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What
holds
adivasis
back?
Examining
poverty
and
exclusion
among
Juang
PVTGs
in
Orissa
Sajjad
Hassan1
Centre
for
Equity
Studies,
New
Delhi
1.0
Introduction
Gonasika
is
a
village
tucked
away
deep
in
the
forests
of
the
Northern
Orissa,
some
30
miles
away
from
the
district
headquarters
of
Keonjhar,
and
as
many
miles
off
the
block
office
at
Banspal.
Home
to
the
Juang
tribe,
declared
a
Particularly
Vulnerable
Tribal
Group2
(PVTG),
one
of
seventy
five
across
the
country,
thirteen
in
Orissa,
and
the
only
one
in
Keonjhar,
being
severely
impoverished
and
vulnerable,
who
have
lived
in
semi-isolation
in
the
hills
and
forests
of
western
Keonjhar.
Described
as
leaf
wearing
tribes
in
ethnographic
accounts3,
and
traditionally
practising
a
shifting
form
of
cultivation,
Juangs
are
today
the
bottom
of
the
development
pile.
Dependent
for
their
livelihood
mostly
on
forests
around
them
access
to
which
has
been
problematic
and
shifting
or
of
late
settled
but
un-remunerative
cultivation,
they
are
increasingly
being
forced
to
resort
to
distress
migration
to
urban
centres,
as
far
away
as
Chennai,
to
earn
a
living
for
their
impoverished
families.
Poverty,
combines
with
severe
malnutrition4,
absence
of
safe
drinking
water
and
sanitary
conditions,
and
poor
access
to
modern
health
facilities,
to
create
pathetic
health
conditions,
with
shockingly
high
infant
and
maternal
mortality
rates.5
With
a
literacy
rate
of
25.28%
(2001
Census)6,
the
prospects
for
Juangs
changing
this
state
of
affairs
does
not
seem
particularly
bright.
Gonasika
is
also
the
home
of
the
Juang
Development
Agency
(JDA),
set
up
in
1978
to
marshal
resources
and
focus
efforts
towards
development
of
Juangs
numbering
only
24,000,
by
last
count,
almost
all
in
Keonjhar
district.
That
the
state
of
the
Juangs
is
what
it
is
today,
despite
over
30
years
of
supposedly
focused
attention
on
the
community,
is
proof,
of
the
failure
of
our
tribal
development
policy,
not
just
in
Orissa
but
across
the
country.
Understanding
and
learning
from
this
failure
is
critical,
not
only
for
the
well
being
of
tribal
individuals
and
communities
(and
that
itself
is
a
significant
constituency,
making
up
8.2
%
of
Indias
population,
numbering
some
85
million,
2011
Census)
but
also
for
the
country
as
a
whole,
in
the
context
of
the
real
and
proverbial
wars
being
fought
across
large
swathes
of
Central
Indian
jungles
as
well
as
in
national
consciousness,
with
both
state
and
rebel
armies
claiming
to
fight
to
protect
rights
of
and
promote
a
better
future
for
tribals
and
the
dispossessed.
This
examination
has
wider
implications
too,
given
the
launch
of
the
12th
Five
year
plans,
with
its
renewed
thrust
on
inclusive
development,
to
understand
how
public
1
This
research
was
made
possible
by
support
from
Dan
Church
Aid.
I
wish
to
thank
Harsh
Mander,
Director
CES,
for
encouraging
me
to
undertake
this
study.
Thanks
are
also
due
to
District
Administration,
Keonjhar,
who
facilitated
the
research
in
Gonasika
and
Keonjhar.
I
also
want
to
thank
Rajkishore
Mishra,
Orissa
State
Advisor
to
Supreme
Court
Commissioners
(in
Right
to
Food
case)
for
helping
with
the
conduct
of
the
research.
As
I
explain
further
on,
I
have
extensively
used
data
from
a
CES
study
on
hunger
among
PTGs,
led
by
Sushmita
Guru,
to
make
my
points.
[All
correspondence
to:
iamsajjadhassan@gmail.com
]
2
Based
on
a
set
of
backwardness
criteria.
3
WW
Hunter,
in
Keonjhar
District
Gazetteer.
4
Also
see
Chhotray,
GP
(2003).
5
132.4
per
1000
live
births,
and
11.4
per
1000
female
population,
respectively,
in
a
survey
among
PTGs
in
Orissa,
by
RMRC
Bhubneshwar.
Quoted
in
above.
6
CES
(2012:
23).
This
against
a
district
overall
literacy
rate
of
close
to
70%,
not
much
below
the
national
74%.
DRAFT
policy
in
India
engages
with
the
excluded
and
marginalised,
and
why
we
are
so
unable
to
square
the
circle
there?
This
paper
seeks
to
engage
with
the
subject
of
tribal
poverty
and
dispossession,
asking
questions
about
the
extent,
nature
and
drivers
and
sustainers
of
tribal
poverty,
particularly
why
they
seem
to
be
stuck
in
destitution,
despite
an
array
of
seemingly
impressive
policies
and
instruments
deployed
over
the
years.
Obviously
there
are
significant
variations
across
states
and
communities,
but
overall,
why
is
the
condition
of
communities
identified
specifically
as
adivasi7
such
that
they
are
unable
to
exit
poverty,
make
use
of
economic
opportunities,
and
participate
as
equal
citizens
in
the
India
success
story?
A
subsidiary
objective
of
the
study
is
also
to
propose
some
broad
brush
suggestions
for
reforms.
In
studying
tribal
poverty,
my
attempt
has
been
to
study
not
so
much
the
tribal
poor,
but
the
phenomenon
of
enduring
poverty
and
exclusion
among
the
poor,
based
on
an
understanding
that
poverty
is
multi-dimensional
and
is
a
political
phenomenon,
with
power
relations
determining
the
distribution
of
opportunities
and
benefits.
Central
here
is
inequality,
not
just
vertical
but
horizontal.
Driving
that
is
social
exclusion8
(and
unfavourable
inclusion),
and
the
various
barriers,
including
identity
based
discrimination
that
tribals
face
in
non-tribal
hands,
all
of
which
add
up
to
create
the
conditions
that
drive
tribals
to
enduring
poverty
and
destitution.
Research
for
this
study
was
conducted
in
two
phases,
in
20109
and
later
in
201210,
in
Gonasika
and
surrounding
villages,
using
mixed
method
methodology,
with
a
slant
towards
participatory
tools,
to
understand
tribal
destitution
on
a
range
of
subjects
land
and
forest
rights
and
livelihood
opportunities;
access
to
food
and
nutrition,
and
health
and
education
entitlements;
and
policy
engagement,
at
local
and
macro
levels,
including
participation
and
voice
in
programme
management.
And
mindful
of
the
significant
difference
(on
development
outcomes)
there
is
between
tribals
characterised
as
adivasi
in
Central
India
and
those
in
North
East
India,
the
study
also
makes
side
comparisons
of
adivasi
outcomes
with
Northeastern
tribals,
specifically
to
highlight
divergent
institutional
and
policy
pathways
and
outcomes.
These
are
based
on
authors
past
scholarly
and
administrative
experiences
in
the
North
East
region.
These
insights
have
been
combined
with
survey
of
public
and
private
documents
on
tribal
policy
and
development,
as
well
as
secondary
reading
of
existing
literature,
to
provide
a
rounded
and
hopefully
more
complete
picture
of
tribal
exclusion,
in
an
effort
to
propose
evidence-based
solutions.
7
A
differentiation
must
be
made
between
tribals
generally,
the
category
Scheduled
Tribe
(ST),
used
in
official
accounts,
and
adivasi,
or
original
inhabitants,
used
specifically
for
tribals
in
Central
India,
as
opposed
to
those
in
the
North
East
of
the
country,
who
are
just
called
tribal
or
ST.
Our
focus
is
adivasi.
The
term
adivasi
signifies
a
degree
of
exclusion
and
dispossession
that
perhaps
tribal
does
not.
See
Guha,
further
on
this
difference.
(2007).
8
There
is
a
large
body
of
literature
of
these
themes,
representative
are
Harriss
(2006)
on
the
political
bases
of
poverty
and
inequality,
Sen
(2000)
and
De
Haan
(2001)
on
social
exclusion,
and
Stewart
et
all
(2005)
on
horizontal
inequality.
9
By
a
team
from
CES
led
by
Sushmita
Guru.
This
was
part
of
a
larger
research
project,
on
tribal
hunger
and
destitution,
with
select
PTG
communities
Juang
and
Lodha
in
Orissa,
Saharia
and
Bhil
in
Rajasthan
and
Gond
and
Konda
Reddy
in
Andhra
Pradesh.
(CES:2012)
10
By
the
author,
with
help
from
colleagues
in
CES
Ankita
Agarwal,
Saba
Sharma
and
Amod
Shah.
DRAFT
The
rest
of
the
paper
is
arranged
as
follows:
I
first
outline
the
problem
at
hand:
why
adivasis
have
remained
severely
poor
and
destitute,
despite
many
laws
and
programmes
for
their
advancement,
based
on
a
survey
of
literature
(Sec
2).
This
is
followed
by
examining
the
working
of
tribal
policy,
based
on
presenting
the
findings
of
the
research
among
Juang
PTG
(Sec.
3).
Following
that
is
a
discussion
on
our
quite
distinct
set
of
outcomes
for
tribals
in
Northeastern
India,
to
understand
what
historical
and
institutional
factors
might
explain
that,
and
what
lessons
they
provide
for
the
rest
of
the
country
(sec.
4).
In
the
ultimate
part
of
the
paper
(sec.
5)
,
I
try
to
draw
out
some
lessons
for
moving
forward,
based
on
brief
engagement
with
conceptual
literature
on
social
exclusion,
to
outline
an
agenda
for
reforms
for
adivasis
in
Central
India,
stopping
at
proposing
broad
markers
hoping
to
develop
these
ideas
further,
in
a
future
paper.
2.
Policy
for
tribals?
The
chasm
between
intentions
and
outcomes!
In
a
conference
of
Chief
Ministers
in
200911,
PM
Manmohan
Singh
strikingly
confessed,
There
has
been
a
systemic
failure
in
giving
the
tribals
a
stake
in
the
modern
economic
processes
that
inexorably
intrude
into
their
living
spaces.
He
listed
particularly
livelihood
concerns,
lack
of
quality
education
and
vocational
opportunities,
losses
suffered
by
tribals
displaced
as
a
result
of
acquisition
of
land
for
various
projects,
the
anti-tribal
Forest
laws
resulting
in
tribals
harassment,
and
finally
very
weak
or
virtually
non-existent
administrative
machinery,
in
tribal
areas,
blaming
weak
infrastructure,
and
notably
weak
commitment
and
competence
of
officers
posted
there.
He
warned:
the
alienation
built
over
decades
is
now
taking
a
dangerous
turn
in
some
parts
of
our
country,
concluding,
the
systematic
exploitation
and
social
and
economic
abuse
of
our
tribal
communities
can
no
longer
be
tolerated.
Singh
went
on
to
link
development
of
our
tribal
areas
and
improvement
in
the
economic
and
social
condition
of
our
tribal
populations
to
our
concept
of
inclusive
growth
concluding,
..
we
need
to
empower
our
tribal
communities
with
the
means
to
determine
their
own
destinies,
their
livelihood,
their
security
and
above
all
their
dignity
and
self-respect
as
equal
citizens
of
our
country,
as
equal
participants
in
the
processes
of
social
and
economic
development.
These
are
tall
ambitions,
that
echo
the
promises
made
by
the
framers
of
the
Constitution,
more
than
half
a
century
ago,
promising
to
provide
adequate
safeguards
for...backward
and
tribal
areas.12
Given
our
poor
track
record
on
keeping
that
promise,
there
is
little
assurance
that
renewed
promises,
or
those
many
claim,
made
cynically
with
an
eye
to
keeping
rebellions
at
bay13,
will
work
better.
But
the
realisation
that
we
have
not
been
able
to
keep
our
promises
made
to
tribal
people
is
not
new
-
although
the
confession
by
a
national
leader
might
be
a
first!
A
Planning
Commission
evaluation
of
Tribal
Development
blocks,
in
1967,
based
on
field
evaluation
in
Orissa
and
Tripura,
had
revealed
the
wretched
life
of
tribals
poverty,
destitutions,
use
of
primitive
agricultural
technology,
all
pervasive
role
of
middle-men
in
forest
produce
trade,
reliance
on
money
lenders
for
meeting
basic
11
th
PM:
4
Nov.
2009.
Conference
of
CMs,
and
state
Tribal
Affairs,
Forest
and
Social
Welfare
ministers,
organised
by
union
Ministry
of
Tribal
Affairs
(MoTA).
Accessed
from
MoTA
website.
12
rd
Debate
on
the
Objective
Resolutions,
Constituent
Assembly,
23
Oct
1949.
13
So
as
to
lay
the
ground
for
a
counter-insurgency
offensive,
Manmohan
Singh
admits
Indian
state
has
failed
tribal
peoples.
Kranti
Kumara
.
27
November
2009
DRAFT
needs,
distress
sale
of
land
to
non-tribals,
and
the
poor
prospect
of
a
improvements
in
quality
of
life.
The
study
came
particularly
hard
on
tribal
development
administration,
commenting
on
poor
commitment
of
the
bureaucracy,
their
poor
extension
work
and
very
weak
implementation
of
programmes.
Among
its
recommendations,
which
appear
lacklustre
given
the
clarity
of
its
findings,
the
study
suggested,
greater
contact
and
communication
between
block
staff
and
tribals,
for
creating
the
necessary
climate
for
development.
(Planning
Commission,
1967)
That
climate
for
development,
it
appears,
remains
as
elusive
now,
as
it
was
in
1967.
A
quick
survey
of
the
wellbeing
indicators
of
tribals,
reveals
they
are
worst
performers
for
any
social
group.
