Art. 992 Cases

1|Succession Art.
992 full text

G.R. No. 28265
NATIVIDAD CENTENO, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
MARTINA CENTENO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
NICOLAS CENTENO, ET AL., intervenors-appellants.
The pious legacy of parcel No. 104 made by the testatrix

Melchora Arroyo, is upheld.
It is ordered that each of the parties, plaintiffs, intervenors, and
defendants, pay a third part of the costs of the trial.
VILLA-REAL, J.:
It is so ordered.
This is an appeal taken by the plaintiffs Natividad Centeno in
her own behalf and as administratrix of the estate of her
deceased father, Valentin Centeno, Jesus Centeno First,
Rosalia and Rosario Centeno, and by the intervenors Nicolas,
Emilio, Isaac and Jesus Centeno Second, from the judgment of
the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, of which the following
is the dispositive part:
The agreement of partition in question is hereby upheld, with
the adjudications to the parties thereto, and therefore the
partition prayed for in this civil case by plaintiffs and
intervenors respecting the realty described in the sixth
paragraph of the original complaint is denied. The other
petition that said partition be held void and of no effect in so far
as it refers only to the said portion adjucated to defendants, is
also denied.
It is held parcels Nos. 70, 86, and 95, described in the
aforementioned sixth paragraphs of the original complaint, are
held by defendants pro indiviso; and the others, Nos. 53, 54,
55, 60, 62, and 69, with the metes and bounds given in the
said sixth paragraph, which are in possession of the plaintiff
Jesus Centeno First, as well as the others, Nos. 82, 85, and
99, which are in the possession of the defendant Telesforo
Centeno.
The defendants' petition that the first 51 parcels of land
described in the said sixth paragraph of the original complaint,
reproduced in the last amendatory complaint, be partitioned in
this case and parcel No. 116 described in the inventory Exhibit
F of the plaintiffs, and 6 of the defendants, as well as the said
parcels Nos. 53, 54, 55, 60, 62, and 69, and the credits is
denied; all of which are considered and declared to the pro
indiviso (Exhibit 7 of the defendants), without prejudice to said
partition being made in such manner as they may agree upon.
It is ordered that the plaintiffs deliver to defendants the two
parcels of land described in the latters' cross complaint in their
second cause of action, and said two mares and harness
cannot be ordered delivered, because they are not formally
detailed and difficulties would arise in the execution of such an
order.
As Fabian Cabanilla and Simplicio Gaberto possessors of
parcels Nos. 76, 77, 59, and 100 claimed by plaintiffs and
intervenorst, were not made defendants in this case, no
pronouncement is here made against them, nor as to parcels
Nos. 52, 66, 94, and 61, the possessors of which are unknown.
Defendants are absolved from the claims with respect to
parcels Nos. 105, 106, 107, 11, 57, 75, 93, 102, 112, 115, 56,
58, 63, 64, 65, 67, 68, 71, 72, 73, 74, 78, 79, 80, 81, 83, 84,
87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 96, 97, 98, 101, 103, 108, 109, 110, 113,
and 114 (43) described in the complaint.
Plaintiffs support their appeal by assigning nineteen alleged

errors, and the intervenors another nineteen, to the trial court
in its judgment, which we shall discuss hereinafter:
In their second and last amended complaint, the plaintiffs pray
for judgment on the cause of action therein set forth: (a)
Ordering the partion between plaintiffs and intervenors in
accordance with the law and the wills of Isaac Centeno and
Melchora Arroyo of all properties described in the sixth
paragraph of the original complaint, together with the property
constituting the portion then adjudicated to the defendants in
the said partition; (b) holding the said partion to be void and of
no effect, only insofar as it refers to the portion adjudicated to
the defendants and ordering the latter to deliver the property in
their possession numbered from 52 to 115, with all its fruits,
and to return what they have unduly received in said erroneous
partition; (c) ordering the defendants to pay the costs of the
action; and (d) granting plaintiffs such further remedy not
herein prayed for as may be just and equitable.
In their second amended complaint the intervenors pray for the
causes of action therein set forth that the voluntary partition of
the property left by the deceased spouses Isaac Centeno and
Melchora Arroyo be declared null and void, in so far as it
respect the portion adjudicated to the defendants, ordering the
latter to return to said plaintiffs and intervenors what they have
unduly received in said partition.
In their amended answer, the defendants generally and
specifically deny each and every one of the allegations of the
complaints of the plaintiffs and the intervenors, with a special
defense and cross-complaint and pray the court: (a) To absolve
the said defendants from the complaint entirely; (b) to order the
partition of the property under Nos. 1 to 51, 53, 54, 55, 60, 61,
69, 116, 119 and 120 with their corresponding fruits or their
equivalent in money, and that their respective portions be
adjucated and delivered to these defendants, and that the
credits of the deceased so far collected be equally distributed
among the heirs; (c) that the plaintiff Valentin Centeno be
ordered to deliver to said defendants Martina Jose and
Telesforo Centeno, the property specified in paragraph 3 of the
cross-complaint, with all the fruits they produced or should
have produce from 1911 up to present date, or in default
thereof, to pay the value of said fruits with the proper legal
interest; (d) that the plaintiff Valentin Centeno be ordered to
pay the costs of this action; and (e) grant said defendants all
such further remedies with respect to their rights as may be
just and equitable.
The case having passed though all the proper proceeding and
after hearing the evidence presented by the parties in support
of their respective claims, the lower court rendered judgment,
the dispositive part of which is quoted above.
2|Succession Art. 992 full text

The preponderance of the evidence establishes the following
pertinent facts necessary to the solution of the questions of fact
and of law raised in the present appeal.
Isaac Centeno and Melchora Arroyo were husband and wife
who brought no property to the marriage but acquired much
property during their married life.
Isaac Centeno died on October 7, 1905, and was survived by
his wife Melchora Arroyo, and their three son, Valentin,
Faustino and Antonio Centeno. Before his death, that is, on
June 30, 1904, Isaac Centeno executed a will, one of the
clauses of which contained the following provision: "I hereby
named and institute as my sole and universal heirs my three
sons Antonio, Valentin and Faustino Centeno or their heirs, if
any, to one-half of the above-named property, provided, that
the same be divided equally among my three said sons."
(Exhibit D of plaintiffs and Exhibit 4 of defendants.) The will
having been admitted to probate and his widow Melchora
Arroyo, appointed administratrix of the property left by him,
said Melchora Arroyo, as such administrator, filed with the
court a detailed inventory of all the property left by her
deceased husband which had come into her possession.
(Exhibit F of plaintiffs and Exhibit 6 of defendants.)
On October 30, 1907, Antonio Centeno died leaving a widow,
Gabriela Fernadez, and a will executed on October 9, 1907,
clauses 3 and 8 of which are as follows:
Third. I declare that I was married once, being still married to
Dna. Gabriela Fernandez y Bribiesca, and during our union we
had not a single child; I also declared that although I said I
have no child, the God of pity has given me eight, who are my
children by another woman, three of whom are called natural,
who are Martina, Jose (alias Pepe), and Telesforo Centeno,
because they were born even before I married my aforesaid
wife, Dna. Gabriela the five are Sisenando, Antonina, Gregorio,
Jose (alias Peping), and Gabriel Centeno, and are called
illegitimate, because they were born after my marriage;
nevertheless I acknowledge them all for I have had them since
theit birth supporting and bringing all of them, up until now.
Eight. Of my portion from my deceased father Isaac Centeno
Purugganan, and of my future portion from my mother Dna.
Melchora Arroyo, I institute as my universal heirs my three
children called natural, to have and to hold in fee simple during
their lives, under God's blessing and my own. (Exhibit 9-b of
defendants.)
This will was probated on petition of his mother Melchora
Arroyo de Centeno, and his widow, Gabriela Fernandez de
Centeno.
This will was probated upon petition of Valentin Centeno, one

of the executors named therein.
While testamentary proceedings for the settlement of the
estates of Isaac Centeno and Melchora Arroyo were being had,
the heirs of both, desiring a just and lawful partition in
accordance with the wills of both, submitted for its approval to
the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, in November, 1910
and agreement of partition executed in October, 1910 wherein
Valentin Centeno, Gabriela Fernandez de Centeno widow of
Antonio Centeno, and the latter's acknowledged natural
children, Martina and Emilio A. Centeno, and Asuncion
Arcebal, widow of Faustino Centeno, for herself and in behalf
of her minor son Jesus Centeno, jr., interverned as parties.
(Exhibit 7 of defendants.)
On March 10, 1911, the court, acting on the motion presented
by said heirs, ordered the publication in newspaper of the
largest circulation in the locality once a week for three
consecutive weeks, of a notice of the filing in said court of the
agreement of partition of the testate estate of the deceased
spouses, Isaac Centeno and Melchor Arroyo, so that each and
every person interested in said property and those who might
have claims thereto may present themselves before the court
on the day appointed and show cause if any, why said
agreement of partition should not be approved or why said
estate should not be declared closed. (Exhibit 8-b of
defendants.) On March 8, 1911 in pursuance of said order, the
clerk of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur set the 8th of
April 1911 for the hearing of the approval of the said
agreement of partition. On April 20, 1911, the Court of First
Instance of Ilocos Sur issued the following order:
All the heirs in this case and in No. 264 having bound
themselves to answer for all just claims agaist the estates the
subject matter of the aforesaid two cases, and having complied
with the order of March 10, 1911 issued in the present case
with respect to the publication in the newspapers of the proper
notification to those interested in the estate or those holding
any claim against said estate, for the approval of the scheme
of partition filed by the heirs the court, notwithstanding the
opposition of Pedro Arroyo to such approval, hereby approves
said scheme of partition declaring said two cases closed,
without prejudice to the oppositor, Pedro Arroyo, claiming his
rights and legal fees from said heirs.
It is so ordered. (Exhibit FF of plaintiffs and Exhibit 8-c of
defendants.)
On October 22, 1913 the said Court of First Instance of Ilocos
Sur issued also the following order:
Melchora Arroyo de Centeno died on December 8, 1909,

leaving one son named Valentin Centeno, and a will executed
on November 3, 1909, clause 3 of which provides:
The present case being called for trial for the approval of the
account presented by the administratrix Gabriela F. de
Centeno, the latter appeared with the heirs name Telesforo and
Sisenando Centeno, and the legatee Antonina Centeno, minor.
(c) The third part shall be divided equally, neither more nor
less, among my sons Antonio and Faustino Centeno, may they
rest in peace, and Valentin Centeno. (Exhibit E of plaintiffs and
Exhibit 5 of defendants.)
Inasmuch as said administratrix declares that the aforesaid

heirs Telesforo and Sisenando, as well as the other heirs not
present, Martina and Jose Centeno, have already received
their corresponding share of the inheritance; and as the said

present heirs confirm this declaration of the administratrix; and
as the latter further declares that she holds the legacy
corresponding to said Antonina and her three brothers
Gregorio, Jose (alias Peping), and Gabriela, all surnamed
Centeno, the court orders that Mr. Sisenando Centeno be
appointed guardian of the said minors with his consent, and
with the acquiescence of the minor Antonio Centeno.
It is likewise ordered that the said heirs file a statement
showing those who have already received their proper share of
the inheritance.
The administratrix is also ordered to present the inventory of
the property given as a legacy to said minors, which will be
turned over to the guardian appointed upon his giving bond,
the amount of which is to be fixed according to the
aforementioned inventory. So ordered.
In the partition agreement submitted by the heirs to the court
and approved by the latter, the property mentioned in plaintiffs'
account Exhibit G, was adjudicated to Antonio Centeno, said
exhibit being singed by all the heirs who took part in said
agreement of partition.
Besides the property left by the deceased spouses, Isaac
Centeno and Melchora Arroyo, which was partitioned among
the heirs, 115 parcels of land described in the sixth paragraph
of plaintiffs' complaint remained undistributed, of which fiftyone, marked Nos. 1 to 51, were in the possession of the
plaintiff Valentin Centeno and is now held by his sons, the
herein plaintiffs, who took his place after his death which
occured in the course of the present proceeding in the lower
court; two, designated Nos. 76 and 77 were in the power and
possession of Fabian Cabanilla who has had them in his
possession as owner for more than ten years previous to the
filing of the complaint having inherited them from his father,
who, in turn, inherited them from his father, having paid the
land tax on the same; two others, designated Nos. 59 and 100,
are held by Simplicio Gaberto, who has been in possession
thereof from time immemorial without any interruption of any
kind, having inherited them from his father.
As to those marked Nos. 52, 66 and 94, there is no evidence
showing who holds and possesses them. Moreover the two
alleged possessors named are not parties in the present suit.
The parcel of land marked No. 104, tax No. 10318, is the same
parcel bearing the same tax number included in the partion
made in October, 1910 (Exhibit 7), destined to pious purposes
by the deceased Melchora Arroyo, according to her will (Exhibit
E of the plaintiffs).
The four parcels of land marked Nos. 105, 106, 107 and 111,
and identified by sworn declarations of ownership Nos. 10328,
10329, 10330 and 10335, respectively, are the same parcels of
land referred to in the said partition made in the month of
October, 1910 (Exhibit 7 of defendants, designated as the
legacy of Martina Centeno one of the defendants according to
the will of the deceased Isaac Centeno (Exhibit D of plaintiffs).
The parcel of land marked Nos. 57, 75, 93, 102, 112 and 115
and identified by sworn declarations of ownership Nos. 10374,
10474, 10533, 10549, 10388 and 10429, respectively, were

adjudicated to the defendants in the said partition made in
October, 1910 (Exhibit G of defendants, who hold them).
The parces of land marked Nos. 53, 54, 55, 60, 62 and 69, and
identified by sworn declarations of ownership Nos. 10333,
10337, 10367, 10410, 10425 and 10459, respectively, and
mentioned in defendants' answer, are held by Jesus Centeno
First.
The declarations of ownership in the name of Melchora Arroyo
de Centeno of the parcels designated by Nos. 82, 85 and 99,
in the complaint were cancelled and substituted by those
numbered 37522, 39333 and 21058, respectively (Exhibit 1 of
the defendants). It does not appear in whose posssession said
parcels are, but it is to be presumed that they are held by
Telesforo Centeno in whose name the new declarations were
made. Neither does it appear how the latter acquired them. As
they are not included in the partition they should be considered
as part of the undivided share of Melchora Arroyo de Centeno
in the estate.
The parcels of land designated by Nos. 56, 58, 101 and 103 in
the complaint have been in possession of the herein
defendants Telesforo and Martina Centeno since the death of
the deceased spouses Isaac Centeno since the death of the
deceased spouses Isaac Centeno and Melchora Arroyo, which
took place on October 7, 1905 and December 8, 1909,
respectively, who have been gathering their products and
enjoying their fruits exclusively. These four parcels of land are
not included in the inventory of the conjugal property left by
said deceased spouses, which gives rise to the presumption
that said four parcels do not belong to their share in the estate;
otherwise, Melchora Arroyo, who must have known all the
property of the conjugal partnership, would have included them
in said inventory which she submitted to the court.
The parcels of land bearing Nos. 70, 86 and 95, are the same
ones designated by Nos. 145, 132 and 135 in said inventory,
but which were not included in the partition agreement. These
three parcels of land are in possession of the herein
defendants, but it does not appear that said possession meets
all the requirements prescribed by law in order that it may ripen
into title.
The parcels of land Nos. 113 and 114, which are also
enumerated in the said inventory, have been in possession of
the herein defendants since the death of the spouses Isaac
Centeno and Melchora Arroyo, who have been gathering their
fruits and enjoying them exclusively.
The parcels of land designated in the complaint by Nos. 63, 64,
65, 68, 71, 72, 73, 74, 78, 79, 80, 81, 83, 84, 87, 88, 89, 90,
91, 92, 96, 97, 98, 108, 109 and 110 also are not mentioned in
the aforesaid inventory and are possessed by the defendants,
who have been enjoying their products exclusively.
As to the parcels of land Nos. 116, 119 and 120, which are the
subject matter of the defendants' cross-complaint said three
parcels belonged to the spouses Isaac Centeno and Melchora
Arroyo during their lifetime and are now in the possession of
the plaintiffs. Two of said parcels, those designated by Nos.

