The Althusserian Legacy

-------------- -------------

Edited by
E. A N N ^ A P L A N
and
M IC H A E L S P R IN K E R

VERSO

London New York

First published by V erso 1993

V erso 1993
A ll rights reserved

Verso
U K : 6 M eard Street, L ondon W 1V 3H R
U S A : 29 West 35th Street, New York, N Y 10001-2291
V erso is the imprint o fN e w Left B ooks
ISB N 0-86091-399-6
IS B N 0-86091-594-8 (pbk)

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the Library of Congi
Printed in G reat Britain by Biddles Ltd, G uildford and Kings Lynn

Contents
In troduction
M ichael Sprinker
T h e N o n -C o n tem p o ran eity o f A lth u sser

vii

Etienne Balibar
A lth u sse rs Solitu de
Gregory Elliott

17

W h at Is Livin g and W h at Is D ead in the P h ilosophy o f A lth usser

A lex Callinicos

39

Spin oza an d A lthusser A g a in st H erm en eu tics: In terpretation or

Interven tion ?
W arren M ontag

51

A lth u sse rs L iberation o f M arxian T h eory

Stephen Resnick and Richard W olff

59

H istory o f S cien ce and the S cien ce o f H istory

M a ria Turchetto

73

A lth u sser and A n n a le s H istoriograp h y A n Im possible

D ialogue?
Peter Schttler

81

F rom A lth usserian ism to R egu lation T h e o ry

99

A lain Lipietz
Ideology an d Fantasy
Rastko Mocnik

139

T h e M arxist T h in g
Tom Lewis

157

A lth u sse rs M arx, A lth u sse rs L a ca n

Michle Barrett

169

Politics and Friendship: A n Interview with Jacques Derrida

T h e L o n ely H ou r o f th e L ast In stan ce: Lo u is Pierre A lth u sser,
19 1 8 -1 9 9 0
Gregory Elliott
T e x t R e ad at L o u is A lth u sser s F un eral
Jacqu es Derrida

Introduction
T h e papers co llected in th is vo lu m e (w ith th e excep tion o f the
interview w ith Jacq u es D errida and the tw o obituaries th at close it) were
delivered at the conference on T h e A lth u sserian Legacy held at the S ta te
U n iv e rsity o f N ew Y ork at S to n y B ro o k in S e p te m b e r 1 9 8 8 under the
auspices o f the u niversitys H u m an ities Institute. F in an cial su p port from the
In stitu tes D irector, E. A n n K aplan, and the D ean o f H u m anities, D on Ihde,
m ad e the co n feren ce p ossible, an d it is gratefully ack n ow led ged here. In
addition, innum erable students and colleagues aided in various conferen ce
a c tiv itie s n ot least in h ousin g m an y o f th e p articip an ts. W ith o u t their
c h ee rfu l p a r tic ip a tio n , th e c o n fe re n c e could n ev e r h a v e g o tte n o ff the
ground.
T h ese papers reflect the conflicted and still vital heritage o f the
A lt h u s s e r ia n r e se a r c h p ro g ra m , in a u g u r a te d in the 1 9 6 0 s and m u c h
c o m m e n te d u p o n a n d c r itic iz e d in th e e n su in g th re e d e c a d e s. T a k e n
togeth er they represent a fa ir sam pling o f the various strands in A lth u ssers
work th a t h ave been pursued by researchers in a variety o f disciplines in the
h u m an sciences, from ph ilo sop h y an d sociology to history, literature, an d
e c o n o m ic s . If th e p a r tic ip a n t s d isa g re e w ith each oth er in m a tte r s o f
em ph asis a n d detail, th e y are u n ited in th e ir c o n v ictio n th a t A lth u sse rs
im p a c t h a s b een indeed c o n tin u e s to b e en orm ou s, even if in m an y
in stan ces co v ert or unacknow ledged. A s E tien n e B alib ar rem arked shortly
b e f o r e t h e c o n f e r e n c e c o m m e n c e d , t h e r e is n o s u c h t h i n g as an
A lth usserian ism in the sense o f a uni vocal, unified theoretical discourse. But
as we ge n e rally agreed a t c o n fe r e n c e s end, there h a v e b e e n n u m erou s
A lth u sserian research agen das in th e sen se o f b ein g inspired, influenced, or
sign ifican tly enabled by A lth u ssers m ajor work. It is therefore fair to judge
his im pact as h avin g a distin ctive legacy th at extends beyond the dom ain of
its origin and initial reception in France and Britain. L ik e the M arxism that
w as its p r in c ip a l o b je c t o f i n v e s t i g a t io n , A lt h u s s e r ia n is m h a s b e e n
p ro d u ctiv e precisely to the e x te n t th a t it h as n ot b een redu ced to a few
easily qu oted slogans and h as n ot ossified in to a dogm a.
It is a m atter o f great sadness to the editors and contributors th at
this volum e could n ot appear prior to A lth u ssers d eath in O ctober 1990.
N o t that any o f us would h ave sough t h is approval for the p roject, nor would
he h ave felt obliged to bestow it. B u t it was hoped th at the darkness of his
last years m igh t be brigh ten ed , h o w ev er sligh'tly, by the app earan ce o f a
volum e th at testifies to the on goin g interest in and continu in g vitality o f the

viii

THE A LTH U SSE R IA N LEGACY

intellectual tradition inextricably bou nd up w ith his n am e an d his writings.

T h is Volume, then, m ust stan d as a testam en t to an in tellectu al
career a n d a p o litical life pursued w ith p assion , inten sity, a n d th e u tm ost
seriousness under enorm ous strain an d often at great p erso n al cost. It is but a
token, however inadequate, o f the respect an d adm iration we continue to
feel for the m an who contributed as m u ch as any 20th-century intellectual
to su staining the critical tradition o f M arxist thought.

M ich ael Sprin k er

Etienne Balibar

The Non-Contemporaneity
of Althusser
L e t m e th a n k you very sincerely fo r th is in vitation . A n d allow m e to
m ake a few com m en ts on the m ere fa c t th a t a w hole conferen ce devoted to
th e A lth u sserian Legacy takes place here, in the U n ited S tate s, in 1988,
ow ing to th e efforts o f M ich ael Sprin ker, E. A n n K aplan , and th e in tellec
tual en viron m en t o f this H u m an ities Institute. You asked m e to be the first
speaker: this, is a great honor, but also a strange p osition for a Frenchm an
indeed. B elieve it or not, such a conferen ce would be unthinkable in France,
and very unlikely in m ost European coun tries, alth ou gh it is only fair to
m e n tio n , in th e p resen ce o f G rego ry E lliott, P eter S c h ttle r an d M aria
T u rch etto, th a t England is th e on e country w here a com prehensive study o f
A lth u ssers w orks a n d politics was elab orated ,1 th at (W estern ) G erm an y is
the on e country where an edition o f the collected papers o f A lthusser has
b e e n sta rte d (in c lu d in g m u c h t h a t h as n e v e r b e e n re a lly a v a ila b le in
F ran ce),2 and th at Italy is the on e country where A lth usser is still publicly
discussed in m ilitan t an d intellectual circles on the L e ft.3 I recall these facts
to em phasize a paradox: nam ely, th at in his own country there is an absolute
ta b o o now su p p re ssin g th e n a m e o f th is m an an d the m e a n in g o f h is
writings.
S e v e ra l reason s in d eed m ay be alle g ed to e x p la in it. W e sh ould n o t
u n d e re stim a te th e effects o f th e sc a n d a lo u s m u rd er o f A lth u s se r s w ife,
w h ich influence b o th opponents a n d friends, a n d are certainly n ot weaker
am o n g in tellectu als. T o the contrary, since they are especially ill at ease
w h en confron ted w ith questions o f crim e a n d m adness, if th ese are n o t (yet)
literary cases. A lth u ssers fate blurs th e clear distin ction betw een p ub lic
an d p riv ate sphere, and destroys the n arcissistic im age o f the intellectual
com m unity. B ut there are obviously other reasons, related to the general
taboo now im posed on M arxism .
For a lm o st tw enty years, A lth u s se r was the c o n tro v e rsia l M a rx ist in
F ra n c e: I m e an c o n tro v e rsia l a m o n g M a r x ists (w ho w ould d iscu ss his
form ulations and react to h is p ositio n s in a passion ate m an ner), but a lso one
w h o fo rc e d oth er in te lle c tu a ls to ta k e M a rx ism serio u sly in th e ir ow n
debates and con troversies (n o t only M arxism as an interestin g case in the
history o f ideas, a legacy o f the past, but M arxism as an actu al ch allenge in

TH E A LTH U SSE R IA N LEGACY

their practice o f philosophy, econom y, p olitical theory, psychoanalysis, etc.).

W ip in g out the role o f A lth usser in this period is a typical aspect o f a more
general censorship, w hich has a very precise m eaning: it m eans denying that
M arxism in the post-war period (and especially in the 60s and 70s) was not
a sim ple repetition o f dogm as drawn from M arx, Engels, Lenin and S talin
(or even M ao ), denyin g therefore th at ch an ge s an d even ts took p lace in its
realm , bearin g an objective relationship to the social and political issues of
the p erio d . It seem s im p o rtan t now to den y th a t there was in te lle c tu a l
a c tiv ity th e refo re p ro d u c tiv ity w ith in M a rx ism , n o t on ly illu sio n s.
M a rx ist in te lle c tu a ls , a n d e sp e c ia lly c o m m u n ist in te lle c tu a ls, m u st be
portrayed as either passive victim s o r im postors, the mere instrum ents o f a
gigantic conspiracy. T h ey should n ot h ave been able to th in k by them selves,
ju st as M a rx ism an d com m u n ism sh ou ld n o t h a v e h ad any real history,
excep t th e history o f a catastrophic im posture. It is n o w onder th at th is way
o f p resen tin g history as non-history is typically displayed in countries like
F ran ce, where M arxism indeed played a decisive role in ph ilosop h y , the
so c ia l sc ie n c es, literary cu ltu re. In te lle c tu a ls m igh t pay a h igh p rice for
a c c e p t i n g t h is a m n e s ia c v iew o f t h e ir ow n h is to r y , ju s t as M a r x is t
in t e lle c t u a ls p a id a h ig h p ric e in d e e d fo r th e ir d is to r te d view o f th e
p h ilo so p h ic a l a n d c u ltu ra l b a ck g ro u n d o f th e ir own. id eas. P erh ap s the
situation is different in the U n ited S tate s.
Y ou e n t it le d th e c o n fe r e n c e T h e A lt h u s s e r ia n L e g a c y . I h av e a
difficulty w ith this form ulation, I m ust say. A gain , som e o f the reasons are
personal: after all, A lth u sser is still alive, or m aybe I d o n t quite understand
the exact m ean in g o f the En glish word legacy. Please do n t m istake my
rem ark; it is n ot a critique. T o calculate the legacy o f a living m an is always
risky. But on the other hand, you are right: if A lthusser is n ot physically
dead, it is as if he were dead m orally, since he doesn t com m u nicate w ith
anybody. H av in g alw ays b een a m an o f livin g ex c h an ges rather th an an
egocentric author, it seems unlikely th at he will now add som eth in g to his
work. O r if he does, I guess th at it would in fa c t co n stitu te a com pletely
different work, in a sense co m in g from a com pletely different person ...I' S o
our debates will involve a parad oxical relationship w ith tim e; th ey will be
ill-tim ed in m any respects. C alcu latin g A lth u ssers legacy, w ith e a c h o f us
retain in g his (her) share, co u ld be our u to p ia n attem p t at keeping o p en a
work w hich is de facto closed.
B u t is th ere so m eth in g to sh are? Is there a work o f A lth u sser, in the
stro n g sense, a treasury o f inheritable th ou gh t? H ere lies th e real cause o f my
p erplexity. W h a t strikes m e at on ce, at least on the F ren ch scen e, is the
rem arkable p ersistence o f som e expression s th a t h ave been either coin ed by
A lth u sser or transferred by h im out o f their specialized initial field into the

THE NON'CONTEM PC^KANEITY OF A LTH U SSER

com m on culture: epistem ological b reak, ov erd eterm ination, ideological

state apparatuses, Process w ithout a S u b je c t. People actu ally use them , in
different ways with little or no reference to the texts in w hich A lth usser
elaborated them far beyond the (now restricted) circle o f M arxists. T h ey
h a v e sta rte d to liv e the sam e k in d o f a u to n o m o u s life and c o n tin u o u s
m e ta m o rp h o se s as, say, th e C o p e r n ic a n r e v o lu tio n , or c o m m o d ity
fetishism . B u t it is doubtful w hether we could really go back to th e work
itself to fin d the com plete m eaning o f these fam iliar A lth usserian concepts,
because there is n o th in g in fact like a system atic work o f A lth usser, w ith a
beginning, an end, a structural unity. A lm ost everything is program m atic.
Premises w ithout co nclu sion s, and con clu sion s w ithout prem ises. W h en
A lth u sse r p u b lish e d For M arx (h is only real book), h e d e sc rib ed in the
P reface in an ironic m anner les philosophes sans oeuvre," philosophers with
no work w hom the sectarian practice o f the C om m unist Party had produced
in th e p erio d o f the C o ld W ar. A n d now, by a d o u b le irony, h e w ould
becom e h im self a philosophe sans oeuvre. H is legacy is m ade o f a han dful o f
am biguous n otion s, o n e single b o o k a n d a num ber o f p artial a n d lacunary
texts, som e rather lengthy (as in Reading C apital), som e beautifully written
(o th e r s n o t ) , but a ll h e a v ily d e p e n d e n t o n a c e r t a in c o n t e x t b o th
discursive and political with am azing discrepancies o f style and p ositions
a m o n g t h e m . In a s e n s e it is t o o l a t e to g r a s p th e u n it y o f t h e s e
in te r v e n tio n s , a s h e w ould h im s e lf la b e l th e m , sin c e th e fa te o f any
in terven tio n is to wither aw ay in its own effects. In a sense it is too early to
decide whether som eth in g from these in terven tions will remain influential,
i.e. active in philosop h ical thinking: an o th er generation is needed to give
an ob jective account.
But in a sense now is perhaps exactly the right m om en t in the suspense
o f m em ory and history to avoid the m ystificatory dissertations about the
U n ity o f the W ork or the T ragedy o f the M an , the academ ic com m entaries
and th e p sy ch o lo gical in quiries. W h a t should be im po rtan t for us is the
present value o f som e questions raised by A lth usser, w hich derives precisely
from their n on -con tem poran eity, their ru n n in g against th e current o f b oth
orth od o x M arx ism an d w hat I would call o rth od o x an ti-M arx ism , their
b re a k in g the lin ear pictures o f a M arxism doom ed to w ither away ju st as
they broke w ith the linear picture o f M arxism on the way to becom ing the
dom inan t w orldview .
W h a t w ere th e se q u estio n s m ain ly abou t? M o st p eo p le w ould say they
were about M arxist theory. M y suggestion is som ew hat different: they were
about the relationship betw een M arxism (as a theory) an d communism (as a
p olitical m ovem en t and a h istorical ten den cy ). W h at G regory Elliott in
h is re m a rk a b le essay has c a lle d th e d e to u r o f th e o ry sh o u ld n ot b e

TH E A LT H U SSE R IA N LEGACY

m isunderstood: if theory is a detour, it could n ot be an end in itself. T h e

debates around A lth ussers theoreticism were violent, and the contradiction
th e y p ro v o k e d w ith in his ow n p o s itio n s was a c u te , p re c ise ly b e c a u se
th e o ry w as req u ested by h im to be tran sfo rm ed in to a re v o lu tio n a ry
p ra c tic e , from th e p ersp ectiv e o f co m m u n ism . T h e new d e fin itio n o f
p h ilo sop h y th at he proposed during these debates ( class struggle in theory )
would apparently invert the conceptu al pattern, b u t so as to em phasize that
M arxism had an original m eaning (a prob lem atic o f its ow n) only if it was
a theory o f and for the com m unist tendency. T h e criterion for acceptin g or
re jectin g any M arxist thesis was always the same, be it presen ted as an
ep istem ological or a ph ilo sop h ical criterion: nam ely whether it m ade a
communist politics intelligible, im plem entable, or n ot.'
B ut w hat does com m u n ism m ean here? T h e question is unavoidable. It
poses for us anoth er difficulty, m aybe w ith a narrow lim itation o f A lth u ssers
critical attitud e towards M arxism . By m easu rin g th e cap acities of M arxist
th eory w ith regard to co m m u n ist politics, did n ot A lh u sser sim ply leave the
concept o f com m unism unquestioned? D o n t we find eviden ce for this on
the practical side in A lth u ssers continuous (some people would say blin d)
fidelity to the C o m m u n ist Party (or the Ideal o f th e C om m u n ist Party) th at
is sustained through ou t his activity? W h at is the benefit, if a critical attitude
t o w a r d s M a r x is m is p a id fo r by a n u n c r i t i c a l a t t i t u d e to w a r d s
com m u n ism ?
T h e r e is n o d o u b t t h a t A lt h u s s e r alw a y s to o k it fo r g r a n te d t h a t
co m m u n ism w as the (proper) n am e for th e lib eratio n from all k in ds of
oppression and exp loitation , the general m ovem en t encom passing all form s
o f struggles tow ards freedom and fratern ity in our societies (in clu d in g the
so cialist societies). W e could say ev en m ore. W h at A lth usser repeatedly
q u e s t io n e d was th e picture o f com m u nism w ith in M a r x is t th e o ry and
ideology, but he did it in the n am e o f co m m u n ism itself. For in sta n ce ,
A lth u sser b ec a m e increasin gly c ritic a l tow ards th e ev olu tion ist p ictu re o f
com m unism as a final stage o f th e socialist tran sition , as it w as proposed by
M arxist (L en in ist) orthodoxy. In th e sam e w ay he criticized the pictures o f
co m m u n ism as a tran sparen t so cie ty (w here th e co m pellin g relation s o f
p ro d u c tio n sh o u ld give way to th e free a sso c ia tio n o f p erso n s ), or as a
society w ithout co n trad ictio n s, w ithout ideology. A d m itted ly there is
m ore than one picture o f com m unism and the p ath towards com m unism in
the M a r x ist tra d itio n and in M arx h im se lf. By ra d ic a lly critic iz in g the
periodization pattern , an d th e transparency p attern as well, A lth u sser com es
closest to th e m ost e co n o m ical defin ition o f com m u n ism th a t we can find
in M arx (e sp ecially in The G erm an Ideology), th erefore also p erh ap s the
m ore m ate ria listic , th e less d e p e n d e n t on any sp e c u la tiv e sy llo gism o f

TH E NO N-CO N TEM PO RANEITY OF A LT H U SSE R

re aso n : the on e th at defines it as n o t a future State, but the real m ovem ent
w h ich abolishes the existin g state o f affairs.
H ow ever, in spite o f his ten tative contribution s to historical m aterialism
(w hich were m ainly developed by his disciples), A lth usser was n ever really a
(M a rx ist) social theoretician; h e is, ra th e r, a philosopher, w h ose c o n sta n t
concern is th e transform ation o f ph ilosoph y6 from a com m unist p o in t o f
view. H is m ain concern is w ith th e way philosophy becom es subverted when
it begins to think its ow n internal p olitical conditions (som ething which,
accordin g to A lthusser, can be done only from a com m unist p oin t of view,
sin ce th ese con d ition s are lin k ed w ith dom ination, more particularly w ith
State d o m in ation ). Th erefore, he push es to th e extrem e th e la te n t ten sion
between M arxist theory and M arxian communism, and he forces us (I m ean
today) to clarify our ideas co n cern in g the nature an d the (practical) value o f
a c o m m u n ist c r itiq u e o f M a r x is t th e o r y (w h ic h is the o p p o s ite o f a
revisionist critique, but also m ore generally the opposite o f every current
critique o f M arxist theory). B ut in doin g so h e confronts us w ith an even
greater tension within the n otion o f co m m u n ism itself, since it appears
i n s e p a r a b le fr o m a t t r ib u t e s w h ic h , in m o st p h ilo s o p h ie s , a re q u ite
a n ta g o n istic: ab so lu te materialism (th e c o n d itio n for a political n o tio n o f
c o m m u n is m ) a n d a b s o lu t e n egativ ity (t h e c o n d it i o n f o r c u t t in g o f f
com m unism from every u to pian realistic picture). C om m u n ism should be
seen as a particular m ode o f p rodu ction , but also as a universal unlim ited
d estru ction of th e h istorical form s o f subjection (alw ays already started,
never fin ally en ded).
W e c a n t h in k h e re o f o th e r fig u re s in t h e c o u rse o f 2 0 th - c e n tu r y
M a rx ism w h o ap p ro a c h ed th e sam e issu es from d iffere n t an g le s. O n e is
K orsch, w ith his project o f a M arxism o f M arxism , or a self-criticism of
historical m aterialism . A n o th er is B en jam in , with his decon struction o f the
teleology o f progress in so cialist thinking. Even G ram sci, with his m otto
that, for historicism to be abso lu te, it should relativize its own p osition
in history. B u t th e co m parison th a t seem s to m e u n avoid ab le is w ith the
ea rly L u k c s, ju st b ec au se th e tw o m en a n d th eir p ro p o sitio n s are so
com pletely sym m etrical. If F o r M arx b ears a resem blance w ith som eth in g in
M a r x is t lite ra tu re , it is w ith t h a t a s to n is h in g b o o k , H istory and C la ss
C on scio u sn ess, la te r on a lso su b m itted to se lf-c r itic ism , a lso m ad e o f
successive essays crossin g p h ilo sop h y a n d p olitics w hich m ay ex p lain why
b o th o f th em are so deeply co n cern ed w ith the qu estio n o f the en d of
p h ilo so p h y . E x c e p t th at L u k cs co n clu d e d th a t p h ilo so p h y is realized in
history, inasm uch as history is the b ec o m in g o f the unity o f S u b je c t and
O b je c t, th e refo re the b e c o m in g o f se lf-c o n sc io u sn e ss in the m a k in g o f
history by the p roletariat, w hereas A lth u sse rs book suggests th at n eith er

TH E A LTH U SSERIA N LEGACY

scientific n or revolutionary practice is reducible to self-consciousness. T h u s

p hilosophy as a th eoretical p ractice should be the actu al critique o f the
illusions of any consciousness, helping m en and forces in history to, so to
speak, overcom e the p oin t o f view o f consciousness. T h ese two great books
c a n in d eed be view ed as th e e x tre m itie s o f co m m u n ist theory in 20th century M arxism : they lie on its edges, as intellectual signals o f its com plete
cycle. A n o th e r striking co m m on feature o f th e two books is their attem p t at
introducin g a new mode o f writing in M arxist philosophy, w hich signals their
singular position w ithin the adventures o f the d ialectic.
Lu kcs invented th e co n cept of th e S u b jec t of H istory, by com pletely
id e n tify in g th e o b je c tiv e or su b sta n tia l p ro ce ss o f c a p ita lis m w ith the
su b je c tiv e tra n sitio n o f the re v o lu tio n a ry class from a lie n ta tio n to selfco n scio u sn e ss: in c a p ita lism co n scio u sn e ss sh ou ld be co m p letely reified ,
th e re fo r e n e g a te d ; in c o m m u n ism it sh o u ld b e c o m p le te ly lib e r a te d ,
th e refo re realized . A lth u sse r v irtu ally clo se d th e d iscu ssio n s a b o u t th is
them e by show ing th at ideology including th e proletariats ow n ideology
being itself real, could never be identified w ith practice w ithin the unity o f
an y c o n sc io u sn e ss; h e n c e , th ere c o u ld be n o q u e stio n o f a su b je c t o f
history. T h is does n ot m ean that th ere is no class struggle, no antagonism to
gran t the p roletariat a revolu tion ary fu n ction , but rath er th at the actu al
p r a c t ic e o f th e p r o le ta r ia t c a n alw a y s c o n t r a d ic t its r e p r e s e n t a t io n s .
U ltim a te ly it must c o n tra d ic t th em . C a ll it a stru ctu ra l lim ita tio n or a
fin itu d e if you like. T h u s Lu kcs (for w hom the S o v ie t R ev o lu tio n had
d e stro y ed fo re v e r th e sc ie n tistic an d re fo rm ist c o n c e p tio n s o f c la ss ic a l
M arxist orth odoxy ) a im ed at an intrinsic foundation o f M arxist dialectics;
w h ereas A lth u sser (w ho saw th e reform ist m oves inside orth odox M arxism L en in ism as bou n d to failu re) anticipated the new a n d decisive crisis o f
M a rx ism , at least p h ilosoph ically, seein g th at th is crisis w as d eep er th an
anyone in the M arxist cam p was ready to adm it, since it con cern ed the very
n o tio n o f proletarian politics.1
*

U p to this p o in t I h ave ju x ta p o se d se v e ra l th e m es: co m m u n ism and

M a rx ist theory, p h ilo so p h y an d p o litic s, p ro le ta ria n re v o lu tio n an d the
crisis o f M a r x ism . A ll o f th e m re v o lv e aro u n d on e ce n tra l a p o ria o f
contem porary history: if com m unism is lo cated outside history, th a t is to say
outside class struggles, it is sim ply an oth er sp eculative or religious m yth; but
if com m u nism is sim ply th e p rocess o f p resen t h istory (or th e direction o f
p resent history), it will n ever becom e real. H ow to break with the mainstream
o f history from within7. H ow to separate in p ractice w hat is dominant in class

THE NO N-CO N TEM PO RANEITY OF A LTH U SSE R

struggles from w hat is determining? A lth u ssers originality lies apparently in

su b je c tin g th is en ig m a (w h ich co u ld h elp us u n d e rsta n d w hy, in so m e
fam ous pages o f Reading Capital, A lth u sser proposed n on-contem poraneity
as the essential ch aracter o f historical tim e) to three successive con ceptu al
shifts:
1.
C lass antagonism is perm an en t, arising from the very structure o f
exp loitation . But it takes continuously changing forms. T h e crucial question
a b o u t th e p o l i t i c a l c a p a c i t y o f th e p r o l e t a r i a t a n d p r o t e l a r i a n
organizations, therefore, is w hether they w ill prove able to recognize changes
in the form s o f class struggle to w hich they belong them selves, in order to
do p olitics.
2.
T h e general field or elem en t o f p olitics is ideology: here we can
rely upon som e rare but precious in d ication s in M arx, above all the phrase
in the Preface to the Critique o f Political Economy th a t says: it is in the
id e o logical form s o f social co n scio u sn ess th at h isto rical an tagon ism s are
fought to th e en d . T h is ex p lain s why p ro letarian class struggle can n o t
spare a theoretical m om ent. V ery m u ch in th e line o f G ram sci's n o tio n o f
h egem on y, it im plies th a t the im portance o f sc ie n c e in revolu tion ary
p ractice is n o t so m u ch to e x p la in re a lity , ev en less to forecast future
h isto ry , but above all to tra n sfo rm th e m a s se s id e o lo g y , th e refo re the
p ro le ta ria ts own ideology. O n e m ay w onder w h ether th is project can be
actu ally im plem en ted. H ow ever, it is im m ediately m odified by a third shift.
3.
Ideology is not consciousness (n ot even so cial or co lle ctiv e, n ot
even false co nsciousness); it is, rather, unconsciousness (o f w hich th e form s
o f co n scio u sn e ss are only on e asp ec t and a co n seq u en ce ). O n this p oin t
A lth usser op p o ses n o t on ly G ram sci but also M arx him self. T h e sam e m otto,
q u o te d ab o v e , w h ich h e lp e d to em p h asize th e a u to n o m y o f p o litic s by
sh o w in g th at th e re a l m a t t e r o f p o lit ic s is m a d e o f th e id e o lo g ic a l
m e d ia tio n s o v erd eterm in in g any c la ss a n ta g o n ism (th u s d e term in in g its
concrete form s), is now criticized.
W h eth er th ese successive shifts, w h ich give A lth u sse rs reflection s on
ideology their em barrassing co n stru c tiv e a n d decon structive aspect, are
productive or not, whether they lead to a contradictory result, is the whole
question w ith his program . Before we try to discuss it, we should m ake clear
how uneasy and parad oxical A lth u ssers position will appear w ith respect to
M a r x s ow n fo rm u la tio n s on id e o lo g y . A d m itte d ly , A lth u s se r alw ays
claim ed th at his propositions w ere faithful to th e genuine M arxian concepts
(or even co n stitu te d a return to M a rx ). N o less clearly, his argu m en ts
im ply th at there is an irreducible in con sisten cy in M arx s ow n definition.
T h e introduction of ideology (m ore precisely, th e join t introduction o f
m ode of p ro d u ctio n a n d ideology ) in the th eory o f social form ations is

THE A LTH U SSE R IA N LEGACY

seen as a conceptual break w ith any expressive causality, the decisive step
towards materialism. But the m echan ism o f ideology as it is pictured by M arx
(in clud in g his analyses o f fetishism ) is seen as idealist: hence, the im m anent
tendency that always already pushes M arxism towards essentialist patterns o f
exp lan atio n . T o escape this aporia there was only one solution for A lth usser:
to in trod u ce under the very sam e n am e a co n ce p t th at is b a sica lly nonM arxian, while p resen tin g it at the sam e tim e as the only possible M arxist
co n cept o f ideology, th e on ly o n e co n sisten t w ith h istorical m aterialism . T o
play off M arx against M arx: th is strategy lies at th e heart o f th e so-called
sy m ptom atic reading o f Capital an d oth er classical texts.
T o be sure, the apo ria was n o th in g ab so lu tely new in th e h istory o f
M arxism . R igh t from the b eg in n in g it h ad been th e guiding th read o f its
successive p h ilo sop h ical recastings. But, from E n gels onw ards,8 it was m ainly
se e n as a lacu n a, a c a se o f u n e v e n d e v e lo p m e n t. A c o m p le te M a r x ist
sociology should include b oth a theory o f the econ om ic stru ctu re and a
theory o f the ideological superstructure. M arxs own personal ach ievem en t
h ad been the e x p la n a tio n o f the econ om ic laws o f cap italism : w h at was
n eeded after him was an exp lan atio n o f the superstructure. M oreover, the
ph ilo sop h ical key to this ach ievem en t was always looked for in the dialectic
o f (social) Being a n d (social) Consciousness (Sein vs. Bewusst-sein: a play on
words already present in Hegel, w hich was now supposed to encapsulate the
essence o f m aterialism ). Engels him self, but also K autsky, Plekhanov, Len in ,
L ab riola, G ram sci, a n d ev en L u k s or Sartre, w ith all their divergences,
would adopt th ese two prerequisites, w ith m ore or less interesting outcom es.
A lth u sse rs p o sitio n is ex actly th e o p p o site : he rejects an y d ia le c tic o f
B e in g a n d C o n sc io u sn e ss, w h eth er in its m e c h a n istic or its sp e c u la tiv e
forms, an d , instead o f adding a theory o f th e superstructure to th e existin g
theory o f th e structure, he aim s at transforming th e co n ce p t of the structure
its e lf by sh o w in g th at its p ro c e ss o f p r o d u c tio n a n d r e p r o d u c tio n
originarily depends on u nconscious ideological conditions. A s a consequen ce,
the so cial form ation is n o lon ger representable in dualistic term s a thesis
th a t logically sh ould lead us to a b a n d o n the im age o f the superstructure. 9
A n o th er co n cept o f historical com plexity m ust be elaborated, w ith opposite
sociological, an th ropological an d on to lo gical prerequisites.
B u t w hy s h o u ld we a d m it t h a t M a r x s d e f in i t i o n o f id e o lo g y is
in con sisten t? T h ere are two m ain argum ents, I think, runn ing throughout
A lth u ssers writings on this point: on e is a priori and philosop h ical; the other
is a posteriori and political.
T h e p h ilo sop h ical argum ent is ism ply th a t you can n o t at th e sam e tim e
define ideology as a reflection o f reality (i.e., the forces and relation s o f
production ) in the realm o f ideas and consciousness, and explain th at it has

TH E NO N -CO N TEM PO RAN EITY OF A LTH U SSER

an effective actio n , or feedback, on the behavior o f individuals and groups,

excep t if you im plicitly adm it th at ideas are m aterial them selves, or th a t the
course o f history is determ ined by spiritual forces. B ut the secon d solu tion is
incom patible w ith the M arxist thesis th at h istorical change arises from class
struggles, whereas the first is ruled out by the very notion o f consciousness as
a re p re se n tativ e n o tio n . A c c o rd in g to A lth u sser, M arx ism could n ever
really free itself from this vicious circle. It was an o n to lo g ica l circle, the
classical idealist dilem m a: ideas, co n scio u sn ess are nothing real (they add
n o th in g to reality save a represen tation ), or th ey are really everything (every
real ch an ge results from ideal m ed iation s). T h e n ex t step m erely reproduces
th e d ile m m a in e p iste m ic term s: th a t fo rm o f c o n s c io u s n e ss w h ic h is
su p posed to be h isto ric a lly effe ctiv e is true co n scio u sn e ss, th e p u re or
a d e q u ate reflection o f reality . B ut th is im m ediately raises an o b je ctio n :
isn t it ra th e r false con sciousn ess th a t h as h istorical effects, since it is the
only one th at impedes the otherw ise inexorable course o f history ( if only by
d isto rtin g or d e lay in g it)? It w ould n o t be d ifficu lt to show that the
o n to lo g ic a l-e p iste m ic circ le , when a p p lie d to the p ro b lem o f h isto ric a l
progress, reproduces th eological dilem m as: w hether it is the good or evil th at
m akes history. But it is m ore interesting here to indicate how it is rooted
in M a rx s contradictory treatm ent o f the an th rop ological problem : at the
sam e tim e t h a t h e w ould draw the c o n s e q u e n c e s fro m h is a n a ly sis of
p ro d u ctio n an d e x c h a n g e as so c ia l re la tio n sh ip s, in order to re je c t any
co n cep t o f the essence o f m an, he would also express his discovery o f the
determ ining role of econ om ic forces by practically considering produ ction
as th e e sse n c e o f m an -in -society , co n scio u sn e ss being its m an ife statio n
an d p h en om en o n .
T h e p olitical argu m ent arises from the effects th at the im plem en tation o f
th is n o t io n p r o d u c e d in the s o c i a l i s t m o v e m e n t, and a b o v e a ll th e
com m unist revolutions. M a rx s own in itial p osition w as, so to speak, doubly
negative: the p roletariat w as the revolutionary force because it was seen as
th e r a d ic a lly o p p r e s s e d c la s s , a n d b e c a u s e it w as d e p r iv e d o f any
id e o l o g i c a l i l l u s i o n s ( b o t h E ig e n tu m slo s an d Illu sio n s lo s). B u t th is
representation proved u nten able a s soon a s the proletariat, in order to carry
out its h istorical m ission, should becom e a co llectiv e force, form a political
p arty in the broad sense o f th e term . T h is gave rise to such n o tio n s as
c la ss c o n s c io u s n e s s , 10 p r o le ta r ia n id e o lo g y , so c ia lis t or c o m m u n ist
w o rld v iew ( W eltanschauung), w ith a p erm an e n t o sc illa tio n b etw een a
c o n c e p t o f c o n sc io u sn e ss as identity an d a c o n c e p t o f c o n sc io u sn e ss as
organization. T h e n otion o f p roletarian ideology is especially sym ptom atic
b e c a u s e it le d to th e m y s t if ic a t o r y c o n c e p t i o n an d p r a c t ic e o f th e
d ic ta to rsh ip o f th e p ro le ta ria t in th e S o v ie t U n io n an d o th e r so c ia list

10

THE A LT H U SSE R IA N LEGACY

countries: proletarian ideology would be presented as the political basis o f

proletarian science itself, the class stan d p o in t th at m akes it possible to
transform society according to the laws o f scien tific socialism , including
the general im position o f proletarian m orals, philosophy, aesthetics, etc. to
ind iv id uals. T h u s a revolu tion ary ideology w ould becom e a do m in an t
ideology, a n o tio n th a t is n ot on ly contradictory in itself, but h as dram atic
p o litica l effects. Instead o f transform in g a S t a te into a n o n -S ta te (to
borrow Len in s form ulation), it helps tran sform an em bryonic n o n -S ta te
(the m ass d em ocracy o f th e S oviets) in to a classical S ta te , or to put it in
oth er terms, transform in g the proletariat into a class dominated in its own
name. C om m unists would fin d them selves trapped in their own d ialectic.
T h e n otion o f ideology that A lth u sser proposed relies upon the idea o f
the imaginary as the general elem en t o f any individual or collective liv ed
relation sh ip to th e real, i.e., to th e forces an d institutions o f history." It h as
n o th in g to do w ith either M arx or H egel, but rath er w ith Sp in o za an d even
m o re w ith Freud, i.e., w ith philosophers o f the u nity o f th e co gn itiv e an d
em o tio n al asp ects o f th e m ind, a n d o f th e am bivalen ce o f trans-individual
relations. B ein g alw ays already im aginary, hu m an life will never cease to be
such, even if th e m odalities o f this stru ctu ral dependency can ch an ge, an d
do indeed ch an g e a cco rd in g to p ractical attitudes (a p ractice in the strong
sense w hether political, aesth etic or scien tific has real effects precisely
in a sm u c h as it m o difies th e p o sitio n o f su b je c ts w ith re sp e ct to on e
a n o th e r in th e im a g in a ry ). R e a l a n d Im a g in a ry th e re fo r e are n o t
opposites, they are inseparable one from another: th inking the real is p art o f
th e re a l, in an in fin ite p ro c e ss (s o m e th in g t h a t p r e v e n ts a n y th e o ry ,
in clu din g scientific theory, how ever accurate it c a n be, from ev er giving a
total picture o f the real). T h u s the Im aginary and the R eal en croach upon
on e another: they do n ot belon g to separate worlds, but produce togeth er
w hat we actually perceive as a co h eren t or a conflictual w orld.
W h at does it m ean, then, to say th at ideologies are basically unconscious?
N o t th at they w ould lack co n sc io u sn e ss: rath e r, they p ro d u ce form s o f
consciousness for individuals and groups, th at is, m odes o f representation,
m odes o f being in the w orld an d subjective identities, alw ays already k n it
togeth er w ith non-representative elem en ts (such as hopes, fears, beliefs, m oral
or im m oral values, m oves towards liberation or dom ination possibly b oth ).
In d o in g so they m ust depen d o n c o n d itio n s th a t n o su b je c t can ever
m aster or create him self: m aterial con strain ts from th e division o f labor, the
form s o f property, etc., and the n o less m aterial co n strain ts o f lan gu age,
desire, sexuality, etc. Id eo lo gies are the v ariou s historical form s in w h ich
u nconscious conditions ca n be elaborated to allow individuals a n d groups to
im agine their own practices.

THE NO N -CO N TEM PO RAN EITY OF A LT H U SSE R

11

In p rin c ip le su ch a c o n c e p tio n d o es n e ith e r den y th a t th e re c a n be

sc ie n tific know led ge or p o litic a l activ ity , n o r sh ou ld it p re v e n t us from
b e lie v in g t h a t k n o w le d g e c a n b e c o m e p u r if ie d o f any id e o lo g ic a l
m y stificatio n , a n a b so lu te w isdom , or th a t p o litic s c a n b ec o m e a purely
ration al adjustm en t o f en d s a n d m ean s, an absolute liberation from o n e s
ow n ideology or an instrum ental m an ip ulation o f th e oth ers ideology. It is
d ire c te d a g a in st p o sitiv ism a n d s c ie n tism ju st as it is d ire c te d a g a in st
decisionism a n d voluntarism . S cien tific know ledge c a n only be a protracted
break w ith particular, determ inate ideological beliefs (n ot w ith ideology as
su ch ), ju st as p o litics can only be a tran sform ation o f d eterm in ate so cial
relationships (n ot o f th e w orld as such). T h e se intrinsic lim itatio n s are in
fact n ot n ih ilistic or relativist ab an d on m en ts, bu t co n d itio n s o f a greater
realism . T h e y increase the d egree o f necessity o f k n o w led ge a n d liberty
them selves. A g e n c y goes alon g w ith necessity, and necessity goes alon g w ith
finitude.
N everth eless, w h en th e q u estio n at stake is com m unist p olitics th at is
to say , a p o lit ic s th a t a im s a t tra n sfo rm in g th e c a p it a lis t sy stem , the
dom in an t structure o f ex p lo ita tio n it is very h ard to escape th e feeling that
such a co n cep tion contradicts the possibility o f a genuine revolution. A n d it
is n ot quite satisfactory to state, in general, th at the pictures o f absolute
F reedom or the birth o f a N ew M a n are th em selves im aginary (in fact
they might w ell be the m essian ic form s o f subjectivity or u topias necessary
for any revolutionary m ass m o vem en t). N e ith e r is it satisfactory to explain
th at th e c o n stru c tio n o f the Im agin ary in th e so cial structure display s a
w h ole new p o sitiv e field (th a t o f cu ltu re , a esth e tic s, ev en re lig io n ) for
r e v o lu tio n a r y p r a c t ic e s . W h a t se e m s n e e d e d at the v e ry le a s t is an
explanation o f why the oppressed or exploited enjoy a (virtually) privileged, active
role with respect to ideology.
T h is is the crux o f A lth u ssers program . Form ally speaking, a discussion o f
this question involves u nderstan din g how the sym m etrical aspect o f ideology
in g e n e ra l (e v e r y m an is an id e o lo g ic a l a n im a l, ev ery in d iv id u a l is
i n t e r p e l l a t e d o r s u m m o n e d a s a s u b je c t ) c o m b i n e s w ith its
dissym m etrical aspect (th e fact th at there are class ideologies, or, better,
there is a class ch aracter to ideologies, a m aterial d eterm in ation o f the
im aginary by class an tago n ism s). In For M arx A lth u sser m erely posed the
question, a n d in th e w ell-know n paper on Id eo lo gical S ta te A p p aratu ses,
h e proposed elem ents o f a n answer, w hich are notoriously incom plete and
seem q u ite c o n tra d ic to ry w ith o th e r a sse rtio n s o n th e e d u c a tiv e ro le
p lay ed by th e cla ss stru ggle for o p p ressed p e o p le a g a in st th e d o m in a n t
id e o lo g y (o r id e o lo g ie s ) . W h a t we c a n d o h e re is s p e c u la te on th e se
elem en ts in order to clarify their orientation .

12

TH E A LTH U SSE R IA N LEGACY

It seem s to me th at two classical interpretations are ruled out. First, w hat

I would call the P laton ic reading: nam ely, the idea th at the roots o f class
ideologies (or the capacity o f ideologies to enforce and reprodu ce class
d o m in a tio n ) lie in th e ignorance an d illu sion s o f th e vulgar, th e uneducated
com m on people, i.e., the oppressed them selves. A n d second, w hat I would
call th e H o b b e sia n re a d in g : n am e ly , th e sy m m e tric a l id e a th at c la ss
ideologies are rooted in the ability o f th e m asters, the dom in an t classes (or
their p rofession al id e o lo gists) to im pose their represen tatio n s u pon the
masses in their own interest (a process that you can picture either in m oral
or technical terms: the m asters are wicked, they are tricky, they control the
c o m m u n ic a t io n n e tw o rk s, th e y k n o w how to ta k e a d v a n t a g e o f th e
a m b ig u itie s o f lan gu age, e tc .). In e ith e r case, we w o u ld be b a c k to the
idealist n o tio n s o f error a n d illusion . B u t it is also insufficient to refer to
th e different co lle ctiv e experiences th a t are lived by th e dom in an t and the
d o m in a te d (a lth o u g h su ch a d iffere n c e cle arly e x ists, sin c e to organ ize
exp lo itatio n an d to be exp loited can n o t con sist o f th e sam e p ractices): it
w ould be m ere tautology. A pparen tly the m issin g link h as to do w ith the
articulation o f th e individual w ith collective (groups, classes an d m asses). T h e
basic im aginary m echanism s refer to the individual (th is is w h at the n o tio n
o f su b ject ultim ately indicates: even a co llective su b ject is n o m ore than
in d iv id u als w ho identify th eir su b je ctiv e e x p e rie n c e s), but th e sy m b olic
p a t t e r n s (e .g ., G o d , th e L aw , th e N a t io n , th e R e v o lu t io n , e t c .) th a t
in terpellate su bjects a n d cast th eir p ractices in to in stitution al structures
are collective. T h e y produce, so to speak, a com m unity-effect.
It is the m odality o f this articulation (what I would call again the transindividual m ech an ism o f ideologies) th at is decisive. W e m ust adm it th at
A lth usser gives little h in t on this point, excep t for the proposition th at IS A s
are n eith er public n or p riv ate , and therefore work below or before this
distin ctio n . I would say, nevertheless, th a t logically his p osition sh ou ld be th e
follow ing: if the d o m in an t ideology m ust w ork beyond th e exp erien ce or
world o f the rulers th em selves to b ecom e n orm al (an d n orm ativ e) in
society, it m ust be universal in som e strong sense. W e are led to the follow ing
q u estio n : w hich is th e (im agin ary ) ex p erien ce th at ca n be universalized,
th at is b o th generalized a n d idealized in society? C on trary to th e com m on
assu m p tion o f m ost so c io lo g ica l th eo ries o f legitim acy and h egem on y, it
can n o t be primarily the lived experience o f the rulers, b u t only th e lived
e x p e rie n c e o f the dom inated m asses, w h ich as M arx said o f re lig io n
involves at the sam e tim e an a cc ep ta n ce or recogn ition and a protest or
revolt again st th e existin g w orld. 12 W e re ach the p arad o x ica l thesis th at in
the last instan ce there is n o th in g like a do m in an t ideology of the rulers (for
exam p le, a dom in an t ca p ita list ideology ). T h e do m in an t ideology in a

THE NO N -CO N TEM PO RAN EITY OF A LT H U SSE R

13

given society is a specific universalization o f the im aginary o f the dominated:

w hat it elaborates are such n otion s as Justice, Liberty and Equality, Effort
and H ap p in ess, etc., w h ich draw th eir p o te n tia l u n iv ersal m e an in g from
their belon ging to the im aginary o f the individuals who live the m asses or
the p eo p les conditions.
W e m ust understand th a t there is no illusion , n o alien ation here (if
only because the basic discourse o f the dom inan t ideology is n ot to present
justice or h ap pin ess as already realized, bu t rath er as co m m on values and
objectives fo r w hich to continuously strive). T h e m ystification lies only in
the denegation o f a structural an tago n ism betw een the dom inated an d the
d o m in a n t. B u t fo r th is v e ry sim p le r e a so n th e re is a h ig h d e g re e o f
am bivalen ce. Ju st as the accu m u lation o f capital is m ade o f living lab or
(accordin g to M arx), so the oppressive apparatuses o f the State, C hurches,
and other dom in an t institutions fun ction w ith the popular religious, m oral,
legal an d aesthetic im aginary o f the m asses as their specific fuel. A n d just as
there is a latent contradiction in exp loitation , there is a latent con trad iction
in id e o lo g ic a l d o m in a t io n . W h e n th e d o m in a t e d ta k e se r io u sly th e
universality o f their own im aginary, w h ich h a s b e e n returned to them from
above, more precisely, when they collectively undertake to act accordin g to
the callin g o f their own im aginary, they d o n t any longer accept the existin g
order, but revolt again st it.13 A n d w hen in given h istorical conjunctures the
con trad iction of exp loitation and ideological revolt m eet, you can call it a
revolution (successful or n o t). N o class is the absolute S u b ject o f H istory,
but th ere is no doub t th a t on ly th e m asses really m ak e history, i.e., only
they can produce p o litical changes.
*

Finally, we m ust adm it th at A lth u ssers co n cep tion o f ideology offers a

rather tragic v isio n o f p o litics. It is tragic n o t on ly d ram atic, as in the
classical traditio n o f the ph ilo sop h y o f history, to w hich M a rx s v isio n o f
r e v o lu tio n w o u ld still a d h e re , w h ere the fo rc e s o f P ro g re ss and T r u th
struggle again st th e forces o f R e actio n a n d Illusion because th e m asses
(i.e ., th e p o te n tia l u n ity o f in d iv id u a ls from th e d o m in a te d or p o p u lar
classes) are seen as really divided, in tern ally sp lit betw een tw o differen t
agen cies or m odes o f o rg an iz atio n o f th e ir ow n im agin ary : th eir n orm al
beh avio r in the Ideological S ta te A p p ara tu se s th a t co ver the w h ole society
(so m eth in g m u ch stron ger th a n sim ple id e as ), and th e com m u n itarian ,
e g a lita ria n , lib e rato ry c o n se q u e n c e s o f th e ir e x p e rie n c e , w h ich alw ays
already imply a latent re v o lt. T h ere is absolutely n o guarantee th at th e latter
side will trium ph over the form er.

