P.D. 1869?
P.D. 1869 was enacted pursuant to the policy of the
government to regulate and centralize thru an
appropriate institution all games of chance authorized by
existing franchise or
62
permitted by law (1st whereas clause, PD 1869). As was

subsequently proved, regulating and centralizing
gambling operations in one corporate entitythe
PAGCOR, was beneficial not just to the Government but to
society in general. It is a reliable source of much needed
revenue for the cash strapped Government. It provided
funds for social impact projects and subjected gambling
to close scrutiny, regulation, supervision and control of
the Government (4th Whereas Clause, PD 1869). With
the creation of PAGCOR and the direct intervention of the
Government, the evil practices and corruptions that go
with gambling will be minimized if not totally eradicated.
Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment
of PD 1896.
Petitioners contend that P.D. 1869 constitutes a waiver of
the right of the City of Manila to impose taxes and legal
fees; that the exemption clause in P.D. 1869 is violative of
the principle of local autonomy. They must be referring to
Section 13 par. (2) of P.D. 1869 which exempts PAGCOR,
as the franchise holder from paying any tax of any kind
or form, income or otherwise, as well as fees, charges or
levies of whatever nature, whether National or Local.
(2) Income and other taxes.(a) Franchise Holder: No
tax of any kind or form, income or otherwise as well as
fees, charges or levies of whatever nature, whether
National or Local, shall be assessed and collected under
this franchise from the Corporation; nor shall any form of
tax or charge attach in any way to the earnings of the
Corporation, except a franchise tax of five (5%) percent of
the gross revenues or earnings derived by the

Corporation from its operations under this franchise. Such
tax shall be due and payable quarterly to the National
Government and shall be in lieu of all kinds of taxes,
levies, fees or assessments of any kind, nature or
description, levied, established or collected by any
municipal, provincial or national government authority
(Section 13 [2]).
Their contention stated hereinabove is without merit for
the following reasons:
(a) The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation
has no inherent right to impose taxes (Icard v. City of
Baguio, 83 Phil. 870; City of Iloilo v. Villanueva, 105 Phil.
337; Santos v. Municipality of Caloocan, 7 SCRA 643).
Thus, the Charter or statute must plainly show an intent
to confer that power or the
63
VOL. 197, MAY 14, 1991 63
municipality cannot assume it (Medina v. City of Baguio,

12 SCRA 62). Its power to tax therefore must always
yield to a legislative act which is superior having been
passed upon by the state itself which has the inherent
power to tax (Bernas, the Revised [1973] Philippine

Constitution, Vol. 1, 1983 ed. p. 445).
(b) The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control
by Congress. It should be stressed that municipal
corporations are mere creatures of Congress (Unson v.
Lacson, G.R. No. 7909, January 18, 1957) which has the
power to create and abolish municipal corporations due
to its general legislative powers (Asuncion v. Yriantes,
28 Phil. 67; Merdanillo v. Orandia, 5 SCRA 541). Congress,
therefore, has the power of control over Local
governments (Hebron v. Reyes, G.R. No. 9124, July 2,
1950). And if Congress can grant the City of Manila the
power to tax certain matters, it can also provide for
exemptions or even take back the power.
(c) The City of Manilas power to impose license fees on
gambling, has long been revoked. As early as 1975, the
power of local governments to regulate gambling thru the
grant of franchise, licenses or permits was withdrawn
by P.D. No. 771 and was vested exclusively on the
National Government, thus:
Section 1. Any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, the authority of chartered cities and
other local governments to issue license, permit or other
form of franchise to operate, maintain and establish horse
and dog race tracks, jai-alai and other forms of gambling
is hereby revoked.
Section 2. Hereafter, all permits or franchises to operate,
maintain and establish, horse and dog race tracks, jai-alai
and other forms of gambling shall be issued by the

national government upon proper application and
verification of the qualification of the applicant x x x.
Therefore, only the National Government has the power
to issue licenses or permits for the operation of
gambling. Necessarily, the power to demand or collect
license fees which is a consequence of the issuance of
licenses or permits is no longer vested in the City of
Manila.
(d) Local governments have no power to tax
instrumentalities of the National Government. PAGCOR is
a government owned or controlled corporation with an
original charter, PD 1869. All of its shares of stocks are
owned by the National
64
Government. In addition to its corporate powers (Sec. 3,

Title II,PD 1869) it also exercises regulatory powers, thus:
Sec. 9. Regulatory Power.The Corporation shall
maintain a Registry of the affiliated entities, and shall
exercise all the powers, authority and the responsibilities
vested in the Securities and Exchange Commission over
such affiliating entities mentioned under the preceding
section, including, but not limited to amendments of

Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws, changes in
corporate term, structure, capitalization and other
matters concerning the operation of the affiliated entities,
the provisions of the Corporation Code of the Philippines
to the contrary notwithstanding, except only with respect
to original incorporation.
PAGCOR has a dual role, to operate and to regulate
gambling casinos. The latter role is governmental, which
places it in the category of an agency or instrumentality
of the Government. Being an instrumentality of the
Government, PAGCOR should be and actually is exempt
from local taxes. Otherwise, its operation might be
burdened, impeded or subjected to control by a mere
Local government.
The states have no power by taxation or otherwise, to
retard, impede, burden or in any manner control the
operation of constitutional laws enacted by Congress to
carry into execution the powers vested in the federal
government. (MC Culloch v. Marland, 4 Wheat 316, 4 L
Ed. 579)
This doctrine emanates from the supremacy of the
National Government over local governments.
Justice Holmes, speaking for the Supreme Court, made
reference to the entire absence of power on the part of
the States to touch, in that way (taxation) at least, the
instrumentalities of the United States (Johnson v.
Maryland, 254 US 51) and it can be agreed that no state
or political subdivision can regulate a federal

instrumentality in such a way as to prevent it from
consummating its federal responsibilities, or even to
seriously burden it in the accmplishment of them.
(Antieau, Modern Constitutional Law, Vol. 2, p. 140, italics
supplied)
Otherwise, mere creatures of the State can defeat
National policies thru extermination of what local
authorities may per-
65
VOL. 197, MAY 14, 1991 65
ceive to be undesirable activities or enterprise using the

power to tax as a tool for regulation (U.S. v. Sanchez,
340 US 42). The power to tax which was called by Justice
Marshall as the power to destroy (Mc Culloch v.
Maryland, supra) cannot be allowed to defeat an
instrumentality or creation of the very entity which has
the inherent power to wield it.
(e) Petitioners also argue that the Local Autonomy Clause
of the Constitution will be violated by P.D. 1869. This is a
pointless argument. Article X of the 1987 Constitution (on
Local Autonomy) provides:
Sec. 5. Each local government unit shall have the power

to create its own source of revenue and to levy taxes,
fees, and other charges subject to such guidelines and
limitation as the congress may provide, consistent with
the basic policy on local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and
charges shall accrue exclusively to the local
government. (italics supplied)
The power of local government to impose taxes and
fees is always subject to limitations which Congress
may provide by law. Since PD 1869 remains an
operative law until amended, repealed or revoked
(Sec. 3, Art. XVIII, 1987 Constitution), its exemption
clause remains as an exception to the exercise of the
power of local governments to impose taxes and fees. It
cannot therefore be violative but rather is consistent with
the principle of local autonomy.
Besides, the principle of local autonomy under the 1987
Constitution simply means decentralization (III Records
of the 1987 Constitutional Commission, pp. 435-436, as
cited in Bernas, The Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines, Vol. II, First Ed., 1988, p. 374). It does not
make local governments sovereign within the state or an
imperium in imperio.
Local Government has been described as a political
subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by
law and has substantial control of local affairs. In a
unitary system of government, such as the government
under the Philippine Constitution, local governments can
only be an intra sovereign subdivision of one sovereign
nation, it cannot be an imperium in imperio . Local

government in such a system can only mean a measure
of decentralization of the function of government. (italics
supplied)
66
As to what state powers should be decentralized and

what may be delegated to local government units
remains a matter of policy, which concerns wisdom. It is
therefore a political question. (Citizens Alliance for
Consumer Protection v. Energy Regulatory Board, 162
SCRA 539).
What is settled is that the matter of regulating, taxing or
otherwise dealing with gambling is a State concern and
hence, it is the sole prerogative of the State to retain it or
delegate it to local governments.
As gambling is usually an offense against the State,
legislative grant or express charter power is generally
necessary to empower the local corporation to deal with
the subject. x x x In the absence of express grant of
power to enact, ordinance provisions on this subject
which are inconsistent with the state laws are void.
(Ligan v. Gadsden, Ala App. 107 So. 733 Ex-Parte
Solomon, 9, Cals. 440, 27 PAC 757 following in re Ah You,

88 Cal. 99, 25 PAC 974, 22 Am St. Rep. 280, 11 LRA 480,
as cited in Mc Quinllan Vol. 3 ibid, p. 548, italics supplied)
Petitioners next contend that P.D. 1869 violates the equal
protection clause of the Constitution, because it
legalized PAGCORconducted gambling, while most
gambling are outlawed together with prostitution, drug
trafficking and other vices (p. 82, Rollo).
We, likewise, find no valid ground to sustain this
contention. The petitioners posture ignores the wellaccepted meaning of the clause equal protection of the
laws. The clause does not preclude classification of
individuals who may be accorded different treatment
under the law as long as the classification is not
unreasonable or arbitrary (Itchong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil.
1155). A law does not have to operate in equal force on
all persons or things to be conformable to Article III,
Section 1 of the Constitution (DECS v. San Diego, G.R. No.
89572, December 21, 1989).
The equal protection clause does not prohibit the
Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or
objects upon which different rules shall operate (Laurel v.
Misa, 43 O.G. 2847). The Constitution does not require
situations which are different in fact or opinion to be
treated in law as though they were the same (Gomez v.
Palomar, 25 SCRA 827).
Just how P.D. 1869 in legalizing gambling conducted by
67
VOL. 197, MAY 14, 1991 67
PAGCOR is violative of the equal protection is not clearly

explained in the petition. The mere fact that some
gambling activities like cockfighting (P.D 449) horse
racing (R.A. 306 as amended by RA 983), sweepstakes,
lotteries and races (RA 1169 as amended by B.P. 42) are
legalized under certain conditions, while others are
prohibited, does not render the applicable laws, P.D. 1869
for one, unconstitutional.
If the law presumably hits the evil where it is most felt, it
is not to be overthrown because there are other instances
to which it might have been applied. (Gomez v. Palomar,
25 SCRA 827)
The equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment
does not mean that all occupations called by the same
name must be treated the same way; the state may do
what it can to prevent which is deemed as evil and stop
short of those cases in which harm to the few concerned
is not less than the harm to the public that would insure if
the rule laid down were made mathematically exact.
(Dominican Hotel v. Arizana, 249 US 2651).
Anent petitioners claim that PD 1869 is contrary to the
avowed trend of the Cory Government away from
monopolies and crony economy and toward free
enterprise and privatization suffice it to state that this is

not a ground for this Court to nullify P.D. 1869. If, indeed,
PD 1869 runs counter to the governments policies then it
is for the Executive Department to recommend to
Congress its repeal or amendment.
The judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can
only declare what the law is and not what the law should
be. Under our system of government, policy issues are
within the domain of the political branches of government
and of the people themselves as the repository of all
state power. (Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr., 170 SCRA 256).
On the issue of monopoly, however, the Constitution
provides that:
Sec. 19. The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies
when public interest so requires. No combinations in
restraint of trade or unfair competition shall be allowed.
(Art. XII, National Economy and Patrimony)
68
It should be noted that, as the provision is worded,

monopolies are not necessarily prohibited by the
Constitution. The state must still decide whether public
interest demands that monopolies be regulated or
prohibited. Again, this is a matter of policy for the

Legislature to decide.
On petitioners allegation that P.D. 1869 violates Sections
11 (Personality Dignity) 12 (Family) and 13 (Role of Youth)
of Article II; Section 13 (Social Justice) of Article XIII and
Section 2 (Educational Values) of Article XIV of the 1987
Constitution, suffice it to state also that these are merely
statements of principles and policies. As such, they are
basically not self-executing, meaning a law should be
passed by Congress to clearly define and effectuate such
principles.
In general, therefore, the 1935 provisions were not
intended to be self-executing principles ready for
enforcement through the courts. They were rather
directives addressed to the executive and the legislature.
If the executive and the legislature failed to heed the
directives of the articles the available remedy was not
judicial or political. The electorate could express their
displeasure with the failure of the executive and the
legislature through the language of the ballot. (Bernas,
Vol. II, p. 2)
Every law has in its favor the presumption of
constitutionality (Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 387;
Salas v. Jarencio, 48 SCRA 734; Peralta v. Comelec, 82
SCRA 30; Abbas v. Comelec, 179 SCRA 287). Therefore,
for PD 1869 to be nullified, it must be shown that there is
a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not
merely a doubtful and equivocal one. In other words, the
grounds for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable
doubt. (Peralta v. Comelec, supra) Those who petition this

Court to declare a law, or parts thereof, unconstitutional
must clearly establish the basis for such a declaration.
Otherwise, their petition must fail. Based on the grounds
raised by petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of
P.D. 1869, the Court finds that petitioners have failed to
overcome the presumption. The dismissal of this petition
is therefore, inevitable. But as to whether P.D. 1869
remains a wise legislation considering the issues of
morality, monopoly, trend to free enterprise,
privatization as well as the state principles on social
justice, role of youth and educational values being
raised, i s u p
69
VOL. 197, MAY 14, 1991 69
for Congress to determine.

As this Court held in Citizens Alliance for Consumer
Protection v. Energy Regulatory Board, 162 SCRA 521
Presidential Decree No. 1956, as amended by Executive
Order No. 137 has, in any case, in its favor the
presumption of validity and constitutionality which
petitioners Valmonte and the KMU have not overturned.
Petitioners have not undertaken to identify the provisions
in the Constitution which they claim to have been

violated by that statute. This Court, however, is not
compelled to speculate and to imagine how the assailed
legislation may possibly offend some provision of the
Constitution. The Court notes, further, in this respect that
petitioners have in the main put in question the wisdom,
justice and expediency of the establishment of the OPSF,
issues which are not properly addressed to this Court and
which this Court may not constitutionally pass upon.
Those issues should be addressed rather to the political
departments of government: the President and the
Congress.
Parenthetically, We wish to state that gambling is
generally immoral, and this is precisely so when the
gambling resorted to is excessive. This excessiveness
necessarily depends not only on the financial resources of
the gambler and his family but also on his mental, social,
and spiritual outlook on life. However, the mere fact that
some persons may have lost their material fortunes,
mental control, physical health, or even their lives does
not necessarily mean that the same are directly
attributable to gambling. Gambling may have been the
antecedent, but certainly not necessarily the cause. For
the same consequences could have been preceded by an
overdose of food, drink, exercise, work, and even sex.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan (C.J.), Narvasa Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano,

Gancayco, Bidin, Sarmiento, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea,
Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
Melencio-Herrera, J., concurring in the result with
Justice Padilla.
Padilla, J., See separate Concurring Opinion.
70
CONCURRING IN THE RESULT

PADILLA, J.:
I concur in the result of the learned decision penned by
my brother Mr. Justice Paras. This means that I agree with
the decision insofar as it holds that the prohibition,
control, and regulation of the entire activity known as
gambling properly pertain to state policy. It is,
therefore, the political departments of government,
namely, the legislative and the executive that should
decide on what government should do in the entire area
of gambling, and assume full responsibility to the people
for such policy.
The courts, as the decision states, cannot inquire into the
wisdom, morality or expediency of policies adopted by
the political departments of government in areas which

fall within their authority, except only when such policies
pose a clear and present danger to the life, liberty or
property of the individual. This case does not involve such
a factual situation.
However, I hasten to make of record that I do not
subscribe to gambling in any form. It demeans the human
personality, destroys self-confidence and eviscerates
ones self-respect, which in the long run will corrode
whatever is left of the Filipino moral character. Gambling
has wrecked and will continue to wreck families and
homes; it is an antithesis to individual reliance and
reliability as well as personal industry which are the
touchstones of real economic progress and national
development. Gambling is reprehensible whether
maintained by government or privatized. The revenues
realized by the government out of legalized gambling
will, in the long run, be more than offset and negated by
the irreparable damage to the peoples moral values.
Also, the moral standing of the government in its
repeated avowals against illegal gambling is fatally
flawed and becomes untenable when it itself engages in
the very activity it seeks to eradicate.
One can go through the Courts decision today and
mentally replace the activity referred to therein as
gambling, which is legal only because it is authorized by
law and run by the
71
VOL. 197, MAY 14, 1991 71
Allied Leasing & Finance Corporation vs. Court of Appeals
government, with the activity known as prostitution.

Would prostitution be any less reprehensible were it to be
authorized by law, franchised, and regulated by the
government, in return for the substantial revenues it
would yield the government to carry out its laudable
projects, such as infrastructure and social amelioration?
The question, I believe, answers itself. I submit that the
sooner the legislative department outlaws all forms of
gambling, as a fundamental state policy, and the sooner
the executive implements such policy, the better it will be
for the nation.
Petition dismissed.
Note.It is presumed that an act of the law-making body
is valid and constitutional. (National Housing Authority vs.
Reyes, 123 SCRA 245.) [Basco vs. Phil. Amusements and
Gaming Corporation, 197 SCRA 52(1991)]

Limbona vs. Mangelin
G.R. No. 80391. February 28, 1989.*EN BANC.SULTAN

ALIMBUSAR P. LIMBONA, petitioner, vs. CONTE MANGELIN,
SALIC ALI, SALINDATO ALI, PILIMPINAS CONDING, ACMAD
TOMAWIS, GERRY TOMAWIS, JESUS ORTIZ, ANTONIO DELA
FUENTE, DIEGO PALOMARES, JR., RAKIL DAGALANGIT, and
BIMBO SINSUAT, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Due Process in Administrative
Proceedings; Access to Judicial Remedies; No one may be
punished for seeking redress in the courts, unless the
recourse amounts to malicious prosecution.In the
second place, the resolution appears strongly to be a
bare act of vendetta by the other Assemblyman against
the petitioner arising from what the former perceive to be
obduracy on the part of the latter. Indeed, it (the
resolution) speaks of a case [having been filed] [by the
petitioner] before the Supreme Court . . . on question
which should have been resolved within the confines of
the Assemblyan act which some members claimed
unnecessarily and unduly assails their integrity and
character as representative of the people, an act that
cannot possibly justify expulsion. Access to judicial
remedies is guaranteed by the Constitution, and, unless
the recourse amounts to malicious prosecution, no one

may be punished for seeking redress in the courts.
Same; Autonomous Regions; Administrative Law; The
autonomous governments of Mindanao are subject to the
jurisdiction of our national courts.An examination of the
very Presidential Decree creating the autonomous
governments of Mindanao persuades us that they were
never meant to exercise autonomy in the second sense,
that is, in which the central government commits an act
of self-immolation. Presidential Decree No. 1618, in the
first place, mandates that [t]he President shall have the
power of general supervision and control over
Autonomous Regions. In the second place, the
Sangguniang Pampook, their legislative arm, is made to
discharge chiefly administrative services. x x x Hence, we
assume jurisdiction. And if we can make an inquiry in the
validity of the expulsion in question, with more reason
can we review the petitioners removal as Speaker.
_______________
* EN BANC.
787
VOL. 170, FEBRUARY 28, 1989 787
Same; Same; Same; Decentralization; Autonomy is either

decentralization of administration or decentralization of
power.Now, autonomy is either decentralization of

administration or decentralization of power. There is
decentralization of administration when the central
government delegates administrative powers to political
subdivision in order to broaden the base of government
power and in the process to make local governments
more responsive and accountable, and ensure their
fullest development as self-reliant communities and make
them more effective partners in the pursuit of national
development and social progress. At the same time, it
relieves the central government of the burden of
managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on
national concerns. The President exercises general
supervision over them, but only to ensure that local
affairs are administered according to law. He has no
control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute
their judgments with his own.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Decentralization of
power involves an abdication of political power in favor of
local government units declared to be autonomous.
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an
abdication of political power in favor of local government
units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the
autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny
and shape its future with minimum intervention from
central authorities. According to a constitutional author,
decentralization of power amounts to self-immolation,
since in that event, the autonomous government
becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to

its constituency.
PETITION to review the decision of the Sangguniang
Pampook of Region XII, Cotabato City.
Ambrosio Padilla, Mempin & Reyes Law Offices for
petitioner.
Makabangkit B. Lanto for respondents.
SARMIENTO, J.:
The acts of the Sangguniang Pampook of Region XII are
assailed in this petition. The antecedent facts are as
follows:
788
1. On September 24, 1986, petitioner Sultan Alimbusar

Limbona was appointed as a member of the Sangguniang
Pampook, Regional Autonomous Government, Region XII,
representing Lanao del Sur.
2. On March 12, 1987 petitioner was elected Speaker of
the Regional Legislative Assembly or Batasang Pampook
of Central Mindanao (Assembly for brevity).
3. Said Assembly is composed of eighteen (18) members.

Two of said members, respondents Acmad Tomawis and
Rakil Dagalangit, filed on March 23, 1987 with the
Commission on Elections their respective certificates of
candidacy in the May 11, 1987 congressional elections for
the district of Lanao del Sur but they later withdrew from
the aforesaid election and thereafter resumed again their
positions as members of the Assembly.
4. On October 21, 1987 Congressman Datu Guimid
Matalam, Chairman of the Committee on Muslim Affairs of
the House of Representatives, invited Mr. Xavier Razul,
Pampook Speaker of Region XI, Zamboanga City and the
petitioner in his capacity as Speaker of the Assembly,
Region XII, in a letter which reads:
The Committee on Muslim Affairs will undertake
consultations and dialogues with local government
officials, civic, religious organizations and traditional
leaders on the recent and present political developments
and other issues affecting Regions IX and XII.
The result of the conference, consultations and dialogues
would hopefully chart the autonomous governments of
the two regions as envisioned and may prod the President
to constitute immediately the Regional Consultative
Commission as mandated by the Commission.
You are requested to invite some members of the
Pampook Assembly of your respective assembly on
November 1 to 15, 1987, with venue at the Congress of
the Philippines. Your presence, unstinted support and

cooperation is (sic) indispensable.
5. Consistent with the said invitation, petitioner sent a
telegram to Acting Secretary Johnny Alimbuyao of the
Assembly to wire all Assemblymen that there shall be no
session in November as our presence in the house
committee hearing of Congress take (sic) precedence
over any pending business in batasang pampook x x x.
6. In compliance with the aforesaid instruction of the
petitioner, Acting Secretary Alimbuyao sent to the
members of the Assembly the following telegram:
789
VOL. 170, FEBRUARY 28, 1989 789
TRANSMITTING FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED FROM SPEAKER LIMBONA QUOTE
CONGRESSMAN JIMMY MATALAM CHAIRMAN OF THE
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON MUSLIM AFFAIRS REQUESTED ME
TO ASSIST SAID COMMITTEE IN THE DISCUSSION OF THE
PROPOSED AUTONOMY ORGANIC NOV. 1ST TO 15. HENCE
WIRE ALL ASSEMBLYMEN THAT THERE SHALL BE NO
SESSION IN NOVEMBER AS OUR PRESENCE IN THE HOUSE
COMMITTEE HEARING OF CONGRESS TAKE PRECEDENCE
OVER ANY PENDING BUSINESS IN BATASANG PAMPOOK

OF MATALAM FOLLOWS UNQUOTE REGARDS.
7. On November 2, 1987, the Assembly held session in
defiance of petitioners advice, with the following
assemblymen present:
1. Sali, Salic
2. Conding, Pilipinas (sic)
3. Dagalangit, Rakil
4. Dela Fuente, Antonio
5. Mangelen, Conte
6. Ortiz, Jesus
7. Palomares, Diego
8. Sinsuat, Bimbo
9. Tomawis, Acmad
10. Tomawis, Jerry
After declaring the presence of a quorum, the Speaker
Pro-Tempore was authorized to preside in the session. On
Motion to declare the seat of the Speaker vacant, all
Assemblymen in attendance voted in the affirmative,
hence, the chair declared said seat of the Speaker
vacant.
8. On November 5, 1987, the session of the Assembly
resumed with the following Assemblymen present:
1. Mangelen ContePresiding Officer

2. Ali Salic
3. Ali Salindatu
4. Aratuc, Malik
5. Cajelo, Rene
9. Ortiz, Jesus
10. Palamares, Diego
790
11. Quijano, Jesus

12. Sinsuat, Bimbo
13. Tomawis, Acmad
14. Tomawis, Jerry
An excerpt from the debates and proceeding of said
session reads:
HON. DAGALANGIT: Mr. Speaker, Honorable Members of

the House, with the presence of our colleagues who have
come to attend the session today, I move to call the
names of the new comers in order for them to cast their
votes on the previous motion to declare the position of
the Speaker vacant. But before doing so, I move also that
the designation of the Speaker Pro Tempore as the
Presiding Officer and Mr. Johnny Evangelista as Acting
Secretary in the session last November 2, 1987 be
reconfirmed in todays session.
HON. SALIC ALI: I second the motions.
PRESIDING OFFICER: Any comment or objections on the
two motions presented? The chair hears none and the
said motions are approved. x x x.
Twelve (12) members voted in favor of the motion to
declare the seat of the Speaker vacant; one abstained
and none voted against.1Rollo, 115-120; emphasis in the
original.Accordingly, the petitioner prays for judgment as
follows:
WHEREFORE, petitioner respectfully prays that
(a) This Petition be given due course;
(b) Pending hearing, a restraining order or writ of
preliminary injunction be issued enjoining respondents
from proceeding with their session to be held on
November 5, 1987, and on any day thereafter;
(c) After hearing, judgment be rendered declaring the

proceedings held by respondents of their session on
November 2, 1987 as null and void;
(d) Holding the election of petitioner as Speaker of said
Legislative Assembly or Batasan Pampook, Region XII
held on March 12, 1987 valid and subsisting; and
(e) Making the injunction permanent.
________________
1 Rollo, 115-120; emphasis in the original.
791
VOL. 170, FEBRUARY 28, 1989 791
Petitioner likewise prays for such other relief as may be

just and equitable.2Id., 6-7.Pending further proceedings,
this Court, on January 19, 1988, received a resolution
filed by the Sangguniang Pampook, EXPELLING
ALIMBUSAR P. LIMBONA FROM MEMBERSHIP OF THE
SANGGUNIANG PAMPOOK, AUTONOMOUS REGION
XII,3Id., 134-135. on the grounds, among other things,
that the petitioner had caused to be prepared and
signed by him paying [sic] the salaries and emoluments
of Odin Abdula, who was considered resigned after filing
his Certificate of Candidacy for Congressmen for the First
District of Maguindanao in the last May 11, elections . . .

and nothing in the record of the Assembly will show that
any request for reinstatement by Abdula was ever made .
. .4Id., 134. and that such action of Mr. Limbona in
paying Abdula his salaries and emoluments without
authority from the Assembly . . . constituted a usurpation
of the power of the Assembly,5Id. that the petitioner
had recently caused withdrawal of so much amount of
cash from the Assembly resulting to the non-payment of
the salaries and emoluments of some Assembly
[sic],6Id., 135. and that he had filed a case before the
Supreme Court against some members of the Assembly
on question which should have been resolved within the
confines of the Assembly,7Id. for which the respondents
now submit that the petition had become moot and
academic.8Id., 142.The first question, evidently, is
whether or not the expulsion of the petitioner (pending
litigation) has made the case moot and academic.
We do not agree that the case has been rendered moot
and academic by reason simply of the expulsion
resolution so issued. For, if the petitioners expulsion was
done purposely to
_______________
2 Id., 6-7.
3 Id., 134-135.
4 Id., 134.
5 Id.
6 Id., 135.
7 Id.
8 Id., 142.
792
make this petition moot and academic, and to preempt

the Court, it will not make it academic.
On the ground of the immutable principle of due process
alone, we hold that the expulsion in question is of no
force and effect. In the first place, there is no showing
that the Sanggunian had conducted an investigation, and
whether or not the petitioner had been heard in his
defense, assuming that there was an investigation, or
otherwise given the opportunity to do so. On the other
hand, what appears in the records is an admission by the
Assembly (at least, the respondents) that since
November, 1987 up to this writing, the petitioner has not
set foot at the Sangguniang Pampook.9Id., 141. To be
sure, the private respondents aver that [t]he
Assemblymen, in a conciliatory gesture, wanted him to
come to Cotabato City,10Id. but that was so that their
differences could be threshed out and settled.11Id.
Certainly, that avowed wanting or desire to thresh out
and settle, no matter how conciliatory it may be cannot

be a substitute for the notice and hearing contemplated
by law.
While we have held that due process, as the term is
known in administrative law, does not absolutely require
notice and that a party need only be given the
opportunity to be heard,12Var-Orient Shipping Co., Inc. v.
Achacoso, G.R. No. 81805, May 31, 1988. it does not
appear herein that the petitioner had, to begin with, been
made aware that he had in fact stood charged of graft
and corruption before his collegues. It cannot be said
therefore that he was accorded any opportunity to rebut
their accusations. As it stands, then, the charges now
levelled amount to mere accusations that cannot warrant
expulsion.
In the second place, the resolution appears strongly to be
a bare act of vendetta by the other Assemblymen against
abduracy on the part of the latter. Indeed, it (the
which should have been re_______________
9 Id., 141.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Var-Orient Shipping Co., Inc. v. Achacoso, G.R. No.