116 and 120 are identified with Nos. 57 and 251 in the
inventory of the estate of Isaac Centeno. The parcel of land
No. 120 is the same parcel No. 60 mentioned in the complaint.
The parcel of land 119 is the same parcel land No. 23 is the
same complaint. The parcel of land No. 116 must be added to
the one hundred and fifteen parcels claimed in the complaint
as having belonged to the deceased spouses Isaac Centeno
and Melchora Arroyo and is pro indiviso.
There are two more parcels of land with sworn declarations of
ownership Nos. 10375 and 10386, which appear in the list of
the properties adjudicated to Antonio Centeno (Exhibit G of
plaintiffs) and which are in the possession of the plaintiffs.
The chattels and cattle adjudicated to Antonio Centeno in the
scheme of partition and which were in the possession of
Valentin Centeno have not yet been delivered to the
defendants.
With respect to the uncollected credits which amount to P8,950
according to the partition agreement Exhibit 7 of the
defendants, and the collection of which was intrusted to
Valentin Centeno, the latter collected P300 owed by Pedro
Biloria, leaving P8,650 uncollected, which is pro indiviso, as
well as the house and lot valued at P300 and adjudicated in
part payment of said credit.
To summarize, then, it appears that the only parcels of land
which may be the subject matter of the partition among the
parties are the following: Those designated in the original
complaint by Nos. 1 to 51, and which are in possession of the
plaintiffs; those designated in said original complaint by Nos.
53, 54, 55, 60, 62 and 69 which are in possession of Jesus
Centeno First; those designated in said original complaint by
Nos. 82, 85 and 99, which are in the possession of Telesforo
Centeno; those designated in said original complaint by Nos.
70, 86 and 95, which are in the possession of the defendants;
and those designated in the cross-complaint by Nos. 116, 119
and 120, which are in the possession of the plaintiffs, the two
last of which are designated in the complaint as Nos. 23 and
60, respectively.
The credits should also be partitioned.
Before entering fully into a discussion of the question of law
raised by the plaintiffs and the intervenors in their respective
briefs, it is well to decide the legal question of procedure raised
by said parties as to whether or not the trial court erred in not
declaring the defendants in default for not having answered the
plaintiffs' second amended complaint and in permitting said
defendants to present their answer on the day of the trial, upon
oral motion made in open court.
In maintaining the affirmative, the plaintiffs-appellants invoke
the provisions of articles 10 and 11 of the Rules of Courts of
First Instance, which require that all motions shall be in writing
and shall be filed with the proper court making it appear that
the adverse party had notice thereof three days before the time
set for the hearing thereof, and providing that unless it so
appears, no action shall be taken on them.
The purpose of requiring such conditions is doubtless to give

sufficient time and opportunity to the adverse party to become
informed of any motion which may be presented in which he
may be interested, and may interpose his objection should he
so desire. When a motion is made in open court and in the
presence of all the parties, it is not necessary to make it in
writing nor that the adverse party be notified thereof, since
proceedings in Courts of First Instance as courts of record, are
reduced to writing by the official court stenographer, and the
adverse party has an opportunity to become informed of said
motion and of its nature and may object to it at once if he so
desires, or may ask the court for a period within which to file
his opposition.
Since the defendants made the motion for the admission of
their answer to the second amended complaint in open court
and in the presence of all the parties, the trial court did not err
in granting it and admitting said answer and in not declaring
them in default, in accordance with section 110 of the Code of
Civil Procedure.
Entering now upon the discussion of the question on the merit,
we may say at the outset that with respect to the questions of
fact raised by the plaintiffs-appellants and intervenorsappellants in their repective briefs, we have examined the
evidence, both documentary and oral, adduced at the trial by
the respective parties in support of their respective
contentions, and have found the preponderance of the
evidence fully justifies the findings of fact made by the trial
court in its judgment, and they are the same as set forth above.
Touching the questions of law raised also by the plaintiffsappellants and intervenors-appellants in their respective briefs,
they may be reduced to the following:
1. Are the defendants entitled, as acknowledged natural
children of Antonio Centeno, to inherit from his legitimate father
Isaac Centeno?
2. Are said defendants entitled, as such acknowledged natural
children of Antonio Centeno, to the reservation of one-half of
said hereditary portion which Melchora Arroyo inherited from
her legitimate son Antonio Centeno which hereditary portion
the latter had inherited from his likewise legitimate father Isaac
Centeno?
3. Are the defendants entitled, as such acknowledged natural
children of Antonio Centeno, to represent their natural father
Antonio Centeno in the inheritance of their natural grandmother
Melchora Arroyo, legitimate mother of Antonio Centeno?
4. Is the partition made among the plaintiffs, intervenors and
defendants, and duly approved by the court, of the conjugal
property left by the deceased spouses Isaac Centeno and
Melchora Arroyo, valid?
5. Did the defendants acquire by prescription the ownership of
the parcels of land adjudicated to them in the partition, and of
the parcels of land included in the inventory of the properties
left by Isaac Centeno and not adjudicated to them in the
partition but which are in the possession of said defendants?

6. Are the defendants entitled, as acknowledged natural
children of Antonio Centeno, to recover from the heirs of
Valentin Centeno the personal and real property, cattle and
credits which were adjudicated to them in said partition and
which remained in the possession of said Valentin Centeno?
7. Are said defendants entitled, as such acknowledged natural
children of Antonio Centeno, to participate in the conjugal
property left by Isaac Centeno and Melchora Arroyo included in
the inventory but not included in the partition?
8. May the partition of the conjugal property left by the spouses
Isaac Centeno and Melchora Arroyo and still remaining pro
indiviso be ordered in these proceedings?
With regard to the first question, the defendants-appellees did
not inherit from their natural granfather Isaac Centno by
intestate succession, but from their natural father Antonio
Centeno, who acknowledged them in his will and named them
heirs to the property he had inherited from his deceased father
Isaac Centeno, who had died before him. The fact the
inheritance left by Isaac Centeno remained pro indiviso when
Antonio Centeno died, did not prevent him from acquiring
during his lifetime, a right to inherit from his deceased father,
since article 657 plainly provides that the rights to succession
of any person are transmitted from the moment of his death.
As to the second question, the defendants, as acknowledged
natural children of Antonio Centeno, are not entitled to more
than the half of the part of the inheritance which could be freely
disposed of by their natural father, the latter not having left any
legitimate decendants, but a legitimate ascendants, who is his
mother Melchora Arroyo, without prejudice to the legitime of his
widow Gabriela Fernandez, in accordance with article 841 in
connection with article 836 of the Civil Code, the other half of
his estate going to his mother Melchora Arroyo as her legitime,
as provided in article 809 of the same Code. Melchora Arroyo
having died, said defendants, as acknowledged natural
children of Antonio Centeno, are not entitled to the reservation
of the hereditary portion which said Melchora Arroyo acquired
gratuitously from her legitimate son Antonio Centeno who, in
turn, also acquired it gratuitously, from his legitimate father
Isaac Centeno, according to the doctrine laid down and
Deocampo ([1920], 41 Phil., 915), as follows:
RESERVABLE RIGHTS IN PROPERTY; INHERITANCE BY
RELATIVES WITHIN THE THIRD DEGREE; ILLEGITIMATE
RELATIVES. Article 811 of the Civil Code which provides
that any ascendants who inherits from his descendants any
property acquired by the latter gratuitously from some other
ascendant, or from a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve
such of the property as he may have acquired by operation of
law for the benefit of relatives within the third degree belonging
to the line from which such property came,' does not apply to
illegitimate relatives. (See also the decision of the Supreme
Court of Spain rendered of June 10, 1918.)
Passing now to the third question, while it is true that in his will
Antonio Centeno named the herein defendants as his heirs,
not only with respect to the hereditary portion given him in the
will of his father Isaac Centeno, but also with respect to the
hereditary portion of the property left by his mother Melchora
Arroyo, which he would inherit, nevertheless said testamentary

disposition with regard to the property of this mother is void
and of no effect, because since his mother still lived, he had
not acquired any right to her inheritance and therefore could
not dispose of said property, since it is a rule of law that no one
can dispose of anything that does not belong to him. (Sy Joc
Lieng vs. Encarnacion, 16 Phil., 137.)
Although Melchora Arroyo in her will named her son Antonio
Centeno as one of her heirs, since he died before her, the
herein defendants, as acknowledged natural children of said
Antonio Centeno have no right to represent their deceased
father, according to the doctrine laid down by the Supreme
Court of Spain, in the judgment rendered on June 10, 1918,
supra, which is as follows:
Considering that the truth of this doctrine, and that the
judgment appealed from has not violated the laws cited in the
fifth, sixth and seventh assignments of errors, is shown,
besides the text of article 807 already cited, by that of articles
836, 944 of the same Code, in comparison with articles 808,
843, and 941 thereof, because while the first of these, in
dealing with the legitime due to legitimate children includes the
legitimate decendants thereof, articles 843 and 941 in
connection with natural children specifically provide that the
portion corresponding to them in the hereditary estate of the
parents who acknowledged them is transmitted upon the death
of these children to their legitimate or natural decendants. The
latter's right, however, to represent their natural father in the
hereditary estate of their grandfather is not admitted because
the law does not call them to participate in the latter's estate,
and for a like reason, in default of parents acknowledging the
natural child, the grandfather, according to article 945, cannot
inherit from the granchild, the doctrine laid down by this
court in its decision of February 13, 1903, to the effect that a
natural child whose deceased father was legitimate, has no
right to inherit from his grandfather, even if the latter should die
without any surviving legitimate decendants is a necessary
consequence of the aforecited legal provisions, because, as
children inherit in their own right and grandchildren by
representation, it is clear that such representation of the
grandchildren only refers to and includes those who are in the
same legal status as the person represented, and never those
who are in a different legal status. (M. Ruiz, Civil Code, vol. 7,
p.175.)
Touching the fourth question, "the heirs of the deceased Isaac
Centeno and his wife Melchora Arroyo de Centeno, also
deceased, desiring to make a just and lawful partition, and in
accord with the wills of both," submitted to the consideration
and approval of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur an
agreement of partition of the pro indiviso conjugal property left
by the deceased spouses as appearing in instrument Exhibit 7
of the defendants. Said partition agreement having been
submitted to the court, the latter ordered the fixing of a day for
the hearing of the accompanying motion, and the publication of
a notice for the appearance of all who might have an interest
therein, and the presentation of the claims and objections they
might have. The day for the hearing having arrived, and all the
parties having been heard, who stated that they bound
themselves to answer for all the just claims against the two
estates of Isaac Centeno and Melchora Arroyo, the court

approved the partition and declared said two testamentary
proceedings closed by its order dated April 20, 1911.
While it is true that the partition agreement was made by all the
heirs extrajudicially, in submitting it to the court for approval,
and in being approved by the latter after having announced the
hearing through publication in the newspapers, said
extrajudicial agreement of partition became judicial, and the
order of the court approving it and declaring the respective
testamentary proceedings involving the estates of the
deceased spouses closed, became final and absolute, and
binding upon all the parties who took part in the said partition
agreement, and acquiesced therein. More than six years
having elapsed from the date the order of the court approving
the extrajudicial agreement of partition became final until the
filing of the first complaint praying for the annulment of said
partition, there is absolutely no legal reason for setting aside
said order which must therefore be considered irrevocable, and
the partition made in accordance with the agreement valid.
The fact that Jesus Centeno Second was a minor at the time
said agreement of partition was entered into, does not render it
void with respect to him, because he was represented by his
mother Asuncion Arcebal, who was his natural guardian by law,
although without the right to the custody of his property unless
so authorized by the court (sec. 553, Act No. 190), and when
the court approved said agreement, said representation was
impliedly approved and the acts of the mother were validated.
Neither does the fact that the defendants were mere
acknowledged natural children, and therefore without the right
of equal participation with the legitimate children, render said
partition void. Article 1081 of the Civil Code provides that a
partition made with the inclusion of any person who was
believed, but was not, and heir shall be void. The herein
defendants-appellees were not strangers to the inheritance for
they were named as heirs by their natural father, whom they
succeeded in his rights to the hereditary portion which should
have gone to him from the unsettled estate left by his
deceased father Isaac Centeno.
Furthermore, the plaintiffs and intervenors cannot allege
ignorance of the condition of the defendants-appellees as
acknowledged natural children, for this condition appeared
from the will of Antonio Centeno, and in making the partition in
the form in which they made it, they desired to do so, in a just,
lawful manner, in accordance with the wills of the deceased
spouses Isaac Centeno and Melchora Arroyo, and they made it
appear so in the preable to the scheme of partition, Exhibit 7 of
the defendants.
It follows, then, that the defendants-appellees not only were
not strangers to the inheritance, but that, with full knowledge of
their status of acknowledge natural children, the plaintiffs and
intervenors adjudicated to them the property appearing in the
agreement of partition, deeming it just, legal, and in conformity
with the wills of their predecessors in interest, and said
partition is therefore legal and valid.
As to the fifth question, having arrived at the conclusion that
the partition made among the plaintiffs, the intervenors, and
the defendants is valid and irrevocable, it is needless to
discuss whether, in addition, said defendants acquired rights of

ownership to the goods ajudicated to them and appearing in
Exhibit G of the plaintiffs, by acquisitive prescription, and we
shall limit ourselves to considering the conjugal property left by
the deceased spouses Isaac Centeno and Melchora Arroyo,
included in inventory Exhibit F of the plaintiffs, and 6 of the
defendants, and not included in the scheme of partition, Exhibit
7 of the defendants, but which is in the latters' possession.
It cannot be doubted that if the defendants have been in
possession of said property adversely, continuously, publicly
and as owners thereof for a period of ten years, they have
acquired the ownership threof by prescription. (Sec. 41, Act
No. 190; Casanas vs. Rosello [1927] 50 Phil., 97.)
Taking up now the sixth question after the fourth has been
solved by holding that the partition among the plaintiffs,
intervenors, and defendants is legal and valid, and since the
personal and real property, the cattle, and credits claimed by
the defendants in their cross-complaint are included in said
partition, they are entitled to claim them from the plaintiffs who
now have them in their possession. With respect to the
seventh question, the defendants, as natural children of
Antonio Centeno, acknowledged by the latter as such and
named as his heirs in his will, are entitled to one-half of the the
hereditary portion belonging to their natural father from the
estate of the deceased Isaac Centeno, which was included in
the inventory of the property left by the latter and which was
not included in the agreement of partition, the other half of said
hereditary portion of Antonio Centeno belonging to his mother
Melchora Arroyo who survived him, with said natural children.
As to the eight question, the plaintiffs and intervenors in their
respective complaints pray for the annulment and setting aside
of the agreement of partition entered into by and between them
and the defendants in October, 1910, in so far only as it refers
to the portion adjudicated to the latter; that it be ordered that
said defendants return to said plaintiffs and intervenors what
they have received in excess; and that it be ordered likewise
that in accordance with the wills of Isaac Centeno and
Melchora Arroyo, the property mentioned in paragraph six of
the original complaint be partitioned between the plaintiffs and
intervenors, together with the property constituting the portion
adjudicated in the said partition.
The defendants in their cross-complaint pray that the property
designated by Nos. 1 to 51, 53, 60, 62, 69, 116, 117, 118, 119
and 120, and their corresponding fruits or their equivalent in
money, be partitioned, and that plaintiff Valentin Centeno be
ordered to deliver to said defendants the property specified in
paragraph three of the cross-complaint, with all the fruits
produced, or which it should have produced from the year 1911
up to the present time, or in its default thereof to pay value of
said fruits, plus the proper legal interest thereon, and the costs
of the action.
As will be seen, the action instituted by the plaintiffs and the
intervenors, respectively, is for the recovery of property through
the annulment of the partition, and to have another partition
made. The defendants' cross-complaint is for the recovery and
partition of undivided property. The ownership of the property
which is the subject matter of the action for recovery having

