National Law Institute University, Bhopal

HART - FULLER DEBATE

JURISPRUDENCE I

Submitted to:

Submitted by:

Mr. Ranjan Kumar

Sanchit Asthana

(Faculty, Jurisprudence-I)

2011 BALLB 87
10th Trimester

CONTENTS

Acknowledgement....................................................................................3
Preface...........................................................................................................4
Research Methodology...........................................................................5
Introduction .................................................................................. 6
Hart Fuller Debate....................................................................... 7
History............................................................................................. 9
Prof Harts Views .......................................................................11
Prof Fullers Criticism ..............................................................13
Judicial Discourse in India on Changing Influence of
Morality.........................................................................................16
Conclusion....................................................................................17
Bibliography ............................................................................................ 19

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
Any project completed or done in isolation is unthinkable. This project, although prepared by
me, is a culmination of efforts of a lot of people. Firstly, I would like to thank our Professor for
Jurisprudence I, Mr. Ranjan Kumar for his valuable suggestions towards the making of
this project.
Further to that, I would also like to express my gratitude towards our seniors who were a lot of
help for the completion of this project. The contributions made by my classmates and friends are,
definitely, worth mentioning.
I would like to express my gratitude towards the library staff for their help also. I would also like
to thank the persons interviewed by me without whose support this project would not have been
completed.
Last, but far from the least, I would express my gratitude towards the Almighty for obvious
reasons.
Sanchit Asthana

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PREFACE
The Hart Fuller debate is an exchange between Lon Fuller and H. L. A. Hart published in
the Harvard Law Review in 1958 on morality and law, which demonstrated the divide between
the positivist and natural law philosophy. Appearing in 1958 in the Harvard Law Review, Hart
took the positivist view in arguing that morality and law were separate. Fuller's reply argued for
morality as the source of law's binding power. Positivists believe in a separation between the law
as it is and the law as it should be. Legal rights and moral rights are not related, beyond mere
coincidence. Hart believes the method of deciding cases through logic or deduction is not
necessarily wrong, just as it is not necessarily right to decide cases according to social or moral
aims.
Hart uses the problem of "the core and the penumbra" to illustrate the idea that laws must be
related to the meaning of the words, not any natural or moral belief. The natural law view
believes that the creation of law should be based on natural laws or common morals. Laws are
viewed based on purpose, not on meaning of the words. In the vehicle in the park example
above, Fuller would say that it would depend on the purpose for banning vehicles from the park.
For example, if the purpose were to prevent noise pollution, a bicycle would not be a vehicle for
the purposes of the law. Because of this focus on purpose instead of meaning, a judge using a
natural law interpretation of statutes relies much more heavily on legislative history. This project
essentially deals with the divide between positivist and natural philosophy in the light of various
considerations and especially in case of Indian scenario.

Sanchit Asthana

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RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Method of Research
The researcher has adopted a purely doctrinal method of research. The researcher has made
extensive use of the available resources at library of the National Law Institute University and
also the internet sources.
Aims and Objectives
The aim of the project is to present an overview of various aspects of the Hart fuller debate
by analyzing the positivist and natural theories in light of juristic opinions available.
Scope and Limitations
Though the Hart Fuller Debate is an immense project and pages can be written over the
topic but due to certain restrictions and limitations the researcher has not been able to deal
with the topic in great detail.
Sources of Data:
The following sources of data have been primarily used in the project1. Books
2. Journals
3. Cases
Method of Writing:
The method of writing followed in the course of this research paper is primarily analytical.
Mode of Citation
The researcher has followed the bluebook method of citation (19th ed.) throughout the
course of this research paper.