81805, May 31, 1988.
793
VOL. 170, FEBRUARY 28, 1989 793
solved within the confines of the Assemblyan act which

some members claimed unnecessarily and unduly assails
their integrity and character as representative of the
people,13Id., 135. an act that cannot possibly justify
expulsion. Access to judicial remedies is guaranteed by
the Constitution,14See CONST. (1987), art. III, sec. 11.
and, unless the recourse amounts to malicious
prosecution, no one may be punished for seeking redress
in the courts.
We therefore order reinstatement, with the caution that
should the past acts of the petitioner indeed warrant his
removal, the Assembly is enjoined, should it still be so
minded, to commence proper proceedings therefor in line
with the most elementary requirements of due process.
And while it is within the discretion of the members of the
Sanggunian to punish their erring colleagues, their acts
are nonetheless subject to the moderating hand of this
Court in the event that such discretion is exercised with
grave abuse.
It is, to be sure, said that precisely because the

Sangguniang Pampook(s) are autonomous, the courts
may not rightfully intervene in their affairs, much less
strike down their acts. We come, therefore, to the second
issue: Are the so-called autonomous governments of
Mindanao, as they are now constituted, subject to the
jurisdiction of the national courts? In other words, what is
the extent of self-government given to the two
autonomous governments of Region IX and XII?
The autonomous governments of Mindanao were
organized in Regions IX and XII by Presidential Decree No.
161815IMPLEMENTING THE ORGANIZATION OF THE
SANGGUNIANG PAMPOOK AND THE LUPONG
TAGAPAGPAGANAP NG POOK IN REGION IX AND REGION
XII AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. promulgated on July 25,
1979. Among other things, the Decree established
internal autonomy16Pres. Decree No. 1618, sec. 3. in
the two regions [w]ithin the framework of the national
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the
Philippines and its Constitu_______________
13 Id., 135.
14 See CONST. (1987), art. III, sec. 11.
15 IMPLEMENTING THE ORGANIZATION OF THE
XII AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
16 Pres. Decree No. 1618, sec. 3.
794
tion,17Supra. with legislative and executive machinery

to exercise the powers and responsibilites18Supra.
specified therein. It requires the autonomous regional
governments to undertake all internal administrative
matters for the respective regions,19Supra, sec. 4.
except to act on matters which are within the jurisdiction
and competence of the National Government,20Supra.
which include, but are not limited to, the following:
(1) National defense and security;
(2) Foreign relations;
(3) Foreign trade;
(4) Currency, monetary affairs, foreign exchange, banking
and quasi-banking, and external borrowing;
(5) Disposition, exploration, development, exploitation or
utilization of all natural resources;
(6) Air and sea transport;
(7) Postal matters and telecommunications;
(8) Customs and quarantine;

(9) Immigration and deportation;
(10) Citizenship and naturalization;
(11) National economic, social and educational planning;
and
(12) General auditing.21Supra.In relation to the central
government, it provides that [t]he President shall have
the power of general supervision and control over the
Autonomous Regions xxx.22Supra, sec. 35(a).Now,
autonomy is either decentralization of administration or
decentralization of power. There is decentralization of
administration when the central government delegates
administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to
broaden the base of government power and in the
process to make local governments more responsive and
accountable,23CONST. (1973), art. XI, sec. 1; also
CONST. (1987), supra, art. X, sec. 3. and en_______________
17 Supra.
18 Supra.
19 Supra, sec. 4.
20 Supra.
21 Supra.
22 Supra, sec. 35(a).
23 CONST. (1973), art. XI, sec. 1; also CONST. (1987),

supra, art. X, sec. 3.
795
VOL. 170, FEBRUARY 28, 1989 795
sure their fullest development as self-reliant communities

and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of
national development and social progress.24Batas Blg.
337, sec. 2. At the same time, it relieves the central
government of the burden of managing local affairs and
enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The
President exercises general supervision25CONST.
(1987), supra, art. X, sec. 4; Batas Blg. 337, supra, sec.
14. over them, but only to ensure that local affairs are
administered according to law.26Batas Blg. 337, supra;
Hebron v. Reyes, 104 Phil. 175 (1958). He has no control
over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their
judgments with his own.27Hebron v. Reyes,
supra.Decentralization of power, on the other hand,
involves an abdication of political power in the favor of
local governments units declared to be autonomous. In
that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its
own destiny and shape its future with minimum
intervention from central authorities. According to a
constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts
to self-immolation, since in that event, the autonomous

government becomes accountable not to the central
authorities but to its constituency.28Bernas, Joaquin,
Brewing storm over autonomy, The Manila Chronicle,
pp. 4-5.But the question of whether or not the grant of
autonomy to Muslim Mindanao under the 1987
Constitution involves, truly, an effort to decentralize
power rather than mere administration is a question
foreign to this petition, since what is involved herein is a
local government unit constituted prior to the ratification
of the present Constitution. Hence, the Court will not
resolve that controversy now, in this case, since no
controversy in fact exists. We will resolve it at the proper
time and in the proper case.
Under the 1987 Constitution, local government units
enjoy autonomy in these two senses, thus:
_______________
24 Batas Blg. 337, sec. 2.
25 CONST. (1987), supra, art. X, sec. 4; Batas Blg. 337,
supra, sec. 14.
26 Batas Blg. 337, supra; Hebron v. Reyes, 104 Phil. 175
(1958).
27 Hebron v. Reyes, supra.
28 Bernas, Joaquin, Brewing storm over autonomy, The
Manila Chronicle, pp. 4-5.
796
Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the

Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities,
municipalities, and barangays. There shall be
autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the
Cordilleras as hereinafter provided.29CONST. (1987),
supra, art. X, sec. 1.Sec. 2. The territorial and political
subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.30Supra, sec.
2.xxx
xxx
xxx
Sec. 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in
Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of
provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas
sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural
heritage, economic and social structures, and other
relevant characteristics within the framework of this
Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as
territorial integrity of the Republic of the
Philippines.31Supra, sec. 15.An autonomous government
that enjoys autonomy of the latter category [CONST.
(1987), art. X, sec. 15.] is subject alone to the decree of
the organic act creating it and accepted principles on the
effects and limits of autonomy. On the other hand, an
autonomous government of the former class is, as we
noted, under the supervision of the national government
acting through the President (and the Department of
Local Government).32Batas Blg. 337, supra, sec. 14. If

the Sangguniang Pampook (of Region XII), then, is
autonomous in the latter sense, its acts are, debatably,
beyond the domain of this Court in perhaps the same way
that the internal acts, say, of the Congress of the
Philippines are beyond our jurisdiction. But if it is
autonomous in the former category only, it comes
unarguably under our jurisdiction.
An examination of the very Presidential Decree creating
the autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades us
that they were never meant to exercise autonomy in the
second sense, that is, in which the central government
commits an act of self-immolation. Presidential Decree
No. 1618, in the first place, mandates that [t]he
President shall have the power of general
_______________
29 CONST. (1987), supra, art. X, sec. 1.
30 Supra, sec. 2.
31 Supra, sec. 15.
32 Batas Blg. 337, supra, sec. 14.
797
VOL. 170, FEBRUARY 28, 1989 797
supervision and control over Autonomous

Regions.33Pres. Decree No. 1618, supra, sec. 35 (b).
Whether or not it is constitutional for the President to
exercise control over the Sanggunians is another
question. In the second place, the Sangguniang Pampook,
their legislative arm, is made to discharge chiefly
administrative services, thus:
SEC. 7. Powers of the Sangguniang Pampook.The
Sangguniang Pampook shall exercise local legislative
powers over regional affairs within the framework of
national development plans, policies and goals, in the
following areas:
(1) Organization of regional administrative system;
(2) Economic, social and cultural development of the
Autonomous Region;
(3) Agricultural, commercial and industrial programs for
the Autonomous Region;
(4) Infrastructure development for the Autonomous
Region;
(5) Urban and rural planning for the Autonomous Region;
(6) Taxation and other revenue-raising measures as
provided for in this Decree;
(7) Maintenance, operation and administration of schools
established by the Autonomous Region;
(8) Establishment, operation and maintenance of health,
welfare and other social services, programs and facilities;
(9) Preservation and development of customs, traditions,

languages and culture indigenous to the Autonomous
Region; and
(10) Such other matters as may be authorized by law,
including the enactment of such measures as may be
necessary for the promotion of the general welfare of the
people in the Autonomous Region.
The President shall exercise such powers as may be
necessary to assure that enactment and acts of the
Sangguniang Pampook and the Lupong Tagapagpaganap
ng Pook are in compliance with this Decree, national
legislation, policies, plans and programs.
The Sangguniang Pampook shall maintain liaison with the
Batasang Pambansa.34Supra, sec. 7.Hence, we assume
jurisdiction. And if we can make an inquiry in the validity
of the expulsion in question, with more reason can we
review the petitioners removal as Speaker.
_______________
33 Pres. Decree No. 1618, supra, sec. 35 (b). Whether or
not it is constitutional for the President to exercise control
over the Sanggunians is another question.
34 Supra, sec. 7.
798
Briefly, the petitioner assails the legality of his ouster as

Speaker on the grounds that: (1) the Sanggunian, in
convening on November 2 and 5, 1987 (for the sole
purpose of declaring the office of the Speaker vacant), did
so in violation of the Rules of the Sangguniang Pampook
since the Assembly was then on recess; and (2) assuming
that it was valid, his ouster was ineffective nevertheless
for lack of quorum.
Upon the facts presented, we hold that the November 2
and 5, 1987 sessions were invalid. It is true that under
Section 31 of the Region XII Sanggunian Rules,
[s]essions shall not be suspended or adjourned except
by direction of the Sangguniang Pampook,35Rollo, id.,
122. but it provides likewise that the Speaker may, on
[sic] his discretion, declare a recess of short
intervals.36Id. Of course, there is disagreement between
the protagonists as to whether or not the recess called by
the petitioner effective November 1 through 15, 1987 is
the recess of short intervals referred to; the petitioner
says that it is while the respondents insist that, to all
intents and purposes, it was an adjournment and that
recess as used by their Rules only refers to a recess
when arguments get heated up so that protagonists in a
debate can talk things out informally and obviate
dissenssion [sic] and disunity.37Id., 145-146. The Court
agrees with the respondents on this regard, since clearly,
the Rules speak of short intervals. Secondly, the Court
likewise agrees that the Speaker could not have validly

called a recess since the Assembly had yet to convene on
November 1, the date session opens under the same
Rules.38Id., 121. Hence, there can be no recess to speak
of that could possibly interrupt any session. But while this
opinion is in accord with the respondents own, we still
invalidate the twin sessions in question, since at the time
the petitioner called the recess, it was not a settled
matter whether or not he could do so. In the second
place, the invitation tendered by the Committee on
Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives provided a
plausible reason for the
_______________
35 Rollo, id., 122.
36 Id.
37 Id., 145-146.
38 Id., 121.
799
VOL. 170, FEBRUARY 28, 1989 799
intermission sought. Thirdly, assuming that a valid recess

could not be called, it does not appear that the
respondents called his attention to this mistake. What
appears is that instead, they opened the sessions

themselves behind his back in an apparent act of mutiny.
Under the circumstances, we find equity on his side. For
this reason, we uphold the recess called on the ground
of good faith.
It does not appear to us, moreover, that the petitioner
had resorted to the aforesaid recess in order to forestall
the Assembly from bringing about his ouster. This is not
apparent from the pleadings before us. We are convinced
that the invitation was what precipitated it.
In holding that the recess in question is valid, we are
not to be taken as establishing a precedent, since, as we
said, a recess can not be validly declared without a
session having been first opened. In upholding the
petitioner herein, we are not giving him a carte blanche
to order recesses in the future in violation of the Rules, or
otherwise to prevent the lawful meetings thereof.
Neither are we, by this disposition, discouraging the
Sanggunian from reorganizing itself pursuant to its lawful
prerogatives. Certainly, it can do so at the proper time. In
the event that he petitioner should initiate obstructive
moves, the Court is certain that it is armed with enough
coercive remedies to thwart them.39See Avelino v.
Cuenco, 83 Phil. 17 (1949).In view hereof, we find no
need in dwelling on the issue of quorum.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
GRANTED. The Sangguniang Pampook, Region XII, is
ENJOINED to (1) REINSTATE the petitioner as Member,
Sangguniang Pampook, Region XII; and (2) REINSTATE

him as Speaker thereof. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr.,
Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Corts, GrioAquino,
_______________
39 See Avelino v. Cuenco, 83 Phil. 17 (1949).
800
Rebollido vs. Court of Appeals
Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Padilla, J., no part in the deliberations.
Petition granted.
Note.Due process is also required in administrative
proceedings. (Doruelo vs. Commission on Elections, 133
SCRA 376.) [Limbona vs. Mangelin, 170 SCRA 786(1989)]

G.R. No. 80391. February 28, 1989.*EN BANC.SULTAN

ALIMBUSAR P. LIMBONA, petitioner, vs. CONTE MANGELIN,
SALIC ALI, SALINDATO ALI, PILIMPINAS CONDING, ACMAD
TOMAWIS, GERRY TOMAWIS, JESUS ORTIZ, ANTONIO DELA
FUENTE, DIEGO PALOMARES, JR., RAKIL DAGALANGIT, and
BIMBO SINSUAT, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Due Process in Administrative
Proceedings; Access to Judicial Remedies; No one may be
punished for seeking redress in the courts, unless the
recourse amounts to malicious prosecution.In the
second place, the resolution appears strongly to be a
bare act of vendetta by the other Assemblyman against
obduracy on the part of the latter. Indeed, it (the
which should have been resolved within the confines of
the Assemblyan act which some members claimed
unnecessarily and unduly assails their integrity and
character as representative of the people, an act that
cannot possibly justify expulsion. Access to judicial
remedies is guaranteed by the Constitution, and, unless

the recourse amounts to malicious prosecution, no one
may be punished for seeking redress in the courts.
Same; Autonomous Regions; Administrative Law; The
autonomous governments of Mindanao are subject to the
jurisdiction of our national courts.An examination of the
very Presidential Decree creating the autonomous
governments of Mindanao persuades us that they were
never meant to exercise autonomy in the second sense,
that is, in which the central government commits an act
of self-immolation. Presidential Decree No. 1618, in the
first place, mandates that [t]he President shall have the
power of general supervision and control over
Autonomous Regions. In the second place, the
Sangguniang Pampook, their legislative arm, is made to
discharge chiefly administrative services. x x x Hence, we
assume jurisdiction. And if we can make an inquiry in the
validity of the expulsion in question, with more reason
can we review the petitioners removal as Speaker.
_______________
* EN BANC.
787
VOL. 170, FEBRUARY 28, 1989 787
Same; Same; Same; Decentralization; Autonomy is either

decentralization of administration or decentralization of
power.Now, autonomy is either decentralization of
administration or decentralization of power. There is
decentralization of administration when the central
government delegates administrative powers to political
subdivision in order to broaden the base of government
power and in the process to make local governments
more responsive and accountable, and ensure their
fullest development as self-reliant communities and make
them more effective partners in the pursuit of national
development and social progress. At the same time, it
relieves the central government of the burden of
managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on
national concerns. The President exercises general
supervision over them, but only to ensure that local
affairs are administered according to law. He has no
control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute
their judgments with his own.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Decentralization of
power involves an abdication of political power in favor of
local government units declared to be autonomous.
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an
abdication of political power in favor of local government
units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the
autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny
and shape its future with minimum intervention from
central authorities. According to a constitutional author,
decentralization of power amounts to self-immolation,
since in that event, the autonomous government

becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to
its constituency.
PETITION to review the decision of the Sangguniang
Pampook of Region XII, Cotabato City.
Ambrosio Padilla, Mempin & Reyes Law Offices for
petitioner.
Makabangkit B. Lanto for respondents.
SARMIENTO, J.:
The acts of the Sangguniang Pampook of Region XII are
assailed in this petition. The antecedent facts are as
follows:
788
1. On September 24, 1986, petitioner Sultan Alimbusar

Limbona was appointed as a member of the Sangguniang
Pampook, Regional Autonomous Government, Region XII,
representing Lanao del Sur.
2. On March 12, 1987 petitioner was elected Speaker of

the Regional Legislative Assembly or Batasang Pampook
of Central Mindanao (Assembly for brevity).
3. Said Assembly is composed of eighteen (18) members.
Two of said members, respondents Acmad Tomawis and
Rakil Dagalangit, filed on March 23, 1987 with the
Commission on Elections their respective certificates of
candidacy in the May 11, 1987 congressional elections for
the district of Lanao del Sur but they later withdrew from
the aforesaid election and thereafter resumed again their
positions as members of the Assembly.
4. On October 21, 1987 Congressman Datu Guimid
Matalam, Chairman of the Committee on Muslim Affairs of
the House of Representatives, invited Mr. Xavier Razul,
Pampook Speaker of Region XI, Zamboanga City and the
petitioner in his capacity as Speaker of the Assembly,
Region XII, in a letter which reads:
The Committee on Muslim Affairs will undertake
consultations and dialogues with local government
officials, civic, religious organizations and traditional
leaders on the recent and present political developments
and other issues affecting Regions IX and XII.
The result of the conference, consultations and dialogues
would hopefully chart the autonomous governments of
the two regions as envisioned and may prod the President
to constitute immediately the Regional Consultative
Commission as mandated by the Commission.
You are requested to invite some members of the

Pampook Assembly of your respective assembly on
November 1 to 15, 1987, with venue at the Congress of
the Philippines. Your presence, unstinted support and
cooperation is (sic) indispensable.
5. Consistent with the said invitation, petitioner sent a
telegram to Acting Secretary Johnny Alimbuyao of the
Assembly to wire all Assemblymen that there shall be no
session in November as our presence in the house
committee hearing of Congress take (sic) precedence
over any pending business in batasang pampook x x x.
6. In compliance with the aforesaid instruction of the
petitioner, Acting Secretary Alimbuyao sent to the
members of the Assembly the following telegram:
789
VOL. 170, FEBRUARY 28, 1989 789
TRANSMITTING FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED FROM SPEAKER LIMBONA QUOTE
CONGRESSMAN JIMMY MATALAM CHAIRMAN OF THE
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON MUSLIM AFFAIRS REQUESTED ME
TO ASSIST SAID COMMITTEE IN THE DISCUSSION OF THE
PROPOSED AUTONOMY ORGANIC NOV. 1ST TO 15. HENCE
WIRE ALL ASSEMBLYMEN THAT THERE SHALL BE NO
SESSION IN NOVEMBER AS OUR PRESENCE IN THE HOUSE

COMMITTEE HEARING OF CONGRESS TAKE PRECEDENCE
OVER ANY PENDING BUSINESS IN BATASANG PAMPOOK
OF MATALAM FOLLOWS UNQUOTE REGARDS.
7. On November 2, 1987, the Assembly held session in
defiance of petitioners advice, with the following
assemblymen present:
1. Sali, Salic
5. Mangelen, Conte
6. Ortiz, Jesus
7. Palomares, Diego
8. Sinsuat, Bimbo
9. Tomawis, Acmad
10. Tomawis, Jerry
After declaring the presence of a quorum, the Speaker
Pro-Tempore was authorized to preside in the session. On
Motion to declare the seat of the Speaker vacant, all
Assemblymen in attendance voted in the affirmative,
hence, the chair declared said seat of the Speaker
vacant.
8. On November 5, 1987, the session of the Assembly

resumed with the following Assemblymen present:
1. Mangelen ContePresiding Officer
2. Ali Salic
3. Ali Salindatu
4. Aratuc, Malik
5. Cajelo, Rene
9. Ortiz, Jesus
10. Palamares, Diego
790
11. Quijano, Jesus

12. Sinsuat, Bimbo
13. Tomawis, Acmad
14. Tomawis, Jerry
An excerpt from the debates and proceeding of said

session reads:
HON. DAGALANGIT: Mr. Speaker, Honorable Members of
the House, with the presence of our colleagues who have
come to attend the session today, I move to call the
names of the new comers in order for them to cast their
votes on the previous motion to declare the position of
the Speaker vacant. But before doing so, I move also that
the designation of the Speaker Pro Tempore as the
Presiding Officer and Mr. Johnny Evangelista as Acting
Secretary in the session last November 2, 1987 be
reconfirmed in todays session.
HON. SALIC ALI: I second the motions.
PRESIDING OFFICER: Any comment or objections on the
two motions presented? The chair hears none and the
said motions are approved. x x x.
Twelve (12) members voted in favor of the motion to
declare the seat of the Speaker vacant; one abstained
and none voted against.1Rollo, 115-120; emphasis in the
original.Accordingly, the petitioner prays for judgment as
follows:
WHEREFORE, petitioner respectfully prays that
(a) This Petition be given due course;
(b) Pending hearing, a restraining order or writ of
preliminary injunction be issued enjoining respondents
from proceeding with their session to be held on
November 5, 1987, and on any day thereafter;
(c) After hearing, judgment be rendered declaring the

proceedings held by respondents of their session on
November 2, 1987 as null and void;
(d) Holding the election of petitioner as Speaker of said
Legislative Assembly or Batasan Pampook, Region XII
held on March 12, 1987 valid and subsisting; and
(e) Making the injunction permanent.
________________
1 Rollo, 115-120; emphasis in the original.
791
VOL. 170, FEBRUARY 28, 1989 791
Petitioner likewise prays for such other relief as may be

just and equitable.2Id., 6-7.Pending further proceedings,
this Court, on January 19, 1988, received a resolution
filed by the Sangguniang Pampook, EXPELLING
ALIMBUSAR P. LIMBONA FROM MEMBERSHIP OF THE
SANGGUNIANG PAMPOOK, AUTONOMOUS REGION
XII,3Id., 134-135. on the grounds, among other things,
that the petitioner had caused to be prepared and
signed by him paying [sic] the salaries and emoluments
of Odin Abdula, who was considered resigned after filing
his Certificate of Candidacy for Congressmen for the First
District of Maguindanao in the last May 11, elections . . .

and nothing in the record of the Assembly will show that
any request for reinstatement by Abdula was ever made .
. .4Id., 134. and that such action of Mr. Limbona in
paying Abdula his salaries and emoluments without
authority from the Assembly . . . constituted a usurpation
of the power of the Assembly,5Id. that the petitioner
had recently caused withdrawal of so much amount of
cash from the Assembly resulting to the non-payment of
the salaries and emoluments of some Assembly
[sic],6Id., 135. and that he had filed a case before the
Supreme Court against some members of the Assembly
on question which should have been resolved within the
confines of the Assembly,7Id. for which the respondents
now submit that the petition had become moot and
academic.8Id., 142.The first question, evidently, is
whether or not the expulsion of the petitioner (pending
litigation) has made the case moot and academic.
We do not agree that the case has been rendered moot
and academic by reason simply of the expulsion
resolution so issued. For, if the petitioners expulsion was
done purposely to
_______________
2 Id., 6-7.
3 Id., 134-135.
4 Id., 134.
5 Id.
6 Id., 135.
7 Id.
8 Id., 142.
792
make this petition moot and academic, and to preempt

the Court, it will not make it academic.
On the ground of the immutable principle of due process
alone, we hold that the expulsion in question is of no
force and effect. In the first place, there is no showing
that the Sanggunian had conducted an investigation, and
whether or not the petitioner had been heard in his
defense, assuming that there was an investigation, or
otherwise given the opportunity to do so. On the other
hand, what appears in the records is an admission by the
Assembly (at least, the respondents) that since
November, 1987 up to this writing, the petitioner has not
set foot at the Sangguniang Pampook.9Id., 141. To be
sure, the private respondents aver that [t]he
Assemblymen, in a conciliatory gesture, wanted him to
come to Cotabato City,10Id. but that was so that their
differences could be threshed out and settled.11Id.
Certainly, that avowed wanting or desire to thresh out
and settle, no matter how conciliatory it may be cannot

be a substitute for the notice and hearing contemplated
by law.
While we have held that due process, as the term is
known in administrative law, does not absolutely require
notice and that a party need only be given the
opportunity to be heard,12Var-Orient Shipping Co., Inc. v.
Achacoso, G.R. No. 81805, May 31, 1988. it does not
appear herein that the petitioner had, to begin with, been
made aware that he had in fact stood charged of graft
and corruption before his collegues. It cannot be said
therefore that he was accorded any opportunity to rebut
their accusations. As it stands, then, the charges now
levelled amount to mere accusations that cannot warrant
expulsion.
In the second place, the resolution appears strongly to be
a bare act of vendetta by the other Assemblymen against
abduracy on the part of the latter. Indeed, it (the
which should have been re_______________
9 Id., 141.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Var-Orient Shipping Co., Inc. v. Achacoso, G.R. No.