Literacy
is
significantly
lower
than
normal,
and
so
is
enrolment
in
schools
and
drop
out
rate
of
those
enrolled.
(Table
1)
Table
1:
Education
Literacy
Gross
Enrolment
Ratio
Out
of
School
children
(Rural)
(07-08)
(6-17
years
(%)
Male
Female
All
Primary
UP
Secondary
Male
Female
Persons
SC
70.6
49.9
60.5
124.9
76.3
39.0
21.0
25.0
22.8
ST
69.3
47.8
58.8
129.3
74.4
30.8
21.7
28.4
24.8
All
77.0
56.7
67.0
114.6
77.5
45.5
16.9
21.8
19.2
Source:
Tabulated
by
author
from
India
HDR
2011
(p183,
187)
On
health,
tribals
have
higher
percentage
of
women
with
Body
Mass
Index
(BMI)
lower
than
18.5
(the
cut
off).
More
than
50%
of
ST
children
are
underweight
and
stunted,
and
more
than
75
%
have
anaemia.
Representing
extend
of
poverty,
Total
Fertility
Rate
(TFR)
is
a
high
3.12
(compared
to
2.6
for
all
India).
And
less
than
one
fourth
ST
households
have
access
to
toilets
compared
to
1/3rd
for
Scheduled
Caste,
the
other
disadvantaged
group.
Few
have
access
to
safe
drinking
water.
(Planning
Commission,
2011:
171)
As
it
turns
out,
not
only
did
we
deny
the
adivasis
quality
education
and
health
care,
but,
as
the
historian
Ram
Guha
says,
our
policies
and
practices,
in
fact
actively
dispossessed
very
many
adivasis
of
their
traditional
means
of
life
and
livelihood.
(Guha,
2007)
What
was
their
asset
the
forests,
fast-flowing
rivers,
and
rich
mineral
resources,
providing
them
the
means
for
subsistence
and
survival
have,
in
the
context
of
growth,
become
their
liability,
attracting
large
factories
and
dams,
forcing
adivasi
to
make
way
for
commercial
forestry,
dams
and
mines,
all
to
feed
growth
in
the
cities.
He
contends,
it
is
the
adivasis
on
the
margins
of
Indias
growth
that
have
borne
the
brunt
of
the
cost
of
growth.
Table
2
presents
income
and
livelihood
attainments
for
tribals,
showing
the
severity
of
the
poverty
problem.
Labour
Force
Participation
Rate
(LFPR)
-
a
proxy
for
poor
education,
hence
reliance
on
manual
labour
is
highest
for
tribals.
Of
their
low
per
capita
expenditure,
a
full
58.9%
is
spent
on
food
the
highest
for
all
groups,
further
showing
how
desperate
the
situation
is.
Table
2:
Income
and
Livelihoods
LFPR
Unemployment
ratio
Mean
PK
Incidence
of
poverty
among
09-10
expenditure
(RS)
social
groups
(%,
07-08)
09-10
Rural
Urban
Rural
Urban
Rural
Urban
SC
62.4
1.6
3.2
652
1100
20.6
22.8
DRAFT
ST
All
69.9
60.4
1.4
1.6
4.4
3.4
617
772
1221
1472
25.3
14.9
20.6
14.5
Source: Tabulated by author from India HDR 2011 (p98, 112, 113 and 116)
Among
the
tools
employed
by
the
Government
recently,
for
adivasi
uplift,
under
the
much-
mouthed
mantra
of
inclusive
development,
have
been
some
high
profile
laws
and
programmes,
building
up
on
old
ones.14
These
include
a
revised
Tribal
Sub
Plan
strategy,
and
the
Scheduled
Tribes
and
Other
Traditional
Forest
Dwellers
(Recognition
of
Forest
Rights)
Act
2006.
The
former,
is
a
budgeting
strategy,
used
since
1974,
to
ensure
adequate
flow
of
public
investment
in
tribal
areas
for
the
development
of
tribals.
Realising
that
the
strategy
was
not
working
as
most
central
ministries
and
State
governments
did
not
adhere
to
the
guidelines
-
Government
announced
revised
guidelines
for
TSP,
based
on
recommendations
of
a
task
force
(Planning
Commission,
2010)
,
that
give
the
strategy
greater
teeth,
and
require
unspent
funds
to
be
carried
over
to
future
years,
to
prevent
diversion,
with
the
intention,
voiced
by
the
PM,
in
a
national
conference
in
2005,
of
bridging
the
gap
in
socio-economic
development
of
STs,
within
a
period
of
10
years.15
It
is
not
clear,
as
Harsh
Mander
demonstrates
in
his
study
of
tribal
administration,
how
these
new
guidelines
will
address
the
issue
of
poor
accountability
towards
tribals
that
let
ministries
and
states
get
away
with,
at
best
misreporting
spending,
at
worst
gross
neglect.
(Mander,
2004:
Ch
3)
And
the
Forest
Rights
Act,
as
the
latter
initiative
is
popularly
known,
aims
to
recognise
forest
rights
and
occupation
in
forests
lands,
for
the
benefit
of
forest-
residing
communities,
most
of
whom
are
tribal.
This,
commentators
have
noted,
has
the
potential
to
correct
the
historical
injustice
done
to
forest
dwelling
communities
through
the
seizure
of
their
lands
and
forests
and,
thereby,
addressing
the
livelihood
insecurity
that
plagues
the
daily
lives
of
forest
dwellers.16
But
as
the
Saxena
Committee
enquiring
into
transfer
of
Niyamgiri
forest
land
in
Western
Orissa
for
mining
purposes,
found
in
its
examination
of
the
competing
claims
of
traditional
tribal
communities
and
big
business,
FRA
implementation
is
fraught
with
serious
risks,
allowing
state
agents
to
favour
vested
interests
at
the
cost
of
tribal
rights.
(Saxena
et
al,
2010:
3-4)
An
earlier
law,
the
Panchayat
(Extension
to
Scheduled
Areas)
Act,
1996,
had
potentially
more
far-reaching
consequences
for
tribals.
In
aiming
to
extend
the
provision
of
the
XIth
Schedule
of
the
Constitution
(on
self
rule)
to
scheduled
(tribal)
areas,
the
law
seeks
to
enable
tribal
communities
to
assume
control
over
their
own
destiny
-
to
preserve
and
conserve
their
traditional
rights
over
natural
resources,
and
acquire
the
authority
and
ability
to
make
decisions
on
matters
of
development
affecting
their
lives.
The
fact
that
states
have
been
dragging
their
feet
to
adopt
this
central
legislation,
that
they
are
constitutionally
required
to,
ties
in
with
their
wider
unwillingness
to
devolve
power
to
tribal
communities,
thereby
empower
them,
and
which,
as
the
Ministry
of
Tribal
Affairs
Draft
National
Tribal
Policy
candidly
notes,
.remains
one
of
the
most
critical
factors
responsible
for
the
less
14
th
The
old
ones
include
provisions
under
the
5
Schedule
of
the
Constitution,
and
the
many
entries
in
it,
specifically
to
safeguard
rights
and
advance
the
interests
of
STs
-
Articles
244,
244A,
275(1),
342,
338(A)
and
339,
being
notable.
15
Inaugural
speech
by
PM
Manmohan
Singh,
to
National
Development
Council
2005.
16
nd
Scheduled
Tribes
Bill
2005.
Letters.
Economic
and
Political
Weekly,
22
October
2005
DRAFT
than
desired
outcomes
in
all
the
interventions,
monetary
or
otherwise,
meant
for
(tribal)
development.
(Ministry
of
Tribal
Affairs,
2006,
Sec.
1.13)
The
results
have
been
disastrous
for
tribals.
In
the
words
of
Guha,
...the
tribals
of
peninsular
India
are
the
unacknowledged
victims
of
six
decades
of
(Indian)
democratic
development,
in
which
time
they
have
been
exploited
and
dispossessed
by
the
wider
economy
and
polity.(Guha,
2007).
I
will
argue,
in
the
sections
ahead,
that
our
primal
sin,
as
it
were,
in
so
far
as
tribals
are
concerned,
was
in
envisioning
a
much
conservative
protective
regime
for
adivasi
(under
the
Fifth
Schedule
of
Constitution)
as
opposed
to
more
bold
self-
government
provisions
for
tribal
communities
in
North
East
India
(under
the
Sixth
Schedule)
the
region
with
the
other
large
concentration
of
tribals,
and
where,
given
the
greater
tribal
voice
and
participation,
wellbeing
results
are
more
sanguine.
3.
How
are
the
Juang
doing?
Reporting
evidence
from
Gonasika
3.1
Research
This
section
presents
findings
of
research,
on
poverty
and
destitution
among
Juangs,
in
Gonasika
micro-project
area
of
Keonjhar
district,
in
201017
and
again
in
2012.
The
focus
of
the
first
research
was
hunger
and
dispossession,
and
access
to
social
protection
programmes
ICDS,
PDS,
MDM,
pension
and
MG-NREGS18
-
in
an
effort
to
shed
light
on
the
lived
experiences
of
hunger
and
access
to
livelihood
opportunities
among
Juangs,
and
the
ways
in
which
they
cope
with
stress.
The
study
also
examined
factors
creating
the
particular
vulnerabilities
-
issues
of
land
alienation,
indebtedness,
bondage
and
distress
migration,
particularly.
Although
employing
mixed-method
tools,
researchers,
most
of
who
were
purposely
recruited
from
local
Juang
communities
and
put
through
a
crash
course
in
research
methodology,
relied
for
most
data
collection,
on
qualitative
household
surveys,
of
100
Juang
families,
covering
5
Juang-majority
villages,
with
houses
selected
randomly.
Insights
from
the
survey
were
shared
with
local
community,
through
a
series
of
FGDs,
to
explore
community
and
group
dynamics,
including
specific
disabilities
faced
by
more
vulnerable
members
among
Juangs
women,
older
persons
and
the
disabled.
The
same
sites
were
revisited
in
201219,
to
understand
in
an
ethnographically
nuanced
way,
the
drivers
of
chronic
poverty
and
dispossession
among
Juangs,
and
their
access
to
pro-poor
laws
and
programmes
devised
to
address
the
very
disabilities
that
excluded
communities
such
as
Juangs
faced.
This
involved
understanding
the
lived
experiences
of
poverty
and
exclusion
by
Juangs,
exploring
institutional
and
political-economy
factors
that
created
the
conditions
for
the
exclusion,
and
the
opportunities
and
barriers
that
public
institutions
and
programmes
created
for
Juangs,
in
the
process
of
delivering
development.
This
research
relied
almost
wholly
on
qualitative
tools
interviews,
focus
groups
discussions
and
observations.
17
This
was
part
of
the
larger
CES
research,
conducted
by
Sushmita
Guru,
on
hunger
and
access
to
social
protection
programmes
by
PTGs
in
Orissa,
Rajasthan
and
Andhra
Pradesh,
(CES,
2012)
18
Integrated
Child
Development
Services,
Public
Distribution
System,
Mid
Day
Meal
scheme,
and
National
Rural
Employment
Guarantee
Scheme,
all
flagship
social
protection
programmes
of
the
central
Government.
19
This
time
by
the
author,
as
part
of
a
CES
exploration,
on
poverty
and
exclusion
among
the
most
marginalised
communities
in
the
country,
that
also
included
Musahars
in
Bihar
(Hassan,
Forthcoming),
adivasis
Palamu,
Jharkhand,
dalits
in
Banda,
Uttar
Pradesh,
and
Saharia
PTG
in
Baran,
Rajasthan.
DRAFT
The
report
that
follows
uses
material
from
both
the
field
studies,
to
catalogue
Juang
outcomes
on
access
to
livelihoods,
the
challenges
they
face
in
securing
that,
and
how
Juangs
cope
given
the
severe
vulnerabilities.
This
is
followed
by
an
account
of
the
impact
of
these
vulnerabilities
on
access
to
food
and
nutrition,
the
resultant
poor
health
and
malnutrition
conditions,
and
the
extent
to
which
food
security
programmes
are
able
to
fill
the
gap.
The
section
concludes
with
examining
change
among
Juangs,
and
the
principal
vehicles
for
that,
looking
specifically
at
the
agency
of
Juang
Development
Agency
(JDA),
and
the
potential
role
of
education
in
this.
3.2
Inroduction
Juangs
mostly
inhabit
the
upper
forest
reaches
of
western
part
of
Keonjhar,
where
they
number
some
25,000
(2001
Census)20.
They
are
dependent
on
forest
and
agriculture
for
much
of
their
livelihood,
and
now
increasingly
on
wage
labour
in
neighbouring
villages,
as
farm
hands,
or
in
urban
centres,
near
and
far,
as
labourers.
Dependence
on
forest
has
declined,
that
as
wage
labourer
has
increased,
but
agriculture
still
acts
as
the
staple
source
of
sustenance.
Technology,
however,
is
ancient,
investment
low
and
dependence
on
vagaries
of
nature
high
forcing
Juangs
to
increasingly
look
to
seasonal
migration,
at
much
cost
to
themselves
and
their
families
left
behind,
(and
hence
distress)
as
a
source
of
livelihood
security.
Livelihood
security
was
a
problem
in
the
past
too,
when
forests
were
under
the
control
of
Keonjhar
Rajas.
While
Juangs
were
not
required
to
pay
any
tax
to
the
Raja,
they
were
often
forced
to
provide
free
goods
and
services.
This
included
such
minor
obligations
as
supplying
honey,
fuel,
mahua
and
broom
grass,
and
assisting
the
king
in
hunting
expeditions.
As
Verrier
Elwin
observed,
often
these
demands
were
indefinite
and
exploitative21.
The
British
repealed
the
old
system,
and
introduced
fixed
rents
a
small
amount,
on
the
village
as
a
whole,
taking
account
of
the
vulnerable
condition
and
fragility
of
the
livelihood
of
the
community.
Land
rights
were
given
communally
to
Juang
Pidhs,
the
Juang
community
organisation.