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INTRODUCTION
Law brings with itself some reflections of public morality, but can law be separated from
morality? This question is of a familiar nature in the study of Law. Such debates were frequent
much before Prof Hart and Prof Fuller put forward their view on the subject and is likely to
continue between the two schools of thought, one supporting it and other opposing it. The side
supporting it is essentially are the English jurists and the side opposing it are essentially the
American jurists. Such distinctions are not always clear because Sir William Blackstone, an
English jurist supported the Natural Law Theory. Similarly Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes an
American Jurist opposed the doctrine of Natural Law1.
Hart was an English jurist who worked as Professor at Oxford. He defends positivist
school of jurisprudence. This round of debate on separation of law and morals was started by
Prof Hart. Lon Fuller was an American jurist and worked as a professor at Harvard. He defends
the Natural law principles of jurisprudence. To appreciate the debate it is appropriate to note the
fundamental differences in the evolution of law in the two countries2. In England Law has
evolved over many centuries and largely through case laws. In America law has evolved over a
shorter period of time and largely based on codified law. England has seen relative political
stability for longer period of time and America for a much shorter time. In England Equity courts
are different from Common Law courts. Justice according to equity can be granted only in the
Chancellors court and all other courts will grant justice by applying law as established either by
the letter of the law or through case laws or by a new case law made for the facts of the case3.

Jeremy Waldron, Positivism And Legality: Hart's Equivocal Response To Fuller, 83 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1135, 2008,
At P. 1135
2
Nicola Lacey, H. L.A. Hart's Rule Of Law: The Limits Of Philosophy In Historical Perspective, 36 Quaderni
Fiorentini 1203 (2007).
3
Supra Note 1 at. p. 1138
1

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HART FULLER DEBATE

In 1958, the first volley in the famous debate on law and morality between H.L.A. Hart
and Lon Fuller was published in the Harvard Law Review.4 One of the issues at stake in the
Hart-Fuller debate was how the post-Nazi German legal system should respond to heinous acts
committed during the Nazi period and purportedly authorized by Nazi law. Hart argued that
because these acts, however reprehensible, were lawful at the time they were committed, the
only way that their perpetrators could be lawfully punished was through retrospective criminal
legislation. Any other approach especially reasoning suggesting that Nazi laws were not valid
laws because they were morally odious would, according to Hart, confuse what the law is with
what the law ought to be. Hart argued that maintaining this distinction was not only intellectually
sound, but also might encourage individuals to question, and perhaps to refuse to obey, immoral
laws.
For Hart, encouraging individuals not to blindly adhere to law is important because laws
may be used for immoral ends a point that relates to his larger theory of law, according to which
a norm is considered a law when it is understood to be valid by officials who enforce it. In other
words, rather than locating the validity of laws in the perspectives of individuals who are actually
subject to them, Hart resorted instead to the internal perspective of officials responsible for
enforcing laws, pointing out that there is no reason why the mere fact that such officials
recognize a norm as legally valid should mean that the norm is morally sound.5Fuller, by
contrast, argued that Hart had too quickly conceded that the heinous acts in question were lawful.
It is important to note that Fuller did not argue, in natural law terms, that Nazi dictates had
immoral ends and that such immoral ends simply could not be accomplished through law
properly so-called. Rather, Fuller argued that fidelity to legality i.e., to ensuring that laws are
public, clear, non-contradictory, proscriptive, reliable, possible to comply with, and applied as
articulated is an essential feature of legal systems that allows human beings to govern their
interactions with one another with reference to rules. Fuller contended that the systemic

H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals (1957) 71 Harv. L. Rev. 593 [Hart,
Positivism]; Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to LawA Reply to Professor Hart (1957) 71 Harv. L. Rev.
630 [Fuller, Fidelity]. [as cited in Leslie Green, Positivism and the Inseparability of Law and Morals, 83 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1035 , 1038 (2008).]
5
See generally Hart, Positivism, Ibid .See also H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2d ed. (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1994).
4