81805, May 31, 1988.
793
VOL. 170, FEBRUARY 28, 1989 793
solved within the confines of the Assemblyan act which

some members claimed unnecessarily and unduly assails
their integrity and character as representative of the
people,13Id., 135. an act that cannot possibly justify
expulsion. Access to judicial remedies is guaranteed by
the Constitution,14See CONST. (1987), art. III, sec. 11.
and, unless the recourse amounts to malicious
prosecution, no one may be punished for seeking redress
in the courts.
We therefore order reinstatement, with the caution that
should the past acts of the petitioner indeed warrant his
removal, the Assembly is enjoined, should it still be so
minded, to commence proper proceedings therefor in line
with the most elementary requirements of due process.
And while it is within the discretion of the members of the
Sanggunian to punish their erring colleagues, their acts
are nonetheless subject to the moderating hand of this
Court in the event that such discretion is exercised with
grave abuse.
It is, to be sure, said that precisely because the

Sangguniang Pampook(s) are autonomous, the courts
may not rightfully intervene in their affairs, much less
strike down their acts. We come, therefore, to the second
issue: Are the so-called autonomous governments of
Mindanao, as they are now constituted, subject to the
jurisdiction of the national courts? In other words, what is
the extent of self-government given to the two
autonomous governments of Region IX and XII?
The autonomous governments of Mindanao were
organized in Regions IX and XII by Presidential Decree No.
161815IMPLEMENTING THE ORGANIZATION OF THE
XII AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. promulgated on July 25,
1979. Among other things, the Decree established
internal autonomy16Pres. Decree No. 1618, sec. 3. in
the two regions [w]ithin the framework of the national
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the
Philippines and its Constitu_______________
13 Id., 135.
14 See CONST. (1987), art. III, sec. 11.
15 IMPLEMENTING THE ORGANIZATION OF THE
XII AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
16 Pres. Decree No. 1618, sec. 3.
794
tion,17Supra. with legislative and executive machinery

to exercise the powers and responsibilites18Supra.
specified therein. It requires the autonomous regional
governments to undertake all internal administrative
matters for the respective regions,19Supra, sec. 4.
except to act on matters which are within the jurisdiction
and competence of the National Government,20Supra.
which include, but are not limited to, the following:
(1) National defense and security;
(2) Foreign relations;
(3) Foreign trade;
(4) Currency, monetary affairs, foreign exchange, banking
and quasi-banking, and external borrowing;
(5) Disposition, exploration, development, exploitation or
utilization of all natural resources;
(6) Air and sea transport;
(7) Postal matters and telecommunications;
(8) Customs and quarantine;

(9) Immigration and deportation;
(10) Citizenship and naturalization;
(11) National economic, social and educational planning;
and
(12) General auditing.21Supra.In relation to the central
government, it provides that [t]he President shall have
the power of general supervision and control over the
Autonomous Regions xxx.22Supra, sec. 35(a).Now,
autonomy is either decentralization of administration or
decentralization of power. There is decentralization of
administration when the central government delegates
administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to
broaden the base of government power and in the
process to make local governments more responsive and
accountable,23CONST. (1973), art. XI, sec. 1; also
CONST. (1987), supra, art. X, sec. 3. and en_______________
17 Supra.
18 Supra.
19 Supra, sec. 4.
20 Supra.
21 Supra.
22 Supra, sec. 35(a).
23 CONST. (1973), art. XI, sec. 1; also CONST. (1987),

supra, art. X, sec. 3.
795
VOL. 170, FEBRUARY 28, 1989 795
sure their fullest development as self-reliant communities

and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of
national development and social progress.24Batas Blg.
337, sec. 2. At the same time, it relieves the central
government of the burden of managing local affairs and
enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The
President exercises general supervision25CONST.
(1987), supra, art. X, sec. 4; Batas Blg. 337, supra, sec.
14. over them, but only to ensure that local affairs are
administered according to law.26Batas Blg. 337, supra;
Hebron v. Reyes, 104 Phil. 175 (1958). He has no control
over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their
judgments with his own.27Hebron v. Reyes,
supra.Decentralization of power, on the other hand,
involves an abdication of political power in the favor of
local governments units declared to be autonomous. In
that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its
own destiny and shape its future with minimum
intervention from central authorities. According to a
constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts
to self-immolation, since in that event, the autonomous

government becomes accountable not to the central
authorities but to its constituency.28Bernas, Joaquin,
Brewing storm over autonomy, The Manila Chronicle,
pp. 4-5.But the question of whether or not the grant of
autonomy to Muslim Mindanao under the 1987
Constitution involves, truly, an effort to decentralize
power rather than mere administration is a question
foreign to this petition, since what is involved herein is a
local government unit constituted prior to the ratification
of the present Constitution. Hence, the Court will not
resolve that controversy now, in this case, since no
controversy in fact exists. We will resolve it at the proper
time and in the proper case.
Under the 1987 Constitution, local government units
enjoy autonomy in these two senses, thus:
_______________
24 Batas Blg. 337, sec. 2.
25 CONST. (1987), supra, art. X, sec. 4; Batas Blg. 337,
supra, sec. 14.
26 Batas Blg. 337, supra; Hebron v. Reyes, 104 Phil. 175
(1958).
27 Hebron v. Reyes, supra.
28 Bernas, Joaquin, Brewing storm over autonomy, The
Manila Chronicle, pp. 4-5.
796
Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the

Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities,
municipalities, and barangays. There shall be
autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the
Cordilleras as hereinafter provided.29CONST. (1987),
supra, art. X, sec. 1.Sec. 2. The territorial and political
subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.30Supra, sec.
2.xxx
xxx
xxx
Sec. 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in
Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of
provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas
sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural
heritage, economic and social structures, and other
relevant characteristics within the framework of this
Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as
territorial integrity of the Republic of the
Philippines.31Supra, sec. 15.An autonomous government
that enjoys autonomy of the latter category [CONST.
(1987), art. X, sec. 15.] is subject alone to the decree of
the organic act creating it and accepted principles on the
effects and limits of autonomy. On the other hand, an
autonomous government of the former class is, as we
noted, under the supervision of the national government
acting through the President (and the Department of
Local Government).32Batas Blg. 337, supra, sec. 14. If

the Sangguniang Pampook (of Region XII), then, is
autonomous in the latter sense, its acts are, debatably,
beyond the domain of this Court in perhaps the same way
that the internal acts, say, of the Congress of the
Philippines are beyond our jurisdiction. But if it is
autonomous in the former category only, it comes
unarguably under our jurisdiction.
An examination of the very Presidential Decree creating
the autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades us
that they were never meant to exercise autonomy in the
second sense, that is, in which the central government
commits an act of self-immolation. Presidential Decree
No. 1618, in the first place, mandates that [t]he
President shall have the power of general
_______________
29 CONST. (1987), supra, art. X, sec. 1.
30 Supra, sec. 2.
31 Supra, sec. 15.
32 Batas Blg. 337, supra, sec. 14.
797
VOL. 170, FEBRUARY 28, 1989 797
supervision and control over Autonomous

Regions.33Pres. Decree No. 1618, supra, sec. 35 (b).
Whether or not it is constitutional for the President to
exercise control over the Sanggunians is another
question. In the second place, the Sangguniang Pampook,
their legislative arm, is made to discharge chiefly
administrative services, thus:
SEC. 7. Powers of the Sangguniang Pampook.The
Sangguniang Pampook shall exercise local legislative
powers over regional affairs within the framework of
national development plans, policies and goals, in the
following areas:
(1) Organization of regional administrative system;
(2) Economic, social and cultural development of the
Autonomous Region;
(3) Agricultural, commercial and industrial programs for
the Autonomous Region;
(4) Infrastructure development for the Autonomous
Region;
(5) Urban and rural planning for the Autonomous Region;
(6) Taxation and other revenue-raising measures as
provided for in this Decree;
(7) Maintenance, operation and administration of schools
established by the Autonomous Region;
(8) Establishment, operation and maintenance of health,
welfare and other social services, programs and facilities;
(9) Preservation and development of customs, traditions,

languages and culture indigenous to the Autonomous
Region; and
(10) Such other matters as may be authorized by law,
including the enactment of such measures as may be
necessary for the promotion of the general welfare of the
people in the Autonomous Region.
The President shall exercise such powers as may be
necessary to assure that enactment and acts of the
Sangguniang Pampook and the Lupong Tagapagpaganap
ng Pook are in compliance with this Decree, national
legislation, policies, plans and programs.
The Sangguniang Pampook shall maintain liaison with the
Batasang Pambansa.34Supra, sec. 7.Hence, we assume
jurisdiction. And if we can make an inquiry in the validity
of the expulsion in question, with more reason can we
review the petitioners removal as Speaker.
_______________
33 Pres. Decree No. 1618, supra, sec. 35 (b). Whether or
not it is constitutional for the President to exercise control
over the Sanggunians is another question.
34 Supra, sec. 7.
798
Briefly, the petitioner assails the legality of his ouster as

Speaker on the grounds that: (1) the Sanggunian, in
convening on November 2 and 5, 1987 (for the sole
purpose of declaring the office of the Speaker vacant), did
so in violation of the Rules of the Sangguniang Pampook
since the Assembly was then on recess; and (2) assuming
that it was valid, his ouster was ineffective nevertheless
for lack of quorum.
Upon the facts presented, we hold that the November 2
and 5, 1987 sessions were invalid. It is true that under
Section 31 of the Region XII Sanggunian Rules,
[s]essions shall not be suspended or adjourned except
by direction of the Sangguniang Pampook,35Rollo, id.,
122. but it provides likewise that the Speaker may, on
[sic] his discretion, declare a recess of short
intervals.36Id. Of course, there is disagreement between
the protagonists as to whether or not the recess called by
the petitioner effective November 1 through 15, 1987 is
the recess of short intervals referred to; the petitioner
says that it is while the respondents insist that, to all
intents and purposes, it was an adjournment and that
recess as used by their Rules only refers to a recess
when arguments get heated up so that protagonists in a
debate can talk things out informally and obviate
dissenssion [sic] and disunity.37Id., 145-146. The Court
agrees with the respondents on this regard, since clearly,
the Rules speak of short intervals. Secondly, the Court
likewise agrees that the Speaker could not have validly

called a recess since the Assembly had yet to convene on
November 1, the date session opens under the same
Rules.38Id., 121. Hence, there can be no recess to speak
of that could possibly interrupt any session. But while this
opinion is in accord with the respondents own, we still
invalidate the twin sessions in question, since at the time
the petitioner called the recess, it was not a settled
matter whether or not he could do so. In the second
place, the invitation tendered by the Committee on
Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives provided a
plausible reason for the
_______________
35 Rollo, id., 122.
36 Id.
37 Id., 145-146.
38 Id., 121.
799
VOL. 170, FEBRUARY 28, 1989 799
intermission sought. Thirdly, assuming that a valid recess

could not be called, it does not appear that the
respondents called his attention to this mistake. What
appears is that instead, they opened the sessions

themselves behind his back in an apparent act of mutiny.
Under the circumstances, we find equity on his side. For
this reason, we uphold the recess called on the ground
of good faith.
It does not appear to us, moreover, that the petitioner
had resorted to the aforesaid recess in order to forestall
the Assembly from bringing about his ouster. This is not
apparent from the pleadings before us. We are convinced
that the invitation was what precipitated it.
In holding that the recess in question is valid, we are
not to be taken as establishing a precedent, since, as we
said, a recess can not be validly declared without a
session having been first opened. In upholding the
petitioner herein, we are not giving him a carte blanche
to order recesses in the future in violation of the Rules, or
otherwise to prevent the lawful meetings thereof.
Neither are we, by this disposition, discouraging the
Sanggunian from reorganizing itself pursuant to its lawful
prerogatives. Certainly, it can do so at the proper time. In
the event that he petitioner should initiate obstructive
moves, the Court is certain that it is armed with enough
coercive remedies to thwart them.39See Avelino v.
Cuenco, 83 Phil. 17 (1949).In view hereof, we find no
need in dwelling on the issue of quorum.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
GRANTED. The Sangguniang Pampook, Region XII, is
ENJOINED to (1) REINSTATE the petitioner as Member,
Sangguniang Pampook, Region XII; and (2) REINSTATE

him as Speaker thereof. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Corts, GrioAquino,
_______________
39 See Avelino v. Cuenco, 83 Phil. 17 (1949).
800
Rebollido vs. Court of Appeals
Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Padilla, J., no part in the deliberations.
Petition granted.
Note.Due process is also required in administrative
proceedings. (Doruelo vs. Commission on Elections, 133
SCRA 376.) [Limbona vs. Mangelin, 170 SCRA 786(1989)]
[No. 46440. January 18, 1939]

CARMEN PLANAS, petitioner, vs. JOSE GIL,
Commissioner of Civil Service, respondent.
1. 1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; ACTS OF THE CHIEF
EXECUTIVE; INQUIRY BY THE SUPREME COURT INTO
THE VALIDITY OR CONSTITUTlONALITY OF SUCH
ACTS.The acts of the Chief Executive performed
within the limits of his jurisdiction are his official acts
and courts will neither direct nor restrain executive
action in such cases. The rule is non-interference.
But from this legal premise, it does not necessarily
follow that the court is precluded from making an
inquiry into the validity or constitutionality of his
acts when these are properly challenged in an
appropriate legal proceeding.
1. 2. ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; SEPARATION OF GOVERNMENTAL
POWERS.The classical separation of governmental
powers, whether viewed in the light of the political
philosophy of Aristotle, Locke, or Montesquieu, or of
the postulations of Mabini, Madison, or Jefferson, is a
relative theory of government, There is more truism
and actuality in interdependence than in
independence and separation of powers, for as
observed by Justice Holmes in a case of Philippine
origin, we cannot lay down "with mathematical
precision and divide the branches into watertight
compartments" not only because "the great
ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and
divide fields of black and white" but also because
"even the more specific of them are found to

terminate in a penumbra shading gradually from
one extreme to the other." (Springer vs. Government
[1928], 277 U. S., 189; 72 Law. ed., 845, 852.)
1. 3. ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; SYSTEM OF CHECKS AND
BALANCES.As far as the judiciary is concerned,
while it holds "neither the sword nor the purse" it is
by constitutional placement the organ called upon to
allocate constitutional boundaries, and to the
Supreme Court is entrusted expressly or by
necessary implication the obligation of determining
in appropriate cases the constitutionality or validity
of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or
regulation. (Sec. 2 [1], Art. VIII, Constitution of the
Philippines.) In this sense and to this extent, the
judiciary restrains the other departments of the
government and this result is one of the necessary
corollaries of the "system of checks and balances" of
the government established.
1. 4. ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID.A mere plea that a
subordinate officer of the government is acting
under orders from the Chief Executive may be an
important averment, but is neither decisive nor
conclusive upon this court. Like the dignity of his
high office, the relative immunity of the Chief
Executive from ju
63
VOL. 67, JANUARY 18, 1939
63
Planas vs. Gil.
1. dicial interference is not in the nature of a sovereign
passport for all the subordinate officials and
employees of the Executive Department to the

extent that at the mere invocation of the authority
that it purports the jurisdiction of this court to
inquire into the validity or legality of an executive
order is necessarily abated or , suspended. The f
acts in Severino vs. Governor-General ([1910], 16
Phil., 366), Abueva vs. Wood ([1924], 45 Phil., 612),
and Alejandrino vs. Quezon ([1924], 46 Phil., 83),
are different, and the doctrines laid down therein
must be confined to the facts and legal environment
involved and whatever general observations might
have been made in elaboration of the views therein
expressed but which are not essential to the
determination of the issues presented are mere
obiter dicta.
1. 5. ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; PROHIBITION.While,
generally, prohibition as an extraordinary legal writ
will not issue to restrain or control the performance
of other than judicial or quasijudicial functions (50 C.
J., 658), its issuance and enforcement are regulated
by statute and in this jurisdiction it may issue to any
inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or person,
whether exercising functions judicial or ministerial,
whose acts are without or in excess of jurisdiction.
(Secs. 516 and 226, Code of Civil Procedure.) The
terms "judicial" and "ministerial" used with
reference to "functions" in the statute are
undoubtedly comprehensive and include the
challenged investigation by the respondent
Commissioner of Civil Service, which investigation if
unauthorized and is violative of the Constitution as
contended is a fortiori without or in excess of
jurisdiction.
1. 6. ID.; ID. ; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.The statutory rule in this

jurisdiction is that the writ of prohibition is not
confined exclusively to courts or tribunals to keep
them within the limits of their own jurisdiction and to
prevent them from encroaching upon the jurisdiction
of other tribunals, but will issue, in appropriate
cases, to an officer or person whose acts are without
or in excess of his authority. Not infrequently, "the
writ is granted, where it is necessary for the orderly
administration of justice, or to prevent the use of the
strong arm of the law in an oppressive or vindictive
manner, or a multiplicity of actions." (Dimayuga and
Fajardo vs. Fernandez [1922], 43 Phil., 304, 307;
Aglipay vs. Ruiz [1937], 35 Off. Gaz., 2164.) This
court, therefore, has jurisdiction over the instant
proceedings and will accordingly proceed to
determine the merits of the present controversy.
1. 7. ID.; ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID.A perusal of our
Constitution will show that extensive authority over
the public service is granted the President of the
Philippines. Article VII of the Constitution
64
64

Planas vs. Gil.
1. begins in its section 1 with the declaration that "The
Executive power shall be vested in a President of the
Philippines." All executive authority is thus vested in
him, and upon him devolves the constitutional duty
of seeing that the laws are "faithfully. executed." (Art
VII, sec. 11, subsec. 1, last clause.) In the fulfillment
of this duty which he cannot evade, he is granted
specific and express powers and functions. (Art. VII,
sec. 11.) In addition to these specific and express

powers and functions, he may also exercise those
necessarily implied and included in them. (Myers vs.
United States [1926], 272 U. S., 52; 71 Law. ed.,
160; 47 Sup Ct. Rep., 21; Willoughby, Constitution of
the United States, sec. 953, citing Taft's Our Chief
Magistrate and His Powers, p. 139.) The National
Assembly may not enact laws which either expressly
or impliedly diminish the authority conferred upon
the President of the Constitution. (Cf. Concepcion vs.
Paredes [1921], 42 Phil., 599.) The Constitution
provides that the President "shall have control of all
the executive departments, bureaus, and offices"
(Art. VII, sec. 11 [1], first clause) and shall "exercise
general supervision over all local governments as
may be provided by law" (Ibid, second clause). This
power of control and supervision is an important
constitutional grant.
1. 8. ID. ; ID.; ID. ; ID. ; ID.The President in the
exercise of the executive power under the
Constitution may act through the heads of the
.executive departments. The heads of the executive
departments are his authorized assistants and
agents in the performance of his excutive duties,
and their official acts, promulgated in the regular
course of business, are presumptively his acts.
(Runkle vs. United States [1887], 122 U. S., 543; 30
Law. ed., 1167; 7 Sup. Ct. Rep., 1141. See also U. S.
vs. Eliason [1839], 16 Pet., 291; 10 Law. ed., 968;
Jones vs. U. S. [1890], 137 U. S., 202; 34 Law. ed.,
691; 11 Sup. Ct. Rep., 80; Wolsey vs. Chapman
[1880], 101 U. S., 755; 25 Law. ed., 915; Wilcox vs.
Jackson [1836], 13 Pet., 498; 10 Law. ed., 264.)
1. 9. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.The power of removal which

the President may exercise directly and the practical
necessities of efficient government brought about by
administrative centralization easily make the
President the head of the administration.
(Willoughby, Constitution of the United States, Vol.
II, 2nd ed., sec. 959.) Independently of any statutory
provision authorizing the President to conduct an
investigation of the nature involved in this
proceeding, and in view of the mature and character
of the executive authority with which the President
of the Philippines is invested, the constitutional
grant to him of power to exercise general
supervision over all local govern
65
65
Planas vs. Gil.
1. ments and to take care that the laws be faithfully
executed must be construed to authorize him to
order an investigation of the act or conduct of the
petitioner herein. Supervision is not a meaningless
thing. It is an active power. It is certainly not without
limitation, but it at least implies authority to inquire
into facts and conditions in order to render the
power real and. effective. If supervision is to be
conscientious and rational, and not automatic and
brutal, it must be founded upon a knowledge of
actual facts and conditions disclosed after careful
study and investigation.
1. 10. ID.; ID.; ID. ; ID. ; ID.Section 64 of the
Administrative Code of 1917 provides as follows: "In
addition to his general supervisory authority, the
Governor-General (President) shall have such

specific powers and duties as are expressly
conferred or imposed on him by law and also, in
particular, the powers and duties set forth in this
chapter. Among such special powers and duties shall
be: * * * (c) To order, when in his opinnion the good
of the public service so requires, an investigation of
any action or the conduct of any person in the
Government service, and in connection therewith to
designate the official, committee, or person by
whom such investigation shall be conducted." This
provision of the law, in existence before the taking
effect of the Constitution, still subsists. It is not
inconsistent with the Constitution and has not been
abrogated or repealed by the National Assembly.
(See sec. 2, Art. XV Constitution.)
1. 11. ID.; ID.; ID. ; ID. ; ID.Assuming that this is not
one of the grounds provided by law for which the
petitioner may be investigated administratively (sec.
2078, Rev. Adm. Code), there is weight in the
argument that the investigation would, still be in
order if for no other purpose than to cause a full and
honest disclosure of all the facts so that, if found
proper and justified, appropriate action may be
taken against the parties alleged to have been guilty
of the illegal acts charged. This is essential to render
effective the authority vested in the President by the
Constitution to "take care that the laws be faithfully
executed." (Sec. 11, par. 1, Art. VII.) The
enforcement of the law and the maintenance of
peace and order are primarily an executive
obligation. The declaration that the President should
"take care that the laws be faithfully executed" is
more an imposition of an obligation than a

conferment of power. His oath requires him to
"faithfully and conscientiously fulfill" his duties as
President, "preserve and defend" the Constitution
and "execute" the law. This duty of the Executive to
see that the laws be faithfully executed is
66
66

Planas vs. Gil.
1. not limited to the enforcement of legislative acts or
the express terms of the Constitution but also
includes the due enforcement of rights, duties,
obligations, prerogatives and immunities growing
out of the Constitution itself and of the protection
implied by the nature of the government under the
Constitution. (Cunningham vs. Neagle, 135 U. S., 1;
34 Law. ed., 55.)
1. 12. ID.; ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID.; FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND
OF THE PRESS.The court is vigilantly alive to the
necessity of maintaining and protecting the
constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech and of
the press, no less than the right of assembly and
petition which, according to Stimson (The American
Constitution As It Protects Private Rights, 152), is its
origin rather than its derivation. We do not forget
that when repression of political and religious
discussion became intensewhen censorship of the
press Was resorted to most vigorously by the Long
Parliament in EnglahdJohn Milton, that great
historiographer of Cromwell, in his Areopagitica,
denounced the suppression of truth and appealed
for "the liberty to know, to utter, and to argue freely
according to conscience, above all liberties"

("Areopagitica", 73, 74 Ambler's Reprint). And this
court has had occasion to vindicate this right, and it
is now a settled doctrine that the official conduct
and the policies of public officials can be criticized
(U. S. vs. Bustos. 37 Phil., 731), and that criticism of
the constitution and legislation of government
measures or policies cannot be suppressed or
prevented (U. S. vs. Perfecto, 43 Phil., 225), unless
the intention be to incite rebellion and civil war
(Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 614). In the
present case, however, the petitioner is not denied
the right, nor is she being investigated because she
had exercised that right. She has a perfect right to
criticize the Government, its administration, its
policies and officials, but she may not, on the plea of
freedom of speech and of the press, impute
violations of law and the commission of frauds and
thereafter fold her arms and decline to face an
investigation conducted to elicit the truth or falsity
of the charges formulated by her. Otherwise, the
guarantee which, in the language of Wendell Phillips,
is "at once the Instrument, and the guarantee, and
the bright consummate flower of all liberty" would
degenerate into an unbridled license, and render the
Government powerless to act.
67
Planas vs. Gil.
67
Juan Sumulong, Vicente Sotto, Godofredo Reyes,

Wenceslao Q. Vinzons, Lorenzo Sumulong and Jose de
Leon for petitioner.
Solicitor-General Ozaeta for respondent.
LAUREL, J.:
This is an original action of prohibition instituted in this
court by which the petitioner seeks to enjoin the
respondent Commissioner of Civil Service from
conducting the investigation ordered by authority of the
President of the Philippines. The case arose as a result -of
the publication in one of the local dailies of a statement in
which the petitioner, then and now a member of the
municipal board of the City of Manila, criticized the acts
of certain government officials in connection with the
general election for Assemblymen held on November 8,
1938. The statement as published in the issue of La
Vanguardia of November 17, 1938, is translated as
follows:
"All opposition efforts in the country are useless just as all
movement toward the unification of the opposition as
long as in the opposition group there are people who
present their candidacies and then speculate on these
candidacies, offering them to the highest bidder. In
Manila, the opposition should have won the November 8
elections, but lost instead because of a disastrous division
due to people who commercialized their candidacies.
"The Constitution prohibits the reelection of the President
precisely so that the President may devote all his time to
the administration of public affairs for the welfare of the
people, but the President was the first to play politics,
publicly expressing his preference for candidates of his

liking; and with the President all other officials of the
government also moved, taking part in electoral
campaigns.
"With the government machinery feverishly functioning to
flatten the opposition and prevent candidates supported
by the people from going to the National Assembly, and
with frauds and violations of all rules of the civil service to
push to victory the candidates of the Nacionalista Party
and the administration, all constructive opposition in the
68
68

Planas vs. Gil.
country is useless. In past elections, all the municipal and

city mayors have been mobilized to insure the victory of
the candidates of the administration, depriving the
people of their right to vote for the candidates of their
own choosing.
"Even members of the cabinet moved, one of them, the
Hon. Eulogio Rodriguez going to the extent of speaking at
meetings in the Province of Rizal to counteract the
avalanche of votes for the opposition, instead of staying
in his office in the government. The opposition is
struggling within the law, but the party in power uses
means that are not worthy of gentlemen in order that it
may predominate in the government forever; never has it
tried to fight fairly.
"It may be said that the President of the United States is
also making electoral campaigns, but the situation in the
United States is different. There the President is allowed
to run for reelection while in the Philippines the

Constitution wisely provides against the reelection of the
President. It is reasonable to believe that the President is
from this moment paving the way for his reelection. It is
to be feared that the new National Assembly will change
this wise provision of our Constitution to permit the
reelection of President Manuel L. Quezon."
On November 18, 1938, the day following the publication
of the foregoing statement, the petitioner received a
letter, Annex A, signed as follows: "By authority of the
President: Jorge B. Vargas, Secretary to the President," in
which letter the statement is quoted in full and the
petitioner is informed thus:
"In the above statement, you appear to make the
following charges: (1) That the President of the
Philippines has violated the Constitution in that he has
taken part in politics, expressing his preference for the
candidates of the Nacionalista Party; (2) That the whole
government machinery has been put in action to prevent
the election to the National Assembly of the candidates of
the people; (3) That the candidates of the Nacionalista
Party and of the administration have won the election
through frauds and
69
Planas vs. Gil.
69
violations of the civil service rules; (4) That the

administration does not permit the people to freely elect
the candidates of their choice.
"You are hereby directed to appear before the

Commissioner of Civil Service, either alone or
accompanied by counsel, at 9 o'clock a. m., on November
the 22nd, to prove the statements made by you. Failure
to sustain your charges or to prove that they have been
made in good faith will be considered sufficient cause for
your suspension or removal from office."
At the appointed time, the petitioner, accompanied by
her counsel, appeared at the office of the respondent and
delivered to him a letter, Annex B, in which she voiced
objection to the authority of the respondent to conduct
the investigation. The respondent Commissioner did not
desist from proceeding with the investigation, but
announced before adjourning the hearing of November
22nd that he would decide the question raised as to his
jurisdiction on November 26, 1938. It was at this state of
the investigation that the petitioner filed in this court her
original petition for prohibition of November 25, 1938, in
which she at the same time prayed for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the respondent
commissioner from continuing with the investigation. The
petition for the issuance of a writ of preliminary Injunction
was denied by resolution of this court dated November
25, 1938. The next day the petitioner requested the
respondent, in writing (Annex D), to refrain from making
any ruling on the question of his jurisdiction to investigate
the petitioner and to abstain from taking any further step
in connection with said investigation until the
jurisdictional issue could be finally passed upon by this
court. On the same day, the request of the petitioner was
denied and the respondent ruled that he had jurisdiction
to proceed with the investigation (Annex E.) The
respondent also notified the petitioner to appear before
him on Saturday, December 3, 1938, and to testify in her

behalf and produce such other evidence as she might
desire to present in support of the charges contained in
her statement of November 17, 1938.
70
70