In
any
case
land
in
Juang
areas
was
owned
communally,
and
the
fruits
of
cultivation
divided
up
among
the
village.
Shifting
cultivation
was
widely
practised.
(CES,
2012:30)
3.3
Land
and
agriculture:
Today,
most
Juangs
own
land,
most
might
also
have
a
patch
of
irrigated
land.
Our
survey
findings
-
corroborated
by
Juang
Development
Agency
data
-
indicate
that
91
percent
of
villagers
possessed
some
land,
and
87.9
percent
had
records
of
those
possessions.
Most
villagers
had
recently
acquired
title
deeds
to
forest
land,
made
possible
under
FRA,
2006,
although
in
most
cases,
in
the
absence
of
ground
mapping,
deed
holders
are
not
clear
where
the
particular
piece
of
land
might
be,
and
that
itself
is
problem
enough,
undermining
the
benefits
of
what
looks
like
an
otherwise
successful
FRA
implementation
in
Gonasika.
But
most
holdings,
own
as
well
as
those
under
FRA,
are
either
too
small
or
non-remunerative
-
over
58
per
cent
had
less
than
one
acre
of
land.
The
small
size
of
holding,
fact
that
they
are
mostly
rain-fed
and
being
on
uplands,
of
low
fertility,
close
to
forest,
hence
subject
to
pillage
by
wild
animals,
means
the
output
mostly
rice,
millet
20
21
DRAFT
and
maize,
for
own
consumption,
and
linseed,
for
sale
locally
-
is
poor.
Combined
with
this,
is
the
reluctance
to
adopt
modern
farming
practices
most
farmers
use
seeds
saved
from
previous
years
harvest,
for
example,
and
only
a
few
interviewed
said
they
used
fertilizer,
even
though
these
are
provided
free
by
JDA
and
local
development
NGOs.
These
factors
combine
to
result
in
low
agriculture
output,
and
the
inability
of
most
Juangs
to
meet
their
food
requirements
for
the
full
year.
(Ibid:31-32)
3.4
Minor
Forest
Produce
(MFP)
such
as
small
timber,
bamboo,
thatching
grass
and
Non-
timber
Forest
Produce
(NTFP),
like
mahua,
tendu
leaves,
and
sal
seed
and
leaves,
have
traditionally
been
the
prime
source
of
livelihood
for
tribal
communities,
but
our
data
shows,
their
usefulness
to
Juangs
might
be
diminishing.
Only
4.3
per
cent
of
survey
households
indicated
forest
as
their
prime
source
of
income,
for
64.51
per
cent
it
was
only
the
secondary
source.
(Ibid,
37).
This
is
explained
by
the
depleting
availability
of
forest
produce,
because
of
reducing
forest
cover,
but
mostly
due
to
poor
access
to
Juangs,
as
other
forest
dwellers,
due
to
the
pattern
of
ownership
over
forest
land
in
Orissa
owned
partly
by
Forest
Department
and
partly
by
Revenue.
This
lack
of
settlement
of
forest
land
has
led
to
the
rights
of
tribals
over
non-reserve
forest
areas
being
wholly
undefined,
and
thus
subject
to
the
vagaries
of
the
Forest
bureaucracy.
These
data
are
corroborated
with
our
conversations
in
Upar
Chempai
village,
for
instance,
where
Bikas
Juang
and
his
wife
tell
us,
they
collect
fuelwood
from
forests,
for
domestic
use,
and
along
with
sal
and
tendu
leaves,
occasionally
travel
to
Keonjhar,
some
eight
hours
on
foot,
once
a
week,
to
sell
that
at
the
weekly
haat,
for
the
extra
money.
22
A
bundle
of
firewood,
that
must
be
carried
all
the
way,
as
head
load,
fetches
about
Rs.
180.
Fact
that
Forest
Department
officials
frown
upon
this
collection
of
forest
produce
-
and
actively
impede
it
further
removes
forests
as
a
source
of
livelihood
for
the
old
couple.
Combined
with
this
depleting
opportunity
is
the
problem
about
the
difficulty
with
reaching
forest
produce
at
a
viable
price
to
markets.
The
Orissa
Forest
Development
Corporation
(OFDC)
and
the
Tribal
Development
Cooperative
Cooperation
(TDCC)
do
not
seem
to
make
much
of
a
headway
in
terms
of
enabling
people
like
Bikas
Juang
earn
a
remunerative
price,
without
reliance
on
middle
men
and
moneylenders.
Middle
men
have
greater
market
reach
and
access,
and
are
closely
intertwined
with
tribal
livelihood
patterns
tribals
depending
on
them,
not
vice
versa
-
and
have
thus
subverted
attempts
to
replace
them
using
cooperatives
or
public
corporations.
Together,
these
factors
have
ensured
that
forests,
that
could
have
been
a
potentially
viable
source
of
income
and
sustenance
for
Juangs,
hold
little
livelihood
promise.
They
contribute
little
to
better
incomes
or
improved
nutritional
status
of
Juang
communities.
An
overwhelming
majority
of
Juangs
covered
in
the
survey
reported
total
annual
income
from
sale
of
MFP
as
under
Rs.
500,
with
some
reporting
Rs.
1500
a
year.
(Ibid:
41).
3.5
Most
Juang
families
also
domesticate
animals
in
the
past
pigs,
but
now
mostly
goat
and
poultry.
But
these
are
not
remunerative,
being
used
mostly
for
occasional
festive
and
religious
consumption,
and
only
seldom
as
source
of
income
mostly
when
their
situation
gets
dire.
Attempts
by
government
agencies
JDA
in
this
case
to
organise
villagers
in
self
help
groups,
have
not
been
very
successful.
Villagers
we
spoke
with,
put
this
down
to
poor
22
st
Author interview. Upar Chempai village, Toda Champhaee Gram Panchayat. 21 Sept. 2012.
DRAFT
management
by
JDA
and
other
agencies,
of
the
programme.
Absence
of
a
clear
plan,
and
training
of
self
help
group
members,
and
no
attempt
to
link
up
to
markets,
means
that
a
potentially
useful
economic
activity
goatry
villagers
informed,
if
done
well
could
fetch
about
5000
a
annually
to
every
family
-
and
a
useful
way
of
organising
enterprise
fails
to
take
off.23
3.6
Our
conversation
with
Juang
villagers
on
livelihoods
and
sustenance,
revealed
that
this
combination
of
food
and
proceeds
from
sale
of
cash
crop,
forest
produce
and
livestock,
does
not
generate
adequate
income,
indeed
just
food,
to
last
for
the
year.
What
of
public
programmes
like
MG-NREGS?
Is
NREGS
providing
the
wage
security
it
is
designed
for?
In
our
discussions
with
a
group
of
youth
in
Uttar
Bhaitarani
village,
we
were
informed
that
at
most,
they
had
been
provided
work
under
NREGS
for
7
days,
on
earthwork
for
a
pond,
despite
the
utter
paucity
of
wage
work
in
the
village.
The
previous
year
too,
total
days
of
work
made
available
was
the
same
7
days.
In
both
cases,
even
this
limited
opportunity
did
not
result
in
immediate
payment
of
the
wage
wages
were
paid
after
a
gap
of
six
months.
When
we
spoke
in
September
2012,
labourers
had
received
only
partial
payment
for
work
done
in
June
that
year.
Enquiries
revealed
this
was
the
case
with
most
villagers
work
is
just
not
made
available
by
the
NREGA
bureaucracy,
and
payments
for
work
done
are
regularly
delayed,
in
some
cases
underpaid.24
Thus
is
not
an
exceptional
story,
but
one
that
we
hear
in
every
village
we
visited.
While
NREGA
might
aspire
to
provide
100
days
of
work
a
year
to
every
family
that
needs
it
and
is
willing
to
do
wage
employment,
it
is
woefully
failing
in
that
objective.
First
is
the
problem
of
labourers
being
registered
acquiring
a
labour
card.
Many
do
not
have
it,
and
little
effort
seems
to
have
been
made
to
create
the
awareness
among
villagers
and
get
potential
labourers
to
register.
And
those
who
do
have
the
card
do
not
get
work.
Only
46
per
cent
of
the
survey
respondents
who
had
cards,
had
managed
to
obtain
any
wage
work.
NREGS
is
also
designed
to
provide
work
opportunities
throughout
the
year,
but
particularly
during
lean
seasons,
when
the
poor
have
little
avenue
for
earning
a
wage.
I
practice,
that
is
not
happening.
Half
the
persons
spoken
to
reported
work
being
available
only
during
specific
periods
of
the
year,
only
some
20
per
cent
reported
work
was
available
for
longer
durations.
Actual
availability,
across
the
five
survey
sites,
ranged
from
8-30
days,
with
most
falling
in
the
lower
category.
An
those
who
had
worked,
received
payments
only
after
long
delays,
many
at
reduced
rates
than
promised,
some
from
banks
and
post
offices
that
required
them
to
travel
long
distances,
thus
defeating
the
purpose
of
a
scheme
that
was
meant
to
provide
immediate
wage
relief
to
those
in
need
as
we
saw
in
the
case
of
Juang
families
in
village
after
village,
that
is
a
sizeable
number.
3.7
Food
and
nutritional
security:
Poor
incomes
and
an
existence
constantly
on
the
edge,
means
reliance
of
Juangs
on
well
functioning
social
protection
schemes,
especially
food,
cannot
be
stressed
enough.
How
are
food
security
schemes
-
PDS,
ICDS
and
MDM
-
performing
to
provide
that
safety
net?
What
impact
does
this
performance
have
on
the
health
and
nutritional
status
of
Juangs?
And
does
health
and
nutrition
infrastructure
23
nd
24
DRAFT
succeed
in
providing
support
where
it
is
needed?
We
will
report
on
these
questions
in
the
survey
in
the
following
pages.
The
days
of
suffering
silently,
in
hunger,
with
just
the
forest
for
succour,
may
be
over
for
most
Junags,
but
eating
rough
and
inadequate
are
facts
of
life
for
most.
While
more
pronounced
for
older
persons,
widows
and
single
women,
and
those
with
disabilities,
hunger
appears
endemic
in
the
community.
For
most,
pseudo
food
like
mango
kernels
act
as
a
convenient
escape,
but
there
is
little
nutritional
value
ion
those
foods.
Some
even
resort
to
drinking
local
brew
handia
to
mask
hunger.
Given
this
food
and
nutritional
insecurity,
the
national
flagship
food
security
safety
net
scheme
-
Targeted
Public
Distribution
System
(TPDS)25,
becomes
crucial.
Our
examination
both
household
survey
and
community
interaction
revealed
that,
on
the
whole,
food
was
reaching
the
beneficiaries.
Ration
shops
run
mostly
by
GP
or
the
local
womens
SHG
-
work
effectively.
They
are
open
for
business
on
the
days
of
the
month,
as
required.
Beneficiaries
get
their
due
quantity
of
rice,
at
prescribed
rates,
although
the
same
cannot,
perhaps,
be
said
about
sugar
and
kerosene,
where
villagers
complained
of
mismanagement
and
corruption.
Most
Juangs
reported
that
the
scheme
helped
them
with
food
security
for
15
days
a
month.
But
there
are
many
who
are
left
out
of
the
scheme.
This
is
the
problem
of
identification
according
to
JDA
data,
only
46
percent
Juangs
have
Antodaya
Yojna
(AAY)
card26,
while
43
percent
have
BPL
cards,
6
percent
had
APL,
and
5
percent
have
no
card
at
all
(Ibid:61).
And
given
that
most
of
the
administrative
attention
that
has
led
to
the
success
of
the
scheme
among
Juangs
has
been
on
AAY
(declaring
all
PTG
as
AAY
beneficiary),
non-AAY
card
holders
are
mostly
left
high
and
dry.
In
Tangarpada
village,
we
noticed
among
those
who
had
no
cards
at
all,
or
faulty
cards,
were
old
and
infirm,
single-woman,
or
newly
set
up
families.
Enquiries
revealed
that
many
old
women,
some
widows,
had
applied
for
issue
of
appropriate
cards,
but
found
the
going
difficult,
and
had
given
up
the
attempt.
Many,
forced
by
poverty,
had
used
their
AAY
or
BPL
card
as
security
for
taking
out
loan
from
moneylenders
or
shop
keepers,
losing
their
entitlement
temporarily,
in
some
cases
permanently.27
The
other
national
nutrition
programme,
targeted
universally
at
women
and
younger
children
is
the
Integrated
Child
Development
Service
(ICDS).
ICDS
is
hugely
important
for
a
state
like
Orissa,
with
extremely
high
IMR
(71
as
against
55
nationally28),
and
high
incidence
of
maternal
mortality
and
underweight
children.
For
Juangs
with
even
higher
IMR
and
MMR29,
effective
working
of
ICDS
can
be
the
difference
between
life
and
death.
But
survey
data
does
not
provide
a
very
encouraging
picture.
In
contravention
of
Supreme
court
directions
to
prioritise
SC
and
ST
hamlets,
and
particularly,
those
of
PVTG
groups
such
as
25
Beneficiaries
under
the
scheme
are
entitled
to
25
kg
(BPL)
or
35
kg
(Antodaya)
rice,
@
Rs.
2
per
kilo;
3
kg
of
sugar,
@
Rs.
15;
and
3
litre
of
kerosene
@
Rs.
9.5.
26
In
violation
of
the
May
2003
order
of
the
Supreme
Court,
to
cover
all
PTGs
under
AAY.
27
st
FGD,
Tangarpada
village,
Gonasika
GP,
21
September
2012.
28
RHS
Bulletin,
March
2008,
M/O
Health
&
F.W.,
GO
29
132.4
per
1000
live
births,
and
11.4
per
1000
female
population,
respectively,
in
a
survey
among
PTGs
in
Orissa
(Chhotray,
GP
2003)
DRAFT
DRAFT
work.