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procedural irregularities in which Nazi dictates were embedded departed so seriously from the
principles of legality that at least some Nazi dictates could not reasonably be characterized as
legal. These irregularities included extensive use of legislation to retroactively render criminal
acts (including mass murder) lawful, secret regulations and legislation, and political interference
with the judiciary such that the interpretation and application of laws became subject to
executive whims. Given these irregularities, according to Fuller post-Nazi German courts could
legitimately refuse to allow individuals to avoid legal repercussions for heinous acts committed
under the colour of Nazi law. Fullers contention ties into his general theory of law, according
to which legal systems are not constituted by the mere existence of officials who share an
internal perspective on what counts as a valid set of laws, but rather by an orientation shared by
officials and legal subjects alike towards governing their interactions with one another in a
manner that displays fidelity to the principles of legality, or, as Fuller sometimes called it, to the
internal morality of law.6

See generally Fuller, Fidelity, Ibid. See also Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law, rev. ed. (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1969).
6

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HISTORY
Experience is a great teacher. Gustav Radbruch, a Jew by birth lived in Germany prior to
Second World War. He was a firm believer in "positivist" doctrine. After seeing the atrocities
perpetrated by Nazi regime on the Jews under Nazi laws he changed his belief and became a
staunch supporter of Natural Law Theory and exhorted everybody to discard the doctrine of the
separation of law and morals. This was also a provocation for Prof Hart to initiate this discourse7.
The conflicts faced by the German jurists in post war Germany, is well illustrated by a category
of cases which may be called informer cases.8 One such case is discussed by both Prof Hart
and Prof Fuller. The case is as under .9 In 1944 a German soldier came home from far front for a
short visit. In his conversation with his wife he criticized the Hitler government and Nazi Party.
He even expressed his dismay that the man who attempted to assassinate Hitler did not succeed.
During his long absence there were other men in her life and hence she was keen to get rid of her
husband. After his departure to war front the wife reported his remarks to the local leader of the
Nazi party. The husband was tried by a military tribunal and sentenced to death.
However he was not executed. After a short period of imprisonment, he was sent to the
front again. After the collapse of the Nazi regime, a case was initiated against for illegally
depriving the husband of his freedom. After the collapse of the Nazi regime, the wife was
brought to trial for having procured unlawfully the imprisonment of her husband. The wifes
defense was that she was required to furnish such information to the authorities under the Nazi
statutes and she did not commit any crime. The court of appeal which decided the case held that
the statute under which the wife was claiming protection "was contrary to the sound conscience
and sense of justice of all decent human beings."Hence it was reasoned that she could not be
given protection under such statute10. This reasoning became a precedent in many other informer
cases. This reasoning was followed in many cases which have been hailed as a triumph of the
doctrines of natural law and as signaling the overthrow of positivism11.According to Prof Hart
there were only two options: a) to let the woman go free because the statute protected her; b) to

H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals (1957) 71 Harv. L. Rev. 593 [Hart, Positivism]
Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to LawA Reply to Professor Hart (1957) 71 Harv. L. Rev. 630 [Fuller,
Fidelity].
9
See Hart, supra note 6. 618-619
10
See Hart, 620
11
Ibid.
7
8

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make a retrospective legislation repealing the statute under which she claimed protection.12
Because retrospective legislation is anathema in most criminal justice system the woman should
have been allowed to go free if integrity of judicial principles was to be preserved. Prof Hart
considers it a cardinal mistake of the Court of Appeal to introduce the concept of morality of the
law, under which she was claiming protection, to say that law was no law at all.