Planas vs. Gil.
The original petition of November 25th was amended by

another of December 2nd. The amendent was allowed by
this court. The Solicitor-General filed his amended answer
accordingly.
Petitioner contends in her amended petition:
1. "(a)
That the respondent is absolutely without

jurisdiction to investigate petitioner with a view to
her suspension or removal in connection with her
statement of November 17th;
2. "(b) That the said investigation with a view to
petitioner's suspension or removal is against Article
VII, sec. 11 (1) of the Constitution of the Philippines
and is not warranted by any statutory provision;
3. "(c)
That even under the- statutes in force before the

approval of the Constitution of the Philippines,
petitioner, as Councilor of the City of Manila, cannot
be investigated administratively with a view to her
suspension or removal except for acts or conduct
connected with the discharge of her official
functions;
4. "(d)
That petitioner, as an elective official, is

accountable for her political acts to her constituency
alone, unless such acts constitute offenses

punishable under our penal laws, and not to
executive officials belonging to a party opposed to
that to which petitioner is affiliated;
5. "(e)
That petitioner's statement of November 17th

made by her as a private citizen and in the exercise
of her right to discuss freely political questions
cannot properly be the subject of an administrative
investigation had with a view to her suspension or
removal, and is only cognizable by our courts of
justice in case the contents of said statement
infringe any provision of our Penal Code;
6. "(f)
That if petitioner's statement of November 17th,

as asserted in the Vargas letter of November 21st
Annex 'C', constitute sedition or any other criminal
offense in that said statement 'tends to create
general discontent, and hatred among the people
against their government, to make them lose faith in
the effectiveness of lawful processes to secure a
change in the control of the government,
71
71
Planas vs. Gil.
1. and to present the next National Assembly as an
illegal body, constituted by men who have been
elected through wholesale frauds and violations of
the civil service rules', then petitioner's
responsibility is a matter that should be heard and
decided by the competent courts in a trial publicly
and impartially conducted, and should not be the
subject of an administrative investigation with a
view to suspension or removal held behind closed
doors, with the power of final decision resting in the

hands of the very officials imputing seditious or
other criminal utterances to the petitioner;
2. "(g) That the authority sought to be conferred on
respondent by means of the two letters Annexes A
and C both signed 'By authority of the President:
Jorge B. Vargas, Secretary, to the President' is
without any force or effect, since the powers and
prerogatives vested in the President of the
Philippines by our Constitution and by our laws can
be exercised by the President alone, and cannot be
delegated to Mr. Jorge B. Vargas or to any other
person;
3. "(h)
That the proposed investigation with a view to

petitioner's suspension or removal by this Honorable
Court, would constitute an exercise of arbitrary,
inquisitorial, unlawful, and oppressive powers on the
part of respondent, tending to the suppression of the
constitutional right of petitioner, as a citizen, to
express freely and without fear of political
persecution her honest opinions concerning the
policies and political conduct of government
officials."
Petitioner prays:
1. "(1)
That a writ of preliminary injunction be forthwith

issued directing the respondent Commissioner of
Civl Service to desist from the investigation sought
to be conducted by him of petitioner, with a view to
her suspension or removal, in connection with her
statement published November 17th, until further
orders of' this Honorable Court;
2. "(2)
That upon due hearing the respondent be

permanently prohibited from proceeding further in
connection with said investigation;
3. "(3)
That the orders contained in the two letters of
Mr.
72
72

Planas vs. Gil.
1. Jorge B. Vargas (Annexes 'A' and 'C') and the
respondent's resolution dated November 26, 1938
(Annex 'E'), under which respondent seeks to
undertake the investigation so many times referred
to herein, be declared arbitrary and unconstitutional,
and therefore without any force or effect;
2. "(4) For costs of the petitioner and for such other
remedy as to this Honorable Court may seem just
and equitable."
Upon the other hand, the Solicitor-General contends in his

amended answer:
1. (a)
That respondent not only has jurisdiction but is in

duty bound to investigate the charges contained in
the petitioner's statement published on November
17, 1938, by virtue of and pursuant to the order of
His Excellency, the President of the Philippines (par.
3) ;
2. (b) That the power to order an investigation is vested
in the President of the Philippines by section 11 (1)
of Article VII of the Constitution and section 64 (c) of
the Revised Administrative Code (Id.);
3. (c)
That the question of whether or not the good of

the public service requires the investigation in
question is a matter on which the opinion of the
Chief Executive is conclusive and not subject to
review by the courts (par. 4, [b]);
4. (d)
That an administrative investigation of any act or

conduct of any person in the government service is
independent and exclusive of any judicial action that
the interested parties may institute arising from the
same act or conduct (par. 4, [c]) ;
5. (e)
That petitioner's theory that an elected provincial

or municipal official is accountable to his or her
constituency alone and is not subject to any
administrative investigation but only to a criminal
prosecution in court, has no basis either in law or in
precedent (par. 5, [a]);
6. (f)
That such investigation is neither arbitrary nor

unlawful nor inquisitorial because sanctioned by the
Constietition and statutory provisions (par. 5, [b]);
7. (g)
That the petition does not state a cause of action
73
73
Planas vs. Gil.
1. nor does it appear that petitioner has suffered any
grievance that calls for the court's intervention, for it
is not alleged that petitioner has been removed or
suspended from office or that she has; in any way
been deprived of any civil or political right (par. 7,
[a]) ;
2. (h)
That the present action is premature and that

there is no justification for the court to entertain the
same (par. 9); and
3. (i)
That this court has no jurisdiction over the case

under the doctrine of separation of powers (par. 10).
The Solicitor-General, under the last paragraph (par. 10)

of his amended answer, raises the question of jurisdiction
of this court over the acts of the Chief Executive. He
contends that "under the separation of powers marked by
the Constitution, the court has no jurisdiction to review
the orders of the Chief Executive, evidenced by Annex A
and Annex C of the petition, which are of purely
administrative character." Reliance is had on the previous
decisions of this court: Severino vs. Governor-General
([1910], 16 Phil., 366) ; Abueva vs. Wood ([1924], 45
Phil., 612) ; and Alejandrino vs. Quezon ([1924], 46 Phil.,
83). Although this is the last point raised by the
Government in its answer, it should, for reasons that are
apparent, be first to be considered. If this court does not
have jurisdiction to entertain these proceedings, then, the
same should be dismissed as a matter of course;
otherwise, the merits of the controversy should be passed
upon and determined.
It must be conceded that the acts of the Chief Executive
performed within the limits of his jurisdiction are his
official acts and courts will neither direct nor restrain
executive action in such cases. The rule is noninterference. But from this legal premise, it does not
necessarily follow that we are precluded from making an
inquiry into the validity or constitutionality of his acts
when these are properly challenged in an appropriate
legal proceeding. The classical separation of
governmental powers, whether viewed in the light of the

political philosophy of Aristotle, Locke, or Montesquieu, or
of the postulations of Mabini, Madison, or Jefferson, is a
relative theory of government.
74
74

Planas vs. Gil.
There is more truism and actuality in interdependence

than in independence and separation of powers, for as
observed by Justice Holmes in a case of Philippine origin,
we cannot lay down "with mathematical precision and
divide the branches into watertight compartments" not
only because "the great ordinances of the Constitution do
not establish and divide fields of black and white" but
also because "even the more specific of them are found
to terminate in a penumbra shading gradually from one
extreme to the other." (Springer vs. Government [1928],
277 U. S., 189; 72 Law. ed., 845, 852.) As far as the
judiciary is concerned, while it holds "'neither the sword
nor the purse" it is by constitutional placement the organ
called upon to allocate constitutional boundaries, and to
the Supreme Court is entrusted expressly or by necessary
implication the obligation of determining in appropriate
cases the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law,
ordinance, or executive order or regulation. (Sec. 2 [1],
Art. VIII, Constitution of the Philippines.) In this sense and
to this extent, the judiciary restrains the other
departments of the government and this result is one of
the necessary corollaries of the "system of checks and
balances" of the government established.
In the present case, the President is not a party to the

proceeding. He is neither compelled nor restrained to act
in a particular way. The Commissioner of Civil Service is
the party respondent and the theory is advanced by the
Government that because an investigation undertaken by
him is directed by authority of the President of the
Philippines, this court has no jurisdiction over the present
proceedings instituted by the petitioner, Carmen Planas.
The argument is farfetched. A mere plea that a
subordinate officer of the government is acting under
orders from the Chief Executive may be an important
averment, but is neither decisive nor conclusive upon this
court. Like the dignity of his high office, the relative
immunity of the Chief Executive from judicial interference
is not in the nature of a sovereign passport for all the
subordinate offi75
Planas vs. Gil.
75
cials and employees of the Executive Department to the

extent that at the mere invocation of the authority that it
purports the jurisdiction of this court to inquire into the
validity or legality of an executive order is necessarily
abated or suspended. The facts in Severino vs.
GovernorGeneral, supra, Abueva vs. Wood, supra, and
Alejandrino vs. Quezon, supra, are different, and the
doctrines laid down therein must be confined to the facts
and legal environment involved and whatever general
observations might have been made in elaboration of the
views therein expressed but which are not essential to
the determination of the issues presented are mere obiter
dicta.
While, generally, prohibition as an extraordinary legal writ

will not issue to restrain or control the performance of
other than judicial or quasi-judicial functions (50 C. J.,
658), its issuance and enforcement are regulated by
statute and in this jurisdiction it may issue to any inferior
tribunal, corporation, board, or person, whether
exercising functions judicial or ministerial, whose acts are
without or in excess of jurisdiction. (Secs. 516 and 226,
Code of Civil Procedure.) The terms "judicial" and
"ministerial" used with reference to "functions" in the
challenged investigation by the respondent Commissioner
of Civil Service, which investigation if unauthorized and is
violative of the Constitution as contended is a fortiori
without or in excess of jurisdiction. The statutory rule in
this jurisdiction is that the writ of prohibition is not
confined exclusively to courts or tribunals to keep them
within the limits of their own jurisdiction and to prevent
them from encroaching upon the jurisdiction of other
tribunals, but will issue, in appropriate cases, to an officer
or person whose acts are without or in excess of his
authority. Not infrequently, "the writ is granted, where it
is necessary for the orderly administration of justice, or to
prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an
oppressive or vindictive manner, or a multiplicity of
actions." (Dimayuga and Fajardo vs. Fernandez [1922], 43
Phil., 304, 307; Aglipay vs. Ruiz [1937],
76
76

Planas vs. Gil.
35 Off. Gaz., 2164.) This court, therefore, has jurisdiction

over the instant proceedings and will accordingly proceed
to determine the merits of the present controversy.
As is seen from the foregoing relation of facts various
legal questions are propounded. Reducing, however, the
issues to what is considered is the fundamental legal
proposition presented, we are asked in these proceedings
to prohibit the respondent Commissioner of Civil Service
from conducting or continuing with the investigation
ordered by authority of the President of the Philippines. It
is not denied that the President did authorize the
issuance of the order, but it is contended "that the said
investigation with a view to petitioner's suspension or
removal is against Article VII, sec. 11 (1) of the
Constitution of the Philippines and is not warranted by
any statutory provision." (Par. XV [b], amended petition.)
It, therefore, becomes necessary to inquire into the
constitutional and legal authority of the President to order
the investigation which has given rise to the present
controversy.
A perusal of our Constitution will show that extensive
authority over the public service is granted the President
of the Philippines. Article VII of the Constitution begins in
its section 1 with the declaration that "The Executive
power shall be vested in a President of the Philippines."
All executive authority is thus vested in him, and upon
him devolves the constitutional duty of seeing that the
laws are "faithfully executed." (Art. VII, sec. 11, subsec. 1,
last clause.) In the fulfillment of this duty which he cannot
evade, he is granted specific and express powers and
functions. (Art. VII, sec. 11.) In addition to these specific
and express powers and functions, he may also exercise
those necessarily implied and included in them. (Myers
vs. United States [1926], 272 U. S., 52; 71 Law. ed., 160;
47 Sup. Ct. Rep., 21; Willoughby, Constitution of the
United States, sec. 953, citing Taft's Our Chief Magistrate
and His Powers, p. 139.) The National Assembly may not
enact laws which either expressly or impliedly diminish
the authority conferred upon the President of the
77
Planas vs. Gil.
77
Constitution. (Cf. Concepcion vs. Paredes [1921], 42 Phil.,

599.) The Constitution provides that the President "shall
have control of all the executive departments, bureaus,
and offices" (Art. VII, sec. 11 [1], first clause) and shall
"exercise general supervision over all local governments
as may be provided by law" (Ibid, second clause). This
power of control and supervision is an important
constitutional grant. The President in the exercise of the
executive power under the Constitution may act through
the heads of the executive departments. The heads of the
executive departments are his authorized assistants and
agents in the performance of his executive duties, and
their official acts, promulgated in the regular course of
business, are presumptively his acts. (Runkle vs. United
States [1887], 122 U. S., 543; 30 Law. ed., 1167; 7 Sup.
Ct. Rep., 1141. See also U. S. vs. Eliason [1839], 16 Pet.,
291; 10 Law. ed., 968; Jones vs. U. S'. [1890], 137 U. S.,
202; 34 Law. ed., 691; 11 Sup. Ct., Rep., 80; Wolsey vs.
Chapman [1880], 101 U. S., 755; 25 Law. ed., 915; Wilcox
vs. Jackson [1836], 13 Pet., 498; 10 Law. ed., 264.) The
power of removal which the President may exercise
directly and the practical necessities of efficient
government brought about by administrative
centralization easily make the President the head of the

administration. (Willoughby, Constitution of the United
States, Vol. II, 2nd ed., sec. 959.) Independently of any
statutory provision authorizing the President to conduct
an investigation of the nature involved in this proceeding,
and in view of the nature and character of the executive
authority with which the President of the Philippines is
invested, the constitutional grant to him of power to
exercise general supervision over all local governments
and to take care that the laws be faithfully executed must
be construed to authorize him to order an investigation of
the act or conduct of the petitioner herein. Supervision is
not a meaningless thing. It is an active power. It is
certainly not without limitation, but it at least implies
authority to inquire into facts and conditions in order to
render the power real and effective- If su78
78

Planas vs. Gil.
pervision is to be conscientious and rational, and not

automatic and brutal, it must be founded upon a
knowledge of actual facts and conditions disclosed after
careful study and investigation,
Viewed from the totality of powers conferred upon the
Chief Executive by our Constitution, we should be
reluctant to yield to the proposition that the President of
the Philippines who is endowed with broad and
extraordinary powers by our Constitution, and who is
expected to govern with a firm and steady hand without
vexatious or embarrassing interference and much less
dictation from any source, is yet devoid of the power to
order the investigation of the petitioner in this case, We

should avoid that result.
Our attention has been directed to the fact that, with
reference to local governments, the Constitution speaks
of general supervision which is distinct from the control
given to the President over executive departments,
bureaus and offices. This is correct. But, aside from the
fact that this distinction is not important insofar as the
power of the President to order the investigation is
concerned, as hereinabove indicated, the deliberations of
the Constitutional Convention show that the grant of the
supervisory authority to Chief Executive in this regard
was in the nature of a compromise resulting from the
conflict of views in that body, mainly between the
historical view which. recognizes the right of local selfgovernment (People ex rel. Le Roy vs. Hurlbut [1871], 24
Mich., 44) and the legal theory which sanctions the
possession by the state of absolute control over local
governments (Booten vs. Pinson, L. R. A. [N. S., 1917-A],
1244; 77 W. Va., 412 [1915]). The result was the
recognition of the power of supervision and all its
implications and the rejection of what otherwise would be
an imperium in imperio to the detriment of a strong
national government.
Apart from the constitutional aspect, we find that section
64 of the Administrative Code of 1917 provides as f
ollows:
79
Planas vs. Gil.
79
"In addition to his general supervisory authority, the

Governor-General (President) shall have such specific
powers and duties as are expressly conferred or imposed
on him by law and also, in particular, the powers and
duties set forth in this chapter.
"Among such special powers and duties shall be:
*
*
*
"(c) To order, when in his opinion the good of the public

service so requires, an investigation of any action or the
conduct of any person in the Government service, and in
connection therewith to designate the official, committee,
or person by whom such investigation shall be
conducted."
This provision of the law, in existence before the taking
effect of the Constitution, still subsists. It is not
inconsistent with the Constitution and has not been
abrogated or repealed by the National Assembly. (See
sec. 2, Art. XV, Constitution.)
It is next urged that assuming the power of the President
to order the investigation, that investigation should' be in
accordance with law; that the petitioner as an elective
official can be proceeded against administratively only on
the grounds specifically stated in the law, namely,
disloyalty, dishonesty, oppression, misconduct, or
maladministration in office; and that as an elective official
she is responsible for her political acts to her constituency
alone. At the risk of repetition, it should be observed that
in the letter addressed by Secretary Vargas, by authority
of the President, to Miss Planas, the latter is informed as
follows: "In the above statement, you appear to make the

following charges: (1) That the President of the
Philippines has violated the Constitution in that he has
taken part in politics, expressing his preference for the
candidates of the Nacionalista Party; (2) That the whole
government machinery has been put in action to prevent
the election to the National Assembly of the candidates of
the people; (3) That the candidates of the Nacionalista
Party and of the administration have won the election
through frauds and
80
80

Planas vs. Gil.
violations of the civil service rules; (4) That the

administration does not permit the people to freely elect
the candidates of their choice"; and in that letter she is
directed to appear before the Commissioner of Civil
Service to prove the statement made by her. In the letter
designating the respondent commissioner as investigator
of the petitioner, it is stated: "The charges contained in
the foregoing statement tend to create general
discontent, and hatred among the people against their
government, to make them lose faith in the effectiveness
of lawful processes to secure a change in the control of
the government, and to present the next National
Assembly as an illegal body, constituted by men who
have been elected through wholesale frauds and
violations of the civil service rules. The interest of the
public service requires that these charges be
investigated, so that, if found to be true, appropriate
action may be taken against the parties alleged to have
been guilty of illegal acts, and if found untrue and made
without justifiable motives, the party making them may

be proceeded against in accordance with section 2440, in
connection, with section, 2078, of the Revised
Administrative Code." Assuming that this is not one of the
grounds provided by law for which the petitioner may be
investigated administratively (sec. 2078, Rev. Adm.
Code), there is weight in the argument that the
investigation would still be in order if for no other purpose
than to cause a full and honest disclosure of all the facts
so that, if found proper and justified, appropriate action
may be taken against the parties alleged to have been
guilty of the illegal acts charged. This is essential to
render effective the authority vested in the President by
the Constitution to "take care that the laws be faithfully
executed." (Sec. 11, par. 1, Art. VII.) The enforcement of
the law and the maintenance of peace and order are
primarily an executive obligation. The declaration that the
President should "take care that the laws be faithfully
executed" is more an imposition of an obligation than a
conferment of power. His oath requires him to "faithfully
and conscientiously fulfill" his duties as Pres81
Planas vs. Gil.
81
ident, "preserve and defend" the Constitution and

"execute" the law. This duty of the Executive to see that
the laws be faithfully executed is not limited to the
enforcement of legislative acts or the express terms of
the Constitution but also includes the due enforcement of
rights, duties, obligations, prerogatives and immunities
growing out of the Constitution itself and of the protection
implied by the nature of the government under the
Constitution. (Cunningham vs. Neagle, 135 U. S., 1; 34

Law. ed., 55.)
Petitioner contends that she has not abused the right of
free speech, and in this connection directs our attention
to the provisions of section 1 (pars. 1 and 8) of the Bill of
Rights. She also urges that "in the supposition that the
statement in question is libelous * * *, the corresponding
criminal or civil action should be brought in the courts of
justice at the initiative, not of the government, but of the
individuals claiming to have been defamed by the
statement." (P. 11, printed memorandum of the
petitioner.) We are vigilantly alive to the necessity of
maintaining and protecting the constitutional guaranty of
freedom of speech and of the press, no less than the right
of assembly and petition which, according to Stimson
(The American Constitution As It Protects Private Rights,
152), is its origin rather than its derivation. We do not
forget that when repression of political and religious
discussion became intensewhen censorship of the press
was resorted to most vigorously by the Long Parliament in
EnglandJohn Milton, that great historiographer of
Cromwell, in his Areopagitica, denounced the suppression
of truth and appealed for "the liberty to know, to utter,
and to argue freely according to conscience, above all
liberties" ("Areopagitica", 73, 74, Ambler's Reprint). And
this court has had occasion to vindicate this right, and it
is now a settled doctrine that the official conduct and the
policies of public officials can be criticized (U. S. vs.
Bustos, 37 Phil., 731), and that criticism of the
constitution and legislation, of government measures or
policies cannot be suppressed or prevented (U. S. vs.
Perfecto, 43 Phil., 225), unless the intention be to incite
rebellion and civil war (Cooley, Cons-
82
82

Marcos vs. Cruz.
titutional Limitations, 614). In the present case, however,

the petitioner is not denied the right, nor is she being
investigated because she had exercised that right. She
has a perfect right to criticize the Government, its
administration, its policies and officials, but she may not,
on the plea of freedom of speech and of the press, impute
violations of law and the commission of frauds and
thereafter fold her arms and decline to face an
investigation conducted to elicit the truth or falsity of the
charges formulated by her. Otherwise, the guarantee
which, in the language of Wendell Phillips, is "at once the
instrument, and the guarantee, and the bright
consummate flower of all liberty" would degenerate into
an unbridled license, and render the Government
powerless to act.
The petition is hereby dismissed, with costs against the
petitioner. So ordered.
Avancea, C. J., Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz, and
Concepcion, JJ., concur.
Petition dismissed.

Pamatong vs. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 161872. April 13, 2004.*EN BANC.REV. ELLY

VELEZ PAMATONG, ESQUIRE, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Election Law; Equal Access to Public Office; There is no
constitutional right to run for or hold public office and,
particularly, to seek the presidencywhat is recognized is
merely a privilege subject to limitations imposed by law.
Implicit in the petitioners invocation of the
constitutional provision ensuring equal access to
opportunities for public office is the claim that there is a
constitutional right to run for or hold public office and,
particularly in his case, to seek the presidency. There is
none. What is recognized is merely a privilege subject to
limitations imposed by law. Section 26, Article II of the
Constitution neither bestows such a right nor elevates the
privilege to the level of an enforceable right. There is
nothing in the plain language of the provision which
suggests such a thrust or justifies an interpretation of the
sort.
Same; Same; Constitutional Law; Declaration of Principles

and State Policies; The provisions under the Article are
generally considered not self-executing, and there is no
plausible reason for according a different treatment to the
equal access provisionlike the rest of the policies
enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain
any judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely
specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action.
The equal access provision is a subsumed part of
Article II of the Constitution, entitled Declaration of
Principles and State Policies. The provisions under the
Article are generally considered not self-executing, and
there is no plausible reason for according a different
treatment to the equal access provision. Like the rest of
the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does
not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right
but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or
executive action. The disregard of the provision does not
give rise to any cause of action before the courts.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; Words
and Phrases; Words and phrases such as equal access,
opportunities, and public service are susceptible to
countless interpretations owing to their inherent
impreciseness.The provision as written leaves much to
be desired if it is to be regarded as the source of positive
rights. It is difficult to interpret the clause as operative in
the absence of legislation since its effective means and
reach are not properly defined. Broadly written, the
myriad of claims that can be subsumed under this rubric
appear to be entirely open-ended. Words and phrases

such as equal access opportuni_______________
* EN BANC.
97
VOL. 427, APRIL 13, 2004 97
ties and public service are susceptible to countless

interpretations owing to their inherent impreciseness.
Certainly, it was not the intention of the framers to inflict
on the people an operative but amorphous foundation
from which innately unenforceable rights may be sourced.
Same; Same; The privilege of equal access to
opportunities to public office may be subjected to
limitations; Equality is not sacrificed as long as the
burdens engendered by the limitations are meant to be
borne by any one who is minded to file a certificate of
candidacy.As earlier noted, the privilege of equal access
to opportunities to public office may be subjected to
limitations. Some valid limitations specifically on the
privilege to seek elective office are found in the
provisions of the Omnibus Election Code on Nuisance
Candidates and COMELEC Resolution No. 6452 dated
December 10, 2002 outlining the instances wherein the
COMELEC may motu proprio refuse to give due course to
or cancel a Certificate of Candidacy. As long as the

limitations apply to everybody equally without
discrimination, however, the equal access clause is not
violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens
engendered by the limitations are meant to be borne by
any one who is minded to file a certificate of candidacy. In
the case at bar, there is no showing that any person is
exempt from the limitations or the burdens which they
create.
Same; Same; Nuisance Candidates; The rationale behind
the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the
disqualification of candidates who have not evinced a
bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divinethe
State has a compelling interest to ensure that its electoral
exercises are rational, objective, and orderly; Inevitably,
the greater the number of candidates, the greater the
opportunities for logistical confusion, not to mention the
increased allocation of time and resources in preparation
for the electiona disorderly election is not merely a
textbook example of inefficiency, but a rot that erodes
faith in our democratic institutions.The rationale behind
the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the
disqualification of candidates who have not evinced a
bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divine. The
State has a compelling interest to ensure that its electoral
exercises are rational, objective, and orderly. Towards this
end, the State takes into account the practical
considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably, the
greater the number of candidates, the greater the
opportunities for logistical confusion, not to mention the

increased allocation of time and resources in preparation
for the election. These practical difficulties should, of
course, never exempt the State from the conduct of a
mandated electoral exercise. At the same time, remedial
actions should be available to alleviate these logistical
hardships, whenever necessary and proper. Ultimately, a
disorderly election is not merely a textbook example of
inefficiency, but a rot that erodes faith in our democratic
institutions. As the United States Supreme Court held:
[T]here is surely an important state interest in requiring
some preliminary showing
98
of a significant modicum of support before printing the

name of a political organization and its candidates on the
ballotthe interest, if no other, in avoiding confusion,
deception and even frustration of the democratic
[process].
Same; Same; Same; Owing to the superior interest in
ensuring a credible and orderly election, the State could
exclude nuisance candidates and need not indulge in, as
the song goes, their trips to the moon on gossamer
wings.The preparation of ballots is but one aspect that
would be affected by allowance of nuisance candidates
to run in the elections. Our election laws provide various

entitlements for candidates for public office, such as
watchers in every polling place, watchers in the board of
canvassers, or even the receipt of electoral contributions.
Moreover, there are election rules and regulations the
formulations of which are dependent on the number of
candidates in a given election. Given these
considerations, the ignominious nature of a nuisance
candidacy becomes even more galling. The organization
of an election with bona fide candidates standing is
onerous enough. To add into the mix candidates with no
serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable campaign
would actually impair the electoral process. This is not to
mention the candidacies which are palpably ridiculous so
as to constitute a one-note joke. The poll body would be
bogged by irrelevant minutiae covering every step of the
electoral process, most probably posed at the instance of
these nuisance candidates. It would be a senseless
sacrifice on the part of the State. Owing to the superior
interest in ensuring a credible and orderly election, the
State could exclude nuisance candidates and need not
indulge in, as the song goes, their trips to the moon on
gossamer wings.
Same; Same; Same; The determination of bona fide
candidates is governed by the statutes, and the concept
is satisfactorily defined in the Omnibus Election Code.
The Omnibus Election Code and COMELEC Resolution No.
6452 are cognizant of the compelling State interest to
ensure orderly and credible elections by excising
impediments thereto, such as nuisance candidacies that

distract and detract from the larger purpose. The
COMELEC is mandated by the Constitution with the
administration of elections and endowed with
considerable latitude in adopting means and methods
that will ensure the promotion of free, orderly and honest
elections. Moreover, the Constitution guarantees that
only bona fide candidates for public office shall be free
from any form of harassment and discrimination. The
determination of bona fide candidates is governed by the
statutes, and the concept, to our mind is, satisfactorily
defined in the Omnibus Election Code.
Same; Same; Same; The question of whether a candidate
is a nuisance candidate or not is both legal and factual.
Petitioner has submitted to this Court mere photocopies
of various documents purportedly evincing
99
VOL. 427, APRIL 13, 2004 99
his credentials as an eligible candidate for the presidency.