been settled, and its delivery to the proper party ordered, and
the property belonging in common and pro indiviso to the
parties determined, there in no bar in law, either positive or
adjective, to the partition thereof.
In the case of Africa vs. Africa (42 Phil., 934), this court
enunciated the following doctrine:
1. PARTITION; RECOVERY OF PROPERTY; ACTION FOR.
An action cannot be considered as one for the partition of an
inheritance, even though it is so entitled and the prayer of the
complaint is to this effect, if any party to the suit denies the pro
indiviso character of the estate whose partition is sought, and
claims exclusive title thereto, or to any part thereof. In such
case the action becomes one for the recovery of property in so
far as the property claimed exclusively by any of the parties is
concerned.
What this court meant in saying that an action cannot be
considered as one for the partition of an inheritance, even
though it is so entitled and the prayer of the complaint is to this
effect, if any party to the suit denies the pro indiviso character
of the estate of coownership is not recognized by all the
parties, but that some claim to be exclusive owners thereof,
and it is found that there is no property to partition, the action
for partition loses its character as such and becomes one for
the recovery of property; but when the action is for the
recovery of property based upon the annulment of a partition
and at the same time for the partition of the property declared
to be undivided common property, it is not improper to order
the partition of the estate which has been declared to be
undivided common property, since there is no incompatibility
between the action for the recovery of property and for partition
of an inheritance, once the court has declared that the
property, the recovery of which is sought, belongs to the
parties in common and pro indiviso.
The conjugal property which has just been declared to be pro
indiviso, and which must be divided into two equal parts for the
purpose of ascertaining the participation of the defendants
separating the one-half which corresponds to Isaac Centeno
from the other half that belongs to Melchor Arroyo. The
defendants, as we have said, are only entitled to the one-half
of the hereditary portion which belonged to their natural father
Antonio Centeno of the conjugal property left by Isaac
Centeno, and not to the conjugal property left by Melchora
Arroyo. There being three children who survived Isaac
Centeno, namely, Valentin, Faustino, and Antonio Centeno,
said one-half of the conjugal property which still remains
undivided, left by Isaac Centeno, must be divided into three
parts, one-third pertaining pro indiviso to the children of
Valentin Centeno, and Faustino Centeno, respectively. Of the
one-third which belongs to Antonio Centeno, one-half, that is,
one-sixth of the whole, is what belongs to the defendants, and
the other half, or the other sixth part, to his legitimate mother
Melchora Arroyo, who inherited from her legitimate son Antonio
Centeno, becuase he died before her saving always the rights
of Gabriela Fernandez, as surviving spouse of Antonio
Centeno.
As to the one-half of the undivided conjugal property which

belongs to Melchora Arroyo, the only ones entitled to it are the
plaintiffs and intervenors.
Summarizing all the above, we are of the opinion, and so hold:
(1) That the defendants, as acknowledged natural children and
named heirs of Antonio Centeno in his will, are entitled to
inherit the one-half of hereditary portion which their deceased
natural father had inherited from his legitimate father by will; (2)
that said defendants, though they are acknowledged natural
children of Antonio Centeno, are not entiltled to the reservation
of the one-half which Melchora Arroyo received as her
legitimate from the hereditary portion which her son had
received from his father, Isaac Centeno also legitimate; (3) that
the defendants, thought they are acknowledged natural
children of Antonio Centeno, are not entitled to represent the
latter in the inheritance of his legitimate mother Melchora
Arroyo; (4) that the fact that defendants, as acknowledged
natural children of Antonio Centeno, took part, together with
Valentin Centeno, legitimate brother of said Antonio Centeno,
and with the children of Faustino Centeno, another legitimate
brother of said deceased Antonio Centeno, in the partition of
the estates left by Isaac Centeno and Melchora Arroyo, father
and mother Antonio, Valentin and Faustino Centeno, does not
make the partition void; (5) that the partition made between the
heirs, while extrajudicial at the beginning became judicial on
being approved by the court after complying with the proper
requirements prescribed by the law, and once all the periods
have elapsed within which the law permits its revocation for
any reason, it became final and irrevocable; (6) that the fact
that Jesus Centeno Second, son of Faustino Centeno, was a
minor at the time the agreement of partition was entered into,
does not make said agreement void, since he was represented
by his mother Asuncion ARcebal, and when said agreement
was approved by the court, said representation was implied
approved, and all her acts became validated ipso facto; (7) that
in the absence of a preponderance of evidence to the contrary,
the defendants are exclusive owners of the parcels of land
designated by Nos. 113 and 114, which are included in the
inventor of the estate of Isaac Centeno, having acquired title
thereto by prescription; (8) that the defendants, as crosscomplaint, are entitled to the ownership and possesion of the
two parcels of land described in the third paragraph of the
second cause of action of the cross-complaint, as well as the
two mares and the harness which are in possession of the
plaintiffs; (9) that the defendants are entitled to one-sixth part
of the undivided conjugal property left by Isaac Centeno, which
is yet to be partitioned; (10) that the action for the recovery of
the undivided property is not incompatible with the action for
partition, once the existence of the community of the property
of the estate whose recovery and partition are sought, has
been declared.
For the foregoing, and with the sole modification of orderinfg
the partition of the conjugal property left by the deceased
spouses Isaac Centeno and Melchora Arroyo declared by
lower court to be pro indiviso, the judgment appealed from is
affirmed in all other respects, without special pronoucement as
to costs. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-22469October 23, 1978

TOMAS CORPUS, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
ADMINISTRATOR and/or EXECUTOR of the Estate of
Teodoro R. Yangco, RAFAEL CORPUS, AMALIA CORPUS,
JOSE A. V. CORPUS, RAMON L. CORPUS, ENRIQUE J.
CORPUS, S. W. STAGG, SOLEDAD ASPRER and
CIPRIANO NAVARRO, defendants-appellees.
AQUINO, J.:
Teodoro R. Yangco died in Manila on April 20, 1939 at the age
of seventy-seven years. His will dated August 29, 1934 was
probated in the Court of First Instance of Manila in Special
Proceeding No. 54863. The decree of probate was affirmed in
this Court's 1941 decision in Corpus vs. Yangco, 73 Phil. 527.
The complete text of the will is quoted in that decision.
Yangco had no forced heirs. At the time of his death, his
nearest relatives were (1) his half brother, Luis R. Yangco, (2)
his half sister, Paz Yangco, the wife of Miguel Ossorio (3)
Amalia Corpus, Jose A. V. Corpus, and Ramon L. Corpus, the
children of his half brother, Pablo Corpus, and (4) Juana
(Juanita) Corpus, the daughter of his half brother Jose Corpus.
Juanita died in October, 1944 at Palauig, Zambales.
Teodoro R. Yangco was the son of Luis Rafael Yangco and
Ramona Arguelles, the widow of Tomas Corpus. Before her
union with Luis Rafael Yangco, Ramona had begotten five
children with Tomas Corpus, two of whom were the
aforenamed Pablo Corpus and Jose Corpus.
Pursuant to the order of the probate court, a project of partition
dated November 26, 1945 was submitted by the administrator
and the legatees named in the will. That project of partition was
opposed by the estate of Luis R. Yangco whose counsel
contended that an intestacy should be declared Because the
will does not contain an institution of heir. It was also opposed
by Atty. Roman A. Cruz, who represented Juanita Corpus,
Pedro Martinez and Juliana de Castro. Juanita Corpus was
already dead when Atty. Cruz appeared as her counsel.
Atty. Cruz alleged in his opposition that the proposed partion
was not in conformity with the will because the testator
intended that the estate. should be "conserved" and not
physically partitioned. Atty. Cruz prayed "que declare que el
finado no dispuso en su testamento de sus bienes y negocios
y que ha lugar a sucession intestado con respecio a los
raismos y que same un dia en esta causa para la recepcion de
pruebas previa a la declaracion de quienes son los herederos
legales o abintestato del difunto."
The Probate court in its order of December 26, 1946 approved

the project of partition. It held that in certain clauses of the will
the testator intended to conserve his properties not in the
sense of disposing of them after his death but for the purpose
of Preventing that "tales bienes fuesen malgastados o desfilpar
radios por los legatarios" and that if the testator intended a
Perpetual prohibition against alienation, that conch tion would
be regarded "como no puesta o no existents". it concluded that
"no hay motives legales o morales para que la sucession de
Don Teodoro R. Yangco sea declarada intestada (See Barretto

vs. Tuason, 50 Phil. 888, which cites article 785 of the Spanish
Civil Code as prohibiting perpetual entails, and Rodriguez vs.
Court of Appeals, L-28734, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 546.)
From that order, Pedro Martinez, Juliana de Castro , Juanita
Corpus (deceased) and the estate of Luis R. Yangco aped to
this Court (L-1476). Those appeals were dismissed in tills
Court's resolutions of October 10 and 31, 1947 after the
legatees and the appellants entered into compromise
agreements. In the compromise dated October 7, 1947 the
legatees agreed to pay P35,000 to Pedro Martinez, the heirs of
Pio V. Corpus, the heirs of Isabel Corpus and the heir of
Juanita Corpus. Herein appellant Tomas Corpus signed that
compromise settlement as the sole heir of Juanita Corpus. The
estate of Luis R. Yangco entered into a similar compromise a
ment A the resolution dismissing the appeal became, final and
executory on October 14 and November 4, 1947, entries of
judgment were made on those dates.
Pursuant to the compromise agreement, Tomas Corpus Signed
a receipt dated October 24, 1947 wherein he acknowledge that
he received from the Yangco estate the sum of two thousand
pesos (P2,000) "as settlement in full of my share of the
compromise agreement as per understanding with Judge
Roman Cruz, our attorney in this case" (Exh. D or 17).
On September 20, 1949, the legatees executed an agreement
for the settlement and physical partition of the Yangco estate.
The probate court approved that agreement and noted that the
1945 project of partition was pro tanto modified. That did not
set at rest the controvery over the Yangco's estate.
On October 5, 1951, Tomas Corpus, as the sole heir of Juanita
corpus, filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila
to recover her supposed share in Yangco intestate estate. He
alleged in his complaint that the dispositions in his Yangcos will
sing perpetual prohibitions upon alienation rendered it void
under article 785 of the old Civil Code and that the 1949
partition is invalid and, therefore, the decedent's estate should
be distributed according to the rules on intestacy.
The trial court in its decision of July 2, 1956 dismissed the
action on the grounds of res judicata and laches. It held that
the intrinsic validity of Yangco's will was passed upon in its
order dated December 26, 1946 in Special Proceeding No.
54863 approving the project of partition for the testator's
estate.
Tomas Corpus appealed to the Court of Appeals which in its
resolution dated January 23, 1964 in CA-G. R. No. 18720-R
certified the appeal to this Court because it involves real
property valued at more than fifty thousand pesos (Sec. 17151
Judiciary Law before it was amended by Republic Act No.
2613).
Appellant Corpus contends in this appeal that the trial court
erred in holding (1) that Teodoro R. Yangco was a natural child,
(2) that his will had been duly legalized and (3) that plaintiff's
action is barred by res judicata and laches.

In the disposition of this appeal it is not necessary to resolve
whether Yangco's will had been duly legalized and whether the
action of Tomas Corpus is barred by res judicata and laches.
The appeal may be resolved by de whether Juanita Corpus,
the mother of apt Tomas Corpus was a legal heir of Yangco.
Has Tomas Corpus a cause of action to recover his mother's
supposed intestate share in Yangco's estate?
To answer that question, it is necessary to ascertain Yangco's
filiation The trial court found that Yangco "a su muerte tambien
le sbrevivieron Luis y Paz appellidados Yangco, hermanos
naturales reconocidos por su padre natural Luis R. Yangco".
The basis of the trial court's conclusion that Teodoro R. Yangco
was an acknowledged natural child and not a legitimate child
was the statement in the will of his father, Luis Rafael Yangco,
dated June 14, 1907, that Teodoro and his three other children
were his acknowledged natural children. His exact words are:
Primera. Declaro que tengo cuatro hijos naturales reconocidos,
Hamados Teodoro, Paz, Luisa y Luis, los cuales son mis
unicos herederos forzosos (Exh. 1 in Testate Estate of Teodoro
Yangco).
That will was attested by Rafael del Pan Francisco Ortigas,
Manuel Camus and Florencio Gonzales Diez
Appellant Corpus assails the probative value of the will of Luis
R. Yangco, Identified as Exhibit 1 herein, which he says is a
mere copy of Exhibit 20, as found in the record on appeal in
Special Proceeding No. 54863. He contends that it should not
prevail over the presumption of legitimacy found in section 69,
Rule 123 of the old Rules of Court and over the statement of
Samuel W. Stagg in his biography of Teodoro R. Yangco, that
Luis Rafael Yangco made a second marital venture with
Victoria Obin implying that he had a first marital venture with
Ramona Arguelles, the mother of Teodoro.
These contentions have no merit. The authenticity of the will of
Luis Rafael Yangco, as reproduced in Exhibit I herein and as
copied from Exhibit 20 in the proceeding for the probate of
Teodoro R. Yangco's wilt in incontestable. The said will is part
of a public or official judicial record.
On the other hand, the children of Ramona Arguelles and
Tomas Corpus are presumed to be legitimate. A marriage is
presumed to have taken place between Ramona and Tomas.
Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. It is disputably
presumption "That a man and a woman deporting themselves
as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage"; "that a child born in lawful wedlock, there being no
divorce, absolute or from bed and board, is legitimate", and
"that things have happened according to the ordinary course of
nature and the ordinary habits of life" (Sec. 5[z], [bb] and cc
Rule 131, Rules of Court).
Since Teodoro R. Yangco was an acknowledged natural child
or was illegitimate and since Juanita Corpus was the legitimate
child of Jose Corpus, himself a legitimate child, we hold that
appellant Tomas Corpus has no cause of action for the
recovery of the supposed hereditary share of his mother,
Juanita Corpus, as a legal heir, in Yangco's estate. Juanita
Corpus was not a legal heir of Yangco because there is no
reciprocal succession between legitimate and illegitimate

relatives. The trial court did not err in dismissing the complaint
of Tomas Corpus.
Article 943 of the old Civil code provides that "el hijo natural y
el legitimado no tienen derecho a suceder abintestato a los
hijos y parientes legitimos del padre o madre que to haya
reconocido, ni ellos al hijo natural ni al legitimado". Article 943
"prohibits all successory reciprocity mortis causa between
legitimate and illegitimate relatives" 16 Sanchez Roman, Civil
Code, pp. 996-997 cited in Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 63
Phil. 279, 287. See 16 Scaevola Codigo Civil, 4th Ed., 4556). ...
Appellant Corpus concedes that if 'Teodoro R. Yangco was a
natural child, he (Tomas Corpus) would have no legal
personality to intervene in the distribution of Yangco's estate
(p. 8, appellant's brief).
The rule in article 943 is now found in article 992 of the Civil
Code which provides that "an illegitimate child has no right to
inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of
his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit
in the same manner from the illegitimate child".
That rule is based on the theory that the illegitimate child is
disgracefully looked upon by the legitimate family while the
legitimate family is, in turn, hated by the illegitimate child.
The law does not recognize the blood tie and seeks to avod
further grounds of resentment (7 Manresa, Codigo Civil, 7th
Ed., pp. 185- 6).
Under articles 944 and 945 of the Spanish Civil Code, "if an
acknowledged natural or legitimated child should die without
issue, either legitimate or acknowledged, the father or mother
who acknowledged such child shall succeed to its entire
estate; and if both acknowledged it and are alive, they shall
inherit from it share and share alike. In default of natural
ascendants, natural and legitimated children shall be
succeeded by their natural brothers and sisters in accordance
with the rules established for legitimate brothers and sisters."
Hence, Teodoro R. Yangco's half brothers on the Corpus side,
who were legitimate, had no right to succeed to his estate
under the rules of intestacy.
Following the rule in article 992, formerly article 943, it was
held that the legitimate relatives of the mother cannot succeed
her illegitimate child (Cacho vs. Udan L- 19996, April 30, 1965,
13 SCRA 693. See De Guzman vs. Sevilla, 47 Phil. 991).
Where the testatrix, Rosario Table was the legitimate daughter
of Jose Table the two acknowledged natural children of her
uncle, Ramon Table her father's brother, were held not to be
her legal heirs (Grey vs. Table 88 Phil. 128).
By reason of that same rule, the natural child cannot represent
his natural father in the succession to the estate of the
legitimate grandparent (Llorente vs. Rodriguez, 10 Phil. 585;
Centeno vs. Centeno, 52 Phil. 322; Allarde vs. Abaya, 57 Phil.
909).
10 | S u c c e s s i o n A r t . 9 9 2 f u l l t e x t
The natural daughter cannot succeed to the estate of her
deceased uncle, a legitimate brother of her natural mother
(Anuran vs. Aquino and Ortiz, 38 Phil. 29).
WHEREFORE the lower court's judgment is affirmed. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-51263February 28, 1983