14

THE A LT H U SSE R IA N LEGACY

It is a tragic view, bu t n ot a pessim istic or a fatalistic one. C om m u n ism as

a m o d e o f p r o d u c tio n is a p o ss ib ility r o o te d in the c o n t r a d ic t io n s o f
c a p it a l is m a t e v e ry s t a g e o f its d e v e lo p m e n t , n o m o re , n o l e s s . 11
C om m u n ism as anoth er way o f living social relations, by revolting against
the dom inant universality, is a possibility th at always exists in the history
o f any ideology, n ot only bourgeois ideology: this is but the reverse side of
ideology being etern al or h avin g n o history, th at is, n ot an evolutionary
history, but a repetitive history. T h e p ossib ility exists in religion (c a ll it
heresy) as it exists in h u m an istic m oral an d econ om ic ideology (c a ll it
socialism ).
O rth o dox M arxism would see the econ om ic con d ition s o f com m unism as
a co n seq u en ce of m atu re cap italism , and its su b jectiv e co n d itio n s as a
co n sequ en ce o f the com plete do m in atio n o f class co n sciou sn ess. H en ce
th e M arxist revolutionaries in pow er would aim at ou trun n in g cap italist
production (with the actu al result o f being always behind its in n ovation s)
and would build a gigantic ideological m achin e to force the m asses into a
h o m o g e n o u s p r o l e t a r i a n w o r ld v ie w (w it h t h e a c t u a l r e s u lt o f
e x t i n g u i s h in g a n y s p i r it o f r e v o l t , e x c e p t o f c o u r s e a g a in s t o f f i c i a l
com m u nism ). T h e tran sition towards com m u nism would becom e anoth er
m o d e o f t r a n s itio n to w a rd s c a p it a lis m , w ith its v io le n t and p e a c e fu l
episodes. B y draw ing the conclusion th at ideology is everywhere in society
(from the lab o r p rocess to the sta te ), and th a t c o n flic t is everyw here in
ideology, A lth usser did certainly n ot solve th e problem o f revolution for our
days, but he w ould certainly re-open it, th a t is, rephrase it. A t a tim e when
we are to ld th at the q u e stio n o f re v o lu tio n has n o fu tu re, th at it w as
(n egatively) answered by the facts, isn t th is w orth discussing a little bit
m ore?

TH E NO N -CO N TEM PO RAN EITY OF A LTH U SSE R

15

NO TES
1.

Se e Gregory E lliott, Althusser: The Detour of Theory (London and N ew

York: Verso, 1987).

2. S e e Louis A lth usser, Machiavelli Montesquieu Rousseau (Schriften 1);
Philosophie.,und Spontane Philosophie der Wissenchaftler (Schriften 4 ); herausgegeben
von Peter_Schttler und Frieder O tto W o lf (Berlin: A rgum en t Verlag, 1985, 1987).
3. See L a cognizione della crisi Saggi sul marxismo di Louis Althusser, (M ilano:
Centro Studi di M aterialism o Storico, Franco A n geli Editore, 1986).
4. T h ere is a p rovocative assertion in Sp in oza on this point: Ethics, IV,
scholium o f prop. 39.
5. S o , H egelianism (m ore precisely: the H egelian con cept o f historical
tim e ) was rejected in Reading Capital because its teleology would make such a
politics unthinkable, by associating com m unism with the end of politics, even
w hen reversed in m aterialistic terms. Later on, som ething o f H egelianism (and
something essential indeed: Process w ithout an Origin or an End) was vindicated
exactly for the same reason: because it appeared as a prerequisite to understanding
communism as an infinite political struggle.
6. T h e title of A lthussers Lecture at G ran ad a in 1976, now translated into
English (see L. A lthusser, Philosophy and the Spontaneous Philosophy of the Scientists
and Other Essays [London and N ew York: Verso 1990]).
7. T h e sym m etry o f A lth u sse rs For M arx and L u k cs History an d C lass
Consciousness is very impressive indeed. In spite o f som e critical allusions, I hardly
think th a t A lth u sse r had properly read L u k c s b ook (w h ich was com p letely
translated into French only in 1960) when he started writing the essays collected in
For M arx. B u t I can thin k of a precise lin k betw een them : M erleau -P o n ty s
Adventures o f the Dialectic (1 9 5 5 ), w hich based its critiq u es o f any com m un ist
philosophy of history on a careful reading o f Lukcs, and which much m ore than
Sartre, for exam ple undoubtedly acted as an intellectual challenge to Althusser.
8. I am especially thinking of the brilliant developm ents in his later writings,
above all Ludwig Feuerbach and the End o f German Classical Philosophy.
9. A t le a s t as far as id e o lo gy is c o n c e rn e d : the n o tio n o f a p o litic a l
superstructure, including the set of State institutions or apparatuses, c an retain a
descriptive function.
10. W hich is not literally traceable in Marx, although it is anticipated in the
d istin c tio n s b etw een class in i t s e l f and class for itse lf, the re fo rm ist or
revolutionary attitude o f the working classes.
11. Even this formulation is perilous, unless you immediately make clear that
re a l m ean s p rac tic e (s), not a given th in g or o b je c t . T h e su b stitu tio n o f
imaginary for consciousness appears as a necessary counterpart to the substitution
of practice for object in the m aterialist conception of reality. T h is implies that
the im aginary is not a reflection or a reproduction, but a production o f identities,
representations and discourse. It is fictional in the active sense of the term, as justly
pointed out in M ichael Sprinkers Imaginary Relations: Aesthetics and Ideology in the
Theory of Historical Materialism (London and New York: V erso, 1987).
12. Nietzsche had a n acute understanding o f this, although from a passionate
counter-revolutionary point of view: a dom inant ideology is always, in his terms, a
slaves morals (e.g., Christianity, the R ights of M an ).

16

TH E A LT H U SSE R IA N LEGA CY

13. S o m e peop le think that A lth u sse r never spok e o f the p o ssib ility of
revolting against the dom in ant ideological apparatuses. T h is is a clear mistake. N ot
only are there his praise of the students' and workers' revolt in 1968, but there is his
rem ark ab le analysis o f the critical effects o f m ate rialist th e atre in For M arx
(Bertolazzi and Brecht ). T o say that the latter is m etaphoric is to miss the point,
since, following the line of Brecht, aesthetics is seen here as a political practice.
14. A com m unist revolution is n ot m aterially possible in just any social or
e c o n o m ic c o n d itio n s, but it does not d ep en d on the n e c essity o f re a ch in g a
predeterm ined m ature form o f capitalism . W hat shall m ature are the political
contradictions arising from exploitation, n ot the rate of concentration of capital.
H ere we can borrow an idea from G ram sci: a fatalistic view of the revolutionary
con dition s merely reflects the subordinate position o f a divided working class.

Gregory Elliott

Althussers Solitude
C om m u n ists, w hen they are M arxists, an d M arxists
w h e n th e y are C o m m u n is t s , n e v e r cry in th e
W ilderness. E ven w hen they are practically alone.
Lo u is A lth u sser, Reply to John Lewis
In a lecture delivered in 1977, A lth u sser reflected on M ach iav elli s
S o litu d e. In .h is solitude M ach iav elli is n ot quite alone. For the auth or of
The Prince was n ot the only thinker in w hom Louis A lth u sser discerned a
c e rta in so litu d e . In d e ed , the fig u re o f the so lita ry in te lle c t u a l recu rs,
implicitly or explicitly, throughout his oeuvre, from Montesquieu: L a politique
et lhistoire to Solitu de de M ach iav el. A m o n g M ach iav ellis com pan ions in
s o lit u d e are S p in o z a , p r o t a g o n is t o f an u n p r e c e d e n te d t h e o r e t i c a l
revolution in the history o f p h ilosoph y, subjected to a m assive historical
repressio n (A lth u sse r and B a lib ar, 1970: 1 0 2 ); C o m te , th e on ly m ind
w orthy o f in terest...p ro d u c ed ...[b y ] F re n ch p h ilo so p h y in th e 1 3 0 y ears
follow in g th e R e v o lu tio n , re p aid w ith re le n tless h o stility (A lth u sse r,
1969a: 2 5 ); a n d Freud, bereft o f th e o re tic a l p re c e d e n ts, a n d therefore
co m pelled to set up in business alo n e (A lthusser, 1971: 182). T h e single
m ost striking occurrence o f it, how ever, co n cern s M arx. In the concluding
p aragraph o f his contribution to Reading C apital, A lth usser writes th a t the
latters
re p e a te d efforts to break dow n th e o b je c tiv e lim its o f th e e x istin g
T h eo retical, in order to forge a way o f thinking th e qu estio n th a t his
sc ie n tific d iscovery h a s p o se d p h ilo so p h y , h is failu res an d ev en his
re la p se s are a p a r t o f th e th e o r e tic a l d r a m a h e liv e d , in a b so lu te
solitud e... A lo n e , M arx lo o k ed around h im fo r a llie s a n d supporters:
w h o c a n reproach h im for allo w in g h im self to lean on H egel? A s for us,
we can than k M arx for th e fact th at we are n ot alone: our solitude only
lies in our ignorance o f w hat h e said (A lth u sser and Balibar, 1970: 193).
S u c h s o li t u d e d o e s n o t a t t a c h to t h e p e r s o n o f M a r x or F r e u d ,
M ach iav elli o r Spinoza; it is n ot a hu m an solitude. N o r, despite A lth u ssers
o c casio n al allusions to such qualities ( in co n traven tion o f his refusal o f the

18

TH E A LTH U SSE R IA N LEGA CY

claim s o f the constitutive su b ject ), does it co n n o te in tellectu al g e n iu s.1

R ather, it signifies th eoretical solitud e (A lthusser, 1971: 182), referring to
an extra-territoriality vis--vis dom in an t theoretical ideologies, an isolation
in d is p e n s a b le to any r e v o lu tio n a r y d is c o v e r y an y m u ta tio n in , as
o p p o se d to m o d u la tio n of, the e x is tin g t h e o r e tic a l. M a c h ia v e lli, for
exam ple, had to be alone to write The Prince and the Discourses. A lo n e
th a t is, h e h ad to turn out to b e ...c u t o ff from the se lf-e v id e n t tru th s
dom in an t in th e old world, detached from its ideology, in order to h a v e the
freed o m to fou nd a new th eory an d to v e n tu re ...in to u n k n o w n w a ters
(A lthusser, 1988: 4 7 3 ).
E x c e p tio n a lity w ith resp ect to the se lf-e v id e n t tru th s o f a p artic u la r
historical conjuncture entails n eith er total insulation from ideology, n o r the
a u to m a tic a d v e n t o f the c o n c e p tu a l sy stem re q u ired to g iv e a d e q u a te
expression to a theoretical revolution (th e burden o f A lth u ssers reading of
M a rx s epistem ological break is that it is both protracted and vu lnerable
all too e a sily d e fe a sib le by its su p p o rte rs, let a lo n e its o p p o n e n ts: see
A lth u sse r an d B alib ar, 1970, p assim ). A s w ith M arx , F reu d s so litu d e is
c o m p o u n d e d by th e a b se n c e o f the re q u isite in t e lle c tu a l re so u rc e s to
consum m ate his rupture:
when he w anted to th in k i.e. to express in the form o f a rigorous system
o f abstract concepts the extraordin ary discovery th at m et h im every day
in his practice, search as he m igh t for theoretical precedents, fathers in
th e o ry , he c o u ld fin d n o n e . H e h a d to c o p e w ith th e f o llo w in g
situ a tio n : to be h im s e lf his ow n fa th e r, to c o n stru c t w ith his own
c r a f t s m a n s h a n d s the t h e o r e t i c a l sp a c e in w h ic h to s it u a t e h is
discovery, to w eave w ith thread borrowed intuitively left and right the
great n et w ith w h ich to ca tc h in the depths o f blind exp erien ce the
teem ing fish o f the u n con scious...(A lth usser, 1971: 182).
A ccordingly, Freud h ad been obliged to think his discovery and his practice
in imported c o n c e p ts, an In strum en tariu m borrow ed fro m co n tem p orary
sc ie n c e a n d p h ilo s o p h y a n d q u ite in a d e q u a t e to th a t d is c o v e r y a n d
practice with th e result that th e n ew scien ce o f psychoanalysis rem ained
v u ln e r a b le to a r e la p s e into the p sy c h o lo g ism , e tc . e sc h e w e d in its
co n stitu tio n (1 9 7 1 : 1 8 2 -8 6 ). S im ilarly , faute de m ieux, M a rx h a d in part
th o u gh t his im m ense th eoretical re volu tion in term s beq ueath ed by the
very G erm an ideology rejected in the fou ndation o f historical m aterialism .
T h eo retica l solitude, th en , is at o n ce a privilege an d a cross the fa te of
all inventors (19 7 0 : 120) in their revolutionary singularity. Posthum ously,
th e y m ay be sa v e d fro m th e s e c o n d d e g re e o f i s o la t io n ( c o n c e p t u a l

A L T H U SSE R 'S SO LITU D E

19

d e p r iv a tio n ). T h u s, L a c a n s re tu rn to F re u d is c re d ite d w ith h a v in g

elu cidated his irreducible d isco v e ry o f th e u n co n sciou s through adequ ate
im ported concepts (borrow ed from Saussu rian an d Jak o b son ian linguistics)
an d rescued it from th e deform ations hence reductions im posed u pon it
by W estern R easo n as the price fo r a belated p act o f peaceful co ex isten ce
(1971: 186). N ow , how ever, it is the partisan , repeating th e experience o f
the artisan, who is condem n ed, for m any years, to an isolated ...th eoretical
effort (1 970: 16 n .l) .
G iv e n the sym ptom atic recurrence o f this them e, a question arises: can
we discern solitude in A lth u ssers ow n situation as a p artisan and artisan o f
M arxism ? Is there som eth in g in this p h ilo sop h ers return to M arx , or its
m odality, w hich justifies us in su ggesting th at he was p ractically alo n e ?
M ight we in turn speak o f A lth u ssers solitude?
Judging from a handful o f references,2 A lthusser him self would appear to
have experienced intellectual isolation as a C om m u n ist philosopher intent
upon reconstructing M arxism pour la cause de la R volu tion (1 9 6 9 b : 72).
H e would b e the first to insist, how ever, th at his own consciousness o f his
p re d ic am e n t does n ot se ttle th e q u e stio n . M o re o v e r, n u m ero u s facto rs
m ilitate again st an affirm ative response to it. T o begin with, subjected to the
terrible education o f deeds by the war (1 9 6 9 a: 2 1 ), A lth usser was unique
neither in his affiliation to the M arxist tradition, nor in his adh eren ce to the
Fren ch C o m m u n ist Party, thereafter. T h e sem i-d isarray o f C o m m u n ist
intellectuals in th e afterm ath o f Z hdan ovism a n d Lysenkoism in the early
1950s, and the perception o f a p hilosophical vacuum on ce such theoretical
m onstrosities had been rescinded these too are scarcely peculiar to him
(the In trod u ction to For M a rx ch aracterizes the texts co llected th erein as
m erely th e d o cu m en tation o f a p articu lar history 1969a: 2 1 ). N o more
was he alone, follow ing the depred ation s o f S talin ism , in his am b ition to
renovate M arxism , con stitute M arxist philosophy, resolve the M arx-H egel
relationship, clarify th e base-superstructure co n n ectio n , etc. N or, again, was
A lth u sse r iso la te d in e ssa y in g a left-w in g critiq u e o f S ta lin is m ; in h is
enthusiasm for Leninism , sym pathy for M aoism , disdain for H egelian ism ; in
utilizing n on -M arxist discourses (n o r e v e n in som e o f those th at he utilized).
S im p ly b y v irtu e o f th e fa c t th a t h e p o sse sse d th e w h ere w ith al for h is
en terp rise, A lth u sse r w as n o t a lo n e . A n d h e re to o it c o u ld n o t b u t be
p arad o x ica l to speak o f so litu d e in c o n n e c tio n w ith a n auth or w h o, like
M ach iavelli, h a s h im se lf been surrounded...by a... crowd o f irreconcilable
o p p o n e n ts, su pporters and a tte n tiv e co m m e n ta to rs (1 9 8 8 : 4 6 9 ), w hose
work en joyed a considerable vo gu e a n d resonance, n ot on ly in France, but
throughout W estern Europe, a n d beyond (especially L a tin A m erica).

20

T H E A LT H U SSE R IA N LEGACY

Y et despite all the contrary evidence th at c a n be adduced, it is possible to

venture A lth u ssers solitude. N o t, o f course, as a thinker o f the stature or
o rigin ality o f M arx, but in a m an n e r strictly co m p arab le to L a c a n . T h e
e x p l i c i t a n a lo g y d ra w n in F r e u d a n d L a c a n b e t w e e n t h e fa t e o f
psychoanalysis and o f h istorical m aterialism (1 9 7 1 : 179-80) suggests a sub
text: identification, mutatis mutandis, o f a p arallel betw een the return s to
the m aturity o f Freu dian a n d M a rx ist theory (1 9 7 1 : 185) co n d u cted by
L acan and A lth usser as m arginalized m em bers o f the n atio n al sections of
international organizations, re-readings designed to restore M arx and Freud
to their rightful solitude and thereby save us from ours. If, as a C om m u n ist
M arxist, he never cried in the wilderness, in certain respects in his system
o f th ou gh t...its rejection s an d its p o sitio n (1 9 8 8 : 4 7 8 -9 ) A lth u sser was
practically alone. How?
In an in terview p u b lish e d in 1 9 8 2 , tw o o f A lth u s se r s c o lla b o ra to rs,
E tienne Balibar and Pierre M acherey, were at pain s to insist th at A lth usser
was a M arxist...n ot an A lth u sserian (B alib ar and M acherey, 1982: 4 6 ).
A lt h u s s e r w o u ld d o u b t le s s h a v e c o n c u r r e d w ith th is c o n c lu s io n . B y
ch a ra c te riz in g h is ow n w ritin gs a s c o n ju n c tu ra l in te rv e n tio n s (cf., e.g.,
1976a, passim ), their author likew ise disavow ed any am bition to construct a
th eoretical system in For M arx and Reading Capital (an d if he did attem pt
any such co n stru ction prior to 1967, subsequently he was u n questionably
preoccupied with its decon struction ). N everth eless, w hether w elcom ing or
re p re h e n d in g th e fact, in his w ork th e m a jo rity o f co m m e n ta to rs h ave
e n c o u n te re d a d is tin c tiv e d isc o u rse w h ich m erits it ow n proper n o u n :
A lth u sserian ism som eth in g th at pertains to, yet d o es n o t exactly coincide
w ith M arx ism . H ow ever we u ltim a te ly e v a lu a te it, A lth u s se r s th o u g h t
possesses an unw onted ch aracter (1 9 8 8 : 4 7 0 ) w ith in th e M arx ist tradition,
w hich consists in its effective rupture n ot only w ith the o rth o d o x D ialectical
and H istorical M ate rialism o f th e S e c o n d an d T h ird In tern atio n als, an d
w ith the h eterodox W estern M arxism that em erged as a co n testan t o f it, but
w ith key c o m p o n e n ts o f c la s s ic a l M a r x is m itse lf. For in th e n a m e of
restoring M arxism to its original purity, and then developing it, A lth u ssers
return issued in su b stan tial revision, even a rad ical recasting, o f it.
W h a t was A lth u ssers solitud e in his ow n tim e? T h e conju ncture in the
i n t e r n a t i o n a l C o m m u n is t m o v e m e n t in w h ic h h i s p h i l o s o p h i c a l
m an ifestos appeared was dom inated b y th e earth qu ake4 o f K h ru sh ch ev s
d e n u n ciatio n o f S ta lin at the T w e n tie th C on gress o f th e C P S U (1 9 5 6 ),
w h e r e u p o n a n ew r o a d to C o m m u n is m w a s m a p p e d ; a n d by t h e
convu lsion s o f the S in o -S o v ie t split (1 9 6 0 ), w herein, reactin g against these
developm en ts, the C h in ese Party berated the revision ism o f their S o v ie t
(a n d F re n c h ) co m ra d e s. T h e im p act o f K h ru sh c h e v ism u p o n th e P C F ,

A L T H U SSE R 'S SO LITU D E

21

c o n d e m n e d to the ghetto by D e G a u lle s exp loitation o f the A lgerian crisis,

w as p rofou n d . E v ery th in g for M a n b ecam e its id e o lo g ic a l w atch w ord,
peaceful co existen ce betw een the superpow ers its foreign policy, peaceful
tran sition in allian ce w ith so cialists and dialogue w ith all m en o f good
will its dom estic horizon. C orrelatively, in the realm o f theory a return to
the Y ou ng M arx as th e tru th o f h is m atu rity resou n d ed th ro u gh o u t the
C om m u n ist universe, its leaders effecting an adroit appropriation o f M arxist
hum anism from critics an d dissidents for their official ideology. T h e latter
naturally experienced the lifting o f the dogm atist n igh t (1 9 6 9 a: 3 1 ) as a
M a r x is t d a w n . A lt h u s s e r , by c o n t r a s t , r e g a r d e d S t a l i n i s m as a n
abandonm ent o f the revolutionary th eoretical and political heritage o f M arx

and Lenin, and K h ru sh ch evs S ec ret S p e e c h as a right-w ing critique of it

conducive to rightw ards evolution o f th e C om m u n ist m ovem en t (S a rtre s
op tim ism w as m isp laced : d e - S ta lin iz a tio n h a d n o t d e -S ta lin iz e d th e deStalinizers; cf. Sartre, 1969: 73). C onversely, in its p utative fidelity to the
Leninist legacy at hom e and abroad, M aoism gave every appearance o f n ot
su b o rd in atin g raison de la rvolution to raison d tat. Yet C h in a was th e
e x c e p tio n to th e v irtu a l id e o lo g ic a l, p o lit ic a l an d th e o r e tic a l p a c t o f
p e a c e fu l c o e x is t e n c e ( A lt h u s s e r s use o f th e e x p r e ss io n e lse w h e re is
poin ted ) b ein g co n clu ded b etw een M arx ism a n d its op po n en ts, o f w hose
suspicious side its supporters were seem ingly oblivious, believin g th at the
world was com ing round to their position s when they w ere...com ing round
to the w orlds (1971: 186).
A lth u ssers dissen t from the rap pro ch em en t b eck o n in g C o m m u n ists at
the turn o f the 1960s, h is in ten tio n to alert them to the suspicious side of
the p a c t th e n b e in g s e a le d , w as su m m e d up in a r e t r o s p e c t iv e se lfassessm ent:
I would never h ave w ritten anything were it n ot for the 20th C ongress
and K hrush chevs critique o f S talin ism and the subsequent liberalization.
But I would never h ave w ritten these books if I had not seen this affair as
a bungled destalinization, a right-wing de-stalinization w hich instead o f
analyses offered us only in can tation s; w hich instead o f M arxist concepts
h ad a v a ila b le only the p overty o f b ou rgeois ideology. M y target was
therefore clear: these h u m an ist ravin gs, these feeble dissertation s on
liberty, labour or a lie n a tio n w hich were the effects o f all th is am on g
F ren ch Party intellectuals. A n d my aim was equally clear: to m ake a start
on the first left-wing critique o f Stalinism , a critique th at would m ake it
possible to reflect n ot only on K hrushchev and S ta lin but also on Prague
and Lin Piao: that would above all help to put some substance back into
the revolutionary project here in the W est.5

22

TH E A LTH U SSE R IA N LEGACY

C o u n te rin g the p rev a le n t recou rse to (h u m a n ist) id e o lo g y (1 9 6 9 a :

23 8), A lth u ssers enterprise proclaim ed a return to M arx (an d intim ated a
turn to P ekin g see, e.g., 1 9 6 6 b ), aim ed at a re n o v atio n o f th e p o litica l
p r a c t ic e o f th e P C F by a r e s t o r a t io n /r e n e w a l o f M a r x is t t h e o r y an
u n d ertak in g whose vo lu n tarist w ager w as th a t w orkin g-class p olitics, and
h e n c e h isto ry , c o u ld be p u t b a c k o n th e rig h t tra c k by a re v e rsio n to
th eoretical rectitude. T h e A lthusserian reform ation was distinguish ed by its
se n se o f th e o re tic a l re ctitu d e , o f w hat was requ ired in ord er to re co v er
M a r x s scientific revolution and render it a livin g and active truth for us
(1976a: 194).
It involved a critique o f actually existin g M arxism in its entirety, w hich,
grosso m odo, id e n tifie d all its v a r ia n t s as v a r ia t io n s u pon a H e g e lia n
p ro b le m atic (th is eq u ally a p p lie d to D e lla V o lp e a n M a rx ism , w h ic h , as
A lth u sser n oted [1976a: 173]), w as a lso a m aterialist counter-trend w ithin
W estern M arxism , explicitly a n tip a th e tic to H egelian ism a n d com m itted to
th e scientificity o f M arxism ). T w o b asic ten den cies could be identified in it:
eco n o m ism an d h u m an ism , e a c h o f w h ich was a sp ecies o f h istoricism , a
philosophy o f history as a process w ith a su bject and a telos derivative o f the
G erm an ideology w ith w hich M arx had settled accoun ts in the m id-1840s as
a p reco n d itio n o f the fou n d ation o f the science o f history. C o n seq u en tly ,
b oth were coun terrevolution s aga in st C apital (cf. G ram sci, 1977: 34-7). Very
s c h e m a tic a lly , e c o n o m ism th e p o o r m a n s H e g e lia n is m (1 9 7 1 : 7 8 )
ch aracteristic of the Seco n d In tern ation al after Engels and the T h ird after
L e n i n w as a t e l e o l o g i c a l t e c h n o lo g i c a l d e t e r m in is m w h e r e in th e
d evelo pm en t o f the productive forces m otored history towards its appointed
d e stin a tio n in co m m u n ism , en route en g e n d erin g th e class w hich w ould
d eliv er capitalism , highest stage o f cla ss society , its quietus in a n egatio n o f
th e n e g a tio n . H u m a n ism th e r ic h m a n s e v o lu t io n is m ( 1 9 6 7 : 1 2 )
ch a ra cteristic o f the re actio n a g a in st K au tsk y ism in the early 1920s and
S talin ism in the late 1950s was a teleo logical ph ilo sop h ical anth ropology
w herein the ineluctable travails o f the hu m an essence in alienation presaged
its reappropriation and realization under com m unism , solution o f the riddle
of history, (M arx, 1975: 3 4 8 ) courtesy o f the praxis o f the universal class.
T h e s c a n d a l o f A l t h u s s e r s a s s a u l t u p o n t h e s e d o c t r i n e s w a s h is
id e n tific a tio n o f th em a s m irro r-im ages, re se m b lin g e a c h o th e r in th eir
u n d e r ly in g t h e o r e t i c a l s t r u c t u r e ( t h e r e b y o f f e r in g s c o p e for t h e ir
a m a lg a m a t io n ) a n d h is t o r ic a l m e ss ia n is m . A n d n o t w ith s t a n d in g h is
reticence, it is clear that A lth u ssers critique o f econ om ism was directed at
the h isto m a t ad u m b rated in S t a li n s c a te c h ism (1 9 4 1 ), b eh in d w hose
su rfa c e h o s t ilit y to H e g e l A lt h u s s e r d e te c te d a r e - H e g e lia n iz a tio n o f
M arxism in w hich, th e E co n o m ic h a v in g b een p rom o ted to th e ran k of
Essence, the Ruse o f R eason is reversed (1 9 6 9 a: 107-8).

A L T H U SSE R 'S SO LITU D E

23

A lt h u s s e r s o p p o s itio n to su c h r e d u c t io n is t sc h e m a s se c u la r iz e d
versions, in their closed n arrative structure, o f H e g e ls th eodicy derived
from th e consideration that, quite th e reverse o f affording facilities for the
investigation o f the co m plexities o f real history, they precluded it. H en ce
they in h ib ite d th e co n cre te a n a ly sis o f a c o n c re te situ a tio n a prim e
d esid e ratu m o f an y ra tio n a l p o litic a l p ra c tic e (h e n c e o f sc ie n tific , as
opposed to u topian, so cialism ) and w ere destitute before th e im placable
test o f th e facts o f n in eteenth -tw entieth-century history (1976a: 187).
In these circum stan ces, A lth u sser ado pted an am b itiou s program m e of
reconstruction and an audacious strategy, involvin g an in tellectual reversal
o f alliances, to accom p lish it. In counterpoint to the n ation al culture in its
turn from phen om enology and the th ree H s (H egel, Husserl, H eidegger
D escom bes, 1981: 3), and its em brace o f various form s o f theoretical antihum anism , A lthusser resorted to several n on-M arxist currents o f thought in
an attem pt to force an exit from the crisis afflicting M arxism . O f these, the
m ost im portant were, firstly, a tradition o f ration al m aterialism in French
philosophy o f science associated with G asto n Bachelard, Jean C av aills and
G e o r g e s C a n g u il h e m , in w h o se c o n v e n t i o n a l i s m a n d h i s t o r i c a l
epistem ology, adopted b y A lth u sser, are probably to b e found a C o m tea n
c o n n e x io n (w h ich w ould e x p la in A lt h u s s e r s e le c tio n o f C o m te as an
e x c e p tio n to th e p h ilo so p h ic a l r u le ).6 S e c o n d ly , th e u n p r e c e d e n te d
rationalist and determ inist p h ilo sop h ical system o f Spin oza, som e o f whose
key prin ciples A lth usser sough t to naturalize in d ialectical an d h istorical
m a terialism (in a quite d iffere n t fash ion from P le k h a n o v s m a te ria list
m onism cf. 1969a: 201-02 n .), sin ce, contrary to a century o f M arxist self
r e f le c t io n , it w as h e a n d n o t H e g e l w h o w a s M a r x s h i s t o r ic a l
predecessor (1969a: 78 n .4 0 ).7 Th irdly though subsidiary to Spinozism
a sp e c ts o f th e s t r u c t u r a lis t p a r a d ig m in its S a u s s u r ia n re w o r k in g o f
D urkh eim s m e th o d o lo gical c o lle ctiv ism (com p are S a rtre s p ro je ct in his
1976), and in siste n ce on th e irredu cib le sp ecificity o f so cial fa c ts; and
e sp e c ia lly L a c a n s re -th e o riz a tio n o f F reu d (r e a d m itte d to the fo ld by
A lth usser fifteen years after the P C F s condem n ation o f psycho-analysis as a
re a c tio n a ry id e o lo g y ) ,8 so m e o f w h o se c a te g o r ie s w ere b o rro w e d to
reconceptualize the M arxist d ialectic and the theory o f ideology.
T h u s, p a r a lle l w ith L a c a n s e m p lo y m e n t o f stru c tu ra l lin g u istic s to
theorize Freud, A lth usser h a d recourse to a d etou r through other sciences
or p h ilosoph ies (1971: 191) in order to illum inate the object o f M arxism and
p in poin t the discon certin g n ovelty o f M ars revolutionary discovery (1970:
78). A n d it is this th at accoun ts for the disconcerting novelty o f A lth usserian
M arxism , for it is these re fe re n c e -p o in ts th a t d e term in ed th e differentia
spedfica o f his system of thought the singularity o f A lth usserian ism .

24

THE A LTH U SSE R IA N LEGACY

T h e A lth usserian program m e featured the elaboration o f a new M arxism

o f M a r x is m ( a r e p e r i o d i z a t i o n o f M a r x is m ) ; o f a n a n t i - e m p i r i c i s t
e p i s t e m o l o g y ( t r a d i t i o n a l l y , d i a l e c t i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m , o r M a r x is t
p h ilosoph y); and o f a non-historicist theory o f social form ations (historical
m aterialism , or M arxist scien ce). T h e reperiodization o f M arxism revolved
around the p ostu late o f a sim u ltan eo u sly co n ce p tu a l and ep.istem ological
d iscon tin u ity betw een th e supposedly n on -M arxist E arly W orks o f 1840-44
an d th e u n even ly M arxist w orks o f 1 8 4 5 -9 an e p iste m o lo g ic a l b re a k
betw een irreconcilable prob lem atics, separating th e scie n ce o f history from
any id e o lo g ic a l p h ilo so p h y o f h isto ry , lo c a te d w h ere M arx h im s e lf h a d
a tte ste d a se ttle m e n t o f a c c o u n ts (T h e G erm an Ideology), an d w h ose
p r i n c i p a l im p o r t w as th e r e i n s t a t e m e n t , a m id s t its c o n t e m p o r a r y
devaluation , o f C apital as the pinnacle o f M arxism . A gain st the grain o f the
M a r x ist-h u m a n ist re n a issa n c e e n c o m p a ssin g th e o lo g ia n s lik e B ig o an d
C alvez, in d ep en d en t M arxists like L efeb v re an d G o ld m an n , C o m m u n ists
like S c h a ff an d G a ra u d y ,10 in its b road ou tlin es th is ch ron ology accorded
w ith p re v io u s C o m m u n ist o r th o d o x y (a s o n e o f A lt h u s s e r s ow n early
article s, 1 9 5 3 a, d e m o n str a te s). H ow ever, h is a c c o u n t d iffered from th e
available altern atives in three crucial respects. F irst, in th e severity o f the
rupture it posited betw een M arxism and its sources (G erm an philosophy,
E n glish p olitical econ om y an d F ren ch u topian socialism ) an d betw een the
M arx o f C ap ital and the M arx o f the Paris M anuscripts. T h e latter was now
m erely and irrevocably an avan t-gard e Feuerbach ian applying an eth ical
p rob lem atic to the u n d erstan d in g o f h u m an h isto ry (1 9 6 9 a : 4 6 ), w hose
co n ceptu al repertoire could on ly be assim ilated to M arx ism by a teleological
re a d in g w h ic h tr a v e stie d th e a d v e n tu re o f sc ie n c e in d e v e lo p m e n t ;
(1969a: 245) w hereas the form er was n eith er H egel inverted nor F euerbach
transcended, but the founder o f an utterly un an ticipated science. Seco n d , in
its scrutiny o f the road to Capital, its interrogation o f the M arxist status of
the writings subsequent to the M anuscripts, but prior to Capital. A cco rdin g
to A lth usser, these still bore the im print o f the ideology with w hich they
were in rupture; M arxs passage from the quicksands o f speculative ideology
to the terra firma of conceptual science was no instantaneous transportation
to scientificity, bu t a laborious transition period. T h ird, in its insistence on
the lacunary natu re o f C apital itself, in sofar as M a rx s text failed to specify
the scientific re volu tion realized in it, thereby facilitatin g recrudescence o f
the ideological w ithin M arxism . For in his solitude, M arx h ad w anted for
th e co n ce p ts (in p articular, stru ctu ral cau sality ) required u n equ ivo cally to
en capsu late his critique of political econom y at the level o f its m eth od and
o b ject; his revolu tion therefore stood in need o f co m p letio n A lth u ssers
self-ap poin ted task.

A L T H U SSE R 'S SO LITU D E

25

A lth usser conceived Capital a s a radically n on-H egelian , n on -R icard ian

te x t w h ich h ad o p e n e d up to sc ie n tific k n o w le d g e ...th e c o n tin e n t of
H istory, (1 9 7 1 : 4 2 ) but on ly com m enced exp loration o f th at co n tin en t.
T h e B o o k in w h ich th e S e c o n d In te r n a tio n a l read th e fa ta lity o f th e
a d v e n t o f s o c ia lis m as if in a B i b l e (1 7 0 : 1 2 0 ) did n o t c o n t a in an
evolutionist discourse, be it econ om ist or hum an ist. T h erein M arx had laid
the corner-stones o f historical m aterialism by: ( 1 ) theorizing the econ om ic
le v e l (o r in fra str u c tu re ) o f the c a p it a lis t m ode o f p ro d u c tio n an d (2 )
p r o v id in g g u id e lin e s fo r th e t h e o r iz a t io n o f ( a ) th e n o n - e c o n o m ic
(su p e rstru c tu ral) lev e ls o f th e c a p it a lis t m o d e o f p ro d u c tio n ; (b) n o n capitalist m o des o f production ; (c) transition from on e m o de o f production
to ano th er. M arx , in sh o rt, h a d in itia te d a g e n e ra l theory o f m o d es o f
p rod u ction an d so cial fo rm a tio n s a research p rogram m e, rath er th a n a
finished or fixed doctrine.
T h e thrust o f A lth u ssers in terpretation was to affirm the scientificity of
M a rx ism , w h ile h ig h lig h t in g its im p e r fe c tio n a c o n s e q u e n c e of th e
in evitable lim ita tio n s o f M a r x s ow n a ch ie v e m e n t (a n d its d isto rtio n by
successors), a n d a norm al correlate of its ch aracter as a scientific problem atic
am enable to rectificatio n an d capable o f y ielding new k now ledge. It was
here, in its a tte m p te d re c la m a tio n o f th e sc ie n tific ity a n d auton om y o f
historical m aterialism , as a th eory o f history, from S ta lin ist n atu ralism and
W este rn -M arxist a n ti-n atu ralism , from o rth o d o x y an d h e tero d o x y alik e,
that A lth u ssers M arxism o f M arxism was novel. C on trary to the positivism
o f th e on e a n d th e relativism o f the oth er, th e theory develo ped in Capital
was u n d ersto o d as a sc ie n c e a m o n g o th e rs, that is to say, as a th eory
go v ern ed solely by the exigen cies o f the pursuit o f o b je ctiv e know ledge,
o p e n to s u b s t a n t i a l d e v e lo p m e n t , p r o d u c t i v e o f r e s u lt s w h o se
ep iste m o lo g ic a l d ign ity w a s eq u a l to th o se o f th e n atu ra l sc ie n c e s, and
possessed o f its own theory, m ethod and object.
T h e co n ce p ts deployed in A lth u sse rs ep istem ological history pertained
to a h isto ric a l ep istem o lo gy the T h e o ry o f th e o re tic a l p ra c tic e . T h is
p h ilo so p h y was a t tr ib u t e d to M a r x , a r t is a n o f a d o u b le t h e o r e t ic a l
re volu tion (1 9 6 6 a: 9 0 ), a double fo u n d ation in a sin gle b reak (1 9 6 9 a :
33 ). O perative in Capital, it rem ained to be theoretically constituted. H ence
A lth u sse r n ot only re je c te d the in itia tiv e s o f the W e ste rn M a r x ists as
historicist philosop h ies o f praxis which, in assim ilatin g the sciences to the
su p erstructu re, rep resen ted them as the e x p re ssio n o f class su b je cts. H e
likew ise re p u d iated the d ia le c tic a l m a te ria lism h azard ed by E n gels, and
system atized in th e form o f d iam at by S talin (1 9 4 1 ), as an on tology o f
m atter-in -m o vem en t w h ich, c la im in g to co n stitu te a g e n e ra l scien ce o f
nature, h istory a n d thought, prescribed laws th at infringed the autonom y o f

26

T H E A LT H U SSE R IA N LEGACY

th e sc ie n c e s. T h e v o lu n ta r ism an d su b je c tiv is m c o m m o n to b o th
cu rren ts h ad reach ed th e ir calam itou s clim ax under th e in ten d an cies o f
Z h d a n o v a n d L y s e n k o d u r in g th e C o l d W ar in th e o r y , w ith w h ic h
A lt h u s s e r s m e m b e rsh ip o f th e P C F c o in c id e d (see 1 9 6 9 a : 2 1 - 3 1 ). H e
essayed a construction a t their antipodes.
Sui generis, M arxist ph ilo sop h y w ould be a th eory o f the p rodu ction of
k now ledges, com prising a theory o f the specificity o f theoretical practice
(sc ie n tific an d id e o lo g ic a l); a th eory o f th e a u to n o m o u s h isto ry o f the
sciences; a n d a th eory of the n o n -th e o retical social p ractices w ith w h ich
th e o r e tic a l p ra c tic e is a r t ic u la t e d in th e s o c ia l fo rm a tio n . A lth u s se r
discovered the license and rough draft for it in M arx s 1857 Introduction. A s
develo ped by him , it w as in effect an on tology and a n ep istem ology, the
fo rm e r u n d e r p in n in g th e la tte r . A c c o r d in g to A lt h u s s e r s h isto r ic o d ialectical m aterialism o f praxis (1 9 6 9 a : 229) society the co m plex unity
o f so cial p ractice could be dissected in to four m ain practices econ om ic,
p o litical, ideological a n d theoretical each o f w hich h a d th e transform ative
stru c tu re o f th e la b o u r p ro c e ss as a n a ly z e d by M a r x , in v o lv in g th re e
m o m e n ts: raw m aterial, m eans o f p rod u ction a n d produ ct. In sofar as it
c o n c e iv e d so c ia l re a lity as a c o m p le x u n ity o f d is tin c t y et im b ric a te d
practices (irreducible o n e to anoth er a n d n o t appearan ces o f so m e originary
e s s e n c e ) , the o n t o lo g y o f p r a c t ic e s to o k its d is t a n c e fro m id e a lis m ,
em piricism and historicism , p ositin g th e ever-pre-givenness o f a structured
c o m p le x u n it y ( 1 9 6 9 a : 1 9 9 ). D e v e l o p in g S p i n o z a s c o n c e p t i o n of
know ledge as production, the epistem ology proposed that the p roduction o f
k n o w le d g e by the p r o d u c tio n o f a d e q u a te c o n c e p ts was the re su lt o f
theoretical practice, possessed o f its ow n raw m aterial (facts, concepts, etc.),
m e an s o f p ro d u ctio n (p ro b le m a tic , o r th e o re tic a l m a trix ), and p ro d u cts
(know ledges) (1969a: 166-67). T h is fin essed th e frequent co n trap ositio n o f
concrete/m aterial p ractice to ab stract/sp iritu al theory, sin ce th e la tte r was
itself p recisely su ch a practice, th e d e n ial o f w h ich en tailed n ullification o f
the reality o f scien ce. T h e re b y A lth u sse r so u gh t to secu re its co g n itiv e
au to n o m y a g a in st th e in tru sion s o f p o litic s, w hile reco gn izin g its so c ia l
relative auton om y vis--vis the oth er practices.
C on trary to w hat he term ed the em piricist co n ce p tio n of know ledge,
(1 970: 3 5 if) A lth u ssers epistem ology excluded an y confron tation betw een
(k n o w in g ) subject a n d o b je ct (to be k n o w n ). T h e co gn itiv e p rocess was
in tra-theoretical and the real ob ject (e.g., contem porary capitalism ) was
n o t d irectly involved in it. O n the contrary, its startin g -p o in t an d endproduct alik e w ere th e o b je ct o f know ledge, via w hich know ledge o f the
real object was appropriated in thought. T h e theory o f theoretical practice
sim u ltan eo u sly aspired to m aterialism (p rim acy o f the real, w h ich ex ists

A LT H U SSE R 'S SO LITU D E

27

independently o f theory) and anti-em piricism (specificity o f the theoretical,

w hich is irreducible to the real). It was sufficiently confident to claim th a t
with its arrival the classical problem o f k n ow led ge dissolved. T h eo ries of
k n o w le d g e e r e c te d in r e sp o n s e to th is (n o n - ) p r o b le m ille g it im a t e ly
adjudicated on the results o f th e sciences. B ut once a theoretical practice
h ad experienced an epistem ological break w ith the ideological (governed
by non-cognitive interests and factors), crossed the threshold o f scientificity,
an d a t ta in e d a u to n o m y , it r e q u ir e d n o p rio r g u a r a n t e e s or e x t e r n a l
con firm ation . C o n tra e p iste m o lo g ica l realism or p ragm atism , th e o re tica l
practice was its ow n criterion an d verification was internal to theory (1970:
59-60). G iv e n th at such discon tin uity betw een a science and a n ideology
occurred at a p articu lar m om en t in th e o re tic a l history, it could on ly be
located by an epistem ological history (e.g., A lth u ssers o f M arx ) a form of
h isto rio g rap h y w h ich d e p a rte d from E n g lig h te n m e n t ta le s o f sc ie n tific
progress and recognized th e n ecessity o f co n tin gen cy (1 9 7 0 : 4 5 ).
T h e th e o ry o f t h e o r e tic a l p r a c t ic e re d e e m e d th e a u to n o m y o f th e
v e rid ic a l fro m S t a te , P arty , C la s s , e tc ., an d in stitu te d th e c o n tin u o u s
p ro d u ctio n o f new k n o w le d g e as o p p o se d to th e re p e titio n o f F am o u s
Q u otation s as a criterion o f scientificity. O v e r and above such con ju n ctural
merits, it co nstituted an effort to in corp orate the lessons o f m odern, nonM arxist philosophy of science into M arxism and, in particular, to integrate
the co m p e llin g asp ects o f th e c o n v e n tio n a list critiq u e o f p o sitiv ism and
em piricism into a m aterialist epistem ology. In other words, it am oun ted to
an attem pt to recon cile the co n v en tio n alist analysis o f the historical, social
and theoretical character o f scien tific p ractice w ith th e realist p ostulate of
the e x is te n c e o f an in d e p e n d e n t re a lity irre d u c ib le to th e o ry ( i f on ly
k n o w ab le v ia it). W h a te v e r its p ro b le m s an d c o n tra d ic tio n s, it w as o f
u n p reced en ted so p h istic a tio n w ithin the C o m m u n ist traditio n . T o h av e
fashioned a m odern ist epistem ology o f this order w ithin th e P C F , erstwhile
cham pion o f Lysenkoism , was a singular ach ievem en t.
A s w as th e A lth u sse r ia n re c o n stru c tio n o f h isto r ic a l m a te ria lism . If
A lt h u s s e r s e n d e a v o u r to c o n s t it u t e M a r x is t p h ilo s o p h y im p a r te d to
d ia le c tic a l m a te r ia lism a q u ite n o v e l c o n te n t, his p ro je c t in h isto r ic a l
m aterialism w as n o less radical: to recon stitu te it on non-historicist b a se s so
as to facilitate its com prehensive d evelo p m en t now th a t th e lon g S talin ist
night had passed. T h e upshot o f A lth u sse rs labours was four-fold. First, a
new conception o f the M arxist d ialectic. A lth usser rejected the term s o f the
sta n d a rd in t e r p r e t a tio n s o f the M a r x - H e g e l r e la t io n s h ip , fro m M a r x
( in version ) and Engels (m ethod-system dich otom y) onw ards (1 9 6 9 a: 934 ). T h e M a rx ist d ia le c tic w as n o t som e Aufhebung o f the H e g e lia n , but
structurally d ista n t fro m its illu strio u s p red ece sso r. T h e la tte r s lo g ic was

28

T H E A LT H U SSE R IA N LEGA CY

in exorably teleological; the type o f co n trad iction figuring in it was sim p le,
c h a r g e d w ith th e m a g ic a l m o v e m e n t o f th e c o n c r e t e c o n t e n t s o f a
h isto ric al ep och towards their id e o logical G o al (1 9 6 9 a : 1 0 4 ). Y et it was
p recisely this th at h ad been preserv ed in ec o n o m istic M arxism , w herein
eco n o m ic co n trad ictio n (betw een th e forces an d re latio n s o f p rodu ction )
was to be found stan ding to a tte n tio n in its role a n d essen ce (1 9 6 9 a: 2 0 9 ).
A lth u sse r so u g h t to strip th e M a r x ist d ia le c tic o f su ch a b stra c tio n and
fatalism w ith his th eory o f con trad iction an d overd eterm in ation (1969a:
8 9 ff). E v ery c o n tra d ic tio n , it a sserte d , is o v e rd e te rm in e d , so th a t the
m u ltip lic ity o f c o n tra d ic tio n s a ctiv e in any so cial fo rm a tio n , a lth o u g h
organized in a determ in ate (th o u gh v a ria b le ) order, are inelim in ab ly real
an d effective, sim ultaneously determ in an t and determ ined a circum stance
w h ic h m ay re su lt in th e ir c o n d e n s a t io n in th e ru p tu ra l u n ity o f a
revolutionary rupture.
C o m p lem en tary to A lth u ssers recasting o f the M arxist dialectic was a
recon ceptualization o f the structure o f social form ation s in their constitutive
com plexity. E n gels late efforts to w rest the base-superstructure topography
from vulgar determ inism had issued in a bad infinity (1 9 6 9 a: 117-28) and
the in teractio n m odel (action /reaction ) led to a night in w hich all cows are
b la c k (1 9 6 9 a : 4 9 ). W h a t F red ric Ja m e s o n (1 9 8 1 : 3 7 ) has term ed the
A lth u sserian revolu tion h ere consisted in restoring the specific effectivity
o f the superstructures (1 9 6 9 a: 113) by differentiatin g the M arxist totality
fro m th e H e g e l ia n . T h e l a t t e r w a s a n e x p r e s s iv e t o t a l i t y , w h o se
co m p o n en t parts express each other an d the to tality s sim ple essence (1 9 7 0 :
9 4 ). T h e M arxist totality, in contrast, secreted n o essence to be expressed or
c e n tre to be reflected . A glo b al stru ctu re, su b su m in g three in e ra d ica b le
r e g io n a l s tr u c tu r e s ( e c o n o m ic , p o l it i c a l a n d id e o l o g i c a l ) , th e s o c ia l
form ation was to be viewed as a structure o f structures (1 9 7 0 : 17), each o f
w hich is assigned relative auton om y . T h e su perstructu ral levels are not,
then heteronom ous secondary p h e n o m e n a su bject to the ex te rn al laws o f
the infrastructural essence; the lon ely hour o f the last instan ce (econ om ic
d e t e r m in a t io n ) n e v e r c o m e s (1 9 6 9 a : 1 1 3 ). Y e t n o t w ith s t a n d in g its
articulated decentricity (1 9 7 0 : 104), th e social form ation w as unified, for
go v ern ed by (e c o n o m ic ) d e te rm in a tio n in th e la st in sta n ce . A n y so c ia l
fo rm a tio n w as a stru ctu re in d o m in a n c e , th a t is to say re g u la te d by a
structural causality whereby u ltim ate [econom ic determ in ation ] operated
th ro u g h the p e rm u ta tio n o f d o m in a n c e b etw een th e d iffe re n t re g io n s,
determ in ing its ow n dom inan ce under cap italism , for exam ple (e.g., 1969a:
200-13; 1 9 7 0 :2 1 6 -2 4 ).
In th is in g e n io u s ( i f fr a g ile ) so lu t io n to th e p e r e n n ia l p ro b le m o f
econ om ic determ inism , the econ om ic w as n o longer the primum mobile o f