As
to
the
supervisor
herself
a
middle
aged
non-tribal
woman
from
Mayurbhanj
district,
she
neither
had
the
thick
understanding
of
local
conditions
that
come
in
the
way
of
women
adopting
modern
child-rearing
practices,
nor
the
access
and
trust
in
the
community
to
leverage
to
deliver
awareness
and
capacity
building
programme
with
the
credibility
to
encourage
people
to
adopt
the
changes.
According
to
the
supervisor,
the
main
challenges
to
fighting
malnutrition
among
Juangs
were
poor
awareness
among
people
about
hygiene,
healthy
food
and
child
rearing
practices,
and
benefits
of
institutional
deliveries;
prevalence
of
superstition
among
people,
besides
remoteness
of
villages
that
came
in
the
way
of
speedy
referrals
to
Primary
Health
Centres
or
Nutrition
Rehabilitation
Centres
(NRC),
and
the
poor
working
of
Gaon
Kalyan
Samiti
the
village
level
body
meant
to
provide
guidance
and
oversight.
As
a
result,
most
deliveries
are
conducted
at
home
thus
putting
new-borns,
mothers,
or
both,
to
serious
risk,
in
cases
of
complicated
deliveries.
The
supervisor
claims
she
and
her
team
motivate
ASHAs
(village
level
health
para-workers)
to
persuade
women
to
travel
to
hospitals
for
the
delivery,
linking
up
to
the
Janani
Suraksha
Yojana33
support
(of
Rs.
1400
for
transport
subsidy),
but
the
attempts
fails
mostly,
as
transport
costs
in
these
remote
villages
Keonjhar
tertiary
hospital
being
20
Km
away
are
high.
The
PHC
at
Gunasika
is
closer
at
hand
and
many
women
would
be
willing
to
travel
there,
but
the
PHC
neither
has
the
facilities
nor
does
it
work
effectively.
What
have
provision
for
community
participation
and
governance
in
the
working
of
ICDS
done
to
its
performance?
Guidelines
talk
of
a
village
level
monitoring
committee,
made
up
of
7
members,
drawn
from
different
walks
of
life.
Our
questioning
revealed,
villagers
were
unaware
of
such
a
committee,
and
that
meetings
of
the
committee
had
never
been
held,
in
the
open
transparent
manner
required.
ICDS
guidelines
also
require
a
Mothers
Committee,
made
up
of
a
selection
of
mothers
of
children
attending
Anganwadi
centres.
In
the
ICDS
scheme
of
things,
a
great
deal
of
the
oversight
of
the
working
is
left
to
these
two
village
level
oversight
bodies.
But
discussions
in
the
village,
with
both
the
providers
and
the
beneficiaries
of
the
service
proved
that
there
was
little
realisation
of
the
intention.
34Clearly,
multiple
governance
fora,
with
unclear
roles,
resources
and
responsibilities,
and
members
not
fully
on
board,
along
with
little
awareness
among
the
local
community
about
the
programme
and,
meant
the
defeat
of
what
is
conceptually
a
sound
idea
peoples
participation
but
that
requires
a
great
deal
of
ground
work,
to
get
going.
And
while
the
survey
revealed
that
Mid
Day
Meal
(MDM)
scheme35
was
functioning
satisfactorily
in
most
villages
-
hot
meals
were
being
provided
daily
to
children
that
attended
school.
And
parents
responses
demonstrated
that
the
support
was
helpful
in
enhancing
nutritional
status
of
their
children,
the
problem
in
Gonasika,
with
providing
nutritional
support
through
schools
was
the
poor
enrolment
in
schools.
Of
the
five
Juanga
villages
surveyed,
only
three
had
any
schools
(Saria,
Talapanasa,
Tangarpada),
the
other
two
(Upar
chempai
and
Baitarani)
were
outside
of
the
education
dept
footprint,
thus
depriving
children
from
the
village.
And
in
the
village
covered,
there
was
additional
problem
of
poor
33
A
national
scheme
to
attract
women
to
hospital
delivery,
through
a
package
of
incentives
and
services.
FGD,
Tangarpada
village.
Ibid.
35
The
calorie
norm
prescribed
by
the
Supreme
Court
is
a
minimum
of
300
calories
and
8
to
12
grams
of
proteins
each
day
for
a
minimum
of
200
days.
34
DRAFT
enrolment
-
of
the
83
Juang
households
covered,
comprising
of
153
children
eligible
for
MDM
benefits,
only
67.33
percent
were
enrolled
in
schools.
(Ibid:
68)
The
findings
confirmed
that
that
though
MDM
programme
was
working
satisfactorily,
the
objective
of
a
hunger
free
childhood
is
far
from
being
realized.
3.8
Shortage,
and
in
some
cases
prolonged
unavailability
of
adequate
and
nutritious
food,
combines
with
poor
health
and
sanitation
conditions
and
practices,
to
create
severe
health
and
nutrition
challenges
for
Juangs.
Isolated
and
remote
habitations
far
away
from
nearest
health
facilities
-
belief
in
superstitions
and
reluctance
to
adopt
modern
health
and
sanitary
practices,
play
their
part.
Doctors
at
the
Gunasika
PHC
inform
us36,
impatiently,
how
mothers
are
reluctant
to
breastfeed
their
children,
relying
rather,
on
the
unhelpful
traditional
practice
of
feeding
with
a
mix
of
mahua
leaves.
And
their
bathing
newborns
right
after
birth,
makes
them
vulnerable
to
diarrhoea
and
respiratory
diseases.
Villagers
later
explained
to
us
the
particular
feeding
practice,
on
account
of
the
mothers
preoccupation
with
daily
chores,
and
also
because
of
their
lack
of
awareness
about
the
benefits
of
breastfeeding,
for
which
little
effort
has
been
made
by
the
very
PHC
doctors.
In
any
case,
the
tropical
forest
tracks
that
Juangs
inhabit,
are
festering
grounds
for
diseases
such
as
Malaria
the
biggest
concern
for
the
doctors,
who
claim
50
per
cent
of
all
cases
that
visit
the
PHC
are
Malaria
cases,
and
because
they
come
in
such
advanced
stages,
must
be
referred
to
the
district
hospital
in
Keonjhar,
reducing
their
survival
chance.
Poverty,
and
the
absence
of
safety
nets,
means
that
household
expenditure
on
health
is
very
low,
most
people
relying
rather
on
quacks
and
the
village
medicine-man
for
cure.
When
faced
with
severe
crisis
and
forced
to
spend
-
to
undergo
a
major
surgery
for
instance
-
the
cost
is
devastating.
In
the
remote
Baragarh
village,
we
met
Ramesh
Juang,
whose
wife
was
taken
severely
ill
last
year,
and
had
to
be
carried,
on
foot
in
a
stretcher,
all
the
way
to
the
district
hospital
at
Keonjhar
half
a
day
away.
While
she
survived
still
anaemic
and
not
fully
recovered
-
the
family
had
to
spend
Rs
4000
on
her
treatment,
raised
through
selling
off
their
livestock,
and
borrowing
money
from
the
sahukar,
at
a
usurious
50
per
cent
rate
of
interest.37
Its
a
difficult
choice
people
have
to
make
between
spending
on
health
and
living
in
bondage
for
a
long
time.
These
factors
have
implications
for
health
outcomes
for
Juangs.
Only
52
per
cent
of
the
respondents
in
the
household
survey
were
found
to
be
in
the
normal
BMI
range,
rest
belonged
variously
to
severely
thin,
moderately
thin,
mildly
thin
or
had
pre-obese
conditions.
This
was
not
surprising
considering
that
the
National
Nutrition
Monitoring
Bureau
(2000-2001)
had
declared
Orissa
as
having
the
second
highest
level
of
under-
nutrition
in
the
country.
Our
survey
revealed
that
Juanga
suffer
disproportionately
from
malaria,
tuberculosis,
sexually
transmitted
diseases,
anaemia
and
other
diseases
caused
by
nutritional
deficiencies.
These
have
resulted
in
very
high
mortality
amongst
them.
In
the
five
villages
covered
in
the
survey,
a
total
of
50
persons
were
reported
dead
prematurely,
during
the
previous
five
years.
According
to
relatives
a
large
proportion
of
these
were
hunger-
related.
(Ibid:
79)
36
nd
37
DRAFT
Is
the
public
health
system
equal
to
the
task?
Gonasika
has
a
PHC,
established
recently,
upgraded
from
a
sub-Centre.
Today,
both
the
PHC
and
the
PHSC,
surprisingly,
work
from
the
same
compound.
Two
doctors
are
posted,
one
allopathic,
another,
a
homeopathic
doctor,
appointed
through
the
Ayush
route38,
with,
as
the
Ayush
doctors
informs
us,
similar
work
profile
but
on
a
very
different
term
of
engagement,
including
a
much
reduced
wage
rate.
The
morale
among
both
is
low,
reflected
in
our
experience
that,
at
any
given
time
during
our
fiend
research
in
Gonasika,
only
one
doctor
was
available
to
see
patients.
Apparently,
many
reports
have
to
be
filed
and
issues
chased
up
with
higher
authorities
at
district
offices
in
Keonjhar,
and
which
keeps
one
or
the
other
doctor
away.
The
PHC
has
only
basic
consulting
and
surgery
facilities
most
complicated
cases
of
delivery,
for
instances,
or
those
requiring
caesarean
operations,
must
be
referred
to
Keonjhar
district
hospital.
The
doctors
claim
they
see
some
50-60
patients
a
month,
most
relating
to
malaria,
diarrhohea
and
scabies.
Half
of
these
are
children
from
the
government
residential
schools
in
Gunasika,
where
the
doctors
inform,
teachers
are
very
alert
to
diseases.39
The
PHC
has
a
mobile
health
vehicle
too,
to
provide
doorstep
service
to
patients
that
are
unable
to
travel
to
Gonasika.
But
this
has
been
reduced
to
making
rounds
of
villages,
twice
a
month,
to
hold
camps
and
distribute
the
odd
medicine.
A
janani
express
too
is
allotted,
to
transport
pregnant
women
from
their
villages
to
the
PHC,
at
no
cost,
but
absence
of
telephone
network
in
Gonasika,
means
villagers
are
unable
to
make
use
of
the
facility.
The
ones
that
get
through
to
the
service,
travel
to
Keonjhar
hospital
rather
than
come
to
Gonasika.
In
any
case,
remoteness
of
villages
means
patients
approach
the
PHC
only
when
a
problem
is
compounded
by
when
it
is
probably
too
late,
anyway.
ASHAs
and
ICDS
Anganwadi
Workers
are
available
in
each
village,
but
are
not
used
effectively
or
imaginatively
to
fill
the
gap
in
local
provision
of
health
service.
They
are
neither
resourced
well
in
terms
of
medicines
and
kits
nor
trained
adequately,
to
identify
problems
and
report
them
in
time
for
useful
intervention.
3.9
Debt:
Marginal
incomes,
and
poor
working
of
public
food,
nutrition
and
employment
programmes,
means
Juangs
are
left
wholly
income
vulnerable,
unable
to
bear
shocks
such
as
crop
failure,
natural
calamity,
or
a
health
emergency
-
forcing
them
to
seek
alternative
support,
when
they
need
large
infusions
of
cash.
There
is
wide
body
of
literature
reporting
the
large
presence
of
moneylenders
among
tribal
settlements,
and
the
high
incidence
of
borrowing
at
usurious
rates
of
interest
leading
to
tribal
indebtedness40.
Our
surveys
in
Gonasika
corroborate
this
understanding.
Debt
is
widespread
among
Juangs.
68
per
cent
of
families
the
survey
covered,
had
taken
out
one
or
another
form
of
loan,
most
being
small-scale,
typically
under
Rs.
2000,
mostly
for
meeting
household
expenditure
and
that
for
social
obligations
birth
and
death
feasts,
and
wedding
ceremonies.
Across
the
families
interviewed,
liquor
acted
as
a
source
of
much
wasteful
expenditure,
and
a
route
into
the
debt
trap.
Only
a
little
money
borrowed
went
into
more
productive
forms
of
expenditure
health,
land
development
and
purchase
of
agricultural
inputs,
for
example.
(Ibid:
52
)
38
Ayush,
short
for
Ayurved,
Unani,
and
Siddhi
systems
of
medicine,
that
together
make
the
Governments
thrust
for
using
indigenous
systems
of
medicine
to
supplement
modern
allopathic.
39
nd
Author
interview,
Gonasika
PHC.
22
September
2012.
40
Indebtedness.
DRAFT
Source
of
credit,
surprisingly,
varied
-
both
institutional
and
non-institutional
sources
were
used,
ranging
from
agricultural
banks,
self
help
groups,
family
members
and
relatives,
and
moneylenders.
Moneylenders,
seemed
very
popular
(despite
presence
of
a
formal
source
in
the
form
of
the
Baitarani
Grameen
Bank,
26
per
cent
of
respondents
relied
on
moneylenders
for
credit).
This,
we
realised
later
was
presumably
due
to
the
fewer
conditions
and
simple
procedures
no
paperwork
needed
-
used
by
moneylenders,
which
made
that
source
very
attractive
to
those
in
urgent
need
of
cash
(Ibid:53).41
The
rub,
however,
is
in
the
usurious
rate
of
interest
charged
by
moneylenders
ranging
from
5
to
20
per
cent,
per
month
and
which
ensures
that
people
are
trapped
in
indebtedness.
Illiteracy
among
Juangs
and
absence
of
any
written
agreement
between
the
parties,
works
to
the
advantage
of
moneylenders.
Repayment
is
usually
in
kind
oil
seed
and
crop,
that
sells
at
a
premium,
further
benefiting
the
moneylender.
All
this
goes
on,
alongside
laws
such
as
the
Orissa
Scheduled
Areas
Moneylenders
Regulation,
1967
(Regulation
2
of
1968),
meant
for
regulating
money
lending
in
Scheduled
Areas,
and
the
Orissa
(Scheduled
Areas)
Debt
Relief
Regulation,
1967
(Regulation
1
of
1968),
for
providing
relief
to
tribals
from
indebtedness.