Yet this Court, not being a trier of facts, can not properly
pass upon the reproductions as evidence at this level.
Neither the COMELEC nor the Solicitor General appended
any document to their respective Comments. The
question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate
or not is both legal and factual. The basis of the factual
determination is not before this Court. Thus, the remand

of this case for the reception of further evidence is in
order.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
Alioden D. Dalaig for public respondent.
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
Petitioner Rev. Elly Velez Pamatong filed his Certificate of
Candidacy for President on December 17, 2003.
Respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) refused
to give due course to petitioners Certificate of Candidacy
in its Resolution No. 6558 dated January 17, 2004. The
decision, however, was not unanimous since
Commissioners Luzviminda G. Tancangco and Mehol K.
Sadain voted to include petitioner as they believed he
had parties or movements to back up his candidacy.
On January 15, 2004, petitioner moved for
reconsideration of Resolution No. 6558: Petitioners
Motion for Reconsideration was docketed as SPP (MP) No.
04-001. The COMELEC, acting on petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration and on similar motions filed by other
aspirants for national elective positions, denied the same
under the aegis of Omnibus Resolution No. 6604 dated
February 11, 2004. The COMELEC declared petitioner and
thirty-five (35) others nuisance candidates who could not
wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not nominated
by a political party or are not supported by a registered

political party with a national constituency. Commissioner
Sadain maintained his vote for petitioner. By then,
Commissioner Tancangco had retired.
In this Petition For Writ of Certiorari, petitioner seeks to
reverse the resolutions which were allegedly rendered in
violation of his right to equal access to opportunities for
public service under
100
Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution,1SEC. 26.

The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities
for public service, and prohibit political dynasties as may
be defined by law. by limiting the number of qualified
candidates only to those who can afford to wage a
nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by political
parties. In so doing, petitioner argues that the COMELEC
indirectly amended the constitutional provisions on the
electoral process and limited the power of the sovereign
people to choose their leaders. The COMELEC supposedly
erred in disqualifying him since he is the most qualified
among all the presidential candidates, i.e., he possesses
all the constitutional and legal qualifications for the office
of the president, he is capable of waging a national
campaign since he has numerous national organizations

under his leadership, he also has the capacity to wage an
international campaign since he has practiced law in
other countries, and he has a platform of government.
Petitioner likewise attacks the validity of the form for the
Certificate of Candidacy prepared by the COMELEC.
Petitioner claims that the form does not provide clear and
reasonable guidelines for determining the qualifications
of candidates since it does not ask for the candidates
bio-data and his program of government.
First, the constitutional and legal dimensions involved.
Implicit in the petitioners invocation of the constitutional
provision ensuring equal access to opportunities for
public office is the claim that there is a constitutional
right to run for or hold public office and, particularly in his
case, to seek the presidency. There is none. What is
recognized is merely a privilege subject to limitations
imposed by law. Section 26, Article II of the Constitution
neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to
the level of an enforceable right. There is nothing in the
plain language of the provision which suggests such a
thrust or justifies an interpretation of the sort.
The equal access provision is a subsumed part of
Article II of the Constitution, entitled Declaration of
Principles and State Policies. The provisions under the
Article are generally considered not self-executing,2See
Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation,
G.R. No. 91649, May 14, 1991, 197 SCRA 52, 68;
Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, G.R. No. 118910, 246 SCRA
540, 564. A provision which lays down a and there is no

plausible reason for according a
_______________
1 SEC. 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to
opportunities for public service, and prohibit political
dynasties as may be defined by law.
2 See Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation, G.R. No. 91649, May 14, 1991, 197 SCRA 52,
68; Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, G.R. No. 118910, 246 SCRA
540, 564. A provision which lays down a
101
VOL. 427, APRIL 13, 2004 101
different treatment to the equal access provision. Like

the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the
provision does not contain any judicially enforceable
constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for
legislative or executive action.3See Kilosbayan, Inc. v.
Morato, G.R. No. 118910, 16 November 1995, 250 SCRA
130, 138; Manila Prince Hotel v. Government Service
Insurance System, supra note 2 at p. 436. The disregard
of the provision does not give rise to any cause of action
before the courts.4Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, supra note
2.An inquiry into the intent of the framers5A searching
inquiry should be made to find out if the provision is

intended as a present enactment, complete in itself as a
definitive law, or if it needs future legislation for
completion and enforcement. The inquiry demands a
micro-analysis and th... produces the same determination
that the provision is not self-executory. The original
wording of the present Section 26, Article II had read,
The State shall broaden opportunities to public office
and prohibit public dynasties.6J. Bernas, THE INTENT OF
THE 1986 CONSTITUTION WRITERS (1995), p. 148.
Commissioner (now Chief Justice) Hilario Davide, Jr.
successfully brought forth an amendment that changed
the word broaden to the phrase ensure equal access,
and the substitution of the word office to service. He
explained his proposal in this wise:
I changed the word broaden to ENSURE EQUAL
ACCESS TO because what is important would be equal
access to the opportunity. If you broaden, it would
necessarily mean that the government would be
mandated to create as many offices as are possible to
accommodate as many people as are also possible. That
is the meaning of broadening opportunities to public
service. So, in order that we should not mandate the
State to
_______________
general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the
1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. Manila
Prince Hotel v. Government Service Insurance System,
G.R. No. 122156, 3 February 1997, 267 SCRA 408, 431.
Accordingly, [the Court has] held that the provisions in

Article II of our Constitution entitled Declaration of
Principles and State Policies should generally be
construed as mere statements of principles of the State.
Justice Puno, dissenting, Manila Prince Hotel v.
Government Service Insurance System, Id., at p. 474.
3 See Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, G.R. No. 118910, 16
November 1995, 250 SCRA 130, 138; Manila Prince Hotel
v. Government Service Insurance System, supra note 2 at
p. 436.
4 Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, supra note 2.
5 A searching inquiry should be made to find out if the
provision is intended as a present enactment, complete in
itself as a definitive law, or if it needs future legislation for
completion and enforcement. The inquiry demands a
micro-analysis and the context of the provision in
question. J. Puno, dissenting, Manila Prince Hotel v.
Government Service Insurance System, supra note 2.
6 J. Bernas, THE INTENT OF THE 1986 CONSTITUTION
WRITERS (1995), p. 148.
102
make the government the number one employer and to

limit offices only to what may be necessary and
expedient yet offering equal opportunities to access to it,
I change the word broaden.7IV RECORDS OF
PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES, 1986 CONSTITUTIONAL
COMMISSION 945. (emphasis supplied)
Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the
State to enact positive measures that would
accommodate as many people as possible into public
office. The approval of the Davide amendment indicates
the design of the framers to cast the provision as simply
enunciatory of a desired policy objective and not
reflective of the imposition of a clear State burden.
Moreover, the provision as written leaves much to be
desired if it is to be regarded as the source of positive
rights. It is difficult to interpret the clause as operative in
the absence of legislation since its effective means and
reach are not properly defined. Broadly written, the
myriad of claims that can be subsumed under this rubric
appear to be entirely open-ended.8See J. Feliciano,
concurring, Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., G.R. No. 101083, 30
July 1993, 224 SCRA 792, 815. Words and phrases such
as equal access opportunities and public service
are susceptible to countless interpretations owing to their
inherent impreciseness. Certainly, it was not the intention
of the framers to inflict on the people an operative but
amorphous foundation from which innately unenforceable
rights may be sourced.
As earlier noted, the privilege of equal access to

opportunities to public office may be subjected to
limitations. Some valid limitations specifically on the
privilege to seek elective office are found in the
provisions9Section 69. Nuisance Candidates.The
Commission may, motu proprio or upon a verified petition
of an interested party, refuse to give due course or cancel
a certificate of candidacy if it is shown that said
certificate has been filed to put the elec... of the Omnibus
Election Code on Nuisance Candidates and COMELEC
Resolution No. 645210SEC. 6. Motu Proprio Cases.The
Commission may, at any time before the election, motu
proprio refuse to give due course to or cancel a dated
December 10,
_______________
7 IV RECORDS OF PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES, 1986
CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 945.
8 See J. Feliciano, concurring, Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., G.R.
No. 101083, 30 July 1993, 224 SCRA 792, 815.
9 Section 69. Nuisance Candidates.The Commission
may, motu proprio or upon a verified petition of an
interested party, refuse to give due course or cancel a
certificate of candidacy if it is shown that said certificate
has been filed to put the election process in mockery or
disrepute or to cause confusion among the voters by the
similarity of the names of the registered candidates or by
other circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate
that the candidate has no bona fide intention to run for
the office for which the certificate of candidacy has been

filed and thus prevent a faithful determination of the true
will of the electorate.
10 SEC. 6. Motu Proprio Cases.The Commission may, at
any time before the election, motu proprio refuse to give
due course to or cancel a
103
VOL. 427, APRIL 13, 2004 103
2002 outlining the instances wherein the COMELEC may

motu proprio refuse to give due course to or cancel a
Certificate of Candidacy.
As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally
without discrimination, however, the equal access clause
is not violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the
burdens engendered by the limitations are meant to be
borne by any one who is minded to file a certificate of
candidacy. In the case at bar, there is no showing that
any person is exempt from the limitations or the burdens
which they create.
Significantly, petitioner does not challenge the
constitutionality or validity of Section 69 of the Omnibus
Election Code and COMELEC Resolution No. 6452 dated
10 December 2003. Thus, their presumed validity stands

and has to be accorded due weight.
Clearly, therefore, petitioners reliance on the equal
access clause in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution
is misplaced.
_______________
certificate of candidacy of any candidate for the positions
of President, Vice-President, Senator and Party-list:
I. The grounds:
a. Candidates who, on the face of their certificate of
candidacy, do not possess the constitutional and legal
qualifications of the office to which they aspire to be
elected;
b. Candidate who, on the face of said certificate, filed
their certificate of candidacy to put the election process
in mockery or disrepute;
c. Candidates whose certificate of candidacy could cause
confusion among the voters by the similarity of names
and surnames with other candidates; and
d. Candidates who have no bona fide intention to run for
the office for which the certificate of candidacy had been
filed or acts that clearly demonstrate the lack of such
bona fide intention, such as:
d.1. Candidates who do not belong to or are not
nominated by any registered political party of national
constituency;
d.2. Presidential, Vice-Presidential [candidates] who do

not present running mates for vice-president,
respectively, nor senatorial candidates;
d.3. Candidates who do not have a platform of
government and are not capable of waging a nationwide
campaign.
104
The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance

candidates and the disqualification of candidates who
have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is
easy to divine. The State has a compelling interest to
ensure that its electoral exercises are rational, objective,
and orderly. Towards this end, the State takes into
account the practical considerations in conducting
elections. Inevitably, the greater the number of
candidates, the greater the opportunities for logistical
confusion, not to mention the increased allocation of time
and resources in preparation for the election. These
practical difficulties should, of course, never exempt the
State from the conduct of a mandated electoral exercise.
At the same time, remedial actions should be available to
alleviate these logistical hardships, whenever necessary
and proper. Ultimately, a disorderly election is not merely
a textbook example of inefficiency, but a rot that erodes

faith in our democratic institutions. As the United States
Supreme Court held:
[T]here is surely an important state interest in requiring
some preliminary showing of a significant modicum of
support before printing the name of a political
organization and its candidates on the ballotthe
interest, if no other, in avoiding confusion, deception and
even frustration of the democratic [process].11Jenness v.
Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971).The COMELEC itself
recognized these practical considerations when it
promulgated Resolution No. 6558 on 17 January 2004,
adopting the study Memorandum of its Law Department
dated 11 January 2004. As observed in the COMELECs
Comment:
There is a need to limit the number of candidates
especially in the case of candidates for national positions
because the election process becomes a mockery even if
those who cannot clearly wage a national campaign are
allowed to run. Their names would have to be printed in
the Certified List of Candidates, Voters Information Sheet
and the Official Ballots. These would entail additional
costs to the government. For the official ballots in
automated counting and canvassing of votes, an
additional page would amount to more or less FOUR
HUNDRED FIFTY MILLION PESOS (P450,000,000.00).
x x x [I]t serves no practical purpose to allow those
candidates to continue if they cannot wage a decent
campaign enough to project the prospect of winning, no

matter how slim.12Rollo, pp. 469._______________
11 Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971).
12 Rollo, pp. 469.
105
VOL. 427, APRIL 13, 2004 105
The preparation of ballots is but one aspect that would be

affected by allowance of nuisance candidates to run in
the elections. Our election laws provide various
entitlements for candidates for public office, such as
watchers in every polling place,13See Section 178,
Omnibus Election Code, as amended. watchers in the
board of canvassers,14See Section 239, Omnibus Election
Code, as amended. or even the receipt of electoral
contributions.15See Article XI, Omnibus Election Code, as
amended. Moreover, there are election rules and
regulations the formulations of which are dependent on
the number of candidates in a given election.
Given these considerations, the ignominious nature of a
nuisance candidacy becomes even more galling. The
organization of an election with bona fide candidates
standing is onerous enough. To add into the mix
candidates with no serious intentions or capabilities to
run a viable campaign would actually impair the electoral

process. This is not to mention the candidacies which are
palpably ridiculous so as to constitute a one-note joke.
The poll body would be bogged by irrelevant minutiae
covering every step of the electoral process, most
probably posed at the instance of these nuisance
candidates. It would be a senseless sacrifice on the part
of the State.
Owing to the superior interest in ensuring a credible and
orderly election, the State could exclude nuisance
candidates and need not indulge in, as the song goes,
their trips to the moon on gossamer wings.
The Omnibus Election Code and COMELEC Resolution No.
6452 are cognizant of the compelling State interest to
ensure orderly arid credible elections by excising
impediments thereto, such as nuisance candidacies that
distract and detract from the larger purpose. The
COMELEC is mandated by the Constitution with the
administration of elections16See Section 2(1), Article IX,
Constitution. and endowed with considerable latitude in
adopting means and methods that will ensure the
promotion of free, orderly and honest
elections.17Sanchez v. Commission on Elections, 199 Phil.
617; 153 SCRA 67 (1987), citing Cauton v. Commission on
Elections, L-25467, 27 April 1967, 19 SCRA 911.
Moreover, the Constitution guarantees that only bona fide
candidates for public office
_______________
13 See Section 178, Omnibus Election Code, as amended.

14 See Section 239, Omnibus Election Code, as amended.
15 See Article XI, Omnibus Election Code, as amended.
16 See Section 2(1), Article IX, Constitution.
17 Sanchez v. Commission on Elections, 199 Phil. 617;
153 SCRA 67 (1987), citing Cauton v. Commission on
Elections, L-25467, 27 April 1967, 19 SCRA 911.
106
shall be free from any form of harassment and

discrimination.18See Section 9, Article IX, Constitution.
The determination of bona fide candidates is governed by
the statutes, and the concept, to our mind is,
satisfactorily defined in the Omnibus Election Code.
Now, the needed factual premises.
However valid the law and the COMELEC issuance
involved are, their proper application in the case of the
petitioner cannot be tested and reviewed by this Court on
the basis of what is now before it. The assailed
resolutions of the COMELEC do not direct the Court to the
evidence which it considered in determining that
petitioner was a nuisance candidate. This precludes the

Court from reviewing at this instance whether the
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
disqualifying petitioner, since such a review would
necessarily take into account the matters which the
COMELEC considered in arriving at its decisions.
Petitioner has submitted to this Court mere photocopies
of various documents purportedly evincing his credentials
as an eligible candidate for the presidency. Yet this Court,
not being a trier of facts, can not properly pass upon the
reproductions as evidence at this level. Neither the
COMELEC nor the Solicitor General appended any
document to their respective Comments.
The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance
candidate or not is both legal and factual. The basis of
the factual determination is not before this Court. Thus,
the remand of this case for the reception of further
evidence is in order.
A word of caution is in order. What is at stake is
petitioners aspiration and offer to serve in the
government. It deserves not a cursory treatment but a
hearing which conforms to the requirements of due
process.
As to petitioners attacks on the validity of the form for
the certificate of candidacy, suffice it to say that the form
strictly complies with Section 74 of the Omnibus Election
Code. This provision specifically enumerates what a
certificate of candidacy should contain, with the required
information tending to show that the candidate possesses

the minimum qualifications for the position aspired for as
established by the Constitution and other election laws.
_______________
18 See Section 9, Article IX, Constitution.
107
VOL. 427, APRIL 13, 2004 107
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, COMELEC Case No. SPP

(MP) No. 04-001 is hereby remanded to the COMELEC for
the reception of further evidence, to determine the
question on whether petitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is
a nuisance candidate as contemplated in Section 69 of
the Omnibus Election Code.
The COMELEC is directed to hold and complete the
reception of evidence and report its findings to this Court
with deliberate dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr. (C.J.), Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, AustriaMartinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr. and Azcuna,
JJ., concur.
Vitug, J., On Official Leave.

Comelec Case No. SPP (MP) No. 04-001 remanded to
Comelec for reception of further evidence.
Notes.The requirement of a bond equivalent to one year
salary for the office run for to be filed by a candidate for
public office is violative of the republican nature of the
Philippines. Such property qualification is inconsistent
with the nature and essence of the Republican system
ordained in the Constitution and the principle of social
justice underlying the same, for said political system is
premised upon the tenet that sovereignty resides in the
people and all government authority emanates from them
and this, in turn, implies necessarily that the right to vote
and to be voted for shall not be dependent upon the
wealth of the individual concerned, whereas social justice
presupposes equal opportunity for all, rich and poor alike,
and that, accordingly, no person shall, by reason of
poverty, be denied the chance to be elected to public
office. (Maquera vs. Borra, 15 SCRA 7 [1965])
A fundamental tenet of representative democracy is that
the people should be allowed to choose those whom they
please to govern them. (Borja, Jr. vs. Commission on
Elections, 295 SCRA 157 [1998]) [Pamatong vs.
Commission on Elections, 427 SCRA 96(2004)]

Valmonte vs. Belmonte, Jr.
G.R. No. 74930. February 13, 1989.*EN BANC.RICARDO

VALMONTE, OSWALDO CARBONELL, DOY DEL CASTILLO,
ROLANDO BARTOLOME, LEO OBLIGAR, JUN GUTIERREZ,
REYNALDO BAGATSING, JUN NINOY ALBA, PERCY LAPID,
ROMMEL CORRO and ROLANDO FADUL, petitioners, vs.
FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR., respondent.
Constitutional Law; Bill of Rights; Right to Information;
Administrative Law; Exhaustion of Administrative
Remedies; As the issue involved herein is the
interpretation of the scope of the constitutional right to
information which is purely a legal question, the
exception of this case from the application of the general
rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is
warranted.Among the settled principles in
administrative law is that before a party can be allowed
to resort to the courts, he is expected to have exhausted
all means of administrative redress available under the
law. The courts for reasons of law, comity and
convenience will not entertain a case unless the available
administrative remedies have been resorted to and the
appropriate authorities have been given opportunity to
act and correct the errors committed in the
administrative forum. However, the principle of

exhaustion of administrative remedies is subject to
settled exceptions, among which is when only a question
of law is involved [Pascual v. Provincial Board, 106 Phil.
466 (1959); Aguilar v. Valencia, et al., G.R. No. L-30396,
July 30, 1971,40 SCRA 210; Malabanan v. Ramento, G.R.
No. L-2270, May 21, 1984, 129 SCRA 359.] The issue
raised by petitioners, which requires the interpretation of
the scope of the constitutional right to information, is one
which can be passed upon by the regular courts more
competently than the GSIS or its Board of Trustees,
involving as it does a purely legal question. Thus, the
exception of this case from the application of the general
rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is
warranted. Having disposed of this procedural issue, We
now address ourselves to the issue of whether or not
mandamus lies to compel respondent to perform the acts
sought by petitioners to be done, in pursuance of their
right to information.
Same; Same; Same; The right to information is meant to
enhance the widening role of the citizenry in
governmental decision-making as
_______________
* EN BANC.
257
VOL. 170, FEBRUARY 13, 1989 257
well as in checking abuses in the government.The right

to information is an essential premise of a meaningful
right to speech and expression. But this is not to say that
the right to information is merely an adjunct of and
therefore restricted in application by the exercise of the
freedoms of speech and of the press. Far from it. The
right to information goes hand-in-hand with the
constitutional policies of full public disclosure and honesty
in the public service. It is meant to enhance the widening
role of the citizenry in governmental decision-making as
well as in checking abuse in government.
Same; Same; Same; Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions;
Mandamus; The constitutional right to information is not
an absolute right, hence, before mandamus may issue, it
must be clear that the information sought is of public
interest or public concern and that the same is not
exempted by law from the operation of such
constitutional right.Yet, likely all the constitutional
guarantees, the right to information is not absolute. As
stated in Legaspi, the peoples right to information is
limited to matters of public concern, and is further
subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
Similarly, the States policy of full disclosure is limited to
transactions involving public interest, and is subject to
reasonable conditions prescribed by law. Hence, before
mandamus may issue, it must be clear that the
information sought is of public interest or public
concern, and is not exempted by law from the operation
of the constitutional guarantee [Legaspi v. Civil Service

Commission, supra, at p. 542.]
Same; Same; Same; Public Interest and Public Concern;
The information sought by herein petitioners as to the
truth of reports that some opposition members were
granted clean loans by the GSIS is a matter of public
interest and concern.The information sought by
petitioners in this case is the truth of reports that certain
Members of the Batasang Pambansa belonging to the
opposition were able to secure clean loans from the
GSIS immediately before the February 7, 1986 election
through the intercession of the former First Lady, Mrs.
Imelda R. Marcos. The GSIS is a trustee of contributions
from the government and its employees and the
administrator of various insurance programs for the
benefit of the latter. Undeniably, its funds assume a
public character. More particularly, Secs. 5(b) and 46 of
P.D. 1146, as amended (the Revised Government Service
Insurance Act of 1977), provide for annual appropriations
to pay the contributions, premiums, interest and other
amounts payable to GSIS by the government, as well as
the obligations which the Republic of the Philippines
assumes or guarantees to pay. Considering the
258
nature of its funds, the GSIS is expected to manage its

resources with utmost prudence and in strict compliance
with the pertinent laws or rules and regulations. Thus,
one of the reasons that prompted the revision of the old
GSIS law (CA. No. 186, as amended) was the necessity
to preserve at all times the actuarial solvency of the
funds administered by the System [Second Whereas
Clause, P.D. No. 1146.] Consequently, as respondent
himself admits, the GSIS is not supposed to grant clean
loans. [Comment, p. 8.] It is therefore the ligitimate
concern of the public to ensure that these funds are
managed properly with the end in view of maximizing the
benefits that accrue to the insured government
employees. Moreover, the supposed borrowers were
Members of the defunct Batasang Pambansa who
themselves appropriated funds for the GSIS and were
therefore expected to be the first to see to it that the
GSIS performed its tasks with the greatest degree of
fidelity and that all its transactions were above board. In
sum, the public nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS
and the public office held by the alleged borrowers make
the information sought clearly a matter of public interest
and concern.
Same; Same; Right to Privacy; The right to privacy
belongs to the individual in his private capacity, it cannot
be invoked by juridical entities like the GSIS.When the
information requested from the government intrudes into
the privacy of a citizen, a potential conflict between the
rights to information and to privacy may arise. However,
the competing interests of these rights need not be

resolved in this case. Apparent from the above-quoted
statement of the Court in Morfe is that the right to
privacy belongs to the individual in his private capacity,
and not to public and governmental agencies like the
GSIS. Moreover, the right cannot be invoked by juridical
entities like the GSIS. As held in the case of Vassar
College v. Loose Wills Biscuit Co. [197 F. 982 (1912)], a
corporation has no right of privacy in its name since the
entire basis of the right to privacy is an injury to the
feelings and sensibilities of the party and a corporation
would have no such ground for relief.
Same; Same; Same; The right to privacy may be invoked
only by the person whose privacy is claimed to have been
violated.Neither can the GSIS through its General
Manager, the respondent, invoke the right to privacy of
its borrowers. The right is purely personal in nature [Cf.
Atkinson v. John Doherty & Co., 121 Mich 372, 80 N.W.
285, 46 L.R.A. 219 (1899); Schuyler v. Curtis, 147 N.Y.
434, 42 N.E. 22, 31 L.R.A. 286 (1985)], and hence may be
invoked only by the
259
VOL. 170, FEBRUARY 13, 1989 259
person whose privacy is claimed to be violated.
Same; Same; Right to Information; Adminstrative Law;

Government Corporations; GSIS; The government,
whether carrying out its sovereign attributes or running
some business, discharges the same function of service
to the people.Respondent next asserts that the
documents evidencing the loan transactions of the GSIS
are private in nature and hence, are not covered by the
Constitutional right to information on matters of public
concern which guarantees (a)ccess to official records,
and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions only, xxx First of all, the
constituentministrant dichotomy characterizing
government function has long been repudiated. In ACCFA
v. Confederation of Unions and Government Corporations
and Offices [G.R. Nos. L-21484 and L-23605, November
29, 1969, 30 SCRA 644], the Court said that the
government, whether carrying out its sovereign attributes
or running some business, discharges the same function
of service to the people, consequently, that the GSIS, in
granting the loans, was exercising a proprietary function
would not justify the exclusion of the transactions from
the coverage and scope of the right to information.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Transactions
entered into by the GSIS are within the ambit of the
peoples right to be informed pursuant to the
constitutional policy of transparency in governmental
dealings.Considering the intent of the framers of the
Constitution which, though not binding upon the Court,
are nevertheless persuasive, and considering further that
government-owned and controlled corporations, whether

performing proprietary or governmental functions are
accountable to the people, the Court is convinced that
transactions entered into by the GSIS, a governmentcontrolled corporation created by special legislation are
within the ambit of the peoples right to be informed
pursuant to the constitutional policy of transparency in
government dealings.
Same; Same; Same; The right to information does not
include the right to compel custodians of official records
to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like.
However, the same cannot be said with regard to the first
act sought by petitioners, i.e., to furnish petitioners the
list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members
belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to
secure clean loans immediately before the February 7
election thru the intercession/marginal note of the then
First Lady Imelda Marcos.
260
Although citizens are afforded the right to information

and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to access to official
records, the Constitution does not accord them a right to
compel custodians of official records to prepare lists,
abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to
acquire information on matters of public concern. It must

be stressed that it is essential for a writ of mandamus to
issue that the applicant has a well-defined, clear and
certain legal right to the thing demanded and that it is
the imperative duty of defendant to perform the act
required. The corresponding duty of the respondent to
perform the required act must be clear and specific [Lemi
v. Valencia, G.R. No. L-20768, November 29, 1968, 126
SCRA 203; Ocampo v. Subido, G.R. No. L-28344, August
27, 1976, 72 SCRA 443.] The request of the petitioners
fails to meet this standard, there being no duty on the
part of respondent to prepare the list requested.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION for mandamus with preliminary
injunction to review the decision of the GSIS General
Manager.
Ricardo C. Valmonte for and in his own behalf and his
co-petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondent.
CORTS, J.:
Petitioners in this special civil action for mandamus with
preliminary injunction invoke their right to information
and pray that respondent be directed:
(a) to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the
Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO
and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans
immediately before the February 7 election thru the
intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda

Marcos; and/or
(b) to furnish petitioners with certified true copies of the
documents evidencing their respective loans; and/or
(c) to allow petitioners access to the public records for the
subject information. [Petition, pp. 4-5; paragraphing
supplied.]
The controversy arose when petitioner Valmonte wrote
respondent Belmonte the following letter:
261
VOL. 170, FEBRUARY 13, 1989 261
June 4, 1986
Hon. Feliciano Belmonte
GSIS General Manager
Arroceros, Manila
Sir:
As a lawyer, member of the media and plain citizen of our
Republic, I am requesting that I be furnished with the list
of names of the opposition members of (the) Batasang
Pambansa who were able to secure a clean loan of P2
million each on guarantty (sic) of Mrs. Imelda Marcos. We

understand that OIC Mel Lopez of Manila was one of those
aforesaid MPs. Likewise, may we be furnished with the
certified true copies of the documents evidencing their
loan. Expenses in connection herewith shall be borne by
us.
If we could not secure the above documents could we
have access to them?
We are premising the above request on the following
provision of the Freedom Constitution of the present
regime.
The right of the people to information on matters of
public concern shall be recognized. Access to official
records, and to documents and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions or decisions, shall be afforded
the citizen subject to such limitation as may be provided
by law. (Art. W, Sec. 6).
We trust that within five (5) days from receipt hereof we
will receive your favorable response on the matter.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) RICARDO C. VALMONTE
[Rollo, p. 7.]
To the aforesaid letter, the Deputy General Counsel of the
GSIS replied:
June 17, 1986
Atty. Ricardo C. Valmonte