A L T H U SSE R S SO LITU D E

29

history and society. T h e M arxist theory o f the econ om y was itself radically
tra n sfo rm e d in the a n t i - t e l e o l o g i c a l th e o ry o f m o d e s o f p r o d u c t io n
p ro p o u n d e d by A lt h u s s e r a n d B a lib a r th e th ird c o m p o n e n t o f th e
A lthusserian reconstruction. C on trary to th e tech n o lo gical determ inism and
e v o lu tio n ism of h isto m a t, e c o n o m ic m o d e s o f p r o d u c tio n w ere to be
conceived as articulated, n ot contradictory, com b in ation s o f relation s and
forces o f production, under the do m in an ce o f the relations. T h e forces were
thus dem oted fro m their status as in d ep en den t variab le and treated as a
variety or sub-set o f the relation s. T h e contradictory d ialectic o f forces and
relations, which had provided the p rin cipal dynam ic o f history on M a rx s
reading o f it in th e 1859 Preface, was excised from h istorical m aterialism ,
in d icatin g its rad ically anti-evolutionist c h a ra c te r (1 9 7 0 : 2 2 5 ). M odes o f
production harbored no inh erent ten den cies to the grow th o f the productive
forces, to the fetterin g of the forces by the relations o f production, to the
latter's replacem ent th at the forces m ight resume their forward m arch. T h ey
were n ot to be analyzed, in the m anner of S talin , as h istorical form s whose
quasi-H egelian supersession was predeterm ined by iron laws o f m otion, but
as self-rep ro d u cin g to ta litie s w h ose e x iste n c e w as n o t circu m scrib ed by
an y th in g o th e r th a n the p r e r e q u isite s o f re p ro d u c tio n . T h e th e o ry o f
h i s t o r i c a l t r a n s i t i o n f u r n i s h e d by B a l i b a r r e m a in e d o n e o f n o n correspondence (1970: 2 7 3 -3 0 8 ), bu t explored its ob ject in two directions
th at diverged from econ om ism : n on -co rrespo n d en ce betw een the forces and
re la tio n s o f p ro d u c tio n in w h ich the la tte r are d e te rm in a n t; and n on c o r r e s p o n d e n c e (o r d i s l o c a t i o n ) b e t w e e n th e le v e ls o f th e s o c ia l
form ation, in w hich dom in an ce is displaced on to the political and the class
struggle interven es as the m otor o f history (a qu asi-M aoist thesis directed
against p olitical gradualism ).
O ne th in g w as clear in the A lth u sserian schem e o f things: M arxism was
n o t a h u m a n ism . H u m a n b e in g s were n o t th e c o n s titu tiv e su b je c ts o f
history, but co n stitu ted subjects in history. T h a t is to say, they were agents
subsumed under, and alloted their p laces/fun ctions by, an ensem ble o f social
structures (ideological, econ om ic, p olitical) an terior and exterior to them ,
an d regulated by their own peculiar laws. H istory was n ot the creatio n o f a
subject, singular or collective, but a process without a su bject w hich only a
science disju n ct from the consciousness and illusions of hum an subjects
viz, h i s t o r ic a l m a t e r ia lis m c o u ld illu m in a t e , th e r e b y e n a b lin g its
transform ation and th eir em an cip atio n (see, e.g., 1955: 15; 1970: 119-44;
1971: 219; 1972: 182-86). O f these structures, the ideological perform ed a
crucial role.
O n A lth u ssers retheorization o f ideology, it was n o t an ab erration or a
contingent excrescence o f H istory (1 9 6 9 a: 2 3 2 ), destined to disappear with

30

T H E A LT H U SSE R IA N LEGACY

the ad v en t o f com m unism (com p are M a rx ), but an organ ic p art o f any

society because a trans-historical requirem ent o f social reproduction (1965:
23-33; 1969a: 2 3 1-36 ). T o suppose a d isalien a tio n o f h u m an ity in w h ich
false yielded to true consciousness, w h ereupon the veil would be torn from
the opacity o f social form ations an d th eir structural determ in ants laid bare,
re n d e rin g sc ie n c e su p erflu o u s, w as to indulge in h isto r ic a l m e ssia n ism .
B r e a k in g w ith th e c o n c e p tio n o f id e o lo g y as fa lse c o n s c io u s n e ss an d
draw ing upon L acan ian psychoanalysis, A lth usser co n ceiv ed it as th e realm
o f the im agin ary in w h ich h u m an subjectivity is constituted, the subject of
ex p erie n ce and co n scio u sn ess en dow ed w ith iden tity an d the illu sion o f
autonom y. T h e constitution o f subjects in ideology, it is argued, inverts the
re a l r e la t io n s b e tw e e n in d iv id u a ls and th e s o c ia l f o r m a tio n in to an
im aginary relation. T h erein individuals live those relations as if they were
c o n s t it u t iv e o f th e m , w h e re a s th e y are in r e a lit y s u b je c t e d to th e m
(h e t e r o n o m o u s , and n o t a u t o n o m o u s ). Id e o lo g y , th e n , is th e se t o f
rep resen tatio n s o f p e o p le s im aginary relation s to their real co n d itio n s o f
existen ce required in order for them to fun ction as social agents under any
con ceivable set o f relations o f production.
M erely sk etch ed in the rough est o f ou tlin es here, A lth usserian M arxism
was an enterprise o f great scope an d originality. W h atever its p rotagon ists
so litud e at th e outset, n ation ally a n d internationally he proved lucky in the
m om en t o f his em ergence (H obsbaw m , 1982: 145) in the middle o f a red
decade. W hilst the leadership o f the P C F sharply criticized theoretical antih u m an ism shortly after the p u b lication o f Reading C a p i t a l the fact th a t it
poin ted in a contrary ideological and political direction to the evolution o f
his p arty assu red an e n th u sia stic re c e p tio n elsew h ere. A lth u sse r ia n ism
possessed su c h allure b e c a u se it co m b in e d p h ilo so p h ic a l m o dern ism and
political radicalism . Politically, A lth u sser was and was seen to be a leftwing critic o f the m oderate course o f F ren ch C om m u n ism , sym pathetic, at
least, to M aoism ; yet as a m em ber o f the P C F , he was in som e sense rooted
in w orking-class p olitics, w hich h eld o p en the p ossibility o f an influence
outside the academ y. P h ilosoph ically, A lth u sser was b oth soph isticated and
c o n te m p o ra ry , p ro p o u n d in g , d e sp ite h is p r e s e r v a tio n o f m u ch o ffic ia l
term in o lo g y , a re c o n stru c tio n o f M a r x ism in im p e cc ab ly m o d ern an d
m o d is h te rm s, a p p a r e n tly c o n s o n a n t w ith le dern ier cri o f P a r is ia n
in tellectual culture.
It rapidly lost its allu re again , fo r p o litic a l an d th e o re tic a l reason s.
A lth usserian ism was discom fited by the surprise o f M ay 68 and discredited,
in the eyes o f th e groupuscules the ev en ts spaw ned, by its association w ith
the P C F . M o reover, it was subjected to a series o f critiques, for theoretic ism , an ti-h u m an ism , a n ti-h isto ricism , e tc ., som e o f w h ich A lth u sser

A LT H U SSE R 'S SO LITU D E

31

p a r tia lly a d o p te d in th e a u t o c r it iq u e a n d r e c t if i c a t i o n t o w h ic h he
proceeded.
A lth usser was open to criticism on num erous counts. T h us, w hatever the
merits o f his re-reading o f M a rx s oeuvre in orienting M arxists away from the
cult o f the Early W orks an d foregrou n din g the em ergen ce o f a theory o f
h isto ry as th e d e c is iv e d e v e lo p m e n t in h is th o u g h t, it w as t e x tu a lly
te n d e n tio u s (w itn ess the sy m p to m a tic a b se n c e o f the G ru n d risse), and
theoretically conten tious (w itness the su b stitution o f Spin ozist for H egelian
categories). Sim ilarly, n otw ith stan d in g its virtues as a ph ilo sop h y for science
in com parison w ith the je ju n e m aterialism o f o rth o d o x m arxism and the
so p h istic a te d id e alism s o f W e ste rn m a rx ism , the th e o ry o f th e o re tic a l
practice w as u ltim ately a msalliance o f co n v e n tio n alism a n d m aterialism .
F or it was u n stable betw een a ratio n alism in w h ich the prior identity o f the
order o f theoretical practice and the order o f practice in general perm itted
the app rop riation o f the latter in the form er hence an extrao rdin ary re
edition o f d ialectical m aterialism itself and a c o n v e n tio n alism in w hich
the total disjun ction betw een theory and reality precluded any such thing
hence an an ticip ation o f relativism .
M o st se rio u sly fo r th e su b se q u e n t fo rtu n e s o f A lt h u s s e r s work, the
reconstruction o f h isto rical m aterialism p roved on inspection to be vitiated
in its core com ponents. U n q u estion ab ly , it represented a lib eratio n o f the
m aterialist co n cep tion o f h isto ry from its S talin izatio n in to iro n law s and
stages, and re-established it as a p o ten tially in finite research program m e.
T h e p ric e p aid fo r th is, h o w ev er, was its r e c a stin g as a m o st u n u su al
structuralism (A lth u sse r et al., 1965, vol. II: 2 0 5 a phrase cu t from the
secon d edition o f 1968), so as to retrieve M arx from the n in eteen th century,
century o f history and ev olu tion . In other words, in his solitude A lth usser
broke w ith th e G erm an id e o lo g y in a c tu a lly e x istin g M a rx ism , on ly to
coalesce w ith the F ren ch o f the m id-1960s in his altern ative to it. M arx s
historical m aterialism in its A lth usserian rendition was a structuralism avant
la lettre and that because it was a Spin ozism after the event.
A lth u s se r h im s e lf h a p p ily a d m itte d th is a n d c o n sid e re d it a v irtu e
(1976a: 132-41); and in m any respects it w as. N everth eless, the assim ilation
o f th e p h ilo sop h y o f his real co m p an io n in h eresy (P ch eux, 1982: 2 1 4 )
the distinction betw een real o b je ct and ob je ct o f knowledge, the critique o f
the theory o f know ledge, the n o tio n o f structural causality, the perm anence
o f ideology, are all o f S p in o z ist p e d ig re e did n ot reso lv e th e very real
problem s w h ich led A lth u sser to excise ce n tra l ten ets o f classical M arxism
an d in trod u ce it. H is in n o v a tio n s were ex trem ely pow erful as critiq u es,
successfully p ro b lem atizin g so m e o f th e b asic th e o re tica l assu m p tio n s o f
M arxism and m aking reversion to p re-A lthu sserian form s o f it difficult; yet

32

TH E A LT H U SSE R IA N LEGACY

they were precarious as constructs. A n ti-h u m an ism , fo r exam ple, so utterly

excluded h u m an agen cy in its p rioritization o f stru ctu ral necessity th at it
rendered the action o f subjects in history/society inexplicable, unless as the
e ffe c t o f an a g e n c y tra n sferred to the stru c tu ra l-sy ste m ic le v e l, w h ose
e x ig e n c ie s su b je c ts in te r n a liz e (a p o lit ic a lly , as w ell a s t h e o r e tic a lly ,
p ro b le m atic n o tio n ). A n ti-h isto ric ism so u tterly e x c lu d ed h isto ry in its
prioritization o f social reproduction (th e ah istorical structurality o f m odes o f
p ro d u c tio n ) th at it ren d ered so c ia l c h a n g e in c o n c e iv a b le , u n less as the
effect o f a surreptitiously teleological history (B alib ars tran sition al m odes o f
p rodu ction ), or o f an unstructured history (the su p erven tion o f class struggle
in the m achin ery o f structural cau sality).
A lt h u s s e r s e n d e a v o u r to r e s o lv e so m e o f t h e s e p ro b le m s in a u to d e c o n str u c tio n o f h is sy stem , fr o m th e 1 9 6 7 le c tu re s on Philosophie et
philosophie spontane des savants (1 9 7 4 ) to L a T ransform ation de la filosfia
(1 9 7 6 ), foundered. A new accoun t of M a rx s in tellectual develo pm en t (e.g.,
1976a: 151-61) recon nected it w ith the n on -th eoretical history from w hich
it had been disarticulated, yet restored historicism . A secon d defin ition o f
p h ilo sop h y as, in th e last instance, the class struggle in theory, represen ted a
v a l u a b l e a t t e m p t to r e a li g n M a r x i s t p h il o s o p h y as a L o c k e a n
u nderlabourer to the sciences, bu t surrendered m u ch th at was o f value in
the theory o f th eoretical practice, and co n stitu ted a partial return to preA lth u sserian p ositio n s (in cludin g th o se o f the Y o u n g A lth u sser see 1971:
2 7 -6 8 an d cf. 1 9 5 3 b ). A r e c tific a tio n o f h is to r ic a l m a te r ia lism b y th e
in je ctio n o f th e class struggle provoked a profound co n trad iction betw een
f u n c t i o n a l i s m a n a u t o m a t i c i t y o f s o c i a l r e p r o d u c t io n v i a s t a t e
apparatuses and voluntarism a co n tin gen cy o f so cial transform ation via
th e cla ss struggle (see, e.g., th e rem arkable I S A s e s s a y in 1971: 121-73).
S ev eral poin ts are in order ab ou t A lth u ssers later work. N o t only did it
offer n o co m p e llin g a lte rn a tiv e to his in itia l v e rsio n s o f d ia le c tic a l an d
h istorical m aterialism ; a com prom ise form ation , in part at least it am oun ted
to a r e g r e s s io n to fo r m s o f M a r x is m w h ic h h e , a m o n g o t h e r s , h a d
problem atized. A s such, it was always liable to be surpassed by other internal
critiqu es o f A lth u sserian ism , w h ich would be m u ch m ore co m p reh en siv e
an d ultim ately lead out o f M arxism . T h is ph en om en o n was w idespread, for
it w as discovered th at some o f the fertile elem en ts in A lth u ssers w ritings
(e.g., the th eory o f ideology) could be ex tracted from his residual M arxist
fra m e w o r k , (s e e , in ter a lia , H ir s t , 1 9 7 9 ) . A f t e r M a y 6 8 th e F r e n c h
t h e o r e t ic a l a n d p o lit ic a l c o n ju n c tu r e g ra d u a lly tu r n e d as in im ic a l to
A lth u sserian ism as it h ad on ce b een h osp itab le. For all A lth u ssers optim ism
abou t w h at M ay p o rten d ed (1 9 6 9 b : 1, 107, 150; M a c cio cc h i, 1973: 3 0 2 ,
3 1 0 , 3 2 0 ), h e also h ad a p re se n tim e n t o f th e a sc e n d a n c y o f th e o rie s o f

A L T H U S S E R S SO LITU D E

33

pow er/kn ow ledge a n tith e tic a l to his ow n and again st w h ich h e vain ly
defended M arxism as fu rn ish in g an e m a n c ip a to ry scie n tific k n o w led ge
(1 9 6 9 b : 1 2 6 ). A t th e o u tse t, o f c o u rse , th ese a ssu m ed an u ltra -le ftist,
maoisant form , and possibly even h ad a n influence o n the gauchiste accen ts o f
A l t h u s s e r s a u t o c r i t iq u e . By t h e m i d - 1 9 7 0 s , h o w e v e r , a m i d s t th e
disappointm ents o f the revolution ary exp ectation s o f the 1960s a t hom e and
abroad (especially in M a o s C h in a ), in the guise o f la nouvelle philosophie they
had b ecom e viru len tly an ti-M arx ist. If one secret o f A lth u sse rs o rigin al
success was his con ju gatio n o f the classic al an d the contem porary an d his
left-wing C o m m u n ism , w h ich to g e th er seem in gly im parted an actu ality to
theoretical M arxism , he was now trebly vu lnerable as a C om m u n ist, as a
M arxist, and as a stru ctu ral-M arxist to generalized P arisian su sp icion o f
the intellectual pretensions (let alon e p o litical inten tion s) o f social science
and of m o dern ity s grande histoire o f h u m an em ancipation .
A lth usser was n ot unaffected by these developm ents. In the late 1970s
h is w ork w as in fe c te d w ith s k e p t ic is m a b o u t th e s ta tu s o f h is t o r ic a l
m a t e r ia lis m . I n c r e a s in g ly is o la t e d d u r in g th e P C F s f l ir t a t i o n w ith
Eurocom m unism , his defence o f the dictatorsh ip o f the proletariat (1 9 7 7 )
was th e la st th e o r e tic a lly c o n fid e n t p ie c e fro m h is p en . S o o n h e w as
proclaim ing a crisis o f M arxism (1 9 7 8 b a n d 1 9 7 8 c), for w hose resolution
he looked to popu lar p o litica l p ractice. T h e failure o f on e su ch p ractice,
w ith th e defeat o f th e U n io n o f the Left at th e p olls in th e sp rin g o f 1978,
w as re c o g n iz e d for th e g rie v o u s h is t o r ic a l se tb a c k it w as, a n d in c ite d
A lth usser to the assault o n the S ta lin ist legacy w ithin h is party (1 9 7 8 a ) w ith
w hich his career effectively ended.
T e n years on, the crisis o f M arxism can be seen to h ave endured and
deepened. M oreover, it is now only a sub-set o f a general crisis o f workingc la s s p o l i t i c s in its t r a d i t io n a l fo rm s ( s o c ia l- d e m o c r a c y , s o c ia lis m ,
co m m u n ism ), organization s (th e S e c o n d and T h ird In tern atio n als, tradeu nion m ovem ents, etc .), an d ideologies. T h e tw entieth anniversary o f 1968,
widely heralded a t the tim e a s a return o f the repressed revolutionary p roject
to the W est, serves only to u nderscore the ex ten t to w hich the F ren ch M ay
was less th e p o rten t o f the future th a n the h igh poin t o f an h istorical era of
unfulfilled hopes (Jay, 1984: 3 5 9 ). It is th e less surprising th at A lth usserian
M arxism , com m itted to th at p roject, h as b een m arginalized, or supplanted,
am o n g p ro g re ssiv e in te lle c tu a ls , by p o st- stru c tu r a lism , m o d e rn ism , or
analy tical M arxism . In deed , A lth u sserian ism c a n app ear very d ated and,
like the B eatles m usic or G o d a rd s first film s, inevitably evokes a recen t but
van ished p ast (Ferry and R en au t, 1985: 200).
Perhaps this is the u ltim ate p o in t in A lth u ssrs solitude (cf. 1988: 4 7 4 ):
th e f a c t t h a t h e o c c u p ie d a u n iq u e a n d p r e c a r io u s p la c e in m o d e rn

34

THE A LTH U SSE R IA N LEGACY

in te lle c tu a l h istory b etw een a tra d itio n o f M a rx ism w h ich h e ra d ic ally

critic iz e d an d so u g h t to re c o n stru c t, a n d a p o st- M a rx ism w h ich h as
subm erged its predecessor, and in w h ich th e cla ss o f 6 8 h a s found its selfim age. For in its critique o f En gligh ten m ent M arxism , its anti-evolu tion ism
an d a n ti-h u m a n ism , A lth u sse r ia n M a rx ism p ro v e d to be a tra n sitio n a l
f o r m a t io n , th e p r o d u c t o f a v e ry s p e c if i c t h e o r e t i c a l a n d p o l i t i c a l
co n ju n c tu re w hose m u tatio n h e lp s to e x p la in its fate. T h u s in scrib ed in
history, A lthusser is restored to his solitude.
T o say th is is n o t to a c c e p t th e p rev ale n t ev alu ation o f A lth u ssers work;
or to deny a co n sid erab le A lth u sse ria n in flu en ce, in p articu lar areas, on
cu rre n t in te lle c tu a l w ork (n o tw ith sta n d in g a m n e sia and se ttle m e n ts of
a cc o u n ts); or even to suggest that A lth u sse rs w ritings cannot con trib ute
t o d a y (fa r fr o m i t ) . It is to t a k e s e r io u s ly th e o r ig in a l a m b it io n o f
A lt h u s s e r ia n is m , as a r e c o n str u c tio n o f M a r x ism , n o t to f a sh io n th e
scien tific sociology and epistem ology, b u t as a political enterprise aspiring to
help put som e substan ce back into the revolu tion ary p roject here in the
W est and the failure, in its own tim e, o f th at am bition . T h is would be
A lth u s se r s fin a l so litu d e (cf. 1 9 8 8 : 4 7 8 - 9 ). L ik e M a c h ia v e lli, A lth u sse r
knew th a t if his thought contributed to th e m aking of history, he w ould n o
lon ger be th ere; n or did th is in te lle c tu a l believe th at in tellectu als m ad e
history. A n d he also h a d said and sto o d for too m uch n o t to be repressed
in the afterm ath o f a history w h ich proved so unexpectedly resistant to the
m ak in g o f history by the exploited and oppressed. In the last instance, no
o th er sy stem o f th o u g h t, h o w ev er c lo se to his by its re je c tio n s a n d its
p osition, could save h im from his solitude only th e em ancipatory p ractice
h e en deavoured to aid. A s for us, fa ced w ith the crisis o f M arxism , we can
than k L o u is A lth u sser, a m o n g others, for th e fact th at we are n ot alone.

W orks Cited

A lth u sse r, L o u is ( 19 5 3 a ) A p r o p o s d u m a rx ism e , Revue de lenseignem ent philosophique 3,4A lt h u s s e r , L o u is ( 1 9 5 3 b ) N o t e su r le m a t r ia lis m e d i a l e c t i q u e , R ev u e de l en seign em en t
philosophique 3,5.
A lt h u s s e r , L o u is ( 1 9 5 5 ) S u r l o b je c t iv it d e l'h is t o ir e (le tt r e P a u l R i c o e u r ) , R evue de
lenseignem ent philosophique 5,4A tlh u sse r, L o u is (1 9 6 5 ) T h o r ie , p ratiq u e th o riq u e e t fo r m a tio n th o riq u e. Id o lo g ie et lu tte
id o lo g iq u e , u n p u b lish e d m a n u sc r ip t (E n g lish tr a n sla tio n in A lth u sse r [1 9 8 9 ]).
A l t h u s s e r , L o u is ( 1 9 6 6 a ) M a t r ia lis m e h i s t o r iq u e e t M a t r ia l is m e d i a l e c t i q u e , C a h ie r s
m arxistes-lninistes 11.

A L T H U SSE R S SO LITU D E

35

A tlh u sse r, L o u is (1 9 6 6 b ) S u r la r v o lu tio n c u ltu re lle , C ahiers marxistes-lninistes 14.

A lth u ss e r , L o u is (1 9 6 7 ) S u r le t r a v a il th o r iq u e . D iffic u lt s et r e s o u r c e s , L a P ense 132
(E n glish tra n sla tio n in A lth u sse r [1 9 8 9 ]).
A lth u sse r, L o u is (1 9 6 8 ) L n in e e t l a p h ilo so p h ie , Bulletin d e la Socit fran aise d e Philosophie
.4- .
-A lthusser, Lou is (1 9 6 9 a ) F or M arx , H a rm o n d sw o rth : A lle n L a n e .
A lth u sse r , L o u is (1 9 6 9 b ) D e la S u p e rstru ctu re : D roit - E tat - Idologie, u n p u b lish e d m a n u scrip t.
A lth u sser, L o u is' (1 9 7 1 ) L en in a n d Philosophy a n d O th er E ssay s, L o n d o n : N L B .
A lth u sser, L o u is (1 9 7 2 ) Politics an d H istory M ontesquieu, R ou sseau , H egel an d M a r x , L o n d o n :
NLB.
A lth u sser, L o u is (1 9 7 4 ) Philosophie et philosophie spontane des sav an ts, P aris: M a s p e ro (E n glish
tran slatio n in A lth u sse r [1 9 8 9 ]).
A lth u sse r, L o u is (1 9 7 6 a ) E ssay s in Self-C riticism , L o n d o n : N L B .
A lth u sse r, L o u is (1 9 7 6 a ) L a T ran sform aci n de la filosofia, G r a n a d a : U n iv e r sid a d de G r a n a d a
(E n glish tr a n sla tio n in A lth u sse r [1 9 8 9 ]).
A lth u sser, L o u is (1 9 7 6 c ) Positions, P aris: E d itio n s S o c ia le s.
A lth u sser, L o u is (1 9 7 7 ) O n th e T w e n ty - S e c o n d C o n g r e ss o f th e F ren c h C o m m u n is t P arty ,
N ew Left Review 104.
A lth u sser, L o u is (1 9 7 8 a ) W h a t M u st C h a n g e in t h e P a r ty , N e w Left Review 109.
A lth u sser, L o u is (1 9 7 8 b ) T h e C r isis o f M a rx ism , M arxism T od ay July.
A lth u sse r , L o u is ( 1 9 7 8 c ) Il m a r x is m o o g g i, Q u e l ehe deve cam biare nel partito com m u n ista,
M ilan : G arz an ti (E n g lish tr a n sla tio n in A lth u sse r [1 9 8 9 ]).
A lth u sse r, L o u is ( 1 9 8 8 ) M a c h ia v e llis S o lit u d e , Econom y an d Society, N o v e m b e r .
A lth u sse r, L o u is (1 9 8 9 ) Philosophy a n d the S p o n tan eo u s Philosophy o f the Scientists & O th er
E ssay s, L o n d o n : V e rso.
A lth u sse r , L . et al. (1 9 6 5 ) Lire le C a p ita l, (2 v o ls.), P aris: M asp ero .
A lth u sse r, L o u is an d B alib ar, E tie n n e (1 9 7 0 ) R e a d in g C a p ita l, L o n d o n : N L B .
B alib ar, E tie n n e an d M ac h e re y , P ierre (1 9 8 2 ) In terview , D iacritics 12.
B e n to n , T e d ( 1 9 8 4 ) T h e Rise a n d F all o f S tru c tu ral M a rx ism , L o n d o n : M ac m illa n .
D e sa n ti, D o m in iq u e (1 9 8 5 ) Les Staliniens, P aris: M a ra b o u t.
D esc o m b es, V in c e n t (1 9 8 1 ) M o d em French Philosophy, C a m b r id g e : C a m b r id g e U n iv e r sity P ress.
D ew s, P e te r (1 9 8 0 ) S tru c tu r a lism an d th e F re n c h E p iste m o lo g ic a l T r a d it io n , u n p u b lish e d
m an u scrip t.
Ellio tt, G re g o ry (1 9 8 7 ) A lthusser: T h e D etou r o fT h e o r y , L o n d o n : V e rso .
Ferry, L u c an d R e n a u t, A la in (1 9 8 5 ) L a Pense 6 8 , P aris: G a llim a rd .
G r a m sc i, A n t o n io (1 9 7 7 ) Selections from the Political W ritings 1 9 1 0 - 1 9 2 0 , L o n d o n : L a w ren ce
an d W ish art.
G u itto n , J e a n (1 9 8 7 ) U n d o c u m e n t J e a n G u it t o n , Lire.

36

TH E A LT H U SSER IA N LEGACY

H irst, P au l (1 9 7 9 ) O n L a w a n d ideology, L o n d o n : M a c m illa n .

H o b sb a w m , E.J. (1 9 8 2 ) R evolutionaries, L o n d o n : Q u a rte t.
J a m e so n , F re d ric (1 9 8 1 ) T h e Political U n con sciou s, L o n d o n : M e th u e n .
Ja y , M a r tin (1 9 8 4 ) M arx ism a n d T otality, C a m b r id g e : P olity;
L a c a n , J a c q u e s (1 9 7 7 ) Th e F o u r F u n d a m e n tal C o n c e p ts o f P sy c h o an aly sis, H a r m o n d sw o r th :
P en g u in .
M a c c io c c h i, M a r ia - A n to n ie tta (1 9 7 3 ) Letters F ro m inside the Italian C o m m u n ist Party to Lo u is
A lth u sser, L o n d o n : N L B .
M a r x , K a rl (1 9 7 5 ) Early W ritings, H a rm o n d sw o rth : P en g u in .
P c h e u x , M ic h e l (1 9 8 2 ) L an gu age, S e m a n tic sa n d Ideology, L o n d o n : M a c m illa n .
R o u d in e sc o , E lisa b e th ( 1 9 8 6 ) L a B ataille de cent a n s Histoire de la psychanalyse en F ra n c e , Paris:
S e u il.
S a r tr e , J e a n P au l (1 9 6 9 ) The Spectre o f Stalin, L o n d o n : H a m ish H a m ilto n .
S a r tr e , J e a n P a u l (1 9 7 6 ) C ritique o f D ialectical R eason , L o n d o n : N L B .
S ta lin , J. V . ( 1941 ) D ialectical an d H istorical M aterialism , M o sc o w : F o r e ig n L a n g u a g e s P u b lish in g
H o u se .

A LT H U SSE R 'S SO LITU D E

37

N otes

S e e , fo r e x a m p le , A lth u sse r a n d B a lib a r 1 9 7 0 : 27 an d cf. th e g estu re s to w ards M a r x s

gen iu s in , fo r e x a m p le , A lth u sse r 1 9 6 9 a : 65 a n d 1 9 7 1 : 9 (a n d e v e n to w ard s E n g e ls in A lth u sse r

a n d B a l ib a r 1 9 7 0 : 1 4 8 - 4 9 ) . T h e s e h u m a n i s t r e s id u e s in a n oeu v re d e d i c a t e d to t h e ir
exp rict ft from M arx ism d o u b tle ss d e riv e from A lth u sse r s e lisio n o f tw o d istin c t p ro p o sitio n s:
v i z , re je c tio n o f th e co n stitu tiv e su b je c t an d re je c tio n o f in d e p e n d e n t h u m a n a g e n c y tout court
in sc ie n tific p r a c tic e . S e e B e n to n 1 9 8 4 : 4 3-5.
2
C f . A lth u sse r 1 9 6 9 a : 114; 1 9 7 1 : 1 3 6 ; 1 9 7 6 a: 39, 16 9 , 173; A lth u sse r a n d B a lib a r
1 9 7 0 :5 3 .
3
S e e R o u d in e sc o 1 9 8 6 : 3 8 5 . In d eed, L a c a n h a d b e e n ce n su red by th e In te r n a tio n a l
P s y c h o a n a ly t ic a l A s s o c i a t i o n a n d his t e a c h in g b a n n e d by th e F r e n c h P s y c h o a n a ly t ic a l
A sso c ia tio n in 1963 in resp o n se. S ig n ific a n tly , in h is first se m in a r th e re afte r h e w a s to in v o k e
the e x c o m m u n ic a tio n o f S p in o z a ( 1 9 7 7 : 3 - 4 ) ce t E x c lu U n iv e r s e l, in A l th u s s e r s w ords
(1 9 6 9 b : 1 0 9 ). A lth u sse r s p art in fa c ilita tin g tra n sfe r o f L a c a n s se m in a r to th e E c o le N o r m a le
S u prieu re, a n d th e role o f h is essay o f 1 9 6 4 , Freu d a n d L a c a n , in th e d iffu sio n o f p sy c h o
an alysis in F ran c e, are u n d erlin ed by R o u d in e sc o .
4
T h e .r e c o lle c tio n o f fo rm e r le a d in g P C F in t e lle c t u a l, J e a n - T o u s s a in t D e s a n t i, in
D e san ti 1 9 8 5 : 510.
5
Q u o te d fr o m Le N ou v el O bservateur in R adical Philosophy 12, W in ter 1 9 7 5 , p . 44
6

S e e D e w s 1 9 8 0 : 1 9 ; a n d E l l i o t t 1 9 8 7 : 53 n .1 0 3 fo r r e f e r e n c e s to C o m t e in

A lth u sse ria n te x ts.

7
P rio r to h is a d m issio n o f S p in o z ism in h is E le m e n ts o f S e lf- C r it ic is m o f 1 9 7 4
(1 9 7 6 : 1 3 2 -4 1 ). A lth u sse r h a d ta k e n t h e o p p o rtu n ity o f h is lec tu re o n L e n in a n d P h ilo so p h y
to the S o c i t fra n a ise de p h ilo so p h ie to c o n fid e to an in te rlo c u to r: P e o p le alw ays situ a te
th em selv es in re la tio n to so m e o n e . B u t m y referen c e p o in t w o u ld be n e ith e r K a n t n o r H e g e l; it
w ou ld be S p in o z a.. .Im a S p in o z ist (1 9 6 8 : 1 6 4 ). In a letter d a tin g fro m 1 9 7 4 r e c e n tly p u b lish e d
by Je a n G u itto n , A lth u sse r is q u o te d as say in g th a t o f all p h ilo so p h e rs, S p in o z a is truly an d
in co m p arab ly the g re a te st (G u it t n , 1 9 8 7 : 8 7 ).
8
S e e A lth u sse rs c o m m e n ts i n ' 1971: 1 7 8 -7 9 an d h is rem ark s w h en r e p rin tin g Freu d
a n d L a c a n (1 9 7 6 c : 7).
9
F o r A lth u sse rs su b -d iv isio n s o f M a r x s oeu vre, see 1 9 6 9 a: 3 1 -8 .
10
A c c o r d i n g to h is s u c c e s s o r a s t h e P C F s p h il o s o p h ic a l a u t h o r it y , L u c ie n S v e ,
G a ra u d y it w as w h o v e to e d th e p u b lic a tio n o f P o u r M a r x a n d Lire le C a p ita l by th e P a r ty s
im p rin t, E d itio n s S o c ia le s , in 1 9 6 5 ; see L H u m an it, 2 4 A p ril 1 9 7 6 a n d Le M on d e, 2 5 -2 6 , A p r il
1976.
11
S e e C ah iers d u C om m un ism e 5 -6, 1 9 6 6 , D b a t s sur le s p ro b l m e s id o lo g iq u e s et
cu ltu rels, c o n t a in in g th e in te rv e n tio n s m a d e a t th e C e n tr a l C o m m itt e e m e e tin g a t A r g e n te u il
in M a r c h 1 9 6 6 esp ecially G e n e r a l S e c r e ta r y W a ld e c k - R o c h e t s L e m a rx ism e et les c h e m in s
de la v e n ir .

Alex Callinicos

What Is Living and What Is Dead

in the Philosophy of Althusser
W ho reads A lth u sser now? E v en before p ersonal tragedy silen ced him
A lth usser had ceased to attra ct to th e exten t th at he had ever enjoyed the attention accorded Parisian matres penser first Sartre and M erleauPonty, th e n L vi-Strau ss and L acan , m ore recen tly D errida an d F oucault,
now Lyotard an d Baudrillard. T h e u ltim ate put-dow n cam e in Luc Ferrys
a n d A la in R e n a u ts ex p la n a tio n fo r why they largely ignored A lth u sser in
their study o f L a pense 68, th e F ren ch an ti-h um an ism o f th e 1960s an d
1970s: A lth u sserian ism ... seem s very dated and irresistibly evokes, like
the B eatles m usic or G o d a rd s first film , a recen t bu t v a n ish ed p ast. (Ferry
and R enau t, 1985, p. 200)
T h is is hardly a n argum ent likely to recom m en d itself to so m eo n e who
has seen the way in w h ich, in B rita in at least, ru b b ish in g th e 1960s in
general and 1968 in p articu lar is on e o f the favorite them es o f the N ew
R ight and indeed o f those on th e left b u sy w riting th e class struggle o u t o f
socialism . N o r is the app eal to fash ion to settle w hich p h ilosoph ers m erit
study calcu lated to con trib ute to th e restoration o f in tellectu al stan dard s
after the depredation s of N ietzsch ean irration alism w h ich Ferry and R en au t
are o ste n sib ly c o m m itte d to a c h ie v in g . T h e g e n e ra l c o n s ig n m e n t o f
A lth usser to th e dustb in of h isto ry is a pow erful te m p ta tio n to em phasize
his m erits, a tem p tation to w hich I succum b in w hat follows.
It is, how ever, w orth pau sin g a m om en t at Ferrys an d R e n a u ts book,
w hich is a m u ch m ore serious an d su b stan tial work th an the lam en tab le
passage cited above m igh t su ggest. T h e y shrew dly n o te a ch a ra cteristic
o scilla tio n in L a pense 68, for exam p le in F oucault:
T h e c e n tra l th esis o f th e H istoire de la folie suffers fro m a carefu lly
c o n tro lled am bigu ity co n cern in g th e identity o f th a t co n stitu tin g the
m otor o f the process o f exclu sion . S o m etim es, in accord an ce with the
p h i l o s o p h i c a l a u t h o r i t i e s a c c e p t e d by F o u c a u l t ( H e id e g g e r +
N ie tz sc h e ), the h isto ry o f m a d n e sss e x c lu sio n seem s to h a v e b een
a c h ie v e d by th e d e p lo y m e n t o f r e a so n as su ch , fro m its c la s s ic a l
em erg en ce to its m o dern c o m p le tio n in th e reign o f te c h n o lo g y ...
S o m e t im e s , a b a n d o n in g t h is N ie t z s c h e o - H e id e g g e r ia n r e g is t e r ,

40

THE A LTH U SSE R IA N LEGACY

F oucault suggests th at the m otor o f this exclu sion o f m adness is none
other th an the develo pm en t o f th e produ ctive forces, in oth er words
the grow th o f capitalism . (1 9 8 5 , pp. 113-14)

W h ile th e fir st r e g is te r is e v id e n t in F o u c a u lt s a p o lo g ia o f th e
ir r a tio n a l at th e en d o f th e Histoire de la folie, th e se co n d issues in a
c r itiq u e o f the t e c h n o - e c o n o m ic r a t io n a liz a t io n so u g h t by b o u rg e o is
society, b u t it is a m atter in this case o f de n o u n cin g a pseu do-ration ality in
t h e n a m e o f a m o re d e v e lo p e d r a t i o n a l i t y , c o n c e iv e d as g e n u in e ly
e m an c ip ato ry (Ferry and R en au t, 1 9 8 5 , p p . 1 1 5 -16 ). Ferry and R e n au t
argue th a t it is by co n sta n tly play in g o n th ese two tab leau x (th a t o f a
N ietzsch eo -H e id egg erian critique o f reason in th e n am e o f the w ithoutre a so n [sans-raison], th a t is, o f th e irra tio n a l, a n d th a t o f a critiq u e o f
bourgeois ration ality in th e n am e, if on ly im plicitly, o f an o th er ration ality )
th at th e possibility is preserved o f an ob jective allia n c e, beyond surface
p o le m ic s , b e tw e e n F o u c a u lt and B o u r d ie u , or b e tw e e n D e r r id a a n d
A lth u sse r. B u t, it is ju st th is ra lly in g o f te n d e n c ie s th a t are profou ndly
h etero gen eou s, an d in the last instan ce incom p atib le, th at m ade possible,
despite th e cle av a g es, th e birth an d su rv iv al o f a pense 6 8 (ibid., p. 118).
W h atev er reservation s on e m ight h ave about the ideal type Ferry and
R e n au t con struct o f F ren ch an ti-h um an ism (it is, for exam ple, too sim ple
to c a ll F o u cau lt an irra tio n a list), let a lo n e ab ou t th e lib e ral-d em o cratic
altern ative w ith w hich th ey seem to re p lace it, th e y h ave, in my o p in io n ,
correctly identified th e a llia n c e betw een M a rx a n d N ietzsch e w h ich som e
F ren ch ph ilosop h ers so u gh t, w ith v a ry in g degrees o f co n v ictio n , to ach ieve
in th e late 1960s an d early 1970s. It is evid en t in th e ge n u fle ctio n s to
M arxism m ade by D errida and Foucault in interview s o f the early 1970s, in
th e exten siv e (th o u gh eccen tric) use o f M arx by D eleuze a n d G u a tta ri in
IAnti-Oedipe, and in A lth u ssers own w riting n ot sim ply in the favorable
re fere n c es he m ak es, for ex a m p le, to D errid a (1 9 7 0 , p. 1 8 4 ), b u t m ore
su b stan tively in th e influence o f N ie tz sc h e s a n d H eid e g g e rs critiqu es o f
W estern m etaphysics on his th ou gh t. D om in iq u e L ecou rt, fo r instan ce, has
described th e first essay in Reading C apital, w hose op en in g p ages invoke the
m a ste rs o f s u s p ic io n n o t ju s t M a r x , but a lso N ie tz sc h e an d F reu d
(A lth u sse r a n d B a lib a r 1968, p. 1 6 ), as m a n ife stly draw in g in sp ira tio n
from H eid egger (1 9 8 2 , p. 6 3 ). T h is blurring o f th e bou ndaries betw een
M arxism a n d the traditio n stem m in g from N ietzsch e helps to exp lain th e
w idespread re cep tio n o f Fren ch an ti-h u m an ism (A lth u sse r in clu ded) by a
W este rn in te llig e n tsia rad icalized by 6 8 an d se arch in g for so p h isticated
tools for th e critic a l analysis o f th e d o m in a n t culture.

W H AT IS LIVING A N D W H A T IS DEAD

41

T h e story o f the subsequen t P arisian crisis o f M arxism is th at o f how

in a p o litic a l clim ate w h ich n o lo n g er seem ed to offer th e p ro sp ec ts o f
in stan t re volu tion w h ich m an y en tertain ed at th e en d o f th e 1 9 6 0 s it
b ec am e c le a r th a t M a rx a n d N ie tz sc h e w ere in d eed in c o m p a tib le . A
discourse redu cing ration ality and su b jectiv ity tout court to instances o f the
will to pow er traversing the social and n atu ral w orlds could n o t be married
to h istorical m aterialism , w h ich uses the procedures o f th eo retical inquiry
f a s h i o n e d by th e p h y s i c a l s c i e n c e s to a n a ly z e p r o c e s s e s o f s o c i a l
transform ation, and w h ich sees the d evelo p m en t o f the p roductive forces to
w h ich the a p p lic a tio n o f th e se p ro c e d u re s in c re a sin g ly c o n trib u te s as
actu ally d estru ctive but e x p a n d in g the p o ssib ilities o f hum an lib eratio n .
M arxism m ay n ot, as E tie n n e B a lib ar h as argued (1 9 7 8 ) , be a rationalism ,
but it is certain ly n ot an irrationalism .
M arxism .nevertheless lost the co n test w ith N ietzsch ean ism in the late
1970s. T h is w as fun dam en tally for political reason s. V arious factors the
reflux o f class struggle in the W est after the great upturn o f 1968-76, the
crisis of the C o m m u n ist Parties, caught betw een really ex istin g so cialism
a n d a re in vigorated so cial dem ocracy , th e d isin te gratio n o f M ao ism (see
H arm an 1988, esp. ch. 16) u nderm ined th e con fiden ce o f m any w h o yet
rem ained M arxists in th e v ia b ility o f th e so cialist p ro je ct. G regory E lliott
h as d e te cte d su ch a failu re o f n erv e in A lth u sse r's w ritings o f th e later
1970s (1 9 8 7 , ch. 6). R e p a c k a g e d fo r the A m eric an m ark et as poststructuralism , the w ritings o f the m ajor F ren ch N ietzsch ean s Foucault, D errida,
an d D eleuze could now be con sum ed in a depoliticized form as sim ply the
la te st in te lle c tu a l sty le, a d e v e lo p m e n t fo re sh ad o w e d by th e a c a d e m ic
ap p ro p riatio n o f D errida by th e Y ale D eco n stru ctio n ists an d w hose latest,
d egen erate ph ase can be seen in the cu rren t p ostm o dern ist craze w h ich
h as p ro m o te d su ch epigoni as L y o tard a n d B a u d rilla rd fa r beyond th eir
in tellectu al m erits.
A lth u sse rs eclipse ca n n o t, how ever, be p u t dow n sim ply to ch an ges in
th e p o lit ic a l c o n ju n c tu re a n d th e a c a d e m ic m a rk e t. T h e re were a lso
in te rn a l c o n c e p tu a l re a so n s w h ic h h a v e b ee n u n d e rlin e d by su cc e ssiv e
c r itiq u e s (G lu c k s m a n n 1 9 6 7 ; G e r a s 1 9 7 2 ; C a llin ic o s 1 9 7 6 a n d 1 9 8 2 ;
H in d ess and H irst 1977; T h o m p so n 1978; A n d erso n 1980; B e n to n 1984;
E lliott 1987). W h at is interestin g is how often the w ell-know n aporias of
A lth u ssers system stem from his attem p t to use w hat Ferry and R en au t call
N i e t z s c h e o - H e id e g g e r i a n t h e m e s to r e c o n s t r u c t M a r x is m . T h u s ,
in corp oratin g difference a co n ce p t key b o th to H eidegger and to the Paris
N ie tz sc h e a n s in to th e M a rx ist d ia le c tic by m eans o f such co n c e p ts as
o v e r d e t e r m in a t io n le d to a c o lla p s e in to p lu r a lis m ; c o n c e p t u a liz in g
su b je c t iv it y as a f o r m im p o se d o n in d iv id u a l a g e n ts by id e o lo g ic a l

42

TH E A LTH U SSE R IA N LEGA CY

relation s rendered it m ysterious how, as A lth u sser also argued, the m asses
m ak e h isto r y , an d en co u ra g e d a c c e p ta n c e o f a fu n c tio n a list theory o f
ideology; developing an accou n t o f the sciences w hich in its insistence th at
in d iv id u a l th e o r e tic a l d isco u rse s in v o lv e th e ir ow n c r ite r ia o f v a lid ity
d enied the possibility o f any general d em arcation betw een scien ce and nons c ie n c e th e r e b y u n d e r m in e d an y a t t e m p t to d e fe n d th e c e le b r a t e d
d istin ctio n betw een science and ideology from the N ietzsch ean reduction
o f every know ledge to a form o f the will to pow er. T h a t on ce n otorious
pair B arry H in d ess an d Paul H irst did at least h ave the m erit o f ruthlessly
dem on stratin g, on their way to F abian ism , the in con sisten cy o f A lth u sse rs
own th e o re tical postulates.
It is tem ptin g to see this episode from the p erspective o f th e c o n te m
p orary debate ab ou t m odernity. H ab erm as argues th a t this debate h as n o t
in fa c t m o ved o n sin ce th e tim e o f th e Y ou n g H e g e lia n s, w h en three
d e fin itiv e r e sp o n se s were m ad e to H e g e l s a tte m p t to p ro v id e a selfu nderstanding o f m odernity in term s o f the w orkings o f an absolute reason
su bten din g the individual subject. M arx and the H eg elian left argued for
revolu tion , aim ed at m obilizing the h isto rically accu m u lated p o ten tia l of
re a so n (a w a itin g re le a se ) a g a in st its m u tila tio n , a g a in st th e o n e -sid e d
ration alization o f the bourgeois w orld. (1 9 8 5 , p. 56) T h e H eg elian right
se ttle d fo r e x istin g so c ie ty as th e b est a v a ila b le em b o d im e n t o f re a so n
(H ab erm as does n o t m e n tio n him , bu t Parsons a n d th e k in d o f co n cep tion
o f m odernity he represents seem a better exam ple o f this response th an the
G e r m a n n e o - c o n s e r v a t i v e s h e d i s c u s s e s ) . N ie t z s c h e r e m o v e d th e
d ialectical thorn from the critique o f a reason cen tered o n the su b ject and
sh rivelled in to purposive rationality; and he related to reason as a w hole
the way the Y oung H egelian s did to its su blim ation s: R easo n is nothing else
th a n power, th a n the will to power, w hich it so radian tly co n ce a ls. (loc.
cit.)
From th is p e rsp e c tiv e A lth u s s e r s m ista k e was to try to re c o n stru c t
M arxism , w h ich in vo lv es w h at Ferry a n d R e n a u t c a ll a m o re develo ped
ra tio n a lity [th an b o u rg e o is Zw eckrationalitaat], c o n c e iv e d as g e n u in e ly
e m a n c ip a to r y , by d ra w in g .on th e m e s d e riv ed fr o m th e N ie t z s c h e a n
critique o f reason tout court. H aberm as by co n trast rightly argues that any
p roject com m itted to w hat M arx called h u m an e m an c ip atio n m ust place
itse lf in the traditio n o f the radicalized E n lig h ten m en t (1 9 8 6 , p. 1 5 8 ).
N e v e r th e le s s , h is ow n a tte m p t t o re fo rm u la te w h at h e re g a rd s a s th e
en d u rin g in sigh ts o f h isto rical m aterialism on th e basis o f th e co n c e p t o f
co m m u n icative ac tio n seem s to m e profoundly p rob lem atic (see C a llin ic o s
1 9 8 9 b , ch . 4 ) . A t th e sam e tim e , d e sp ite th e m ista k e n c o n c e s s io n s
A lth u sser m ad e to th e N ietzsch ean varian t o f th e C ou n ter-E n ligh ten m en t,

W H AT IS LIVING A N D W H A T IS DEAD

43

his thought h as certain enduring strengths w h ich m ake it an indispensable

part o f an y attem p t to co n tin u e the M arxist tradition. I sh all try to bring
out these stren gth s, in part by co m parin g th em w ith w hat H ab erm as h as to
say on the relevan t subjects.
In th e first p lace, A lth u sse rs critique o f an y atte m p t to base h istorical
m aterialism on the co n ce p tu a l stru ctu res o f H e g e lia n th o u gh t is, in my
view, absolutely defin itive. C o n tra d ic tio n and O v erd eterm in atio n , T h e
O b ject o f C apital," and, in some ways m ost cogen tly, M a rx s R e la tio n to
H egel, dem olish the idea th at H e g e ls d ialectical m ethod can be separated
from h is id e a lis t sy ste m . T h e r e h a v e , o f c o u rse , b e e n o th e r M a r x is t
o p p o n e n ts o f H e g e l, b u t n o n e fo rm u la te d th e d iffe re n c e s b etw een the
H egelian an d M arxist d ia le c tic s w ith the sam e clarity an d m etap h y sical
insight as A lth u sser. T h e on e to com e closest to do in g so A d o rn o was
never able fully to escape the circle o f H eg elian con cepts, sin ce his own
accoun t o f cap italism was h eavily indebted to the masterwork o f H egelian
M arxism , History and C la ss Consciousness.
A lth u ssers dem on stration th at a genuin ely m aterialist theory o f history
could n o t m ak e use o f such H e g e lia n c o n c e p ts as th e n e g a tio n o f the
n egation h as h ad c o n seq u en ce s w hich h av e o u tla sted th e ec lip se o f his
school. T h e m o st p h ilo sop h ically fertile contem porary current o f M arxist
th o u g h t is w ithout a d o u b t th e an aly tical M arxism o f G .A . C o h e n , Jo n
E lster, Jo h n R o e m e r, E rik O lin W rig h t, a n d o th e rs. But the k in d s o f
questions they have pursued ar on es w hich on ly becom e pressing on ce a
H e g e lia n fram ew ork is a b a n d o n e d . T h u s th e d e b a te over th e re la tiv e
w eight o f fu n ctio n al a n d ra tio n a l-ch o ice e x p la n a tio n s in a cc o u n tin g for
h istorical p rocesses presup poses th at M arx ism can n o lon ger rely on any
variant o f H egelian ism , w hether it take the ob jectiv ist form o f D iam at or
th e su b jectiv ist form o f p ost-1 9 1 7 h istoricism (L ukcs, G ram sci, K orsch ).
S im ila r ly , th e p r e o c c u p a tio n o f a n a ly t ic a l M a r x is ts w ith th e issu e o f
w hether M a r x s theory o f ex p lo ita tio n in vo lv es or requires a prin ciple o f
justice is sym ptom atic o f the problem s w hich arise on ce one can n ot rely on
a H eg elian teleology interw eavin g fact and value into a seam less garm ent.
T h e re is, th en , quite a strong sense in w h ich an aly tical M arxism is postA lth u sserian M arxism . (S e e C a llin ic o s 1 989a.)
A lt h u s s e r s c r itiq u e o f H e g e lia n M a r x ism h as im p lic a tio n s fo r th e
contem porary debate about m odernity. F or o n e thing, a m ain corollary o f
his argum ent, th e distin ctio n b etw een expressive a n d co m plex to ta litie s, is
o f direct relevan ce to argum ents raised by attack s on to talizin g thought.
M an y o f these attacks, typically o f u ltim ately N ietzsch ean inspiration, are
little m ore th an confused and in co n sisten t rejection s o f any fo rm o f general
theory (se e , fo r e x a m p le , P a tto n 1 9 8 8 ).