3.10
Land
Alienation.
Indebtedness,
it
turns
out,
is
also
behind
Juangs
gradually
losing
their
land,
mostly
to
non-tribals
the
phenomenon
of
land
alienation.
Historically,
land
transfers
in
Junag
areas,
from
tribal
to
non-tribals,
have
happened
most
to
Gaudas,
traditional
milkmen,
classified
Other
Backward
Class
in
Orissa.
Discussions
with
the
community
reveal
the
emergence
of
Gaudas
in
Juanga
dominated
region
in
the
last
century,
who
came
in
search
of
pasture
for
their
cattle,
but
switched
over
gradually
to
agriculture,
by
taking
over
land
from
Juangs,
in
transfers
behind
which
were
informal
mortagages
of
land
for
money
loaned
to
Juangs.
Villagers
in
Upar
Chempai
told
us
wistfully,
how,
according
to
their
forefathers,
Gaudas
asked
Juang
elders
then
dependent
wholly
on
the
plentiful
forests,
and
with
limited
farming
practice
-
to
let
them
use
flat
lands,
lower
down
the
valley,
for
cultivation.
As
a
sign
of
goodwill,
and
given
the
limited
use
then
that
those
lower
footholds
held
for
Juangs,
their
forefathers
wrote
away
vast
tracts
of
fertile,
and
now
irrigated,
lands
to
Gaudas.
When
settlement
operations
came
to
Gonasika,
those
lands,
in
occupation
of
Gaudas,
were
recorded
in
Gauda
name
while
Junags
little
realised
the
import
of
the
development.
Villagers
informed
us,
it
was
on
those
same
ancestral
lands,
now
owned
by
Gaudas,
that
Juang
youth
now
labour
during
harvest
time,
to
eke
out
a
living.
42
It
seems
outsider
creep
into
Gonasika
and
subsequent
Juang
land
alienation
became
alarming
enough
for
the
Keonjhar
State
authority
to
pass
an
act,
the
Bhuiyan
and
Juanga
Pirh
Immigration
Act,
in
1947,
in
an
attempt
to
control
immigration
of
non-tribals.
Non-
tribals
already
residing
on
lands
were
given
titles
and
exempted
from
this
control.
43
Subsequent
attempts
by
the
State
Government
to
control
land
alienation
-
the
Orissa
Scheduled
Areas
Transfer
of
Immovable
Property
(by
STs)
Regulation,
1956,
have
only
been
partially
successful
in
averting
the
problem.
41
th
This
supports
the
national
trends
According
to
the
All
India
Debt
and
Investment
Survey,
(NSS,
59
round,
2002),
the
share
of
moneylenders
in
the
rural
household
increased
from
17.5
%
in
1991
to
29.6
%
in
2002.
Reserve
Bank
of
India
(2007).
42
st
FGD,
Upar
Chapmai
village,
21
September
2012.
43
Rath
(2005:51),
quoted
in
CES
(2012:57).
DRAFT
3.11
Mounting
debt
and
the
hopelessness
that
it
brings
to
the
poor,
also
results
in
the
other
pathology
affecting
tribal
communities
bondage.
Unable
to
repay
their
debt,
and
with
little
asset
to
mortgage,
many
families
are
forced
to
render
labour,
without
payment,
to
repay
debt,
under
a
system
locally
called
Goti.
(Kulkarni,
2004)
The
survey
identified
a
number
of
boded
labourers
in
the
villages
it
covered,
in
the
age
range
9-65
years.
While
the
adults
among
them
(called
Bagadias)
are
employed
for
agricultural
and
household
chores,
children
(chelias)
help
with
grazing
cattle.
Discreet
conversations
with
bagadias
revealed
they
had
been
forced
into
the
system
due
to
their
(or
parents)
inability
to
repay
loans
from
moneylenders
or
richer
persons
in
the
village,
itself
taken
because
of
destitution
and
hunger
facing
them.
(Ibid:58)
The
terms
of
the
recruitment
vary
mostly
an
oral
contract
is
established,
renewed
on
a
yearly
basis.
Details
of
wage
and
the
length
of
the
arrangement
are
neither
demanded
by
the
illiterate
and
desperate
bagadia,
nor
provided
by
the
employer.
Working
conditions
are
harsh,
with
no
leave
or
respite
given.
In
our
survey
we
came
across
an
old
man
who
said
he
had
been
working
in
a
household
for
many
years,
and
believed
that
his
son
would
have
to
take
on
the
responsibility
of
repayment
of
the
left
over
loan,
by
rendering
service
himself.
All
this
goes
on,
despite
the
presence
of
national
and
state
laws
specifically
to
abolish
the
practice
-
the
Orissa
Debt
Bondage
(Abolition
and
Regulation)
Act,
1948
and
the
Central
Bonded
Labour
System
(Abolition)
Act,
1976.
As
is
the
case
elsewhere,
while
those
affected
know
little
about
these
legislations,
those
responsible
for
implementing
the
law,
deny
the
existence
of
the
practice
at
all.
3.12
Migration:
Given
this
combination
of
poor
opportunity
and
poorer
access,
resulting
in
extreme
vulnerability
and
risk,
options
close
at
hand
available
to
villagers,
for
just
eking
out
a
living,
survival
in
fact,
are
limited.
Juangs,
we
were
informed,
are
increasingly
being
compelled
to
seek
livelihoods
away
from
home.
Occasional
work
is
available,
during
harvest
time
particularly,
on
fields
of
non-tribal
(mostly
Gauda)
farmers
in
nearby
villages,
at
wage
rate
of
between
Rs.
100
130,
a
day.
This
is
a
huge
step
up
from
the
normal
wage
rate
in
village
of
Rs.
40-80
a
day,
women
typically
being
paid
even
less.
But
this
work
is
very
limited
lasting
on
an
average,
ten
days
a
year.
Given
the
absence
of
alternate
wage
opportunities
for
the
rest
of
the
year,
and
the
promise
of
higher
wages,
the
trend
now
is
increasingly
for
Juang
youth,
to
migrate
outside
the
security
of
the
village,
mostly
to
far-flung
and
unfamiliar
cities
and
metropolises
-
Cuttack
and
Balasore,
as
well
as
further
afield,
to
Chennia
and
Mumbai
for
agricultural
and
non-agricultural
work.
These
involve
labour
intermediaries,
locally
called
sardars,
and
payment
of
advances
by
them
to
potential
labourers,
a
new
characteristic
of
migration
in
these
remote
villages.
The
giving
of
advance,
with
is
the
starting
point
of
a
long
and
often
exploitative
journey
for
the
labourer,
ironically
also
acts
as
an
immediate
safety
net,
in
the
absence
of
any
other,
for
the
desperately
impoverished
youth
and
his
family,
with
nothing
to
look
forward
to44.
Ramesh
Juang
and
his
wife,
from
Upar
Champai,
inform
us
of
their
elder
son
who
has
been
travelling
to
Chennai,
in
the
south,
for
a
few
years,
to
work
as
labour
hand,
in
one
of
the
citys
many
factories.
The
son
is
able
to
save
a
total
of
Rs.
5000
for
the
six
months
of
work
there
(July
to
January)
that
is
his
contribution
to
family
kitty;
this
the
outcome
of
cash
44
st
DRAFT
advance
he
took
from
the
Gauda
sardar,
from
the
lower
Baitharani
village.
But
conditions
are
harsh
at
work,
risks
high,
and
back
home
the
family
has
to
make
do
with
what
is
available
until
the
son
returns
with
his
little
saving.
We
hear
similar
stories
in
the
remote
Baragarh
village,
where
in
the
just
passed
harvest
season,
12
youth
travelled
out
to
Andhpur
block,
in
the
plains,
to
work
on
rice
fields
of
land
owners,
helping
harvest
the
crop.
Government
does
not
recognise
distress
migration,
preferring
to
call
the
annual
cycle
of
labour
movements,
economic
migration,
just
as
any
professional
would
move
home
for
better
working
conditions
for
himself
and
family.
Official
statistics
also
do
not
acknowledge
temporary
migration
for
under
two
months
-
especially
rural
to
rural
migration.
According
to
the
survey
data,
that
found
22
per
cent
households
had
one
or
more
members
resorting
to
migration
to
cope,
all
migration
was
for
under
3
months
in
a
year.
Inter-state
migration
was
also
seasonal,
most
happening
during
mid-October
to
mid-January,
and
mostly
for
agricultural
work.
As
to
the
reasons,
villagers
reported
chronic
hunger
and
insufficient
food;
indebtedness
and
the
urgency
to
pay
off
loans
taken
for
health
reasons
or
for
meeting
social
obligations;
and
search
for
better
wages,
as
the
most
common
reasons.
(Ibid:43).
It
is
a
measure
of
the
hopeless
of
the
situation,
and
the
breakdown
of
community
and
public
safety
nets
among
Juangs,
that
seasonal
migration,
in
desperate
search
for
livelihood,
already
common
among
other
destitute
communities,
has
become
a
preferred
coping
mechanism
also
for
the
otherwise
isolated
and
mostly
self-sufficient
Juang
tribe.
But
migration,
and
the
opportunity
for
earning
a
decent
wage,
comes
at
extremely
high
cost,
both
for
those
who
migrate
out,
having
to
suffer
harsh
working
and
living
conditions,
besides
indignities,
and
for
their
families
left
behind,
with
little
support
in
the
intervening
months,
until
return
of
the
breadwinner.
The
long
term
implications
of
this
absence
of
heads
of
household,
on
single-parent
raised
children,
is
also
devastating.
3.13
Modernity
and
change
among
Juangs
What
does
this
picture
of
all-round
dismay
and
desperation
among
Juangs
tell
us
about
mobility
and
change
in
the
community
and
the
role
of
change
agents?
No
leadership
has
emerged
among
the
Juangs.
There
are
no
Juang
youth,
cultural
or
political
organisations
to
speak
on
their
behalf.
Our
effort
to
enquire
about
traditional
bodies
Junaga
pidh
or
the
like
too,
brought
little
success.
We
had
heard
of
a
Juang
Yuva
Morcha,
set
up
in
the
past,
through
the
effort
of
donor
agencies,
working
with
a
rights
based
approach.
But
it
turned
out
that
our
interlocutor
Srikant,
the
headteacher
of
the
residential
girls
school,
was
its
chief
organiser.
Enquiries
with
him
revealed
the
Morcha,
never
even
got
on
to
a
start.
The
absence
of
a
middle
class,
even
in
its
most
primitive
form,
among
the
Juangs
makes
the
emergence
of
leadership
all
the
more
difficult.
Reservation
in
panchayats
have
ensured
that
there
are
a
handful
of
Juang
men
and
women
elected
to
positions
of
authority
in
village
level
panchayats.
But
meetings
with
them
and
discussions
in
FGDs
revealed
that
they
were
not
ready
to
take
up
the
leadership
role.
Most
were
uneducated
in
the
finer
details
of
development
schemes,
and
were
too
disinterested
and
hardly
resourceful
to
be
of
much
help
to
their
constituents.
A
lady
Gram
Panchayat
sarpanch
we
met,
initially
mouthed
the
usual
rhetoric
about
juangs
being
lazy
and
interested
in
an
easy
life,
to
explain
away
the
harsh
situations,
but
later
confided
to
us
her
DRAFT
own
weaknesses
before
the
bureaucracy
and
powerful
elements,
when
pushing
Juang
agenda45.
And
a
Ward
member
we
interacted
with
said
he
was
helpless
to
do
much
about
grievances
of
people,
and
could
not
represent
the
voice
of
his
people
before
the
panchayat,
because
no
one
took
him
seriously46.
There
are
the
odd
non-governmental
development
agencies
working
in
the
Gonasika
region,
but
none
target
the
Juangs
or
work
specifically
with
them.
The
oldest
NGO
in
the
block,
and
by
far
the
one
with
the
most
impact,
the
Belgian-funded
Village
Resource
Organisation
(VRO),
works
with
youth,
to
empower
them
with
skills
and
abilities
for
the
jobs
market,
through
a
training
school
for
boys
in
Gonasika,
and
another
for
girls
in
Biakamutai
village,
both
residential
and
set
up
in
1979.
But
again,
only
a
handful
of
Juangs,
and
none
among
girls,
have
been
able
to
make
use
of
this
opportunity.
Other
NGOs
of
note,
in
the
region,
are
Pradhan
(working
on
education
and
forest
rights),
World
Lutheran
Federation
(working
on
health),
and
Kalinga
Education
Advancement
Trust
(KEATS),
on
education
and
youth
empowerment,
but
again,
none
work
directly
with
Juangs.
Most,
in
cases
where
their
work
takes
them
to
Juang
villages,
have
a
paternalistic
attitude
to
help
Juangs
with
some
services,
rather
than
educate,
organise
and
capacity
build
them
in
other
words,
empower
-
to
demand
and
obtain
their
rights,
a
strategy
increasingly
commonplace
now,
in
developmental
practice.
Key
agents
of
change,
in
Gonasika
and
among
the
Juang,
have
been
government
agencies
principally
the
Juang
Development
Agency
(JDA),
and
the
Gonasika
Higher
secondary
school,
the
latter,
set
up
in
1972,
has
enabled
other
communities
tribal
as
well
and
non-tribal
-
to
acquire
education,
and
resultant
mobility,
but
seems
to
have
affected
Juangs
only
marginally.
Recently,
in
2009,
a
residential
school
was
set
up
in
Gonasika,
under
the
auspices
of
the
JDA,
specifically
for
Juang
girls,
with
the
hope
that
this
will
set
in
motion
definite
change.
Change
among
Juangs
then,
is
down
to
the
working
of
the
JDA.
The
agency
was
set
up,
in
1978,
under
the
micro-project
approach
for
development
of
PTGs,
introduced
in
the
5th
Five
Year
Plan.