12

Ibid, at 619

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PROF HARTS VIEWS

Prof Hart believes in the theories of law as put forward by jurists like Bentham and
Austin. These jurists propounded utilitarian theory of law. Bentham and Austin, constantly
insisted on the need to distinguish, firmly and with the maximum of clarity, law as it is from law
as it ought to be13. Austin formulated the doctrine: The existence of law is one thing; its merit or
demerit is another14. A judge deciding a case should go by law as it is. Prof. Hart points out that
all cases may not fall exactly within the law as it is which he calls the core. There will be cases
in the penumbra of law. Harts view is that morals can be an influential factor in deciding cases
in the penumbra. Jurists like Bentham saw two dangerous results of natural law theory. The
anarchist may argue: This ought not to be the law, therefore it is not and I am free not merely to
censure but to disregard it. On the other hand the reactionary may argue: This is the law,
therefore it is what it ought to be.15 In other words the danger is that on the one hand law and
its authority may be dissolved in man's conceptions of what law ought to be and on the other
hand there is the danger that the existing law may supplant morality as a final test of conduct and
so escape criticism. So Prof Hart canvasses for the distinction between law as it is and law as it
ought to be. Bentham criticized Natural Law theory on the ground that "the natural tendency of
such a doctrine is to impel a man, by the force of conscience, to rise up in arms against any law
whatever that he happens not to like.16
Bentham also feared that under natural law theory courts might be legally bound to
decide in accordance with what they thought just or best. Such an approach can lead to all round
confusion. It is admitted by Prof Hart and other supporters of Positivism that legal systems had
been powerfully influenced by moral opinion and, conversely, that moral standards had been
profoundly influenced by law, so that the content of many legal rules mirrored moral rules or
principles. According to Bentham this is only a historical causal connection, but Bentham was
certainly ready to admit its existence.17 Prof Hart presents the discussion of separation of law and

13

Ibid, at 594
Ibid.
15
Ibid, at 598
16
Ibid.; See also Bentham. , A Comment On The Commentaries, 49 (1928) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1928)
(as cited in Jeremy Waldron, Positivism And Legality: Hart's Equivocal Response To Fuller, 83 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
1135, 2008, At P. 1145)
17
Hart, supra note 3, at 601-602
14

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morals as a problem of separating law as it is and law as it ought to be. He criticizes natural
law thinkers for ignoring this difference. Prof Hart identifies the essentials of positivism as the
following:18(i) The contention that laws are commands of human beings, (ii) The contention that
there is no necessary connection between law and morals or law as it is and ought to be (iii) The
contention that the analysis (or study of the meaning) of legal concepts is worth pursuing and to
be distinguished from historical inquiries into the causes or origins of laws, from sociological
inquiries into the relation of law and other social phenomena, and from the criticism or appraisal
of law whether in terms of morals, social aims, functions, or otherwise. (iv) A legal system is
a closed logical system inwhich correct legal decisions can be deduced by logical means from
predetermined legal rules without reference to social aims, policies, moral standards, (v) The
contention that moral judgments cannot be established or defended, as statements of facts can, by
rational argument, evidence, or proof.
Prof Hart also deals with the issue lack of precision in the words used in any human
language and the role of this factor in judicial interpretation. While applying legal rules to the
facts of a case it become necessary quite often to decide the meaning of the words in a statue
and to decide whether the words used covers the facts to be decided. Sometime standard
instances of the words may not be sufficient to give proper effect to the law. Prof Hart calls
these as problems of the penumbra.19Problems of penumbra cannot be solved by logical
deduction. The criterion which makes a decision sound in such cases is some concept of what the
law ought to be. This is where a moral judgment is made about what law ought to be. This is
called by Prof. Hart as necessary intersection between law and morals.20