But A lt h u s s e r s g e n e a lo g y o f

44

THE A LTH U SSE R IA N LEGA CY

co m p lex to ta lity , his d e m o n stra tio n th a t th e best M a r x ist th o u g h t h as

sough t to u n d erstan d so cial form ation s sim ultan eously as co n crete w holes
and as m u ltip licities o f determ in ation s, provides an im po rtan t rebuttal o f
the argu m en t th at any totalization n ecessarily involves the eradication of
d iffe re n c e . I h a v e alrea d y in d ic a te d th a t h is ow n p o sitiv e a c c o u n t of
co m p le x to tality , develo ped through such co n cep ts as o v erd eterm in atio n
a n d s t r u c t u r a l c a u s a lit y , is u n s a t is f a c t o r y . Its f a u lt s a re , h o w e v e r ,
rem ed iable, a s I h ave tried to show elsew here, particularly on ce w e see th at
c o n c e iv in g a so c ia l fo rm atio n as a m u ltip licity is n ot in c o n siste n t w ith
re co g n izin g a hierarchy o f d e te rm in a tio n w h ich m a te ria list e x p la n a tio n
se ek s to resp ect (see C a llin ic o s 1982, ch s. 5 -7 ). I know t h a t ta lk about
hierarch ies these days is held to be in b ad political taste, but a social theory
w h ich does n ot atten d to the relative causal weight o f different practices,
in stitution s, and ag en ts is strategically w orthless an d co n ce p tu ally em pty.
A lt h u s s e r s c ritiq u e o f H e g e lia n ism is re le v a n t to th e d e b a te a b o u t
m o d e rn ity in a n o th e r re sp ect. H e argu es th a t th e d e c isiv e d iffe re n c e
betw een M arx a n d H eg el is th a t th e latte r co n ce iv es h istory id e o lo g ica lly ,
as the process o f self-realization o f the A b so lu te Idea. T h e p arad o x is that
the su b ject o f this p rocess the A b so lu te is id e n tical with th e circular
structure o f th e dialectic: th a t is w hy there can be n o separation betw een
H egels m eth od and system the m eth od is the system. T h is clearly h as a
bearin g on w h at is fo r H aberm as the central qu estio n in the discourse o f
m odernity, the relation betw een history and reason. In w hat sense is history
the e m b o d im e n t o f re a so n on ce we h a v e a b a n d o n e d th e t e le o lo g ic a l
H egelian dialectic? H ab erm ass answer lies partly in follow ing W eber and
Parsons in seeing the differentiation into distin ct sub-system s (econom y,
polity, etc.) as a form o f genuine, albeit one-sided rationalization, and partly
in tracing the developm en t o f a broader fo rm o f com m unicative rationality:
thus, even m odern, largely decen tred societies m ain tain in their everyday
co m m u n icative action a virtual centre o f self-understanding (1 9 8 5 , p. 3 5 9 ).
Passages such as th is one suggest th at desp ite his frequen t attack s o n the
philosophy o f consciousness H aberm as still tends to co n ceive society as a
m acro-subject, an interpretation encouraged by his propensity to assim ilate
so cial develo pm en t to individual learn in g processes (see H ab erm as 1979).
A lt h u s s e r s r e je c t io n o f H e g e l le a d s h im , u n d e r th e in flu e n c e o f th e
N ietzsch eo-H eid eggerian tradition, to th e opposite extrem e o f co n ceivin g
history as a process w ithout a su b ject, rendering individual or collective
agen cy m ysterious. T h e ration al k ern el this a p p ro ac h nevertheless co n tain s
lies in the insistence th a t so cial theory centers on u n co verin g the objective
stru c tu re s w h ich e n a b le or im p e d e c h a n g e ra th e r th a n o n tr a c in g , as
H aberm as does, th e self-differentiation o f co m m u n icative action .

W H A T IS LIVING A N D W H A T IS DEAD

45

T h is m ay be ju s t a w ay o f sa y in g t h a t A lt h u s s e r re m a in e d a fa irly
orth odo x M a rx ist, w h ile H ab erm as is n o t. H ere lies A lth u sse rs secon d
m ajo r a c h ie v e m e n t, n am ely th a t Reading C ap ital in p articu la r, in Perry
A n d e rso n s w ords, p ion eered closer th eo retical scrutiny o f th e c a n o n s o f
h istorical m aterialism (1 9 8 0 , p. 6 5 ). T o com pare A lth u ssers an d B a lib ars
discussions o f the co n cep ts im bricated in th a t o f m ode o f p rodu ction w ith
the m ost so p h istic a te d c o n trib u tio n s o f earlier M a rx ist p h ilo so p h ers
L u k c s a n d S id n e y H o o k , fo r e x a m p le is to be c o n f r o n t e d w ith a
quantum -leap in the level o f co n ce p tu al p recision and atte n tio n to detail.
A fu n d a m e n ta l w e a k n e ss o f all H a b e r m a ss c r it ic a l d is c u s sio n s o f th e
produ ction p arad igm in M arx ism , from Lab ou r a n d In teraction to The
Philosophical D iscourse o f M odernity, c o n sists in his c o m p le te in co m p re
hension o f the co n ce p t o f p rodu ction relation s on w hich A lth u sser an d
B alib ar fo cu s an d his co n seq u en t co u n ter-p o sitio n o f in stru m en tal and
c o m m u n ic a t iv e a c t io n w it h o u t any u n d e r s t a n d in g o f the e s s e n t i a l
m ediatin g role assigned by h istorical m aterialism to the social relation s of
effective control over th e produ ctive forces and the form s o f exp lo itatio n
an d class struggle to w hich they give rise.
T o stress th e im p o rtan ce o f A lth u s se r s a n d B a lib a rs a n a ly se s o f th e
b asic co n cep ts o f h istorical m aterialism is n o t o f course to assert th a t they
are u n p rob lem atic. M o st ob viou sly, A lth u sser an d his co llab orators no
doubt in part b ec au se o f th e in flu e n ce on them o f M a o ism ten d e d to
assig n c a u sa l p rim a cy to p ro d u c tio n re la tio n s, re d u c in g th e p ro d u ctiv e
forces to m ere effects a th eo retical m o v e w hose disastrous consequ en ces
are am ply d em on strated by the first two volum es o f C h arles B e tte lh e im s
C lass Struggles in the U S S R . In th is resp ect C o h e n s K arl M a r x s Theory of
H istory, w ith the exp lan atory prim acy it accords to th e develo pm en t of the
p r o d u c tiv e fo rc e s, is th e n e c e ss a r y c o u n te rw e ig h t to Reading C a p ita l.
C o h e n , in the preface to h is book , ackn ow ledges th e influence o f For M arx
and p ra ise s B a lib a r s c o n tr ib u tio n to Reading C a p ita l b u t critic iz e s th e
obscu rity o f th e A lth u sseria n idiom , p referring lo g ic a l p o sitiv ism for its
in siste n c e o n p re c isio n o f in te lle c tu a l c o m m itm e n t (1 9 7 8 , x ) . But if
an alytical M arxism h as, as its nam e suggests, ch o sen to express itself in a
vocabulary derived from the dom inan t form s o f tw entieth-century Englishsp eak in g philosophy, it h as co n tin u ed th e p roject initiated by A lth u sser,
n am ely , in th e w ords o f W rig h t (h im se lf a form er A lth u s se r ia n ), th e
sy ste m a tic in te r ro g a tio n a n d c la r ific a tio n o f b a sic c o n c e p ts a n d th e ir
recon stru ction in to a m ore co h eren t th eo retical structure (1 9 8 5 , p. 2 ). In
this se n se also , an aly tical M arxism is p ost-A lth u sserian M arxism , exp lorin g
a th eo retical space created by the d em o litio n o f H egelian ism .

46

TH E ALTH USSER.IAN LEGACY

T h is is n o t to gloss over the real differences betw een A lth u sser and the
a n a ly tic a l M a r x is ts , w h ic h c o n c e rn m a tte r s o f su b sta n c e as w ell as o f
p h ilo so p h ic a l idiom . I sh all refer m erely to on e issue, w here th e m erits
seem to lie m ore w ith A lth u sser than w ith the a n a ly tic a l M arxists. O ne
re a so n for the l a t t e r s w illin g n e ss to em p lo y c o n c e p ts and p ro ce d u re s
d e riv ed from a n a ly tic a l p h ilo so p h y a n d from m a in stre a m so c ia l sc ie n c e
(ratio n a l-ch o ic e theory, for ex am p le) is th e b elief th e y ten d to share th at
there is n o d istin ctiv e M arxist m ethod (see, fo r exam ple, Levine 1986, p.
728 n. 2 5 ). A s a re je c tio n o f the e x a g g e ra te d an d u ltim a tely fo rm alist
id e n tific a tio n o f M arx ism w ith m e th o d w h ose m ost ex trem e ex am p le is
p ro v id e d by H istory and C lass C on sciou sn ess, but w hich w as also q u ite
com m on during the heyday o f A lth u sserian ism (th e classic case is H in d ess
and H irsts Precapitalist M odes o f Production, rapid ly co n su m ed by an a u to
c r it i q u e w h ic h r e f le c t e d , a m o n g o t h e r t h i n g s , a k in d o f fre n z y o f
m e th od ological purity), this eclecticism is com preh en sib le. B ut it carries
w ith it the dan ger, m ost fully realized in E lste rs a n d R o em e rs work, o f so
fr a g m e n tin g M a r x ism as to d e p riv e it o f a n y d is tin c t id e n tity , w h ose
co n sequ en ces a re evid en t in th e w holesale collapse o f an aly tical M arxism
in to varian ts o f so cial dem ocracy. In th is respect, A lth u sse rs insistence,
m o st o b v io u sly by m ean s o f th e co n ce p ts o f p ro b le m atic an d ep istem o lo g ic a l b re ak , th at M a rx ism is a th e o re tic a l d isco u rse c h a ra cte riz e d by
certain sy stem atic properties w hose rem oval would lead to its dissolu tion
re tain s its im portance.
T h ese co n cepts fin d their p lace w ithin A lth u sse rs third m ain co n trib u
tion, n am ely his attem p t to situate M arxist theory w ithin a general, a n ti
e m p iric ist a n d n o n - p o sitiv is t p h ilo so p h y o f sc ie n c e . H e was a b le , in
s e e k in g to e s ta b lish th e s c ie n tific ity o f M a rx , to draw on th e F re n c h
e p istem o lo gical tradition o f B ach elard , C a v a ill s a n d C an gu ilh em , whose
sign ifican ce lay in the p roject o f continuin g C o m te s program o f a history o f
the sciences, but on e w hich gave prim acy to the co n cep tu al elab oration of
sc ie n tific d isco u rse s rath e r th an to th e ir im m e d ia te c o rre sp o n d e n c e to
se n se -e x p e rie n c e (e v e n w h en p h e n o m e n o lo g ic a lly re d u c e d ). A lth u sse r
to o k o v er v ario u s B ach elard ian them es, tran spo sin g th e idea th a t a science
co n stitu te s itself by b reakin g w ith co m m on sense into th e co n ce p t o f an
ep istem ological beak betw een science and ideology. H is ow n epistem ology,
o f c o u rse , h a s its stre n g th s a n d w e a k n e sse s. T h u s th e m u c h -d e rid e d
d istin ctio n betw een real and th ou gh t-ob ject m eets o n e requirem ent for any
r e a l i s t a c c o u n t o f s c i e n c e , n a m e ly t h a t th e t h e o r e t i c a l c o n c e p t s
ch aracteristic o f a science are likely to differ sharply form those co n cepts
w hich correspond directly to im m ediate exp erience. A lth u ssers insistence,
how ever, on the self-validatin g ch aracter o f th e o re tica l discourses p revents

W H A T IS LIVING A N D W H AT IS DEAD

47

: him from givin g due w eight to an oth er such requirem ent, n am ely th e need
for som e criterion by m eans o f w h ich it is possible to estab lish an at least
ap p ro x im a te co rre sp o n d en ce b etw een th o u g h t O b je c t an d real o b je ct.
Imre L a k a to ss m eth odology o f scien tific research program s seem s to m e the
best available accou n t o f how both requirem ents can be properly fulfilled.
W h atever on e m ay feel ab ou t th e lim itatio n s o f A lth u sse rs epistem ology, it is in a different leagu e from H a b e rm a ss discussions o f th e sciences.
T h e se h a v e n ever su cc e e d e d in lib e ra tin g th e m se lv e s fro m th e m align
i n f l u e n c e o f n e o - K a n t i a n i s m a n d o f t h e e a r ly F r a n k f u r t s c h o o l s
identification o f the E n ligh ten m en t w ith instrum en tal reason . T h e result is
an in stru m e n ta list a c c o u n t o f th e p h y sic a l sc ie n c e s as a co m p o n e n t o f
n a t u r e - d o m i n a t i n g p u r p o s i v e - r a t i o n a l a c t i o n an d a d e n i a l o f th e
m eth od ological unity o f the sciences. T h e term s in w h ich these m istaken
positions are .form ulated h ave ch an ge d over tim e, from the highly doubtful
n otion o f k n o w le d g e -co n stitu tin g in terests to th e d istin c tio n H ab erm as
n ow draw s betw een different k in d s o f ration ality on th e basis o f his theory
o f c o m m u n ic a tiv e a c tio n . But la c k in g in all v e rsio n s are th e in sigh ts
A lth u sse r w as ab le to a rtic u la te th e c o n stitu tio n o f every th e o re tic a l
discourse by c e rta in im p licit q u estio n s (th e A lth u sse ria n p ro b lem atic or
L a k a to sia n heuristic) w hich allow it, under th e right co n d ition s, to develop
an in te rn a l h isto ry govern ed by w h at C o llin g w o o d called the logic o f
question and answ er rather th an by any ex te rn al im peratives, a dynam ic
w hose u n d erstan din g is essential to any accou n t o f th e objectivity o f all the
scien ces, p h y sical an d so cial alik e. T h e ab sen ce o f any sense fo r th ese
general featu res o f scien tific discou rse in H a b e rm a ss w ork is a sad reflection
o f the d a m a g e c a u s e d by R o m a n t i c i s m in G e r m a n p h ilo s o p h y , a n d
u n d erm in es h is a tte m p t to p ro v id e a p h ilo so p h ic a l d e fe n se o f m o d ern
reason.
T h e se , th en , are th e three re sp ects in w h ich I b eliev e A lth u sse r has
m ade a la s t in g c o n t r ib u t io n th e c r itiq u e o f H e g e lia n M a r x ism , th e
co n ceptu al clarification o f h isto rical m aterialism , and th e elab oration o f a
realist p h ilosop h y o f scien ce. T o stress these ach ievem en ts is n ot to deny
th at there were others, but th ese for ex am p le, his theory o f ideology
seem to be generally cases where, after the m ystical husk has been rem oved,
th e r a t io n a l k e rn e l p ro v e s to be ra th e r sm a ll. It is w orth n o tin g , in
conclusion , th at the effect o f A lth u sse rs in terven tio n is to leave M arxist
ph ilo sop h y itself in a som ew hat u n certain position. S o lo n g as th ere was a
d istin c tiv e c o n c e p tio n o f a m a te r ia list m e th o d e x tr a c te d from H e g e ls
Logic, then M arxist ph ilosoph y h ad a secure status as the guardian o f the
d ialectic. B ut on ce A lth u sser h ad driven H egel out, w hat was the rationale
o f th is d isc o u rse ? A lt h u s s e r s tw o a tte m p ts to r e h a b ilita te d ia le c tic a l

THE A LTH U SSE R IA N LEGACY

48

m a te ria lism , first as th e T h eo ry o f th e o re tic a l p ra c tic e and then as the

p roletarian class struggle in theory, were n o t great successes. O n e problem
w ith the secon d defin ition o f ph ilosop h y was th a t its th eo retical co n ten t
seem ed to co m e dow n to a d e fen ce o f realism -the thesis th a t reality is
prior to but know able by thou gh t undoubtedly a w orthw hile task, but n ot
on e reserv ed e x c lu siv e ly for M a rx ists, as my in v o c a tio n o f the w ork o f
L a k a t o s , a f e r v e n t a n t i - M a r x i s t , s h o u ld i n d ic a t e . P e r h a p s M a r x is t
p h ilosop h ers are left w ith the role o f L o ck ea n underlaborers ex p licatin g and
clarifying the th eoretical fram ew ork o f h isto rical m aterialism . T h e record
o f an aly tical M arxism in the past decade shows th at this activity can be a
fertile on e thou gh this cu rren ts p o litica l trajectory also u nderlines th at
co n ce p tu al analysis is n ot an in n ocen t p ractice. T h is is hardly a surprising
discovery it is, after all, w hat A lth u sser tau gh t us to expect. S o perhaps
there is still scope for the class struggle in theory. A t any rate, it does seem
as if we sh ou ld see A lth u sser as co n trib u tin g to the g e n e ra l d e fla tio n o f
ph ilosop h y th a t is so strik in g a feature o f late tw entieth-century in tellectual
life.

W orks C ited
A lth u sse r , L ., (1 9 7 0 ) M a r x s R e la t io n to H e g e l, in Politics a n d H isto ry (L o n d o n : N L B , 1 9 7 2 ).
A lth u ss e r , L ., an d B a lib a r , E ., (1 9 6 8 ) R eading C a p ita l (L o n d o n : N L B , 1 9 7 0 ).
A n d e rs o n , P ., (1 9 8 0 ) A rgum en ts within English M arx ism (L o n d o n : V e rs o , 1 9 8 0 ).
B a lib a r , E ., (1 9 7 8 ) Irra tio n a lism a n d M a rx ism , N e w L eft Review 1 0 7 ( 1 9 7 8 ) .
B e n to n , T ., (1 9 8 4 ) Th e Rise an d F all o f Stru ctu al M arx ism (L o n d o n : M a c m illa n , 1 9 8 4 ).
C a llin ic o s , A ., (1 9 7 6 ) A lth u ssers M arx ism (L o n d o n : P lu to , 1 9 7 6 ).
C a llin ic o s , A ., (1 9 8 2 ) Is there a Futu re fo r M a rx ism ? (L o n d o n : M a c m illa n , 1 9 8 2 ).
C a lli n ic o s , A ., ( 1 9 8 9 a ) In t r o d u c tio n , t o C a lli n ic o s , e d ., M a rx ist T h eory (O x fo r d : O x fo r d
U n iv e r sity P ress, 1 9 8 9 ).
C a llin ic o s , A ., (1 9 8 9 b ) P ostm odem ity an d Revolution (C a m b rid g e : P o lity , 1 9 8 9 ).
C o h e n , G .A ., (1 9 7 8 ) K a r l M a r x s T h eory o f H isto ry a D efen ce (O x fo r d : C la r e n d o n P ress,
1 9 7 8 ).
E llio tt, G ., (1 9 8 7 ) A lth usser the D eto u r o f T h eory (L o n d o n : V e rso , 1 9 8 7 ).
Ferry, L ., a n d R e n a u t, A ., (1 9 8 5 ) L a Pense 6 8 (P a ris: G a llim a r d , 1 9 8 5 ).
G e r a s , N ., (1 9 7 2 ) A lth u s s e r s M a r x ism , N ew L eft Review 71 (1 9 7 2 ) .
G lu c k sm a n n , A ., (1 9 6 7 ) A V e n tr ilo q u ist S tr u c tu r a lism , N e w L eft Review 7 2 ( 1 9 7 2 ) .
H a b e rm a s, J ., (1 9 7 9 ) C om m un ication an d the Evolution o f Society (L o n d o n : H e in e m a n n , 1 9 7 9 ).
H a b e rm a s, J., (1 9 8 5 ) Th e Philosoph icalD iscourse o f M odernity (C a m b rid g e : P o lity , 1 9 8 7 ).
H a b e rm a s, J ., (1 9 8 6 ) A uton om y an d Solidarity (L o n d o n : V e rso 1 9 8 6 ).
H a r m a n , C ., (1 9 8 8 ) Th e Fire L a s t T im e (L o n d o n : B o o k m a rk s, 1 9 8 8 ).
L e v in e , A .E ., (1 9 8 6 ) R e v ie w o f J. E lste r, M ak in g S en se o f M a r x , in Jo u r n a l o f Philosophy 8 3
(1 9 8 6 ).

W H A T IS LIVING A N D W H A T IS DEAD

49

P atto n , P. ( 1 9 8 8 ) M a rx ism a n d B e y o n d ?, in C . N e ls o n a n d L. G r o s s b e r g , ed s., M arx ism an d

the Interpretation o f C u ltu re (H o u n d m ills: M a c m illa n , 1 9 8 8 ).
T h o m p so n , E .P ., (1 9 7 8 ) The Poverty o f Theory an d O th er E ssay s (L o n d o n : M e r lin , 1 9 7 8 ).
W rig h t, E. O ., (1 9 8 5 ) C la sse s (L o n d o n : V e rso , 1 9 8 5 ).

Warren Montag

Spinoza and Althusser Against

Hermeneutics: Interpretation
or Intervention?
D espite the fact th at Spin oza was am on g the m ost im portant reference
p o in ts fo r F re n c h p h ilo s o p h ic a l and p o litic a l r e fle c tio n in the six tie s
(especially the now m uch criticized an ti-h u m an ist offensive o f th at tim e),
his n am e is strik in g ly an d th e re fo re sy m p to m a tic a lly a b se n t from th e
A n glo-A m erican w ork th a t tak e s or at least claim s to ta k e its inspiration
from th e F ren ch . T h is ab sen ce takes on even greater sign ifican ce w hen we
n ote th at H egel, N ietzsch e an d H eid egger h av e p roven co m p atib le with
the A n glo -A m erican recon stru ction o f F ren ch anti-h um anism , m ore easily
assim ilated in to its th eoretical (an d p o litical) p roject. O f course, S p in o z a s
sin gular fate is n o t too surprising: H egel, H eidegger an d N ietzsch e were
already present in A n g lo -A m e ric a n p h ilo so p h ical culture, even by m ean s o f
an an tiqu ated, n aive readin g th a t was su p p lan ted by the o th e r H e g el, th e
n ew N ie t z s c h e a n d m ost re c e n tly , th e F re n ch H e id e g g e r. N o su c h
p rim ary re a d in g p re c e d e d an d th e re fo re m ad e p o ssib le a r e c e p tio n o f
Spin oza. A n g lo - A m e r ic a n p h ilo so p h y , at least fo r th e la st on e h u n d red
years, h a s found S p in o z a un in telligib le. E v en th e m ore re ce n t ten dency in
c ritica l th ou gh t w h ich sees its very raison d tre as th e c o n te s ta tio n or
decon struction o f the certitudes o f an aly tic p hilosophy h as n oth in g to say
abou t Spin oza even as their F ren ch coun terparts speak co n stan tly o f him .
W hat is it t h a t renders S p in o z a u n th in k ab le for A n g lo -A m eric an thou gh t
even in its divergence?
O f all th e p h ilo so p h ers in France in th e six tie s n o n e is m ore closely
a sso c ia te d w ith S p in o z a th a n A lth u sse r . T o sp eak o f th e in flu e n c e o f
S pin oza on A lth u sse r is alread y to g ra n t a c o n c e p tu a l regim e th a t b o th
thinkers refused. T h e term influence does n ot b egin to capture th e way
in w h ic h a n im p o r t a n t p a r t o f A lt h u s s e r 's w o rk is i t s e l f S p in o z is t ,
c o n stitu tin g a th e o re tic a l p ro je ct p rofou n d ly in tern al to the co n c e p tu a l
sp ace delim ited by S p in o za's w orks. O f course, as A lth u sser h im se lf h as
said, th is ta k in g o f p o sitio n s w as n ever sim p ly th e resu lt o f a p e rso n a l
c h o ice. It w as ra th e r th a t so m e th in g o f S p in o z a 's th e o re tic a l stru ggle,
m odified by the re la tio n sh ip o f th e o re tic a l forces th a t ch aracterized th e

52

TH E A LTH U SSE R IA N LEG A C Y

la tte r h a lf o f th e se v e n te e n th century, re p e ate d itse lf in the th e o re tica l

co n ju n c tu re o f 1 9 6 0 s F ran ce. T h is repetition , or retu rn o f th e repressed,
sign alled a n d co n tin u es to sign al th e ex isten ce o f a c o n flic t to be analyzed.
T o m ake m atters ev en m ore com plicated , A lth u sser said very little directly
about Sp in o za in. his published works: aside from a brief ch apter in Essays in
Self-C riticism on h is S p in o z ist d e v ia tio n , th e re are n o m o re th a n b rie f
references scattered throughout his works. A m o n g these b rie f references, I
w ant to focus on on e in particular from Reading Capital.
A lth u sser writes in th at p lace: th e first m an ever to pose the problem o f
reading and in co n sequ en ce, o f writing, was Sp in o za, and he was the first
m an in the world to h ave proposed b oth a theory o f history and philosophy
o f th e o p acity o f the im m ediate. W ith him, fo r the first tim e ever, a m an
lin ked togeth er in this way the essence o f readin g and the essence o f history
in a theory o f th e difference betw een the im aginary an d the true. 1 O n first
readin g, this p assage would seem to m an ifest the th eo reticism for w h ich
A lth u sse rs critics rep ro ach ed h im a n d w h ich he h im self recognized as on e
o f his errors. T h e ap p aren t elevation o f readin g to a status eq ual to th at o f a
th e o ry o f h isto ry or the k n o w led g e o f w ritin g , o f te x ts , to th at o f the
know ledge o f th e class struggle would seem to sign al the erasure o f nondiscursive or m aterial reality and its rep lacem en t by an in finite, seam less
discursivity w ithout oth er or outside.
H ow ever, if we take th is adm itted ly ellip tical p assage a n d recon stru ct
t h e a n a ly s is o f S p in o z a t h a t fo rm s its c o n d it i o n o f p o s s ib i l it y and
in te llig ib ility , we w ill fin d q u ite th e o p p o site : n o t an in te rp re ta tio n o f
Sp in o za bu t an in terven tio n in the relation sh ip o f forces that governs his
text, ta k in g the side o f ce rtain h y p oth eses aga in st oth ers, p u sh in g these
h y p o th eses to extrem e co n clu sion s, tow ards the d ism an tlin g o f a th eoretical
app aratus in w h ich the n otion s o f tran scen d en ce, im m ateriality or ideality
are do m in an t. T h is in terven tio n produ ces a m aterialism so th orough goin g
th a t it rem ains fo r A lth u ssers critics, as fo r S p in o z a s three hundred years
earlier, illegible and unthinkable.
L e t us now turn to th e theory o f readin g an d o f w riting th at A lth usser
fou n d so re v o lu tio n a ry in th e history o f p h ilo so p h y . It is sta te d in the
s e v e n t h c h a p t e r o f S p i n o z a s T r a c ta tu s T h e o lo g ic o -P o litic u s: O f th e
In terpretation o f Scrip tu re. 2 O n e o f th e m a jo r o b jectiv es o f th e work is to
analyze and thereby dim in ish the power o f superstition. S u p erstition , the
ch ain o f ideas th at perm its m en to fight as bravely for servitude as fo r their
ow n w ell-bein g and to co un t it n ot sh am e b u t the h igh est glory to risk
th eir lives for the van ity o f a ty ran t, is b ased on a rejection o f nature, o f
w h at is, in favor o f w hat is above, beyond or b eh in d it, th at is, in favor o f
w h at is n o t .3 S p in o z a , by c o n tra st, so u g h t to c o m b a t s u p e r s titio n by

SPINOZA A N D A LT H U SSE R

53

elim in a tin g th e su p ern atu ral an d th e tra n sc e n d e n ta l. In the Ethics, he

posited a world w hose essence entirely coincided w ith its existence, a world
o f actu ality w ithout p o ten tial, a w orld w ithout an outside or a beyond. It
was fo r th is reason th at the phrase D eus sive N atu ra, w hose p aren th etical
ch a ra cter b elied its im p o rta n c e b o th fo r S p in o z a a n d fo r his c ritics, so
sc a n d a liz e d h is a g e a n d s e e m e d to su m m a riz e w h a t B a y le c a lle d h is
system atic ath eism .4
H ow to conceptu alize n ature (o f w hich the h u m an was part and in no
way a kingdom w ithin a k in gd o m ) w ithout recourse to the category o f
tran scen d en ce w h ich w ould re n d er n atu re su scep tib le to a h erm en eu tic
reading: it is to this th a t A lth u sse r refers in his p h rase th e op acity o f the
im m ediate. Further, the id e n tification o f this ob jectiv e renders intelligible
S p i n o z a s f i r s t p r o p o s i t i o n c o n c e r n i n g th e m e t h o d o f s c r i p t u r a l
in terpretation in the Tractatus: th e know ledge o f scripture m ust b e sought
from scripture alon e ju st as the know ledge o f natu re is sough t on ly from
n ature. 5 It is useless to look b eh in d or beyond Scrip tu re for the h idd en
p resen ce th at w ould be th e tru th to w h ich it m ust be reduced. Like n ature,
a text is entirely co in cid en t w ith its actu al ex isten ce, it is a surface w ithout
depth , w ithout a reservoir o f h erm en eu tic p o te n tia l.6 A ll th at scripture is,
is displayed fo r an y o n e to see. A n d so the herm en eutic m ethod, the m ethod
proper to the institution alized su p erstition th at Spinoza sough t to unm ask,
must reject the actuality o f Scrip tu re, ju st as it does the actuality o f nature,
in favor o f u ltim ate en ds and divin e purposes, thu s co u n terp o isin g w hat
ou gh t to be to w hat is. In the sam e way th at superstition adds to n atu re the
a n th r o p o m o r p h ic p r o je c t io n s th a t are n o w h e re to be fo u n d in it, so
su perstition adds to Scrip tu re profou nd m ysteries to justify the desp otism
that it upholds.
Sp in o za con fers a su b stan tiality or a m ateriality on Scrip tu re eq u al to
th at o f n atu re itself. It is n ot to be n egated or denied. Scripture does n ot
represent or express a m ore prim ary reality; it is itself fully and irreducibly
real. T h is irreducibility m ust be gran ted at th e ou tset for it to be know n.
S crip tu re is n o m ore the allegorical figu ration o f a hidd en T ru th th a n is
n a tu r e ; its m e a n in g is th u s d iv o r c e d fro m all n o t io n s o f r e f le c t io n ,
r e p re se n ta tio n o r re fe re n c e in so fa r a s th e se term s im ply a h ie ra rc h ic a l
relation betw een, for ex am p le, th e represen tatio n a n d w h at is represented.
A t the sam e tim e, the in ju n ctio n scriptura so la , from scripture alon e, in
no sense n egates or subsum es the su b stan tiality o f nature. R ath er, scripture
an d n a tu re are, to use S p in o z a s p h ra se fro m the E th ics, p a r a lle l an d
th e re fo re e q u a lly m a te r ia l. A s S p in o z a a rg u e d in th e T reatise on the
Em endation o f the Intellect, n am es or ideas are n o t redu cible to th in gs or
objects: Peter, fo r exam ple, is so m eth in g real; but a true idea o f Peter is an

54

THE A LTH U SSERIA N LEGA CY

o b je c tiv e e sse n c e o f Peter an d so m e th in g real in itself, an d a lto g e th e r

different from Peter h im self.7 A s different, S p in o z a will add, as a triangle
from a circle.
T h e o b jectiv e, m aterial existen ce o f Scrip tu re is ch aracterized first o f all
by th e lan gu age in w h ich it w as w ritten, n am ely H ebrew . T h e p recise
n ature and properties o f the H ebrew langu age, and e v e n m ore its history,
m ak e o f th e Scrip tu re w h at it is. In order to estab lish the m e an in g o f ea c h
p assage an d o f th e words o f w h ich the passages are co m prised , we m ust
forsake a ll recourse to the truth, i.e., the truth o f nature (or o f w hat w as for
Spin oza the sam e, G o d ), a truth extern al to the tex t itself. For any attem pt
to bring the scripture into conform ity w ith an extern al reality would be to
deny the reality o f the scripture itself, and to abandon th at specific reason
th at ack n ow led ges n o fou ndation but Scrip tu re .
A t th is p o in t, we m ay pose a very S p in o z is t q u e stio n : w h at c a u se s
in terp retation to se ek the m ean in g or tru th o f Scrip tu re outside th e very
object th a t is to be know n? T h e answ er to this question o f course is th e key
to the history n ot o f Scripture but o f the interpretation s that, accordin g to
Spin ozist principles, must them selves possess an in depen den t existence. For
a th o ro u g h k n o w led g e o f H eb rew w ill force th e re a d e r to co n fro n t an
inescap able fa c t o f Scrip tu ral existence. It is traversed from b egin n in g to
end w ith o b scu rities, in c o n sisten cies an d c o n tra d ic tio n s. K n o w led ge o f
H ebrew , far from dispelling these difficulties, only places them more clearly
in relief. Spin oza adduces an entire series o f com plexities derived from the
nature o f B iblical Hebrew. T h e absence o f vow els and p un ctuation renders
e v e n the d iv isio n o f th e t e x t into d is tin c t se n te n c e s. T h e o rd er a n d
c o h e r e n c e o f th e t e x t h as b ee n im p o se d or a d d ed to it by su b se q u e n t
g e n e r a t io n s o f re a d e r s a n d m ust th e r e fo r e be r e je c te d a t th e o u tse t.
K now ledge therefore does n ot lead us from the appearan ce o f disorder to a
h id d en o rig in a l sim p lic ity an d purity, but rath e r to th e recov ery o f the
com plexity proper to Scripture itself.
B u t a sp ecialized k n o w led ge o f H ebrew is n o t n ece ssary to grasp the
disorder o f the n arrative itself. For this specific disorder is equally apparent
in translation to, as Spin oza puts it, anyone w ho pays a tte n tio n . If we do
now w ilfully b lin d ou rselv es to th e o b je c tiv e e x iste n c e o f the T orah or
Pentateuch, we will see the way in w hich all the histories and precepts in
these five b ook s are set dow n p rom iscu o u sly an d w ith ou t order w ith no
regard to dates; and further how the sam e story is o ften repeated, som etim es
in a different version; th a t all the m aterials were prom iscuously collected
an d h e a p e d t o g e t h e r . A n d ju s t as la t e r g e n e r a t io n s s u p p lie d th e
gram m atical co h eren ce th at the tex t itself lack ed , so h ave gen eration s o f
c o m m e n ta to rs a tte m p te d to h arm on ize the d isp a ra te an d in c o m p atib le
n arrative m aterials o f w hich the Scripture is com posed.

SPINO ZA A N D A LT H U SSE R

55

Further, Sp in o za discovers yet an o th er m ode o f S crip tu ral com plexity:

that o f doctrine itself. S crip tu re n ow h ere teach es exp licitly an d as etern al
doctrine the n atu re o f G o d , his m an n e r o f providin g for th in gs and sim ilar
d octrin es; on the contrary we h ave show n th a t th e p ro p h ets th em selves did
not agree on such su bjects; therefore we must n o t lay dow n as scriptural any
doctrine concern in g such su b je cts. 10
A n d so th e m ethod th at p o sits the irreducible m ateriality o f the text
c o n str u c ts th e o b je c t to be k n o w n as a c o m p o site m ad e o f n a r r a tiv e
m aterials from d iffere n t tim es a n d p la c e s, a n d e v e n d ifferen t la n gu ages
whose very co e x iste n c e in a sin gle tex t b eco m es a p ro b lem to be exp lain ed .
W e m ay also see one o f the m ajo r prin ciples u n d erly in g the en tire tradition
o f Scrip tu ral in terp re ta tio n . It is based on a fu n d a m en ta l den ial o f the
objective m aterial existence o f the S crip tu re; its very reason for being is to
ex p lain aw ay the a n ta g o n ism s an d in c o n siste n c ie s th at the text all too
op en ly displays. E v en th e greatest co m m e n ta to rs su ch as M aim o n id es in
th e More Nebuchim are guilty o f b rin g in g co n trad iction s to lig h t on ly the
better to exp lain th em away, to restore the text's harm on y and qu iet the
doubts o f the perp lexed . T h e re jectio n o f the Scrip tu re as it is and as it can
be read by anyone n ecessitates the p rodu ction o f a su pertextu al m ean in g
(a n a lo g o u s to the s u p e r n a tu r a l m e a n in g a d d e d to th e w o rld by the
m ech an ism s o f su p erstitio n ) a v a ila b le on ly to the in itia ted and guarded
over by the in stitu tion s o f e cclesiastical authority.
In an im portan t sense, S pin ozas in terpretation o f Scrip tu re is n ot the
sam e o p e r a tio n th a t h e d e sc rib e s in o th e rs. In so fa r as he r e je c ts the
reduction o f Scrip tu re to n ature or reason (just as he rejects th e reduction
o f n atu re to scripture), he speaks o f an ob je ct, an objective existen ce th at
th e oth ers do n ot, can n o t, or will n ot see.
B u t th is in te r v e n tio n its e lf requ ired a n o th e r, se p a ra te in te r v e n tio n
w hose im po rtan ce for th e T ractatus h a s n o t b een sufficiently recognized.
S p in o z a w a s n o t t h e f ir s t to p o s i t t h e i r r e d u c i b il i t y o f S c r i p t u r a l
co n trad iction . N early twenty years earlier T h o m a s H ob b es brough t to bear
on Scrip tu re th e very m e th o d h e em ployed to arrive at a k n o w led ge o f
n atu re: th e resolu to-com p ositive m eth od . S o in C h a p te r 33 o f th e Leviathan
he divided Scrip tu re into its elem en ts as he would any corporeal entity and
inquires in to the N u m b er, A n tiq u ity , S co p e , A u th o rity , and Interpreters
o f the book s o f the H oly S crip tu re . " For H ob b es as for Spin oza the words
and se n te n c e s o f w h ich th e S c rip tu re is co m p rised n o longer re v e a l or
c o n c e a l m e a n in g s d e e p e r th a t th e m se lv e s . In ste a d , they c o n g e a l in to
objects w hich can .be investigated.
H obbes, too, does n ot fail to fin d co n trad icto ry assertion s a n d in co n sis
tencies. M oses, for exam ple, speaks o f his ow n burial in D eu teron om y, a

56

THE A LT H U SSE R IA N LEG A CY

b ook attribu ted to him , so m eth in g even a p rop h et m ight fin d difficult to
d o .12 T o cast doubt on the auth orsh ip o f the Scrip tu re, to recognize th at it
is a com posite artifact, the work o f m any h an ds an d m any m inds, is to cast
doubt on its very auth en ticity .
B ut (an d th is is w hat separates H ob b es from S pin oza) , the differen ces
in tern a l to the Scrip tu re ultim ately call in to qu estio n its ex isten ce as a text
a n d therefore render it un in terpretab le, a m ystery. T h e rad ical absence o f
organ ic unity n ece ssita tes the m ed iatin g fu n ctio n o f th e S o v e re ign who,
th ro u g h th e in s tit u t io n o f th e e s t a b lis h e d c h u r c h , w ill b rin g t e x t u a l
c o n flic ts a n d a n ta g o n ism s in to an a r tific ia l u n ity p o sse sse d fin ally o f a
(artificial) m ean in g. H obbes therefore needs mystery. H e must suspend his
se a rc h for an in terp re tiv e m e th o d in Leviathan at this p o in t b ec au se to
p r o c e e d any fu r th e r to w a rd s a r a t io n a lity p r o p e r to S c r ip tu r e w o u ld
u n d e r c u t th e very a u th o rity w h ose e x is te n c e th e m ystery o f S c r ip tu re
ju stifies and m akes necessary.
Spin oza, enem y o f m ysteries an d o p p o n e n t o f servitude, was free from
th e c o n s tr a in ts t h a t p re v e n te d H o b b e s fro m d e v e lo p in g a m e th o d o f
r e a d in g p ro p er to S c rip tu re . In his h a n d s, te x tu a l c o n tra d ic tio n s w ere
revealed to be th e m arks o f th e co n stitu tio n o f th e Scrip tu re as a m aterial
artifac t: its h istorical and auth orial diversity (th e p roblem o f the cortipiling
o f Scriptu re) an d the transform ation s it h as u n d ergon e as a text.
Spin oza takes the exam ple o f C h rists statem en t, B u t if a m an strike you
on th e right ch eek, turn to h im the left a lso . 1 T h e statem en t constitutes
an ab rog ation o f the law o f M oses, the n o tio n th a t an eye sh ould be given
an eye. 14 R a th e r th an attem p t to distort th ese co u n terp osed doctrines into
agreem ent through a herm en eutic procedure (w h ich adds to the text w hat
it claim s to d iscover in it), Spin oza accepts the con trad iction as irreducible
an d p ro ce ed s to e x p la in it by se ek in g its cau se . H e fin d s th a t w h ereas
M oses stro ve to found a w ell-ordered co m m o n w ealth a n d to o rd ain law s as
a legislator, C h rists p recep t o f Su b m issio n to injuries was on ly valid in
p lace s w h ere ju stice is n eg lec ted a n d in tim e o f o p p ressio n bu t d o es n o t
h o ld good in a w ell-ordered state. 15 N e ith e r m ystery n or m etaphor, n eith er
indeterm in ate (an d thus u n intelligible) co n tra d ictio n nor h id d en (because
su p ertextu al) u n ity: the te x t is in telligib le b ecau se o f th e co n tra d ictio n s
th a t co n stitu te its h istorical an d m aterial reality.
Spin oza h ad produced, and his critics in F ran ce an d E n gland from 16771 7 2 0 w ere w e ll aw are o f it, a n o tio n o f th e m a te r ia lity o f w ritin g , o f
S c r ip tu r e .16 B u t th a t did n o t m ean oth ers, lik e H o b b es b e fo re h im an d
R ich a rd S im o n afterw ards, could n ot occupy th e sam e p ositio n to exp loit it,
to turn it again st itself by p rod u cin g new m ysteries th e b etter to u phold
authority.

SPINOZA A N D A LTH U SSE R

57

N ow w e m ay see why A lth u sser accorded such im portance to S p in o z as

theory o f reading. In our own tim e a n um ber o f theories h ave en tered the
field again st the n o tio n th at literary (an d p h ilo so p h ical) texts are unified
a n d c o h e r e n t. In so fa r as th e se t h e o r ie s re fu se to n e g a te or d e n y th e
m ateriality o f the te x tu a l su rfa c e , they draw a lin e o f d e m a rc a tio n th a t
separates th e m from a certain id e alism o f th e text.
Bu t th e struggle does n o t en d th e re; it is sim ply reproduced in a new
form . W h e n A lth u sser proposed th e n o tio n o f th e sym ptom atic readin g o f
M arx , a n o tio n w h ic h stressed th e n ecessarily co n trad icto ry ch aracter o f
th eoretical tex ts, n o t as a fault for w hich th e y m ight be reproached bu t as
th e very p rin c ip le o f th e ir in te llig ib ility , h is sta te m e n ts c o n stitu te d an
in terven tion again st tw o d istin c t th eoretical adversaries sim ultaneously. For
it was n ot sim ply th e partisan s o f textu al unity or coherence, w hether the
h e r m e n e u t i c r e a d e r s w h o s o u g h t th e p o ly s e m y o f th e t e x t or th e
structuralists w ho described the system proper to every text, against w hom
A lth u sse r a rgu ed . A lth u s se r a lso drew a lin e o f d e m a rc a tio n b etw een
h im self a n d th ose w h o would e x p lo it th e n o tio n o f th e a n tago n istic and
con flictu al ch aracter o f texts in order to declare them unknow able, beyond
the grasp o f any rationality w hatever. T w en ty years after Reading Capital,
this ten d en cy h as grow n im m easu rably stronger, its p artisan s ce leb ratin g
im m a te r ia lity an d in d e te r m in a c y in o rd e r, lik e th o se w h o e x p lo ite d
Sp in o za, to tran sfo rm literary a n d p h ilo so p h ic a l te x ts in to in e x p licab le,
m ir a c u lo u s e x i s t e n c e s w h ic h i n c it e us to w o n d e r w h ile r e m a in in g
necessarily unknow able.
A lth u sser was sp eak in g as a Spin ozist w hen, in the essay Ideology and
Id eo lo g ic al S ta te A p p a r a tu se s, h e argu ed that m atter ex ists in different
m odalities. T h is statem en t allow ed h im to p osit the m aterial existen ce o f
ideology. It, in turn, allow s us to posit the m ateriality o f w riting, to speak
o f a d isc u r siv e m a te r ia lity . T h is n o t io n is th e very c o n d itio n o f our
know ledge o f literary texts, a n d o f discursive form s in general. If we have
n ot progressed further tow ards a theory o f literary p roduction , it is because
th is p artic u la r m a te ria lity re m a in s to b e sp e c ifie d a n d d e fin ed . S u c h a
p r o je c t m ay p la u s ib ly b e g in fo r u s, as it d id fo r A lt h u s s e r , w ith an
un d erstan din g o f Spin oza's heresy, th at is, his th eo retical revolution .

