In Re Summary Settlement of the Estate of Melodia Ferraris

Filomena ABELLANA DE BACAYO, petitioner-appellant, vs.

Gaudencia FERRARIS, et al., oppositors-appellants.
G.R. No. L-19382, August 31, 1965
FACTS:
Melodia Ferraris was a resident of Cebu until 1937 when she transferred to Intramuros until 1944.
Thereafter she was no longer heard from again and thus after more than 10 years having elapsed, she
was declared presumptively dead for purposes of opening her succession and distribute her estate
among heirs. She left properties in Cebu City consisting of 1/3 share in the estate of her aunt Rosa
Ferraris. Hence, a petition for the summary settlement of her estate was filed. Melodia left no surviving
descendant, ascendant or spouse, but was survived only by collateral relatives: 1) an aunt and half-sister
of decedents father; and 2) her nieces and nephews who were children of Melodias only brother of full
blood who predeceased her. In the settlement proceeding, Filomena Abellana de Bacayo, who is the
decedents half-sister, was excluded as an heir pursuant to Article 1009 of the New Civil Code as written
in the resolution issued by the lower court. A motion for reconsideration was denied hence this action.
The petitioner-appellant contends she is of the same or equal degree of relationship as the oppositors
appellees, three degrees removed from the decedent; and that under article 975 of the New Civil Code no
right of representation could take place when the nieces and nephew of the decedent do not concur with
an uncle or aunt, as in the case at bar, but rather the former succeed in their own right.
ISSUE:
Who should inherit the intestate estate of a deceased person when he or she is survived only by
collateral relatives, to wit an aunt and the children of a brother who predeceased him? Or will the aunt
concur with the children of the decedents brother or will the former be excluded by the latter.
RULING:
As an aunt of the deceased she is as far distant as the nephews from the decedent (three degrees)
since in the collateral line to which both kinds of relatives belong, degrees are counted by first ascending
to the common ancestor and descending to the heir (Art. 966, Civil Code). Appellant is likewise right in
her contention that nephews and nieces alone do not inherit by right of representation unless concurring
with brothers or sisters of the deceased, as provided expressly by Art. 975.
Nevertheless, the trial court was correct when it held that, in case of intestacy, nephews and nieces
exclude all other collaterals (aunts and uncles, first cousins, etc.) from the succession. This is readily
apparent from articles 1001, 1004, 1005, and 1009 of the Civil Code. Thus under our laws of succession,
a decedent's uncles and aunts may not succeed ab intestato so long as nephews and nieces of the
decedent survive and are willing and qualified to succeed.

In the Matter of the Probate of the Last Will and Testament of the Deceased Brigido Alvarado,
Cesar ALVARADO, petitioner vs.
Hon. Ramon GAVIOLA
G.R. No. 74695, September 14, 1993
FACTS:
Brigido Alvarado, 79 years old executed on Nov 5, 1977 a notarial will entitled, Huling Habilin
wherein he disinherited an illegitimate son, Cesar Alvarado, and expressly revoked a previously executed
a holographic will at the time awaiting probate before RTC. As testified to by the three instrumental
witnesses, the notary public and Cesar, the testator did not read the final draft of the will, instead, Atty.
Rino, as the lawyer who drafted the document read the same aloud in the presence of the testator, the
three instrumental witnesses and the notary public. While the testators holographic will was admitted to
probate on December 9, 1977, a codicil executed on Decembe 29, 1977 was subsequently executed
changing some dispositions in the notarial will to generate cash for the testators eye operation because
he was then suffering from glaucoma. But the disinheritance and the revocatory clauses remained and as
in the case of the notarial will, the testator did not personally read the final draft of the codicil. Instead, it
was Atty. Rino who read it alound in his presence and in the presence of the three instrumental witnesses
and of the notary public. Upon the testators death, Atty Rino as executor filed a petition for probate of the
notarial will on January 3, 1979 which was in turn opposed by Cesar alleging that the will sought to be
probated was not executed and attested as required by law. Upon failure of Cesar to substantiate his
Opposition, a Probate Order was issued from which an appeal was made to IAC stating that the probate
of the deceaseds last will and codicil should have been denied because the testator was blind within the
meaning of the law at the time his Huling Habilin and the codicil thereto was executed;and that since
reading required by Art. 808 was admittedly not complied with. CA concluded that although Art. 808 was
not followed, there was, however, as substantial compliance.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Brigido Alvarado was blind within the meaning of Article 808 at the time his
Huling Habilin and codicil were executed.
2. If so, whether or not the requirement of double-reading in said Article was complied with such
that whether or not, they were validly executed.
RULING:
1. Art. 808 applies not only to blind testators but also to those who, for one reason or another, are
incapable of reading their wills. Since the deceased was incapable of reading the final drafts of his will
and codicil on the separate occasions of their execution due to his poor, defective, or blurred vision,
there can be no other course but to conclude that he comes within the scope of the term blind as used in
Art. 808. Unless the contents were read to him, he had no way of ascertaining whether or not the lawyer
who drafted the will and codicil did so conformably with his instruction. Hence, to consider his will as
validly executed and entitled to probate, it is essential to ascertain whether or not Art. 808 had been
complied with.
2. There is no evidence and Cesar does not allege that the contents of the will and codicil were not
sufficiently made known and communicated to the testator. On the contrary, with respect to the Huling
Habilin, the day of the execution was not the first time that the testator had affirmed the truth and
authenticity of the contents of the draft. Moreover, with four persons following the reading word for word
with their own copies, it can be safely concluded that the testator was reasonably assured that what was
read to him were the terms actually appearing on the typewritten documents. This is especially true
considering the fact that the three instrumental witnesses were persons known to the testator.
The spirit behind that law was served though the letter was not. Although there should be strict
compliance with the substantial requirements of the law in order to insure authenticity of the will, the
formal imperfection should be brushed aside when they do not affect its purpose and which, when taken

into account may only defeat the testators will. Substantial compliance is acceptable where the purpose
of the law has been satisfied, the reason being that the solemnities surrounding the execution of will are
intended to protect the testator from all kinds of fraud and trickery but are never intended to be so rigid
and inflexible as to destroy the testamentary privilege.

Eugenio C. DEL PRADO, plaintiff and appellant, vs.

Aurea S. SANTOS, legal guardian of the minor Jesus Santos
del Prado, defendant appellee.
G.R. No. L-20946, September 23, 1966
FACTS:
Eugenio del Prado is a legitimate brother of Anastacio del Prado, who died single and intestate.
Anastacio cohabited with Aurea Santos (who was legally married to Deogracias Demetria but separted)
without the benefit of matrimony and they begot a son named Jesus del Prado whom Anastacio admitted
as his son in Jesus birth certificate. At the time of Anastacios death, a parcel of land in his name was
adjudicated to Jesus del Prado. Eugenio then filed a complaint before CFI to annul the deed executed by
Aurea adjudicating to her son a parcel of land left by Anastacio alleging that he (Eugenio) was deprived of
his rightful share in the estate of his brother. The lower court dismissed the petition (ascendant excludes
collateral relatives), and upon appeal to CA, the appellate court certified the case to Supreme Court that
such involved purely legal questions. Appellant contends that ven if said minor is the illegitimate son of
the deceased, the latter never recognized him as such, no showing having been made that it was at the
instance or with the consent of the deceased that said minor was entered as his son in the civil registry or
that the birth certificate where the recognition appears authentic.
ISSUE:
Who has the better right to the parcel of land? Is it the minor left by Anastacio or the latters brother?
RULING:
Since Anastacio del Prado died in 1958, the new Civil Code applies (Article 2263). Illegitimate
children other than natural are entitled to successional rights (Article 287). Where, as in this case, the
deceased died intestate, without legitimate descendants or ascendants, then his illegitimate child shall
succeed to his entire estate (Article 988), to the exclusion of appellant who is only a collateral relative.

Rosa K. Kalaw, petitioner, vs.