CRESENCIANO LEONARDO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, MARIA CAILLES, JAMES
BRACEWELL and RURAL BANK OF PARAAQUE, INC.,
respondents.
DE CASTRO, J.:
Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 43476-R, promulgated on February
21, 1979, reversing the judgment of the Court of First Instance
of Rizal in favor of petitioner:
(a)
Declaring plaintiff Cresenciano Leonardo as the great
grandson and heir of deceased FRANCISCA REYES, entitled
to one-half share in the estate of said deceased, jointly with
defendant Maria Cailles;
(b)
Declaring the properties, subject of this complaint, to
be the properties of the deceased FRANCISCA REYES and
not of defendants Maria Cailles and James Bracewen
(c)
Declaring null and void any sale of these properties
by defendant Maria Cailles in so far as the share of
Cresenciano Leonardo are affected;
(d)
Ordering the partition within 30 days from the finality
of this decision, of the properties subject of this litigation,
between defendant Maria Cailles and plaintiff Cresenciano
Leonardo, share and share alike;
(e)
Ordering defendants Maria Cailles and James
Bracewell, within 30 days from the finality of this decision, to
render an accounting of the fruits of the properties, and 30
days thereafter to pay to plaintiff Cresenciano Leonardo his
one-half share thereof with interest of 6% per annum;
(f)
Ordering defendants Maria Cailles and James to pay
jointly and severally plaintiff Cresenciano Leonardo the amount
of P2,000.00 as attorney's fees;
(g)
Ordering defendants to pay the costs; and
(h)
Dismissing defendants' counterclaim. 1
From the record, it appears that Francisca Reyes who died

intestate on July 12, 1942 was survived by two (2) daughters,
Maria and Silvestra Cailles and a grandson, Sotero Leonardo,
the son of her daughter, Pascuala Cailles who predeceased
her. Sotero Leonardo died in 1944, while Silvestra Cailles died

in 1949 without any issue.
On October 29, 1964, petitioner Cresenciano Leonardo,
claiming to be the son of the late Sotero Leonardo, filed a
complaint for ownership of properties, sum of money and
accounting in the Court of First Instance of Rizal seeking
judgment (1) to be declared one of the lawful heirs of the
deceased Francisca Reyes, entitled to one-half share in the
estate of said deceased jointly with defendant, private
respondent herein, Maria Cailles, (2) to have the properties left
by said Francisca Reyes, described in the complaint,
partitioned between him and defendant Maria Cailles, and (3)
to have an accounting of all the income derived from said
properties from the time defendants took possession thereof
until said accounting shall have been made, delivering to him
his share therein with legal interest.
Answering the complaint, private respondent Maria Cailles
asserted exclusive ownership over the subject properties and
alleged that petitioner is an illegitimate child who cannot
succeed by right of representation. For his part, the other
defendant, private respondent James Bracewell, claimed that
said properties are now his by virtue of a valid and legal deed
of sale which Maria Cailles had subsequently executed in his
favor. These properties were allegedly mortgaged to
respondent Rural Bank of Paranaque, Inc. sometime in
September 1963.
After hearing on the merits, the trial court rendered judgment in
favor of the petitioner, the dispositive portion of which was
earlier quoted, finding the evidence of the private respondent
insufficient to prove ownership of the properties in suit.
From said judgment, private respondents appealed to the
Court of Appeals which, as already stated, reversed the
decision of the trial court, thereby dismissing petitioner's
complaint, reconsideration having been denied by the
appellate court, this petition for review was filed of the following
assignment of errors:
I
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
PROPERTIES IN QUESTION ARE THE EXCLUSIVE
PROPERTIES OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.
II
PETITIONER HAS NOT ESTABLISHED HIS FILIATION.
III
PETITIONER, AS THE GREAT GRANDSON OF FRANCISCA
REYES, HAS NO LEGAL RIGHT TO INHERIT BY
REPRESENTATION.
To begin with, the Court of Appeals found the subject
properties to be the exclusive properties of the private
respondents.
There being two properties in this case both will be discussed
separately, as each has its own distinct factual setting. The first
was bought in 1908 by Maria Cailles under a deed of sale
(Exh. '60'), which describes it as follows:
. . . radicada en la calle Desposorio de este dicho Municipio
dentro de los limites y linderos siquientes: Por la derecha a la
entrada el solar de Teodorico Reyes por la izquierda el solar
de Maria Calesa (Cailles) arriba citada por la espalda la via
ferrea del Railroad Co., y la frente la dicha calle Desposorio
After declaring it in her name, Maria Cailles paid the realty
taxes starting from 1918 up to 1948. Thereafter as she and her
son Narciso Bracewell, left for Nueva Ecija, Francisca Reyes
managed the property and paid the realty tax of the land.
However, for unexplained reasons, she paid and declared the
same in her own name. Because of this, plaintiff decided to run
after this property, erroneously thinking that as the great
grandson of Francisca Reyes, he had some proprietary right
over the same.
The second parcel on the other hand, was purchased by Maria
Cailles in 1917 under a deed of sale (Exh. '3') which describes
the property as follows:
. . . una parcela de terreno destinado al beneficio de la sal, que
linda por Norte con la linea Ferrea y Salinar de Narciso
Mayuga, por Este con los de Narciso Mayuga y Domingo
Lozada, por Sur con los de Domingo Lozada y Fruto Silverio y
por Oeste con el de Fruto Silverio y Linea Ferrea de una
extension superficial de 1229.00 metros cuadrados.
After declaring it in her name, Maria Cailles likewise paid the
realty tax in 1917 and continued paying the same up to 1948.
Thereafter when she and her son, Narciso Bracewell,
established their residence in Nueva Ecija, Francisco Reyes
administered the property and like in the first case, declared in
1949 the property in her own name. Thinking that the property
is the property of Francisca Reyes, plaintiff filed the instant
complaint, claiming a portion thereof as the same allegedly
represents the share of his father,
As earlier stated, the court a quo decided the case in favor of
the plaintiff principally because defendants' evidence do not
sufficiently show that the 2 properties which they bought in
1908 and 1917, are the same as the properties sought by the
plaintiff.
Carefully going over the evidence, We believe that the trial
judge misinterpreted the evidence as to the identification of the
lands in question.
To begin with, the deed of sale (Exh. '60') of 1908 clearly states
that the land sold to Maria Cailles is en la cane Desposorio in
Las Pinas Rizal which was bounded by adjoining lands owned
by persons living at the time, including the railroad track of the
Manila Railroad Co. ('la via ferrea del Railroad Co.')
With the exception of the area which was not disclosed in the
deed, the description fits the land now being sought by the
plaintiff, as this property is also located in Desposorio St. and

is bounded by the M.R.R. Co.
With these natural boundaries, there is indeed an assurance
that the property described in the deed and in the tax
declaration is one and the same property.
The change of owners of the adjoining lands is immaterial
since several decades have already passed between the deed
and the declaration and 'during that period, many changes of
abode would likely have occurred.
Besides, it is a fact that defendants have only one property in
Desposorio St. and they have paid the realty taxes of this
property from May 29, 1914 up to May 28, 1948. Hence, there
is no reason to doubt that this property is the same, if not
Identical to the property in Desposorio St. which is now being
sought after by the plaintiff.
With respect to the other parcel which Maria Cailles bought
from Tranquilino Mateo in 1917, it is true that there is no similar
boundaries to be relied upon. It is however undeniable that
after declaring it in her name, Maria Cailles began paying the
realty taxes thereon on July 24, 1917 until 1948. (Reference to
Exhibits omitted.) 2
Petitioner takes issue with the appellate court on the above
findings of fact, forgetting that since the present petition is one
for review on certiorari, only questions of law may be raised. It
is a well-established rule laid down by this Court in numerous
cases that findings of facts by the Court of Appeals are,
generally, final and conclusive upon this Court. The exceptions
are: (1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculation; (2) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is a grave
abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; and (5) when the Court of Appeals,
in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and
the same are contrary to the submission of both appellant and
appellee. 3 None of the above exceptions, however, exists in
the case at bar, hence, there is no reason to disturb the
findings of facts of the Court of Appeals.
Anent the second assignment of error, the Court of Appeals
made the following findings:
Going to the issue of filiation, plaintiff claims that he is the son
of Sotero Leonardo, the son of one of the daughters
(Pascuala) of Francisca Reyes. He further alleges that since
Pascuala predeceased Francisca Reyes, and that his father,
Sotero, who subsequently died in 1944, survived Francisca
Reyes, plaintiff can consequently succeed to the estate of
Francisca Reyes by right of representation.
In support of his claim, plaintiff submitted in evidence his
alleged birth certificate showing that his father is Sotero
Leonardo, married to Socorro Timbol, his alleged mother.
Since his supposed right will either rise or fall on the proper
evaluation of this vital evidence, We have minutely scrutinized
the same, looking for that vital link connecting him to the family
tree of the deceased Francisca Reyes. However, this piece of
evidence does not in any way lend credence to his tale.
This is because the name of the child described in the birth
certificate is not that of the plaintiff but a certain 'Alfredo
Leonardo' who was born on September 13, 1938 to Sotero
Leonardo and Socorro Timbol. Other than his bare allegation,
plaintiff did not submit any durable evidence showing that the
'Alfredo Leonardo' mentioned in the birth certificate is no other
than he himself. Thus, even without taking time and space to
go into further details, We may safely conclude that plaintiff
failed to prove his filiation which is a fundamental requisite in
this action where he is claiming to be an heir in the inheritance
in question. 4
That is likewise a factual finding which may not be disturbed in
this petition for review in the absence of a clear showing that
said finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or that
there was a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the court
making the finding of fact.
Referring to the third assignment of error, even if it is true that
petitioner is the child of Sotero Leonardo, still he cannot, by
right of representation, claim a share of the estate left by the
deceased Francisca Reyes considering that, as found again by
the Court of Appeals, he was born outside wedlock as shown
by the fact that when he was born on September 13, 1938, his
alleged putative father and mother were not yet married, and
what is more, his alleged father's first marriage was still
subsisting. At most, petitioner would be an illegitimate child
who has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate
children and relatives of his father, like the deceased Francisca
Reyes. (Article 992, Civil Code of the Philippines.)
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals sought to
be reviewed in this petition is hereby affirmed, with costs
against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 77867
February 6, 1990
ISABEL DE LA PUERTA, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CARMELITA
DE LA PUERTA, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
The basic issue involved in this case is the filiation of private
respondent Carmelita de la Puerta, who claims successional
lights to the estate of her alleged grandmother.
Dominga Revuelta died on July 3, 1966, at the age of 92, with
a will leaving her properties to her three surviving children,
namely, Alfredo, Vicente and Isabel, all surnamed de la Puerta.
Isabel was given the free portion in addition to her legitime and
was appointed executrix of the will. 1
The petition for the probate of the will filed by Isabel was
opposed by her brothers, who averred that their mother was
already senile at the time of the execution of the will and did
not fully comprehend its meaning. Moreover, some of the
properties listed in the inventory of her estate belonged to them
exclusively. 2
Meantime, Isabel was appointed special administratrix by the
probate court. 3 Alfredo subsequently died, leaving Vicente the
lone oppositor. 4
On August 1, 1974, Vicente de la Puerta filed with the Court of
First Instance of Quezon a petition to adopt Carmelita de la
Puerta. After hearing, the petition was granted. 5 However, the
decision was appealed by Isabel to the Court of Appeals.
During the pendency of the appeal, Vicente died, prompting
her to move for the dismissal of the case 6
On November 20, 1981, Carmelita, having been allowed to
intervene in the probate proceedings, filed a motion for the
payment to her of a monthly allowance as the acknowledged
natural child of Vicente de la Puerta. 7 At the hearing on her
motion, Carmelita presented evidence to prove her claimed
status to which Isabel was allowed to submit counter-evidence.
On November 12,1982, the probate court granted the motion,
declaring that it was satisfied from the evidence at hand that
Carmelita was a natural child of Vicente de la Puerta and was
entitled to the amounts claimed for her support. The court
added that "the evidence presented by the petitioner against it
(was) too weak to discredit the same. 8
On appeal, the order of the lower court was affirmed by the
respondent court, 9 which is now in turn being challenged in
this petition before us.
The petitioner's main argument is that Carmelita was not the
natural child of Vicente de la Puerta, who was married to
Genoveva de la Puerta in 1938 and remained his wife until his
death in 1978. Carmelita's real parents are Juanita Austrial and
Gloria Jordan.
Invoking the presumption of legitimacy, she argues that
Carmelita was the legitimate child of Juanita Austrial and Gloria
Jordan, who were legally or presumably married. Moreover,
Carmelita could not have been a natural child of Vicente de la
Puerta because he was already married at the time of her birth
in 1962.
To prove her point, Isabel presented Amado Magpantay, who
testified that he was a neighbor of Austrial and Jordan.
According to him, the two were living as husband and wife and
had three children, including a girl named "Puti," presumably
Carmelita. He said though that he was not sure if the couple
was legally married. 10
Another witness, Genoveva de la Puerta, Identified herself as
Vicente de la Puerta's wife but said they separated two years
after their marriage in 1938 and were never reconciled. In
1962, Gloria Jordan started living with Vicente de la Puerta in
his house, which was only five or six houses away from where
she herself was staying. Genoveva said that the relationship
between her husband and Gloria was well known in the
community. 11
This physical impossibility may be caused:
In finding for Carmelita, the lower court declared that:
(1)
. . . By her evidence, it was shown to the satisfaction of the

Court that she was born on December 18, 1962 per her birth
certificate (Exh. A); that her father was Vicente de la Puerta
and her mother is Gloria Jordan who were living as common
law husband and wife until his death on June 14, 1978; that
Vicente de la Puerta was married to, but was separated from,
his legal wife Genoveva de la Puerta; that upon the death of
Vicente de la Puerta on June 14, 1978 without leaving a last
will and testament, she was the only child who survived him
together with his spouse Genoveva de la Puerta with whom he
did not beget any child; that she was treated by Vicente de la
Puerta as a true child from the time of her birth until his father
died; that the fact that she was treated as a child of Vicente de
la Puerta is shown by the family pictures showing movant with
Vicente de la Puerta (Exhs. D, D-1 and D-2) and school
records wherein he signed the report cards as her parent (Exh.
E and E-1); that during the hearing of her adoption case in
Special Proceeding No. 0041 in Branch V of this Court at
Mauban, Quezon, Vicente de la Puerta categorically stated in
court that Carmelita de la Puerta is his daughter with Gloria
Jordan (Exhs. B and B-1); that it was Vicente de la Puerta
during his lifetime who spent for her subsistence, support and
education; . . . 12
(2)
By the fact that the husband and wife were living
separately in such a way that access was not possible;
This is a factual finding that we do not see fit to disturb, absent

any of those circumstances we have laid down in a long line of
decisions that will justify reversal. 13 Among these
circumstances are: (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded
entirely on speculation, surmise and conjecture; (2) the
inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave
abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are
conflicting; (6) the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of
the case and its findings are contrary to the admissions of both
appellant and appellees; (7) the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) said findings
of facts are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based; (9) the facts set forth in the petition as
well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed
by the respondents; and (10) the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence
and contradicted by the evidence on record.
But this last-quoted presumption is merely disputable and may

be refuted with evidence to the contrary. As the Court sees it,
such evidence has been sufficiently established in the case at
bar.
The petitioner insists on the application of the following

provisions of the Civil Code to support her thesis that Carmelita
is not the natural child of Vicente de la Puerta but the
legitimate child of Juanito Austrial and Gloria Jordan:
Art. 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days
following the celebration of the marriage, and before three
hundred days following its dissolution or the separation of the
spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.
Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other
than that of the physical impossibility of the husband's having
access to his wife within the first one hundred and twenty days
of the three hundred which preceded the birth of the child.
(3)
By the impotence of the husband;
By the serious illness of the husband.
Art. 256. The child shall be presumed legitimate, although the

mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have
been sentenced as an adulteress.
These rules are in turn based on the presumption that Juanito
and Gloria were married at the time of Carmelita's birth in
1962, pursuant to Rule 131, Sec. 5(bb) of the Rules of Court,
providing that:
Sec. 5. Disputable
presumptions.The
following
presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be
contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
xxx
xxx
xxx
(bb)
That a man and woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage;
The cases 14 cited by the petitioner are not exactly in point

because they involve situations where the couples lived
continuously as husband and wife and so could be reasonably
presumed to be married. In the case before us, there was
testimony from Vicente's own wife that her husband and Gloria
lived together as a married couple, thereby rebutting the
presumption that Gloria was herself the lawful wife of Juanita
Austrial.
Such testimony would for one thing show that Juanito and
Gloria did not continuously live together as a married couple.
Moreover, it is not explained why, if he was really married to
her, Juanito did not object when Gloria left the conjugal home
and started openly consorting with Vicente, and in the same
neighborhood at that. That was unnatural, to say the least. It
was different with Genoveva for she herself swore that she had
separated from Vicente two years after their marriage and had
long lost interest in her husband. In fact, she even renounced
in open court any claim to Vicente's estate. 15
The presumption of marriage between Juanito and Gloria
having been destroyed, it became necessary for the petitioner
to submit additional proof to show that the two were legally
married. She did not.
Turning now to the evidence required to prove the private
respondent's filiation, we reject the petitioner's contention that
Article 278 of the Civil Code is not available to Carmelita. It is
error to contend that as she is not a natural child but a spurious
child (if at all) she cannot prove her status by the record of
birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or any
authentic writing. On the contrary, it has long been settled that:
the law calls the children or descendants of the person

represented to succeed by right of representation. 18
The so-called spurious children or illegitimate children other

than natural children, commonly known as bastards, include
adulterous children or those born out of wedlock to a married
woman cohabiting with a man other than her husband or to a
married man cohabiting with a woman other than his wife.
They are entitled to support and successional rights (Art. 287,
CC). But their filiation must be duly proven.(Ibid, Art. 887)
The law is clear that there is representation only when relatives

of a deceased person try to succeed him in his rights which he
would have had if still living. In the present case, however, said
deceased had already succeeded his aunt, the testatrix herein.
. . . It is a fact that at the time of the death of the testatrix,
Reynaldo Cuison was still alive. He died two months after her
(testatrix's) death. And upon his death, he transmitted to his
heirs, the petitioners herein Elisa Cuison et al., the legacy or
the right to succeed to the legacy. . . . In other words, the
herein petitioners-appellants are not trying to succeed to the
right to the property of the testatrix, but rather to the right of the
legatee Reynaldo Cuison in said property. 19
How should their filiation be proven? Article 289 of the Civil