18

Ibid, at 608
Ibid.
20
Ibid, at 609
19

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PROF FULLERS CRITICISM

Fuller on the other hand believes in the Natural Theory of Law and the moral foundations
of a legal order. So for him law should always conform to the idea of Gods justice. He is more
concerned with fidelity to law. He emphasizes the view point that fidelity to law can be achieved
only if law is consistent with morals at all stages that is during its making and during its
application by the court whether the case is in the core or the penumbra of law. Prof Fuller feels
that Prof Harts argument is about definition of law and why there is no room for morals in the
defining law. His argument is that morals cannot be fitted into any type of definition of law21.
This is the main criticism against Harts line of thinking as given by Prof Fuller.
Professor Fuller argues that there cannot be a precise definition of law. So also there cannot be
precise definition of morals. When neither can be defined correctly it is futile to argue that both
are separate. The primary concern of Prof Hart is to preserve the integrity of the concept of
law.22 For Prof Fuller fidelity to law is of utmost importance. He argues that there will be fidelity
to law only if laws are consistent with moral values of the people who have to follow law
.
Prof Hart criticized Harts theory under the following specific points
The Definition of Law23
It is pointed out that it is clearly recognized that there cannot be any one definition of
law. When definition of law is not precise it is futile to argue that it is different from morals.
The Definition of Morality24
Defining Morality is as difficult as defining Law. Law and Morals can be considered to
be different only if we define morals as all desirable standards for human behavior other than law
itself.

Varier, Kartik and Mathew, Ankita Susan, Looking Beyond Hart vs Fuller Law and Morality in Contemporary
Indian Society (October 26, 2010). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1917342 or
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1917342.
22
Fuller, supra note 7, at 635
23
See Fuller, supra note 7, at 633-635
24
Ibid, at 635- 638
21

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The Moral Foundations of a Legal Order 25

People comply with law only if they are convinced that the law is for common good. That
is to say for achieving fidelity to law, Law should have moral foundations.
The Morality of Law Itself26
On rare occasions legal system is confronted with Laws which are anathema to general
sense of morality. Such situations were faced during Nazi regime. After the fall of the Nazi
regime the jurists had a challenge to choose between the consequence of such immoral laws and
the rule of law itself. Prof Fuller presents this dilemma as one involving order and good order
and he argues that good order should be chosen for the reason that it is good.
The Problem of Restoring Respect for Law and Justice after the Collapse of a Regime That
Respected Neither27
The conflict between law and morals came to sharp focus in the predicament faced by the
German Court after the collapse of the Nazi Regime. It was not possible to declare all the laws
made by the Nazi regime and actions of citizens in conformity with such laws to be illegal. This
would have resulted in total destabilization of the society. On the other hand some of the laws
made by Nazi regime was so repulsive to human morals that there was a need for disapproving
actions taken in conformity with such wicked laws. There was also a need to send a message that
the new regime does not approve all the wicked laws of the Nazi regime Thus on the one hand,
there was a moral duty to obey law. On the other hand, there was a moral duty to do what people
thought (after the war) was right and decent. The fundamental postulate of positivism that law
must be strictly severed from morality seems to deny the possibility of any bridge between the
obligation to obey law and other moral obligations. Thus the German Courts faced a serious
dilemma in restoring both respect for law and respect for justice. Essentially Radbruch saw the
dilemma as that of meeting the demands of order, on the one hand, and those of good order, on
the other. Order by itself is no good unless it serves some purpose for the society. So we should
not get obsessed with just order. At the same time in the process of seeking good order we
should lose order itself leading to anarchy. As we seek to make our order good, we can remind

25

Ibid. at 638-643
Ibid. at 644-648
27
See Fuller, supra note 7, at 648-657.
26

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ourselves that justice itself is impossible without order, and that we must not lose order itself in
the attempt to make it good.28
The Moral Implications of Legal Positivism29
After the war Gustav Radbruch started believing that a general acceptance of the
positivistic philosophy in pre-Nazi Germany made smoother the route to dictatorship.30 Professor
Hart regards this as the most outrageous of all charges against positivism. In pre-Nazi Germany
the German jurists had little respect to the Natural Law Theory discussed by The English and the
Americans. For them positivism was the only theory of law that could claim to be scientific in
an Age of Science.31 It could be reported by 1927 that to be found guilty of adherence to natural
law theories is a kind of social disgrace.32 Prof Fuller, like Professors Hart and Radbruch, would
have preferred a retroactive statute to deal with informer cases. His reason for this preference is
not that this was the most nearly lawful way of making unlawful what was once law.33 He argues
that this would have helped the judiciary to return more rapidly to a condition in which the
demands of legal morality could be given proper respect. According to him this would have
helped in preserving the fidelity to law in a more ideal manner.
The Problem of Interpretation-The Core and The Penumbra34
Professor Fuller sees the problem as one of meanings of words and not an issue of core
and penumbra of law. Further he advocates that the objectives of entire provisions should be
sought rather than the meanings of individual words which are claimed to have standard
instances.35
The Moral and Emotional Foundations of Positivism36
Prof Fuller is of the view that every Rule has a structural integrity. Within the limits of
that structure, fidelity to law not only permits but demands a creative role from the judge, but
beyond that structure it does not permit him to go.