It
caters
to
35
Juang
villages
in
Keonjhar,
of
the
total
132
Juang
villages.
By
latest
reckoning,
the
35
villages
are
made
up
of
2000
households,
evidence
how
conservative
an
ambition
JDA
has
set
for
itself.
According
to
the
head
of
JDA,
the
main
developmental
challenges
before
Juangs
is
health
Tuberculosis
and
Malaria
incidence
is
very
high,
and
the
high
infant
and
child
mortality,
are
a
matter
of
concern
-
and
education,
with
very
low
literacy
and
education
attainments.
Livelihood
is
another
major
concern,
with
poor
wage
and
employment
opportunities,
and
low
productivity
on
land
people
till.
Equally
worrisome
for
the
head
is
the
rampant
drinking
among
Juangs,
one
that
according
to
him,
is
killing
them.
Given
this
clear
statement
of
purpose,
it
is
surprising
that
health
does
not
figure
at
all
in
the
annual
work
plan
of
JDA.
All
heath
and
related
efforts,
informs
the
JDA
chief,
are
the
responsibility
of
the
Health
Department.
But
we
saw
little
evidence
of
any
coordination
between
JDA
and
health
department,
on
fighting
the
common
cause,
in
JDA
areas.
On
education,
the
principal
programme
is
the
Gonasika
girls
residential
school,
something
like
45
rd
46
DRAFT
the
flagship
education
programme
of
JDA.
The
rest
of
the
work
plan
is
all
about
infrastructure
building
roads,
check
dams,
buildings,
electrifications,
water
supply,
canal
systems,
compound
walls,
toilet
complexes
as
well
as
staff
quarters
for
the
school.47
While
all
these
are
important
projects
for
advancing
welfare
and
development,
the
absence
of
activities
on
creating
livelihood
opportunities48,
or
those
to
directly
address
the
specific
problems
faced
by
Juangs,
rather
than
implementing
set
projects
picked
off
the
shelf,
is
remarkable.
The
findings
of
an
evaluation
of
JDA
micro-project,
conducted
in
2010
by
Orissa
SC-ST
Research
and
Training
Institute
(RTI),
are
revealing
in
that
they
echo
these
observations49.
Since
its
inception
in
1978,
JDA
has
been
provided
a
total
resource
of
Rs.
9.5
crores,
of
which
it
has
spent
only
Rs.
7
crores
on
various
programme.
These,
the
evaluation
found,
had
resulted
in
some
gains.
Housing
had
been
provided,
roads
had
helped
with
improve
connectivity,
and
girls
school
had
helped
improve
reach
of
education
among
the
community.
Additionally
JDAs
efforts
towards
mobilising
applications
for
award
of
record
of
right
over
forest
land
under
FRA
had
been
quite
successful,
leading
to
decrease
in
the
number
of
landless
families.
The
programme
to
get
youth
involved
in
SHGs
and
running
of
ration
shops
too
had
been
helpful.
But
the
evaluation
reported
some
serious
lapses
too.
Most
money
had
been
spent
on
infrastructure
projects,
that
are
easy
to
envisage
and
push
through,
even
though
they
did
not
address
the
specific
challenges
faced
by
Juangs.
Livelihood
efforts,
the
evaluation
found,
had
been
too
scanty,
and
even
those
had
totally
failed,
due
to
poor
institutional
and
managerial
attention.
Poverty
levels,
as
a
result,
decreased
only
marginally.
These
findings
echo
our
own
assessment
that
most
JDA
work
planning,
specially
for
complex
development
outcomes
such
as
livelihoods
or
food
and
health
security,
is
not
based
on
any
need
analysis
and
business
planning,
to
identify
gaps
and
devise
strategies
to
overcome
those
in
a
time
bound
manner.
Rather
much
of
the
work
planning
is
top-down,
based
on
ready-to-use
tools
and
shelf
of
projects,
pushed
through
on
technical
considerations,
with
little
citizen
input,
and
implemented
in
an
even
more
centralised
and
unprofessional
manner.
We
noticed
some
effort
by
the
district
authorities
to
identify
community
needs50,
but
our
fear
is
that
too
technical
a
need-assessment
and
planning,
without
much
peoples
involvement,
might
defeat
the
very
intent
to
understand
inclusively,
why
people
remain
where
they
are,
and
how
to
enable
them
to
climb
out
of
poverty.
The
RTI
report
further
revealed
that
governance
of
JDA
itself
was
poorly
managed
-
JDA
board
meetings
were
held
only
once
a
year
instead
of
the
required
four
times,
and
even
these
were
held
at
a
distance,
in
district
headquarters,
rather
than
in
Gonasika.
Connecting
to
this
arms-length
dealing
of
the
development
administration
with
its
subjects,
was
the
more
damning
criticism
that
there
was
little
involvement
of
Juangs
in
the
entire
developmental
effort
of
JDA,
and
that
they
were
more
the
objects
of
development
rather
than
participants
in
it.
47
DRAFT
RTI
study
made
some
very
pointed
suggestions
for
action.
It
asked
for
greater
thrust
on
livelihood
promotion
work,
and
JDA
to
connect
with
health
department
to
ensure
that
adequate
supply
of
medicine
was
available
to
ANMs
in
villages.
But
the
really
insightful
directions
to
JDA
were
to
involve
Juangs
in
the
development
process,
as
partners,
while
also
enlisting
local
NGOs
in
the
effort.
The
report
also
asked
for
JDA
to
create
better
awareness
about
its
programmes
and
developmental
issues,
among
the
community.
Finally
the
report
recommended
posting
to
JDA,
only
officers
willing
to
serve
in
the
area.
Lets
pick
up
these
two
strands
of
posting
of
willing
officers
and
involvement
of
Juangs
themselves
in
the
development
process
for
further
examination.
JDA,
in
the
way
it
is
staffed
today,
is
an
unlikely
change
agent.
It
is
an
agency
of
the
Scheduled
Caste
&
Scheduled
Tribe
Development
Department
of
the
Orissa
Government.
It
is
led
typically
by
Orissa
Welfare
Service
officers,
and
officers
from
the
department
are
seconded
to
it
in
various
capacities.
Most
officers,
from
the
top
to
the
bottom,
are
non-
tribal,
certainly
most
are
non-Juang,
with
implications
for
how
they
connect
to
the
people
or
the
place.
The
tough
living
conditions
at
Gonasika
do
not
help.
The
patch
is
forested,
malaria
and
TB
are
rampant,
housing
is
poor,
power
is
erratic,
there
are
only
two
shops
selling
basic
provisions,
and
mobiles
do
not
work,
even
though
the
distance
from
Keonjhar
is
only
30
KM
and
roads
are
surprisingly
good.
We
were
told
how
most
officers
took
their
posting
with
JDA
as
punishment.
We
heard
how
the
head
of
the
agency,
was
forced
against
his
wishes
to
operate
out
of
Gonasika
rather
than
commute
from
Keonjhar.
His
deputy
still
commutes
everyday,
and
thus
has
little
connecting
him
to
Gonasika.
And
there
are
few
Juangs
qualified
to
fill
the
gap.
Since
its
inception
in
1978,
there
have
been
only
two
Juang
staff
a
peon,
and
a
recently
appointed
Field
Assistant,
both
from
nearby
villages.
This
combination
of
low
morale
and
dissatisfaction
with
working
conditions
among
staff,
is
toxic
for
how
JDA
delivers
to
its
constituents
whose
evidence
we
saw
in
operation
every
day
of
our
research,
in
the
officials
interactions
with
Juang
villagers.
Officers
routinely
called
Juangs
lazy,
and
liars
who
could
not
be
trusted
with
their
words.
They
blamed
the
stark
poverty
and
destitution
all
around,
on
Juang
propensity
for
easy
life,
drinking
and
making
merry,
and
their
being
guided
by
blind
faith,
rather
than
reason.
Poor
participation
of
Juangs
in
NREGS
works
was
blamed
on
their
laziness,
no
effort
made
to
introspect
if
there
might
be
weaknesses
in
the
working
of
the
programme
itself,
and
how
it
might
exclude
the
poor.
It
is
not
surprising
then,
these
unhelpful
attitudes
only
push
Juangs,
still
uneasy
with
an
unequal
interaction
with
the
outside
world,
further
into
the
protective
security
of
their
tradition,
away
from
modernity
and
change,
coming
as
it
is
through
the
unlikely
agents.
We
put
this
question
to
the
Juang
Field
Assistant
(FA),
one
of
the
two
Juang
staff
members
of
JDA.
What,
would
you
say,
has
been
the
impact
of
JDA
in
your
community?
What
change
has
come
about?
Only
marginal,
he
replied.
Very
few
jobs
have
been
created,
in
JDA
or
in
other
institutions
for
Juangs.
Ten
Juang
language
teachers
have
been
appointed.
Apart
from
that
nothing
else.
According
to
him
the
main
hindrance
towards
change
had
been
poor
education.
DRAFT
There
are
very
few
Juangs
who
can
claim
to
be
educated.
Most
children
drop
out
by
the
time
they
reach
class
6-7,
at
most
class
10.
Very
few
are
able
to
continue
beyond
matriculation
to
higher
secondary
and
only
a
handful
aspire
to
a
college
education.
He
recounts
his
own
experience,
how
his
parents
worked
as
a
helper
in
a
non-tribal
household,
and
where
his
parents
learned
the
value
of
education,
and
drove
them
to
put
him
and
his
siblings
into
the
local
school.
The
resolve
of
his
mother,
more
than
the
father,
worked
to
see
that
he
completed
his
schooling,
right
up
to
Class
10,
a
surprising
feat,
some
30
years
ago.
In
1978,
when
JDA
was
established,
he
was
among
the
few
Juangs
who
had
any
education,
and
easily
landed
a
job.
So
what
is
the
way
out
of
the
poverty
trap,
we
ask
him.
We
need
to
get
youth
and
parents
to
take
education
seriously.
If
our
children
are
educated,
they
will
have
a
better
life
than
the
wretched
one
we
live
every
day.
But
what
incentives
are
there
for
education?
The
FA
admits
there
are
poor
drivers
within
the
community
for
education.
Children
and
their
parents,
live
for
the
day.
Most
boys,
12
yrs
onward,
work
in
fields
or
elsewhere
with
parents,
while
girls
help
take
care
of
younger
siblings
while
parents
are
toiling
in
the
fields
or
forest.
Thinking
is,
if
we
spend
a
day
in
the
jungle,
we
will
collect
enough
produce
to
sell
in
the
market
for
a
few
rupees.
Then
why
waste
time
going
to
school,
since
there
are
no
immediate
benefits
to
education
anyway.
Unlike
Dalits,
FA
claimed,
who
have
been
able
to
use
reservation
to
their
advantage
to
land
jobs,
in
our
case
that
stage
is
still
a
long
way
off.
As
a
result
there
are
very
few
success
stories
and
role
models
within
the
community
for
youth
to
look
up
to
and
follow.
Clearly
the
critical
mass
to
break
out
of
the
trap,
has
still
not
been
attained.
And
for
families
living
hand
to
mouth,
even
the
little
investment
in
education,
especially
post-matriculation,
when
children
must
step
out
of
their
villages
and
move
to
urban
centres,
with
its
additional
costs
of
rent
and
food
besides
books
and
tuition,
is
a
disincentive
strong
enough
to
outweigh
any
long
term
benefits
of
education,
that
is
never
assured.
In
any
case,
the
fear
of
discrimination
by
teachers
and
other
staff
members
in
school,
is
turn
off
enough.
Availability
of
schools
too
is
a
problem.
Of
the
five
villages
we
covered,
two
had
no
school
at
all,
excluding
little
children
from
education.
At
higher
levels
this
problems
becomes
more
common,
requiring
children
to
walk
or
cycle
long
distances.
This
is
specially
problematic
for
girls.
And
even
if
schools
are
located
within
the
village,
teacher
absence
is
typically
a
major
problem.
In
Upper
Champee
village,
the
primary
school,
with
50
students
enrolled,
had
no
language
teacher,
and
the
other
teacher
shared
his
time
with
another
school
down
in
the
plains.
And
where
teachers
are
posted,
as
the
survey
team
discovered
in
Tangarpada
and
Ghodabandha
villages,
they
might
attend
to
their
work
erratically,
escaping
away
to
their
homes
with
regularity,
depriving
students
of
the
opportunity
they
need.
All
these
translate
into
some
very
disturbing
education
outcomes
for
Juangs.
While
55.55
per
cent
of
Juangs
had
received
primary
education,
that
figure
for
secondary
schooling
was
merely
11.11
percent,
signifying
the
sharp
drop.
Drop
out
happens
most
at
primary
level
(45.4
percent),
followed
by
middle
school
level
(36.36
percent)
and
18.18
percent
at
Secondary.
All
these
translate
into
dismal
literacy
figures
for
Juangs
as
a
whole
(24.12%,
according
to
JDA
data).
Of
the
200
households
covered
in
the
survey,
a
full
were
totally
illiterate
unable
to
write
or
read.
(CES,
2012:48-50)
DRAFT
If
education
is
the
route
to
empowerment,
which
it
must
be,
where
is
the
evidence
that
it
is
getting
the
eyeball
it
deserves?
There
seems
only
weak
hearted
attempt,
either
by
government
or
NGOs
to
have
children
seen
through
to
college.
The
Gonasika
Government
High
School,
established
in
1972
as
an
aided
school
and
upgraded
to
High
School
in
1984
was
the
first
and
early
attempt
in
that
direction.
As
we
sit
down
for
a
post-dinner
chat
with
the
boys
from
the
school
hostel,
we
are
informed
that
17
of
the
30
present
in
the
room,
are
Juangs,
a
big
enough
moral
boost.
And
just
like
the
rest
of
the
students,
they
too
have
aspirations
of
becoming
doctors
and
policemen
and
teachers,
even
a
scientist.