Code allows the investigation of the paternity or maternity of
spurious children under the circumstances specified in Articles
283 and 284 of the Civil Code. The implication is that the rules
on compulsory recognition of natural children are applicable to
spurious children.
Spurious children should not be in a better position than
natural children. The rules on proof of filiation of natural
children or the rule on voluntary and compulsory
acknowledgment for natural children may be applied to
spurious children. 16
This being so, we need not rule now on the admissibility of the
private respondent's certificate of birth as proof of her filiation.
That status was sufficiently established by the sworn testimony
of Vicente de la Puerta at the hearing of the petition for
adoption on September 6, 1976, where he categorically
declared as follows:
Q
What relation if any do you have with Carmelita de la
Puerta?
A
She is my daughter. 17
Finally, we move to the most crucial question, to wit: May

Carmelita de la Puerta claim support and successional rights to
the estate of Dominga Revuelta?
According to Article 970 of the Civil Code:
Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by
virtue of which the representative is raised to the place and the
degree of the person represented, and acquires the rights
which the latter would have if he were living or if he could have
inherited.
The answer to the question posed must be in the negative. The
first reason is that Vicente de la Puerta did not predecease his
mother; and the second is that Carmelita is a spurious child.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Not having predeceased Dominga Revuelta, her son Vicente

had the right to inherit from her directly or in his own right. No
right of representation was involved, nor could it be invoked by
Carmelita upon her father's death, which came after his own
mother's death. It would have been different if Vicente was
already dead when Dominga Revuelta died. Carmelita could
then have inherited from her in representation of her father
Vicente, assuming the private respondent was a lawful heir.
But herein lies the crux, for she is not. As a spurious child of
Vicente, Carmelita is barred from inheriting from Dominga
because of Article 992 of the Civil Code, which lays down the
barrier between the legitimate and illegitimate families. This
article provides quite clearly:
Art. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato
from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or
mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same
manner from the illegitimate child.
Applying this rule in Leonardo v. Court of Appeals, 20 this
Court declared:
. . . even if it is true that petitioner is the child of Sotero
Leonardo, still he cannot, by right of representation, claim a
share of the estate left by the deceased Francisca Reyes
considering that, as found again by the Court of Appeals, he
was born outside wedlock as shown by the fact that when he
was born, his alleged putative father and mother were not yet
married, and what is more, his alleged father's first marriage
was still subsisting. At most, petitioner would be an illegitimate
child who has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate
children and relatives of his father, like the deceased Francisca
Reyes.
It is settled that
The reason for this rule was explained in the recent case of
Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 21 thus:
In testamentary succession, the right of representation can

take place only in the following cases: first, when the person
represented dies before the testator; second, when the person
represented is incapable of succeeding the testator; and third,
when the person represented is disinherited by the testator. In
all of these cases, since there is a vacancy in the inheritance,
Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron

curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato
between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and
relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child. They
may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by
law for the purpose of Article 992. Between the legitimate
family and the illegitimate family there is presumed to be an
intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate
child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate
family; the family is in turn, hated by the illegitimate child the
latter considers the privileged condition of the former, and the
resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former in turn
sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin,
palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no
more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further ground of
resentment. 22
Indeed, even as an adopted child, Carmelita would still be
barred from inheriting from Dominga Revuelta for there would
be no natural kindred ties between them and consequently, no
legal ties to bind them either. As aptly pointed out by Dr. Arturo
M. Tolentino:
If the adopting parent should die before the adopted child, the
latter cannot represent the former in the inheritance from the
parents or ascendants of the adopter. The adopted child is not
related to the deceased in that case, because the filiation
created by fiction of law is exclusively between the adopter and
the adopted. "By adoption, the adopters can make for
themselves an heir, but they cannot thus make one for their
kindred. 23
The result is that Carmelita, as the spurious daughter of
Vicente de la Puerta, has successional rights to the intestate
estate of her father but not to the estate of Dominga Revuelta.
Her claims for support and inheritance should therefore be filed
in the proceedings for the settlement of her own father's
estate 24 and cannot be considered in the probate of Dominga
Revuelta's Will.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the appealed
decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, with costs
against the private respondent. It is so ordered.
G.R. No. L-66574June 17, 1987

ANSELMA DIAZ, guardian of VICTOR, RODRIGO,
ANSELMINA and MIGUEL, all surnamed SANTERO,
petitioners, and FELIXBERTA PACURSA guardian of
FEDERICO SANTERO, et al.,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and FELISA PAMUTI
JARDIN, respondents.
mother Juliana were the only legitimate children of the spouses

Felipe Pamuti and Petronila Asuncion; 2) that Juliana married
Simon Jardin and out of their union were born Felisa Pamuti
and another child who died during infancy; 3) that Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero is the widow of Pascual Santero and
the mother of Pablo Santero; 4) that Pablo Santero was the
only legitimate son of his parents Pascual Santero and Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero; 5) that Pascual Santero died in 1970;
Pablo Santero in 1973 and Simona Santero in 1976; 6) that
Pablo Santero, at the time of his death was survived by his
mother Simona Santero and his six minor natural children to
wit: four minor children with Anselma Diaz and two minor
children with Felixberta Pacursa.
Judge Jose Raval in his Orders dated December 1, 1976 1 and
December 9, 1976 2 declared Felisa Pamuti Jardin as the sole
legitimate heir of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
Before the trial court, there were 4 interrelated cases filed to
wit:
a)
Sp. Proc. No. B-4 is the Petition for the Letters of
Administration of the intestate Estate of Pablo Santero;
b)
Sp. Proc. No. B-5 is the Petition for the Letters of
Administration of the Intestate Estate of Pascual Santero;
c)
Sp. Proc. No. B-7 is the Petition for Guardianship
over the properties of an Incompetent Person, Simona Pamuti
Vda. de Santero;
d)
Sp. Proc. No. B-21 is the Petition for Settlement of
the Intestate Estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
Felisa Jardin upon her Motion to Intervene in Sp. Proceedings
Nos. B-4 and B-5, was allowed to intervene in the intestate
estates of Pablo Santero and Pascual Santero by Order of the
Court dated August 24, 1977.
Petitioner Anselma Diaz, as guardian of her minor children,
filed her "Opposition and Motion to Exclude Felisa Pamuti
Jardin dated March 13, 1980, from further taking part or
intervening in the settlement of the intestate estate of Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero, as well as in the intestate estate of
Pascual Santero and Pablo Santero.
Felixberta Pacursa guardian for her minor children, filed thru
counsel, her Manifestation of March 14, 1980 adopting the
Opposition and Motion to Exclude Felisa Pamuti, filed by
Anselma Diaz.
PARAS, J.:
Private respondent filed a Petition dated January 23, 1976 with
the Court of First Instance of Cavite in Sp. Proc. Case No. B21, "In The Matter of the Intestate Estate of the late Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero," praying among other things, that the
corresponding letters of Administration be issued in her favor
and that she be appointed as special Administratrix of the
properties of the deceased Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
It is undisputed: 1) that Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero who together with Felisa's
On May 20, 1980, Judge Ildefonso M. Bleza issued an order

excluding Felisa Jardin "from further taking part or intervening
in the settlement of the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda.
de Santero, as well as in the intestate estates of Pascual
Santero and Pablo Santero and declared her to be, not an heir
of the deceased Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero." 3
After her Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the trial
court in its order dated November 1, 1980, Felisa P. Jardin filed
her appeal to the Intermediate Appellate Court in CA-G.R. No.
69814-R. A decision 4 was rendered by the Intermediate
Appellate Court on December 14, 1983 (reversing the decision
of the trial court) the dispositive portion of which reads
WHEREFORE, finding the Order appealed from not consistent
with the facts and law applicable, the same is hereby set aside
and another one entered sustaining the Orders of December 1
and 9, 1976 declaring the petitioner as the sole heir of Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero and ordering oppositors-appellees not
to interfere in the proceeding for the declaration of heirship in
the estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
Costs against the oppositors-appellees.
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by oppositors-appellees
(petitioners herein) was denied by the same respondent court
in its order dated February 17, 1984 hence, the present petition
for Review with the following:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
I.
The Decision erred in ignoring the right to intestate
succession of petitioners grandchildren Santero as direct
descending line (Art. 978) and/or natural/"illegitimate children"
(Art. 988) and prefering a niece, who is a collateral relative
(Art. 1003);
II.
The Decision erred in denying the right of
representation of the natural grandchildren Santero to
represent their father Pablo Santero in the succession to the
intestate estate of their grandmother Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero (Art. 982);
III.
The Decision erred in mistaking the intestate estate of
the grandmother Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero as the estate
of "legitimate child or relative" of Pablo Santero, her son and
father of the petitioners' grandchildren Santero;
IV.
The Decision erred in ruling that petitioner-appellant
Felisa P. Jardin who is a niece and therefore a collateral
relative of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero excludes the
natural children of her son Pablo Santero, who are her direct
descendants and/or grand children;
V.
The Decision erred in applying Art. 992, when Arts.
988, 989 and 990 are the applicable provisions of law on
intestate succession; and
VI.
The Decision erred in considering the orders of
December 1 and December 9, 1976 which are provisional and
interlocutory as final and executory.
The real issue in this case may be briefly stated as follows
who are the legal heirs of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero
her niece Felisa Pamuti Jardin or her grandchildren (the
natural children of Pablo Santero)?
The dispute at bar refers only to the intestate estate of Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero and the issue here is whether
oppositors-appellees (petitioners herein) as illegitimate children
of Pablo Santero could inherit from Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero, by right of representation of their father Pablo Santero
who is a legitimate child of Simona Pamuti Vda, de Santero.
Now then what is the appropriate law on the matter?

Petitioners contend in their pleadings that Art. 990 of the New
Civil Code is the applicable law on the case. They contend that
said provision of the New Civil Code modifies the rule in Article
941 (Old Civil Code) and recognizes the right of representation
(Art. 970) to descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate
and that Art. 941, Spanish Civil Code denied illegitimate
children the right to represent their deceased parents and
inherit from their deceased grandparents, but that Rule was
expressly changed and/or amended by Art. 990 New Civil
Code which expressly grants the illegitimate children the right
to represent their deceased father (Pablo Santero) in the
estate of their grandmother Simona Pamuti)." 5
Petitioners' contention holds no water. Since the heridatary
conflict refers solely to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti
Vda. de Santero, who is the legitimate mother of Pablo
Santero, the applicable law is the provision of Art. 992 of the
Civil Code which reads as follows:
ART. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab
intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father
or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the
same manner from the illegitimate child. (943a)
Pablo Santero is a legitimate child, he is not an illegitimate
child. On the other hand, the oppositors (petitioners herein) are
the illegitimate children of Pablo Santero.
Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron
curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato
relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child. They
may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by
law for the purposes of Art. 992, Between the legitimate family
and the illegitimate family there is presumed to be an
intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate
child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate
family; the family is in turn, hated by the illegitimate child; the
latter considers the privileged condition of the former, and the
resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn,
more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of
resentment. 6
Thus, petitioners herein cannot represent their father Pablo
Santero in the succession of the letter to the intestate estate of
his legitimate mother Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero,
because of the barrier provided for under Art. 992 of the New
Civil Code.
In answer to the erroneous contention of petitioners that Article
941 of the Spanish Civil Code is changed by Article 990 of the
New Civil Code, We are reproducing herewith the Reflections
of the Illustrious Hon. Justice Jose B.L. Reyes which also finds
full support from other civilists, to wit:
In the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 the right of representation
was admitted only within the legitimate family; so much so that
Article 943 of that Code prescribed that an illegitimate child can
riot inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and
relatives of his father and mother. The Civil Code of the
Philippines apparently adhered to this principle since it
reproduced Article 943 of the Spanish Code in its own Art. 992,
but with fine inconsistency, in subsequent articles (990, 995
and 998) our Code allows the hereditary portion of the
illegitimate child to pass to his own descendants, whether
legitimate or illegitimate. So that while Art. 992 prevents the
illegitimate issue of a legitimate child from representing him in
the intestate succession of the grandparent, the illegitimates of
an illegitimate child can now do so. This difference being
indefensible and unwarranted, in the future revision of the Civil
Code we shall have to make a choice and decide either that
the illegitimate issue enjoys in all cases the right of
representation, in which case Art. 992 must be suppressed; or
contrariwise maintain said article and modify Articles 995 and
998. The first solution would be more in accord with an
enlightened attitude vis-a-vis illegitimate children. (Reflections
on the Reform of Hereditary Succession, JOURNAL of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, First Quater, 1976, Volume 4,
Number 1, pp. 40-41).
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 84240 March 25, 1992

OLIVIA S. PASCUAL and HERMES S. PASCUAL,
petitioners,
vs.
ESPERANZA C. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, MANUEL C.
PASCUAL, JOSE C. PASCUAL, SUSANA C. PASCUALBAUTISTA, ERLINDA C. PASCUAL, WENCESLAO C.
PASCUAL, JR., INTESTATE ESTATE OF ELEUTERIO T.
PASCUAL, AVELINO PASCUAL, ISOCELES PASCUAL,
LEIDA PASCUAL-MARTINES, VIRGINIA PASCUAL-NER,
NONA PASCUAL-FERNANDO, OCTAVIO PASCUAL,
GERANAIA PASCUAL-DUBERT, and THE HONORABLE
PRESIDING JUDGE MANUEL S. PADOLINA of Br. 162,
RTC, Pasig, Metro Manila, respondents.
PARAS, J.:
It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the New Civil Code that
the phrase "legitimate children and relatives of his father or
mother" includes Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero as the word
"relative" includes all the kindred of the person spoken of. 7
The record shows that from the commencement of this case
the only parties who claimed to be the legitimate heirs of the
late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero are Felisa Pamuti Jardin
and the six minor natural or illegitimate children of Pablo
Santero. Since petitioners herein are barred by the provisions
of Article 992, the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court did
not commit any error in holding Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be the
sole legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the late Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
Lastly, petitioners claim that the respondent Intermediate
Appellate Court erred in ruling that the Orders of the Court a
quo dated December 1, 1976 and December 9, 1976 are final
and executory. Such contention is without merit. The Hon.
Judge Jose Raval in his order dated December 1, 1976 held
that the oppositors (petitioners herein) are not entitled to
intervene and hence not allowed to intervene in the
proceedings for the declaration of the heirship in the intestate
estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero. Subsequently,
Judge Jose Raval issued an order, dated December 9, 1976,
which declared Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole legitimate
heir of Simona Pamuti. The said Orders were never made the
subjects of either a motion for reconsideration or a perfected
appeal. Hence, said orders which long became final and
executory are already removed from the power of jurisdiction of
the lower court to decide anew. The only power retained by the
lower court, after a judgment has become final and executory
is to order its execution. The respondent Court did not err
therefore in ruling that the Order of the Court a quo dated May
30, 1980 excluding Felisa Pamuti Jardin as intestate heir of the
deceased Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero "is clearly a total
reversal of an Order which has become final and executory,
hence null and void. "
WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DISMISSED, and the
assailed decision is hereby AFFIRMED.
This is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to reverse