28

Ibid.
See Fuller, supra note 7, at 657-661
30
Ibid. at 657.
31
Ibid. at 659.
32
Ibid. at 659; See also Voegelin, Kelsen's Pure Theory of Law, 42 POL. SCI Q. 268, 269 (1927).
33
Ibid. at 661.
34
Ibid.at 663.
35
See Fuller supra note 7, at 661-669
36
Id. at 669-672.
29

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JUDICIAL DISCOURSE IN INDIA ON CHANGING INFLUENCE OF

MORALITY
It may be interesting to examine some recent cases in India in this context. The following
cases seem relevant to the context.
1. Naz Foundation v. Government of NCT of Delhi37
In their decision, Chief Justice A. P. Shah and Justice S. Muralidhar declared Section 377
of IPC, as it pertains to consensual sex among people above the age of 18, in violation of
important parts of Indias Constitution. Consensual sex amongst adults is legal, which includes
even gay sex and sex among the same sexes, they said. Thus a law which has been applied for
long in India has been recently found ultra-virus to the Constitution. Such a decision could never
have been thought of in 1950. So decisions of courts depend on the changing moral values.
2. D. Velusamy v. D. Patchaiammal38
In this case the Supreme Court decided that women who had a living in relationship with
a man can claim for maintenance under section 20 (1) (d) of The Protection of Women from
Domestic Violence Act, 2005. The lower Courts declined to grant maintenance under section
125 of Criminal Procedure Code, to a lady who had a live in relationship with a man but was not
a legally wedded wife. The Supreme Court took note of section 2 (f) and section 20 (1) (d) of
The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 and directed that the matter should
be examined in the light of these provisions. In this case it is not that the Court has made a new
lw but interpreted a new law made by the Parliament considering the changing social values in
Indian society. In the said judgment the court observed,39
In feudal society sexual relationship between man and woman outside marriage was totally
taboo and regarded with disgust and horror, as depicted in Leo Tolstoy's novel `Anna Karenina',
Gustave Flaubert's novel `Madame Bovary' and the novels of the great Bengali writer Sharat
Chandra Chattopadhyaya. However, Indian society is changing, and this change has been
reflected and recognized by Parliament by enacting The Protection of Women from Doestic
Violence Act, 2005.

37

2009 (160) DLT 27.