108 E. Benin Street
Caloocan City
262
Dear Companero:
Possibly because he must have thought that it contained
serious legal implications, President & General Manager
Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. referred to me for study and reply
your letter to him of June 4,1986 requesting a list of the
opposition members of Batasang Pambansa who were
able to secure a clean loan of P2 million each on guaranty
of Mrs. Imelda Marcos.
My opinion in this regard is that a confidential relationship
exists between the GSIS and all those who borrow from it,
whoever they may be; that the GSIS has a duty to its
customers to preserve this confidentiality; and that it
would not be proper for the GSIS to breach this
confidentiality unless so ordered by the courts.
As a violation of this confidentiality may mar the image of
the GSIS as a reputable financial institution, I regret very
much that at this time we cannot respond positively to

your request.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) MEYNARDO A. TIRO
Deputy General Counsel
[Rollo, p. 40.]
On June 20, 1986, apparently not having yet received the
reply of the Govenrment Service and Insurance System
(GSIS) Deputy General Counsel, petitioner Valmonte
wrote respondent another letter, saying that for failure to
receive a reply, (W)e are now considering ourselves free
to do whatever action necesary within the premises to
pursue our desired objective in pursuance of public
interest. [Rollo, p. 8.]
On June 26, 1986, Valmonte, joined by the other
petitioners, filed the instant suit.
On July 19, 1986, the Daily Express carried a news item
reporting that 137 former members of the defunct interim
and regular Batasang Pambansa, including ten (10)
opposition members, were granted housing loans by the
GSIS [Rollo, p. 41.]
Separate comments were filed by respondent Belmonte
and the Solicitor General. After petitioners filed a
consolidated reply, the petition was given due course and
the parties were
263
VOL. 170, FEBRUARY 13, 1989 263
required to file their memoranda. The parties having

complied, the case was deemed submitted for decision.
In his comment respondent raises procedural objections
to the issuance of a writ of mandamus, among which is
that petitioners have failed to exhaust administrative
remedies.
Respondent claims that actions of the GSIS General
Manager are reviewable by the Board of Trustees of the
GSIS. Petitioners, however, did not seek relief from the
GSIS Board of Trustees. It is therefore asserted that since
administrative remedies were not exhausted, then
petitioners have no cause of action.
To this objection, petitioners claim that they have raised a
purely legal issue, viz., whether or not they are entitled to
the documents sought, by virtue of their constitutional
right to information. Hence, it is argued that this case
falls under one of the exceptions to the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Among the settled principles in administrative law is that
before a party can be allowed to resort to the courts, he
is expected to have exhausted all means of
administrative redress available under the law. The courts
for reasons of law, comity and convenience will not

entertain a case unless the available administrative
remedies have been resorted to and the appropriate
authorities have been given opportunity to act and
correct the errors committed in the administrative forum.
However, the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies is subject to settled exceptions, among which is
when only a question of law is involved [Pascual v.
Provincial Board, 106 Phil. 466 (1959); Aguilar v. Valencia,
et al., G.R. No. L-30396, July 30, 1971, 40 SCRA 210;
Malabanan v. Ramento, G.R. No. L-2270, May 21, 1984,
129 SCRA 359.] The issue raised by petitioners, which
requires the interpretation of the scope of the
constitutional right to information, is one which can be
passed upon by the regular courts more competently
than the GSIS or its Board of Trustees, involving as it does
a purely legal question. Thus, the exception of this case
from the application of the general rule on exhaustion of
administrative remedies is warranted. Having disposed of
this procedural issue, We now address ourselves to the
issue of whether or not
264
mandamus lies to compel respondent to perform the acts

sought by petitioners to be done, in pursuance of their
right to information.
We shall deal first with the second and third alternative
acts sought to be done, both of which involve the issue of
whether or not petitioners are entitled to access to the
documents evidencing loans granted by the GSIS.
This is not the first time that the Court is confronted with
a controversy directly involving the constitutional right to
information. In Tanada v. Tuvera, G.R. No. 63915, April 24,
1985, 136 SCRA 27 and in the recent case of Legaspi v.
Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 72119, May 29,
1987,150 SCRA 530, the Court upheld the peoples
constitutional right to be informed of matters of public
interest and ordered the government agencies concerned
to act as prayed for by the petitioners.
The pertinent provision under the 1987 Constitution is
Art. 111, Sec. 7 which states:
records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to
such limitations as may be provided by law.
The right of access to information was also recognized in
the 1973 Constitution, Art. IV Sec. 6 of which provided:

records, and to documents and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions, or decisions, shall be afforded
the citizen subject to such limitations as may be provided
by law.
An informed citizenry with access to the diverse currents
in political, moral and artistic thought and data relative to
them, and the free exchange of ideas and discussion of
issues thereon, is vital to the democratic government
envisioned under our Constitution. The cornerstone of
this republican system of
265
VOL. 170, FEBRUARY 13, 1989 265
government is delegation of power by the people to the

State. In this system, governmental agencies and
institutions operate within the limits of the authority
conferred by the people. Denied access to information on
the inner workings of government, the citizenry can
become prey to the whims and caprices of those to whom
the power had been delegated. The postulate of public
office as a public trust, institutionalized in the
Constitution (in Art. XI, Sec. 1) to protect the people from
abuse of governmental power, would certainly be mere
empty words if access to such information of public

concern is denied, except under limitations prescribed by
implementing legislation adopted pursuant to the
Constitution.
Petitioners are practitioners in media. As such, they have
both the right to gather and the obligation to check the
accuracy of information they disseminate. For them, the
freedom of the press and of speech is not only critical,
but vital to the exercise of their professions. The right of
access to information ensures that these freedoms are
not rendered nugatory by the governments monopolizing
pertinent information. For an essential element of these
freedoms is to keep open a continuing dialogue or
process of communication between the government and
the people. It is in the interest of the State that the
channels for free political discussion be maintained to the
end that the government may perceive and be responsive
to the peoples will. Yet, this open dialogue can be
effective only to the extent that the citizenry is informed
and thus able to formulate its will intelligently. Only when
the participants in the discussion are aware of the issues
and have access to information relating thereto can such
bear fruit.
The right to information is an essential premise of a
meaningful right to speech and expression. But this is not
to say that the right to information is merely an adjunct of
and therefore restricted in application by the exercise of
the freedoms of speech and of the press. Far from it. The
right to information goes hand-in-hand with the

constitutional policies
266
of full public disclosure**Art. II, Sec. 28. Subject to

reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts
and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest. and honesty in the
public service.***Art XI, Sec. 1. Public office is a public
trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with
partriotism and justice, and lead modest live... It is meant
to enhance the widening role of the citizenry in
governmental decision-making as well as in checking
abuse in government.
Yet, like all the constitutional guarantees, the right to
information is not absolute. As stated in Legaspi, the
peoples right to information is limited to matters of
public concern, and is further subject to such limitations
as may be provided by law. Similarly, the States policy
of full disclosure is limited to transactions involving
public interest, and is subject to reasonable conditions
prescribed by law.
Hence, before mandamus may issue, it must be clear that

the information sought is of public interest or public
concern, and is not exempted by law from the operation
of the constitu_______________
** Art. II, Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions
prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a
policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions
involving public interest.
*** Art XI, Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public
officers and employees must at all times be accountable
to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with partriotism and
justice, and lead modest lives.
The following provisions of the 1987 Constitution are
further indicative of the policy of transparency:
Art. VII, Sec. 12. In case of serious illness of the President,
the public shall be informed of the state of his health. The
members of the cabinet in charge of national security and
foreign relations and the Chief of Staff of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines shall not be denied access to the
President during such illness.
Art. XI, Sec. 17. A public officer or employee shall, upon
assumption of office and as often thereafter as may be
required by law, submit a declaration under oath of his
assets, liabilities, and net worth. In the case of the
President, the Vice-President, the Members of the
Cabinet, the Congress, the Supreme Court, the

Constitutional Commissions and other constitutional
offices, and officers of the armed forces with general or
flag rank, the declaration shall be disclosed to the public
in the manner provided by law.
Art. XII, Sec. 21. Foreign loans may only be incurred in
accordance with law and the regulation of the monetary
authority. Information on foreign loans obtained or
guaranteed by the Government shall be made available
to the public.
267
VOL. 170, FEBRUARY 13, 1989 267
tional guarantee [Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission,

supra, at p. 542.]
The Court has always grappled with the meanings of the
terms public interest and public concern. As observed
in Legaspi:
In determining whether or not a particular information is
of public concern there is no rigid test which can be
applied. Public concern like public interest is a term
that eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace a broad
spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know,
either because these directly affect their lives, or simply
because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an

ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to
determine on a case by case basis whether the matter at
issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or
affects the public. [Ibid, at p. 541.]
In the Taada case the public concern deemed covered by
the constitutional right to information was the need for
adequate notice to the public of the various laws which
are to regulate the actions and conduct of citizens. In
Legaspi, it was the legitimate concern of citizens to
ensure that government positions requiring civil service
eligibility are occupied only by persons who are eligibles
[Supra at p. 539.]
The information sought by petitioners in this case is the
truth of reports that certain Members of the Batasang
Pambansa belonging to the opposition were able to
secure clean loans from the GSIS immediately before
the February 7, 1986 election through the intercession of
the former First Lady, Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos.
The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the
government and its employees and the administrator of
various insurance programs for the benefit of the latter.
Undeniably, its funds assume a public character. More
particularly, Secs. 5(b) and 46 of P.D. 1146, as amended
(the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977),
provide for annual appropriations to pay the
contributions, premiums, interest and other amounts
payable to GSIS by the government, as employer, as well
as the obligations which the Republic of the Philippines
assumes or guarantees to pay. Considering the nature of

its funds, the GSIS is expected to manage its resources
with utmost pru-
268
dence and in strict compliance with the pertinent laws or

rules and regulations. Thus, one of the reasons that
prompted the revision of the old GSIS law (CA. No. 186, as
amended) was the necessity to preserve at all times the
actuarial solvency of the funds administered by the
System [Second Whereas Clause, P.D. No. 1146.]
Consequently, as respondent himself admits, the GSIS is
not supposed to grant clean loans. [Comment, p. 8.] It
is therefore the legitimate concern of the public to ensure
that these funds are managed properly with the end in
view of maximizing the benefits that accrue to the
insured government employees. Moreover, the supposed
borrowers were Members of the defunct Batasang
Pambansa who themselves appropriated funds for the
GSIS and were therefore expected to be the first to see to
it that the GSIS performed its tasks with the greatest
degree of fidelity and that all its transactions were above
board.
In sum, the public nature of the loanable funds of the

GSIS and the public office held by the alleged borrowers
make the information sought clearly a matter of public
interest and concern.
A second requisite must be met before the right to
information may be enforced through mandamus
proceedings, viz., that the information sought must not
be among those excluded by law.
Respondent maintains that a confidential relationship
exists between the GSIS and its borrowers. It is argued
that a policy of confidentiality restricts the indiscriminate
dissemination of information.
Yet, respondent has failed to cite any law granting the
GSIS the privilege of confidentiality as regards the
documents subject of this petition. His position is
apparently based merely on considerations of policy. The
judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can only
declare what the law is, and not what the law should be.
Under our system of government, policy issues are within
the domain of the political branches of the government,
and of the people themselves as the repository of all
State power.
Respondent however contends that in view of the right to
privacy which is equally protected by the Constitution and
by
269
VOL. 170, FEBRUARY 13, 1989 269

existing laws, the documents evidencing loan

transactions of the GSIS must be deemed outside the
ambit of the right to information.
There can be no doubt that right to privacy is
constitutionally protected. In the landmark case of Morfe
v. Mutuc [130 Phil. 415 (1968), 22 SCRA 424], this Court,
speaking through then Mr. Justice Fernando, stated:
. . . The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition
independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it
is fully deserving of constitutional protection. The
language of Prof. Emerson is particularly apt: The
concept of limited government has always included the
idea that governmental powers stop short of certain
intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. This is
indeed one of the basic distinctions between absolute and
limited government. Ultimate and pervasive control of the
individual, in all aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the
absolute, state. In contrast, a system of limited
government safeguards a private sector, which belongs
to the individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public
sector, which the state can control. Protection of this
private sectorprotection, in other words, of the dignity
and integrity of the individualhas become increasingly
important as modern society has developed. All the
forces of technological ageindustrialization,
urbanization, and organizationoperate to narrow the

area of privacy and facilitate intrusion into it. In modern
terms, the capacity to maintain and support this enclave
of private life marks the difference between a democratic
and a totalitarian society. [at pp. 444-445.]
When the information requested from the government
intrudes into the privacy of a citizen, a potential conflict
between the rights to information and to privacy may
arise. However, the competing interests of these rights
need not be resolved in this case. Apparent from the
above-quoted statement of the Court in Morfe is that the
right to privacy belongs to the individual in his private
capacity, and not to public and governmental agencies
like the GSIS. Moreover, the right cannot be invoked by
juridical entities like the GSIS. As held in the case of
Vassar College v. Loose Wills Biscuit Co. [197 F. 982
(1912)], a corporation has no right of privacy in its name
since the entire basis of the right to privacy is an injury to
the feelings and sensibilities of the party and a
corporation would have no such ground for relief.
270
Neither can the GSIS through its General Manager, the

respondent, invoke the right to privacy of its borrowers.
The right is purely personal in nature [Cf. Atkinson v. John

Doherty & Co., 121 Mich 372, 80 N.W. 285, 46 L.R.A. 219
(1899); Schuyler v. Curtis, 147 N.Y. 434, 42 N.E. 22, 31
L.R.A. 286 (1895)], and hence may be invoked only by the
person whose privacy is claimed to be violated.
It may be observed, however, that in the instant case, the
concerned borrowers themselves may not succeed if they
choose to invoke their right to privacy, considering the
public offices they were holding at the time the loans
were alleged to have been granted. It cannot be denied
that because of the interest they generate and their
newsworthiness, public figures, most especially those
holding responsible positions in government, enjoy a
more limited right to privacy as compared to ordinary
individuals, their actions being subject to closer public
scrutiny [Cf. Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. v. Capulong, G.R.
Nos. 82380 and 82398, April 29,1988; See also Cohen v.
Marx, 211 P. 2d 321 (1949).]
Respondent next asserts that the documents evidencing
the loan transactions of the GSIS are private in nature
and hence, are not covered by the Constitutional right to
information on matters of public concern which
guarantees (a)ccess to official records, and to
documents, and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions only.
It is argued that the records of the GSIS, a government
corporation performing proprietary functions, are outside
the coverage of the peoples right of access to official
records.
It is further contended that since the loan function of the

GSIS is merely incidental to its insurance function, then
its loan transactions are not covered by the constitutional
policy of full public disclosure and the right to information
which is applicable only to official transactions.
First of all, the constituentministrant dichotomy
characterizing government function has long been
repudiated. In ACCFA v. Confederation of Unions and
Government Corporations and Offices [G.R. Nos. L-21484
and L-23605, November 29, 1969, 30 SCRA 644], the
Court said that the government, whether carrying out its
sovereign attributes or running some
271
VOL. 170, FEBRUARY 13, 1989 271
business, discharges the same function of service to the

people.
Consequently, that the GSIS, in granting the loans, was
exercising a proprietary function would not justify the
exclusion of the transactions from the coverage and
scope of the right to information.
Moreover, the intent of the members of the Constitutional
Commission of 1986, to include government-owned and
controlled corporations and transactions entered into by
them within the coverage of the State policy of full public

disclosure is manifest from the records of the
proceedings:
xxx
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Colayco). Commissioner
Suarez is recognized.
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you. May I ask the Gentleman a few
question?
MR. OPLE. Very gladly.
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you.
When we declare a policy of full public disclosure of all
its transactionsreferring to the transactions of the
Stateand when we say the State which I suppose
would include all of the various agencies, departments,
ministries and instrumentalities of the government. . . .
MR. OPLE. Yes, and individual public officers, Mr. Presiding
Officer.
MR SUAREZ. Including government-owned and controlled
corporations.
MR. OPLE. That is correct, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. SUAREZ. And when we say transactions which
should be distinguished from contracts, agreements, or
treaties or whatever, does the Gentleman refer to the
steps leading to the consummation of the contract, or
does he refer to the contract itself?
MR. OPLE. The transactions used here, I suppose, is

generic and, therefore, it can cover both steps leading to
a contract, and already a consummated contract, Mr.
Presiding Officer.
MR. SUAREZ. This contemplates inclusion of negotiations
leading to the consummation of the transaction.
MR. OPLE. Yes, subject only to reasonable safeguards on
the national interest.
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you. [V Record of the Constitutional
Commission 24-25.] (Italics supplied.)
272
Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution

which, though not binding upon the Court, are
nevertheless persuasive, and considering further that
government-owned and controlled corporations, whether
performing proprietary or governmental functions are
accountable to the people, the Court is convinced that
transactions entered into by the GSIS, a governmentcontrolled corporation created by special legislation are
within the ambit of the peoples right to be informed
pursuant to the constitutional policy of transparency in
government dealings.
In fine, petitioners are entitled to access to the

documents evidencing loans granted by the GSIS, subject
to reasonable regulations that the latter may promulgate
relating to the manner and hours of examination, to the
end that damage to or loss of the records may be
avoided, that undue interference with the duties of the
custodian of the records may be prevented and that the
right of other persons entitled to inspect the records may
be insured [Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, supra at
p. 538, quoting Subido v. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383, 387.] The
petition, as to the second and third alternative acts
sought to be done by petitioners, is meritorious.
However, the same cannot be said with regard to the first
act sought by petitioners, i.e., to furnish petitioners the
list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members
belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to
secure clean loans immediately before the February 7
election thru the intercession/marginal note of the then
First Lady Imelda Marcos.
Although citizens are afforded the right to information
and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to access to official
records, the Constitution does not accord them a right to
compel custodians of official records to prepare lists,
abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to
acquire information on matters of public concern.
It must be stressed that it is essential for a writ of
mandamus to issue that the applicant has a well-defined,
clear and certain legal right to the thing demanded and
that it is the imperative duty of defendant to perform the
act required. The corresponding duty of the respondent to

perform the required act must be clear and specific [Lemi
v. Valencia, G.R. No. L-20768, Novem-
273
VOL. 170, FEBRUARY 13, 1989 273
ber 29, 1968, 126 SCRA 203; Ocampo v. Subido, G.R. No.
L-28344, August 27, 1976, 72 SCRA 443.] The request of
the petitioners fails to meet this standard, there being no
duty on the part of respondent to prepare the list
requested.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby granted and
respondent General Manager of the Government Service
Insurance System is ORDERED to allow petitioners access
to documents and records evidencing loans granted to
Members of the former Batasang Pambansa, as
petitioners may specify, subject to reasonable regulations
as to the time and manner of inspection, not incompatible
with this decision, as the GSIS may deem necessary.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr.,
Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento,
Grino-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Cruz, J., see concurrence

CRUZ, J., concurring:
Instead of merely affixing my signature to signify my
concurrence, I write this separate opinion simply to say I
have nothing to add to Justice Irene R. Cortes
exceptionally eloquent celebration of the right to
information on matters of public concern.
Petition granted.
Notes.Exhaustion of administrative remedies is not
applicable when: (1) Section 2233 of the Revised
Administrative Code which provides for an appeal to the
Office of the President from an action of the provincial
board is one that is available to the municipal council, but
not to the private respondents as in the case at bar; (2)
Exhaustion of administrative remedies as a condition
before a litigant may resort to the courts is inapplicable in
this case because it is the petitioner and not the private
respondents who initiated the litigations; (3) The issue
before the trial court, is purely a legal one in
274
Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., (SIOL) vs. Asuncion
which case there is no need to exhaust administrative

remedies; and (4) resolution No. 68 is patently illegal
because it was passed in excess of jurisdiction and in
such a case exhaustion of administrative remedies is not

necessary. (Velazco vs. Blas, 115 SCRA 540.) [Valmonte
vs. Belmonte, Jr., 170 SCRA 256(1989)]
VOL. 203, NOVEMBER 13, 1991 515

Aquino-Sarmiento vs. Morato
G.R. No. 92541. November 13, 1991.*EN BANC.MA.

CARMEN G. AQUINO-SARMIENTO, petitioner, vs. MANUEL
L. MORATO (in his capacity as Chairman of the MTRCB)
and the MOVIE & TELEVISION REVIEW AND
CLASSIFICATION BOARD, respondents.
Administrative Law; Doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies; Exceptions.The doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies simply provides
that before a party litigant is allowed resort to the courts,
he is required to comply with all administrative remedies
available under the law (Rosales v. Court of Appeals, 165
SCRA 344 [1988]). The rationale behind this salutory
principle is that for reasons of practical considerations,
comity and convenience, the courts of law will not
entertain a case until all the available administrative
remedies provided by law have been resorted to and the
appropriate authorities have been given ample
opportunity to act and to correct the errors committed in
the administrative level. If the error is rectified, judicial
intervention would then be unnecessary. Nonetheless, the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not
absolute. The applicability of the principle admits of
certain exceptions, such as: 1) when no administrative

review is provided by law; 2) when the only question
involved is one of law x x x; 3) where the party invoking
the doctrine is guilty of estoppel x x x; 4) where the
challenged administrative action is patently illegal,
arbitrary and oppressive. x x x; 5) where there is
unreasonable delay or official inaction that would greatly
prejudice the complainant. x x x; 6) where to exhaust
administrative review is impractical and unreasonable x x
x; and 7) where the rule of qualified political agency
applies. x x x. The issue raised in the instant petition is
one of law, hence, the doctrine of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedy relied upon by respondents is
inapplicable and cannot be given any effect.
Constitutional Law; Right of access to public records.We
find respondents refusal to allow petitioner to examine
the records of respondent MTRCB, pertaining to the
decisions of the review committee as well as the
individual voting slips of its members, as violative of
petitioners constitutional right of access to public
records. xxx As We held in Legaspi v. Civil Service
Commission (150 SCRA 530 [1987]), this constitutional
provision is self-executory and supplies the rules
_______________
* EN BANC.
516
by means of which the right to information may be

enjoyed (Cooley, A Treatise on Constitutional Limitations
167 [1927]) by guaranteeing the right and mandating the
duty to afford access to sources of information. Hence,
the fundamental right therein recognized may be
asserted by the people upon the ratification of the
constitution without need for any ancillary act of the
Legislature (Id. at p. 165). What may be provided for by
the Legislature are reasonable conditions and limitations
upon the access to be afforded which must, of necessity,
be consistent with the declared State Policy of full public
disclosure of all transactions involving public interest.
Same; Same; Public distinguished from private
documents.Respondents contend, however, that what is
rendered by the members of the board in reviewing films
and reflected in their individual voting slip is their
individual vote of conscience on the motion picture or
television program and as such, makes the individual
voting slip purely private and personal; an exclusive
property of the member concerned. The term private has
been defined as belonging to or concerning, an
individual person, company, or interest; whereas, public
means pertaining to, or belonging to, or affecting a
nation, state, or community at large (People v. Powell,
274 NW 372 [1937]). May the decisions of respondent
Board and the individual members concerned, arrived at
in an official capacity, be considered private? Certainly
not. As may be gleaned from the decree (PD 1986)

creating the respondent classification board, there is no
doubt that its very existence is public in character; it is an
office created to serve public interest. It being the case,
respondents can lay no valid claim to privacy.
Same; Same; Same; Decisions of Board and individual
voting slips are public in character.The decisions of the
Board and the individual voting slips accomplished by the
members concerned are acts made pursuant to their
official functions, and as such, are neither personal nor
private in nature but rather public in character. They are,
therefore, public records access to which is guaranteed to
the citizenry by no less than the fundamental law of the
land. Being a public right, the exercise thereof cannot be
made contingent on the discretion, nay, whim and
caprice, of the agency charged with the custody of the
official records sought to be examined. The constitutional
recognition of the citizens right of access to official
records cannot be made dependent upon the consent of
the members of the board concerned, otherwise, the said
right would be rendered nugatory.
517
VOL. 203, NOVEMBER 13, 1991 517
Same; Same; Exceptions.The Court is not unaware of

RA 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees) which provides, among

others, certain exceptions as regards the availability of
official records or documents to the requesting public,
e.g., closed door Cabinet sessions and deliberations of
this Court. Suffice it to state, however, that the
exceptions therein enumerated find no application in the
case at bar. Petitioners request is not concerned with the
deliberations of respondent Board but with its documents
or records made after a decision or order has been
rendered. Neither will the examination involve disclosure
of trade secrets or matters pertaining to national security
which would otherwise limit the right of access to official
records.
Movie and Television Review and Classification Board;
Limits on Chairmans Authority.Respondent Morato, as
Chairman of the MTRCB, is not vested with any authority
to reverse or overrule by himself alone a decision
rendered by a committee which conducted a review of
motion pictures or television programs. The power to
classify motion pictures into categories such as General
Patronage or For Adults Only is vested with the
respondent Board itself and not with the Chairman
thereof (Sec. 3 [e], PD 1986). As Chief Executive Officer,
respondent Moratos function as Chairman of the Board
calls for the implementation and execution, not
modification or reversal, of the decisions or orders of the
latter (Sec. 5 [a], Ibid.). The power of classification having
been reposed by law exclusively with the respondent
Board, it has no choice but to exercise the same as
mandated by law, i.e., as a collegial body, and not

transfer it elsewhere or discharge said power through the
intervening mind of another. Delegata potestas non
potest delegaria delegated power cannot be delegated.
And since the act of classification involves an exercise of
the Boards discretionary power with more reason the
Board cannot, by way of the assailed resolution, delegate
said power for it is an established rule in administrative
law that discretionary authority cannot be a subject of
delegation.
PETITION for review from the resolution of the Movie and
Television Review and Classification.
Araullo, Zambrano, Gruba, Chua Law Firm for
petitioner.
Francisco Ma. Chanco for respondents.
518
BIDIN, J.:
At issue in this petition is the citizens right of access to
official records as guaranteed by the constitution.
In February 1989, petitioner, herself a member of

respondent Movie and Television Review and
Classification Board (MTRCB), wrote its records officer
requesting that she be allowed to examine the boards
records pertaining to the voting slips accomplished by the
individual board members after a review of the movies
and television productions. It is on the basis of said slips
that films are either banned, cut or classified accordingly.
Acting on the said request, the records officer informed
petitioner that she has to secure prior clearance from
respondent Manuel Morato, as chairman of MTRCB, to
gain access to the records sought to be examined.
Petitioners request was eventually denied by respondent
Morato on the ground that whenever the members of the
board sit in judgment over a film, their decisions as
reflected in the individual voting slips partake the nature
of conscience votes and as such, are purely and
completely private and personal. It is the submission of
respondents that the individual voting slips is the
exclusive property of the member concerned and
anybody who wants access thereto must first secure his
(the members) consent, otherwise, a request therefor
may be legally denied.
Petitioner argues, on the other hand, that the records she
wishes to examine are public in character and other than
providing for reasonable conditions regulating the
manner and hours of examination, respondents Morato
and the classification board have no authority to deny
any citizen seeking examination of the boards records.
On February 27, 1989, respondent Morato called an

executive meeting of the MTRCB to discuss, among
others, the issue raised by petitioner. In said meeting,
seventeen (17) members of the board voted to declare
their individual voting records as classified documents
which rendered the same inaccessible to the public
without clearance from the chairman. Thereafter,
respondent Morato denied petitioners request to
examine the voting slips. However, it was only much
later, i.e., on July 27, 1989, that respondent Board issued
Resolution No. 10-89 which declared as confidential,
private and personal, the decision of
519
VOL. 203, NOVEMBER 13, 1991 519
the reviewing committee and the voting slips of the

members.
Petitioner brought the matter to the attention of the
Executive Secretary, which in turn, referred the same to
respondent Morato for appropriate comment.
Another incident which gave rise to this petition occurred
in a board meeting held on June 22, 1989. In that
meeting, respondent Morato told the board that he has
ordered some deletions on the movie Mahirap ang
Magmahal notwithstanding the fact that said movie was

earlier approved for screening by the Board with
classification R-18 without cuts. He explained that his
power to unilaterally change the decision of the Review
Committee is authorized by virtue of MTRCB Resolution
No. 88-1-25 (dated June 22, 1988) which allows the
chairman of the board to downgrade a film (already)
reviewed especially those which are controversial.
Petitioner informed the Board, however, that respondent
Morato possesses no authority to unilaterally reverse a
decision of the review committee under PD 1986
(Creating the Movie and Television Review and
Classification Board).
After the matter was referred by the Deputy Executive
Secretary to the Justice Secretary, the latter opined that
PD 1896 does not vest respondent Morato any authority
to unilaterally reverse the decision of the review
committee but declined to comment on the
constitutionality of Res. No. 10-89 on the ground that the
resolution thereof is a judicial prerogative (Rollo, pp. 3842).
The Justice Secretarys opinion to the contrary
notwithstanding, respondent Morato opted to ignore it.
Hence, this petition anchored on the following:
A. MORATO AND THE MTRCB BY APPROVING AND
ENFORCING RESOLUTION NO. 10-89 ACTED WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION BECAUSE THE SAME VIOLATES ARTICLE III