and set aside: (a) the decision of the Court of Appeals 1 dated
April 29, 1988 in CA-G.R. SP. No. 14010 entitled "Olivia S.
Pascual and Hermes S. Pascual v. Esperanza C. PascualBautista, Manuel C. Pascual, Jose Pascual, Susana C.
Pascual-Bautista, Erlinda C. Pascual, Wenceslao C. Pascual,
Jr., et al." which dismissed the petition and in effect affirmed
the decision of the trial court and (b) the resolution dated July
14, 1988 denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioners Olivia and Hermes both surnamed Pascual are the
acknowledged natural children of the late Eligio Pascual, the
latter being the full blood brother of the decedent Don Andres
Pascual (Rollo, petition, p. 17).
Don Andres Pascual died intestate on October 12, 1973
without any issue, legitimate, acknowledged natural, adopted
or spurious children and was survived by the following:
(a)
Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, surviving spouses;
(b)
Children of Wenceslao Pascual, Sr., a brother of the
full blood of the deceased, to wit:
Esperanza C. Pascual-Bautista
Manuel C. Pascual
Jose C. Pascual
Susana C. Pascual-Bautista
Erlinda C. Pascual
Wenceslao C. Pascual, Jr.
(c)
Children of Pedro-Bautista, brother of the half blood of
the deceased, to wit:
Avelino Pascual
Isoceles Pascual
Loida Pascual-Martinez
Virginia Pascual-Ner
Nona Pascual-Fernando
Octavio Pascual
Geranaia Pascual-Dubert;
(d)
Acknowledged natural children of Eligio Pascual,
brother of the full blood of the deceased, to wit:
Olivia S. Pascual
Hermes S. Pascual
(e)
Intestate of Eleuterio T. Pascual, a brother of the half
blood of the deceased and represented by the following:
Dominga M. Pascual
Mamerta P. Fugoso
Abraham S. Sarmiento, III
Regina Sarmiento-Macaibay
Eleuterio P. Sarmiento
Domiga P. San Diego
Nelia P. Marquez
Silvestre M. Pascual
Eleuterio M. Pascual
(Rollo, pp. 46-47)
Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, the surviving spouse of the late
Don Andres Pascual, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 162 (CFI of Rizal, Br. XXIII), a Special Proceeding,
Case No. 7554, for administration of the intestate estate of her
late husband (Rollo, p. 47).
On December 18, 1973, Adela soldevilla de Pascual filed a
Supplemental Petition to the Petition for letters of
Administration, where she expressly stated that Olivia Pascual
and Hermes Pascual, are among the heirs of Don Andres
Pascual (Rollo, pp. 99-101).
On February 27, 1974, again Adela Soldevilla de Pascual
executed an affidavit, to the effect that of her own knowledge,
Eligio Pascual is the younger full blood brother of her late
husband Don Andres Pascual, to belie the statement made by
the oppositors, that they were are not among the known heirs
of the deceased Don Andres Pascual (Rollo, p. 102).
On October 16, 1985, all the above-mentioned heirs entered
into a COMPROMISE AGREEMENT, over the vehement
objections of the herein petitioners Olivia S. Pascual and
Hermes S. Pascual, although paragraph V of such compromise
agreement provides, to wit:
This Compromise Agreement shall be without prejudice to the
continuation of the above-entitled proceedings until the final
determination thereof by the court, or by another compromise
agreement, as regards the claims of Olivia Pascual and
Hermes Pascual as legal heirs of the deceased, Don Andres
Pascual. (Rollo, p. 108)
The said Compromise Agreement had been entered into
despite the Manifestation/Motion of the petitioners Olivia
Pascual and Hermes Pascual, manifesting their hereditary
rights in the intestate estate of Don Andres Pascual, their uncle
(Rollo, pp. 111-112).
On September 30, 1987, petitioners filed their Motion to

Reiterate Hereditary Rights (Rollo, pp. 113-114) and the
Memorandum in Support of Motion to reiterate Hereditary
Rights (Rollo, pp. 116-130).
On December 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court, presided
over by Judge Manuel S. Padolina issued an order, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court resolves as it
is hereby resolved to Deny this motion reiterating the
hereditary rights of Olivia and Hermes Pascual (Rollo, p. 136).
On January 13, 1988, petitioners filed their motion for
reconsideration (Rollo, pp. 515-526). and such motion was
denied.
Petitioner appealed their case to the Court of Appeals
docketed as CA-G.R. No. 14010 (Rollo, p. 15.).
On Aril 29, 1988, the respondent Court of Appeals rendered its
decision the decision the dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against the
petitioners.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 38)
Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration of said
decision and on July 14, 1988, the Court of Appeals issued its
resolution denying the motion for reconsideration (Rollo, p. 42).
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
After all the requirements had been filed, the case was given
due course.
The main issue to be resolved in the case at bar is whether or
not Article 992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, can be
interpreted to exclude recognized natural children from the
inheritance of the deceased.
Petitioners contend that they do not fall squarely within the
purview of Article 992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, can
be interpreted to exclude recognized and of the doctrine laid
down in Diaz v. IAC (150 SCRA 645 [1987]) because being
acknowledged natural children, their illegitimacy is not due to
the subsistence of a prior marriage when such children were
under conception (Rollo, p. 418).
Otherwise stated they say the term "illegitimate" children as
provided in Article 992 must be strictly construed to refer only
to spurious children (Rollo, p. 419).
On the other hand, private respondents maintain that herein
petitioners are within the prohibition of Article 992 of the Civil
Code and the doctrine laid down in Diaz v. IAC is applicable to
them.
The petition is devoid of merit.
Pertinent thereto, Article 992 of the civil Code, provides:
An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the
legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor
shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from
the illegitimate child.
The issue in the case at bar, had already been laid to rest in
Diaz v. IAC, supra, where this Court ruled that:
Article 992 of the Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in
that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between
the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of
the father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a
natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the
purposes of Article 992. Between the legitimate family and
illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening
antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is
disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the
family is in turn hated by the illegitimate child; the latter
considers the privileged condition of the former, and the
resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn,
more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of
resentment.
Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but petitioners are his
illegitimate children.
Applying the above doctrine to the case at bar, respondent IAC
did not err in holding that petitioners herein cannot represent
their father Eligio Pascual in the succession of the latter to the
intestate estate of the decedent Andres Pascual, full blood
brother of their father.
In their memorandum, petitioners insisted that Article 992 in the
light of Articles 902 and 989 of the Civil Code allows them
(Olivia and Hermes) to represent Eligio Pascual in the intestate
estate of Don Andres Pascual.
On motion for reconsideration of the decision in Diaz v. IAC,
this Court further elucidated the successional rights of
illegitimate children, which squarely answers the questions
raised by the petitioner on this point.
The Court held:
Article 902, 989, and 990 clearly speaks of successional rights
of illegitimate children, which rights are transmitted to their
descendants upon their death. The descendants (of these
illegitimate children) who may inherit by virtue of the right of
representation may be legitimate or illegitimate. In whatever
manner, one should not overlook the fact that the persons to
be represented are themselves illegitimate. The three named
provisions are very clear on this matter. The right of
representation is not available to illegitimate descendants of
legitimate children in the inheritance of a legitimate
grandparent. It may be argued, as done by petitioners, that the
illegitimate descendant of a legitimate child is entitled to
represent by virtue of the provisions of Article 982, which
provides that "the grandchildren and other descendants shall

inherit by right of representation." Such a conclusion is
erroneous. It would allow intestate succession by an
illegitimate child to the legitimate parent of his father or mother,
a situation which would set at naught the provisions of Article
992. Article 982 is inapplicable to the instant case because
Article 992 prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato
relatives of the father or mother. It may not be amiss to state
Article 982 is the general rule and Article 992 the exception.
The rules laid down in Article 982 that "grandchildren and other
descendants shall inherit by right of representation" and in
Article 902 that the rights of illegitimate children . . . are
transmitted upon their death to their descendants, whether
legitimate or illegitimate are subject to the limitation prescribed
by Article 992 to the end that an illegitimate child has no right
to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives
of his father or mother. (Amicus Curiae's Opinion by former
Justice Minister Ricardo C. Puno, p. 12). Diaz v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 182 SCRA 427; pp. 431-432; [1990]).
Verily, the interpretation of the law desired by the petitioner
may be more humane but it is also an elementary rule in
statutory construction that when the words and phrases of the
statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be
determined from the language employed and the statute must
be taken to mean exactly what is says. (Baranda v. Gustilo,
165 SCRA 758-759 [1988]). The courts may not speculate as
to the probable intent of the legislature apart from the words
(Aparri v. CA, 127 SCRA 233 [1984]). When the law is clear, it
is not susceptible of interpretation. It must be applied
regardless of who may be affected, even if the law may be
harsh or onerous. (Nepomuceno, et al. v. FC, 110 Phil. 42).
And even granting that exceptions may be conceded, the same
as a general rule, should be strictly but reasonably construed;
they extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and
all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provisions
rather than the exception. Thus, where a general rule is
established by statute, the court will not curtail the former nor
add to the latter by implication (Samson v. C.A., 145 SCRA 654
[1986]).
Clearly the term "illegitimate" refers to both natural and
spurious.
Finally under Article 176 of the Family Code, all illegitimate
children are generally placed under one category, which
undoubtedly settles the issue as to whether or not
acknowledged natural children should be treated differently, in
the negative.
It may be said that the law may be harsh but that is the law
(DURA LEX SED LEX).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DISMISSED for lack
of merit and the assailed decision of the respondent Court of
Appeals dated April 29, 1988 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 126707 February 25, 1999
BLANQUITA E. DELA MERCED, LUISITO E. DELA
MERCED, BLANQUTIA M. MACATANGAY, MA. OLIVIA M.
PAREDES, TERESITA P. RUPISAN, RUBEN M. ADRIANO,
HERMINIO M. ADRIANO, JOSELITO M. ADRIANO,
ROGELIO M. ADRIANO, WILFREDO M. ADRIANO, VICTOR
M. ADRIANO, CORAZON A. ONGOCO, JASMIN A.
MENDOZA and CONSTANTINO M. ADRIANO, petitioners,
vs.
JOSELITO P. DELA MERCED, respondent.
to share in the one-third (1/3) pro-indiviso share in the estate of

the deceased Evarista, corresponding to the heirs of
Francisco.
On August 3, 1990, the trial court issued the temporary
restraining order prayed for by private respondent Joselito,
enjoining the sale of any of the real properties of the deceased
Evarista.
After trial, however, or on June 10, 1992, to be definite, the trial
court dismissed the petition, lifted the temporary restraining
order earlier issued, and cancelled the notice of lis pendens on
the certificates of title covering the real properties of the
deceased Evarista.
PURISIMA, J.:
In dismissing the petition, the trial court stated:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision of the
Court of Appeals, dated October 17, 1996, in CA-G.R. CV No.
41283, which reversed the decision, dated June 10, 1992, of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 67, Pasig City, in Civil Case
No. 59705.
The facts of the case are, as follows:
On March 23, 1987, Evarista M. dela Merced died intestate,
without issue. She left five (5) parcels of land situated in
Orambo, Pasig City.
The factual setting of the instant motion after considering the

circumstances of the entire case and the other evidentiary
facts and documents presented by the herein parties points
only to one issue which goes into the very skeleton of the
controversy, to wit: "Whether or not the plaintiff may participate
in the intestate estate of the late Evarista M. Dela Merced in
his capacity as representative of his alleged father, Francisdo
Dela Merced, brother of the deceased, whose succession is
under consideration.
xxx
At the time of her death, Evarista was survived by three sets of

heirs, viz: (1) Francisco M. dela Merced, her legitimate brother;
(2) Teresita P. Rupisan, her niece who is the only daughter of
Rosa dela Merced-Platon (a sister who died in 1943); and (3)
the legitimate children of Eugenia dela Merced-Adriano
(another sister of Evarista who died in 1965), namely:
Herminio, Ruben, Joselito, Rogelio, Wilfredo, Victor and
Constantino, all surnamed Adriano, Corazon Adriano-Ongoco
and Jasmin Adriano-Mendoza.
Almost a year later or on March 19, 1988, to be precise,
Francisco (Evarista's brother) died. He was survived by his
wife Blanquita Errea dela Merced and their three legitimate
children, namely, Luisito E. dela Merced, Blanquita M.
Macatangay and Ma. Olivia M. Paredes.
On April 20, 1989, the three sets of heirs of the decedent,
Evarista M. dela Merced, referring to (1) the abovenamed heirs
of Francisco; (2) Teresita P. Rupisan and (3) the nine [9]
legitimate children of Eugenia, executed an extrajudicial
settlement, entitled "Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of
the Deceased Evarista M. dela Merced" adjudicating the
properties of Evarista to them, each set with a share of onethird (1/3) pro-indiviso.
On July 26, 1990, private respondent Joselito P. Dela Merced,
illegitimate son of the late Francisco de la Merced, filed a
"Petition for Annulment of the Extrajudicial Settlement of the
Estate of the Deceased Evarista M. Dela Merced with Prayer
for a Temporary Restraining Order", alleging that he was
fraudulently omitted from the said settlement made by
petitioners, who were fully aware of his relation to the late
Francisco. Claiming successional rights, private respondent
Joselito prayed that he be included as one of the beneficiaries,
xxx
xxx
It is to be noted that Francisco Dela Merced, alleged father of

the herein plaintiff, is a legitimate child, not an illegitimate.
Plaintiff, on the other hand, is admittedly an illegitimate child of
the late Francisco Dela Merced. Hence, as such, he cannot
represent his alleged father in the succession of the latter in
the intestate estate of the late Evarista Dela Merced, because
of the barrier in Art. 992 of the New Civil Code which states
that:
An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the
legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother, nor
shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from
the illegitimate child.
The application of Art. 992 cannot be ignored in the instant
case, it is clearly worded in such a way that there can be no
room for any doubts and ambiguities. This provision of the law
imposes a barrier between the illegitimate and the legitimate
family. . . . (Rollo, p. 87-88)
Not satisfied with the dismissal of his petition, the private
respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals.
In its Decision of October 17, 1996, the Court of Appeals
reversed the decision of the trial court of origin and ordered the
petitioners to execute an amendatory agreement which shall
form part of the original settlement, so as to include private
respondent Joselito as a co-heir to the estate of Francisco,
which estate includes one-third (1/3) pro indiviso of the latter's
inheritance from the deceased Evarista.
The relevant and dispositive part of the Decision of the Court of
Appeals, reads:
xxx
xxx
xxx
It is a basic principle embodied in Article 777, New Civil Code

that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the
moment of the death of the decedent, so that Francisco dela
Merced inherited 1/3 of his sister's estate at the moment of the
latter's death. Said 1/3 of Evarista's estate formed part of
Francisco's estate which was subsequently transmitted upon
his death on March 23, 1987 to his legal heirs, among whom is
appellant as his illegitimate child. Appellant became entitled to
his share in Francisco's estate from the time of the latter's
death in 1987. The extrajudicial settlement therefore is void
insofar as it deprives plaintiff-appellant of his share in the
estate of Francisco M. dela Merced. As a consequence, the
cancellation of the notice of lis pendens is not in order because
the property is directly affected. Appellant has the right to
demand a partition of his father's estate which includes 1/3 of
the property inherited from Evarista dela Merced.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Defendants-appellees
are
hereby
ordered
to
execute
an
amendatory
agreement/settlement to include herein plaintiff-appellant
Joselito dela Merced as co-heir to the estate of Francisco dela
Merced which includes 1/3 of the estate subject of the
questioned Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of
Evarista M. dela Merced dated April 20, 1989. The amendatory
agreement/settlement shall form part of the original
Extrajudicial Settlement. With costs against defendantsappellees.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 41)
In the Petition under consideration, petitioners insist that being
an illegitimate child, private respondent Joselito is barred from
inheriting from Evarista because of the provision of Article 992
of the New Civil Code, which lays down an impassable barrier
between the legitimate and illegitimate families.
participates in his own right, as an heir of the late Francisco, in

the latter's share (or portion thereof) in the estate of Evarista.
Petitioners argue that if Joselito desires to assert successional
rights to the intestate estate of his father, the proper forum
should be in the settlement of his own father's intestate estate,
as this Court held in the case of Gutierrez vs. Macandog (150
SCRA 422 [1987])
Petitioners' reliance on the case of Gutierrez vs. Macandog
(supra) is misplaced. The said case involved a claim for
support filed by one Elpedia Gutierrez against the estate of the
decedent, Agustin Gutierrez, Sr., when she was not even an
heir to the estate in question, at the time, and the decedent
had no obligation whatsoever to give her support. Thus, this
Court ruled that Elpedia should have asked for support
pendente lite before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court in which court her husband (one of the legal heirs of the
decedent) had instituted a case for legal separation against her
on the ground of an attempt against his life. When Mauricio
(her husband) died, she should have commenced an action for
the settlement of the estate of her husband, in which case she
could receive whatever allowance the intestate court would
grant her.
The present case, however, relates to the rightful and
undisputed right of an heir to the share of his late father in the
estate of the decedent Evarista, ownership of which had been
transmitted to his father upon the death of Evarista. There is no
legal obstacle for private respondent Joselito, admittedly the
son of the late Francisco, to inherit in his own right as an heir
to his father's estate, which estate includes a one-third (1/3)
undivided share in the estate of Evarista.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Petition is hereby DENIED
and the Appealed Decision of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED
in toto.
SO ORDERED.
The Petition is devoid of merit.