(2010) 10 SCC 469
39
Ibid at. p 491
38

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CONCLUSION
Law and Morals both lays down desirable behavior from human beings. So there is
nothing surprising that both have many elements in common. If law has to be accepted by people
it should conform to the behavior standards that people desire. These standards are decided
largely by morals. Prof Fuller is not completely off the mark, when he criticizes the positivist
approach to law. He has a point while attacking the strict positivist approach, which was evident
during the Nazi war crimes trials, where the deciding authorities were faced with the strange
paradox of having a monstrous law in one hand, while on the hand, was the defense, that the
same law was good law in the days of the Reich. And to this point, Prof Fullers doesnt seem to
be only voice against the apparent flaw with the positivist viewpoint, as Radbruch, himself a
positivist, agreeing with Fullers view in the wake of the trials. The issue devolves into the larger
question over how law should be defined. Prof Hart was of the opinion that integrity of the law
must be maintained. Prof Fuller argues that law itself cannot be defined within set parameters
and hence it is fidelity of law which must be preserved. Fidelity, he maintains, would involve
morality and so one has to see law and morals as one, in this context. In everyday practice it
would be wise for any individual to keep a moralistic lookout while acting upon laws, because,
as Fuller later points out, not all situations may fall within the core areas of the law.
There are some unchartered waters as well, which he calls, the penumbra. And the
standard instances may not be standard after all, an in such cases, it will be prudent to look at
the objective of the entire provision. So it is not possible to separate law from morals. No law
can be very precise because every word has different meanings and different shades of meanings.
Further no law can envisage all types of situation it has to handle to achieve the desired behavior.
So when in doubt regarding the meaning of law one has to look at the moral values among other
things. The debate is really about their own legal systems, their respective countries, though it is
misleadingly cast in universal terms. Both Hart and Fuller share the estimable aim of articulating
a coherent vision of the appropriate relationship between law and morals and of thereby
achieving a moral law. While Hart thinks this aim is best achieved by keeping law and morals
distinct and then comparing the two and seeing if the law lives up to morals. One then knows
whether it is right to obey the law. Fuller thinks it is better to require law itself to display what he
terms an internal morality so that it commands fidelity.
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Both assume a society ordered in a particular way with a certain orderly legal framework
and system. Both want moral laws and assume that their laws are in the most fundamental ways
already moral. Both have difficulty envisaging truly alien ways of thinking, the truly
incommensurable. Hart refers to the undeveloped legal system and leaves it at that. Fuller refers
to the perverted legal system but even then he cannot imagine it failing to conform to what he
takes to be the fundamental moral precepts. Thus, although much has been made of the
disagreement between Hart and Fuller, implicit in their work is a fundamental agreement on an
idea the reverse of the one they thought they were affirming: the idea of a necessary connection
between law and substantive justice.

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PRIMARY SOURCES

BIBLIOGRAPHY

CASES
1. NAZ FOUNDATION V. GOVERNMENT OF NCT OF DELHI, 2009 (160) DLT 27.
2. D. VELUSAMY V. D. PATCHAIAMMAL, (2010) 10 SCC 469
SE
CONDARY SOURCES
BOOKS
1. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, 2D ED. (OXFORD: CLARENDON PRESS,
1994).
2. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW, REV. ED. (NEW HAVEN: YALE
UNIVERSITY PRESS, 1969).
3. BENTHAM. , A COMMENT ON THE COMMENTARIES, 49 (OXFORD: OXFORD
UNIVERSITY PRESS, 1928)
ARTICLES
1. JEREMY WALDRON, POSITIVISM AND LEGALITY: HART'S EQUIVOCAL
RESPONSE TO FULLER, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1135, 2008, AT P. 1135
2. NICOLA LACEY, H. L.A. HART'S RULE OF LAW: THE LIMITS OF
PHILOSOPHY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, 36 QUADERNI FIORENTINI 1203
(2007).
3. H.L.A. HART, POSITIVISM AND THE SEPARATION OF LAW AND MORALS
(1957) 71 HARV. L. REV. 593
4. LON L. FULLER, POSITIVISM AND FIDELITY TO LAWA REPLY TO
PROFESSOR HART (1957) 71 HARV. L. REV. 630
5. LESLIE GREEN, POSITIVISM AND THE INSEPARABILITY OF LAW AND
MORALS, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1035 , 1038 (2008).]
6. VARIER, KARTIK AND MATHEW, ANKITA SUSAN, LOOKING BEYOND HART
VS FULLER LAW AND MORALITY IN CONTEMPORARY INDIAN SOCIETY
(OCTOBER 26, 2010). SSRN.
7. VOEGELIN, KELSEN'S PURE THEORY OF LAW, 42 POL. SCI Q. 268, 269 (1927)

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