SECTION 7 OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.
B. MTRCB RESOLUTION NO. 88-1-25 HAS NO LEGAL
BASIS AND CONSTITUTES AN UNLAWFUL DELEGATION OF
DISCRETIONARY POWERS.
C. MORATO AND THE MTRCB BY REFUSING TO ABIDE BY
OPINION NO. 1 SERIES OF 1990 OF THE SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE AND BY INSISTING ON THE VALIDITY OF
RESOLUTION
520
NO. 88-1-25 ACTED CAPRICIOUSLY, ARBITRARILY, IN BAD

FAITH, IN EXCESS OF THEIR JURISDICTION, AND WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
Petitioner therefore seeks the nullification of 1) MTRCB
Resolution No. 88-1-25 which allows the Chairman of the
Board to unilaterally downgrade a film (already) reviewed
especially those which are controversial and 2) MTRCB
RESOLUTION No. 10-89 (dated July 27, 1989) declaring as
strictly confidential, private and personal a) the decision
of a reviewing committee which previously reviewed a
certain film and b) the individual voting slips of the
members of the committee that reviewed the film.
Respondents argue at the outset that the instant petition

should be dismissed outright for having failed to comply
with the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies.
We disagree. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies simply provides that before a party litigant is
allowed resort to the courts, he is required to comply with
all administrative remedies available under the law
(Rosales v. Court of Appeals, 165 SCRA 344 [1988]). The
rationale behind this salutory principle is that for reasons
of practical considerations, comity and convenience, the
courts of law will not entertain a case until all the
available administrative remedies provided by law have
been resorted to and the appropriate authorities have
been given ample opportunity to act and to correct the
errors committed in the administrative level. If the error is
rectified, judicial intervention would then be unnecessary.
Nonetheless, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies is not absolute. The applicability of the principle
admits of certain exceptions, such as: 1) when no
administrative review is provided by law; 2) when the
only question involved is one of law (Valmonte v.
Valmonte, 170 SCRA 256 [1989], citing Aguilar v.
Valencia, 40 SCRA 210 [1971]; Malabanan v. Ramento,
129 SCRA 359 [1984]; Bagatsing v. Ramirez, 74 SCRA
306; Del Mar v. Philippine Veterans Administration, 51
SCRA 340 [1973]; Pascual v. Provincial Board, 106 Phil.
466 [1959]; 3) where the party invoking the doctrine is
guilty of estoppel (Vda. de Tan v. Veterans Backpay
Commission [1969]; 4) where the challenged

administrative action is patently ille-
521
VOL. 203, NOVEMBER 13, 1991 521
gal, arbitrary and oppressive (Azur v. Provincial Board, 27

SCRA 50 [1969]; National Development Co. v. Collector of
Customs of Manila, 9 SCRA 429 [1963]; 5) where there is
unreasonable delay or official inaction that would greatly
prejudice the complainant (Gravador v. Mamigo, 20 SCRA
742 [1967]; Azuelo v. Arnaldo, 108 Phil. 293 [1960]; 6)
where to exhaust administrative review is impractical and
unreasonable (Cipriano v. Marcelino, 43 SCRA 291); and
7) where the rule of qualified political agency applies
(Demaisip v. Court of Appeals, 106 Phil. 237 [1906]).
The issue raised in the instant petition is one of law,
hence, the doctrine of non-exhaustion of administrative
remedy relied upon by respondents is inapplicable and
cannot be given any effect. At any rate, records are
replete with events pointing to the fact that petitioner
adhered to the administrative processes in the disposition
of the assailed resolutions of public respondents prior to
filing the instant petition by, among others, writing the
Executive Secretary and bringing the matter to the
attention of the Office of the President (Rollo, pp. 145-
147). Respondents claim that petitioner failed to exhaust

administrative remedies must therefore fail.
Having disposed of the procedural objection raised by
respondents, We now proceed to resolve the issues raised
by petitioner. In this regard, We find respondents refusal
to allow petitioner to examine the records of respondent
MTRCB, pertaining to the decisions of the review
committee as well as the individual voting slips of its
members, as violative of petitioners constitutional right
of access to public records. More specifically, Sec. 7, Art.
III of the Constitution provides that:
records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to
such limitations as may be provided by law. (italics
supplied)
As We held in Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission (150
SCRA 530 [1987]), this constitutional provision is selfexecutory and supplies the rules by means of which the
right to
522
information may be enjoyed (Cooley, A Treatise on

Constitutional Limitations 167 [1927]) by guaranteeing
the right and mandating the duty to afford access to
sources of information. Hence, the fundamental right
therein recognized may be asserted by the people upon
the ratification of the constitution without need for any
ancillary act of the Legislature (Id. at p. 165). What may
be provided for by the Legislature are reasonable
conditions and limitations upon the access to be afforded
which must, of necessity, be consistent with the declared
State Policy of full public disclosure of all transactions
involving public interest (Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 28).
(See also Taada v. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27 [1985];
Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr., 170 SCRA 256 [1989]).
Respondents contend, however, that what is rendered by
the members of the board in reviewing films and reflected
in their individual voting slip is their individual vote of
conscience on the motion picture or television program
and as such, makes the individual voting slip purely
private and personal; an exclusive property of the
member concerned.
The term private has been defined as belonging to or
concerning, an individual person, company, or interest;
whereas, public means pertaining to, or belonging to, or
affecting a nation, state, or community at large (People
v. Powell, 274 NW 372 [1937]). May the decisions of
respondent Board and the individual members concerned,
arrived at in an official capacity, be considered private?
Certainly not. As may be gleaned from the decree (PD

1986) creating the respondent classification board, there
is no doubt that its very existence is public in character; it
is an office created to serve public interest. It being the
case, respondents can lay no valid claim to privacy. The
right to privacy belongs to the individual acting in his
private capacity and not to a governmental agency or
officers tasked with, and acting in, the discharge of public
duties (See Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr., supra.) There can
be no invasion of privacy in the case at bar since what is
sought to be divulged is a product of action undertaken in
the course of performing official functions. To declare
otherwise would be to clothe every public official with an
impregnable mantle of protection against public scrutiny
for their official acts.
Further, the decisions of the Board and the individual
voting
523
VOL. 203, NOVEMBER 13, 1991 523
slips accomplished by the members concerned are acts

made pursuant to their official functions, and as such, are
neither personal nor private in nature but rather public in
character. They are, therefore, public records access to
which is guaranteed to the citizenry by no less than the
fundamental law of the land. Being a public right, the

exercise thereof cannot be made contingent on the
discretion, nay, whim and caprice, of the agency charged
with the custody of the official records sought to be
examined. The constitutional recognition of the citizens
right of access to official records cannot be made
dependent upon the consent of the members of the board
concerned, otherwise, the said right would be rendered
nugatory. As stated by this Court in Subido v. Ozaeta (80
Phil. 383 [1948]):
Except, perhaps when it is clear that the purpose of the
examinations is unlawful, or sheer, idle curiosity, we do
not believe it is the duty under the law of registration
officers to concern themselves with the motives, reasons,
and objects of the person seeking access to the records.
It is not their prerogative to see that the information
which the records contain is not flaunted before public
gaze, or that scandal is not made of it. If it be wrong to
publish the contents of the records, it is the legislature
and not the officials having custody thereof which is
called upon to devise a remedy. (italics supplied)
It is significant to point out that this Court in the 1948
case of Subido v. Ozaeta, supra, upheld the right to
information based on the statutory right then provided in
Sec. 56 of the Land Registration Act (Act 496, as
amended). Consequently, We see no cogent reason why
said right, now constitutionalized, should be given less
efficacy and primacy than what the fundamental law
mandates.
The Court is not unaware of RA 6713 (Code of Conduct

and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees)
which provides, among others, certain exceptions as
regards the availability of official records or documents to
the requesting public, e.g., closed door Cabinet sessions
and deliberations of this Court. Suffice it to state,
however, that the exceptions therein enumerated find no
application in the case at bar. Petitioners request is not
concerned with the deliberations of respondent Board but
with its documents or records made after a decision or
order has been rendered. Neither will the examination in-
524
volve disclosure of trade secrets or matters pertaining to

national security which would otherwise limit the right of
access to official records (See Legaspi v. Civil Service
Commission, supra).
We are likewise not impressed with the proposition
advanced by respondents that respondent Morato is
empowered by PD 1986 to unilaterally downgrade or
upgrade a film reviewed especially those which are
controversial. The pertinent provisions of said decree
provides:
SECTION 4. Decision.The decision of the BOARD either

approving or disapproving for exhibition in the Philippines
a motion picture, television program, still and other
pictorial advertisement submitted to it for examination
and preview must be rendered within a period of ten (10)
days which shall be counted from the date of receipt by
the BOARD of an application for the purpose x x x.
For each review session, the Chairman of the Board shall
designate a sub-committee composed of at least three
BOARD members to undertake the work of review. Any
disapproval or deletion must be approved by a majority of
the sub-committee members so designated. After receipt
of the written decision of the sub-committee, a motion for
reconsideration in writing may be made, upon which the
Chairman of the Board shall designate a sub-committee
of five BOARD members to undertake a second review
session, whose decision on behalf of the Board shall be
rendered through a majority of the sub-committee
members so designated and present at the second review
session. This second review session shall be presided
over by the Chairman, or the Vice-Chairman. The decision
of the BOARD in the second review session shall be
rendered within five (5) days from the date of receipt of
the motion for reconsideration.
Every decision of the BOARD disapproving a motion
picture, television program or publicity material for
exhibition in the Philippines must be in writing, and shall
state the reasons or grounds for such disapproval. No film
or motion picture intended for exhibition at the
moviehouses or theaters or on television shall be

disapproved by reason of its topic, theme or subject
matter, but upon the merits of each picture or program
considered in its entirety.
The second decision of the BOARD shall be final, with the
exception of a decision disapproving or prohibiting a
motion picture or television program in its entirety which
shall be appealable to the President of the Philippines,
who may himself decide the appeal, or be assisted either
by an ad hoc committee he may create or by the Appeals
Committee herein created.
525
VOL. 203, NOVEMBER 13, 1991 525
An Appeals Committee in the Office of the President of

the Philippines is hereby created composed of a Chairman
and four (4) members to be appointed by the President of
the Philippines, which shall submit its recommendation to
the President. The Office of the Presidential Assistant for
Legal Affairs shall serve as the Secretariat of the Appeals
Committee.
The decision of the President of the Philippines on any
appealed matter shall be final.
Implementing Rules and Regulations
SECTION 11. Review by Sub-Committee of Three.a) A

proper application having been filed, the Chairman of the
Board shall, as the exigencies of the service may permit,
designate a Sub-Committee of at least three Board
Members who shall meet, with notice to the applicant,
within ten days from receipt of the completed application.
The Sub-Committee shall then preview the motion picture
subject of the application.
b) Immediately after the preview, the applicant or his
representative shall withdraw to await the results of the
deliberation of the Sub-Committee. After reaching a
decision, the Sub-Committee shall summon the applicant
or his representative and inform him of its decision giving
him an opportunity either to request reconsideration or to
offer certain cuts or deletions in exchange for a better
classification. The decision shall be in writing, stating, in
case of disapproval of the film or denial of the
classification rating desired or both, the reason or reasons
for such disapproval or denial and the classification
considered by the Sub-Committee member dissenting
from the majority opinion may express his dissent in
writing.
c) The decision including the dissenting opinion, if any,
shall immediately be submitted to the Chairman of the
Board for transmission to the applicant.
SECTION 12. Review by Sub-Committee of Five.Within
five days from receipt of a copy of the decision of the
Sub-Committee referred to in the preceding section, the
applicant may file a motion for reconsideration in writing
of that decision. On receipt of the motion, the Chairman

of the Board shall designate a Sub-Committee of Five
Board Members which shall consider the motion and,
within five days of receipt of such motion, conduct a
second preview of the film. The review shall, to the extent
applicable, follow the same procedure provided in the
preceding section.
SECTION 13. Reclassification.An applicant desiring a
change in the classification rating given his film by either
the Sub-Committee
526
of Three? or Committee of Five mentioned in the

immediately preceding two sections may re-edit such film
and apply anew with the Board for its review and
reclassification.
SECTION 14. Appeal.The decision of the Committee of
Five Board Members in the second review shall be final,
with the exception of a decision disapproving or
prohibiting a motion picture in its entirety which shall be
appealable to the President of the Philippines who may
himself decide the appeal or refer it to the Appeals
Committee in the Office of the President for adjudication.
On the other hand, the powers and functions of the

MTRCB Chairman are found in Section 5 of the same
decree as follows:
SEC. 5. Executive Officer.The Chairman of the BOARD
shall be the Chief Executive Officer of the BOARD. He
shall exercise the following functions, powers and duties:
(a) Execute, implement and enforce the decisions,
orders, awards, rules and regulations issued by the
BOARD;
(b) Direct and supervise the operations and the internal
affairs of the BOARD;
(c) Establish the internal organization and administrative
procedures of the BOARD, and recommend to the BOARD
the appointment of the necessary administrative and
subordinate personnel; and
(d) Exercise such other powers and functions and
perform such duties as are not specifically lodged in the
BOARD.
It is at once apparent from a reading of the above
provisions of PD 1986 that respondent Morato, as
Chairman of the MTRCB, is not vested with any authority
to reverse or overrule by himself alone a decision
rendered by a committee which conducted a review of
motion pictures or television programs.
The power to classify motion pictures into categories such
as General Patronage or For Adults Only is vested
with the respondent Board itself and not with the
Chairman thereof (Sec. 3 [e], PD 1986). As Chief

Executive Officer, respondent Moratos function as
Chairman of the Board calls for the implementation and
execution, not modification or reversal, of the decisions or
orders of the latter (Sec. 5 [a], Ibid.). The power of
classification having been reposed by law exclusively with
the respondent Board, it has no choice but to exercise the
same as
527
VOL. 203, NOVEMBER 13, 1991 527
mandated by law, i.e., as a collegial body, and not

transfer it elsewhere or discharge said power through the
intervening mind of another. Delegata potestas non
potest delegaria delegated power cannot be delegated.
And since the act of classification involves an exercise of
the Boards discretionary power with more reason the
Board cannot, by way of the assailed resolution, delegate
said power for it is an established rule in administrative
law that discretionary authority cannot be a subject of
delegation.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Resolution
Nos. 10-89 and 88-1-25 issued by the respondent Board
are hereby declared null and void.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Medialdea, Regalado and
Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
Grio-Aquino, J., No part.
Romero, J., did not take part in the deliberations.
Petition granted. Resolution null and void.
Notes.Exhaustion of administrative remedies is not
applicable where the question in dispute is purely a legal
one or where the controverted act is patently illegal or
was performed without jurisdiction. (Animos vs. Philippine
Veterans Affairs Office, 174 SCRA 214.)
The right to privacy belongs to the individual in his
private capacity, it cannot be involved by juridical entities
like the GSIS. (Valmonte vs. Belmonte, Jr., 170 SCRA 256.)
[Aquino-Sarmiento vs. Morato, 203 SCRA 515(1991)]
No. L-63915. April 24, 1985.*EN BANC.LORENZO M.

TAADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF
ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND
NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners, vs. HON. JUAN
C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the
President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as
Deputy Executive Assistant to the President, MELQUIADES
P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as Director, Malacaang
Records Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity
as Director, Bureau of Printing, respondents.
_______________
* EN BANC.
28
Taada vs. Tuvera
Mandamus; Private individuals who seek to procure the

enforcement of a public duty (e.g. the publication in the
Official Gazette of Presidential Decrees, LOI, etc.) are real
parties in interest in mandamus case.The reasons given
by the Court in recognizing a private citizens legal
personality in the aforementioned case apply squarely to
the present petition. Clearly, the right sought to be

enforced by petitioners herein is a public right recognized
by no less than the fundamental law of the land. If
petitioners were not allowed to institute this proceeding,
it would indeed be difficult to conceive of any other
person to initiate the same, considering that the Solicitor
General, the government officer generally empowered to
represent the people, has entered his appearance for
respondents in this case.
Same; Statutes; Fact that a Presidential Decree or LOI
states its date of effectivity does not preclude their
publication in the Official Gazette as they constitute
important legislative acts, particularly in the present
situation where the President may on his own issue laws.
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to
give the general public adequate notice of the various
laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as
citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would
be no basis for the application of the maxim ignorantia
legis non excusat. It would be the height of injustice to
punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression
of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even
a constructive one.
Same; Same; Same.Perhaps at no time since the
establishment of the Philippine Republic has the
publication of laws taken so vital significance than at this
time when the people have bestowed upon the President
a power heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature.
While the people are kept abreast by the mass media of
the debates and deliberations in the Batasan Pambansa

and for the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative
recordsno such publicity accompanies the law-making
process of the President. Thus, without publication, the
people have no means of knowing what presidential
decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a
definite way of informing themselves of the specific
contents and texts of such decrees. As the Supreme Court
of Spain ruled: Bajo la denoroinacin genrica de leyes,
se comprenden tambin los reglamentos, Reales
decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordines
dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno
en uso de su potestad.
Same; Same; C.A. 638 imposes a duty for publication of
Presidential decrees and issuances as it uses the words
shall be
29
VOL. 136, APRIL 24, 1985 29
Taada vs. Tuvera
published.The very first clause of Section 1 of

Commonwealth Act 638 reads: There shall be published
in the Official Gazette x x x. The word shall used
therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative
duty. That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional
right of the people to be informed on matters of public
concern is to be given substance and reality. The law
itself makes a list of what should be published in the

Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves
respondents with no discretion whatsoever as to what
must be included or excluded from such publication.
Same; Same; But administrative and executive orders
and those which affect only a particular class of persons
need not be published.The publication of all presidential
issuances of a public nature or of general applicability
is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that
provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation
or otherwise impose a burden on the people, such as tax
and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other
presidential issuances which apply only to particular
persons or class of persons such as administrative and
executive orders need not be published on the
assumption that they have been circularized to all
concerned.
Same; Same; Due Process; Publication of Presidential
decrees and issuances of general application is a matter
of due process.It is needless to add that the publication
of presidential issuances of a public nature or of
general applicability is a requirement of due process. It
is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by
law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of
its contents.
Same; Same; Same; Presidential Decrees and issuances
of general application which have not been published
shall have no force and effect.The Court therefore
declares that presidential issuances of general
application, which have not been published, shall have no

force and effect. Some members of the Court, quite
apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect this
decision might have on acts done in reliance of the
validity of those presidential decrees which were
published only during the pendency of this petition, have
put the question as to whether the Courts declaration of
invalidity apply to P.D.s which had been enforced or
implemented prior to their publication. The answer is all
too familiar. In similar situations in the past this Court had
taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in
Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank.
30
Taada vs. Tuvera
Same; Same; Same; Implementation of Presidential

Decrees prior to their publication in the Official Gazette
may have consequences which cannot be ignored.
Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential
decrees prior to their publication in the Official Gazette is
an operative fact which may have consequences which
cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be
erased by a new judicial declaration x x x that an allinclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive
invalidity cannot be justified.
Same; Same; Same; Only P.D. Nos. 1019 to 1030, 1278

and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been published. It
is undisputed that none of them has been implemented.
From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of
Court, it appears that of the presidential decrees sought
by petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette, only
Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive. 1278,
and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been so published.
Neither the subject matters nor the texts of these PDs
can be ascertained since no copies thereof are available.
But whatever their subject matter may be, it is
undisputed that none of these unpublished PDs has ever
been implemented or enforced by the government.
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring with qualification:
Statutes; Due Process; I am unable to concur insofar as
the opinion written by Justice Escolin would unqualifiedly
impose the requirement of publication in the Official
Gazette for unpublished Presidential issuances to have a
binding force and effect.It is of course true that without
the requisite publication, a due process question would
arise if made to apply adversely to a party who is not
even aware of the existence of any legislative or
executive act having the force and effect of law. My point
is that such publication required need not be confined to
the Official Gazette. From the pragmatic standpoint, there
is an advantage to be gained. It conduces to certainty.
That is to be admitted. It does not follow, however, that
failure to do so would in all cases and under all
circumstances result in a statute, presidential decree or
any other executive act of the same category being

bereft of any binding force and effect. To so hold would,
for me, raise a constitutional question. Such a
pronouncement would lend itself to the interpretation
that such a legislative or presidential act is bereft of the
attribute of effectivity unless published in the Official
Gazette. There is no such requirement in the Constitution
as Justice Plana so aptly pointed out. It is true that what is
decided now applies only to past presidential issuances.
31
VOL. 136, APRIL 24, 1985 31
Taada vs. Tuvera
Nonetheless, this clarification is, to my mind, needed to

avoid any possible misconception as to what is required
for any statute or presidential act to be impressed with
binding force or effectivity.
Same; Same; The Civil Code rule on publication of
statutes is only a legislative enactment and does not and
cannot have the force of a constitutional command A
later executive or legislative act can fix a different rule.
Let me make clear therefore that my qualified
concurrence goes no further than to affirm that
publication is essential to the effectivity of a legislative or
executive act of a general application. I am not in
agreement with the view that such publication must be in
the Official Gazette. The Civil Code itself in its Article 2
expressly recognizes that the rule as to laws taking effect

after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette is subject to this
exception, unless it is otherwise provided. Moreover,
the Civil Code is itself only a legislative enactment,
Republic Act No. 386. It does not and cannot have the
juridical force of a constitutional command. A later
legislative or executive act which has the force and effect
of law can legally provide for a different rule.
Same; Same; I am unable to agree that decrees not
published are devoid of any legal character.Nor can I
agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion
of Justice Escolin that presidential decrees and executive
acts not thus previously published in the Official Gazette
would be devoid of any legal character. That would be, in
my opinion, to go too far. It may be fraught, as earlier
noted, with undesirable consequences. I find myself
therefore unable to yield assent to such a
pronouncement.
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
Statutes; Unless laws are published there will no basis for
the rule that ignorance of the law excuses no one from
compliance therewith.Without official publication in the
Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil Code
and the Revised Administrative Code, there would be no
basis nor justification for the corollary rule of Article 3 of
the Civil Code (based on constructive notice that the
provisions of the law are ascertainable from the public
and official repository where they are duly published) that
Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance

therewith.
32
Taada vs. Tuvera
Same; Respondents theory that a Presidential Decree

that fixes its date of effectivity need not be published
misreads Art. 2 of the Civil Code.Respondents
contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the Civil
Code that only laws which are silent as to their
effectivity [date] need be published in the Official Gazette
for their effectivity is manifestly untenable. The plain
text and meaning of the Civil Code is that laws shall take
effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise
provided, i.e. a different effectivity date is provided by
the law itself. This proviso perforce refers to a law that
has been duly published pursuant to the basic
constitutional requirements of due process. The best
example of this is the Civil Code itself: the same Article 2
provides otherwise that it shall take effect [only] one
year [not 15 days] after such publication. To sustain
respondents misreading that most laws or decrees
specify the date of their effectivity and for this reason,
publication in the Official Gazette is not necessary for
their effectivity would be to nullify and render nugatory
the Civil Codes indispensable and essential requirement
of prior publication in the Official Gazette by the simple

expedient of providing for immediate effectivity or an
earlier effectivity date in the law itself before the
completion of 15 days following its publication which is
the period generally fixed by the Civil Code for its proper
dissemination.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:
Statutes; When a date of effectivity is mentioned in the
Decree, but becomes effective only 15 days after
publication in the Gazette, it will not mean that the
Decree can have retroactive effect to the expressed date
of effectivity.I agree. There cannot be any question but
that even if a decree provides for a date of effectivity, it
has to be published. What I would like to state in
connection with that proposition is that when a date of
effectivity is mentioned in the decree but the decree
becomes effective only fifteen (15) days after its
publication in the Official Gazette, it will not mean that
the decree can have retroactive effect to the date of
effectivity mentioned in the decree itself. There should be
no retroactivity if the retroactivity will run counter to
constitutional rights or shall destroy vested rights.
PLANA, J., separate opinion:
Constitutional Law; Statutes; Due Process; The
Constitution does not require prior publication for laws to
be effective and while
33
VOL. 136, APRIL 24, 1985 33

Taada vs. Tuvera
due process require prior notice, such notice is not

necessarily publication in the Official Gazette.The
Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of
laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some
Constitutions elsewhere. It may be said though that the
guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to
affected parties before they can be bound thereby; but
such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official
Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise.
Neither is the publication of laws in the Official Gazette
required by any statute as a prerequisite for their
effectivity, if said laws already provide for their effectivity
date.
Same; Same; Same; C.A. 638 does not require Official
Gazette publication of laws for their effectivity.
Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not
support the proposition that for their effectivity, laws
must be published in the Official Gazette. The said law is
simply An Act to Provide for the Uniform Publication and
Distribution of the Official Gazette. Conformably
therewith, it authorizes the publication of the Official
Gazette, determines its frequency, provides for its sale
and distribution, and defines the authority of the Director
of Printing in relation thereto. It also enumerates what
shall be published in the Official Gazette, among them,
important legislative acts and resolutions of a public

nature of the Congress of the Philippines and all
executive and administrative orders and proclamations,
except such as have no general applicability. It is
noteworthy that not all legislative acts are required to be
published in the Official Gazette but only important
ones of a public nature. Moreover, the said law does not
provide that publication in the Official Gazette is essential
for the effectivity of laws. This is as it should be, for all
statutes are equal and stand on the same footing. A law,
especially an earlier one of general application such as
Commonwealth Act No. 638, cannot nullify or restrict the
operation of a subsequent statute that has a provision of
its own as to when and how it will take effect. Only a
higher law, which is the Constitution, can assume that
role.
PETITION to review the decision of the Executive Assistant
to the President.
ESCOL1N, J.:
Invoking the peoples right to be informed on matters of
public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV
of
34
Taada vs. Tuvera
the 1973 Philippine Constitution,1Section 6. The right of

the people to information on matters of public concern
shall be recognized, access to official records, and to
documents and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, shall be afforded the citizens
subje... as well as the principle that laws to be valid and
enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or
otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ
of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to
publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official
Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of
instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive
orders, letter of implementation and administrative
orders.
Specifically, the publication of the following presidential
issuances is sought:
a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103,
171, 179, 184, 197, 200, 234, 265, 286, 298, 303, 312,
324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 368, 404,
406, 415, 427, 429, 445, 447, 473, 486, 491, 503, 504,
521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574, 594, 599, 644, 658, 661,
718, 731, 733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961,
1017-1030, 1050, 1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 1165, 1166,
1242, 1246, 1250, 1278, 1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808,
1810, 1813-1817, 1819-1826, 1829-1840, 1842-1847.
b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108,

116, 130, 136, 141, 150, 153, 155, 161, 173, 180, 187,
188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204, 205, 209, 211-213, 215224, 226-228, 231-239, 241-245, 248-251, 253-261, 263269, 271-273, 275-283, 285-289, 291, 293, 297-299, 301303, 309, 312-315, 325, 327, 343, 346, 349, 357, 358,
362, 367, 370, 382, 385, 386, 396-397, 405, 438-440,
444-445, 473, 486, 488, 498, 501. 399, 527, 561, 576,
587, 594, 599, 600, 602, 609, 610, 611, 612, 615, 641,
642, 665, 702, 712-713, 726, 837-839, 878-879, 881,
882, 939-940, 964, 997, 1149-1178, 1180-1278.
c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 &
65.
d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196,
1270, 1281, 1319-1526, 1529, 1532, 1535, 1538, 15401547, 1550-1558, 1561-1588, 1590-1595, 1594-1600,
1606-1609, 1612-1628, 1630-1649, 1694-1695, 16971701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734, 1737-1742, 1744, 17461751, 1752, 1754, 1762, 1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797,
1800, 1802-1804, 1806-1807, 1812-1814, 1816, 18251826, 1829, 1831-1832, 1835-1836, 1839_______________
1 Section 6. The right of the people to information on
matters of public concern shall be recognized, access to
official records, and to documents and papers pertaining
to official acts, transactions, or decisions, shall be
afforded the citizens subject to such limitation as may be
provided by law.
35
VOL. 136, APRIL 24, 1985 35
Taada vs. Tuvera
1840, 1843-1844, 1846-1847, 1849, 1853-1858, 1860,

1866, 1868, 1870, 1876-1889, 1892, 1900, 1918, 1923,
1933, 1952, 1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1984, 1986-2028,
2030-2044, 2046-2145, 2147-2161, 2163-2244.
e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454,
457-471, 474-492, 494-507, 509-510, 522, 524-528, 531532, 536, 538, 543-544, 549, 551-553, 560, 563, 567568, 570, 574, 593, 594, 598-604, 609, 611-647, 649677, 679-703, 705-707, 712-786, 788-852, 854-857.
f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 2527, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 80-81, 92, 94, 95, 107, 120, 122,
123.
g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360378, 380-433, 436-439.
The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would
have this case dismissed outright on the ground that
petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring
the instant petition. The view is submitted that in the
absence of any showing that petitioners are personally
and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged nonpublication of the presidential issuances in question2Anti-
Chinese League vs. Felix, 77 Phil. 1012; Costas vs.