Article 992 of the New Civil Code is not applicable because
involved here is not a situation where an illegitimate child
would inherit ab intestato from a legitimate sister of his father,
which is prohibited by the aforesaid provision of law. Rather, it
is a scenario where an illegitimate child inherits from his father,
the latter's share in or portion of, what the latter already
inherited from the deceased sister, Evarista.
As opined by the Court of Appeals, the law in point in the
present case is Article 777 of the New Civil Code which
provides that the rights to succession are transmitted from the
moment of death of the decedent.
Since Evarista died ahead of her brother Francisco, the latter
inherited a portion of the estate of the former as one of her
heirs. Subsequently, when Francisco died, his heirs, namely:
his spouse, legitimate children, and the private respondent,
Joselito, an illegitimate child, inherited his (Francisco's) share
in the estate of Evarista. It bears stressing that Joselito does
not claim to be an heir of Evarista by right of representation but
G.R. No. 117246 August 21, 1995

BENIGNO MANUEL, LIBERATO MANUEL, LORENZO
MANUEL, PLACIDA MANUEL, MADRONA MANUEL,
ESPERANZA MANUEL, AGAPITA MANUEL, BASILISA
MANUEL, EMILIA MANUEL and NUMERIANA
MANUEL, petitioners,
vs.
HON. NICODEMO T. FERRER, Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court, Branch 37, Lingayen, Pangasinan, MODESTA
BALTAZAR and ESTANISLAOA MANUEL, respondents.
The property involved in this petition for review on certiorari is
the inheritance left by an illegitimate child who died intestate
without any surviving descendant or ascendant.
Petitioners, the legitimate children of spouses Antonio Manuel
and Beatriz Guiling, initiated this suit. During his marriage with
Beatriz, Antonio had an extra-marital affair with one Ursula
Bautista. From this relationship, Juan Manuel was born.
Several years passed before Antonio Manuel, his wife Beatriz,
and his mistress Ursula finally crossed the bar on, respectively,
06 August 1960, 05 February 1981 and 04 November 1976.
Juan Manuel, the illegitimate son of Antonio, married
Esperanza Gamba. In consideration of the marriage, a
donation propter nuptias over a parcel of land, with an area of
2,700 square meters, covered by Original Certificate of Title
("OCT") No. P-20594 was executed in favor of Juan Manuel by
Laurenciana Manuel. Two other parcels of land, covered by
OCT P-19902 and Transfer Certificate of Title ("TCT") No.
41134, were later bought by Juan and registered in his name.
The couple were not blessed with a child of their own. Their
desire to have one impelled the spouses to take private
respondent Modesta Manuel-Baltazar into their fold and so
raised her as their own "daughter".
On 03 June 1980, Juan Manuel executed in favor of
Estanislaoa Manuel a Deed of Sale Con Pacto de Retro (with a
10-year period of redemption) over a one-half (1/2) portion of
his land covered by TCT No. 41134. Juan Manuel died
intestate on 21 February 1990. Two years later, or on 04
February 1992, Esperanza Gamba also passed away.
On 05 March 1992, a month after the death of Esperanza,
Modesta executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication claiming for
herself the three parcels of land covered by OCT P-20594,
OCT P-19902 and TCT No. 41134 (all still in the name of Juan
Manuel). Following the registration of the document of
adjudication with the Office of the Register of Deeds, the three
titles
(OCT P-20594, OCT P-19902 and TCT No. 41134) in the name
of Juan Manuel were canceled and new titles, TCT No.
184223, TCT No. 184224 and TCT No. 184225, were issued in
the name of Modesta Manuel-Baltazar. On 19 October 1992,
Modesta executed in favor of her co-respondent Estanislaoa
Manuel a Deed of Renunciation and Quitclaim over the
unredeemed one-half (1/2) portion of the land (now covered by
TCT No. 184225) that was sold to the latter by Juan Manuel
under the 1980 Deed of Sale Con Pacto de Retro. These acts
of Modesta apparently did not sit well with petitioners. In a
complaint filed before the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen,
Pangasinan, the petitioners sought the declaration of nullity of
the aforesaid instruments.
The case, there being no material dispute on the facts, was
submitted to the court a quo for summary judgment.
The trial court, in its now assailed 15th August 1994 decision,
dismissed the complaint holding that petitioners, not being
heirs ab intestato of their illegitimate brother Juan Manuel,
were not the real parties-in-interest to institute the suit.
Petitioners were also ordered to jointly and severally (solidarily)

pay
(a) respondent Modesta Manuel-Baltazar the sum of P5,000.00
for moral damages, P5,000.00 for exemplary damages,
P5,000.00 for attorney's fees and P500.00 for litigation
expenses and (b) Estanislaoa Manuel the sum of P5,000.00 for
moral damages, P5,000.00 for exemplary damages and
P500.00 for attorney's fees.
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial
court.
The petition before us raises the following contentions: That
1. THE LOWER COURT (HAS) FAILED TO
CONSIDER THE LAST PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE
994 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE, AS THE
CONTROLLING LAW APPLICABLE BY VIRTUE OF
THE ADMITTED FACTS, AND NOT ARTICLE 992 OF
THE SAME CODE.
2. THE LOWER COURT, IN NOT ANNULLING ALL
THE ACTS OF, AND VOIDING ALL DOCUMENTS
EXECUTED BY, RESPONDENT MODESTA
BALTAZAR, WHO ARROGATED UNTO HERSELF
THE RIGHTS OF AN HEIR TO THE ESTATE OF
DECEDENT JUAN MANUEL, (HAS) VIRTUALLY
GRANTED SAID RESPONDENT THE STATUS OF
AN HEIR MANIFESTLY CONTRARY TO LAW,
MORALS AND PUBLIC POLICY.
3. TO ENFORCE ONE'S RIGHT WHEN THEY ARE
VIOLATED IS NEVER A LEGAL WRONG. 1
Petitioners argue that they are the legal heirs over one-half of
Juan's intestate estate (while the other half would pertain to
Juan's surviving spouse) under the provision of the last
paragraph of Article 994 of the Civil Code, providing thusly:
Art. 994. In default of the father or mother, an
illegitimate child shall be succeeded by his or her
surviving spouse, who shall be entitled to the entire
estate.
If the widow or widower should survive with brothers
and sisters, nephews and nieces, she or he shall
inherit one-half of the estate, and the latter the other
half. (Emphasis supplied)
Respondents, in turn, submit that Article 994 should be read in
conjunction with Article 992 of the Civil Code, which reads:
Art. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab
intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of
his father or mother; nor shall such children or relative
inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child.
(Emphasis supplied)
Article 992, a basic postulate, enunciates what is so commonly
referred to in the rules on succession as the "principle of
absolute separation between the legitimate family and the
illegitimate family." The doctrine rejects succession ab
intestato in the collateral line between legitimate relatives, on
the one hand, and illegitimate relatives, on other hand,
although it does not totally disavow such succession in the
direct line. Since the rule is predicated on the presumed will of
the decedent, it has no application, however, on testamentary
dispositions.
This "barrier" between the members of the legitimate and
illegitimate family in intestacy is explained by a noted
civilist. 2 His thesis:
inoperative 11 by, but must always be construed in relation to,

any other part as to produce a harmonious whole. 12
In passing, we might, in easy graphic presentation, collate the
order of preference and concurrence in intestacy expressed in
Article 978 through
Article 1014, inclusive, of the Civil Code; viz.:
Order of Preference
Legitimate Children and
What is meant by the law when it speaks of brothers
and sisters, nephews and nieces, as legal or intestate Descendants
heirs of an illegitimate child? It must be noted that
under Art. 992 of the Code, there is a barrier dividing
members of the illegitimate family from members of
Legitimate Parents and
the legitimate family. It is clear that by virtue of this
barrier, the legitimate brothers and sisters as well as Ascendants
the children, whether legitimate or illegitimate, of such
brothers and sisters, cannot inherit from the
illegitimate child. Consequently, when the law speaks
of"brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces" as legal Illegitimate Children and
heirs of an illegitimate child, it refers to illegitimate
Descendants (in the absence
brothers and sisters as well as to the children,
of ICDs and LPAs, the
whether legitimate or illegitimate, of such brothers
Illegitimate Parents)
and sisters. (Emphasis supplied)
Surviving Spouse
Order of Concurrence
(a) Legitimate Children and
Descendants, Illegitimate
Children and Descendants,
and Surviving Spouse
(b) Legitimate Parents and
Ascendants Illegitimate
Children and Descendants,
(c) Illegitimate Children and
Descendants and Surviving
Spouse
(d) Surviving Spouse and
Illegitimate Parents
(e) Brothers and Sisters/
Nephews and Nieces
(f) Alone
The Court, too, has had occasions to explain this "iron curtain",
firstly, in the early case of Grey v. Fabie 3 and, then, in the
Brothers and Sisters/
relatively recent cases of Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate
Nephews and
Court 4 and De la Puerta v. Court of Appeals. 5 InDiaz, we have
Nieces
said:
Other Collateral Relatives
(within the fifth civil degree)
Article 992 of the New Civil Code . . . prohibits
absolutely a succession ab intestato between the
State
(g) Alone
illegitimate child and the legitimate children and
relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate
In her answer to the complaint, Modesta candidly
child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is
admitted that she herself is not an intestate heir of
not recognized by law for the purposes of Article 992.
Juan Manuel. She is right. A ward (ampon), without
Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate
the benefit of formal (judicial) adoption, is neither a
family there is presumed to be an intervening
compulsory nor a legal heir. 13
antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child
is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate
family; the legitimate family is, in turn, hated by the
We must hold, nevertheless, that the complaint of
illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged
petitioners seeking the nullity of the Affidavit of Selfcondition of the former, and the resources of which it
Adjudication executed by Modesta, the three (3)
is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the
TCT's issued to her favor, as well as the Deed of
illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin,
Renunciation and Quitclaim in favor of Estanislaoa
palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law
Manuel, was properly dismissed by the trial court.
does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding
Petitioners, not being the real "parties-in-interest" 14 in
further grounds of resentment.
the case, had neither the standing nor the cause of
action to initiate the complaint.
The rule in Article 992 has consistently been applied by the
Court in several other cases. Thus, it has ruled that where the
The Court, however, sees no sufficient reason to
illegitimate child had
sustain the award of amounts for moral and
half-brothers who were legitimate, the latter had no right to the
exemplary damages, attorney's fees and litigation
former's inheritance; 6 that the legitimate collateral relatives of
expenses. An adverse result of a suit in law does not
the mother cannot succeed from her illegitimate child; 7 that a
mean that its advocacy is necessarily so wrongful as
natural child cannot represent his natural father in the
to justify an assessment of damages against the
succession to the estate of the legitimate grandparent; 8 that
actor. 15
the natural daughter cannot succeed to the estate of her
deceased uncle who is a legitimate brother of her natural
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Regional
father; 9 and that an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab
Trial Court of Pangasinan (Branch 37) is AFFIRMED,
intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his
except insofar as it has awarded moral and exemplary
father. 10 Indeed, the law on succession is animated by a
damages, as well as attorney's fees and litigation
uniform general intent, and thus no part should be rendered
expenses, in favor of private respondents, which
portion is hereby DELETED. No special
pronouncement on costs.
SO ORDERED.
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF CRISTINA

AGUINALDO- SUNTAY; EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY III
Petitioner, vs. ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY,
Respondent.
Unlike Pope Alexander VI[1] who, faced with the impasse

between Spain and Portugal, deftly and literally divided the
exploration, or more appropriately, the riches of the New World
by issuing the Inter Caetera,[2] we are confronted with the
difficult, albeit, all too familiar tale of another family imbroglio
over the estate of a decedent.[3]
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 74949,[4] reversing the
decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 78, Malolos,
Bulacan, in Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95.[5]
Before anything else, we disentangle the facts.
On June 4, 1990, the decedent, Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay

(Cristina), married to Dr. Federico Suntay (Federico), died
intestate. In 1979, their only son, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay
(Emilio I), predeceased both Cristina and Federico. At the time
of her death, Cristina was survived by her husband, Federico,
and several grandchildren, including herein petitioner Emilio
A.M. Suntay III (Emilio III) and respondent Isabel CojuangcoSuntay.
During his lifetime, Emilio I was married to Isabel Cojuangco,
and they begot three children, namely: herein respondent,
Isabel; Margarita; and Emilio II, all surnamed CojuangcoSuntay. Emilio Is marriage to Isabel Cojuangco was
subsequently annulled. Thereafter, Emilio I had two children
out of wedlock, Emilio III and Nenita Suntay Taedo (Nenita),
by two different women, Concepcion Mendoza and Isabel
Santos, respectively.
Despite the illegitimate status of Emilio III, he was reared ever
since he was a mere baby, nine months old, by the spouses
Federico and Cristina and was an acknowledged natural child
of Emilio I. Nenita is an acknowledged natural child of Emilio I
and was likewise brought up by the spouses Federico and
Cristina.
As previously adverted to, the marriage between Emilio I and
Isabel was annulled.[6] Consequently, respondent and her
siblings Margarita and Emilio II, lived with their mother on
Balete Drive, Quezon City, separately from their father and
paternal grandparents.
Parenthetically, after the death of Emilio I, Federico filed a
petition for visitation rights over his grandchildren: respondent
Isabel, Margarita, and Emilio II. Although the Juvenile and

Domestic Relations Court in Quezon City granted the petition
and allowed Federico one hour of visitation monthly, initially
reduced to thirty minutes, it was altogether stopped because of
a manifestation filed by respondent Isabel, articulating her
sentiments on the unwanted visits of her grandparents.
Significantly, Federico, after the death of his spouse, Cristina,
or on September 27, 1993, adopted their illegitimate
grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita.[7]
On October 26, 1995, respondent filed a petition for the
issuance of letters of administration in her favor, containing the
following allegations:
[A]t the time of [the decedents] death, [she] was a resident of
the Municipality of Hagonoy, Province of Bulacan; that the
[decedent] left an estate of real and personal properties, with a
probable gross value of P29,000,000.00; that the names, ages
and residences of the surviving heirs of the [decedent] are: (1)
Federico C. Suntay, 89 years old, surviving spouse and a
resident of x x x; (2) Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay, 36 years old,
legitimate granddaughter and a resident of x x x; (3) Margarita
Cojuangco-Suntay, 39 years old, legitimate granddaughter and
a resident of x x x; and (4) Emilio Cojuangco-Suntay, 35 years
old, legitimate grandson and a resident of x x x; and that as far
as [respondent] knew, the decedent left no debts or obligation
at the time of her death.[8]
Disavowing the allegations in the petition of his
grandchild, respondent Isabel, Federico filed his opposition on
December 21, 1995, alleging, among others, that:
[B]eing the surviving spouse of Cristina, he is capable of
administering her estate and he should be the one appointed
as its administrator; that as part owner of the mass of conjugal
properties left by Cristina, he must be accorded legal
preference in the administration thereof; that Isabel and her
family had been alienated from their grandparents for more
than thirty (30) years; that the enumeration of heirs in the
petition was incomplete as it did not mention the other children
of his son[,] namely: Emilio III and Nenita S. Taedo; that he is
better situated to protect the integrity of the estate of Cristina
as even before the death of his wife[,] he was already the one
who managed their conjugal properties; that the probable value
of the estate as stated in the petition was grossly overstated
(sic); and that Isabels allegation that some of the properties
are in the hands of usurpers is untrue.[9]
Meanwhile, after a failed attempt by the parties to settle the

proceedings amicably, Federico filed a Manifestation dated
March 13, 1999, nominating his adopted son, Emilio III, as
administrator of the decedents estate on his behalf, in the
event he would be adjudged as the one with a better right to
the letters of administration.
Subsequently, the trial court granted Emilio IIIs Motion for
Leave to Intervene considering his interest in the outcome of
the case. Emilio III filed his Opposition-In-Intervention, which
essentially echoed the allegations in his grandfathers
opposition, alleging that Federico, or in his stead, Emilio III,
was better equipped than respondent to administer and
manage the estate of the decedent, Cristina. Additionally,
Emilio III averred his own qualifications that: [he] is presently
engaged in aquaculture and banking; he was trained by the
decedent to work in his early age by involving him in the
activities of the Emilio Aguinaldo Foundation which was
established in 1979 in memory of her grandmothers father; the
significant work experiences outside the family group are
included in his curriculum vitae; he was employed by the
oppositor [Federico] after his graduation in college with
management degree at F.C.E. Corporations and Hagonoy
Rural Bank; x x x.[10]
Aguinaldo Suntay. Let letters of administration be issued in her

favor upon her filing of a bond in the amount of Two Hundred
Thousand (P200,000.00) Pesos.
In the course of the proceedings, on November 13, 2000,