The
headmaster
explains,
what
they
lack
is
perhaps
the
ability,
in
a
comparative
sense,
to
translate
those
dreams
into
reality,
and
this
is
where
consistency
and
a
long
enough
stay
in
a
residential
environment
is
helping
students.
Results
are
showing
of
those
present,
7
have
siblings
who
were
past
students
of
the
school.
2
have
become
teachers,
one
is
a
mason
and
the
rest
are
all
going
through
college
all
have,
thus,
broken
through!51
The
Gonasika
residential
girls
school,
set
up
in
2009,
is
the
latest
attempt
to
address
the
education
problem
among
Juangs.
But
the
effort
is
probably
a
case
of
too
little
too
late.
While
we
must
wait
to
see
the
impact
it
makes
on
Juang
youth
and
society,
it
is
important
to
recognise
the
bigger
problem,
as
our
Field
Assistant
reminds,
of
the
very
high
incidence
of
children
dropping
out
of
schools,
due
mostly
to
economic
reasons
back
at
home.
Residential
schools,
for
a
limited
number
of
students
might
be
helpful
short-term
measure,
to,
in
a
figure
of
speaking,
jump-start
the
education
process,
but
they
need
to
be
scaled
up
to
cover
many
more
children.
And
the
question,
what
happens
after
girls
have
completed
class
8,
still
remaisn
to
be
answered.
Experience
of
similar
mainstream
residential
schools
for
weaker
sections
show
that
drop
out,
after
graduating
from
such
schools
can
be
quite
high.
Further,
a
way
has
to
be
found
to
mainstream
education,
so
Juang
youth
grow
up,
not
in
a
mono-
cultural
Juang
environment,
but
with
skills
to
make
the
best
of
all
that
society
has
to
offer.
4.
Divergent
institutional
design
for
tribals:
Fifth
vs.
Sixth
Schedule
of
Constitution
What
explains
durable
poverty
among
Juangs,
and
the
dismal
performance
of
programmes
meant
for
their
uplift?
I
argue
that
the
basic
flaw
is
our
inability
to
give
adivasis
their
due
share
of
authority
and
control
over
resources
affecting
their
lives.
A
cynical
reading
might
blame
economics
for
this
failure
fact
that
tribal
areas
are
also
repositories
powering
our
engines
of
growth
forest
and
timber,
coal,
bauxite,
iron
and
manganese,
and
the
rivers
and
stream
that
help
generate
power.
While
economic
considerations
cannot
be
denied,
for
they
play
an
important
part
in
our
continued
refusal
to
allow
local
communities
Gram
Sabhas
and
village
panchayats
control
over
how
those
resources
will
be
used,
the
roots
of
the
problem
lie
perhaps
in
the
way
in
which
history
of
state
formation
has
panned,
from
colonial
to
present
times.
This
argument
is
best
made,
by
comparing
trends
for
adivasis
against
those
for
tribals
in
North
East
India
the
other
region
with
a
large
concentration
of
ST
population,
but
with
very
different
development
outcomes.
Varying
institutional
arrangements,
for
governance
of
tribal
areas,
embodied
in
Fifth
Schedule
and
Sixth
Schedule
arrangements
of
the
Constitution,
former
for
Central
India
and
latter
for
the
North
East,
are
central
to
explaining
51
st
DRAFT
this
difference.
This
discussion,
I
argue,
also
provides
pathways
to
reforms
required
for
enabling
change
in
the
lives
of
adivasis
in
Central
India.
We
will
start
with
a
survey
of
wellbeing
attainments
in
the
North
East
region,
to
demonstrate
how
dissimilar
they
are
to
Central
India.
According
to
latest
human
development
calculations,
Northeastern
states
(except
Assam),
covering
pretty
much
the
entire
tribal
population
of
the
region,
ranked
6th
in
HDI
for
all
Indian
states,
sandwiched
between
such
rich
states
as
Maharashtra
and
Punjab.
HDI
was
also
improving
between
2000
and
2008,
with
specially
significant
change
in
health
situation.
(Planning
Commission,
2011:
24,
28).
Health
indicators
for
all
states
-
Life
expectancy
at
birth,
and
Infant
as
well
as
under
five
mortality
rates
and
sex
ratio
were
well
above
national
trends
(DoNER,
2011:
40,
46).
So
is
nutritional
status
(Ibid.
:45)
resulting
in
low
incidence
of
underweight
children,
and
low
percentage
of
women
with
low
BMI.
Literacy
is
high
for
all
states,
and
education
attainments
-
enrolment
rates
and
children
out
of
school,
are
positive.
(Ibid.:
19,
24).
Sound
development
indicators
for
the
northeast
region
as
a
whole
can
be
explained
based
on
a
combination
of
historical
reasons
and
the
play
of
institutions.
Observers
have
noted
the
role
of
Christian
missionaries
in
introducing
to
tribes
in
the
region,
modern
education,
and
how
that,
besides
improving
literacy
levels,
set
in
motion
dynamics
that
enabled
social
mobilisation
and
development.
(Xaxa,
2001:
2772;
Hassan,
2008:64).
This
itself
lends
the
region
and
its
people
great
advantage
in
awareness,
association,
and
participation,
all
resulting
in
better
development
outcomes.
But
education
and
awareness
is
not
all.
Improved
development
indicators
have
been
further
explained
by
the
fact
that
STs
are
the
majority
in
these
states,
and
thus
the
mainstream
there,
unlike
those
in
other
parts
of
the
country.
This
leads
to
development
programmes
benefiting
tribals
in
the
region,
in
ways
that
tribals
in
other
parts
of
India
do
not.
(Planning
Commission,
2011:31).
This
inclusiveness
of
the
development
process,
benefiting
tribals,
is
demonstrated
for
example
in
the
case
of
Nagaland
in
its
strong
push
for
communitising
of
public
services,
including
education,
public
health
and
livelihood
programmes,
that
essentially
marshal
community
dynamics
at
the
grassroots
for
effective
performance.
Similar
trends
can
be
observed
in
Meghalaya
and
Mizoram,
and
to
a
lesser
extent
in
Manipur,
all
with
high
literacy
rates,
strong
community
norms
among
tribals,
both
enabling
high
degree
of
public
participation.
Inclusion,
as
I
demonstrate
elsewhere,
in
the
form
of
strong
state-society
links
in
Mizoram,
also
enables
greater
effort
and
success
on
delivery
of
public
services
education,
access
to
food
and
other
entitlements,
and
particularly,
through
the
medium
of
Autonomous
District
Councils
and
Development
Councils,
access
to
minority
tribal
groups
in
the
state
to
development,
resources
and
power.
(Hassan,
2008:75).
Inclusion,
participation
and
public
service
delivery
through
strong
state-society
links
in
the
region,
undoubtedly
have
multiple
roots
and
pathways.
A
strong,
rather
critical
one,
is
the
adoption
of
the
Sixth
Schedule
provisions
of
the
constitution,
and
the
self-rule
dynamic
that
it
set
in
motion,
a
dynamic
central
to
which
is
tribal
autonomy
-
that
has
developed
over
the
years.
Sixth
Schedule
of
the
Constitution
applies
to
states
of
Mizoram,
Tripura,
Meghalaya
and
tribal
districts
of
Assam.
It
divides
tribes
in
the
region
into
autonomous
districts
and
regions,
for
specific
tribes,
with
members
elected
directly.
As
the
name
would
imply,
the
elected
councils
have
considerable
autonomy,
(i)
to
make
laws
with
respect
to
a
variety
of
subjects
DRAFT
(ranging
from
prevention
of
alienation
of
land,
to
allotment,
occupation
and
use
of
land
for
agricultural
and
other
purposes;
regulation
of
money-lending,
and
social
customs
-
inheritance
of
property
and
appointment
of
village
chiefs,
among
others);
(ii)
exercise
judicial
authority
(constitute
village
councils
and
courts
to
try
suits
and
cases
involving
tribals
within
the
area,
and
for
which
the
courts
exercise
powers
under
CPC
and
CrPC);
and
carry
out
a
range
of
executive
functions
from
establishing
and
managing
primary
schools
to
waterways
and
roads.
Further,
(iv)
to
enable
district
councils
to
exercise
this
authority
and
carry
out
these
functions,
the
Sixth
Schedule
creates
District
Fund,
to
keep
councils
financial
free
from
the
control
of
State
Governments.
To
this
is
credited
levies
on
land,
buildings,
professions,
vehicles,
passengers
and
goods,
and,
importantly,
the
rights
to
sharing
royalty
from
licenses
or
leases
for
the
purpose
of
prospecting
for
or
extraction
of
minerals
granted
by
the
State
Government.
The
Sixth
Schedule
thus
embodies
a
concept
of
autonomy
that
includes
constitutionally
specified
legislative
and
judicial
subjects
exclusively
the
domain
of
the
(tribal)
local
government,
the
limitation
of
the
states
executive
authority,
and
financial
independence
of
local
governments.
How
does
autonomy
contribute
to
better
wellbeing?
Central
to
Sixth
Schedule
then,
is
property
rights
for
tribals
in
scheduled
areas
and
the
limited
authority
of
the
state
there.
(For
a
survey,
see
Hassan,
2006)
This
allows
for
land,
for
instance,
to
be
owned
by
local
communities,
rather
than
the
state,
and
District
Councils
to
have
the
authority
to
decide
how
forests
(with
the
exception
of
reserved
forest)
will
be
used,
to
what
purposes.
As
Kurup
notes,
while
this
substitution
of
legal
rights
to
property
right
elsewhere,
with
fundamental
right
for
tribal
communities
in
Sixth
Schedule
areas,
still
allows
the
state
to
acquire
tribal
land
and
property,
and
pay
just
compensation,
it
significantly
alters
the
balance
of
power
between
state
and
tribal
local
communities
resulting
in
police
powers
of
the
state
being
severely
curtailed.
(Kurup,
2008:
117).
Seen
in
the
context
of
the
role
of
land
alienation,
and
especially
development
induced
displacement
and
their
impact
on
tribals
in
Fifth
Schedule
areas,
this
is
significant
gain
for
tribals
in
North
East
region.
Sixth
Schedule
provisions
enable
District
Councils,
and
tribal
communities
through
them,
to
undo
the
other
banes
of
tribal
society
indebtedness,
and
the
noxious
role
of
moneylenders.
Along
with
allowing
District
Councils
the
upper
hand
in
regulation
of
tribal
social
customs
and
dispute
resolution
mechanisms,
this
vision
of
the
balance
of
power,
helps
manage
another
a
balance
that
between
the
assimilation
of
tribal
peoples
and
their
independent
identity.
The
fact
that
Sixth
Schedule
goes
further
beyond,
to
also
enable
District
Councils
to
exercise
executive
authority
with
implications
for
socio-economic
rights
of
their
constituents,
while
ring
fencing
resources
for
the
Councils
to
carry
out
these
functions
helps
establish
mechanism
for
tribals
to
preserve
their
way
of
life
without
compromising
on
development.
Fifth
Schedule
of
Constitutions
is
a
very
conservative
piece
of
law
making,
in
comparison.
It
substitutes
the
autonomy
enjoyed
by
district
and
regional
councils
with
the
almost
absolute
authority
of
the
provincial
Governor,
as
the
benevolent
protector
of
tribal
interests
in
scheduled
areas
in
the
particular
State.
Fifth
Schedule
gives
the
Governor
the
unprecedented
power
to
limit
or
modify
the
application
of
any
national
or
state
law
in
scheduled
areas;
and
regulate
peace
and
good
government
there.
It
specifically
empowers
them
to
act
to
prevent
tribal
land
alienation,
and
regulate
money-lending.
The
only
DRAFT
limitation
to
this
wide
authority
Governors
enjoy,
is
the
requirement
for
them
to
consult
the
Tribal
Advisory
Council
before
making
such
regulations
-
a
body
only
indirectly
representative
of
tribal
interest,
with
3/4ths
of
members
being
tribal
members
of
the
state
legislative
assembly,
and
whose
authority
is
compromised
given
it
can
only
take
up
issues
referred
to
it
by
the
Governor.
All
regulations
so
made,
also
need
the
Presidents
assent.
The
primacy
of
the
Governor,
and
through
him
the
Central
Government,
in
the
lives
of
tribals
in
Fifth
Schedule
areas
is
further
underlined
by
the
fact
that
the
Governor
reports
to
the
Union,
through
annual
reports,
on
administration
of
those
areas,
and
the
Union
has
powers
to
direct
states
on
the
matter.
Completing
this
picture
of
a
(top
down)
centralised
bureaucratic
structure
of
tribal
administration
is
the
extension
of
states
executive
powers
in
scheduled
areas.
This
is
a
far
cry
from
the
self
rule
provisions
of
Sixth
Schedule,
and
explains
the
dramatically
divergent
outcomes
for
tribals
in
the
two
pockets
of
tribal
habitation
in
the
country
of
maintaining
tribal
way
of
life
without
compromising
development
in
Sixth
Schedule
areas
as
against
being
culturally
deprived
and
economically
robbed52
in
Sixth
Schedule.
How
squarely
the
top-down
bureaucratic
design
has
failed
to
deliver
is
demonstrated
by
a
recent
article
titled
Governors
failure
spans
60
years53
that
brings
to
light
the
fact
that
Governors
power
under
Fifth
Schedule
has
been
used
only
once,
and
the
suggestion
that
part
of
this
massive
failure
of
Governors,
to
rise
to
the
expectations
of
framers
of
the
constitution
to
act
the
benevolent
patriarch
of
tribal
interests,
might
be
unnecessary
confusion
among
Governors,
as
well
as
the
Union
Government,
on
the
discretionary
powers
Governors
enjoy
with
regards
tribal
welfare,
unencumbered
by
ministerial
advice,
so
clearly
spelt
out
in
the
Fifth
Schedule.