TH E A LT H U SSE R IA N LEGA CY

58

N otes
1. L o u is A lth u s s e r .a n d E tie n n e B a lib a r , R eadin g C a p ita l, tran s. B e n B re w ste r, (L o n d o n :
N e w L e f t B o o k s, 1 9 6 7 ), p . 16.
2. B e n e d ic t d e S p in o z a , A T h eologico-P olitical T re a tise , tr a n s. R . H . M . E lw e s (N e w
Y o rk : D o v e r, 1 9 5 1 ), 9 8 - 1 9 9 . T h i s is t h e o n ly read ily a v a ila b le tr a n sla tio n o f th e T r a c ta tu s, b u t
it is o fte n u n re lia b le .

I h a v e a lte re d it w h e n e v e r n e ce ssary .

F o r th e. sta n d a r d e d itio n o f th e

L a t in o r ig in a l, se e S p in o z a , O p e ra , e d . C a r l G e b h a r d t , 4 v o ls.

(H e ild e lb e r g : C a r l W in te r ,

1 9 2 5 ).
3. Ib id ., 5-6.
4 . P ierre B a y le , H istorical an d C ritical D ictionary (N e w Y o rk : B o b b s- M e r r ill, 1 9 6 5 ).
5. S p in o z a , T reatise, 100.
6. S e e A n d r e T o s e l , Spinoza et le C rpu scu le de la servitude, (P a r is : A u b e r , 1 9 8 4 ), an d
J e a n -P ie r r e O ser, L H e rm e n e u tiq u e d e H o b b es et d e S p in o z a , S tu d ia Spin o zan a, v o l. 3, 1 9 8 7 .
7. B e n e d ic t d e S p in o z a , T reatise o n the E m en dation o f the intellect, in C ollected W orks,
e d . E dw in C u rley (P r in c e to n : P rin c e to n U P , 1 9 8 6 ), 1 7 -1 8 .
8. S p in o z a , T reatise, 101.
9. Ib id ., 1 3 5 .
1 0 . Ib id ., 104.
11. T h o m a s H o b b e s , Leviath an (M id d le se x : P e lic a n , 1 9 6 8 ), 4 1 5 -2 7 .
12. Ib id ., 4 1 7 .
13. S p in o z a , T rea tise , 105.
14- Ibid.
15. S e e P au l V e r n i r e , Spino za et la pense fran aise av an t la rvolution (P aris: P re sse s
U n iv e r s i t a ir e s d e F ra n c e , 1 9 5 4 ) , a n d R o s a lie L C o lie , S p i n o z a in E n g la n d , 1 6 6 5 - 1 7 3 0 ,
Proceedings o f the A m erican Philosophical Society 10 7 , 3 (Ju n e 1 9 6 3 ), 1 8 3 -2 1 9 .
16. S p in o z a , T reatise.

Stephen Resnick and Richard Wolff

Althussers Liberation of Marxian

Theory
T o d a y M arxists qu estion the A lth u sserian p roject. Ideas only recently
ta k e n to b e o f e x trao rd in ary im p o rta n c e h ave been w idely re le gated to
secondary in te lle c tu a l statu s or dism issed altogether. It is often said th at
while A lth u sserian n otion s o f o v erd eterm in atio n and co n trad ictio n were
com pellin g abstractly, they proved im possible to apply to co n crete p o litical
a n d th eo retical activity. Indeed, first A lth u sse rs w ork a n d th e n M arxism
m o re g e n e r a lly h a v e h a d to fa c e a c o m m o n c o m p la in t fro m fo rm e r
devotees: n eith er seem ed to go anyw here after the prom ises and hopes o f
1968. A lt h u s s e r s w ork, m u ch lik e th a t o f M a rx , seem s to h a v e b ee n
superseded by events.
In Reading C ap ital, A lth u sser suggested th a t th ere are m an y ways to read
M arx. T h ere are as well m any ways to read A lth usser. T h e A lth u sser that
we read h as p resen ted us with a very different legacy: nam ely, th at o f some
pow erful new concepts enabling new departures in so cial theory generally
and in econ om ic analysis in particular. W e w ish to sketch these departures
here.
F or us A lt h u s s e r s w ork is o n e o f th e g re a te st c o n trib u tio n s in th e
M arxian tradition. H is legacy is a profou nd critiqu e o f all determ inism s
en abled by m ean s o f the co n cepts o f ov erd eterm in atio n a n d co n trad iction
(n ew r e a d in g s o f M a rx , as h e put it). H is critiq u e sw eeps aw ay the
stau n ch d eterm in ism s th a t h ith e rto h au n ted M arx ism : the stru ctu ralism
and h u m an ism in its so cial th eory , a n d th e ratio n alism a n d em piricism in
its ep istem ology. It th u s perm its a reth in k in g o f M arxism . M arx ism m ay
finally be liberated from the co n servatism bred by these determ in ist form s
o f thought.
E v id e n c e th a t o th e rs h av e a lso n o te d so m e th in g o f our re a d in g o f
A lth u sser exists in certain con tem porary trends a m o n g M arxian theorists.
It h as b ecom e de rigueur for m an y M arx ists to affirm , in on e way or another,
th e A lt h u s s e r ia n r e je c t io n o f d e te m in is m in all its g u ise s: e c o n o m ic
d eterm in ism , h u m an ism , h isto ricism , em piricism , ratio n alism , p o stivism ,
a n d fou n d ation alism . O n th e o th e r h an d, d e sp ite su c h affirm ations, these
thinkers typically return in th eir works to the id en tical form s o f determ in ist
th in k in g th a t elsew here th ey seem ed to reject.

60

THE A LTH U SSERIA N LEGA CY

H ow can we acco u n t for this paradox? P art o f the exp lan atio n lies in
th e r e p u d ia tio n by M a r x is ts o f w h at they u n d e rs ta n d , c o n s c io u s ly or
u nconsciously, to be th e logical im plications o f th e A lth u sserian critique o f
determ in ism . T h e y fear breaking finally w ith th e security offered by som e
d e te r m in a te e s se n c e , w h e th e r it b e th a t p o se d in e ith e r h u m a n is t or
structuralist theorizing about so ciety or th a t offered in eith e r em piricist or
ration alist th in k in g about know ledge. T h is loss o f security (or certitu de) is
sim ultan eously for th e m a terrifying glim pse in to an abyss th a t h as always
c o n f r o n t e d t h o s e w h o lo se t h e ir g o d s . In t h i s s e n s e , A l t h u s s e r s
co n tribu tion w as too rad ical even for those co m m itted to radicalism .
M o reo v er, in a w orld o f ideas an d actio n s n ow ca st adrift fro m any
gu aran teein g anch ors, all theories an d political m ovem en ts b ecom e m erely
d ifferen t from on e anoth er. For trad ito n al M a rx ists, su ch a co n clu sio n
confirm s th eir w orst fears, for it adm its a th eoretical a n d p o litica l pluralism
in w h ich struggle over any n on -class part o f life m akes as m u ch sense as
struggle over class. A rejection o f determ inism , w hether in the first or the
last in stan ce , carries w ith it, th en , th e w orrisom e im p lica tio n th at class
(e co n o m ic) co n trad ictio n s are n o longer determ in an t. M a r x s cla ss struggle
betw een cap italists an d workers over the m eans o f production or the labor
p ro cess or the ap p ro p riatio n o f surplus value seem s to lose its priv ileged
h isto r ic a l a n d th e o re tic a l p lace. It b ec o m e a t b est m erely o n e a m o n g
e q u ally w orthy struggles including th o se over th e righ ts o f w om en , racial
m in orities, gays, th e p oor, th e h o m eless, a n d anim als. For the determ in ist
M arxist, th is is a pluralism th a t h as run am ok.
T h e A lth u sserian critique also im plies th a t M arxism can n o longer be
held up as science and non-M arxism as ideology. . C onsequently, n o longer
ca n h isto r ic a l fa c tic ity re v e a l th e tru th o f M a rx ism , as e m p iric ists so
ferven tly wish to b eliev e. N o lon ger can the texts o f M arx p rovide the
sin g u la r theory th at allow s th e a p p ro p ria tio n o f H isto ry in th o u g h t, as
ration alists so intensely affirm . A ll we h ave are m erely different form s o f
th in k in g , d iffe re n t th e o rie s w ith th e ir c o rre sp o n d in g ly d iffe re n t tru th
c r it e r ia : n o in t e r - t h e o r e t ic a l s t a n d a r d s o f t r u th a re a d m it t e d . For
ep istem ological determ in ists, w ho believe th a t truth is singular rather th an
plural, this is a n igh tm are. It n o t only d em otes M arxism as a privileged
th eory, it a lso o p en s a d o or to irra tio n a lity p o sin g as m erely an o th e r
th e o ry . F irst an u n w a n te d p o lit ic a l a n d th e n an e q u a lly in to le r a b le
th e o re tic a l plu ralism seem s to h a v e b e e n u n lea sh ed by the A lth u sse ria n
critique o f determ in ist thinking.
A lth u ssers w ork itself was hardly im m une from th is parad ox. H is lapse
in to th e id e o lo g y a n d sc ie n c e d ic h o to m y , o n th e on e h a n d , a n d h is
affirm ation o f determ in ation in the last in stan ce b y the econom y, o n the

A LT H U SSE R 'S LIBERATION OF M ARXIAN THEORY

61

other, suggest to u s an unw illingness t o free his own texts from determ inist
thinking. Like m an y oth ers w ho affirm the im portance o f th e critique o f
determ inism , he too seem s to h av e sh ied aw ay from the consequ en ces o f its
lo g ic fo r h is o w n w o rk . H is c o n t r a d i c t o r y a t t e m p t to h o ld o n t o
determ inism , w hile sim ultan eously castin g it out, p arallels the ten den cies o f
so m a n y o t h e r M a r x is t s to r e a d m i t in t o t h e ir o w n w o rk th e v e ry
determ in ism s they claim to re je c t.1
It is n o great surprise, then, to d isco v er in the w ork o f m any current
M a r x ists th e re tu rn o f th e d e te rm in ism s o f Jere m y B e n th a m an d M a x
W eber to fill A lth u sse rs lon ely hour o f the last in stan ce . T h e calculus o f
p le a su re in the fo rm a l g u ise o f a g iv e n h u m a n a g e n c y re tu rn s as th e
u ltim ate determ in an t o f th e econ om y in th e recent sch ool o f a n a ly tic a l
M a r x is m . T h e c a lc u lu s o f o w n e r sh ip r ig h t s a n d a u t h o r it y in b o t h
stru c tu ra list a n d h u m a n sit fo rm s re tu rn s in th e w ork o f m an y cu rren t
M a rx ist a n d ra d ic al theorists w h o m ake pow er th e esse n tia l determ in an t o f
econ om ic a n d so cial ch an ge.
W e th in k th a t a radically different altern ative th an these is possible for
M arxists. It is one th at accep ts the A lth u sserian critique o f determ in ism
but also exten d s it beyond his boundaries. It em b races rath er th a n fears the
sy stem atic rejection o f determ in ism b ecause it sees in all determ in ism s a
com m on goal o f co n servin g from ch an ge som e form o f experience, thought,
or part o f society. In this p recise sense, w hat A lth usser accom plish ed was
o f extraordin ary im portance, fo r h e provided the tools to recognize and, it is
hoped, to ch allen ge this conservative ob jective. O ur task now is to justify
this thesis.
A lth u sse r clearly recognized a n d defin ed a basic p h ilo sop h ical problem
w ith in th e M arxian tra d itio n th at he inh erited and valued highly. T h e
problem co n cern s the ways social en tities are thou gh t to stan d in relation
to on e ano th er. T ra d itio n a l M arxism views giv en objects and ev en ts in
s o c i e t y as i n t e r a c t i n g , b u t a l s o as e i t h e r u lt i m a t e l y d e p e n d e n t or
independent, as either fun dam en tally determ ining or determ ined. It aim s
to id e n tify th o se a sp e c ts o f so c ie ty th a t are d e te rm in in g esse n c e s (th e
fa m o u s last in sta n c e d e te rm in a n ts ) th e ec o n o m ic base, the m o de o f
production, class struggle, etc. an d th en to dem on strate the m echan ism s
w hereby they determ ine all the oth er asp ects o f society the political and
cu ltu ral superstructure. In short, traditional M arxism operates w ithin the
fra m e w o rk o f a c le a r ly d e te rm in ist (o r e s s e n t ia lis t ) so c ia l th eory . A s
A lth u sser often reiterated, this M arx ian co m m itm en t to determ in ist social
th eory m atch ed -a n d th u s did n o t b re a k fro m an e q u a lly p re v a le n t
determ in ism am on g n o n -M arx ian so c ia l theories.
T r a d i t i o n a l M a r x is m a ls o o p e r a t e s w ith in a c l e a r ly e s s e n t i a l i s t

62

T H E A LTH U SSE R IA N LEGA CY

ep istem ology, w h ich p resen ted a parallel problem to A lth u sser. It presum es
a fu n d a m e n ta l d ic h o to m y or gap b e tw e e n th o u g h t (id e a s ) a n d b e in g
(reality ), su ch th a t th e g o a l o f all hu m an th ou gh t is to bridge th a t presum ed
gap. H u m an th o u gh t strives to m irror (represen t) accurately the real world
of being to w h ich thou gh t is directed. T h e key to a successful bridging a
tru e rep resen tatio n o f how the real world actu ally is lies in follow ing
o n e or b o th o f th e tw o c la ss ic p ro to c o ls o f d e te rm in ist e p iste m o lo g y :
em piricism or ration alism . In p osin g th e p roblem o f know led ge how to
estab lish truth and distinguish it from falseh ood in th is w ay, tradition al
M a r x ism defin es e p iste m o lo g ic a l issu es e x a c tly as does th e tr a d itio n a l
bourgeois ph ilosoph y it opposes. N o t surprisingly, M arxism h as found its
w ay to th e sam e tw o sorts o f answ ers: em piricism or rationalism .
Em piricism presum es th a t true ideas are th ose verified by reference to
sen sory facts o f experience. T h e essen ce (u ltim ate d e term in a n t) o f truth is
e m p irical factu ality . T h e M a rx ia n form o f su ch em p iricism stresses th e
n o tio n th a t p ra c tic e (e x p e rie n c e in the c o n c re te re al w o rld) p ro v e s or
disproves th e truth o f all p o ssib le theories o f so c ia l structure a n d change.
T h e sign o f M arxian em piricism is argum ent by reference to w h at history
sh ow s.
R a t io n a lis m p resu m es th a t re a lity is a c tu a lly g o v e rn e d , an d fu rth er
p resu m ed to be k n o w ab le by, h u m a n reaso n w h ich is th u s o rie n te d to
re p re se n t (m irro r) th e u n d erly in g o rd e rlin e ss o f th e real. T h e esse n c e
(u ltim ate d e te rm in an t) of tru th is n o t co n crete factuality, bu t rather the
reason able logic th at underlies and govern s th at factuality. T h e M arxian
form o f su ch rationalism is th e n o tio n th at M arx and the subsequen t great
th in k e rs w ith in th e tra d itio n h a d fin a lly g ra sp e d th e true u n d e rly in g
ration ality o f social life d ialectical and h istorical m aterialism w hich had
elu ded all the pre-M arxists an d still eludes the n on -M arxists. M a rx ism s
m irro rin g o f the true u n d erly in g ratio n ality o f th e c o n c re te re a l en ab les
cu rren t day M arxists sim ply to apply it to truly know a n d ch an ge the w orld.
T h e sign o f M a rx ia n ratio n alism is argum ent by qu otatio n .
F or A lth u s se r , b o th k in d s o f e s se n tia lism in so c ia l th eory a n d in
epistem ology were m ore th a n p roblem s for M arxist theory. T h e y h ad
been im ported in to M arxism without criticism and transformation from the
bourgeois p h ilo so p h ical tradition . T h e y were fetters p reven tin g M arxism
fro m c o m p le tin g its b re ak w ith th e b o u rg e o is tra d itio n a n d th u s fro m
fulfillin g it revolu tion izing m ission o f estab lish in g a p h ilo sop h y and social
th eory fo r co m m u n ism . A lth u sse r set ab ou t to renew th a t m issio n by
a tta c k in g essentialism s in epistem ology an d so cial th eory as in com patible
w ith M arxism .

A LT H U SSE R 'S LIBERATION OF M ARXIAN THEORY

63

T h e tw o key c o n ce p ts for A lth u sse r in his critic a l attack were overd e te rm in a tio n c o u n te rp o se d to d e te rm in a tio n an d co m p le x co n tra d ic t io n s c o u n te r p o s e d to sim p le c o n t r a d ic t io n s . H e b o rro w e d a n d
a d ap te d ov erd eterm in atio n from Freu d (an d p erh ap s L u k cs) precisely to
defin e an altern ative to determ in ist analyses o f all sorts in social theory and
in ep istem ology. W h ereas those analyses presum ed a n o tio n o f cau satio n in
w h ich so m e e n titie s d eterm in e oth ers, A lth u sse r in sisted that n o so c ia l
e n tity w as ev er d e term in ed by o n e or a su b se t o f o th e r so c ia l en titie s.
R ath e r, e a c h an d every en tity w ith in society w as alw ays presum ed to be
determ in ed by the effects o f all the oth er en tities at on ce. S tate d otherw ise,
each en tity w as th e p rod u ct o f the in teractio n o f all th e oth ers. It was
ov erdeterm ined by all th o se oth ers, rather th a n b ein g determ in ed by any
one or a subset o f them .
Further, each so cial en tity bears w ithin itself the traces o f all the oth er
so cial en tities th at, together, com prise its overd eterm inants. Indeed, ea c h
e n tity s e x iste n c e is n o th in g oth er th e n th e co m b in e d effects o f all th e
oth ers in the so cial to tality .2 A s such, each entity is the site o f the different

\
1
I

;
j

e ffe c tiv itie s o f all o th e r s o c ia l e n titie s . A n in d iv id u a l is th e site , for

exam ple, o f th e effects o f class, p aren ts, jobs, religions, politics, literature,
biology, etc. S o , too, is an enterprise, a literary text, or a p o litical party.
A s such sites, each en tity co n tain s different effects th at push an d pull it in
all direction s w ith varying force. In th is precise sense, A lth u sser refers to
th e co n trad ictio n s w ithin every en tity as co m plex; they em an ate from the
influences exerted by all other en tities. In stead o f the du alistic (A lth u sser
c a l l s it s i m p l e ) n o t io n o f c o n t r a d i c t i o n in h e r it e d fro m p r e v io u s
p h il o s o p h y t h e m e t a p h o r o f p o s i t i v e a n d n e g a t i v e A l t h u s s e r
coun terp oses the n o tio n o f overd eterm in ed an d h en ce infinitely co m plex

;
!
j

co n trad ictio n s co n stitu tin g every social entity.

If every so cial en tity is overdeterm ined by every other, it follow s th at
A lth usser is here posing a new and different n o tio n o f cau satio n in society
a n d a c r o s s h is to r y . E a c h s o c i a l e n t it y is n e c e s s a r ily a lw a y s b o t h a
detrm in in g as well as a determ in ed en tity. It is overdeterm ined by all other
e n titie s an d p a r tic ip a te s in o v e rd e te rm in in g every other en tity . Every
e n tity in so c ie ty e x is ts as th e site o f th e e ffe c ts fro m all o th e rs; it is
o v erd eterm in ed and h e n c e co m p le x ly contradictory.
T h o se in fluenced by A lth u sser h av e taken th is argum ent an o th er step.
From the ov erd eterm in ation and co n trad ictio n s o f each social entity, they
h ave derived the n otion th at all en tities are in ceaseless ch an ge, since a
ch an ge in any social entity alters the influence it exerts on all others. T h e
image o f A lth u sserian theory, then, is on e o f the ceaseless play of ch ange in
a ll e n t it ie s . E v e r y th in g e x is t s in c h a n g e . T o s ig n a l th is as a b a sic

!
:

64

TH E A LTH U SSER IA N LEG A CY

presum ption o f analysis, we drop the w ord entity an d replace it by the word
p r o c e ss .4 T h e so c ia l to ta lity is c o n c e iv e d th e n as the se t o f all so c ia l
p ro ce sses. T h e s e are gro u p ed , for ex p ository ease, u n d er four h ead in gs:
n atu ral, e c o n o m ic, p o litic a l and cultural p rocesses. N a tu ra l processes refer
to all the ch an ges in the realm s o f physical, ch em ical and -biological m atter.
E c o n o m ic processes refer to all the ch an ges occu rrin g in the p rodu ction
and distribu tion o f goods a n d services. P o litical processes refer to all the
changes occurring in the ordering o f in d iv id u als interpersonal beh aviors.
C u ltu ral processes refer to all th e ch an ges o ccu rrin g in the p rodu ction and
d issem in ation o f m ean in gs in the society.
T h e p ro cess th e so c ia l en tity e x istin g in c h a n g e h as b e c o m e the
b asic elem en t o f so cial analysis. E a c h process ch a n g e s in p articu lar ways
a n d at a sp e c ific p a c e a c c o rd in g to its u n iq u e o v e r d e te r m in a tio n an d
c o n t r a d ic t io n s . M o r e o v e r , th e se p ro c e ss e s do n o t o c c u r a lo n e or by
th e m se lv e s in so cie ty ; th e y occur in clu m p s or groups w h ich co m p rise
p articu lar sites in so ciety su ch as a person, a relation sh ip, an activity, etc.
It follow s th a t every site in society is approach ed as precisely a grouping of
distin ct, co n stitu tive processes. M oreover, since processes are understood
as u n iq u ely o v erd eterm in e d and co n tra d icto ry , it follow s th at all so c ia l
sites, bein g com posed o f m ultiple so c ia l processes, m u st exp erien ce uneven
d evelo p m en t. S in ce eac h o f the distinct social processes com prisin g any
site has its own overdeterm ined form and rhythm o f ch an ge, the site itself
displays th e uneven , differential m o v em en ts o f its co m p o n e n ts; it develops
unevenly. For A lth u sser as for M arx, th e u n even d evelo pm en t o f all social
en tities was a basic prem ise o f social analysis. T h e A lth u sserian co n ce p ts o f
o v e rd e te r m in a tio n an d c o m p le x c o n tr a d ic tio n , h o w ev er, e n a b le us to
clarify an d ju stify th a t prem ise m ore ca re fu lly an d th o ro u g h ly th a n h ad
been possible w ith ou t th o se concepts.
T h e co n cep t o f overd eterm in ation im plies a M arx ian u n d erstan din g o f
th e ex iste n c e o f all so c ia l e n titie s th a t breaks fully from th e p rev a le n t,
determ in ist n otion s th a t h a d characterized b o th M a rx ia n a n d n on -M arxian
s o c i a l t h e o r i e s . It a l s o i m p l i e s , as A l t h u s s e r i n s i s t e d , a M a r x ia n
ep istem ology th at breaks decisively w ith b o th em piricism and ration alism .
T h i s m ay be s h o w n by n o t i n g t h a t a t h e o r e t i c a l c o m m i t m e n t to
ov erd eterm in atio n clearly poses a n im m ediate an aly tical problem . H ow can
we e x p la in any so c ia l e n tity a p o litic a l m o v e m e n t, an en terp rise , an
individual, a m orality if by ex p lan atio n we m ean an accou n t o f how all
oth er social en tities interact to overdeterm ine the en tity in qu estion. S u c h
an e x h a u stiv e a c c o u n t exceed s h u m an c a p a b ility an d w ould requ ire so
m u ch tim e t h a t th e o b je c t o f e x p la n a tio n w ould h a v e ch a n g e d b ey o n d
r e c o g n itio n a n d p e r h a p s b ey o n d an y in te r e s t fo r us by th e tim e th e

A LT H U SSE R 'S LIBERA TION OF M ARXIAN THEORY

65

e x p la n a t io n w as c o m p le te . T h e a n sw e r to th is p ro b le m is t h a t o n e
im plication o f the n o tio n o f o v erd eterm in atio n lie s in the recogn ition that ^
all ex p lan atio n s are inherently and u n avoid ab ly incom plete. A ll theories !
o f society form s o f ex p lan atio n are partial; each takes up only som e o f
the factors influencin g the o b je ct o f its theorizing. W ith those factors it
fash io n s an e x p la n a tio n , a n ece ssarily p artia l e x p la n a tio n re fle ctin g the
particular subset o f overdeterm ining factors th a t it favors.
T h ere are thus always alte rn ativ e ex p lan atio n s or theories o f why and
how even ts occur. T h e m ultiple theories m ay be distinguish ed precisely by
the p articu lar subset o f determ in in g factors upon w hich they focus as they
enter into the task o f so cial analysis. A s we h ave argued elsew here, different
th eories h ave different entry p o m is.5 A lte rn a tiv e theories vary according to
w h ich su b se t o f a sp e c ts o f an y q u e stio n they stre ss in p ro d u c in g th e ir
p articular, p artial exp lan atio n s.
It follow s th at we m ust m ove away from an y n otion o f tru th as singular ^
to a n o t io n r a th e r o f tru th s as p lu r a l. E a c h th e o ry n o t o n ly m a k e s j
statem en ts abou t w hat it takes to be so cial reality; it also erects criteria by
w hich p ractition ers o f the theory c a n decide w h ich subsequent statem en ts
will be accepted into th e grow ing know ledge generated by th e th eory an d
w h ich will be rejected as incom patible. T h e criteria erected by each theory
com prise its stan d ard and defin ition o f truth. T ru th s, th en , vary w ith the
th eories in and by w hich they are produced. T h ere is n o inter-theoretic
stan dard o f truth.
T h e n o tio n o f ov erd eterm in atio n also exp lain s how an d why altern ative
theories differ. W h ich p articu lar entry p oin ts cam e to define any theory,
i.e., w hich p articu lar subset o f determ in an ts o f an y object attracted its focal
atte n tio n , is itself ov erdeterm ined. T h u s, for exam ple, th e sp ecifics o f the
rad ical m ovem en ts in the early n in etee n th century, th e legacy o f G e rm an
p h ilo sop h y cu lm in atin g in H egel at th a t tim e, the effects o f th e industrial
c a p ita lis t re v o lu tio n s, th e c u ltu ra l ch a n g e s sw eep in g E u ro pe an d m any
other factors com bined to overdeterm ine in K arl M arx and others the idea
o f fash io n in g a new social th eory b u ilt around the entry p oin t o f a new |
c o n c e p t o f c la ss as surplus labor production and distribution, d ia le c t ic s , J
m aterialism , and so o n . S im ila rly , th e tran sform ed eco n o m ic, p o litica l,
cu ltu ral a n d n atu ral processes o f la te n in eteen th -cen tu ry Europe com bined
to overd eterm in e in Sigm u n d Freud and others the idea o f fash ion in g a new
so cial theory arou n d the en try p o in t o f an alto geth er newly d efin ed process,
th e un con scious.
T h in k in g , like all o th e r so cial processes, is ov erd eterm in ed by all th e
oth er so cial processes. It is thus replete w ith the co m p le x co n trad iction s
th at o v erd eterm in atio n entails.

O n e form th a t these co n trad ictio n s can

66

THE A LTH U SSE R IA N LEGACY

a n d t y p ic a lly do ta k e is th e c o e x is t e n c e o f d iffe r e n t t h e o r ie s , sin c e

differently ov erd eterm in ed thinkers find different entry p oin ts into social
analysis persuasive. T h e y m ak e their th eoretical co m m itm en ts accordingly.
If and w hen so cial c o n d itio n s overdeterm ine m an y in d iv id u als to fin d a
theory c o n v in cin g , it can becom e a so cially c o n seq u en tia l truth. If and
w hen so c ia l c o n d itio n s ch an ge , such a theory w ill ch an ge an d its tru th
c rite ria w ill c h a n g e . U n d er c e rta in c o n d itio n s, its p ersu a siv e n e ss m ay
v a n ish ; it w ill th e n p e rh a p s d isa p p e a r. T h e o r ie s, lik e all oth er so c ia l
en tities, a re ov erdeterm ined, contradictory and ceaselessly ch anging.
T h is c o n c e p t u a liz a t io n o f th e o ry , o f th in k in g , an d o f its r e su lts
know ledges am ou n ts to a d istin ctiv e ep istem ology th a t is clearly n eith er
e m p i r i c i s m n o r r a t i o n a l i s m . T h e r e are n o e s s e n c e s h e r e : f a c t u a l
ob serv atio n s an d th e o re tica l reason in gs are d istin c t so cial p rocesses th at
particip ate in eac h o th e rs overdeterm ination. T h e truth criteria generate
in eac h theory are ov erd eterm in ed by ob serv atio n s and by reason ju st as
reason in fluen ces observ ation and vice versa. N o single criterion o f truth,
a p p lic a b le across all th e o ries, is allow ed; n o fa c tu a l re ality is th in k ab le
w ithout ta k in g a c c o u n t o f th e influence o f o n e s th eory in overdeterm ining
th a t reality.
A lth u sse rs critiqu e o f th e co n v e n tio n al epistem ologies, em piricist and
r a t i o n a l i s t , t h a t c h a r a c t e r iz e d b o t h th e M a r x ia n a n d n o n - M a r x ia n
traditions, also offered a n altern ative ep istem ological p ositio n . H e believed
th at alte rn ativ e to be a uniquely M arx ian ep istem ological position. T h e
actu al presen ce an d p revalen ce w ithin th e M arxian traditio n o f em piricist
an d r a t i o n a l i s t e p i s t e m o l o g i e s r e s u lt e d fr o m t h e ir b e in g im p o r te d
u n c r it i c a l l y fro m th e n o n - M a r x ia n t r a d i t io n . T h u s h e v ie w e d h is
a lte r n a tiv e e p iste m o lo g y as fa ith fu l to th e e p is t e m o lo g ic a l b re a k he
understood M arx to h a v e m ade (or at least to h ave inaugurated) vis--vis
pre-M arxian philosophy.
Is A lth u sse rs claim to h ave form ulated exp licitly a distinctive M arxian
ep istem o lo gy and social theory acc ep ta b le? T h e answ er m ust b e o f the
frustratin g yes and n o variety. Let us exam in e the ep istem ological claim
first. T h e o re tic a l developm en ts, especially in F ra n c e a m o n g philosophers
o f sc ie n c e an d d isco u rse, literary th e o rists, an d p sy ch o an aly sts, bu t also
elsew h ere, h ad been m ovin g steadily tow ard an ep istem o lo g ical p o sitio n
t h a t m o re or less sy s te m a tic a lly r e je c te d e m p iric ism a n d ra tio n a lism .
B a c h e la r d , C a n g u ilh e m , L a c a n , F o u c a u lt, D e rrid a , an d L y o ta rd ; p osts t r u c t u r a lis m a n d p o s t - m o d e r n is m ; D e w e y , th e la te r W it t g e n s t e in ,
H e id e g g e r , A d o r n o a n d H o r k h e im e r , a n d R o r t y su c h fig u r e s a n d
m o vem en ts were all discardin g the received tradition s o f various protocols,
g u a r a n te e s o f w h at a sin g u la r tru th m ig h t b e . T h e y to o c h a m p io n e d

A LT H U SSE R 'S LIBERATION OF M ARXIAN THEORY

67

difference as em bodied in the m ultip licity o f truths, m eanings, and realities.

O n th e o n e h a n d , A lt h u s s e r m ig h t b e th o u g h t to h a v e b ro u g h t th e
im p lic a tio n s o f th eir w ork, w ith a d ju stm e n ts, in to M arxism . T h e n his
claim to h ave rediscovered M a rx s u nique epistem ology would h ave to be
questioned.
O n th e o th e r h a n d , A lth u sse r did m ak e a profound a d ju stm en t to the
e p is te m o lo g ic a l b re a k a ss o c ia te d w ith so m e o f the n a m e s and fig u re s
id e n tifie d a b o v e . M o re o v e r, t h a t a d ju s t m e n t is su re ly o f M a r x ia n
p ro v e n a n c e . It co n ce rn s the p o litic a l p a rtisa n sh ip o f all th eory . T h e
p o litica l struggles o f any society n ecessarily p articip ate in overdeterm ining
the e x iste n c e o f th e th e o rie s th e ir en try p o in ts, tru th c rite ria , e tc .
o p eratin g in th at society.

In turn, the different theories o f any tim e and

place play their role in overd eterm in in g its p olitical dynam ics. T h u s it is
p o ssib le and,, from an A lth u sse ria n sta n d p o in t, n ecessary to in terro gate
every th eory in term s o f its so cial co n d itio n s and its social consequen ces.
Indeed, w hat a M arxian epistem ology does is to erect those co n d ition s an d
co n sequ en ces as its criteria o f the acceptability o f all existin g theories, i.e.,
its p artisan attitude toward them .
A lth o u g h in flu en ced deeply by the n o n -M a rx ia n in tellectu al currents
s w ir lin g a r o u n d h im , A lt h u s s e r d id n o n e t h e le s s b e g in to f a s h io n a
d istin ctiv ely M arx ian epistem ology. It broke rad ically from the essentialist
epistem ologies o f trad itio n al so cial theory, M a rx ia n a n d n on -M arxian . It
deployed th e co n cep ts o f ov erd eterm in atio n a n d co m p le x co n trad iction to
c h a m p io n tru th s in ste ad o f tru th , d iffe re n c e s a m o n g a m u ltip lic ity o f
th eo ries ra th e r th a n d o g m a tic adh erence to an ab so lu te stan dard. Finally,
it avoided th e th eo retical relativism th a t m igh t otherw ise atten d such an '
e p istem ological p ositio n by articu latin g a basis fo r th eoretical p artisan sh ip
a m o n g th e a lte r n a tiv e tru th s d e v e lo p e d in a n d by a lte r n a tiv e s o c ia l
theories.
F rom such an ep istem ological stan d p oin t, the statem en ts m ade w ithin
an y th e o re tica l p ro ject are interrogated in term s o f their social co n d ition s
an d co n se q u e n ce s. B ased on th a t in terro g a tio n , th e sta te m e n ts will be
a ccepted , re je c te d or transform ed for insertion in to M arx ian so c ia l theory.
M arxian social theorists will take p ositio n s tow ard and m ake alliances with
p rop on en ts o f oth er theories based precisely on its assessm ent o f the social f
co n d itio n s and co n seq u en ces o f th ose theories. AU tru th s a n d all th eories
are n o t equally valid or accep tab le from this stan dp oin t.
T h e y are n o t a c c e p te d or r e je c te d o n th e gou n ds o f som e a b so lu te
stan d ard o f a sin gu lar tru th ; su c h a p ro to c o l is e x a c tly w hat A lth u sse rs
ep istem o lo g ical p o sitio n rules out. T h e y are all tre ate d as th eo ries w ith
t h e ir t r u th s ; n o e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l b a s i s e x i s t s fo r t h e ir r e je c t i o n or

68

THE A LTH U SSE R IA N LEGACY

a ccep tan ce. R ather, such a basis exists on th e different level o f an analysis
o f each theorys social co n d ition s o f existence and its social consequ en ces.
T h is is w hy A lt h u s s e r s d is tin c tiv e M a r x ia n e p iste m o lo g y is n e ith e r a
relativism n or a p ost-m odern ism in the m an ner o f F oucault or Lyotard.
A s i m i l a r a n s w e r m u st be g iv e n to t h e q u e s t i o n o f A l t h u s s e r s
in a u g u r a tio n o f a d is tin c t iv e s o c ia l th e o ry . M a r x is ts su c h a s L e n in ,
G ram sci and L u k cs h ad been struggling to produ ce a M arxian theory freed
from the last in stan ce determ in ism th a t had h au n ted it ever since E n gels
tried to se ttle th e issu e / A lth u s se r s n o tio n s o f o v e rd e te rm in a tio n an d
co n trad ictio n provide an answ er to th is lon g struggle. D espite traces o f
e c o n o m ic d e te rm in ism in his w ork, th e se n o t io n s p e rm it M a r x is ts to
p roduce an entirely new u n d erstan d in g o f the cau sal role o f the eco n o m y in
society.
F rom an A lth u sserian stan dp oin t, th e ec o n o m ic base o f society c a n n o
lon ger be assig n ed som e u ltim ate cau sal prim acy , as was claim ed by th e
p ro p o n e n ts o f ec o n o m ic determ in ism . N o r d o es this re je c tio n o f cau sal
privilege for the ec o n o m y op en a door to a kind o f reverse determ in ism in
w h ich ec o n o m ic d e v e lo p m e n t is reduced to an effect o f th e p o litic a l or
cu ltu ral superstructure. In stead, o v erd eterm in atio n offers a notion o f base
and su p e r s tr u c tu r e as c o n d it io n s o f e a c h o t h e r s e x is te n c e . E a c h is
u nderstood to play a n active role in co n stitu tin g the existen ce o f the other.
N e ith e r can be co n ceived to exist indep en den tly o f the other. T h u s both
o rth o d o x econ om ic determ in ism and the now fash ion ab le n on -econ om ic
determ in ist th eories are rejected. A lth u sser h ad found a way to liberate
M a r x ia n s o c i a l th e o ry fro m th e d e t e r m in is t p r is o n in w h ic h it h a d
lan gu ish ed for alm ost o n e hundred years.
A d istin ctiv e way to understan d society and h istory was now possible.
By freeing M arx ian so cial th eory from the essentialism s o f h u m an ist an d
stru ctu ralist form s o f thought, A lth u sse rs w ork created a new way to view
h u m a n agency, class, cap ital, an d th e law s o f so cial m o tion . It perm itted
th e co n stru ctio n o f a th eory o f society in w h ich n o p rocess eco n o m ic,
p o litic a l, cu ltu ral, or n atu ral and n o site o f p rocesses h u m an agency,
en terp rise , sta te , or h o u seh o ld could be c o n c e iv e d to e x ist as a cau se
w ith ou t bein g itse lf caused. A ll, w hether h u m a n agen t or so c ia l structure,
becam e defined w ithin a web o f m utual overdeterm inations.
T h is fo rm u la tio n o f a n o n - e sse n tia list s o c ia l th e o ry m e an t th a t the
d e v e lo p m e n t o f p ro ce sses an d sites o f p ro ce sses was alw ays u n even and
contingent. H istoric M arx ian gu aran tees such as the in evitab ility o f class
stru ggle, or o f tra n sitio n from on e m ode to a n o th er, an d o f a d e c lin in g
profit rate h a d to be jettiso n ed . A lth u ssers on tology h a d n o sp a ce in it for
ad v an cin g any form o f teleo lo gical developm ent.

A LT H U SSE R 'S LIBERA TION OF M ARXIAN THEORY

69

T h e last step in our argu m en t th at A lth u sse rs interven tions m ark an

e p o c h a l s t e p in th e d e v e l o p m e n t o f M a r x ia n t h e o r i e s i n v o lv e s
d e m o n str a tin g t h e w h o lly n e w k in d o f c la ss a n a ly sis h is w ork m a k es
p ossib le. If a ll en tities a re to be co n ceived in M arxism as processes, then
that m ust app ly to the en tity called class. H ow m ay we read C apital to
locate w ithin it a co n ce p t o f class as process? H ow would such a readin g
en able an d p rovo k e a new kind o f M arxian class analysis?
U tiliz in g A lth u s se r s work, we reread C apital with these qu estio n s in
mind. T h e results m ay be sum m arized as follow s.7 C la ss fo r M arx refers to
tw o p a r tic u la r s o c ia l p ro c e sse s. T h e first k in d o f c la ss p ro c e ss is the
produ citon an d ap p rop riation o f surplus labor. In all h u m an societies som e
in d iv id u als p erform lab o r tran sfo rm in g certain n atu ra l o b je c ts in to usev a lu e s to be co n su m ed. S u c h in d iv id u als perform a qu an tity o f lab or
expenditure o f m uscle and b rain over tim e sufficient to produce the goods
an d se rv ice s n ece ssary fo r their h isto ric a lly o v erd eterm in e d stan dard o f
living. M arx calls this necessary labor. H ow ever, such individuals always
also p erform m ore labor th an the necessary quantity; they do surplus labor.
T h is su rp lu s lab o r is n ot only p ro d u c e d but is alw ay s p ro d u c e d fo r
so m eo n e. T h e qu estio n is, W h o? In M a r x s lan gu age, th e issue is w ho
ap p ro p ria te s the surplus labor b ein g p ro d u ced in every p o ssib le society.
T h e process o f producin g surplus labor is a lso th e process o f appropriatin g
it. W e call th is class process the fundam ental class process to distin guish it
form th e se co n d k in d o f class p ro cess defined by M arx. T h e surplus labor
or its p rodu ct m ay be appropriated by the sam e individuals who perform
that surplus labor, or the surplus m ay be appropriated by other individuals
w ho do n ot perform it.
M arx a lso d is tin g u ish e s d iffe re n t fo rm s th a t th e fu n d a m e n ta l cla ss
process h a s taken across hu m an history. D ep en d in g o n social co n d ition s,
th e fo r m s m ay v a r y fr o m a r r a n g e m e n t s in w h ic h in d iv id u a l s w h o
co llectiv ely produce surplus also co llectiv ely appropriate their ow n surplus
( c o m m u n is m ) to a r r a n g e m e n t s w h e r e so m e i n d iv id u a l s p r iv a t e l y
a p p ro p ria te the su rp lu s p ro d u c e d by o th e rs (c a p ita lism , feu d a lism and
slavery). W h ile M arx theorized still other form s o f the fu n dam en tal class
p ro c e ss , h e fo c u se d his w ork o v e rw h e lm in g ly o n th e c o n te m p o r a rily
prevalen t form , cap italism .
O n c e M a rx th eorized w here a n d how th is fu n d a m e n ta l cla ss p rocess
existed w ithin a cap ita list society the ob je ct o f C apital, vol. 1 he went
on to analyze the secon d kind o f class process the o b je ct o f Capital, vol. 3.
H e reason ed qu ite sim ply th at the produ ction /ap pro priatio n o f surplus labor
im p lie d a l o g i c a l n e x t q u e s t io n : n a m e ly , w h a t w a s d o n e w ith th e
appropriated surplus labor (or its p rodu cts)? M a rx s co m plex answ er held

70

T H E A LTH U SSE R IA N LEGA CY

th at the p rodu cts o f surplus' labor were distributed by its app rop riato rs to
o th e r people in society. T h is distrib u tion o f alread y appropriated surplus is
th e se c o n d k in d o f class p ro ce ss; we h a v e c a lle d it th e subsum ed cla ss
p ro c e ss to d is tin g u ish it from th e fu n d a m e n ta l c la ss p ro c e ss. A s th e
fun dam en tal cla ss process en com passes th e perform ers a n d appropriators o f
surplus labor, th e subsum ed c la ss process en com passes th e distributors and
the recipien ts o f appropriated surplus.
T h e recipien ts o f distributed sh ares o f th e appropriated surplus labor are
th ereb y e n a b led to live and work, even th o u g h they do n ot p articip ate
n e c e ssarily in p ro d u c in g or a p p ro p ria tin g su rp lu s la b o r. T h e d ifferen t
groups o f peop le who ob tain distributed shares o f app rop riated surplus play
a sp ecific role in M a rx s co n cep tion o f a societys class structure. T h ey are
understood to perform specific n on -class processes that provide conditions
o f existence for the fun dam en tal class process. In return fo r so doing, they
obtain distributions o f the surplus. For exam ple, m odern state fun ction aries
educate p resen t and future perform ers o f surplus labor thereby securing a
co n d itio n o f existen ce o f the fu n dam en tal class process, nam ely a supply of
cap ab le w orkers. In return for so doin g, cap ita lists take a portio n o f the
surplus they appropriate from their productive laborers and distribute it to
these state fun ction aries to en able them to perform the n on -class process of
ed ucation .
S u c h state fu n ction aries are th en u n d ersto od to p articip ate in, am on g
m an y oth ers, th e fo llo w in g tw o d ifferen t so c ia l p ro ce sses: th e n o n -class
p ro ce ss o f e d u c a tio n a n d th e subsum ed cla ss p ro cess (sin ce th e y re ceiv e a
distributed portion o f appropriated surplus in the form o f ta x es). O ther
m o d e rn e x a m p le s o f in d iv id u a ls w ho c a n o b ta in su b su m e d c la ss
distribu tion s o f app rop riated surplus include: ban k ers w ho len d m oney to
in d u stria l c a p ita lis ts, law yers who h a n d le le g a l p ro b le m s for in d u stria l
cap italists, m an agers w h o ru n industrial enterprises in clu din g th e ir possible
exp an sio n through cap ital accu m u latio n , m erch an ts w ho h a n d le the selling
o f ou tput for industrial capitalists, ow ners o f w ealth w ho provide cap italists
w ith access to the m ean s o f p rodu ction , a n d a h o st o f others.
U sin g A lth u sse rs n o tio n s o f o v erd eterm in atio n an d co n tra d ic tio n to
th in k o f class in term s o f p ro cess rather than as d istin ct groups o f peop le has
far-reach in g co n sequ en ces for the entire corpus o f M arx ian so cial theory.
C o n sid e r, fo r exam p le, th a t a process ap p ro ach su ggests th a t in d iv id uals
m ay p articip ate in variou s fun dam en tal a n d subsum ed class processes during
the course o f a day or a lifetim e. Sim ilarly, there m ay be different form s o f
the fu n d am en tal class process at different sites in society at the sam e tim e:
for ex am p le, there m ay be c a p ita list p rodu ction o f su rplus go in g on in large
e n te r p r ise s, w h ile th e fe u d a l fu n d a m e n ta l c la s s p r o c e ss re ig n s in sid e

A L T H U SSE R 'S LIBERATION O F M ARXIAN THEORY

71

h o u s e h o ld s, a n d w h ile in d iv id u a l p ro d u c e rs a p p r o p r ia tin g th e ir ow n
in d ivid ual surpluses (self-em ployed p erson s) fu n ction in sm all enterprises.
T h ese co n sid eration s suggest th a t class an aly ses o f societies m ust presum e
an d exp lore far greater co m p lex ities o f class stru ctu res th a n h as often been
th e case in M arxism .
S ta te d otherw ise, th e old du alistic m odel o f tw o great classes, cap italists
an d proletarian s, h as to give way to the presum ption th a t individuals can
an d do p ar tic ip a te in m u ltip le a n d d iffere n t k in d s o f class p ro ce sses at
differen t sites in so c ie ty acro ss th e ir lifetim es. T h is p resu m ptio n carries
heavy im plication s problem atizin g th e lin k ages betw een any in d iv id u als or
gro u p s political interests a n d its co m plex, m u ltiple particip ation in diverse
class processes.
S im ila rly , th e n o tio n o f c la ss as p ro c e ss p ro b le m a tiz e s a n o th e r o ld
sim p licity o f M arxists and other rad icals. T h e A lth u sseria n app roach to
social theory, qu a set o f processes, d ifferen tiates betw een processes o f power
and class. T h a t is, pow er processes refer to ways in w hich individuals order
on e a n o th e rs beh avior in society. C lass processes refer instead to w hether
a n d how in d iv id u a ls p a r tic ip a te in th e p ro d u c tio n , a p p ro p ria tio n and
distribu tion o f surplus labor. T h u s, fo r exam ple, the phrase ruling classes
is a problem . If it m ean s a co n c e p t o f gro u p in g individuals accordin g to the
pow er they w ield in society, th at is different from using class as a co n ce p t o f
how in d iv id u als p articip ate in p rodu cin g, ap p ro p riatin g an d d istrib u tin g
surplus lab or. A t th e very least, A lth u sse rs app roach requires reth in k in g
the in d iscrim in ate use o f the term class in the M arx ian tradition, when
its users do n o t all m ean the sam e thing. Indeed, while som e M arxists use
class to refer to th e pow er in d iv id u als w ield an d o th e rs to refer to th eir
p articip atio n s in th e class p rocess, still others use th e term to refer to th e
property individuals do or do n o t ow n. T h e m ixin g o f different a n d often
in com p atib le usages o f so cen tral a term w ithin the M arxian tradition is a
sign o f th eo retical (an d h en ce also p o litica l) confusion w hich A lth u ssers
re fo rm u la tio n e n a b le s us to re co gn ize , analyze an d so at least b e g in to
resolve. W e h a v e elsew here u n d ertak en to elab orate th e m an y o th e r farr e a c h in g im p lic a tio n s o f the n ew c o n c e p t o f c la ss as p ro ce ss w h ic h is
im plied by A lth u sse rs co ntribution s.
In epistem ology, in social theory, and in the co n ceptu alization o f class,
A lth u ssers break w ith the determ in ism en dem ic to the M arxian tradition
h a s h a d an d c o n tin u e s to h av e e p o c h a l ra m ific a tio n s. H is n o tio n s o f
o v erd eterm in atio n an d co n tra d ic tio n an d his p relim in ary ela b o ratio n o f
th e ir im p lic a tio n s h ave set in m o tio n a b ro a d re c o n c e p tu a liz a tio n o f
M a r x is m . T h e in e v it a b le fits a n d s t a r t s arid fo rw a rd a n d b a c k w a rd
o sc illa tio n s o f any th e o re tic a l re v o lu tio n a tte n d A lth u s se r s p ro je ct too.