Federico died.
A.
IN THE APPOINTMENT OF AN
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE UNDER SECTION 6 OF
RULE 78 OF THE RULES OF COURT, WHETHER ARTICLE
992 OF THE CIVIL CODE APPLIES; and
After the testimonies of both parties witnesses were heard and

evidence on their respective allegations were adduced, the trial
court rendered a decision on November 9, 2001, appointing
herein petitioner, Emilio III, as administrator of decedent
Cristinas intestate estate, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the petition of Isabel
Cojuangco[-]Suntay
is
DENIED
and
the
Opposition[-]in[-]Intervention is GRANTED.
Accordingly, the Intervenor, Emilio A.M. Suntay, III is
hereby appointed administrator of the estate of the decedent
Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay, who shall enter upon the execution
of his trust upon the filing of a bond in the amount of
P200,000.00, conditioned as follows:
(1)
To make and return within three (3) months, a true
and complete inventory;
(2)
To administer the estate and to pay and discharge
all debts, legatees, and charge on the same, or dividends
thereon;
(3)
To render a true and just account within one (1)
year, and at any other time when required by the court, and
(4)
To perform all orders of the Court.
Once the said bond is approved by the court, let Letters of

Administration be issued in his favor.
SO ORDERED.[11]
Aggrieved, respondent filed an appeal before the CA, which
reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC, revoked the
Letters of Administration issued to Emilio III, and appointed
respondent as administratrix of the intestate estate of the
decedent, Cristina, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the assailed
decision dated November 9, 2001 of Branch 78, Regional Trial
Court of Malolos, Bulacan in SPC No. 117-M-95 is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE and the letters of administration issued by the
said court to Emilio A.M. Suntay III, if any, are consequently
revoked. Petitioner Isabel Cojuangco[-]Suntay is hereby
appointed administratrix of the intestate estate of Cristina
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[12]
The motion for reconsideration of Emilio III having been

denied, he appeals by certiorari to this Court, raising the
following issues:
B.
UNDER THE UNDISPUTED FACTS WHERE
HEREIN PETITIONER WAS REARED BY THE DECEDENT
AND HER SPOUSE SINCE INFANCY, WHETHER ARTICLE
992 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE APPLIES SO AS TO BAR HIM
FROM BEING APPOINTED ADMINISTRATOR OF THE
DECEDENTS ESTATE.[13]
In ruling against the petition of herein respondent, the

RTC ratiocinated, thus:
Evidence objectively assessed and carefully evaluated,
both testimonial and documentary, the court opines that it is to
the best interest of the estate of the decedent and all claimants
thereto, that the Intervenor, Emilio A.M. Suntay III, be
appointed administrator of the estate in the above-entitled
special proceedings.
Based on the evidence and demeanor of the parties in
court, [respondents immediate] family and that of the decedent
are apparently estranged. The root cause of which, is not for
this court to ascertain nor is this the right time and the proper
forum to dwell upon. What matters most at this time is the
welfare of the estate of the decedent in the light of such
unfortunate and bitter estrangement.
The Court honestly believes that to appoint the
petitioner would go against the wishes of the decedent who
raised [Emilio III] from infancy in her home in Baguio City as
her own child. Certainly, it would go against the wishes of the
surviving spouse x x x who nominated [Emilio III] for
appointment as administrator.
As between [respondent] and the oppositor [Federico],
the latter is accorded preference as the surviving spouse under
Sec 6(a), Rule 78, Rules of Court. On the basis of such
preference, he vigorously opposed the appointment of the
petitioner and instead nominated [Emilio III], his grandchild and
adopted child. Such nomination, absent any valid and
justifiable reason, should not be imperiously set aside and
insouciantly ignored, even after the oppositor [Federico] has
passed away, in order to give effect to the order of preference
mandated by law. Moreover, from the viewpoint of the estate,
the nomination of [Emilio III] appear[s] intrinsically meritorious.
For the benefit of the estate and its claimants, creditors, as well
as heirs, the administrator should be one who is prepared,
academically and by experience, for the demands and
responsibilities of the position. While [respondent], a practicing
physician, is not unqualified, it is clear to the court that when it
comes to management of real estate and the processing and
payment of debts, [Emilio III], a businessman with an
established track record as a manager has a decided edge and
therefore, is in a position to better handle the preservation of
the estate.[14]
In marked contrast, the CA zeroed in on Emilio IIIs status as

an illegitimate child of Emilio I and, thus, barred from
representing his deceased father in the estate of the latters
legitimate mother, the decedent. On the whole, the CA
pronounced that Emilio III, who was merely nominated by
Federico, and which nomination hinged upon the latters
appointment as administrator of the decedents estate, cannot
be appointed as the administrator of the decedents estate for
the following reasons:[15]
1.
The appointment of Emilio III was subject to a
suspensive condition, i.e., Federicos appointment as
administrator of the estate, he being the surviving spouse of
Cristina, the decedent. The death of Federico before his
appointment as administrator of Cristinas estate rendered his
nomination of Emilio III inoperative;
2.
As between the legitimate offspring (respondent) and
illegitimate offspring (Emilio III) of decedents son, Emilio I,
respondent is preferred, being the next of kin referred to by
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, and entitled to share
in the distribution of Cristinas estate as an heir;
3.
Jurisprudence has consistently held that Article 992[16]
of the Civil Code bars the illegitimate child from inheriting ab
intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father
or mother. Thus, Emilio III, who is barred from inheriting from
his grandmother, cannot be preferred over respondent in the
administration of the estate of their grandmother, the decedent;
and
4.
Contrary to the RTCs finding, respondent is as much
competent as Emilio III to administer and manage the subject
estate for she possesses none of the disqualifications specified
in Section 1,[17] Rule 78 of the Rules of Court.
The pivotal issue in this case turns on who, as between Emilio
III and respondent, is better qualified to act as administrator of
the decedents estate.
We cannot subscribe to the appellate courts ruling excluding
Emilio III in the administration of the decedents undivided
estate. Mistakenly, the CA glosses over several undisputed
facts and circumstances:
1.
The underlying philosophy of our law on intestate
succession is to give preference to the wishes and presumed
will of the decedent, absent a valid and effective will;
2.
The basis for Article 992 of the Civil Code, referred to as
the iron curtain bar rule,[18] is quite the opposite scenario in
the facts obtaining herein for the actual relationship between
Federico and Cristina, on one hand, and Emilio III, on the
other, was akin to the normal relationship of legitimate
relatives;
3.
Emilio III was reared from infancy by the decedent,
Cristina, and her husband, Federico, who both acknowledged
him as their grandchild;
4.
Federico claimed half of the properties included in the
estate of the decedent, Cristina, as forming part of their
conjugal partnership of gains during the subsistence of their
marriage;
5.
Cristinas properties forming part of her estate are still
commingled with that of her husband, Federico, because her
share in the conjugal partnership, albeit terminated upon her
death, remains undetermined and unliquidated; and
6.
Emilio III is a legally adopted child of Federico, entitled to
share in the distribution of the latters estate as a direct heir,
one degree from Federico, not simply representing his
deceased illegitimate father, Emilio I.
From the foregoing, it is patently clear that the CA erred in
excluding Emilio III from the administration of the decedents
estate. As Federicos adopted son, Emilio IIIs interest in the
estate of Cristina is as much apparent to this Court as the
interest therein of respondent, considering that the CA even
declared that under the law, [Federico], being the surviving
spouse, would have the right of succession over a portion of
the exclusive property of the decedent, aside from his share in
the conjugal partnership. Thus, we are puzzled why the CA
resorted to a strained legal reasoning Emilio IIIs nomination
was subject to a suspensive condition and rendered
inoperative by reason of Federicos death wholly inapplicable
to the case at bar.
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court lists the order of
preference in the appointment of an administrator of an estate:
SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration
granted. If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or
executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give
bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be
granted:
(a)
To the surviving husband or wife, as the case
may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or
to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of
kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to
serve;
(b)
If such surviving husband or wife, as the case
may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be
incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of
kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to
apply for administration or to request that administration be
granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or
more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to
serve;
(c)
If there is no such creditor competent and
willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as the
court may select.
However, the order of preference is not absolute for it depends

on the attendant facts and circumstances of each case.[19]
Jurisprudence has long held that the selection of an
administrator lies in the sound discretion of the trial court.[20]
In the main, the attendant facts and circumstances of this case
necessitate, at the least, a joint administration by both
respondent and Emilio III of their grandmothers, Cristinas,
estate.
In the case of Uy v. Court of Appeals,[21] we upheld the
appointment by the trial court of a co-administration between
the decedents son and the decedents brother, who was
likewise a creditor of the decedents estate. In the same vein,
we declared in Delgado Vda. de De la Rosa v. Heirs of
Marciana Rustia Vda. de Damian[22] that:
[i]n the appointment of an administrator, the principal
consideration is the interest in the estate of the one to be
appointed. The order of preference does not rule out the
appointment of co-administrators, specially in cases where
justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be
represented in the management of the estates, a situation
which obtains here.
Similarly, the subject estate in this case calls to the succession
other putative heirs, including another illegitimate grandchild of
Cristina and Federico, Nenita Taedo, but who was likewise
adopted by Federico, and the two (2) siblings of respondent
Isabel, Margarita and Emilio II. In all, considering the conflicting
claims of the putative heirs, and the unliquidated conjugal
partnership of Cristina and Federico which forms part of their
respective estates, we are impelled to move in only one
direction, i.e., joint administration of the subject estate.
One final note. Counsel for petitioner meticulously argues that
Article 992 of the Civil Code, the successional bar between the
legitimate and illegitimate relatives of a decedent, does not
apply in this instance where facts indubitably demonstrate the
contrary Emilio III, an illegitimate grandchild of the decedent,
was actually treated by the decedent and her husband as their
own son, reared from infancy, educated and trained in their
businesses, and eventually legally adopted by decedents
husband, the original oppositor to respondents petition for
letters of administration.
We are not unmindful of the critiques of civilists of a conflict
and a lacuna in the law concerning the bone of contention that
is Article 992 of the Civil Code, beginning with the eminent
Justice J.B.L. Reyes:
In the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 the right of

representation was admitted only within the legitimate family;
so much so that Article 943 of that Code prescribed that an
illegitimate child can not inherit ab intestato from the legitimate

children and relatives of his father and mother. The Civil Code
of the Philippines apparently adhered to this principle since it
reproduced Article 943 of the Spanish Code in its own Art. 992,
but with fine inconsistency, in subsequent articles (990, 995
and 998) our Code allows the hereditary portion of the
illegitimate child to pass to his own descendants, whether
legitimate or illegitimate. So that while Art. 992 prevents the
illegitimate issue of a legitimate child from representing him in
the intestate succession of the grandparent, the illegitimates of
an illegitimate child can now do so. This difference being
indefensible and unwarranted, in the future revision of the Civil
Code we shall have to make a choice and decide either that
the illegitimate issue enjoys in all cases the right of
representation, in which case Art. 992 must be suppressed; or
contrariwise maintain said article and modify Articles 995 and
998. The first solution would be more in accord with an
enlightened attitude vis--vis illegitimate children.[23]
Manresa explains the basis for the rules on intestate

succession:
The law [of intestacy] is founded on the presumed will of the
deceased Love, it is said, first descends, then ascends, and,
finally, spreads sideways. Thus, the law first calls the
descendants, then the ascendants, and finally the collaterals,
always preferring those closer in degree to those of remoter
degrees, on the assumption that the deceased would have
done so had he manifested his last will Lastly, in default of
anyone called to succession or bound to the decedent by ties
of blood or affection, it is in accordance with his presumed will
that his property be given to charitable or educational
institutions, and thus contribute to the welfare of humanity.[24]
Indeed, the factual antecedents of this case accurately reflect

the basis of intestate succession, i.e., love first descends, for
the decedent, Cristina, did not distinguish between her
legitimate and illegitimate grandchildren. Neither did her
husband, Federico, who, in fact, legally raised the status of
Emilio III from an illegitimate grandchild to that of a legitimate
child. The peculiar circumstances of this case, painstakingly
pointed out by counsel for petitioner, overthrow the legal
presumption in Article 992 of the Civil Code that there exist
animosity and antagonism between legitimate and illegitimate
descendants of a deceased.
Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that judicial restraint
impels us to refrain from making a final declaration of heirship
and distributing the presumptive shares of the parties in the
estates of Cristina and Federico, considering that the question
on who will administer the properties of the long deceased
couple has yet to be settled.
Our holding in Capistrano v. Nadurata[25] on the same issue
remains good law:
[T]he declaration of heirs made by the lower court is
premature, although the evidence sufficiently shows who are
entitled to succeed the deceased. The estate had hardly been
judicially opened, and the proceeding has not as yet reached
the stage of distribution of the estate which must come after
the inheritance is liquidated.
Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court does not depart from
the foregoing admonition:
Sec. 1. When order for distribution of residue is made.
x x x. If there is a controversy before the court as to who are
the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive
shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the
controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the
obligations above mentioned has been made or provided for,
unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum
to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said
obligations within such time as the court directs.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74949 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Letters of Administration over
the estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay shall issue to
both petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III and respondent Isabel
Cojuangco-Suntay upon payment by each of a bond to be set
by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan, in
Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95. The Regional Trial
Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan is likewise directed to
make a determination and to declare the heirs of decedent
Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay according to the actual factual milieu
as proven by the parties, and all other persons with legal
interest in the subject estate. It is further directed to settle the
estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay with dispatch.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Art. 992 Cases

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Art. 992 Cases

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1|Succession Art.

992 full text

The pious legacy of parcel No. 104 made by the testatrix

Plaintiffs support their appeal by assigning nineteen alleged

2|Succession Art. 992 full text

This will was probated upon petition of Valentin Centeno, one

Melchora Arroyo de Centeno died on December 8, 1909,

Inasmuch as said administratrix declares that the aforesaid

3|Succession Art. 992 full text

10474, 10533, 10549, 10388 and 10429, respectively, were

4|Succession Art. 992 full text

The purpose of requiring such conditions is doubtless to give

5|Succession Art. 992 full text

Arroyo, which he would inherit, nevertheless said testamentary

6|Succession Art. 992 full text

discuss whether, in addition, said defendants acquired rights of

7|Succession Art. 992 full text

As to the one-half of the undivided conjugal property which

G.R. No. L-22469October 23, 1978

8|Succession Art. 992 full text

The Probate court in its order of December 26, 1946 approved

Don Teodoro R. Yangco sea declarada intestada (See Barretto

9|Succession Art. 992 full text

reciprocal succession between legitimate and illegitimate

G.R. No. L-51263February 28, 1983

Ordering defendants to pay the costs; and

Dismissing defendants' counterclaim. 1

From the record, it appears that Francisca Reyes who died

her. Sotero Leonardo died in 1944, while Silvestra Cailles died

plaintiff, as this property is also located in Desposorio St. and

G.R. No. 77867

ISABEL DE LA PUERTA, petitioner,

This physical impossibility may be caused:

In finding for Carmelita, the lower court declared that:

. . . By her evidence, it was shown to the satisfaction of the

This is a factual finding that we do not see fit to disturb, absent

But this last-quoted presumption is merely disputable and may

The petitioner insists on the application of the following

By the impotence of the husband;

By the serious illness of the husband.

Art. 256. The child shall be presumed legitimate, although the

The cases 14 cited by the petitioner are not exactly in point

the law calls the children or descendants of the person

The so-called spurious children or illegitimate children other

The law is clear that there is representation only when relatives

How should their filiation be proven? Article 289 of the Civil

Finally, we move to the most crucial question, to wit: May

Not having predeceased Dominga Revuelta, her son Vicente

In testamentary succession, the right of representation can

Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron

G.R. No. L-66574June 17, 1987

mother Juliana were the only legitimate children of the spouses

On May 20, 1980, Judge Ildefonso M. Bleza issued an order

Now then what is the appropriate law on the matter?

G.R. No. 84240 March 25, 1992

This is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to reverse

Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, surviving spouses;

On September 30, 1987, petitioners filed their Motion to

provides that "the grandchildren and other descendants shall

to share in the one-third (1/3) pro-indiviso share in the estate of

The factual setting of the instant motion after considering the

At the time of her death, Evarista was survived by three sets of

It is to be noted that Francisco Dela Merced, alleged father of

It is a basic principle embodied in Article 777, New Civil Code