Despite
the
ritual
of
Union
Government
giving
annual
talks
to
Governors
on
how
important
their
role
is
in
the
tribal
schemes
of
things,
and
exhorting
them
to
act,
little
has
been
forthcoming.54
Panchayati
Raj
(Extension
in
Scheduled
Areas)
Act,
2006
was
the
first
attempt
at
decentralisation
in
Fifth
Schedule
areas.
It
mandated
devolution
of
certain
political,
administrative
and
fiscal
powers
to
local
governments
elected
by
local
communities,
while
attempting
to
protect
tribal
social
customs
and
common
property
management
practices.
It
has
therefore
been
billed
the
logical
extension
to
Fifth
Schedule.
(Planning
Commission
2006:
84).
But
a
closer
look
at
the
law,
and
its
implementation
proves,
it
is
really
half-
hearted
decentralisation.
Rather
than
putting
tribal
communities
in
the
drivers
seats,
so
to
speak,
to
negotiate
issues
affecting
their
life
and
wellbeing,
PESA
only
asks
State
Government
to
consult,
involve
and
obtain
recommendations,
as
the
case
may
be,
from
local
communities,
rather
than
empower
the
communities
themselves
to
take
decisions.
While,
the
less
contentious
issues
of
developmental
planning
and
scheme
implementation,
and
managing
water
bodies
are
fully
entrusted
to
Gram
Sabhas
to
control,
land
acquisition
and
resettling
displaced
persons
only
require
States
to
consult
Gram
Sabhas,
or
indeed
52
53
54
In
his
speech
to
the
annual
Conference
of
Governors
(30th
Oct.
2011),
the
Union
Minister
for
Tribal
Affairs,
and
in
the
context
of
the
glaring
gaps
in
development
indices
of
tribals,
underlined
the
vital
role
of
Governors,
in
an
attempt
to
urge
them
to
action:
The
Governors
have
been
endowed
with
certain
special
powers
with
regard
the
Fifth
Scheduled
Areas.
The
judicious
use
of
the
provisions
enshrined
in
the
Fifth
Schedule
of
our
Constitution,
will
certainly
make
a
very
positive
impact
on
the
tribals
living
in
these
regions.
Accessed
from
MoTA
website.
DRAFT
Gram
Panchayats
at
appropriate
level.
And
State
authorities
need
only
obtain
recommendation
from
Gram
Sabhas
or
Gram
Panchayats,
for
granting
prospecting
licenses
and
concessions
for
exploitation
of
minerals.
The
fact
that
PESA
defines
village
very
loosely55
with
little
attempt
to
empower
voices
of
tribal
communities
in
Gram
Sabhas
-
in
a
context
where
Fifth
Scheduled
areas
have,
over
the
years,
been
inundated
with
non-tribal
settlers
-
further
erodes
any
empowering
potential
that
PESA
might
have
had.56
Driving
a
nail
in
PESAs
coffin
is
the
reliance
in
the
act,
on
States
to
empower
Gram
Sabhas,
as
effective
tribal
self
governance
institutions
to
take
greater
control
over
economic
opportunities
such
as
minor
forest
produce
and
developmental
planning
processes,
as
well
as
to
regulate
and
contain
destructive
trends
enforcing
prohibition,
preventing
land
alienation
and
controlling
money-lending.
Observers
have
noted
how
after
a
decade,
it
is
apparent
that
PESA
is
not
clearly
achieving
(that)
objective.
On
the
contrary
blatant
violation
of
tribal
interests
and
the
reluctance
(in
some
cases
sheer
procrastination)
of
State
Administrations
to
cede
authority
have
often
compelled
tribes
in
the
Fifth
Schedule
areas
to
reassert
their
identity
and
rights
violently.
(Kurup,
2008:91)57.
This
scholarly
assessment
of
the
drivers
of
violence
in
5th
Schedule
areas
finds
surprising
echo
in
the
Union
Ministers
of
Tribal
Affairs
own
description
of
the
problem,
when
expressing
frustration
with
the
poor
implementation
of
PESA
to
the
aforementioned
conference
of
Governors.
The
alienation
of
the
tribal
population
has
been
growing
rapidly
mainly
because
they
are
being
dispossessed
of
all
their
livelihood
resources.
The
diversion
of
forests
and
common
property
resources
for
the
use
of
non-forest
purposes
has
resulted
in
the
displacement
of
tribals
from
their
homeland.
He
held
this
trend,
along
with
other
failures
of
tribal
development,
responsible
for
the
growing
unrest
amongst
this
most
oppressed
and
depressed
class
of
people58.
Clearly,
the
general
exhortation
in
the
act,
to
state
legislatures,
to
follow
the
pattern
of
the
Sixth
Schedule
to
the
Constitution
while
designing
the
administrative
arrangements
in
the
Panchayats
at
district
levels
in
(Fifth)
Scheduled
Areas,
(to
promote
self
governance
in
order
to
address
the
problem
of
exploitation)
has
been
wholly
unmet.
Lets
remind
ourselves
why
farmers
of
the
constitution
used
two
different
instruments
to
address
a
single
problem
of
reaching
the
balance
between
tribal
self
identify
and
development.
This
had
antecedents
in
colonial
policy.
Kurup
demonstrates
how
the
British
relied
on
two
considerations
for
determining
the
degree
of
self-government
tribes
would
exercise:
(i)
ability
of
tribes
to
manage
their
own
affairs,
and
(ii)
pattern
of
habitation
of
the
tracts.
(2008:90).
Excluded
Areas
were
those
with
single
tribal
population,
Partially
Excluded
Areas
being
the
ones
also
with
minority
non-tribal
habitations.
Both
were
excluded
from
the
55
DRAFT
competence
of
provincial
and
federal
legislatures,
the
Governor
assuming
that
role,
but
administration
of
Partially
Excluded
Areas
allowed
some
degree
of
popular
control,
through
Council
of
Ministers.
In
proposing
special
administrative
arrangement
for
tribes,
the
Constituent
Assembly
used
this
basic
framework,
but
adapted
it
to
its
own
objectives.
While
continuing
in
the
colonial
typecast
of
seeing
tribes
as
being
incapable
of
self
government,
the
practical
realities
of
the
unfolding
upheavals
in
Assam
and
neighbouring
hills
-
different
tribes
jostling
for
recognition,
the
declaration
of
revolt
by
the
Nagas
being
only
the
major
probably
pushed
them
into
offering,
to
the
tribal
groups
in
the
region,
arrangements
quite
advanced
for
the
age,
in
the
form
of
the
self-government
provisions
under
Sixth
Schedule.
There
were
no
such
pressing
matters
in
Central
India
no
political
movements
among
the
tribes
powerful
enough
to
push
the
national
leadership
to
concede
power
and
authority
to
tribal
communities.
The
upshot
was
falling
back
to
bureaucratic
paternalism
for
experienced
and
sympathetic
handling,
and
protection
from
economic
subjugation
in
place
of
rapid
political
advance
for
Sixth
Schedule
areas.
Fact
that
many
tribal
communities
coexisted
with
minority
non-tribal
populations
in
central
India,
provided
helpful
justification
to
claim
impracticability
of
the
self-rule
idea
there.
The
Indian
Constitution
has
been
called
the
greatest
experiment
in
social
engineering
by
inventing
India
as
a
"modern"
country,
styling
itself
as
a
secular,
federal,
democratic
Republic
committed
to
an
ideology
of
development
(Corbridge
and
Harris,
2000).
The
Idea
of
India
that
the
framers
of
the
Constitution
envisioned
-
modern,
technocratic,
egalitarian,
and
secular
-
was
in
marked
contrast
to
the
India
that
existed
then.
(Khilnani:
1998).
In
taking
this
big
leap
forward,
national
leaders
were
challenging
the
colonial
typecast
about
India
and
Indians,
as
incapable
of
managing
their
affairs.59
It
is
surprising,
rather
tragic,
then,
that
the
same
leaders
wished
a
different
set
of
aspirations
for
the
tribal
population
of
the
country.
Indeed,
as
the
national
experience
with
democracy
tells
us,
it
is
through
democratic
principles
and
practices,
and
the
spaces
those
create
for
participation
of
hitherto
unrepresented
sections,
that
political
representation
and
development
is
best
achieved.
In
denying
the
tribals
of
central
India
that
participation
for
so
many
years,
their
development
too
might
have
been
set
back
to
the
extent.
5.
Conclusion
and
way
forward
This
paper
began
with
the
question:
why
have
Juang
PTGs,
and
like
them,
tribals
in
central
India,
remained
stuck
in
poverty
and
destitution,
despite
an
array
of
impressive
policies
and
instruments
deployed
over
the
years
for
their
uplift.
Explaining
the
severe
and
durable
disparity
between
social
groups
in
Orissa,
that
affects
adivasi
in
particular,
Arjan
De
Haan,
blames
the
lack
of
performance
of
those
very
pro-poor
programmes
on
..a
lack
of
59
By
the
likes
of
Winston
Churchill,
who
in
his
defence
of
denying
self-rule
to
India,
was
commenting:
..here
you
have
nearly
three
hundred
and
fifty
million
people
lifted
to
a
civilisation
and
to
a
level
of
peace,
order,
sanitation
and
progress,
far
beyond
anything
they
could
possibly
have
achieved
themselves
or
could
maintain
.going
on
to
warn,
in
the
event
of
self
rule,
that
India
will
fall
back
quite
rapidly
through
the
centuries
into
barbarism
and
the
privations
of
middle
ages.
Our
Duty
in
India.
Albert
Hall,
March
18,
1931.
Accessed
at
www.winstonchurchill.org/learn/speeches/speeches-of-winston-churchill/105-our-duty-in-india
DRAFT
accountability
within
the
administrative
system,
and
that
the
very
disparities
that
the
policies
try
to
address,
permeate
the
system
of
delivery
responsible
for
these.
(Haan,
2004:1).
He
shows
how
a
narrow
(political
and
administrative)
elite
in
Orissa,
with
little
incentive
to
open
up
its
social
base
to
the
poor,
implementing
a
slew
of
social
programmes,
all
top
down
with
little
tribal
(or
indeed
subaltern)
participation,
both
within
administrative
systems
and
civil
society,
in
a
context
where
civil
society
generally,
and
adivasi
association
and
voice
particularly,
is
very
weak,
results
in
rendering
many
of
the
potentially-progressive
programmes
and
institutions,
ineffective
at
best
and
exploitative
at
worst.
As
we
saw
in
our
own
examination
of
the
evidence
from
Gonasika,
rather
than
addressing
the
unequal
power
imbalance
that
sustains
the
disparity
and
destitution,
norms,
practices
and
interests
of
key
change
agents
like
JDA,
combine
with
poor
control
of
Juangs
over
resources
and
opportunities
that
determine
their
lives,
in
the
context
of
weak
pro-poor
policy
commitment
and
weaker
tribal
voice,
to
reinforce
the
exploitative
system
-
leading
to
exclusion
from
forest
resources,
poor
access
to
land
and
other
productive
assets,
and
denial
of
access
to
services
and
entitlements.
De
Haan
reminds
us,
at
the
heart
of
this
is
the
unrepresentative
power
structure
in
the
state,
that
among
other
things,
drives
the
push
for
industrialisation,
focuses
on
investment
in
mineral
sector
to
the
exclusion
of
agriculture,
and
performance
for
adivasis
and
dalits
-
and
can
afford
to
deny
the
incidence
of
acute
malnutrition
and
hunger,
and
starvation
deaths.
(2004:
19-20)
For
the
adivasis
of
Fifth
Schedule
areas,
the
power
structure
is
unrepresentative
throughout.
This
applies
as
much
to
Madhya
Pradesh
as
Maharashtra
and
Rajastan.
Observers
have
also
noted,
how
even
in
the
exceptional
cases
of
Jharkhand
and
Chattisgarh,
carved
out
as
tribal
states
from
Bihar
and
Madhya
Pradesh
respectively,
separate
state
status
has
not
led
to
any
significant
transfer
of
power
to
tribal
hands.
(Krishna,
2000,
Yadav.,
Corbridge.)
Any
solution
then
must
be
built
around
challenging
the
political
and
socio-cultural
domination
of
the
elite,
mobilising
the
poor
and
adivasis
and
creating
voice
among
them,
and
reforming
institutions
and
their
governance,
to
enable
better
access
of
tribals
to
livelihoods
and
opportunities.
This
is
a
lot
like
how
PM
Singh
described
the
aim
of
the
national
tribal
policy:
.to
empower
our
tribal
communities,
with
the
means
to
determine
their
own
destinies,
their
livelihood,
their
security
and
above
all
their
dignity
and
self-
respect
as
equal
citizens
of
our
country.
60
Given
how
squarely
and
frequently
we
have
failed
in
our
past
attempts,
any
serious
shot
at
this
task
must
employ
new,
even
radical
tools,
but
definitely
innovative
ones,
rather
than
relying
on
tired
and
unsuccessful
instruments
and
strategies.
Business
as
usual
approaches,
that
only
tinker
with
existing
models
will
be
a
waste.
Regrettably,
most
current
solutions
on
the
table,
notably
the
draft
National
Tribal
Policy
(Ministry
of
Tribal
Affairs:
2006)61,
or
debates
around
implementation
of
FRA
2006
and
PESA
1996,
and
fine
tuning
of
TSP
indicate,
are
just
that.
The
draft
NTP,
drawn
up,
with
the
lofty
intention
to
facilitate
translation
of
the
Constitutional
safeguards
(for
tribals)
into
reality,
with
simultaneous
socio-economic
development,
engages
with
some
very
conservative
strategies
60
Address
to
conference
of
CMs
et
al,
organised
by
union
Ministry
of
Tribal
Affairs.
4th
Nov.
2009.
61
Placed
before
the
Union
Cabinet
for
approval
on
31
Oct
2007.
Since
referred
to
the
Group
of
Ministers
for
harmonisation
with
National
Rehabilitation
Policy.
DRAFT
DRAFT
Through a joint project of Supreme Court Commissioners (in Right to Food case) and Action Aid India.
DRAFT
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