72

TH E A LTH U SSE R IA N LEGA CY

Yet, if M arxism n eeds periodic renew al and tran sform ation to en ab le it to

m eet the ch an gin g h isto rical co n d ition s facin g those com m itted to m ove
b e y o n d c a p ita lis m , then A lt h u s s e r s c o n tr ib u tio n s d e se rv e th e c lo se st
a tte n tio n as precisely the m eans for such a renew al and transform ation.

N o te s
1.
C f . J a c k A m a r ig lio , M a rx ism A g a in s t E c o n o m ic S c ie n c e : A lt h u s s e r s L e g a c y , in
P a u l Z a r e m b k a , e d ., R ese arch in P olitical E c o n o m y , V o l. 10 G r e e n w ic h , C o n n e c t ic u t a n d
L o n d o n : J A I P re ss, 1 9 8 7 , p p . 159-942.
It is su g g e stiv e to n o te t h e p a r a lle l h e r e w ith E in s t e in s fam o u s 1 9 0 5 p r o p o sa l th a t
all p h y sic a l m a sse s a re fo rm s o f e n e rg y an d th a t e a c h p a rtic u la r q u a n tu m o f en ergy (m ass) in
t u m d e p e n d s u p o n th e in te r a c tio n o f a ll th e o th e r s in th e u n iv erse.
3.
A sim ilar w ay o f fo rm u la tin g th is id ea h a s b e e n th e d e c o n stru c tio n o r d e c e n te r in g
o f th e s e lf in to a m a ss o f c o n tra d ic to ry se lv e s w ith in e a c h p e rso n .
4F o r fu rth e r d isc u ssio n , see ou r Knowledge a n d C la s s : A M arx ian C ritique o f Political
E co n o m y , C h ic a g o : U n iv e rsity o f C h ic a g o P ress, 1 9 87.
5.
Ib id . F o r a c o n c re te a p p lic a tio n o f how th e n o tio n o f d iffe re n t en try p o in ts c a n b e
u sed in d istin g u ish in g o n e th eo ry fro m a n o th e r, s e e o u r Econom ics: M arx ian versus N eo classical,
B altim o re a n d L o n d o n : T h e J o h n s H o p k in s U n iv e rsity P ress, 1987.
6.
E n g e ls to J o s e p h B l o c h , S e p t e m b e r 2 1 - 2 2 , 1 8 9 0 , in K a r l M a r x a n d F r e d e r ic k
E n g e ls, Selected C orre sp o n d en c e, M o sc o w : P ro gress P u b lish e rs, 1 9 75, p p . 3 9 4 -3 9 6 .
7.
F o r a d e t a i l e d e x p o s i t i o n o f c o n c r e t e c l a s s a n a l y s i s , se e c h a p t e r s 3 - 5 o f o u r
K now ledge a n d C la ss.

Maria Turchetto

History of Science and the Science of

History
I am prop osin g here an ex am in atio n o f the text Reading Capital, w ritten
by Lo u is A lth u sser in 1965. I will co n sid er it as a tex t in th e history o f
p h ilosoph y. In Reading C ap ital A lth u sser explicitly asks w h ich philosophy
provides the basis, the fou nd ation , fo r M arx s scien tific work? In this sense,
Reading C apital is, at the sam e tim e, a tex t in th e h istory o f p h ilo so p h y and
a text in the ph ilosoph y o f scien ce. In research on M a rx s philosophy, it
becom es essen tial in the A lth u sserian argum ent to consider M arx s historical
position in relation to the school o f classical econom y, on the one hand, and
to H e g e ls p h ilo so p h y , on the o th e r. In o th e r w ords, it is a m a tte r o f
d e te r m in in g M a r x s p o s itio n in a history o f science a n d in a history o f
philosophy.
I spoke o f historical position, n o t sim ply th e o re tic a l p o sitio n . In deed ,
accord in g to A lth u sser, M a r x s C apital open s a n ew ep och in th e history o f
sc ie n c e a n d in th e history o f p h ilosoph y: it m arks a p o in t o f n o return in
th e se h isto rie s. I w an t to say th at in readin g Capital, A lth u sser d o es n ot
simply establish a com parison betw een different theories: he form ulates a
historical judgment w h ich is tem porally directed, a vector w ith a very precise
course. M a rx s science is n o t sim ply b etter th a n S m ith s or R icard o s; it is
subsequen t. A n d M a rx s philosophy, w hich is im plicit in his science, is n ot
simply better th an H e g e ls p h ilosophy; it is subsequent. It belongs to the
follow ing epoch. H e g e ls theories o f classical econom y are n ot sim ply other
th eories; they are the prehistory o f M a r x s theories.
B efore b e g in n in g w ith th is to p ic , a few w ords ab o u t the title I h av e
ch o sen for this p ap er H istory o f S cien ce and S cien ce o f H istory. T h is is
n ot a play on w ords, b ecau se h istory a ctu ally en ters in to th e A lth u sserian
argu m ent in tw o ways. O n the on e h an d, I said th at A lth u sser analyzes
C ap ital as a scien tific w ork in term s o f the history o f sciences. O n the other
han d, the p articu lar scie n ce w hose h istory A lth u sse r reco n stru cts is the
scien ce o f h istory . A c c o r d i n g to A lt h u s s e r , M a r x s C a p ita l m a rk s a
fu n d am en tal stage in the history o f the science o f history. T o speak plainly, I
h av e schem atized A lth u sse rs p ositio n in this way: according to A lth usser,
it is o n ly w ith M a rx th a t h isto r y b e c o m e s, fo r th e fir st tim e , a tru e

74

THE A LTH U SSE R IA N LEGA CY

sc ie n c e, or at the very least a m atu re scien ce.

In oth er words, before

M arx there was only prehistory o f the science o f history. O n e can see it;
th e p lay on words is in evitable.
T o get in to m y su b je c t, I w ill a p p ro a c h A lth u s se r s te x t by ask in g a
q u estio n w hich is p o ssib ly ag g re ssiv e b u t, I b eliev e, n o t to o d isso n an t
w ith th e spirit o f the au th or. I ask what is philosophy? A lth u sse r aim s to
situ ate M a r x s C ap ita l in a history o f the sc ie n c e o f history. M oreo ver,
A lth u sse r exp licitly says th a t he reads C apital as a p h ilo so p h er, n ot as a
h istorian . T o exam ine C apitals place in the h istory o f know ledge is then a
p h ilo so p h ical n ot a h istorical question. A lth u sser says th at to read Capital
as a h istorian would h ave m eant to read it q u estio n in g the relation betw een
its h isto rical analyses a n d an h istorical object, previously defined outside o f
it, w it h o u t d i s c u s s i n g t h is o b je c t . In o t h e r w o rd s, t h e h i s t o r i c a l
co n sid e ra tio n in v o lv ed in A lth u sse rs p h ilo so p h y d o es n o t p la c e M a r x s
w ork in relation to a m ilieu w ith a h istorical co n te x t defined som ew here
else. O n the contrary, A lth u ssers p hilosophy reflects on how to define these
co n tex ts or these historical o b je c ts.
P h ilosop h ical discourse is specifically ch aracterized by putting the object of
a science into question. A lth u sser em phazises this ch aracterizatio n in the
co m p ariso n b etw een the p h ilo sp h e rs reading on th e on e han d, an d the
readings o f the h isto rian , the econ om ist, the lo g icia n , etc., on the other
h an d. T h ese last readings would h ave considered the object o f C apital as
given, w hereas the p h ilo so p h ers reading considers the ob ject o f C apital as
its tru e p r o b le m . In t h i s s e n s e , A l t h u s s e r s o m e t im e s d e f in e s th e
p h ilo so p h ers reading as a n epistom o lo gical readin g. T o read C apital a s a
p h ilo so p h er, says A lth u sse r, m eans to ask th e e p isto m o lo g ic a l q u estio n .
T h a t is to say, th e q u e stio n about th e relation with its object, th e qu estion o f
th e d isco u rse c o n str u c te d to tre at th is o b je c t the q u estio n o f scientific
discourse. T o get to the b ottom o f the question I asked previously w hat is
p h ilo so p h y ? we c a n say th a t, a c c o r d in g to A lt h u s s e r , p h ilo so p h y is
ep isto m o lo g y , and ep isto m o lo gy is reflection on sc ie n tific d isco u rse an d ,
n o ta b ly , re se a r c h and rc o n s tr u c tio n o f the c o n c e p t u a l stru c tu re th a t
provides th e o b je c t o f a science.
It is n ecessary to stress th a t in A lth u sse rs tex t the term ep istom ology
always h as a broad m ean in g. I would say it h as the classical sense o f theory
o f knowledge (c o n n a issa n ce ). In p articu la r, I w an t to say th a t it is n o t
n e c e s s a r y to t h in k o f th e lim ite d se n se th e te r m is a s s ig n e d in th e
n eo p o sitiv ist tradition, w h ich uses this term to design ate th e in vestigation
o f th e logical co h eren ce o f scien tific argu m ent, in p olem ical op po sition to
the term ph ilo sop h y, suspected o f m etap h y sics. A cco rd in g to A lth usser,
in vestigation o f th e co h eren ce o f the argum ent co n stitu tes the goal o f the

H ISTORY OF SC IEN C E A N D TH E SC IEN C E OF HISTORY

75

lo g icia n s reading. T h a t is to say, the readin g w hich poses the p roblem o f

m eth od s o f exp o sitio n and p roof, again w ithout questioning th e object o f
these m ethods. T h u s, the p h ilo so p h ical investigation o f a scien tific work is
n o t s im p ly a n h i s t o r i c a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n , an d n o t s im p ly a l o g i c a l
in v e stig a tio n . P h ilo so p h ica l in v e stig a tio n is alw ays a n inquiry in to the
co n ceptu al structure o f a scie n ce w h ich involves a h isto rical ju d gem en t.
O n e se e s th a t th e c o m p a r iso n a n d indeed th e d is tin c tio n b etw een
p h i l o s o p h i c a l , h i s t o r i c a l , a n d l o g i c a l is f u n d a m e n t a l to an
un d erstan din g o f A lth u ssers lesson.
W e c a n ask o th e r, sim ila r q u e stio n s, alw ays w ith th e go al o f b e tte r
u n d e rsta n d in g w h at A lth u s se r ia n e p iste m o lo g ic a l p h ilo so p h y is. For
e x a m p le , o n e c a n in v e stig a te p h ilo so p h y w ith regard to th e d iffere n c e
betw een p h ilo so p h y a n d scien ce. O n e can ask again the qu estion brings
us b a c k to th e sam e n u cle u s o f q u e stio n s w h at are th e m a te r ia ls o f
p h ilo s o p h y ? W h a t d o e s p h ilo s o p h y c o n c e r n it s e l f w ith ? W it h th is
q u e s tio n , I w a n t to p u t forw ard a g a in a p ro b le m r a ise d p rin c ip a lly in
debates on th e su b je c t o f the history o f philosophy. S h o u ld th e history o f
ph ilo sop h y feed itself exclusively on interior m aterial, that is, p h ilo sop h ical
system s? O r, on the con trary, sh ould it lim it itself to the exterior and follow
its p a th a lo n g sid e th e h isto ry o f sc ie n c e s, th e h isto ry o f re la tio n s, th e
history o f culture, etc.?
I b eliev e it is p ossib le to fin d a u n iv o c al resp on se to this qu estio n in
A lth u sse rs tex t. First, one must include the sciences w ithin the m aterials
o f ph ilosoph y th at goes w ithout saying. W e h ave seen th a t ph ilo sop h y is
co n cern ed w ith scien tific discourse. P h ilosophy form ulates a judgm ent o f
the c a p a city for in n o v a tio n o f sc ie n tific th eories, it aim s at recogn izin g
e p iste m o lo g ic a l re v o lu tio n s ; th is, n o tab ly , is th e h isto ric a l ju d g e m e n t
en gaged in by philosophy. T h e sc ie n c es are th u s th e m aterial par excellence,
or in d eed th e raw m aterial o f p h ilo so p h y , b e c a u se p h ilo so p h y d o es not
really h ave an o b je c t (in th e sen se th a t all scien ce h as its ow n o b je c t).
R a th e r , p h ilo so p h y is a tw ic e -re m o v e d r e fle c t io n o n k n o w le d g e . In
ad d itio n , scien ces are th e exclusive m aterial o f p h ilo so p h ical work. T h e
know ledge philosophy provides fo r theory is only scien tific know ledge. It is
n ot, I w an t to say, a know ledge (savoir) in th e b ro ad a n d gen eric sense o f
th e term , th a t is to say, th e sense w h ich in clu des religion s, m yths, form s o f
life, mentalits, etc. T h e se d ifferen t form s o f k n o w ldege can en ter in to
p h ilo so p h ica l discourse at best as ep istem ological o b stacle s, th a t is, on th e
n egativ e side o f a discourse w h ich aim s to distin guish betw een scien tific
and p re-scien tific, betw een sc ie n c e and ideology, betw een history
and prehistory o f know ledge.

76

T H E A LTH U SSE R IA N LEGACY

O f course we must clarify the poin t these cultural n on -scien tific or

p re -sc ie n tific form s c a n form th e sp ecific o b je c t o f differen t p articu lar

scien ces. In this case we will h av e sciences o f n atu re. In this sense we
m u st e m p h a siz e t h a t A lt h u s s e r d e p a r ts fr o m a stro n g u n itary idea o f
k n o w le d g e , a n idea w h ich su ffic e s to e x c lu d e a priori an y d ic h o to m y
betw een n atu re an d culture.
In con clu sion , we can say th a t A lth u sse rs ep istem ological ph ilosop h y
is n ot related to cu ltu re in th e generic sense o f h u m an exp ression or o f
any kind o f k n o w led ge (savoir). E p iste m o lo g ic a l p h ilo so p h y is only
related to w h at is p roperly called scien tific know ledge (savoir). It h as to do
only w ith th e k n o w led g e (con n aissan ce) o f o b je c ts, e ith e r n a tu r a l or
cu ltu ral, but in any case ob jects w h ich are d e fin ed and exam in ed in a
scien tific m anner. C on seq u en tly , the history o f p h ilosop h y is the history o f
sc ie n tific k n o w led g e ( co n n aissan ce), a n d its m a te r ia ls can be the raw
m a te ria ls o f sc ie n c e s, or ev en o f re fin em e n ts, in d ee d o f p h ilo so p h ic a l
elaboration s.
T o c o n c lu d e th e q u e stio n o f th e re la tio n s b e tw e e n p h ilo so p h y an d
sc ie n c e in a p ro v isio n a l m an n er, we m ust ad d th a t th e u nitary idea o f
know ledge (connaissance) I spoke about does n o t exclude the plurality o f the
sciences. T h ere is n o t science (s in g u la r ); th e re are alw ay s a n u m b e r o f
sp ecific scien ces. In th e A lth u sserian co n cep tion , th e plurality o f sciences
does n o t derive from a descriptive n o tatio n such as the specialization o f
the m odern w orld or so m eth in g sim ilar. T h e plurality derives from the
d e fin itio n its e lf o f s c ie n c e . In effe ct, th e re are a n u m b e r o f sc ie n c e s
bec au se sc ie n c e ex ists o n ly from th e p o in t o f th e delimitation of the scientific
object. W h ereas p h ilo so p h y , as we h av e seen , does n o t h av e an ob ject,
scien ce is always science o f a defined ob ject.
D e lim ita tio n o f an o b je c t is really n ot th e prop er term . I ch o se a
s y n t h e t ic fo r m u la , s u it a b le fo r u n r a v e lin g th e d if f e r e n c e s b e tw e e n
ph ilosop h y and science. B u t w e m ust say th at it is n ot really a m atter o f
d e l i m i t a t i o n b u t r a th e r o f co n str u c tio n . T h e te r m d e l im it a t io n
n everth eless em phasizes th at a ll science provides a rupture in the infinite
u n k n o ttin g o f sense th at is the w orld. (H ere, Im using the words o f M ax
W eber.) T h u s, the plurality o f scien ces fin ally returns to the plurality o f
possible ruptures. O n th e other hand, even the term o b je c t is n ot the
m ost p recise. A lth u sser, in fact, alm ost n ever uses it alo n e . H e always
speaks o f the object-discourse relation , o f the u nity o f discourse w ith .its
object, etc. I will return to this shortly. But lets accept fo r the m om en t
this in correct form ulation , delim itation o f the o b je c t. W e say then th a t
all sc ie n c e h a s a d e lim ite d (c o n s tr u c te d ) o b je c t , w h e re a s p h ilo so p h y
co n cern s the m o dalities o f delim itatio n (c o n stru ctio n ). T h e scien ces can

H ISTORY OF SCIEN CE A N D TH E SCIEN CE OF HISTORY

77

rightfu lly b e unaw are o f th ese m o d a lities o f d e lim ita tio n (c o n stru ctio n ),
eith er b ecau se they are n o t in terested in d iscu ssin g th em or, in a stro n g
snse, because they do n ot u n d erstan d th em at all. T h a t is, because they
h ave forgotten or falsified the d elim itatio n .
W h e re is th e an sw er to a qu estio n w h ich derives spon tan eously from the
assertion th at know ledge is only scien tific know ledge: w hat is philosophy
good for? w hat is the use o f it? In other words, isn t the fam ily o f scien ces
sufficient? W hy would it need to h av e a p h ilo sop h y alon gsid e or over it?
W e h a v e ju st se en the reason : scien tific p ractice c a n work very w ell, can
produce know ledge very well, even w ithout un d erstan din g its ph ilo sop h ical
constitution . A cco rd in g to A lth u sser, this is exactly the case w ith M arx.
H i s s c i e n t i f i c p r a c t i c e d o e s n o t c o r r e s p o n d to h is p h i l o s o p h i c a l
d eclaratio n s. N o tab ly an d here the p h ilo sop h ical ju dgm en t b ecom es an
h isto rical ju dgm en t the scien tific p ractice at work in Capital is often more
advanced than the m eth od ological assertion s co n tain ed in the same text.
T h e A lth u sse ria n an aly sis o f the co n trad iction s betw een M a rx s science
an d m an y o f h is p h ilo so p h ical statem en ts is w ell-know n. T h e exam ples he
uses are also w ell-know n (th e Letter to citizen Maurice L a C htre, w here
M arx says th at he applies the H egelian m eth od to econ om ic an d p o litical
argu m en ts). H ere let m e recall the fu n dam en tal in d icatio n w h ich brin gs us
b ack to A lth u sse r ia n a n aly sis. W e m ust lo o k fo r M a r x s p h ilo so p h y in
M arx s scien ce a scien ce w hich is extrem ely in n ovative.
B ut how is M a rx s scien ce in n ovative? It is possible, yet again, to locate
a c le a r a n d u n iv o c a l r e sp o n se in A lt h u s s e r s te x t . M a r x s sc ie n c e is
in n o v a tiv e because it is not empiricist, or, to express it better, b ecause its
object is co n stru cted by rigorous, n on-em piricist m odalities. I believe the
tim e h as com e to provide clarificatio n fo r the term o b je c t. In fact, there
is hardly an em piricist co n cep tio n o f know ledge th at can speak o f o b je cts
w ithout problem s. T h e term o b je c t as w ell as th e term su b je ct belon g
to th e em p iricist tra d itio n . W h en on e speaks o f th e co n stru c tio n o f
s c ie n t i f ic o b je c t s (n o lo n g e r g iv e n o b je c t s ) , o r th e p r o d u c t io n o f
k n o w led ge, th e q u estio n b ecom es co m p licated . It is n o t only a m atter o f
c o n stru c tin g an o b je ct. T h e .s ta r tin g p o in t o f sc ie n tific p ro d u ctio n is a
c o ll e c t io n o f s t r u c t u r a l c o n d i t i o n s , on e c o u ld sa y a s tr u c tu r e o f
o b s e r v a t i o n w h ic h , at th e sa m e tim e , d e f in e s visible ob jects (a n d ,
con sequ en tly, invisible o b je cts), the position o f the subject in the structure o f
observation , and a domain o f verifiability.
I can n o t enter into the d etails here o f this triple d eterm in ation w hich
follow s from scien tific co n stru ctio n (perm it m e to refer you to my other
work, especially to the text Per la critica di u n a u to c ritica ). In any case, I
w a n t to stre ss in a few w o rd s t h a t the s u b je c t is d e te r m in e d by th e

78

T H E A LTH U SSE R IA N LEGA CY

co n cep tu al structure as well as by the object. Indeed, in the A lth u sserian

readin g o f C apital, anti-em piricism is, at the sam e tim e, anti-subjectivism .
S in c e th ere is n o longer a pre-categorial ob ject, ju st as th e re is n o longer a
p r e - c a t e g o r i a l s u b je c t , the s u b je c t is p r o d u c e d by the st r u c t u r a l
co n d itio n s o f the theory, as well a s the ob ject. In oth er words, the givens
o f a real o b je ct provided to sensible in tu ition an d the given s o f the ideal
o b je c t co m in g from su b jective represen tation are eq ually poor accordin g
to A lt h u s s e r : n e i t h e r on e n o r th e o t h e r s u c c e e d s in s h o w in g th e
co n ce p tu al structure w hich constitutes the o b jects o f know ledge. T h ere
you h ave a critiq u e o f id e a list su b je c tiv ism . It is n ot a m a tte r o f an
id e a list in v e rsio n o f e m p iric ism . T h a t s v e ry im p o rta n t, b e c a u se th is
c ritiq u e c a n a v o id th e c o n se q u e n c e s o f a r e la tiv ism w ith n o m e a n s o f
escap e. Put an o th er way, it co n cern s m a in ta in in g th e c o n d itio n s w ith a
view to gu aran teein g the com parison betw een different th eories to avoid
incom m ensurability.
It is also im p o r ta n t to e n v isio n th e d e t e r m in a t io n o f a d o m a in o f
ve rifiab ility . H ere on e en co u n te rs th e q u e stio n A lth u sse rs in terpreters
h av e qu arreled a good d eal about: the qu estio n o f th e in teriority o f th e
c r ite r io n o f tru th . A b o v e all it c o n c e r n s a g a in an a n ti-e m p ir ic is t
appeal. O ne m ust reject the idea o f a verification th at w ould be exterior
and foreign to the th eoretical hypothesis. T h e pressing question o f M a rx s
C apital one know s it w ell is th a t a certain M arx ism claim ed to verify it
sim ply by revolu tion ary practice. A lth u sser n o tes th a t su ch a claim is n ot
legitim ate in other sciences: fo r exam ple, the physicist does n ot claim to
verify all th e m ath em atical th eorem s he uses.
I m ust n ow c a ll atte n tio n to a subsequent n o tio n o f A lth u sse rs. O n e
gran ts to sc ie n c e th e rig h t to an interior criterion o f tru th from th e m om en t
it is co n stitu ted and developed. W h at does th at m ean? From w hat p oin t
can on e say th at a scien ce is d e v e lo p e d , th a t it is m ature, or h as com e o f
age? In a word, sc ie n c e s co m in g o f age co n sists o f b ein g at the level o f its
tim e. T h u s, it is at m ajority relative to its h isto rical tim e. O r, acc o rd in g to
A lth u sser, th e form o f scientificity at th e level o f th e presen t tim e is exactly
th at co n stru ctiv ist, an ti-em piricist form we h ave been talk in g abou t. In
th e h isto r ic a l p re se n t, sc ie n c e s m u st1not d e p a rt fro m th e p re -c a te g o ria l
g iv e n s c o n c e rn in g th e o b je c t, fo r fe a r o f b e in g ju d g e d p r e - sc ie n tific ,
id e o lo g ic a l. T o d a y better, after M a rx there is a p ro h ib itio n ag a in st
bein g an em piricist; em piricism is forbidden.
S o on e can u n d erstan d the sense o f h isto rical ju dgem en t involved in the
p h ilo so p h ic a l in v e stig a tio n o f C ap ita l. T h is is n ot on ly a q u e stio n o f
clarifyin g w hat M arx does. A t the sam e tim e it is a m atter o f in d icatin g
w h at th e sc ie n c e s m ust do. O n c e criticized , em p iricism is n o t ju st any

H ISTORY OF SCIEN CE A N D TH E SCIEN CE OF H ISTO RY

79

th eo retical ch oice w hatever; it is b ack track in g, a retreat. M arx lies beyond

th e th re sh o ld o f sc ie n tific ity ; all e m p iric ist sc ie n c e afte r him re m a in s
beh in d it.
I w an t now to draw several co n clu sio n s. P h ilosop h y m u st clarify the
form o f scien tificity w hich certain scien tific know ledge is based on (often
w ithout b ein g fully con scious o f it). But it does not sim ply concern m aking
n o te s. P h ilo so p h y does n ot h ave a p u rely e x p lic a tiv e fu n ctio n . It p re
sc r ib e s ; it r e q u ir ie s c e r t a in c o n d it io n s fo r re c o g n iz in g k n o w le d g e as
sc ie n tific . In o th e r w ords, p h ilo so p h y m u st d istin g u ish th e sc ie n tific
from the p re-scientific. It follow s th at philosophy is o f n ecessity history of
philosophy. In effect, sc ie n tific and p re-scien tific are relative co n cepts
from the h istorical p o in t o f view .
T h a t m e a n s, o n th e o n e h a n d , th a t A lth u s se r a c c e p ts th e m o d ern
d im en sio n o f the relativity o f know ledges, but th at does n ot m ean foregoing
ju d g e m e n t in th e n a m e o f r e la t iv is m . O n th e o t h e r h a n d , c le a r ly ,
according to A lth usser, history is direction less. R ather, it has to construct
a d ir e c t io n , a d i r e c t i o n a l i t y w h ic h m a rk s a s ig n if ic a n t fo rw a rd a n d
backw ard. T h a t is the ta sk o f philosophy.
F rom th e seco n d h a lf o f th e 1 9 th century, m an y scien ces are carried
a lo n g by a process o f th eoretical tran sform ation w h ich will lead th em very
far from p ositiv ism an d em piricism . T h is is n ot a lin ear process. In fact,
o n e sp eak s o f th is p ro ce s as a crisis o f th e sc ie n c e s, an d th is is n o t a
process w h ich unfolds in exactly the sam e m an n er in each scien tific field.
B ut it is also n ot a m ovem en t o f totally ch ao tic dispersion. O n e ca n locate
the direction s, the coordinates. G a sto n B ach elard spoke o f this process as
the fo rm a tio n o f th e new sc ie n tific sp irit, in clu d in g in it a num ber o f
decisive ep istem ological ruptures in the area o f n atu ral sciences, such as
the in t r o d u tio n o f p r o b a b ilis m in p h y sic s , the m a t h e m a t ic iz a t io n o f
chem istry, etc. In my op in ion , the A lth u sserian reading o f C apital exh ibits
m an y sim ilarities w ith the B a c h e la rd ia n read in g o f the transform ation s o f
the n atu ra l sciences. O n th e on e h an d , A lth u sser judges th e co n ce p t o f the
m ean s o f p ro d u ctio n to be an ep istem ological ru ptu re in th e science of
h isto ry c o m p a r a b l e to th e m a t h e m a t i c i z a t i o n o f c h e m is t r y o r th e
in tro d u ctio n o f p rob ab ilism in to physics. O n th e oth er h an d, A lth u sser
tries to ge n e raliz e th e c h a r a c te r is tic s o f th is e p iste m o lo g ic a l ru p tu re
beyond th e lim its o f th e p articu lar sc ie n c e where it arises. It is th e sam e
synthetic sch em e as B a c h e la rd s. B ach elard sees different aspects o f the
sam e process in the co n cep tu al tran sform ation s o f chem istry and physics.
A p rocess w h ich leads, a cro ss its o scillatio n s a n d altern atin g rhythm s, to
th e g o a l o f a new scien tific spirit w h ich can in th e n am e o f th e unity o f
sc ie n c es be p ictu red in a co h e re n t ch art. In a certain sense, A lth u sser

80

THE A LTH U SSERIA N LEGACY

will co m plete this ch art w ith the p ath o f the historical and social sciences.
T h is is the sam e path, b ec au se after M arx , h istorical and so cial scien ces m ust
le a v e th e old e m p iric ist sp irit an d re -e x a m in e th eir c o n c e p ts o f la w ,
cau sality , d eterm in atio n , etc. T h is p assin g b eyond em piricist history,
w h ich begin s w ith M arx a n d is far fro m b ein g a ttain ed today, is n o t any
th e o re tica l tran sfo rm atio n w h atsoever, but the same transformation w hich
the sciences a ttain in general in the 20th century.
T h e co n sequ en ces are rem arkable. A U barriers betw een n atu re and
cu ltu re are b rok en dow n. T h is is n ot b an al; a large part o f 20th-century
culture, and n otably G erm an culture, h as always p rotected these barriers.
A fte r M arx, on e c a n c o n stru c t a critiq u e o f th e e m p iric ist id e o lo g y o f
h isto r y w h ic h , on th e o th e r h a n d , is in m an y w ays a n a lo g o u s to the
c o n str u c tiv ism e m e rg in g in th e p h y sic a l sc ie n c e s in th e 2 0 th cen tu ry .
C o n s e q u e n t ly , M a r x is d is p la c e d fro m the 1 9 th c e n tu ry to the 2 0 th
cen tu ry . T h u s, w ith th e p erm ission o f th e th e o re tic ia n o f th e crisis o f
M a rx ism , M a rx is n o t properly a classical auth or. O n th e contrary, he
o p e n s th e c o n te m p o r a ry a g e th e new sc ie n tific sp irit in th e fie ld o f
history.
I
would like to add in co n clu sion th a t M a rx s displacem en t to th e 20th
ce n tu ry is very sig n ific a n t w hen o n e co m p ares h im w ith th e m o d ern s,
rather th an com parin g h im w ith classical authors. A lth u sser reads C apital
in relatio n to classical econ om ics and H eg elian philosophy, according to a
traditio n w h ich is certain ly we m ust say p h ilo lo gically correct. H egel,
S m ith , an d R ic a rd o are in d eed th e true so u rces fo r M arx . W h a t I am
su ggestin g is re ad in g C apital in re la tio n to su b sequ en t develo pm en ts in the
scie n ce o f eco n o m ics and th e theory o f history, esp ecially in re la tio n to
authors in the h isto rical school o f econ om ics, on the one hand, and on the
oth er, in re latio n to authors w ho are engaged in a lo n g d eb ate with the
historical school, the so-called co n flict o f m eth od s (Methodenstreit). O n ce
m ore I can n o t go in to details here, but again perm it m e to refer you to my
work cited earlier.
In any case, the lesson o f A lth u sser is fu n d am en tally to a tte m p t this
co m p a riso n b etw een M arx , on th e o n e h a n d , a n d S c h m lle r, R o sch er,
K n ies, M en g er, W eber, a n d R ick ert on' th e o th e r. It in v o lv es a com parison
w h ich is p erh aps questionable from a p h ilological p o in t o f view, but is in
my o p in ion correct from a th eoretical p oin t o f view. A sim ilar com parison
can , I b elieve, further illum inate the subject if on e considers th at today,
n ot only in com m on usage, but also am o n g a large num ber o f scholars and
specialists, the term h isto rical is used as a synonym for em p irical.
T ra n sla ted b y M arth a C alh o u n

Peter Schttler

Althusser and Annales

HistoriographyAn Impossible
Dialogue?
I
Louis A lth u ssers p h ilo so p h ical texts are taken to be an ti-h istorical by
m any h istorian s, o r a t least to possess n o sign ifican ce for historiograph y at
all. T h is is tru e n ot on ly o f the p re se n t, in w h ich A lth u s s e r s M a rx ist
a ffiliatio n seem s ou t o f p lace, bu t a lso o f th e p e rio d w hen it was w idely
sh ared . W h e n e v e r th e so-called stru ctu ralist a tta c k on h isto ry (A lfred
S c h m id t) was at issue, A lth u sse rs n am e was im m ed iately in vo k ed . Few
h is t o r ia n s r e je c t e d th is n e g a t iv e c o n s e n s u s a n d a c k n o w le d g e d th e
su ggestion p rovided by For M arx an d Reading C ap ital. 1
A m o n g the n um erous critiques o f A lth u sser, an article by Pierre V ilar
e n t it le d M a r x is t H isto r y , a H is t o r y in th e M a k i n g is p a r tic u la r ly
rem arkable. Its p lace o f p u b licatio n was program m atic in itself, since it first
ap p eared in 1973 in th e jo u rn al Annales and was then reprin ted, a year
later, in th e c o lle c tio n F aire de lhistoire e d ite d by Ja c q u e s Le G o f f and
Pierre N o r a .2 T h e au th o rs d istin ctiv e profile is an ad d itio n al factor. V ilar
w as ( a n d s t i l l is) o n e o f th e b e s t - k n o w n h i s t o r ia n s o f th e s e c o n d
g e n e ratio n o f the Annales S c h o o l, and from 1962 u n til h is retirem ent held
th e c h a ir in e c o n o m ic an d s o c ia l h isto ry a t th e S o r b o n n e p re v io u sly
o c c u p ie d by M a r c B lo c h a n d E r n e st L a b r o u s s e . M o re o v e r , h e n e v e r
co n ce aled h is M arxist view s w h ich h e discussed in num erous articles. A n d
it is s ig n if ic a n t t h a t V ila r f o r m u la t e d n o p h ilo s o p h ic a l or M a r x is tp h ilo lo g ic a l o b je c t io n s to A lt h u s s e r s th e se s , b u t in c o n tr a st to a ll
previous critiques com pared th em w ith the p ractice and m eth od ological
stan d ard s o f the late st historical scien ce.
In Reading C ap ital (1 9 6 5 ), in th e ch ap ter O u tlin e o f th e C o n c e p t o f
H is t o r y , A lt h u s s e r h a d a ss e r te d th a t m o d e r n h is t o r io g r a p h y still
re m a in ed tied to a n e m p iric ist c o n c e p tio n o f h isto ry in sofar a s like
V o lt a ir e or, la te r , in a s u b lim a t e d fo rm , H e g e l it c o n c e iv e d the
h isto r ic a l p rocess in th e form o f a h o m o g e n e o u s a n d lin ear co n tin u ity ,
w h ich it was sufficient to put in order a n d p eriod ize; an d , secondly, it

82

T H E A LTH U SSE R IA N LEG ACY

presupposed a co n ce p t o f tem porality w herein all the elem ents or levels o f

a society can be reduced to one an d the sam e tem poral axis. A s we know,
this c ritiq u e was p rim arily d ire cted a g a in st th e M a rx ist c o n c e p tio n o f
history p redom inan t at the time, w hich som etim es in fatalist, som etim es
in a ctiv ist, fash io n in verted H eg els ph ilo sop h y o f history, in stead o f
resum ing and co n tin u in g the break w ith any ph ilo sop h y o f history effected
by C apital, as A lth u sser dem an ded. B u t at th e sam e tim e, A lth u sser was
also th in k in g o f the m ost in n ovative p ractition ers o f historiography, since
he ex p lic itly n o ted : N o w ad ay s, a few h isto ria n s are b e g in n in g to pose
th e se q u e stio n s, an d o fte n in a very re m a rk a b le w ay (L u c ie n F eb v re,
Labrousse, Braudel, e tc .).4 T h is reference was follow ed by a sh ort critique,
w h ic h w as, h o w e v e r , r a t h e r a b s t r a c t an d a llu s iv e (in lin e w ith th e
p rogram m atic ton e o f th e b ook ):
b u t they d o n o t pose th ose q u estio n s ex p lic itly a s a fu n ctio n o f the
structure o f the whole they are studying, they do n ot pose them in a truly
co n ce p tu a l form : they sim ply observe that there are different tim es in
history, varieties o f time, lon g times, m edium tim es and sh ort tim es,
a n d th e y are co n ten t to n o te th e ir interferences as so m any products o f
th e ir in te rse ctio n ; th ey do n o t therefore re late th e se v a rieties as so
m an y variations to th e stru ctu re o f th e w h o le, a lth o u g h th e la tte r
d ire c tly g o v e rn th e p ro d u ctio n o f th o se v a ria tio n s; rath er, th e y are
tem pted to relate these v arieties, as so m an y v a ria n ts measurable by
t h e ir d u r a t io n to o r d in a r y tim e i t s e lf , to th e i d e o l o g i c a l tim e
co n tin u u m we h ave discussed. (R C , p. 9 6 )
It was a b o v e all th is p a ssa g e , an d a few o th e rs in w h ich A lth u s se r
criticized th e th o u g h t o f th e b est h isto r ia n s...to d a y (cf. ibid., p. 1 0 0 ),
w ithout polem ic bu t w ithout any con cession s either, th at served as Pierre
V i la r s p o in t o f d e p a rtu re in c h a lle n g in g A lt h u s s e r s p o stu la te s a b o u t
h isto rical scien ce. A lth o u g h he ackn ow ledged th a t th e p ositio n s advan ced
in Reading C ap ital were interesting and possibly even judiciou s on certain
p recise poin ts, he th o u gh t th at generally they were w ide o f th e actu al
practice o f history, and th a t th ey erected criteria w hich were im possible to
fulfill, or were even simply absurd, co n trad icted by em pirical research. V ilar
w en t fu rth e r still. In d ig ressio n s on F eb v re, L ab ro u sse an d B rau d e l, he
so u gh t to sh ow th a t th e h isto ria n s m ention ed by A lth u sse r were, in th eir
p r a c tic e , alread y m o re a d v a n c e d an d ev en m o re M a r x is t th a n th e
p h ilo so p h er in his abstract generality. H is unw arranted critiqu e o f history
was therefore based u pon an ign o ran ce o f the m ost recen t research and,
ultim ately, on an outm oded co n ce p tio n o f the w riting o f history.

A LT H U SSE R A N D A N N A LES H ISTO RIO GRA PH Y

83

V ila r s article h as b een m u ch ech o e d in F ra n c e an d abroad, and was

n early alw ays read as a text directed against A lth u sser.5 In a tte n d in g only to
the h isto ria n s occasion ally iron ic and p o lem ical ton e w ith respect to the
p h i l o s o p h e r s i n ju n c t i o n , p e o p l e f a i l e d to n o t e th e f u n d a m e n t a l
co n v e rg e n c e s b etw een V ila r an d A lth u sse r , a n d also V ila r s u n d erly in g
critiq u e o f c e rta in o f his p rofession al colleagues (n o ta b ly B rau del). T h e su b
title T o w ard s a Dialogue w ith A lth u sse r was n o t ta k e n literally, but
read as a rh etorical or courteous tu rn o f phrase, or ev en as an ad d ition al
irony. For how could th ere co n ceiv ab ly be a co n stru ctiv e debate betw een
th e th e o re ticist A lth u sser and a h istorian im m ersed in em pirical work?
T h e ap p aren t obviousn ess o f th is ch asm , th is incom patibility, persists,
a n d h as even been reinforced subsequently. T h e e v o lu tio n o f th e p o litical
an d th e o re tic a l c o n ju n c tu re in th e la st fifte e n years, A lth u s se rs tragic
retirem en t from th e p ub lic sphere, as well as the recovery o f his texts by
se co n d a ry lite ra tu re , h ave c o n trib u te d to th is. But from th e an gle o f
th eoretical history, the last word h as possibly n ot yet been said. M igh t n o t a
h is t o r ic a l s c ie n c e o f the fu tu re , w h ic h w ish ed to re fle c t on its w ork
e p iste m o lo g ica lly , o n e day find in A lth u sse r am on g oth ers so m eth in g
w h ich w ould aid it to fo u n d its p ractice in a m a te ria list m an n er? O r
rather, sin ce it is n o t a qu estion o f a fou n d atio n in the sense o f a theory o f
k n o w le d g e , so m e th in g w h ich w o u ld h e lp it to defen d th e h is t o r ia n s
craft as M arc B lo ch called it again st its ex p lo itatio n by the ideologies
o f history.
G iv e n the cu rren t ten d en cies in in tern a tio n a l h istorical scien ce, I am
obviou sly rath er sk e p tical th a t su ch a resu rgen ce o f interest in A lth u sser
could rapidly, or indeed ever, occur. B u t as a p racticin g h istorian , it seem s
to m e t h a t su ch a reread in g o f A lth u sse r is u tterly d e sirab le an d q u ite
p o ssib le. It w o u ld a b o v e a ll in v o lv e c o n tin u in g th e d ialo g u e b e g u n by
Pierre V ilar, an d w h ich he co n ce iv ed in a w h olly co n stru c tiv e m an n er,6
betw een the w riting o f history from the perspective o f the (first) Annales
and th e s t r u c t u r a l M a r x is m o f A lt h u s s e r . O f c o u rse , the e n o rm o u s
d ista n ce from th e d e b a te s o f th e 1 9 6 0 s a n d early 1970s will h a v e to be
taken in to accoun t. F o r even if from th e van tage o f the longue dure the
deep structures in the European and W estern countries h ave n ot evolved
m uch , c e rta in c r ite r ia - o f th e th e o r e tic a l debate h a v e been c o m p le te ly
tran sform ed. In the case o f the dialo gu e en v isage d h ere, this esse n tially
b ears on two prem ises.
Firstly, to d ay it w ould be qu ite ab su rd to co n tin u e to sp eak o f M arx ism
as a qu asi-m an d atory fram e o f reference, as a kind o f lingua franca. N o doubt
it is som etim es still useful to use the ad jectiv e M arx ist to characterize a
th eoretical ten dency; but it would no lon ger m ake sense in 1988 to insist

84

TH E A LTH U SSER IA N LEGACY

u pon a p articu lar scien tific discipline called M arxism (n aturally this does
n ot exclude scien tific treatm en t o f th e history o f the th eories in d icated by
this term ).' Secon d ly , it is im po rtan t to avoid a m isu n d erstan d in g w hich
V ila rs tex t implies th rough ou t (probably as a result o f the self-evid en ce
o f a c o n tin e n t o f M a r x is m a n o tio n su p p o rte d at th is tim e by th e
A lth u sse ria n d e fin itio n o f M arxism as the scien ce o f h istory ): n am ely,
th a t p h ilo so p h y a n d h isto rical science h av e a co m m o n o b je c t regarding
w hich they use a co m m on langu age, the langu age o f M a rx ism ; or even
t h a t t h e y m ig h t w o r k in c o m m o n . (I s h a l l r e t u r n to t h is
m isu nderstandin g, w hich seem s to m e contrary to A lth u ssers text, later.)
In re a lity , th e re are n u m e ro u s p ro b le m s o f tr a n s la tio n b e tw e e n th e
sp e c ific d isc o u rse s o f p h ilo so p h y an d h isto r y , w h ic h are b o u n d to be
reflected when peop le are apparently sp eak in g ab ou t the sam e o b je ct (social
form ation s, m o des o f p rodu ction , ideologies, etc .). N o rm ally , this k in d o f
problem is them atized w ith the help o f th e ab stract/co n crete o p p o sition ,
w h ich m erely reproduces th e false o b viou sn ess o f co m m o n sense. W h a t is
re q u ire d , in ste a d , is r e fle c tio n on th e d iffe re n t v ie w p o in ts , i.e ., th e
different practices, o f ph ilosop h y a n d (h isto rica l) scie n ce. H ere a g a in , in his
th e se s o n p h ilo so p h y an d th e sp o n tan e o u s p h ilo so p h y o f th e sc ie n tists,
A lth u sser h a s contributed so m e im portant p o in ters.s
In th is sen se, I w ould like to p rob e th e p o ssib ilities o f this p articu lar
d ialo gu e by re v ealin g an d d iscu ssin g from a h isto r ia n s sta n d p o in t som e
points o f convergence betw een th e prob lem atic o f th e Annales S c h o o l (ab ov e
all L u cien Febvre, th e h ead and the m ost im portan t th e o re tic ia n o f the
first g e n e ra tio n o f th e A n n ales) an d th e p h ilo so p h ic a l p ro b le m atic o f
A lth u sse r. P o in ts o f co n v e rg e n c e : in o th e r w ords, p o in ts o f intellectual
contact w here different p ractices (here, p h ilo so p h y a n d scien ce) or different
t h e o r e t i c a l d is p o s itio n s ( h e r e A l t h u s s e r s M a r x is m a n d A n n a le s
h isto rio grap h y ) co n jo in , i f only very sligh tly, so th at a jo in t or a suture
m igh t ev en tu ally occur. O f co urse th is im plies th a t th e tw o p rob lem atics
w h ic h r e se m b le e a c h o t h e r p e r t a in to th e sam e t h e o r e t ic a l sp a c e .
H ow ever, this does n ot m ean th at there is a direct continu ity, in such a way
th at their respective courses could be laid end to end on the sam e track,
or th at they sim ply tie up. In other words, I am n o t claim in g th at A lth u sser
an d Febvre th in k th e sam e th in g ; I am , rather, n o tin g som e con vergen ces
w h ich only becom e sign ifican t after the ev en t and w h ich I believe co u ld be
o f interest in the contem porary con text.

A LT H U SSE R A N D A N N A LE S H ISTO RIO GRA PH Y

85

II
In m y view the m ost im po rtan t p o in ts o f con vergen ce betw een Annales
historiograph y and A lth u ssers structural M arxism can be summ ed up in
three theses, w h ich I would like to presen t and discuss here. M oreover, I
th in k it is n o t fortuitous th at they are negative theses, but an effect o f the
m ode o f co n v e rge n c e itself:
1. T h e scien tific w riting o f history is only possible in the form o f a history
o f problems (histoire-problme).
2 . T h e r e is no continu ity b e tw e e n the s c ie n c e o f h isto r y and th e
ph ilosop h y o f history;
3. R e al history can only be th o u g h t in the form o f a structural process o f
ev olu tion o f co m p lex societies.
T o pose a p ro b lem is p recisely th e b egin n in g
and end o f all history. N o problem s, no history.
O n ly n arration s an d co m p ilatio n s.
Febvre
1.
W ith the first point o f co n vergen ce (the first th esis), we seem ingly
find ourselves in an all too fam iliar w hirlpool: w hat is history? H ow can it
be an aly zed ? T o w hat e x te n t can h isto rio g ra p h y c la im o b je c tiv ity and
scientificity? A ll these general q estion s h ave been debated at len gth since
the n in etee n th century, a n d the w hirligig keeps on turning. It is striking
th a t th e fo u n d e r s o f A n n a le s p r a c t ic a lly n e v e r p a r tic ip a t e d in th e se
con troversies. E ven M arc B lo c h s posthu m ou s book, The H istorians C raft,
does n o t form ulate an exp licit theory o f kn ow led ge. A pparently, this kind
o f th in g was to be left to the p h ilosoph ers. N e verth eless, Febvre and B lo ch
were alw ays co n cern ed w ith a m in im u m o f th eoretical p ositio n s, but did
not form ulate th em in the sight o f the judgment o f philosophy, but o f the
craft o f history, th at is to say, p ractical work. T h is is why their scattered
th eo retical and ph ilo sop h ical rem arks never get lost in a vacu u m (w hich
a p h ilo so p h y or ideology could easily fill ), bu t alw ays ap p ear as critical
p ositio n s in relation to the p reju dices or bad h ab its o f p rofession al h istorian s.
It is n o t for n o th in g th a t th e m ost im p o rtan t rubric o f the A nnales, w h ich
Febvre said sum m ed up its w hole sp irit, was en titled D bats et combats."
A sh ort se n te n c e o f L u cie n F e b v re s c o n ta in s in co n d en sed form the
w hole h isto rio grap h y o f the A n n ales: H istory can only be scientific i f the
historian has ideas."J In fact, this sentence im plies a double thesis: a) history
can be a scien ce; b) the h istorian must h ave som e ideas o f his ow n and add
these ideas, th at is to say, theories and concepts, to the fa c ts o f real history.