Aldanese, 45 Phil. 345; Almario vs. City Mayor, 16 SCRA
151; Palting vs. San Jose Petroleum, 18 SCRA 924;
Dumlao vs. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392. said petitioners are
without the requisite legal personality to institute this
mandamus proceeding, they are not being aggrieved
parties within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, which we quote:
SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.When any tribunal,
corporation, board or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins
as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or
unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment
of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and
there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby
may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the
facts with certainty and praying that judgment be
rendered commanding the defendant, immediately or at
some other specified time, to do the act required to be
done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the
damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the
wrongful acts of the defendant.
_______________
2 Anti-Chinese League vs. Felix, 77 Phil. 1012; Costas vs.
Aldanese, 45 Phil. 345; Almario vs. City Mayor, 16 SCRA
151; Palting vs. San Jose Petroleum, 18 SCRA 924;
Dumlao vs. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392.
36
Taada vs. Tuvera
Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the

subject of the petition concerns a public right and its
object is to compel the performance of a public duty, they
need not show any specific interest for their petition to be
given due course.
The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as
the 1910 case of Severino vs. Governor General,316 Phil.
366, 378. this Court held that while the general rule is
that a writ of mandamus would be granted to a private
individual only in those cases where he has some private
or particular interest to be subserved, or some particular
right to be protected, independent of that which he holds
with the public at large, and it is for the public officers
exclusively to apply for the writ when public rights are to
be subserved [Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469,
nevertheless, when the question is one of public right
and the object of the mandamus is to procure the
enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as
the real party in interest and the relator at whose
instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show
that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it
being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such
interested in the execution of the laws [High,

Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431].
Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope
Severino, a private individual, as a proper party to the
mandamus proceedings brought to compel the Governor
General to call a special election for the position of
municipal president in the town of Silay, Negros
Occidental. Speaking for this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T.
Trent said:
We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of
authority supports the proposition that the relator is a
proper party to proceedings of this character when a
public right is sought to be enforced. If the general rule in
America were otherwise, we think that it would not be
applicable to the case at bar for the reason that it is
always dangerous to apply a general rule to a particular
case without keeping in mind the reason for the rule,
because, if under the particular circumstances the reason
for the rule does not exist, the rule itself is not applicable
and reliance upon the rule may well lead to error.
_______________
3 16 Phil. 366, 378.
37
VOL. 136, APRIL 24, 1985 37
Taada vs. Tuvera
No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the

general rule insisted upon by counsel for the respondent.
The circumstances which surround this case are different
from those in the United States, inasmuch as if the relator
is not a proper party to these proceedings no other
person could be, as we have seen that it is not the duty of
the law officer of the Government to appear and
represent the people in cases of this character.
The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private
citizens legal personality in the aforementioned case
apply squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the right
sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public
right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of
the land. If petitioners were not allowed to institute this
proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to conceive of any
other person to initiate the same, considering that the
Solicitor General, the government officer generally
empowered to represent the people, has entered his
appearance for respondents in this case.
Respondents further contend that publication in the
Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the
effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for
their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since
the presidential issuances in question contain special
provisions as to the date they are to take effect,
publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for
their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Article
2 of the Civil Code:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following

the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette,
unless it is otherwise provided, x x x
The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with
this Courts construction of said article. In a long line of
decisions,4Camacho vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 80
Phil. 848; Mejia vs. Balolong, 81 Phil. 486; Republic of the
Philippines vs. Encarnacion, 87 Phil. 843; Philippine
Blooming Mills, Inc. vs. Social Security System, 17 SCRA
1077; Askay vs. Cosalan, 46 Phil. 179. this Court has
ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary
in those cases where the legislation itself does not
provide for its effectivity datefor then the date of
_______________
4 Camacho vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 80 Phil. 848;
Mejia vs. Balolong, 81 Phil. 486; Republic of the
Philippines vs. Encarnacion, 87 Phil. 843; Philippine
Blooming Mills, Inc. vs. Social Security System, 17 SCRA
1077; Askay vs. Cosalan, 46 Phil. 179.
38
Taada vs. Tuvera
publication is material for determining its date of

effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its
publicationbut not when the law itself provides for the

date when it goes into effect.
Respondents argument, however, is logically correct only
insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws with the fact of
publication. Considered in the light of other statutes
applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily
reached that said Article 2 does not preclude the
requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if
the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. Thus,
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:
Section 1. There shall be published in the Official
Gazette [1] all important legislative acts and resolutions
of a public nature of tne Congress of the Philippines; [2]
all executive and administrative orders and
proclamations, except such as have no general
applicability: [3] decisions or abstracts of decisions of the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as may be
deemed by said courts of sufficient importance to be so
published; [4] such documents or classes of documents
as may be required so to be published by law; and [5]
such documents or classes of documents as the President
of the Philippines shall determine from time to time to
have general applicability and legal effect, or which he
may authorize so to be published. x x x
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give
the general public adequate notice of the various laws
which are to regulate their actions and conduct as
citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would
be no basis for the application of the maxim ignorantia
legis non excusat. It would be the height of injustice to

punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression
of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even
a constructive one.
Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the
Philippine Republic has the publication of laws taken so
vital significance that at this time when the people have
bestowed upon the President a power heretofore enjoyed
solely by the legislature. While the people are kept
abreast by the mass media of the debates and
deliberations in the Batasan Pambansaand for
39
VOL. 136, APRIL 24, 1985 39
Taada vs. Tuvera
the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative records

no such publicity accompanies the law-making process
of the President. Thus, without publication, the people
have no means of knowing what presidential decrees
have actually been promulgated, much less a definite
way of informing themselves of the specific contents and
texts of such decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain
ruled: Bajo la denominacin genrica de leyes, se
comprenden tambin los reglamentos, Reales decretos,
Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordines dietadas de
conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su
potestad.51 Manresa, Codigo Civil, 7th Ed., p. 146.The

very first clause of Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638
reads: There shall be published in the Official Gazette x x
x. The word shall used therein imposes upon
respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must
be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be
informed on matters of public concern is to be given
substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what
should be published in the Official Gazette. Such listing,
to our mind, leaves respondents with no discretion
whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded from
such publication.
The publication of all presidential issuances of a public
nature or of general applicability is mandated by law.
Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines,
forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise
impose a burden on the people, such as tax and revenue
measures, fall within this category. Other presidential
issuances which apply only to particular persons or class
of persons such as administrative and executive orders
need not be published on the assumption that they have
been circularized to all concerned.6People vs. Que Po Lay,
94 Phil. 640; Balbuena et al. vs. Secretary of Education, et
al., 110 Phil. 150.It is needless to add that the publication
of presidential issuances of a public nature or of
general applicability is a requirement of due process. It
is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by
law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of
its contents. As Justice Claudio
_______________
5 1 Manresa, Codigo Civil, 7th Ed., p. 146.
6 People vs. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640; Balbuena et al. vs.
Secretary of Education, et al., 110 Phil. 150.
40
Taada vs. Tuvera
Teehankee said in Peralta vs. COMELEC782 SCRA 30,

dissenting opinion.:
In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of
instructions which all form part of the law of the land, the
requirement of due process and the Rule of Law demand
that the Official Gazette as the official government
repository promulgate and publish the texts of all such
decrees, orders and instructions so that the people may
know where to obtain their official and specific contents.
The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances
of general application, which have not been published,
shall have no force and effect. Some members of the
Court, quite apprehensive about the possible unsettling
effect this decision might have on acts done in reliance of
the validity of those presidential decrees which were
published only during the pendency of this petition, have
put the question as to whether the Courts declaration of

invalidity apply to P.D.s which had been enforced or
implemented prior to their publication. The answer is all
too familiar. In similar situations in the past this Court had
taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in
Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank8308 U.S.
371, 374. to wit:
The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the
Act of Congress, having been found to be
unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative,
conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and hence
affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton v.
Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, I. & L. Ry. Co.
v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however,
that such broad statements as to the effect of a
determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with
qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to
such a determination, is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past
cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration.
The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may
have to be considered in various aspectswith respect to
particular conduct, private and official. Questions of rights
claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior
determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon
accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both
of the statute and of its previous application, demand
examination. These ques_______________
7 82 SCRA 30, dissenting opinion.

8 308 U.S. 371, 374.
41
VOL. 136, APRIL 24, 1985 41
Taada vs. Tuvera
tions are among the most difficult of those which have

engaged the attention of courts, state and federal, and it
is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive
statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity
cannot be justified.
Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter
vs. Esteban993 Phil. 68. sustained the right of a party
under the Moratorium Law, albeit said right had accrued
in his favor before said law was declared unconstitutional
by this Court.
Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential
decrees prior to their publication in the Official Gazette is
an operative fact which may have consequences which
cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be
erased by a new judicial declaration x x x that an allinclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive
invalidity cannot be justified.
From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of

Court, it appears that of the presidential decrees sought
by petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette, only
Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278,
and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been so
published.10The report was prepared by the Clerk of
Court after Acting Director Florendo S. Pablo Jr. of the
Government Printing Office, failed to respond to her
letter-request regarding the respective dates of
publication in the Official Gazette of the presidential i...
Neither the subject matters nor the texts of these PDs
can be ascertained since no copies thereof are available.
But whatever their subject matter may be, it is
undisputed that none of these unpublished PDs has ever
been implemented or enforced by the government. In
Pesigan vs. Angeles,11129 SCRA 174. the Court, through
Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled that publication is
necessary to apprise the public of the contents of [penal]
regulations and make the said penalties binding on the
persons affected thereby. The cogency of this holding is
apparently recognized by respondent officials considering
the manifestation in their comment that the
government, as a matter of policy, refrains
_______________
9 93 Phil. 68.
10 The report was prepared by the Clerk of Court after
Acting Director Florendo S. Pablo Jr. of the Government
Printing Office, failed to respond to her letter-request
regarding the respective dates of publication in the
Official Gazette of the presidential issuances listed

therein. No report has been submitted by the Clerk of
Court as to the publication or non-publication of other
presidential issuances.
11 129 SCRA 174.
42
Taada vs. Tuvera
from prosecuting violations of criminal laws until the

same shall have been published in the Official Gazette or
in some other publication, even though some criminal
laws provide that they shall take effect immediately.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to
publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential
issuances which are of general application, and unless so
published, they shall have no binding force and effect.
SO ORDERED.
Relova, J., concur.
Fernando, C.J., concurs in a separate opinion
expressing the view that without publication, a due
process question may arise but that such publication
need not be in the Official Gazette. To that extent he
concurs with the opinion of Justice Plana.
Teehankee, J., files a brief concurrence.

Makasiar, J., concurs in the opinion of Chief Justice
Fernando.
Aquino, J., no part.
Concepcion, Jr., J., on leave.
Abad Santos, J., I concur in the separate opinion of the
Chief Justice.
Melencio-Herrera, J., see separate concurring opinion.
Plana, J., see separate opinion.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., I concur insofar as publication is
necessary but reserve my vote as to the necessity of such
publication being in the Official Gazette.
De la Fuente, J., Insofar as the opinion declares the
unpublished decrees and issuances of a public nature or
general applicability ineffective, until due publication
thereof.
Cuevas, J., I concur in the opinion of the Chief Justice
and Justice Plana.
Alampay, J., I subscribe to the opinion of Chief Justice
Fernando and Justice Plana.
43
VOL. 136, APRIL 24, 1985 43
Taada vs. Tuvera
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring with qualification:

There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views
expressed in the ably written opinion of Justice Escolin. I
am unable, however, to concur insofar as it would
unqualifiedly impose the requirement of publication in the
Official Gazette for unpublished presidential issuances
to have binding force and effect.
I shall explain why.
1. It is of course true that without the requisite
publication, a due process question would arise if made
to apply adversely to a party who is not even aware of
the existence of any legislative or executive act having
the force and effect of law. My point is that such
publication required need not be confined to the Official
Gazette. From the pragmatic standpoint, there is an
advantage to be gained. It conduces to certainty. That is
too be admitted. It does not follow, however, that failure
to do so would in all cases and under all circumstances
result in a statute, presidential decree or any other
executive act of the same category being bereft of any
binding force and effect. To so hold would, for me, raise a
constitutional question. Such a pronouncement would
lend itself to the interpretation that such a legislative or
presidential act is bereft of the attribute of effectivity
unless published in the Official Gazette. There is no such
requirement in the Constitution as Justice Plana so aptly
pointed out. It is true that what is decided now applies

only to past presidential issuances. Nonetheless, this
clarification is, to my mind, needed to avoid any possible
misconception as to what is required for any statute or
presidential act to be impressed with binding force or
effectivity.
2. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the
separate opinion of Justice Plana. Its first paragraph sets
forth what to me is the constitutional doctrine applicable
to this case. Thus: The Philippine Constitution does not
require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their
effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. It may
be said though that the guarantee of due process
requires notice of laws to affected parties before they can
be bound thereby; but such
44
Taada vs. Tuvera
notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official

Gazette. The due process clause is not that
precise.1Separate Opinion of Justice Plana, first
paragraph. He mentioned in this connection Article 7,
Sec. 21 of the Wisconsin Constitution and State ex rel.
White v. Grand Superior Ct., 71 ALR 1354, citing the
Constitution of Indiana, U.S.A. I am likewise in agreement
with its closing paragraph: In fine, I concur in the

majority decision to the extent that it requires notice
before laws become effective, for no person should be
bound by a law without notice. This is elementary
fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds
that such notice shall be by publication in the Official
Gazette.2Ibid, closing paragraph.
3. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that
law as the command of the government must be
ascertainable in some form if it is to be enforced at
all.3Learned Hand, The Spirit of Liberty 104 (1960). It
would indeed be to reduce it to the level of mere futility,
as pointed out by Justice Cardozo, if it is unknown and
unknowable.4Cardozo, The Growth of the Law, 3 (1924).
Publication, to repeat, is thus essential. What I am not
prepared to subscribe to is the doctrine that it must be in
the Official Gazette. To be sure once published therein
there is the ascertainable mode of determining the exact
date of its effectivity. Still for me that does not dispose of
the question of what is the jural effect of past presidential
decrees or executive acts not so published. For prior
thereto, it could be that parties aware of their existence
could have conducted themselves in accordance with
their provisions. If no legal consequences could attach
due to lack of publication in the Official Gazette, then
serious problems could arise. Previous transactions based
on such Presidential Issuances could be open to
question. Matters deemed settled could still be inquired
into. I am not prepared to hold that such an effect is
contemplated by our decision. Where such presidential

decree or executive act is made the basis of a criminal
prosecution, then, of course, its ex post facto character
becomes evident.5Cf. Nuez v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
50581-50617, January 30, 1982, 111 SCRA 433. In civil
cases though, retroac_______________
1 Separate Opinion of Justice Plana, first paragraph. He
mentioned in this connection Article 7, Sec. 21 of the
Wisconsin Constitution and State ex rel. White v. Grand
Superior Ct., 71 ALR 1354, citing the Constitution of
Indiana, U.S.A.
2 Ibid, closing paragraph.
3 Learned Hand, The Spirit of Liberty 104 (1960).
4 Cardozo, The Growth of the Law, 3 (1924).
5 Cf. Nuez v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 50581-50617,
January 30, 1982, 111 SCRA 433.
45
VOL. 136, APRIL 24, 1985 45
Taada vs. Tuvera
tivity as such is not conclusive on the due process aspect

There must still be a showing of arbitrariness. Moreover,
where the challenged presidential decree or executive act

was issued under the police power, the non-impairment
clause of the Constitution may not always be successfully
invoked. There must still be that process of balancing to
determine whether or not it could in such a case be
tainted by infirmity.6Cf. Alalayan v. National Power
Corporation, L-24396, July 29, 1968, 24 SCRA 172. In
traditional terminology, there could arise then a question
of unconstitutional application. That is as far as it goes.
4. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence
goes no further than to affirm that publication is essential
to the effectivity of a legislative or executive act of a
general application. I am not in agreement with the view
that such publication must be in the Official Gazette. The
Civil Code itself in its Article 2 expressly recognizes that
the rule as to laws taking effect after fifteen days
following the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette is subject to this exception, unless it is
otherwise provided. Moreover, the Civil Code is itself
only a legislative enactment, Republic Act No. 386. It
does not and cannot have the juridical force of a
constitutional command. A later legislative or executive
act which has the force and effect of law can legally
provide for a different rule.
5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in
the opinion of Justice Escolin that presidential decrees
and executive acts not thus previously published in the
Official Gazette would be devoid of any legal character.
That would be, in my opinion, to go too far. It may be
fraught, as earlier noted, with undesirable consequences.

I find myself therefore unable to yield assent to such a
pronouncement.
I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad
Santos, Cuevas, and Alampay concur in this separate
opinion.
_______________
6 Cf. Alalayan v. National Power Corporation, L-24396, July
29, 1968, 24 SCRA 172.
46
Taada vs. Tuvera
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and
the concurring opinion of Mme. Justice Herrera. The Rule
of Law connotes a body of norms and laws published and
ascertainable and of equal application to all similarly
circumstanced and not subject to arbitrary change but
only under certain set procedures. The Court has
consistently stressed that it is an elementary rule of fair
play and justice that a reasonable opportunity to be
informed must be afforded to the people who are
commanded to obey before they can be punished for its
violation,1People vs. de Dios, G.R. No. 11003, Aug. 31,

1959, per the late Chief Justice Paras. citing the settled
principle based on due process enunciated in earlier
cases that before the public is bound by its contents,
especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or
circular must first be published and the people officially
and specially informed of said contents and its penalties.
Without official publication in the Official Gazette as
required by Article 2 of the Civil Code and the Revised
Administrative Code, there would be no basis nor
justification for the corollary rule of Article 3 of the Civil
Code (based on constructive notice that the provisions of
the law are ascertainable from the public and official
repository where they are duly published) that Ignorance
of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.
Respondents contention based on a misreading of Article
2 of the Civil Code that only laws which are silent as to
their effectivity [date] need be published in the Official
Gazette for their effectivity is manifestly untenable. The
plain text and meaning of the Civil Code is that laws
shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette,
unless it is otherwise provided, i.e. a different effectivity
date is provided by the law itself. This proviso perforce
refers to a law that has been duly published pursuant to
the basic constitutional requirements of due process. The
best example of this is the Civil Code itself: the same
Article 2 provides otherwise that it shall take effect
[only] one
_______________
1 People vs. de Dios, G.R. No. 11003, Aug. 31, 1959, per
the late Chief Justice Paras.
47
VOL. 136, APRIL 24, 1985 47
Taada vs. Tuvera
year [not 15 days] after such publication.2Notes in

brackets supplied. To sustain respondents misreading
that most laws or decrees specify the date of their
effectivity and for this reason, publication in the Official
Gazette is not necessary for their
effectivity3Respondents comment, pp. 14-15. would be
to nullify and render nugatory the Civil Codes
indispensable and essential requirement of prior
publication in the Official Gazette by the simple expedient
of providing for immediate effectivity or an earlier
effectivity date in the law itself before the completion of
15 days following its publication which is the period
generally fixed by the Civil Code for its proper
dissemination.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:
I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a
decree provides for a date of effectivity, it has to be
published. What I would like to state in connection with
that proposition is that when a date of effectivity is

mentioned in the decree but the decree becomes
effective only fifteen (15) days after its publication in the
Official Gazette, it will not mean that the decree can have
retroactive effect to the date of effectivity mentioned in
the decree itself. There should be no retroactivity if the
retroactivity will run counter to constitutional rights or
shall destroy vested rights.
SEPARATE OPINION
PLANA, J.:
The Philippine Constitution does not require the
publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity,
unlike some Constitutions elsewhere.**See e.g.,
Wisconsin Constitution. Art. 7, Sec. 21: The legislature
shall provide publication of all statute laws . . . and no
general law shall be in force until published. See also
State ex rel. White vs. Grand Superior Ct., 71 ALR 1354,
cit... It may be said though that the guarantee of due
process requires notice of laws to affected op
_______________
2 Notes in brackets supplied.
3 Respondents comment, pp. 14-15.
** See e.g., Wisconsin Constitution. Art. 7, Sec. 21: The
legislature shall provide publication of all statute laws . . .
and no general law shall be in force until published. See
also State ex rel. White vs. Grand Superior Ct., 71 ALR
1354, citing the Constitution of Indiana, U.S.A.
48
Taada vs. Tuvera
parties before they can be bound thereby; but such

notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official
Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise.
Neither is the publication of laws in the Official Gazette
required by any statute as a prerequisite for their
effectivity, if said laws already provide for their effectivity
date.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that laws shall take
effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise
provided. Two things may be said of this provision:
Firstly, it obviously does not apply to a law with a built-in
provision as to when it will take effect. Secondly, it clearly
recognizes that each law may provide not only a different
period for reckoning its effectivity date but also a
different mode of notice. Thus, a law may prescribe that it
shall be published elsewhere than in the Official Gazette.
Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not
support the proposition that for their effectivity, laws
must be published in the Official Gazette. The said law is
simply An Act to Provide for the Uniform Publication and
Distribution of the Official Gazette. Conformably
therewith, it authorizes the publication of the Official

Gazette, determines its frequency, provides for its sale
and distribution, and defines the authority of the Director
of Printing in relation thereto. It also enumerates what
shall be published in the Official Gazette, among them,
important legislative acts and resolutions of a public
nature of the Congress of the Philippines and all
executive and administrative orders and proclamations,
except such as have no general applicability. It is
noteworthy that not all legislative acts are required to be
published in the Official Gazette but only important
ones of a public nature. Moreover, the said law does not
provide that publication in the Official Gazette is essential
for the effectivity of laws. This is as it should be, for all
statutes are equal and stand on the same footing. A law,
especially an earlier one of general application such as
Commonwealth Act No. 638, cannot nullify or restrict the
operation of a subsequent statute that has a provision of
its own as to when and how it will take effect. Only a
higher law, which is the Constitution, can assume that
role.
49
VOL. 136, APRIL 25, 1985 49
In Re: Milagros Santia
In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that

it requires notice before laws become effective, for no
person should be bound by a law without notice. This is
elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar
as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the
Official Gazette.
Respondents ordered to publish all unpublished
presidential issuances in the Official Gazette. [Taada vs.
Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27(1985)]

Declaration of Principles and State Policies

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[No. L-2662.

March 26, 1949]

with the generally accepted principles and policies of

PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

5.Id. ; Id.The President as Commander in Chief is fully

confined to the recognition of rules and principles of

parties are usually military personnel who are neither

mission having been convened by virtue of a valid law,

PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

the rule-making power expressly vested by the

16.Id.; Id.; Scope of Powers of Different Governmental

commissions to adopt additional rules of procedure. If the

of the Philippines, or, at latest, upon the surrender of

President of the Philippines. Should there be any

Pedro Serran, Jose G. Lukban, and Liberato B. Cinco for

PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines during a

In support of his case, petitioner tenders the following

Third.That Attorneys Hussey and Port have no

Executive Order No. 68, establishing a National War

"War is not ended simply because hostilities have ceased.

PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

to thwart or impede our military effort have violated the

through the issuance and enforcement of Executive Order

tions were not erased by our assumption of full

There is nothing in said executive order which requires

PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

the vindication of crimes against her government and her

vindication of the honor of its citizens and its government

The commission was empaneled under the authority of

war crimes committed in the Philippines, and prescribe

PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

maintain a record thereof, and bring about the prompt

"(a) Over Persons.The military commissions appointed

Philippines, or under authority delegated by him.

"(e) Presiding Member.In the event that the convening

PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

"(4) Hold each session at such time and place as it shall

"(2) To require the production of documents and other

"(c). Affidavits, depositions or other signed statements.

"(e) Trial Procedure.The proceedings of each trial shall

PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

"(6) The defense may make an opening statement prior

evidence it proposes to submit to the commission, where

the Chief of Staff: Provided, That no sentence of death or

provisions of this Order, or such rules and forms as may

the Philippines for use by the National War Crimes Office

The first question that is thrust at our face, spearheading

PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

system of government as originally enunciated by

VOL. 83, MARCH 26, 1949

It authorizes military commissions to adopt additional

"Commonwealth Act No. 600

"Section 1. The existence of war in many parts of the

PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

and the organization of volunteer guard units, and to

activities; (2) to require all able-bodied citizens (a) when

any officer, without additional compensation, or any

ment of the business of such firm, or corporation shall be

and void, such declaration shall not invalidate the

"Section 1. The existence of war between the United

instrumentalities of government and to abolish any of

PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED