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1. Introductory remarks
Joseph (Jzef) Maria Bocheski (Dominican name: Innocent) was a Polish philosopher (1902
1995), a historian of philosophy and a logician. He studied law (Lvov/Lviv) and economy
(Pozna), received a doctorate in philosophy (Freiburg) and theology (Rome). During World
War II he served as a chaplain in Poland, France and England and he fought as a soldier at
Monte Cassino (the Italian campaign of the II Corps, 1944). He lectured logic in Rome, was a
chair of history of twentieth-century philosophy at the Freiburg University where he was a
Rector (1964-1966) and founded the Institute of Eastern Europe, published the journal
(Studies in Soviet Thought) and books on the foundations of the Marxists philosophy.
Among many writings his books were mostly on logic, Thomism, analytical philosophy,
communism and patriotism.1 But he was also acquainted with Indian logic and philosophy. In
his book A History of Formal Logic (1961) he included a chapter on Indian variety of logic,
where he discussed the views of Nyya logicians and their debate with Buddhists, Jains and
Mmsa philosophers. He selects a few Nyyastras as representative logical passages,
among which he included two passages on testimony, therefore he was familiar with Nyya
philosophy when he wrote his text on authority Was ist Autoritt? in 1974.
The most important ones are: Elementa logicae graecae (1937), Manuale di filosofia bolscevica (1946), La
logique de Thophraste (1947), ABC tomizmu (1950) [ABC of Thomism], Ancient formal logic (1951), The
Problem of Universals: A Symposium I. M. Bochenski, Alonzo Church, Nelson Goodman (1956), Formale
Logik (1956) [translated in English as: A History of Formal Logic (1961)], Ancient Formal Logic (1957),
Handbook on communism (1962), Soviet Russian Dialectical Materialism, Diamat (1963), The Logic of
Religion (1965), The Methods of Contemporary Thought (1968), Guide to Marxist philosophy: an introductory
bibliography (1972), Philosophy, An Introduction (1972), Was ist Autoritt? (1974), Contemporary European
Philosophy (1974), Sto zabobonw. Krtki filozoficzny sownik zabobonw ("One Hundred Superstitions. A
Short Philosophical Dictionary of Superstitions", 1987), Logika i filozofia (1993) [Logic and Philosophy],
Midzy logik a wiar (1994) [Between Logic and Faith], The Road to Understanding. More than Dreamt of in
Your Philosophy (1996).
1
Bocheski (1993:195) provides an example of a cow, which may be defined as a big animal (genre) giving
milk and having horns (class).
3
Author distinguishes three categories: a. thing (a person is an independent, autonomous thing), 2. feature
(which inhere in something, a property of a thing) and 3. relation (e.g. to be on the right, to love, be alike, names
and expressions which denote features are the signs of the relation). Sometimes we say that a person or thing
(e.g. Einstein) or a feature (The mother has a lot of authority in a family) is an authority, but most of the time
authority is a relation.
4
Bocheski, 1993:200-204.
2
group does not have an individual consciousness of a single man, so there is no subject of
authority. Here Bocheski agrees with Aristotle (vs. Hegel), stating that the individual person,
the individual in the society is the final subject (society is not the fiction, because it contains
humans and real relations, in this sense it is something more than the sum of individuals).
Bocheski, 1993:223.
Translation of the theses from: Bocheski, 1993:218-228.
12
There is an another one referring to the Freudian theory of id, ego and superego, which I not intend to discuss,
because I generally agree with Bocheskis objection.
4
11
the exact motivations of our choice. Bocheski himself agrees that in case of authority, a
person may sometimes fail and be wrong about something. Therefore, his claim is not
sufficiently supported.
In the case of mutual authority, his arguments are not convincing enough. He admits, that in
two separate disciplines it is possible, but not in the same one. He justifies his view giving an
example that if he is an authority in logic for L., L. cannot be an authority for him. He
illustrates this view with an example of a general, who gives orders in army to a colonel.
Colonel cannot be an authority for a general in the same military matters, because he would
be a superior of his superior, which is not. I dont find this argument convincing, because
there may be two experts in the same field who could be authorities for each other. Besides,
the example he gives is a type of deontic authority, he does not refer to epistemic authority.
Moreover, he himself states, that it is possible that authority may be reversed in a sense that
the roles may change. He gives an example of a pilot who is steering on one route, then his
co-pilot takes over and steers. He compares this situation with a student, who in the beginning
does not have a lot of knowledge, but in the end he becomes an expert and may know a lot
more in his field than his own professor. Bocheski admits, that this situations may happen
but it is rather in different domains and at different times. This does not seem convincing.
Additionally, he admits, that the relation is transitive; if a person A is an authority for a person
B, who is an authority for a person C, then A is also an authority for C. Authority of an
authority in the same domain is a transitive relation. It may be an idealised case, which may
not work in life. Besides, a person may be an expert in the field, but may have wrong
intuitions for other judgments (Bocheski admits himself that it may happen that authority
may commit a mistake, because, all in all he/she is a person), it does not follow that his choice
of authority is correct and that this authority will be also impressive for another person.
Bocheski admits, that a person is an authority in at least one domain his/her own personal
experiences/feelings and impressions/sensations. However, no person can be an absolute
authority in all domains, he believes that ascribing such an authority to mythological figure,
dictators, celebrities is a mistake. He does not refer to spiritual teachers, gurus, who can be the
absolute authorities in an ashram or monastery for people belonging to a sect or a religion.
But in his view, there is only one absolute authority - God, ascribing it to another individuals
is a misuse.13
13
For Bocheski (1993:227) a misuse may be of a two types - referring to 1. a domain (a person tries to extend
the authority over a domain he/she is not competent, e.g. professor of geography in politics) 2. an object
(towards objects with no relation of authority e.g. there is an authority between an officer and soldiers but none
between an officer and civilians). False authorities are acknowledge due to unjustified generalisations, if he/she
is an expert in one domain, he/she is in other ones. It forms a habit - a person is used to look at a person as an
authority, so even if the subject is not an expert in another domain, it is automatically acknowledged as one e.g. a
teacher is an expert in chemistry, but his word on politics is also approved by the students.
5
5. Types of authority
For Bocheski the domain of authority is a set of propositions (words, sounds and their
meanings; they tell what there is) or a set of directives (instructions; they tell what should be).
They are both ideal, independent objects. Accordingly, there are two types of authority and
every authority belongs to one of those types:
-
epistemic: the authority of the knower, expert, specialist; persons who know the
subject better, e.g. authority of a teacher;
deontic: authority of the superior; persons who have power and the right to give
orders, e.g. the boss, manager, director, commander.
The same person may have both authorities towards the same object and in the same domain 14
and it is desired that the deontic is also the epistemic, but they are mutually independent. E.g.
an expert in court is an epistemic authority but not a deontic one he can give his expertise
but cannot punish.15 Many misuses happen when an authority of one type is confused with
another, like in a situation where deontic authority thinks that he is an expert in the field.
An epistemic authority is not a deontic superior, so she should not give commands of how the
subject should act but only provide (communicate) propositions which are taken as true or
probable by the object. It is a relation between the proposition and the state of knowledge 16 in
the sense that when an authority communicates the proposition, its probability raises. For that
the subject must be convinced about the authoritys competence and that she really knows her
field and is more competent than the person who recognises her expertise. Also, what is
announced must be taken as true, an authority has to be truthful. Trust and some kind of
superiority are necessary conditions for the recognition of authority.
Bocheski provides the following schema:17
14
Bocheski explains that the domain is not exactly the same but closely related, since the domain of the deontic
authority is the set of directives whereas the domain of epistemic authority are practical propositions.
15
Bocheski 1993:237-238.
16
The state of knowledge is defined as the class of all sentences which are taken to be true.
17
Bocheski (1996:244).
6
The author is of the opinion, that recognition of authority without justification is not allowed
because of moral issues. There must be some reason for this recognition, some reasonable
justification and usually it is of a two types: to see directly the truth of the statement (e.g. that
it is raining) or through inference (e.g. the ground is wet, so it is inferred that it must have
been raining) and usually inference is the most common way of acknowledging an authority.18
This inference is a generalisation of propositions (which are based on the experience)19 and
this generalisation is of the two types:
-
I know about the truth of the proposition from the experience I have for the object of
authority, e.g. when what an object of authority said was right many times, then it is
generalised that he will always be right in his domain (a friend philatelist case)
I infer from what I know about the class to which it belongs in this case it is not the
experience with the object of an authority but many experiences with people
belonging to the class the authority belongs (the doctor on a plane case)
In both cases this inference is based on induction, so it does not warrant the reliability of an
authority.
OPEN QUESTIONS:
-
18
Does Bocheskis stress on the author resemble the Nyyas stress on the reliable
speaker (pta) as a source vs. Mmsas concept of languages validity as being
independent of any author (I owe this one to E. Freschi).
How is authority established? Both Bocheski and N. emphasise that authority is
established mainly through inference, rarely through direct perception. However, for
N. a statement of a reliable person concerns perceivable and unperceivable objects.
Vatsyayana adds that this partition is due to common language and language of seers
(which may perceive objects not perceived by a common person). Still, inference
remains a root source for speakers reliability.
What forms the domain of authority? Bocheskis division of authority includes
two domains (sets of):
a. Propositions (epistemic a.)
Bocheskis example for the recognition of an authority through direct insight is: ... someone who is charged
with a crime comes to me, looks me in the eyes and says: I was not at the crime scene. It can happen that I will
believe him, but it means that I had some insight in his personality and it convinced me that he knows of what he
is telling and he is telling the truth. But those are, everyone will admit, the very peculiar cases which in practice
have a very little meaning. He admits that the requirement for the competence and truthfulness are there, but I
am not convinced that it is not a case of inference but an additional category. The belief in the truthfulness of a
person must come from other experiences in the past and linking them with the current case is done by the way
of inference. It is not the same as in the case when I justify the claim that it is raining because I see directly that
it is raining.
19
To paraphrase Bocheski: for experiences provide only particular propositions, an authoritys existence we
need to acknowledge the general propositions (op. cit., p.247)
7
Bibliography:
J. M. Bocheski, Was ist Autoritt? - Einfhrung in die Logik der Autoritt, Taschenbuch
(Akzeptabel) Herder 1974. Polish translation: Co to jest autorytet in: Logika i filozofia:
Wybr pism [Logic and Philosophy: Selected Writings], J. Parys (ed.), Warszawa:
Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN 1993, pp.187-324.
J. M. Bocheski, Rady Starego Filozofa [Advice of the old philosopher], in: Logika &
filozofia logiczna, J. Perzanowski, A. Pietruszczak (eds.), Toru: Uniwersytet Mikoaja
Kopernika 2000.