86

THE A LTH U SSER IA N LEGACY

R e la tiv e to the old G erm an Methodenstreit o n the n o m o th etic ch aracter o f

history, or on h istoricism , p ositivism , M arxism , etc., this scarcely accid en tal
little se n te n c e , w ith its d o u b le im p lic a tio n , turns out to be ex trem e ly
n on con form ist. C o m p are, for instan ce, th e world o f th e G e rm an h istorian s:
w hat rep resen tativ e o f G e rm a n h istorio graph y betw een th e wars or after
(h en ce at the tim e o f Febvre) w ould h a v e b een able to form ulate the sam e
th eo retical d e claratio n o f faith w ithout im m ediately ad d in g a lon g litan y on
th e lim ite d h o rizo n o f any G eistesw issenschaft? In d eed , d o es n ot F ebvre
resum e a q u a si'M a r x ist claim w h ich m ust, in the G e rm a n p ersp ectiv e,
a lm o s t a u t o m a tic a lly le a d h im in to o b je c t i v i s m a n d d o g m a t is m ?
N ev erth eless, Febvre an d B lo ch did n ot ever en tertain the vain hope th at
history as science could on e day com pete directly with physics or biology in
form ulatin g ob jectiv e law s.10 But they did n o t hesitate to com pare the new
h isto r ic a l sc ie n c e w hich th ey aim ed at w ith th e n a tu ra l sc ie n c e s an d
e s p e c ia lly C la u d e B e r n a r d s e x p e r im e n t a l m e d i c i n e in o r d e r to
em ph asize its a n a ly tic a l c h a ra cte r, d e stin e d to su rp ass th e h isto ric ist or
p o sitiv ist realism o f the n in etee n th century. T h e w hole sign ifican ce o f their
a p p ro a c h co n sists in th is dem arcation :
A t th a t tim e h isto ria n s liv ed in a p u erile an d piou s re sp ect fo r th e
facts. T h e y h ad the n aive an d to u ch in g c o n v ictio n th a t the scien tist
was a m an who, p u ttin g his eye to his m icroscope, at o n ce p erceived a
p ile o f fa cts. F ac ts giv en to h im , fa cts m a n u fa ctu red for him by an
ind ulgent P roviden ce, facts w h ich he h ad on ly to record. It would h ave
been en ou gh for on e o f these d o ctors in m eth od to put his eye to the
len s o f a m icro sc o p e , ho w ev er briefly, an d to observe a h isto lo g ic a l
p reparation , for h im to p erceiv e at o n c e th a t it was n o t a q u estio n o f
th e h i s t o l o g i s t o b serv in g , b u t in terp re tin g w h a t m u st in d e e d b e
design ated an abstraction . Five m inutes, and h e w ould h ave assessed,
in the scien tists app rop riation o f w h at he h ad first o f all p rep ared at
len gth and w ith difficulty, in accord an ce w ith a p reconceived idea, the
p e rso n a l c o n trib u tio n o f the m an, o f the re se arch e r w ho only a cts
b ecau se he h as posed a problem a n d form ulated a h y p o th esis."
T h e a n a lo g y is e a sy t o d e c ip h e r. O n ly a h isto r y w h ic h fo rm u la te s
problems can accou n t adequ ately for h istorical reality, n o t by co m p ilin g or
sim ply n arratin g the fa c ts, w h ich se em to com e to the h istorian o f their
own accord, but in d elim itin g and consciously p rep arin g a research ob ject,
w h ich th e h isto ria n m ust first o f all m an u factu re, th a t is to say, construct:
For a ll the scien ces m an ufacture th eir o b je c t. 12 Febvre always insisted on
this prem ise in his work.

A LT H U SSE R A N D A N N A LES H ISTO RIO GRA PH Y

87

W ith o u t p re lim in a ry th e o ry , w ith o u t p r e c o n c e iv e d th e o ry , n o

p ossible scien tific work. A co n stru ction o f the m ind w hich answers to
our need to understan d, theory is the actual exp erien ce o f science. O f a
scien ce whose u ltim ate o b je ctiv e is n o t to discover laws, but to en able
us to understand. Every theory is n atu rally fou n d ed on the postu late
th a t n atu re is e x p lic a b le . A n d m an , o b je c t o f history, form s p art o f
n atu re. H e is for h isto ry w hat th e rock is fo r the m in era lo g ist, th e
an im al fo r th e biologist, the star fo r the astrophysicist: so m eth in g to
e x p la in . T o m ak e u n d e r s to o d . H e n c e to think. A h is t o r ia n w ho
professes pure and sim ple subm ission to th e facts, as if the facts were
n o t m an ufactured, as if they h ad n ot b een previously ch o sen by him,
in all th e sen ses o f the word c h o se n ...is only a tec h n ica l assistan t.
W h o m igh t be e x c ellen t. B u t he is n o t a h isto ria n .15
U n fo r tu n a te ly , it is n o t p o ssib le h ere to d e m o n str a te in d e ta il th e
m an n er in w hich th e Annales h istorian s ap p lie d th is prin ciple or to discuss
their h e sitatio n or incon sisten cies. T a k e th eir b ook s for exam p le, F eb v res
The Problem o f Unbelief in the Sixteenth Century or B lo c h s Feudal Society
and com pare theory and p ractice for yourself. E xcep t th at at root it is not
really a qu estio n o f the a p p lic atio n o f a theory; rather, we can say w ith
A lth u sser, th at it is a m atter o f a p articu lar theoretical practice w hich results
from th e d e m a n d s o f a rigo ro u s sc ie n tific re se a r c h q u ite d istin c t from
n in eteen th -cen tu ry positiv ism and philosop h ies o f history.
H ere is th e first p o in t o f c o n v e r g e n c e w ith A lth u s se r s th e se s. In
d e fin in g the scien ce o f history as a history o f problem s w hich does n ot start
from facts en co u n te re d , bu t w hich m u st on each o c c a sio n co n stru c t its
r e s e a r c h o b je c t , L u c i e n F e b v r e in h is ow n w ay f o r m u l a t e s an
e p iste m o lo g ic a l thesis w h ich e x a c tly co in c id e s (o n th is p articu lar p o in t)
w ith A lth u sse rs an ti-p ositivist and an ti-em piricist co n ce p tio n o f scientific
work. M aybe th is striking co n vergen ce with the A lth u sserian theses on the
sep aration o f th e real o b je ct and the ob je ct o f know ledge, as well as on the
d ifferen ce b etw een sc ie n tific work as th e o re tic a l p ro d u ctio n and sim ple
em pirical (te c h n ic a l) d escrip tio n or exegesis, etc., is lin k ed through the
work o f G a s to n B a c h e la rd a n d o th e r p h ilo so p h e rs o f sc ie n c e . But su ch
c o n c r e t e in f l u e n c e s a re o n ly o f s e c o n d a r y in t e r e s t h e re . W h a t is
im po rtan t is th at A lth u ssers p lea for a theoretical history, o r rather a history
oriented in th eoretical fash ion , u ph old s the sam e perspectiv e as F eb v res
p lea for a n o th e r k in d o f history . T h u s, in apparen tly p arad oxical fashion ,
the an ti-em p iricism o f Reading Capital, w hich has so o ften been understood
as a declaratio n o f war on all em pirical research even by som e so-called

88

TH E A LTH U SSERIA N LEGACY

A l t h u s s e r i a n s ( e .g ., H in d e s s a n d H i r s t ) c o u ld w e ll b e re a d a s a
p h ilo so p h ical co n tribu tion to aiding a h istorical scien ce at on ce open to the
em pirical and oriented tow ards theoretical problem s.
W e w h o are n ot p h ilosoph ers but, as historian s,
users o f p h ilo so p h y ...
Febvre
2.
A s we h ave already seen, the founders o f Annales always thought th at
th e y c o u ld o n ly c o n q u e r and work th e ir te r ra in if th e y su c c e e d e d in
d em arcatin g it from the old co n cep tio n s o f history, w hich were certainly
outm oded, bu t n everth eless reproduced them selves. T h e ir prin cipal enem y
w a s t h e p o s i t i v i s t h i s t o r y t h e n d o m i n a n t in F r e n c h u n i v e r s i t i e s
(represen ted b y Seign o b o s, L an glois, etc.). B u t at the sam e tim e they n ever
n eglected to criticize any phiiosophication o f history, w h ich m erely inh ibits
an d exp loits h isto rio grap h ical practice. It w as m ainly Febvre, w ith his wide
p h ilo so p h ic a l k n o w led g e, w h o w orked on th is d e m a rc a tio n . H ere I am
th in k in g n ot o n ly o f h is in terven tion s a g a in st S p e n g le r or T o y n b ee, etc.,
b u t a ls o o f t h e n u m e ro u s a r t ic le s in w h ic h h e t a c k le s p h ilo s o p h ic a l
argu m ents o r p rob lem atics such as are found in h istorical discourse itself. It
is n o t surprising th at in this co n tex t h e was also led o n several occasion s to
refer to th e h a rm fu l e ffe c ts o f d ia le c t ic a l m a te r ia lism . A lth o u g h h e
re sp e c te d M a rx as o n e o f th e g re a te st th e o r e tic ia n s o f th e n in e te e n th
century (an d was linked by friendship to h istory as m erely a n eco n o m ic
m a t e r ia l i s m w h ic h s o u g h t to re d u c e a ll h u m a n h is t o r y to a sin g le
ex p la n a to ry sy stem by econ om y and c la sse s), like a ll m aste r-k ey s, it
needed to be criticized.14 H ow ever, this skepticism did n o t prevent Febvre
from re a d in g new M a r x ist w ork w ith great in te re st a n d w ritin g review
articles on it.
A p articu larly sign ifican t exam ple is th e d iscrepan t review he wrote o f
L u c ie n G o ld m a n n s b o o k , T h e H um an Sciences a n d Philosophy (1 9 5 2 ). In
this text, G o ld m a n n b ased h im se lf on a w ork th e n u n tran slated in France,
L u k c s History an d C lass C onsciousness, an d argued for a social science at
o n c e p h ilo s o p h ic a l an d h is t o r ic a l, w h ic h w o u ld fo rm a d i a l e c t i c a l
altern ative b o th to D u rkh eim s scien tism an d to the em piricism dom in an t
in th e F re n c h a c a d e m y . D e s p ite its e x p lic it ly M a r x is t la n g u a g e , th is
subversive p roject was very m uch to F eb vres taste, and h is review begins in
a euphoric ton e: S o m any im portant rem arks! W e do n o t h ave to adopt
th e m : they h a v e alw ay s b e e n our o w n . P a r a d o x ic a lly , h o w e v e r, th is
acc o rd and sym path y related exclusively to G o ld m a n n s philosophy; for
as so on as the p h ilo sop h er starts to p ractice his co n ce p tio n on the exam ple

A LT H U SSE R A N D A N N A LE S H ISTO RIO GRA PH Y

89

o f classical F ren ch literature o f the sev en teen th century, the b en ev olen ce

o f the h istorian com es to a su dden end. Febvre offers th en the m ost violen t
o b jection s:
A la s, a la s, th e re isn t o n ly p h ilo so p h y in th is little b o o k ... N o t
co n ten t to inquire in to w hat h istory is, L u d e n G o ld m a n n w anted to
p ass from theory to p ractice. H e w an ted to show us th at this tran sition
was easy, and profitable, so he turned h isto rian and one h u n tin g on
the territory o f the m ost difficult o f all h istories, so cial h istory...N o one
can follow L u d e n G o ld m a n n here. A n d it is regrettable th at it h as to
be said so firm ly since th e n o n -h isto ric al part o f th e book displays
rem arkable q u a lities.15
W h a t h a s h a p p e n e d ? W h e r e a s F e b v r e w a s p r e p a r e d to t o l e r a t e
G o ld m a n n s d ialectical m aterialism a s a p h ilo sop h ical p osition, and could
even subscribe to it, fo r he does n o t take it literally and regards it sim ply as
an en d o rsem en t of, and su pport for, his ow n a n tip o sitiv ist p h ilo so p h y o f
scien ce, he is profoundly irritated w hen the author aspires to be a h istorian
an d wishes to dem o n strate his ideas historically. T h u s, w h en G o ld m an n ,
in ideal-typical an d qu asi-H egelian m anner, assigns the great literary an d
p h ilo so p h ic a l w orks to certain so c ia l classes G a sse n d i an d M o lire, for
ex a m p le, b eco m e the id eal re p re se n ta tiv e s o f the n ob ility , w hereas La
F o n tain e is assig n ed to the p op u lar classes, etc. the great h istorian o f
id e a s a n d o f t h e s o c i a l c o n s i d e r s it an i n a d m i s s i b l e r e d u c t io n .
U n fo rtu n ately , h e does n o t first co n sid er the reason s for this reductionism
in G o ld m a n n s very prem ises, but im m ediately recalls the cau stic criticism s
h e h ad m a d e o f c e r t a in w o rk s o f lit e r a r y h is t o r y a n d o f B o r k e n a u s
som ew h at sim p listic class analysis in h is b ook o n the tran sition from the
feudal to the bourgeois co n ce p tio n o f the w orld. 16 A n article w hich had
begun in such laudatory fash ion ends w ith an in tran sigen t dem arcation :
W h y is it n e c e ssa rily th e c a se th a t p h ilo so p h e rs w ho d e a l w ith
h istory either delib erately ignore w h at it is, or, n ot w ishing to know
th at it is a d iffic u lt craft, w h ich takes a lo n g tim e to learn , a ct as
historian s? Let us say, rath er, th a t they ratio cin ate from a great h eigh t
on p roblem s w h ich can only be tack led by those w ho h av e inquired for
y ears in to how they were p o se d in reality , for th e m en o f a ce rta in
e p o c h a n d a c e rta in society. A n d w h o h a v e n o t tied th e ir research to
the p ostu lates o f any doctrine, any theory, an d ph ilosop h y o f h isto ry .17
F eb vres p o sitio n can app ear utterly contradictory. O n the on e h an d, he

90

THE A LTH U SSERIA N LEGA CY

d efen d s th eo retical presupposition s, even precon ceived ideas (h is w ords!)

in order to save history from positiv ist b lin dn ess; and o ccasion ally h e even
adds gen eral reflection s an d excursions into the gardens o f philosophy. A t
th e sam e tim e, h ow ever, he rejects all sy stem atic p o stu lates, w h ich m igh t
co n fin e h istory to a P ro cru ste an b ed an d in h ib it th e h isto ria n s w ork.
T h is c o n t r a d ic t io n d e fin ite ly c a n n o t b e e x p la in e d by a p h ilo so p h ic a l
affiliation or in coh eren ce (alth ou gh it w ould be interestin g to analyze the
p h ilo so p h ical tw ists and turns in Febvre, B lo ch , B raudel, etc .). It relates to
the difference betw een the h istorical an d the p h ilo so p h ical mode o f thought
w h ich , as F eb v re fre q u e n tly stre ssed , sh o u ld n e v e r be re d u ced to on e
ano th er. [O n th e contrary] it is a qu estio n o f som eh ow arran ging it that,
b o th stan d in g their ground, they do n ot ignore th eir n eigh b or... 1 W h en in
1950 the very serious-m inded Revue de mtaphysique et de morale devoted a
sp ecial num ber to history, Febvre, who also con trib uted, com m ented on the
articles o f his colleagues A ron , R icoeur, L vi-Strau ss, et al. with an am used
sh ake o f the head:
A n d h ere we are, p o o r m ech an ics, as th ey used to say o f craftsm en
in th e s ix t e e n t h ce n tu ry . H ere we are all in fa t u a t e d a n d t e llin g
ourselves: D am n , where do they get a ll th is k in dn ess from ! B ut w hat is
th e link betw een w h at we do, b etw een w h at h isto ry is for us h istorian s,
and all these w onderful things? D ark mystery. A n d rad ical break. S o
m uch the worse. I sh all n o t say for w h om .15
F e b v r e s p h il o s o p h i c a l p r e fe r e n c e s w ere d o u b t le s s d iffe r e n t fro m
A lt h u s s e r s (fo r h im P ro u d h o n , E rasm u s or B lo n d e l w ere alw ays m ore
im p o rta n t th a n M a rx , S p in o z a or F reu d, e t c .). B u t th is idea o f a break
b e tw e e n p h ilo so p h y an d h isto ry (w h ile u n d e rsc o rin g th e irre p la c e a b le
c h a r a c te r o f th e se tw o fo rm s o f th e o ry ) re p re se n ts a d e c isiv e p o in t in
c o m m o n . E v e n if F ebvre o n ly re ason s o n th e b asis o f h is craft, w h ereas
A lt h u s s e r b a se s h im s e lf on e p is t e m o lo g ic a l a rg u m e n ts, we o b se rv e a
c o n v e r g e n c e w h ic h is a ll the m o re s ig n if ic a n t in t h a t it d e fin e s th e
modalities o f a p o ssib le a llia n c e b etw een a m a te r ia list p h ilo so p h y a n d a
novel h istorical scien ce.
T h is d em arcatio n o f p hilosophy from h isto ry su ggests an oth er p o in t in
co m m on w hich runs th ro u gh the th o u gh t o f Febvre an d A lth u sse r: the
refusal o f all teleology. O n c e again, in Febvre it does n o t tak e the form o f an
exp licitly p h ilo so p h ical position; a n d there are som e passages w here he
view s m odern history from th e an gle o f th e progress o f reason hen ce in a
fin a lis t p e r s p e c tiv e .20 But w ith in the fram ew o rk o f th is p ro g re ss iv is t
co n cep tio n o f the world surely to be exp ected o f this m an o f the T h ird

A LT H U SSE R A N D A N N A LE S H ISTO RIO GRA PH Y

91

R e p u b lic h e a d o p ts a p o s itio n w h ic h is in so m e w ays sp o n ta n e o u sly

m a te rialist; it derives from his profession al aversion to anachronism. In an
article on the history o f the scien ces in the eigh teen th century, h e unfolds
w h at h e h im se lf calls the suprem e id eal, th e u ltim a te o b je c tiv e o f the
h isto ria n :
F or each o f th e e p o c h s w h ich he studies, to recom pose th e m ental
m aterial o f the m en o f this ep o ch by m eans o f thought; to recon stitu te,
by a pow erful effort o f erud ition an d im agin atio n , the universe o f eac h
o f th e g e n e r a t io n s t h a t p r e c e d e d it; to h o ld a firm an d s e t t le d
co n v ictio n th at the inadequ acy o f n otion s o f fact, and the correlative
p overty o f theories, are b ou nd to produce lacu n ae and deform ation s in
the represen tatio n s o f any nature th a t such a h istorical collectiv ity has
fash ion ed o f the world, life, and religion , as well as p olitics; in this way
to p ro tect o n e se lf again st those redou b tab le an ach ron ism s the least
re co g n ize d , yet th e g ra v e st th a t do n o t cred it th e c o m b a ta n ts o f
F orn ovo w ith m usquets or M arie-L ouise N ap o lo n at St. H elena with
p h o to g rap h s, but w ith o u t an y ado, m ak e R a b e la is a fre eth in k e r...o r
L a m a rck a D arw in ian avan t la lettre.1'
A t first sigh t, su ch a q u o ta tio n co u ld c o n ce iv a b ly also derive from a
represen tative o f h istoricism , for w hich (in R a n k es words) each ep och has
its d ire c t re la tio n w ith G o d . But the Annales p e rsp e c tiv e is ev id e n tly
co m p letely different, sin ce it w ish es, by c o n tra st, to write h isto ry in the
lig h t o f th e q u e s t io n s o f th e p r e s e n t . T h is r e c u r r e n t p e r s p e c t iv e
(B ach e lard ) in their scien tific analysis is n ot a retrospective teleology, b u t a
r e a d in g o f h isto r y a g a in s t the g r a in ( B l o c h ) .22 A n d th is is why th e
u n e v en n e ss, d isco n tin u itie s, a n d d iscrep an cies a re so insisted u p o n . T h e
p ast is n ot sim ply interpreted as the o rig in a l o f a fam iliar p resen t, bu t
m u st be co n ceiv ed and exp lain ed , w ith th e aid o f current know ledge, in its
alterity. T h e best and m o st sign ifican t exam ple o f th is m eth od ological antifin alism is to be found in th e celeb rated Histoire des mentalits inaugurated
by Febvre and B lo c h .25 A s h as already been n oted m any tim es, there are
im p o r t a n t d e f ic ie n c ie s , e s p e c ia lly o f a t h e o r e t i c a l n a t u r e , in th e se
p io n e e r in g w o rk s I a m t h in k in g p a r tic u la r ly o f F e b v r e s Problem of
U n b e lie f, p u b lish e d in 1 9 4 2 w h en c o m p a r e d w ith th e a p p ro a c h e s o f
con tem porary cultural an th rop ology or p sychoanalysis. For exam ple, in all
his book s Febvre adopts th e co n ce p t o f m en tality in th e sp ecific sense o f
L u cien Lvy-B ruhl w hom he calls our m aster an d w h ich p ostu lates a
fu n d am en tal difference betw een p rim itiv e a n a m odern m en talities, the
form er n o t adv an cin g beyond the stage o f pre-logical th ou gh t. A n d w ith

92

T H E A LT H U SSE R IA N LEGA CY

th is d istin c tio n Febvre accou n ts fo r the p articu lar th ou gh t o f the m en o f

the F ren ch R e n a issa n c e !24 T o d a y it is easy to criticize th is interpretation as
outm oded, and even to regard it as the p ro jectio n o f a theory o f co lo n ial
origins on to the six tee n th century history. B u t in my view, F eb v res analysis
can also be read differently: as an attem pt, adm ittedly deficien t because
based u pon co n cepts w hich h ave been outm oded since the m iddle o f the
century but nevertheless pioneering, at a rupture w ith any teleology. In
fact, F eb vre w an ted to elaborate an o rigin al h isto ric a l p sych ology in order
to dem arcate h im self from the traditional history o f ideas, and to conceive
the difference o f the p e o p le in ea rly m o d e rn tim e s in a r a d ic a l, a n titeleo lo gical w ay.25
O f course, the m e n ta l distance betw een the m en o f the second h a lf o f
the tw en tieth century and a young ph ilo sop h er called M arx, w ho at the age
o f tw enty-seven worked in 1845 on a critique o f p o litical econ om y (based
u p o n F e u e r b a c h a n d H e g e l), is c o n s id e r a b ly le ss th a n th a t b e tw e e n
R a b e la is an d h is an tic le ric a l readers u n d er th e T h ird R e p u b lic . B u t the
tem p tatio n to read in the m anuscripts o f the young M arx th e seed s o f his
su bsequ en t discoveries, and to assign to h im th e theses o f h is future or even
o f his epigon es, is ju st as great. In different ways from Febvre, b u t n o less
p rovocatively, A lth u sser devoted h im self fro m 1960 on w ards to co n testin g
a w riting o f the history o f M arxism in the future an terior. A t a tim e w hen
the end o f S ta lin ist dogm atism was issuing in an o v ervalu ation o f the early
w o rk s, a n d a re a d in g o f the old M arx th ro u gh th e s p e c ta c le s o f th e
young, A lth u sser w as a b le to dem on strate in th is c a se th e harm ful effects o f
a n y p h ilo so p h ico -h isto rical reading. Inversely, h e c o u ld also dem on strate
( a r g u a b l y w it h r a t h e r le s s s u c c e s s ) t h e p o t e n t i a l o f a h i s t o r i c a l ep istem ological analysis in the case o f the d iscon tin u ities, the uneven n ess
a n d the real ru p tu re s w h ic h p u n c tu a te the h isto r y o f th e th e o r e tic a l
form ation know n as M arxism . A passage like th e follow ing m igh t a s well
h av e been signed L u cien F eb vre:
O f course, we know th at the Y ou n g M arx did b ecom e M arx, bu t we
sh o u ld n o t w an t to live faster th a n he did, we sh ou ld n o t w an t to live
in his p lace, reject for him or d iscover for him . W e sh all n o t be w aitin g
for h im at the en d o f th e co urse to throw ro u n d h im as ro u n d a runner
th e m antle o f repose, fo r at last it is over, he h as arrived. R o u sseau
r e m a r k e d t h a t w ith c h ild r e n a n d a d o le s c e n t s th e w h o le art o f
ed u c a tio n co n sists o f know ing how to lose time. T h e a rt o f h istorical
c r itic ism also c o n s is ts o f k n o w in g h ow to lose time so th a t y o u n g
authors can grow up. T h is lost time is sim ply the time we give th em to
live. W e scan the n ecessity o f their lives in our u n d erstan d in g o f its

A L T H U SSE R A N D A N N A L E S H ISTO RIO GRA PH Y

93

n o d a l poin ts, its reversals an d m u tation s. In this area there is perhaps

n o greater jo y th an to be able to witness in an em ergin g life, on ce the
G o d s o f O r ig in s and G o a l s h a v e b e e n d e t h r o n e d , th e b ir t h o f
n ecessity .26
W h at follow ed is su fficien tly w ell-know n: with For M arx and Reading
C ap ital, A lth u sse r p u b lish ed the first in sta llm e n ts in a read in g o f M arx
w h ic h so u g h t to ( r e )c o n s t r u c t th e sp e c ific stru c tu re o f th e th e o ry o f
h istorical m aterialism co n tain ed in C ap ital, by unequ ivocally dem arcatin g
it from the (te le o lo gical) ph ilo sop h y o f history o f the Y oung M arx, bu t also
from the (te le o lo gical) ph ilosop h y o f history o f K au tsk y (even o f S ta lin ). I
do n o t wish to discuss the success o f this enterprise, or the problem s w hich
it raised, here. But in any even t, it seems to m e in con testab le th at up to the
present day it rem ains the m ost radical attem pt to th in k and practise the
b r e a k b e t w e e n a t h e o r y o f h i s t o r y c o n c e i v e d as s c ie n c e a n d th e
p h ilo sop h ies o f history w hich surround it. A n d i f som e o f the ph ilo sop h ers
th in g s im plicated in it would certain ly h ave le ft L u cien Febvre cold, the
c a m p a ig n w ag e d by A lt h u s s e r a g a in s t the p h ilo so p h y o f h isto r y a n d
teleology w ould h a v e b een d e em ed worthy by h im o f a review a rtic le in the
Annales.
T o understan d is to co m p lica te
Febvre
3.
F in ally, in p ractice, we stum ble upon a third p o in t o f con vergen ce
b etw een A nnales an d A lth u sse r, o b v io u sly linked to th e tw o p rec ed in g
o n e s : th e ir r e s p e c tiv e d e fe n se s o f a h isto r y o f stru c tu re s, or ra th e r a
stru ctu ral history.
W h a t characterized the Annales o f F ebvre a n d B lo c h was not, as the first
title o f the jo u rn al m ight suggest, a mere revalorization o f econ om ic and
so cial history relative to the trad itio n al h istory o f ideas and p olitics. T h e
h isto r io g ra p h ic re v o lu tio n (F e b v re ) w hich they tried to in au gu rate is
utterly athw art the usual university barriers. W ith their co n ception o f total
h is t o r y , w h ic h m a tc h e s th e a n t i- h is t o r ic is t a p p r o a c h o f the histoireproblme, th e y d evised a p ro ject th a t would be supported by all th e hum an
sc ie n c e s, a n d w h ic h e x p la in e d all p ro b lem s in a complex an d reciprocal
re latio n sh ip o f efficacity. A s th e great w orks o f social h istory by Febvre,
B lo ch and B rau d el show ,27 it was clearly n o t a question (despite w hat the
ad jectiv e to tal m igh t suggest) o f n aiv e an d vain attem p ts at co m p le te
h is t o r ie s , b u t, o n th e b a sis o f a c e r t a in t h e o r e t i c a l p r o b le m a tic , o f
interrelatin g all th e con d ition s, all th e possible and con cealed determ inants

94

TH E A LTH U SSE R IA N LEGA CY

ch aracteristic o f a h istorical process from geom orph ology to m entalities,

from agrarian stru ctu res to the class struggle.
A lth u sse rs plea fo r a stru ctu ral co n ce p t of history, and the theses he
develo ped in this co n tex t, point almost in the same d irection (ev en if they
are form ulated in a very abstract manner: but they are only p h ilo sop h ical
t h e s e s ! ) . In th e c o n t e x t o f h is c r it iq u e o f H e g e l ia n is m , A lt h u s s e r
c o n fr o n te d in p a r tic u la r th e r e d u c t io n is t a n d u lt im a t e ly a ffir m a tiv e
c h aracter o f h istory w h ich th ink s real processes under su ch categories as
essen ce and p h en o m e n o n , class in its e lf and class fo r itself, etc. For
ten den tially , all p h en om en a are th en reduced to a h idd en noumenon: their
unique co re. S u c h a to ta lity can be ta k e n to p ie c e s o f co u rse, bu t each
elem en t rem ains p ars totalis, th at is to say, an ex p ressive m o m en t o f the
W h o l e w it h o u t its own ir r e d u c ib le s t r u c t u r e . O r to u se a n o t h e r
te rm in o lo g y , o n e m ig h t sa y th a t th ey m erely reflect a su p p o sed b a s e
below , w h ich governs as the last in stan ce b o th the Origin and the
Goal (th e M ean in g ) o f the process, sin ce in fact it already co n tain s it in
germ . A n y h istorical analysis w orking w ith th is co n ce p tio n a n d aim in g at
su ch a presum ed Essence, su ch an Origin, obviou sly c a n n e v e r perceive the
real, sp ecific an d irredu cib le h istory o f the so -c alled p h e n o m e n a w ith
th eir different, m ultiple an d surprising effects.
T h is essen tialism , th is thou gh t on th e m o d el o f ex p re ssiv e cau sality ,
w as c e a se le ssly d e n o u n c e d by A lth u sse r . A n d in so d o in g , h e did n o t
restrict h im self to a critical reading of so m e o f th e great auth ors (Spin oza,
M on tesqu ieu , H egel, M arx, G ram sci, e tc .), or certain M arx ist position s in
recen t decades, but also confron ted h is critique o f teleology w ith som e, at
th at tim e still rather new, theses w hich he d etected in the best h isto rian s
of the p resen t (1 9 6 5 ). A c c o rd in g to him , if on e refuses the H egelian m odel
of exp ressive totality , it is n ecessary to be co n siste n t and equally reject
the m odel o f a continuous an d homogeneous time (R C , p. 9 9 ) and replace it
w ith a co n cep t o f stru ctu ral history, w hich was alon e cap ab le o f grasping
th e u n e v e n , in d ir e c t, a n d in som e se n se m e to n y m ic e ffic a c ity o f the
different structures w ithin a given so cial w hole. T h e h istorian s, how ever
an d here A lth usser apparen tly had Braudel in m in d only observe
the existen ce o f different tim es and rhythm s, w ithout relating them to
the co n ce p t o f their difference, i.e., to the typical depen d en ce w hich
establish es th em in the articulation o f the levels o f the w hole. It is not
e n o u g h , th e re fo re , to say , as m o d ern h is to r ia n s d o , th at there are
d ifferent p eriod izations for different tim es...w e must also th in k these
differences in rh y th m an d p u n ctu ation in th eir fou n d ation , in th e type
o f a r tic u la tio n , d is p la c e m e n t a n d to rsio n w h ic h h a rm o n iz e s th e se

A LT H U SSE R A N D A N N A LE S H ISTO RIOGRAPH Y

95

different tim es w ith one an oth er. T o go even further, I should say th at
we can n o t restrict ourselves to reflectin g the existence o f visible and
m easurable tim es in this way; we must, o f absolute n ecessity, pose the
qu estio n o f th e m ode o f ex isten ce o f invisible tim es, o f the invisible
rh y th m s an d p u n c tu a tio n s c o n c e a le d b e n e a th th e su rfa ce o f e a c h
visible tim e. (R C , pp. 100-01)
U n q u estio n ab ly , this rad ical an ti-essen tialism (A lth u sser calls it antih isto ric ism ) can at first ap p ear im m o derate a n d u n realizab le.211 B u t does
n o t th e c o n c e p t o f t o t a l h i s t o r y lik e w is e c o n t a in a n a p p a r e n t ly
unrealizable dem an d? A n d is the co n ce p t o f stru ctu ral cau sality erroneous
simply because it overinflates the in tellectu al criteria o f historical science?
It is w ell know n th a t A lth u sse r v irtu ally n ev e r put his reflections on th e
co m p le x ity o f h istorical p rocesses in to p ra ctic e. A sid e from so m e analyses
o f c o n te m p o r a r y p o lit ic s o f w h ic h th e b e st, w ith o u t a d o u b t, is h is
critiq u e o f th e P C F in 1 9 7 8 th ere are on ly a few h isto ric a l passages,
a m o n g th em th e fam ou s o u tlin e on th e overdetermination o f th e R u ssian
R ev o lu tio n , w ritten in 1962. But if we rem em ber L u cien F eb vres critique
o f G o ld m a n n , su ch an ov erstrain ed attem p t by A lth u sser to ap p ly his
theses w ould perh aps n ot h a v e rendered th e c o n c e p t o f structural history a
good service. In this light, A lth u sse rs prudence (in part u n prem editated)
o n ly serves to u n d erlin e th a t he an d m ost o f his pupils are n o t h istorian s
and so cio lo gists, bu t p r e c ise ly ph ilosop h ers a division o f lab o r w hich
app aren tly h as m ore and m ore com e to be accepted sin ce th e 1970s.0
H ow ever, the concept of stru ctu ral cau sality does n o t figure like an
errant block in the lan d scap e. For A lth u sser developed a certain num ber o f
other co n cep ts and theses w hich clarify his structural co n cep tion o f history.
T h u s , a g a in s t th e (te le o lo g ic a l) n o t io n o f t o t a lit y , h e p ro p o se d th e
c o n c e p t o f c o m p le x w h o le (o r rath er: p re -g iv e n co m p le x stru ctu red
w h ole ), w hose (n o n -H egelian ) d ialectic is govern ed by th e asym m etry o f
d e term in an t an d d o m in an t c o n tra d ictio n s. W ith th e aid o f S p in o z a an d
F re u d , a n d w ith re d e fin e d or new c o n c e p t s , h e so u g h t to th in k th is
c o m p le x a n d u n e v e n in te r p la y o f th e le v e ls a n d i n s t a n c e s w h ic h ,
m o reo v er, m u st be an aly zed se p a ra te ly in e a c h h isto r ic a l case. C e r ta in
classical n o tio n s o f M a r x s, w h ich in th e 1950s h a d lo st virtually all their
sp ecific co n ten t (e.g., so cial form ation , m ode o f p roduction , ideology, etc .),
receiv ed a rigorous reform u lation . O th e r ideas and im ages, on the other
h an d, were put to shade (sin ce their defin itive ab an d on m en t still did n ot
se e m to be t r a n s m is s ib le w ith in th e C o m m u n is t m o v e m e n t) fo r
e x a m p le , r e f le c t io n , n e g a t io n o f th e n g a t io n , a lie n a t io n , b a se a n d
superstructure, class co n sciou sn ess, w orldview , scien tific socialism , laws of

96

THE A LTH U SSERIA N LEGA CY

the dialectic, the role o f the individual in history, etc. A n d in order to fill
in the lacu n ae o f trad itio n al M arxist theory, o f w hich A lth u sser was m ore
an d m ore aware, an d from w h ich h e literally suffered, h e even proposed
som e n o v el co n cep ts a fairly risky u n d ertak in g at the tim e for a m em ber
o f th e P C F w h ic h h a v e s in c e b e c o m e fa m o u s: t h e o r e tic a l p r a c tic e ,
o v e rd e te r m in a tio n , p ro c e ss w ith o u t g o als or su b je c ts, id e o lo g ic a l sta te
app aratu ses, etc. It could be sh ow n th a t all th ese term in ological ch an ges
were m ore or less co n n ected w ith the co n cept o f structural history. A n d
w ith th is r e fo r m u la tio n o f h is t o r ic a l m a t e r ia lis m , it is a b o v e a ll th e
trad itio n al top ograp h y o f b ase a n d superstructure (w h ose im portant and
finally harm ful effects in the history o f M arxism are w ell known, and w hich
m ade a sp on tan eo u s m aterialist like L u cien Febvre p refer to declare h im self
id e a list50) th at fou n d itself shattered.

Ill
L e t us con clu de. T h e startin g p oin t o f my rem arks was th e h ypothesis
th at A lth u sser is n ot as an ti-h istorical as h as co m m on ly b een believed.
O n c e rta in p oin ts a n d w ith th e help o f a few exam ples, I h a v e attem p ted to
sh ow th a t th e re are som e p o in ts o f c o n ta c t, som e c o n v e rg e n c e s, som e
re s e m b la n c e s , w h ich re p a y c lo s e r e x a m in a t io n ; a n d to c o n tin u e th e
dialogu e begun by Pierre V ilar. A fear o f c o n ta c t is u tterly ou t o f p lace
an d c o n trib u te s n o th in g . H o w ev e r, I by n o m e a n s d en y th e en orm ou s
d iffere n ces betw een stru ctu ral M a rx ism a n d stru ctu ral h isto ric a l scien ce
w h ich , a m o n g the h isto ria n s o f th e so-called new new history" (B rau d el),
th a t is to say, A n n ales, to d ay , e v e n se em t o a m o u n t to a d eep c h a sm .
R e se m b la n c e th u s d o e s n o t m e an id e n tity . It is sim p ly a m a tte r o f a
p u n ctu al co n vergen ce, a p roxim ity in difference, w hich seems to us strange
and w hich m ight, as a result, stim u late dialogue.
A s c a n e a s ily be im a g in e d , I h a v e n o t so u g h t to d e m o n s tr a te th e
p ossibilities o f su ch a dialogue for purely h istorical reasons. T h is parallel
r e a d in g o f A lth u s se r an d F eb v re is also d ire c te d tow ard s th e p re se n t.
R e la t iv e to th e c o n te m p o r a r y c o n tr o v e r s ie s a m o n g h is t o r ia n s I am
th in k in g, for ex am p le, o f d eb ates o n n arrativ ity , fic tio n a lity , m icro- and
m acro -h isto ry , even on the d isap p e a ra n c e o f h isto ry in p o st-h isto ry
recourse to th e problem atic a n d them es o f Annales in th e period o f Febvre
and B loch , and to structural M arxism , could be o f use in developing som e
m a t e r ia lis t (c o u n t e r - ) p o s it io n s . O n e o f A lt h u s s e r s s tr o n g e st th e se s
co n ce rn s the se p a ra tio n , the alterity, the b reak b etw een p h ilo so p h y and
sc ie n c e : a good (m a te r ia list) p h ilo so p h y m u st n e v e r giv e the sc ie n c e s
lesson s, a n d n o t o n ly th e scien ce o f history. B u t it c a n su pport scien tific

A L T H U SSE R AND A N N A LE S H ISTO RIO GRA PH Y

97

p ra ctic e from the o u tside, by p ro v id in g it w ith its sp ecific know ledge in

order to criticize the (idealist) philosop h ies o f history and repel attem pts to
exploit scien tific results fo r ideological ends. In this sense h istorical practice
needs p hilosophy (today, fo r exam ple, in order to criticize the reduction o f
history, ad v ocated by Paul V eyn e, to a sim ple arrangem ent o f true fa c ts)."
B ut th e th esis p rop osed b y A lth u sse r im plies a secon d: n o p h ilo sop h y or
even epistem ology can in itself fo u n d or g e n e rate a science. T h is is why
any philosophical th eory o f h istoriograph y is a futile enterprise: the specific
th eoretical produ ction o f h istorical science can only occur w ithin its own
p ractice o f research an d ex p o sitio n . It is one o f the tragic asp ects o f the
history o f A lth u sser an d the reception o f his work given the co n d ition s o f
p u b lic a tio n o f th e se te x ts and th e ir p a r tic u la r la n g u a g e th a t a lo t o f
in te lle c tu a ls an d h isto ria n s h a v e been u nable to recognize th e o b je ctiv e
assistan ce con tain ed therein. T h a t is w hy Pierre V ila rs attem pt to b eg in a
dialogue w ith A lth usser was all the m ore rem arkable. A n d above all when
he w rote in Annales itself: Louis A lthusser h as rem inded us th at the very
co n cep t o f history h as yet to be co n stru cted. 12
T ran slated by G regory E lliott

N otes
1.
T h e s e la tte r in c lu d e d , a m o n g o th e rs, R . R o b in , G . D u b y , G . B o is, R . C h a r t ie r , G .
S te d m a n J o n e s , a n d R . J o h n so n .
2.
R e p r i n t e d in P ie r r e V i l a r , U n e h isto ire en c o n str u c tio n . A p p ro c h e m a rx iste et
p ro b lm atiq u es co n jo n c tu re lles, P a ris 1 9 8 2 , p p .3 8 2 - 4 2 5 . T r a n s l a t e d in N e w L e ft Review 8 0 ,
Ju ly /A u g u st 1 9 7 3 , p p .6 5 -1 0 6 .
3.
In t h e so m e w h a t r e v is e d e d i t io n o f 1 9 6 8 , A l t h u s s e r c la r ifie d t h e t it l e o f th is
c h a p te r, r e p la c in g c o n c e p t o f h isto r y by c o n c e p t o f h isto r ic a l tim e .
4L o u is A lth u sse r a n d E tie n n e B a lib a r , R eadin g C a p ital, L o n d o n 1 9 7 0 , p .9 6 ; (c ite d in
th e te x t a s R C ) .
5.
O n e o f th e rare e x c e p tio n s w as E. P . T h o m p s o n , w h o fo u n d V ila r to o d e fe r e n tia l
(T h e Poverty o f T h eory, L o n d o n 1 9 7 8 , p .3 9 2 ). O n th e b a c k g ro u n d to th is r e a c tio n , see Perry
A n d e r s o n , A rg u m e n ts within English M a rx ism , L o n d o n 1 9 8 0 , a n d m y in t r o d u c t io n to th e
G e r m a n e d itio n o f G . S t e d m a n J o n e s e ssa y s, K la ssen , Politik und Sprache. F r eine theorientierte
Sozialgeschichte, M u n ste r 1988.
6.

O n t h e h isto ry o f t h is t e x t a n d A lth u sse r 's re a c tio n to it, se e m y In te rv ie w w ith

P ierre V ila r in K om m un e 5, 7, 1 9 8 7 , p p . 6 2 ff.

7.
T h is s e c u la r iz a t io n , w h ic h a ro se in a su r p r isin g f a s h io n , is, lik e an y p r o g r e ss,
a m b ig u o u s. It r e q u ir e s a h isto r ic a l a n aly sis.
8.
L o u is A l t h u s s e r , S p o n ta n e o u s P h ilosoph )' a n d the S p o n ta n e o u s P hilosoph y o f the
Scientists, L o n d o n 1989.
9.
10.

L u c ie n F e b v re , D e la th o rie la p ra tiq u e d e lh isto ir e , A n n ale s 8, 1 9 5 3 , p .3 6 3 .

E v e n i f th ey so m e tim e s sp o k e o f la w s w h ic h h isto ry w o u ld p e rh ap s o n e day b e in

a p o s itio n to fo r m u la te . C f., fo r e x a m p le , L. F e b v re , L H isto ir e d an s le m o n d e e n r u in e s,

R ev u e de syn thse historique, 3 0 , 1 9 2 0 , p p .1 -1 5 , e sp e c ia lly pp.7ff.
11.

L u c ie n F e b v re , C o m b ats pour l'histoire, P aris 1 9 5 3 , p p .2 2 ff.

TH E A LTH U SSE R IA N LEGACY

98
12.

Ib id ., p. 116.

13.
14.

Ibid., p .l 17.
C f. L H isto ire d a n s le m o n d e e n r u in e s, p p .7ff.

15.
16.

D e l a th o rie la p ra tiq u e d e l h isto ire , p p . 3 6 7 -6 8 .

C f . L u c ien F eb v re, P ou r une histoire parc entire, Paris 1 9 6 2 , p p .4 6 7 ff a n d p p .7 4 3 ff.

la

17.

D e la th o rie

18.
19.

C o m b a ts p our lhistoire, p .2 8 2 .
L u c ie n F e b v re , Q u e st-c e q u e l h isto ire ? A n n a le s, 5, 1 9 5 0 , p .2 4 3 .

p ratiq u e d e lh is to ire , p .3 6 9 .

20.

C f., fo r e x a m p le , L u c ie n F e b v re , The P roblem o f U n b elief in the Sixteenth C en tu ry

( 1 9 4 2 ) C a m b rid g e , M a ss.; 1 9 8 2 , p p.354ff21.

C o m b ats p o ur lhistoire, p .3 3 4 .
22.
C f. M a rc B lo c h , French R u ral H isto ry, B e rk e le y a n d L o n d o n , 1 9 6 6 .
23.
For a d e ta ile d p re se n ta tio n a n d d isc u ssio n o f th is a p p ro a c h , se e inter alia, my article
M e n t a lit t e n , Id e o lo g ie n , D isk u rse: Z u r s o z ia lg e s c h ic h t lic h e n T h e m a tisie r u n g d er d r itte n
E b e n e , in A l f L u d tk e (e d .), Aiitagsgeschichte: Z u r Rekonstruktion historischer Erfahrungen und
L e b e n sw eisen , C a m p u s - V e r la g , F r a n k fu rt/N e w Y ork 1 9 8 9 , p p .8 5 - 1 3 6 ; an d H is to r ia n s a n d
D isc o u r s e A n a ly s is , H istory W orkshop Jo u rn a l, 27, S p r in g 1 9 8 9 , p p .3 7 -6 5 .
24-

C f. The Problem o f U n belief, p p .4 3 8 ff.

25.
26.

Ib id ., p .1 0 0 .
L o u is A lth u sse r , F o r M a rx , L o n d o n 1 9 6 9 , p p .7 0 -1 .

27.
L u c ie n F e b v r e , Philippe I I e t la F ran c h e -C o m t, P aris 1911 ; M a r c B lo c h , French R u ral
H isto ry ; id e m , Feudal Society ( 1 9 3 9 - 4 0 ) , tw o v o lu m e s, L o n d o n 1 9 6 1 ; F e r n a n d B ra u d e l, The
M ed iterran ean an d the M editerran ean W orld o f Philip II ( 1 9 4 9 ) , tw o v o lu m e s, G la s g o w 1 9 8 1 -8 2 .
28.

T h u s so m e p e o p le h a v e d ed u ced fr o m it th e e p iste m o lo g ic a l im p o ssib ility o f any

h is to r ic a l sc ie n c e . S e e , fo r e x a m p le , B arry H in d e ss a n d P aul H ir s t, P re -C a p ita list M o d es o f

P rodu ction , L o n d o n 1 9 7 5 . E .P . T h o m p s o n co u ld o n ly re a d A lth u sse r th ro u g h th is p rism .
29.
W ith so m e e x c e p tio n s. T h u s R o b e rt L in h a r t o r E m m a n u e l T e rra y , p h ilo so p h e r s a t
t h e o u t s e t , h a v e b e c o m e s o c i o l o g i s t a n d e t h n o l o g i s t , r e s p e c t i v e l y . M o r e o v e r , c e r t a in
p r o fe ssio n a l h isto ria n s (R g in e R o b in , G a r e t h S te d m a n J o n e s, e t c .) h a v e d e m o n str a te d th a t
A l th u s s e r s c o n c e p ts a n d th e se s c a n b e e m p lo y e d p ro d u c tiv e ly if th ey are n o t ta k e n as d o g m as,
but tra n sfo rm e d in c o n c re te an aly ses.
30.
C f. L u c ie n F e b v re , L H isto ire d a n s le m o n d e e n r u in e s, p. 15.
31.
C f. P a u l V e y n e , C o m m en t on crit lh istoire, P aris 1 9 7 1 . C f. also th e in te rv iew w ith
V e y n e in U . R a u l f f ( e d .) , V o m U m sch reiben d er G esch ich te, B e rlin 1 9 8 6 , p p . 1 3 2 -4 6 , w h e re
F e b v re , B lo c h an d B r a u d e l a re a ll d ism isse d as M a r x is t s .
32.

M a r x ist H isto r y , a H isto ry in th e M a k in g , p .65.