Hon. Judge Benjamin RELOVA
and Gregorio K. KALAW, respondents.
G.R. No. L-40207, September 28, 1984.
FACTS:
Natividad K. Kalaw made a holographic will executed on December 24, 1968. Originally, the will named
Rosa K. Kalaw, sister of Natividad, as the sole heir. However, Natividad eventually changed the name on
the will by crossing out Rosas name and replacing it with Gregorio K. Kalaw as sole heir instead.
Natividad failed to properly authenticate such alteration with her full signature.
Because of this, the parties decided to submit the holographic will for an examination by the National
Bureau of Investigation. The Bureaus findings confirmed that the original writings and those of the
alterations were written by the same person.
Rosa argued that the probate should be denied since the alteration on the will is invalid for failing to
comply with Art. 814 which states that In case of any insertion, cancellation, erasure or alteration in a
holographic will the testator must authenticate the same by his full signature. Further, Rosa asserted that
the will should be probated on its original content before the alteration was made.
Gregorio contends that the mere fact that Rosa agreed to submit the will for examination estoppes her
from questioning the validity of the alteration and invoking Art. 814 of the Civil Code.
Judge Benjamin Relova denied the probate on the will.
Rosa now sought for the probate on the will as to its original unaltered text.
ISSUE:
May the will, in case of alterations, corrections, or cancellations, without the proper authentication, be
submitted for probate as to the original content prior to such alteration, correction, or cancellation.
RULING:
No, this cannot be done.
Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and interlineations made by the testator in a
holographic Will have not been noted under his signature, the Will is not thereby invalidated as a whole,
but at most only as respects the particular words erased, corrected or interlined.
However, when as in this case, the holographic Will in dispute had only one substantial provision,
which was altered by substituting the original heir with another, but which alteration did not carry the
requisite of full authentication by the full signature of the testator, the effect must be that the entire Will is
voided or revoked for the simple reason that nothing remains in the Will after that which could remain
valid.
To state that the Will as first written should be given efficacy is to disregard the seeming change of mind
of the testatrix. But that change of mind can neither be given effect because she failed to authenticate it in
the manner required by law by affixing her full signature. As it is, with the erasures, cancellations and
alterations made by the testatrix herein, her real intention cannot be determined with certitude.

In the Matter of the Instestate Estate of Pedro Santillon,

Claro SANTILLON, petitioner-appellant, vs.
Perfecta MIRANDA, Benito MIRANDA and Rosario
CORRALES, oppositors-appellees.
G.R. No. L-19281, June 30, 1965
FACTS:
Pedro Santillon died without testament leaving his wife, Perfecta Miranda and one son, Claro in Nov. 21,
1953. Pedro had several parcels of land in Pangasinan. Four years after Pedros death, Claro filed a
petition for letters of administration which was opposed by his mother and spouses Benito Miranda and
Rosario Corrales alleging that: the properties were all conjugal, except for 3 which were exclusive
properties of Miranda; That by virtue of 2 documents Miranda had conveyed of her undivided share to
the spouses Benito, that administration of the estate was not necessary, being that there is a pending
partition and if thus needed, Perfect is better qualified for the post. Subsequently oppositor Perfecta
Miranda was appointed administratrix of the estate.
The court appointed commissioners to draft a project of partition and distribution of all properties
of Pedro. Claro then filed a motion to declare share of heirs and to resolve conflicting claims of the parties
invoking Art. 892 of the New Civil Code insisting that after deducting from the conjugal properties
(conjugal share of Perfecta), the remaining must be divided as follows: for her and for him. On the
other hand, Perfecta claimed besides her conjugal half, she was entitled under Art. 996 of the NCC to
another of the remaining half. After due notice and hearing, the court held that Perfecta is entitled to
share and the remaining share for Claro after deducting the share of the widow as co-owner of the
conjugal properties. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
WON the manner of division of share of the estate of an intestate decedent when the only survivors are
fall on the spouse and one legitimate child.
RULING:
Intestate proceedings in the New Civil Codes chapter on legal or intestate succession, the only article
applicable is Art. 996.
Our conclusion (equal shares) seems a logical inference from the circumstance that whereas Article
834 of the Spanish Civil Code form which Art. 996 was taken, contained two paragraphs governing two
contingencies, the first, where the widow or widower survives with legitimate children (general rule), and
the second, where the widow or widower survives with only one child (exception), Art. 996 omitted to
provide for the second situation, thereby indicating the legislators desire to promulgate just one general
rule applicable to both situations.