Alain Lipietz

From Althusserianism to
Regulation Theory
A lm o st th e en tire generation o f M ay 1968 in France cam e to M arxism
through the w ork o f Louis A lth usser and his school. A n d even tod ay alm ost
e v e ry th in g fru itfu l th at is w ritten in F ran ce w ith in a (g reatly rarefied )
culturally M arxist atm osphere rem ains m arked by this origin. T o say this is
n o t to n egate the im portance o f ex isten tial M arxism and the philosophy of
praxis (in particular the work o f H en ri L efebvre), nor to ignore the negative
effects o f the structural M arxism o f Reading Capital (1965). It is sim ply to
sta te th a t th e su ccess o f th e a rticles in the c o lle c tio n For M arx (1965)
greatly h elped to disen gage F ren ch M arx ism from the oversim plification ,
determ in ism an d m echan ism in h erited from th e S talin ist period. It is also to
recognize th a t th e viable a n d justified critiques o f w h ich A lth u sserian ism
h as been the object h ave allow ed som e currents to interiorize w h at has
been tran sce n d ed (to appropriate a H egelian term w hich doubtless would
h av e displeased the m aste r!), an d thus to escape the general crisis o f the
h u m an scien ces and o f stru ctu ralism during the 1970s. I am th in k in g in
particular o f the sociology o f Pierre Bourdeiu (1987), and, in relation to my
ow n p ro fe ssio n (p o litic a l e c o n o m y ), th a t w hich today is referred to as
regulation theory. 1 W e ourselves are regulationists, in a way rebel son s
o f A lth usser.
From th e very first, A lt h u s s e r (fo r e x a m p le in C o n t r a d ic tio n an d
O v e rd e term in atio n , 1962) tau gh t us to co n ceiv e o f history as a fabric o f
c o n trad icto ry relation s, autonom ous in re latio n to on e an o th er, alth o u gh
ov erd eterm in in g rath er th a n re fle ctin g one an oth er. N eith er politics n or
id e o lo g ie s r e fle c t e c o n o m ic fo rces, but id e o lo g ic a l-p o litic o - e c o n o m ic
co n figu ratio n s exist, eith e r as sta b le con figu ration s or con figuration s o f
crisis. D u rin g th e 1960s, F ren ch M arxism th u s align ed itse lf w ith all the
reductionism o f the kapital-logik genre. W e were even invited to discover
in every social form ation a plurality o f m odes o f p ro d u ctio n (relation-type
c o n f i g u r a t i o n s ) a r t i c u l a t e d on e to a n o t h e r (R e y , 1 9 6 9 ): in s h o r t ,
configurations o f configurations.
S in c e th en , fo r ex a m p le, d o m e stic so c ia l re la tio n s (o r p atriarch y , or
sexage") could be studied for them selves, w ithout previous subordination to
cap ita lism . France, as everyw here, was acq u ain ted w ith th e opposition

100

THE A LTH U SSERIA N LEGA CY

betw een so cialist fem in ists an d rad ical fem in ists, but it was less virulent
there th a n elsew here. A u to n o m y an d reciprocal ov erd eterm in ation o f social
r e la tio n s o ffe re d a th e o r e tic a l su b stra tu m to th in k th e a u to n o m y an d
convergence o f so cial m ovem en ts. T h a t this op portun ity was hardly taken
a d v a n ta g e o f p o litic a lly , I e x p la in e lsew h ere (L ip ie tz , 1 9 8 6 a), b u t th e
p o s s ib i l it y o f a c o n v e r g e n c e a n d its t h e o r e t i c a l a r t i c u l a t i o n e x is t s
nevertheless.
A lth u sse r an d his sc h o o l (in p articu lar B alib ar in h is co n trib u tio n to
Reading C apital, an d B ettelh eim , 1970) broke with a determ in ist vision of
h istorical ev olu tion w hich conceived of the p rodu ctive forces them selves
(t r a d it io n a l l o c o m o t iv e s o f h isto ry for S t a li n is t M a r x is m ) as s o c ia l
relation s born in the organization o f p roduction . It was n ot from outside
th at th e lo c a l re p re se n tativ es o f a larger cu rren t, w h ich from M aoists to
radical A m eric an s by way o f the Italian w orkerist m ovem en t, proceeded in
the 1960s and 70s, to co n cen trate in its attack s on capitalism no lon ger on
the e x t r a c t io n o f su rp lu s-v a lu e a lo n e , b u t o n the d o m in a n t p o st-w a r
in d u stria l p arad ig m s, a c c e p te d for th e m o st p a r t by c o m m u n ist p artie s:
T aylorism and Fordism . T h is current was n ot only critically in sync with
the reality o f the labor struggles o f the period, bu t also broke above all w ith
th e idea th at th e d evelo p m en t of capitalist p roductive forces prepared the
way for com m u n ism . C ap italism did n ot prepare the way for anything but
itself, a n d further over th e course of tim e it h ad exp erien ced and developed
co n tra stin g forces o f p ro d u ctio n (form s o f the organ ization of labor).
A t the p o l i t i c a l le v e l, th is d o u b le ru p tu re w ith d e t e r m in is m w as
developed p rin cipally by Poulantzas (1968) in h is reading o f G ram sci. For
the sim p le and p e r m a n e n t ju x t a p o s it io n o f b o u r g e o is ie / p r o le t a r ia t ,
P o u la n tz a s su b stitu te d th e sta b iliz a tio n an d d ilu tio n o f su c c e ssiv e , an d
always origin al, h egem on ic h istorical b locs, u n itin g th e do m in an t a n d the
do m in ated in struggles over the lim its and term s o f social com prom ise, on
the basis o f a perpetually new articulation o f social relations.
T h e se fecun d basic n o tio n s u nfortu nately b eg an to freeze in a k in d o f
form al sch olasticism in w h ich social relations were n o lon ger un d erstood as
c o n t r a d ic t io n s o r u n sta b le te n sio n s but as stru c tu re s. T h is e v o lu tio n
developed explicitly o u t o f Reading Capital. A lth u sserian ism w e n t o n from
there to reject the co n trad icto ry ch a ra cter o f so cial relation s th em selves,
a n d w ith it th e auton om y o f th e in d iv id uals and groups co n tain ed in these
relations and their capacity to be constituted as social su bjects capable o f
tran sform in g stru ctu res. T h is was a return to a p re-M arxist m aterialism ,
forgettin g th e Theses on Feuerbach, forgetting th a t there is a co n sciou sn ess
a n d thus a p o t e n tia l g e n e ra to r o f tr a n s fo r m a tio n in th e m o st ro u tin e
practices, a n d cu t o ff a fortiori from th e transform ing practice o f th e m asses.
T h is o ssific a tio n co n trib u ted to th e crisis o f stru ctu ral M a rx ism an d all

FROM A LTH U SSE R IA N ISM T O REG U LA TIO N THEORY

101

F ren ch M arxism (although, it is true, in a different political conju ncture) in

the m iddle of the 1970s.
It is precisely in a return to the contradictory character o f social relations,
w h ich in h ib its their re p ro d u ctio n , an d in tak in g in to c o n sid e ra tio n th e
conscious elem en t, th e active role o f represen tation in reproducing itself,
th at the approaches based on regulation found their origin. N aturally the
op en in g o f the G rea t C risis o f cap italism in the 1970s obliged us at any rate
to k e e p o u r d is ta n c e fro m any a p p r o a c h t h a t p la c e d q u a s i- e x c lu s iv e
em ph asis o n reproduction.
It is go o d , at th e d ista n c e o f a q u a rter o f a cen tu ry , to m easu re our
co n tin u ities and discon tin uities. In the first part o f this article, I will present
a sy n th e sis w h ich I b e lie v e is a b le to h o n e stly q u alify th e m e a n in g of
classical A lth usserian ism in the 1960s, and w hat com prised its evolution
and its divergences. By classical A lth u sserian ism , I refer to the texts For
M arx, the co n trib u tio n s to Reading C apital (p articularly those o f E tien n e
B alibar) an d th ose o f N ico s P oulantzas (1968). T h e post-1968 evolu tion s o f
these authors belon g to an oth er history, while the texts o f this co rpu s were
the p o in t o f departure for the m ajority o f th ose w ho co n tin u ed in, am ended
or broke w ith classical A lth u sserian ism .
In the secon d section, I w ill exp an d the critique o f the insufficiencies and
dilem m as to w hich classical A lth usserian ism contributed.2
In the third section, I will briefly show how regulation theory currently
seek s to o v erco m e th ese o b sta c le s. It goes w ith ou t saying that, here as
elsew here, I speak only fo r m yself: num erous regu lation ist practition ers
h ave lon g eschew ed referring to M arxism at all, an d would n ot a ccep t the
co n n ectio n claim ed here. H ow ever, I do n ot intend to totally ch art their
intellectual itinerary, or th at o f those who are agn ostics today.

I. Theses of Classical Althusserianism

. In this first section, we will seek to present under the h eading o f th e ses
( d id actic a n d do gm atic, as the M aster liked to say) th e ideas o f the body o f
w orks c ite d above w h ich h a d su ch a great in te lle c tu a l re so n an ce for a
g e n e r a t io n o f s o c ia l s c ie n c e r e se a r c h e r s. W e w ill se e t h a t from th e
begin n in g (th at is, betw een For M arx a n d Reading C apital), so m e slippages
operate w hose ravagin g effects w ould only be felt later. W e will only sk etch
out the critique, p o in tin g out in passin g w hat the regulationists m aintain.
B ut we m ust begin by p lacin g the em ergen ce o f classical A lth usserian ism
itself into perspective.
1 ) Althusserianism in its Time
T h e fir st p a r t o f th e 1960s m a rk e d , in F ra n c e , the r e su r g e n c e o f
M a rx ism , th e re -e m e rg e n ce o f th e fro z e n th e o re tic a l M a rx ism o f th e

102

THE A LTH U SSER IA N LEGACY

S ta lin ist era. O f course, som e isolated th in k ers, m argin al m ilitan ts, had
never ceased to oppose the reigning dogm as, but often without takin g into
accoun t the problem atic w hich precisely defin ed these theses as d o gm a.
A s for an tid o gm atic reactions, for exam ple th o se o f the journ al Arguments
and H en ri Lefebvre, they slipped rapidly into eclecticism , either directly or
through th eir readers. F in ally , th e fra ctio n o f th e e x iste n tia list fellow
tra v e le r cu rren t o f th e F ren ch C o m m u n ist Party b rou gh t in to F ren ch
ph ilo sop h y a w ave o f interest in th e anth ropology o f praxis but virtually
w ithout touching the theory o f history th at they then qualified as M arxist:
in a way, they ju xtap osed th e supplem ent o f the soul. In any case these
co n te statio n s left the intellectual field in tact, sin ce they barely affected
th e p rin c ip a l p o te n tia l u sers o f M arx ism : th e p o litic a l p artie s w hich
c la im e d it fo r th e m se lv es (an d it was n o t th e F ren ch C o m m u n ist Party
a lo n e ), a n d acad em ic research.
It w as co m p le te ly d ifferen t fo r the true th e o re tic a l re fo rm a tio n (in
C a lv in s sense) inaugurated by Louis A lth u ssers articles in For M arx, w hich
would p lace at the front o f the in tellectual scene a pleiad o f scholars and
philosophers. S u ch bastions as the Ecole N orm ale Suprieure and the Ecole
P ratiq u e des H a u te s E tu d e s p ro p a g a te d a wave o f stric tly a c a d e m ic , or
p o litic a lly m ore u sefu l, re se arch : w hat we c a ll here th e A lth u sse r ia n
sc h o o l.
T h is sc h o o l arises from a very p artic u la r p o litic a l a n d ep istem o lo gical
conju ncture, ev o k ed in th e preface o f For M arx.
a) Politics first. T h e renaissance o f M arxist thought was provoked by the
collapse o f frozen M arxism : A lthusser attributed the aw akening to S ta lin s
d e a th a n d th e 2 0 th C o n g re ss. H e ev o k es th e th eory o f tw o sc ie n c e s
(bourgeois science/proletarian science) advan ced by the com m unist leaders
to defen d against bourgeois attacks on M arxism at th at tim e dangerously at
risk in L y s s e n k o s b io lo g y . T h e A lt h u s s e r ia n ru p tu re w ith S t a lin is t
dogm atism thus goes o n to take the form o f a restitution o f the autonom ous
rights o f theory in relation to p olitical n ecessities. T h is ch oice led to a
series o f consequences w hich today appear contradictory but whose logic was
clear at the time. Tactically, this signifies the exclusion o f the other escape
h a tc h th at S ta lin ism then advanced: the Ita lian , T o g lia tist route, to
w hich G araudy can be linked. Philosophically, it is the obsessive refusal of
h isto r ic ism an d the p ro b lem o f the su b je c t. S c ie n tific a lly , it is the
com pletely natural union with the second com ponent o f the conjuncture at
w hich the A lth usserian school began: the structuralist vogue.
b)

In effect, the A lth u sserian sch oo l was resolutely inscribed in a purely

scientific m o v em en t w h ich co rresp o n d s to th e em erg en ce in th e F ren ch

FROM A LT H U SSE R IA N ISM T O REG U LA TIO N TH EO RY

103

university o f a new scien tific c o n tin e n t, still co n tam in ated by ideology:

the so cial sciences. T h e d o m in an t ideology for th e m ost serious researchers
w as structuralism . T h e A lth u sseria n sch o o l inscribed itself com pletely in
the course o f the discovery o f this co n tin en t, m arking w hen necessary its
distances from a certain structuralism , but claim ing n o partisan specificity:
there was on ly one science, and m ay the best-equipped win. S ign ifican t in
t h is r e s p e c t a re th e t o t a l a b s e n c e o f a c la s s b r e a k w ith in F r e n c h
ep istem ology (B ach e lard , C an g u ilh e m , K oyr, etc .) a n d th e fu n d am en tal
w eakness o f the break w ith structuralism . A proudly asserted refusal in the
first case (au ton o m y o f th eo retical p ractic e), and a ta ctic a l ch oice in the
secon d case (one sole enem y: h istoricism ).
2) The Dialectical Materialism o f the Althusserian School
W h at then is th e Philosophy, D ialectical M aterialism (D M ), laten t in
th e p r a c tic e o f th e h isto r ic a l t h e o r e tic ia n o f H isto r ic a l M a te ria lism
(H M )? It includes two groups o f theses: m eth od ological and on tological.
a) T h e Process o f the Production o f K now ledges
T h e m eth od ological theses are posed in op po sition to em piricism , and
d efin e the process o f know ledge. W e can sum m arize th em thus:
Thesis 0: T h e real exists indepen den tly o f the know ledge we h ave o f it, and
is n ot e n g e n d e r e d by h u m a n th o u g h t n or by th e d e v e lo p m e n t o f an
absolute idea. T h is is th e fun dam en tal thesis o f all m aterialism .
Thesis 1 : T h e progress o f know ledge is a process o f p rodu ction like any
other, w hich sets into m otion the activity o f a th eoretician (who carries out
a th eoretical p ractice), w ho applies m eans o f produ ction to objects o f labor
to furnish a product. T h e w hole o f this process u nfolds entirely within the
r e a lm o f th o u g h t. O b je c t s o f la b o r ( G e n e r a lit ie s I ) are p re v io u sly
produced n otion s or concepts, the m eans o f labor ( G en eralities II) is the
a lread y -e x istin g co n ce p tu a l body, th e p rod u ct (G e n e ra litie s III ) a new
c o n c e p t . In p a r tic u la r , th e o p e r a tio n w h ich c o n s is ts o f p a ssin g fro m
id e o lo g ic a l k n o w led ge (r e c o g n itio n - m isre c o g n itio n ) to th e sc ie n tific
know ledge o f a dom ain, an o p eratio n w h ich m arks the b irth o f a science,
is c a lle d e p is t e m o lo g ic a l b r e a k . In th e c o u rse o f its a c c u m u la tio n ,
know ledge is elevated from the ab stract to the concrete, th at is, from more
g en eral co n ce p ts to m ore fertile d e term in atio n s, thus reprodu cin g in the
form o f con crete th ou gh t the com plexity o f con crete reality.4
Thesis 2: T h is p rocess is th e m eth o d for appropriatin g th e realm o f thought;
it is different from the m ethod belon ging to art r pratcial activity. T h ere is
thus n ot a problem o f know ledge (the guarantees o f the adequ acy o f the

104

TH E A LTH U SSE R IA N LEGA CY

idea o f the real), bu t a p lace for m ech an istic theory by w h ich th eoretical
p ractice is articu lated to other p ractices in th e app ro p riatio n o f the real.
T h e result is th a t th e prim acy o f practice does n o t signify the subordination
o f theory to o th e r in sta n c e s o f h u m an a c tiv ity , sin c e th e crite rio n o f
p ra c tic e is in tern al to the very m om en t o f theory.5
b) A C o m p le x O verdeterm in ated W hole
T h u s we arrive at th e o n to lo g ica l th eses w hich are also gn o se o lo gical
theses, since th ere is all th e sam e a relatio n betw een th e structure o f th e real
a n d th e know ledge we h a v e o f it. A rriv in g at th e ob je ct itself (here: the
history o f hu m an so cial form ation s), we m ust be aware o f M a rx s im m ense
theoretical rev o lu tio n : the setting in m otion o f structural causality (L L C ,
II, p. 5 6 ). It is p recisely th ere th a t A lth u sser h im se lf brings us th e m ost
original a n d useful but also the least infallible an d m ost unsable ideas, the
m ost degrad able in the course o f developm en t o f the A lth u sserian school.
H ere it follow s the m ost controversial p ath (for oth er M arxists) yet the m ost
fertile (for everyone). Let us again try to state the theses.
Thesis 3 :

T h e real is p resen ted as a stru ctu ral w hole, n o t as an e v e n

co m b in atio n o f hom ogenous elem ents. Everything is first o f all a structure

o f structures, a system o f relations m ore th an a collection o f elem ents. T h e
elem en ts are them selves defin ed only by their p lace in the structure. For
exam ple, the cap italist and the proletarian, m ore generally defined as m en ,
are defined on ly as p la ce s in th e cap italist relation s o f p rodu ction .6
Thesis 4: T h ese structures articulate relation sh ips w h ich are presen ted as
co n trad ictio n s betw een two aspects, o f w hich one do m in ates the other,
the se n se o f the term d o m in a tio n b e in g sp e c ifie d in e a c h ca se . F or
e x a m p le, th e infrastructure o f th e C M P (C a p ita list M o de o f P rodu ction )
co m b in es two re latio n s o f d o m in ation , proprietorship a n d possession.
It s e e m s t h a t , in c l a s s i c a l A l t h u s s e r i a n i s m , s t r u c t u r e s a n d
co n trad ictio n s are equivalen t, and th e categories and theses valid for one
are so fo r the oth er as well. H ere the great slippage becom es a decoy: PM
speaks o f co n tra d ictio n s a n d ov erd eterm in atio n , L L o f re latio n s an d
stru ctu ral cau sality.
Thesis 5 : E v ery th in g is alw ays alread y given to us as co m p le x (th a t is,
con stituted o f m ultiple indepen den t co n trad iction s). It is con crete in this
sense. T h e real does n o t develop out o f an original sim ple unity: on the
contrary, a sim ple category c a n app ear at th e heart o f the m ost co m plex
given structures.
T h is thesis m arks th e rad ical rupture w ith the v u lg ar reversal o f the

FROM A LTH U SSE R IA N ISM T O R E G U LA T IO N THEORY

105

H e g e lia n d ia le c t ic , th a t o f th e v u lgar M a rx ism o f the S ta lin is t period ,

accordin g to w h ich th e econ om ic infrastructure would be reflected as far as
th e in tellectu al sphere, op p o sin g expressive to tality at every turn: two
solitary term s to a single con trad iction . Bourgeois science an d proletarian
scien ce ... T h e follow ing theses specify the structure o f this already given
co m plex w h ole and the m odality o f its unity.
T h e sis 6 : In e v e r y t h in g a d o m in a n t st r u c t u r e e x is t s su c h t h a t th is
d o m in a tio n is the u nity o f th e w h ole ( the co m p lex w hole possesses the
u n ity o f an a r tic u la te d stru c tu re in d o m in a n c e [PM , p. 2 0 8 ]). T h is
d o m in ation consists in that, to repeat the words o f M arx in the Introduction
to the Critique o f Political Economy, it is a light in w hich all colors are bathed
a n d w h ic h m o d ifie s th e ir p a rtic u la r to n a litie s, a p articu la r eth er w h ich
determ in es th e specific w eigh t o f all form s o f existen ce w hich resort to it.
T h e effects' o f th is do m in ation do n o t intervene from th e o u tsid e o f the
d o m in an t structure but as a sp ecification o f the structure itself.
Thesis 7:

R eciprocally, the secondary co n trad iction s are essential to the

very existen ce o f the p rin cipal con trad iction , in reality they constitute its
co n d ition o f ex iste n ce. For exam ple, th e relations o f p rodu ction are n ot
th e p u re p h e n o m e n a o f the fo rc e s o f p r o d u c tio n : they are a lso th e ir
co n d itio n o f existen ce (P M , p. 2 1 1 ).
Thesis 8 : W ith in the structure in dom inan ce the dom inated structures and
c o n d itio n s h a v e th eir own e ffica cy and au to n o m y w h ich are e a c h tim e
p rec ised by th e d o m in a n t stru ctu re, w hich for th at reason is said to be
determ in ant in the last in stan ce.
T h e fo u r p r e c e d in g th e se s p e r m it a d e f in it io n o f th e c a te g o r y o f
o v e r d e t e r m in a t io n , w h ic h d e s ig n a te s w ith in th e c o n t r a d ic t io n (o r
stru ctu re), w hether it is p rin cip al or subordinated, the follow ing essen tial
qu ality: th e re fle ctio n , in th e co n tra d ic tio n itself, o f its c o n d itio n s o f
existen ce, th at is, o f the situation within the structure in dom inan ce o f the
c o m p le x w h o le (L L , p. 215). For ex am p le, th e p rin cip a l co n tra d ic tio n
( b o u r g e o i s i e / p r o l e t a r i a t ) c a n be o v e r d e t e r m i n e d in b l o c k a g e or
e x p lo sio n by the m u ltip le secondary co n trad iction s w h ich dom inate it but
w h ich are n o t its sim ple d e v e lo p m e n t (m en /w om en , citizens/im m igran ts,
e t c .) . It is im p o rta n t as w ell to grasp th e re a lity , th e e ffic a c y o f th is
ov erdeterm ination, u nth ink able in th e fram ew ork o f a dialectic o f H egelian
form , where, lack in g the au ton om y o f the already given , in the ab sen ce o f
a dislo cation , irreducible to the prin cipal, the secondary con trad iction s are
m a d e o n ly o f a n in t e r io r iz a t io n o f th e o n e a n d o n ly c o n t r a d ic t io n ,

106

TH E A LTH U SSERIA N LEGACY

in d efin itely c o n n e c te d , hence in d efin itely fro z e n . W ith th is we h av e

introduced tw o theses on th e dynamic o f reality (the possibility o f ch an ge).
Thesis 9 : T h e p rin c ip a l c o n tra d ic tio n , a s th e p rin c ip a l a sp e c t o f every
co n trad iction (said an o th er way: th e do m in an t elem en t o f e a c h relation )
can be d isp la ce d , b ecau se n o th in g ever d e v e lo p s in an ab so lu tely even
fash io n (accord in g to the term s o f H eraclitus and M ao T se-tun g).
Thesis 10:

T h e o v ertu rn in g o f th e stru ctu re is m ad e p o ssib le w h en th e

displacem en t o f th e co n trad iction s brings do m in an ce in to a strategic p la ce

w here a co n d e n sa tio n o f a co n trad ictio n operates. C o m p rised in this
way, the co n trad iction is the en gin e o f all d evelo pm en ts. T h e displacem en t
an d conden sation, founded in its ov erd eterm ination, acc o u n t for the phases
w h ic h c o n s tit u t e th e e x is te n c e o f c o m p le x p r o c e ss e s, t h a t is, o f th e
becom in g o f th in gs (P M p. 223).
W h en the A lth u sserian school h a s finished em ptying th e contradiction ,
it w ill b ec o m e in c a p a b le o f th in k in g th e p o ssib ility o f c h a n g e , but w ill
rem ain perfectly cap ab le o f describing it. It will extract th e to o ls o f th at
description particularly from B alibar and Poulantzas. T h ese we will discuss
in the follow in g paragraph s. B u t we m ust first p ro claim our d eb t to the
A lth u sserian sch o o ls first blow to frozen M arxism : the end o f the m yth o f
th e single contradiction , o f the m essian ic an ticipation o f a revolu tion from
the im placable virtue o f th e co n trad iction betw een the productive forces
an d the relation s o f p roduction , interiorized in the proletariat/bourgeoisie
contradiction .
A ll this, set apart from the degrad ation o f the co n trad ictio n in structure,
would then be very positive if it were n ot necessary to n ote in the course o f
these pages an eleven th thesis, n ot necessarily a con sequ en ce of, yet strongly
indicated by the preceding:
T h e sis 1 1 : T h e s u p p o r t- a g e n t s o f a c t iv e s t r u c t u r e s c o n fo r m to th e
requirem ents o f the latter, such th at they appear in a representation w hich
the t h e o r e t i c a l g iv e s th e m , t h a t c a n be v a s t ly d if f e r e n t fro m th e m
co n ce p tu ally , b u t w h ich induces th em n ev e rth e le ss, co n fo rm in g to th eir
p la c e , to reproduce th e structures w hich define them .
H istory thus appears as a theater whose spectators can , on occasion , be
sp ectators only because they are first o f all forced to be its actors, cau g h t in
th e constrain ts o f a script and parts w hose au th o rs they c a n n o t be since it is
in essence an anchorless cheater" (L L C , II, p. 7 1 ). T h is radical n egatio n o f the
su b je ct in the n am e o f stru ctu ralism know s its m ost refin ed fo rm in the
analysis o f form s o f represen tation 7 given by R an cire, w h ich concludes:

FROM A LTH U SSE R IA N ISM TO REG U LA TIO N TH EO RY

107

th e essential con tin u um o f the fun ction o f the su bject will be constituted in
m ystified b ein g (L L C , III, p. 77).
3 ) The Concept of the Capitalist Mode o f Production
T h e p h ilo sop h ical rupture registered w ith the H eg elian con ception o f
the w h ole (a sin gle c o n tra d ictio n w h ich exteriorizes an d interiorizes the
ec o n o m ic ad infinitum) open s in effect the b reach o f a series o f scien tific
ruptures w hich shake the represen tation o f h istorical m aterialism to its very
fo u n d a tio n s. W h at is taken a g a in into co n sid era tio n is the most classic
co n cep t o f M arx: that o f m o d es o f p rodu ction . T h e fam ous Preface o f
1859 presented a sim ple schem a ( m atrix ):
A t the base, productive forces th at ev o lv e. T h is is the en gin e.
A b o v e , th e relation s o f p ro d u ctio n adequate to th e degree o f d e v elo p
m en t o f th e p rod u ctive forces.
O n top, a political arm ature an d an ideological ju stification for it all.
T h e first tw o lev e ls form th e e c o n o m ic in fra stru c tu re , w here all is
defined; the other levels (p o litical an d ideological) only reflect. T h is is
why, in scholarly term s, a m ode o f p rodu ction is defin ed as these two first
l e v e l s , d i s t i n g u i s h in g t h e r e in tw o d e g r e e s : th e f ir s t , f u n d a m e n t a l
(m a n /n a tu re re la tio n s: th e p ro d u ctiv e fo rc e s), an d the alread y derived
se co n d , th e relation s o f p roduction (relation s betw een m en in nature).
T h e A lth u sse ria n sc h o o l b reak s w ith th is sim p le sch em a, a H e g e lia n
m a trix sim ply turned upside-dow n, a n d con d ucts its attack on tw o fronts.
First Front: the m ode o f production is the co n cep t (entirely w ithin thought)
o f th e articulation o f three ever-present instan ces (an d always already given
t o g e th e r ): e c o n o m ic , p o lit ic a l, id e o lo g ic a l. T h is c o m p le x w h ole in
do m in an ce is dom inated in the last instan ce by the econom y, in the sense
t h a t t h e e c o n o m i c s t r u c t u r e d e t e r m in e s the m a t r i x o f th e m o d e
(in d icatio n s o f the dom in an ce and auton om y o f various instan ces until their
e x c is io n ). For ex am p le, th e ec o n o m y can d e term in e th e d o m in an ce o f
politics and religion in the feudal m ode o f production.
S e c o n d F r o n t: it is n e c e s s a r y to c o n s id e r th e v e ry st r u c t u r e o f th e
in frastru c tu re , w ith its c a n o n ic a l d istih c tio n b etw een p ro d u ctiv e forces
(defined tech n o lo gically ) an d relation o f p roduction (defined so cially ).
In so doin g, th e d ev elo p m en t o f p rod u ctive fo rces is itself defin ed as a
social relation .8
A lth o u g h the consequences o f these two affirm ations in the destruction
o f tech n o lo gico-econ o m ic determ inism are considerable, certain questions
m ust rem ain. L et us stop at one o f them , b egin n in g w ith the determ ining
in stan ce .

108

TH E A LTH U SSERIA N LEGACY

a) T h e E con om ic
A ll m aterial p ro d u ctio n (w h atever its m o d e) is n ecessarily so c ia l an d
b rin g s into p la y th e fo llo w in g ele m en ts: w ork ers, m eans o f p ro d u c tio n
(o b jects o f la b o r a n d m e an s o f labor) a n d non-w orkers. T h e relation s o f
p ro d u ctio n are the co m b in atio n o f these elem en ts. For exam ple, in the
C M P , the w orker is separate from the m eans o f produ ction w h ich is the
property o f non-w orkers. T h is is well known. S till, it is necessary to specify
w hat it m eans. F rom the eco n o m ic p o in t o f view , property sign ifies the
cap acity o f the d o m in an t elem en t to affect the unity o f p roduction on to
w hich it brings to a p articu lar production an d to dispose o f the p rod u ct
(B ettelh eim , 1970). But on e such cap acity supposes as a co n d ition on the
p o litic a l and ju rid ica l level, the existen ce o f th e righ t and property and
c o n tr a c ts w h ic h p e r m it th e w orker to se ll h is la b o r p ow er, an d th e
proprietor o f th e m eans o f p roduction to k eep th e product. T h e juridical
right o f property is logically in d ep en d en t o f eco n o m ic property (an d it is
m ad e separate from it in num erous situations com prised w ith in capitalism ).
W e h av e th u s alread y d istin g u ish ed tw o re la tio n s: p ro p erty /ju rid ical
p ro p erty , b o rn e by th e sam e supports (m e n a n d th in g s ), b u t in p la c e s
inscribed in tw o different and relatively auton om ous instances. T h ese two
relation s define (econ om ically and juridically) the co n d ition s o f placing value
on capital (the process o f valorization ). From this p oin t it is possible to
develop theories o f exch an ge value an d surplus value. B u t n oth in g h as been
said o f the process o f labor itself, or the produ ction o f use values th at the
fro z e n re a d in g o f M arx le a v e s in the in d iffe re n t q u a n tita tiv e flow o f
productive forces: th e accum ulation o f m en, m achin es, in ven tion , know
how ...
It is there th at th e A lth u sse ria n sc h o o ls re a d in g o f C apital d eliv ers a
second relation w hich intervenes in the structure o f econ om ics: the relation
o f real appropriation (fro m B a lib a r ) or possession (fro m B e tte lh e im ). It
d e te rm in e s , for th e la b o r p ro c e ss itse lf, th e c o m b in a t io n o f th e sam e
elem en ts o f econ om ic structure. It substitutes, for th e elem en t possessor,
th e cap acity to set in m o tion th e productive forces in the p rocess o f lab or
(B e t t e lh e im , 1 9 7 0 ). T h is im p lie s a p a r t ic u la r d e t e r m in a t io n o f th e
co m b in atio n o f the activity o f the worker, the m eans o f labor and the ob ject
o f labor. It is this co m b in atio n (this relation ) w h ich qualifies the fam ous
develo pm en t o f productive forces.
In the case o f the feudal o r the artisanal m ode o f production , the worker
h im self sets the productive forces into m otion. T h e m eans o f labor is only a
tool w hich extends his arm, an d the process o f labor, to his w ork. T h ere is
a unity, in term s o f the object, o f the activity and the m eans o f labor. In
d e v e lo p e d form s o f cap italist production, there is on th e contrary u n ity o f
th e m e an s an d th e object o f labor (the press a n d th e steel p late), a u nity that

FROM A LT H U SSE R IA N ISM T O REG U LA TIO N TH EO RY

109

is o p p o se d to th e in d iffe r e n t w o rk e r w ho is o n ly the s e r v a n t o f th e
m achinery.
W e th u s e sta b lish in the C M P a h om ology b etw een ea c h o f th e two
e c o n o m ic r e la tio n s (p ro p rie to r sh ip a n d p o sse ssio n , n o t c o u n tin g th e ir
correspondence w itht the ju ridical relation ), characterized by the separation
o f th e worker and the m eans o f p rodu ction an d by th e dom in ation o f the
n on-w ork er. T h e p rofit th e th e o re tic ia n s o f F o rd ism draw from th ese
reflection s is w ell-know n (in p articu la r C o riat, 1978). A t th is poin t, two
e rro rs o f v u lg a r M a r x is m , ju r id ic is m a n d q u a n t it a t iv is m , are c le a r ly
denounced.
T h e first consists o f identifying capitalist relations o f p roduction at the
level o f the juridical property relation . W e are thus led n ot to recognize in
such an econ om ic form the cap italist relations o f production , th in k in g th at
they are n ot yet there (the p uttin g-out system ), or th ay they are no longer
there (state capitalism in Eastern n atio n s).
I n addition , B alib ars dem on stration th at the level o f productive forces
is also a re latio n o f p ro d u c tio n sh a tte rs th e glass o f th e n eu trality o f
p r o d u c tiv e fo r c e s : th e y h a v e a c la ss c h a r a c te r . T h e p o lit ic s o f
q u an titativ e developm en ts o f capitalist-type productive forces, from w hich
S ta lin e x p e c te d th e p ro d u ctio n o f m a te ria l b ases o f co m m u n ism h av e
(literally ) bou n d lab or. T h is error (e ssen tially id en tical to tech n o lo gical
d eterm in ism ) h as existed sin ce th e b eg in n in g o f th e R u ssian R evolu tion ;
sin ce th e n th e w ork ers o p p o sitio n h as b een o p p o sed on th is p o in t to
Lenin, w ho m ech an ically im ported T ay lorism and the individual direction
o f f a c t o r i e s . In t h is i n s t a n c e , f r o z e n M a r x is m c o n f u s e d the tw o
co n stitu tive relation s o f the econ om ic instance.
T h e tw o constitutive relation s ... acco rd in g to Reading Capital. Because
the least vulgar econ om ist c a n n o t suppress his aston ishm en t: evidently, one
is lacking.' T h a t to w hich M arx dedicated the first section o f Capital, and
n otably th e first ch apter: m ark et re latio n s. W e will n o t en ter in to the
sy m p to m a tic a n a ly sis o f th is o v e rsig h t h e re, but th e fa c t re m a in s th a t
c l a s s i c a l A lt h u s s e r ia n is m s criticism , fro m A lt h u s s e r a n d B a l i b a r to
P o u lan tz as by w ay o f M a c h e re y , p u rely a n d sim p ly m a k es o u t th a t th e
u n ific atio n o f th e m ean s o f p ro d u ctio n a n d w orkers, under ju rid ica l an d
e c o n o m ic proprietorship an d p ossessed by cap ital, operates w ithin separate,
n on -coord in ated econ om ic unities, independent o f one another, w hich m ust
first o f all fin d suppliers a n d afterward a clien t for their production.
T h e oversigh t o f this first relation, its reduction to an ideological and
ju rid ic a l illu sio n , w ith o u t d o u b t co rre sp o n d s first to a sim p le re a c tio n :
Stalin ist M arxism h a s for to o lon g lim ite d its critique o f capitalism to the
an arch y o f the m ark et-p lace. By p lacin g the accen t on the exto rtion o f
surplus-value and the dispossession o f the direct producer from the control

110

THE A LTH U SSERIA N LEGACY

o f his labor, classical A lth usserian ism pursues legitim ate political goals. But
this d o es n ot e x c u se (a u to n o m y o f th e o ry !) such a failu re to take in to
account.
A s we see it, h o w ev er, the critic ism is d e e p e r th an th a t. W ith the
auton om y o f econ om ic units, the auton om y o f the individual appears (its
lib e rty ) an d th e c o n tra d ic tio n b etw een in d iv id u a l su b je cts an d so cial
reprodu ction . S u b je c t, c o n tra d ictio n : tw o words w h ich w ill becom e
taboo; H egelian s, h u m an ists. T h is is why A lth usser, in his Preface to
the G arn ier-F lam m arion ed ition o f C ap ital, stro n gly advises th e reader to
sk ip th e first c h a p te r s. T h is is why M a c h e re y (L L C , IV ) p e rsists in
forgetting, over th e course o f dozens o f pages, th at the process o f capitalist
p rodu ction is adm inistered by different capitals. T h is is why B alib ar (L L C )
persists in dem on strating th at th is variety is on ly illusory a n d introduces n o
origin al con trad iction in the reproduction o f ca p ita lism as a whole.
b) T h e A rticu latio n o f Political and Ideological C o n d itio n s
Evidently, it is no lon ger a question o f b uildin g upon this infrastructure a
p olitical and ideological superstructure, like prelim inary essences entering
into a series o f extern al relations. T h e articulation proper to all research on
a M ode o f Production requires the con stitution [of these] regional in stan ces
(Poulantzas, 1968 Part I, p. 11). H ow ever, these in stan ces have in principle a
general definition o f their autonom y, specified in each m ode, accordin g to
m odalities to be determ ined in the last in stan ce by the econom ic.
T h e political level for Poulantzas (p. 3 6 ) is th at o f decoding, m ain tain in g
or transform ing the unity o f a social form ation. T h e p olitical structures o f a
m ode consist o f the institutionalized power o f the S ta te . P olitical practice
is th at w hich produces transform ations within the unity o f the m ode and the
s o c ia l f o r m a tio n . P o lit ic s is th u s th e c r u c ia l in s ta n c e w h en a ll th e
co n trad ictio n s o f a fu n ction are reflected a n d co n d en sed , th at w hich can
imply the existence o f political structures (an d practices) correspond in g to
econ om ic an d ideological functions o f politics properly stated.
T h e id eological level is the site w here the agen ts o f a form ation, bearers
o f its structures, live their con d ition s o f existen ce, the liv ed relations o f
agents to these con d ition s (II, p. 27)., In m odes and social form ations, its
fu n ctio n is to o ccu lt real con trad iction s, to recon stitu te in an im aginary
p lan a relatively coheren t discourse (II, p. 2 8 ). M ore th an th e con ceptu al
system, it recovers a group o f practices an d structures w hich constitute the
cu ltu re o f a society (such as religio n ). It thus reflects the unity o f the
form ation , and constitutes its cement (using G ram scis w ord), but only at the
level o f the im aginary (w hich does n ot im pede its real efficacy on the other
levels o f the structure).
T h e real auton om ization o f the p olitical level is a ch aracteristic aspect o f
the cap italist m ode o f production: to speak truly, there is no P olitics and

FROM A LTH U SSE R IA N ISM T O REG U LA TIO N THEORY

111

S t a t e o th e r th a n th e b o u rg e o is. T h is a u to n o m o u s p la c e for p o litic a l

structure within the C M P is precisely the effect o f determ in ation in the last
instance o f econom ic structure. In this m ode o f production, in effect, the
double separation o f the producer from his m eans o f production assures the
u n ity o f the p ro cess o f v alo riz a tio n u n d er the ow nersh ip o f c a p ita l, and
hence the ap p rop riation o f surplus-value, in the (ap p aren t) absence o f all
extern al v io len ce excep t the despotism o f the enterprise.
L et us go further. T h e cap italist relation s o f production w h ich govern
the p r o d u c tio n o f ju r id ic a lly p r iv a te la b o r, e x e c u te d o n one a n o th e r
indepen den tly w ithin separate econ om ic unities w hich integrate workers
t h e m s e lv e s s e p a r a t e fro m th e ir m e a n s o f p r o d u c t io n h a v e , in th e
co n sequ en t practice and social relation s o f the agents, a n isolating effect
(c o n c u rre n ce betw een c a p ita lists an d workers, e tc .) w h ich refers to the
ju ridical-p olitical superstructure, a u to n o m o u s in relation to th e econom y,
the group o ffu n c tio n s o f the unity o f the structurrre (I, p. 133-37). It is
th e S t a te w hich in teg rates, organ izes an d re p re se n ts a p e o p le -n a tio n o f
citizens, ju ridical personalities. In particular, we h ave already observed that
the relation o f econ om ic ow nership has as a con d ition o f existence (was
overdeterm ined by) th e relation o f ju ridical ow nership.
In this way the tw o specific traits o f politics in the C M P are isolated:
auton om y (by its relatio n to econ om ics) a n d th e fun ction o f unity. T h ey
d iffere n tia te it from th e d e ta iled an d in d issolu b ly ec o n o m ic stru ctu re o f
feudal power. T h ese two traits are intim ately linked, w hen one im agines the
ch a ra cteriz a tio n o f the b ou rgois cla ss that we a ttrib u te to M arx, a class
w hich, at e a c h m om en t, sacrifices its ow n general cla ss interest, its p olitical
in te re st, to its m ost lim ite d p a rtic u la r an d p riv a te in te re sts (T he 18th
Brumaire o f Louis Bonaparte).
T h is co n cep tio n is thus opposed t o the fixed co n ception o f the S ta te th at
could be drawn from L e n in s p olem ical defin ition in State and Revolution: a
tool o f the dom inant classes to subdue the oppressed classes. It em phasizes
(1) th a t th e b o u rg e o isie e x ists on ly as a class fo r itse lf, it n eeds the
e x iste n c e o f p o litic a l stru ctu res to be recognized as a class; (2) th a t the
relative autonom y o f politics perm its the S ta te to assure the reproduction o f
the ca p ita list m ode o f p rod u ction ev en if the b ou rgeoisie is in cap ab le o f
insuring its h istorical responsibility; and (3 ) that, in particular, it is relieved
o f co m p le x tasks oth er th a n th at o f su b d u in g th e d o m in a te d cla sses by
m eans o f special detach m en ts o f arm ed m en .
T h e auton om y o f p o litics th u s acquires a strong m eaning: structural and
institution al autonom y, n ot identified with optim al political econom y (from
an econ om istic p oin t o f view ) and optim al general politics (from the point o f
view o f m ain tain in g the social form ation ), n ot identified with the dom inant
class (econ om ically), the reigning class or ten an ts o f poverty, etc.

112

TH E A LTH U SSERIA N LEGA CY

It is easy to guess th e profit w h ich th e regu lation ists will later draw from
the w ork o f Poulantzas: if politics (an d ideology) are alw ays already given
a n d e c o n o m ic a lly o v erd eterm in ed , th e S ta te is no lon ger a support for
cap ital. Law and R epresen tation intervene in the form ation o f econom ic
relations them selves: m arket, w age-eam ers (Lipietz, 1985b). A n d insofar as
the S ta te (as an institution ) intervenes, it does so as an archetype o f the
regulated form s o f the social form ation (D elorm , A ndr, 1983; Lipietz, 1986).
H ow ever, th e already-sketched critiques d o n o th in g bu t aggrav ate the
d iffic u ltie s. F irst o f all, in th e a b se n c e o f su b je c ts re ally o p p o se d in
contradictory structures, it is n o longer possible to see very well w hat there is
to unify. W h a t are th ese if n o t structures co m b attin g on e anoth er? T h is is a
u se fu l p o in t o f v iew , b u t in s u f f ic ie n t , a n d we w ill se e th e e ffo r ts o f
P o u lan tz a s to a d d ress th is d iffic u lty . In a d d itio n , th e iso la tin g effect
(betw een capitalists, betw een wage-workers) is reported by Poulantzas (w ho
follow s classical A lth u sserian ism in ign o rin g the co n trad ictio n s o f m arket
r e la t io n s ) as the ju r id ic a l in s ta n c e : e c o n o m ic u n it s are a u to n o m o u s
b ec a u se th e y are juridically p riv a te , th e ideological effect o f w h ich is th e
m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g (m c o n n a is sa n c e ) o f t h e ir u n it y a t th e h e a r t o f
re p ro d u c tio n . B e tte lh e im (1 9 7 0 ) w ill re ctify th is fu n d a m e n ta l error by
sh ow ing th at th e separation o f m arket units is a re a l separation at th e core o f
the process o f social production, indicating a real co n trad iction in econ om ic
re p ro d u ctio n , w hich is on ly fo rm ally re co v ere d by th e p la n n in g w ith in
n ation s h avin g p u b lic ow nership o f th e m eans o f production.
4) Social Formations
Pure m odes o f p ro d u ctio n do n ot exist. A ll th at ex ist, in reality, are
particular com bin ation s, specific intersections o f modes. It is thus necessary
to h ave recourse to concrete objects o f thought, social form ation s, com plex
w holes dom inated in general by a m ode o f p rodu ction w h ich im prints its
m a trix u p o n th e m . In g e n e r a l, b e c a u se th e re e x is t p re c ise ly s o c ia l
form ation s in tran sition betw een the dom inan ce o f two m odes.
T o render m ore co n crete in thought the co n ce p t o f the m ode com pared to
th at o f form ation, two directions can be taken: the external articulation o f
the dom in an t m ode w ith other m odes, or the in ternational periodization o f
the mode.
E x te rn al articu latio n w ith oth er m odes evidently does n ot consist o f a
sim ple ju xtap o sitio n : the dom inant m ode overd eterm in es the others and
giv es th em a sp ec ific d e g e n e ra te d form (g ro u n d -re n t, th e slav e p la n
ta tio n s o f the A m e r ic a n S o u th ). It is ev en p ossib le to lo c a te m o d es o f
production w h ich can n o t exist as do m in an t but w h ich can appear in the
transitions or under the dom ination o f another, such as the m ode o f sm all
in depen den t producers.

FROM A LTH U SSE R IA N ISM T O R EG U LA TIO N TH EO RY

113

T h is concern s the dom inant m ode itself. It delim its first in the history o f
the social form ation two phases: th at o f its begin nings (tran sition in the
strict sen se); and the phase o f reproduction enlarged in the structure. But
th e u n e q u al d e v e lo p m e n t b etw een th e b ran ch e s im po ses case by case a
realization o f this distin ctio n after the estab lish m en t o f the dom inance o f
the m ode. N e x t, the displacem en t o f th e co n trad iction s o f the m ode to the
interior o f its invariant structure founds a periodization" o f this m ode w hich
is im posed (w ith dislodgings) on the form ation.
T h e periodization by the C M P by M arxists presents num erous gaps: the
co n trary w ould be surprising, the d islo d ge m en t betw een the structuresco n trad iction s p erm ittin g ch oice. M arx privileges the periodization by the
r e la t io n o f p o s s e s s io n : m a n u fa c tu r e /la r g e - s c a le in d u s tr y /a u to m a tio n .
U ltim ate ly the M arxists h ave privileged a periodization in stages relative to
th e f u n c t i o n i n g o f th e u n i f y i n g s t r u c t u r e o f th e C M P w h ic h th e
A lth u sserian s ignore: the m arket. W e arrive a t the division com petitive
stage/m onopoly stage.
T h e c o e x is t e n c e in a sin g le s o c ia l fo r m a tio n o f d iffe re n t m o d e s o f
production , stages, etc. subdivides the dom in an t and dom inated classes into
strata or fraction s. W h at is then the unity o f a social form ation ? Structural
unity is in scribed in it, we h a v e already said, at the p o litica l level. T h e
q u estio n is n atu rally th at o f the u n ity fou n d ed by a d o m in a tio n . T h is
unity under d o m in atio n introduces the co n cep t o f hegemony, particularly
as developed by Poulantzas follow ing G ram sci, an d m eans two things.
It in d ic ate s th e co n stitu tio n o f th e p o litic a l in terests o f the d o m in an t
classes, in th e ir re la tio n to th e C a p ita list S tate , as rep resen tativ e o f the
g en eral interest o f the p eop le-n atio n . G ram sci poin ts out (in his M odem
Prince): T h is m ean s th at the d o m in a n t group is co n cretely co o rd in ate d
w ith the gen eral in terests o f the subordinated groups a n d th a t th e life o f the
S ta te is ... like a co n tin u al p assage o f u n stab le equ ilib ria ..., eq uilibria to
w h ich th e interests o f do m in an t groups brin g it, but only up to a certain
point, that is, n ot up to the paltry interests o f corporative econ om y.
In the block o f dom in an t classes in power, on e o f the classes (o r a fraction )
holds a h egem on y over others.
W e c a n see th a t th e an aly sis in term s o f so cial fo rm a tio n rectifies the
eco n o m ic co n cep tion o f frozen M arxism :
Because it takes into a cc o u n t a plurality o f co n trad iction s overdeterm ined
betw een them , and no longer leaves two hom ogeneous cam ps fa ce to face,
defined by th eir antago n istic p lace in th e relation s o f production. T h ere are
c e r t a in ly at e v e ry m o m e n t tw o c a m p s on e-ither sid e o f a p r in c ip a l
c o n tr a d ic tio n , b u t it m u st b e d e te rm in e d a t a ll m o m e n ts b e c a u se it is
displaced and n ot necessarily identifiable a t the econ om ic level.

114

THE A LTH U SSER IA N LEGACY

Because, even at the econ om ic level, it can explain the obstacle or the
lessening o f the tendentially explosive co n trad iction s o f cap italism (against
th e catastro p h ism o f R o sa Luxem burg).
B ecau se a t the p o litical and id eological level, it perm its a d ista n cin g
betw een the im m ediate a n d catastrophic in terests o f th e bourgeoisie an d the
stra te g y o f th e ir cla ss. T h is d ista n c e p ro v o k e s a fra c tu rin g w ith in the
d o m in an t classes, an d show s th a t th e fraction w hich is h e gem on ic is n ot
indifferent to th e d o m in ated classes, n eith er from th e p oin t o f view o f their
sh ort-term m aterial interests, n or from th e poin t o f view o f th e struggle for
so cial transform ation.
Poulantzas certainly had in m ind the ch oice betw een fascism an d social
dem ocracy, w hich the K PD did n ot know how to m ake under the W eim ar
R epu blic. B ut the regulationists reintroduced a m uch m ore general idea:
c a p ita lism do es n o t alw ays fu n ctio n in th e sam e way; th ere are several
so lu tio n s, several p ossible form s o f reorgan ization at th e tim e o f its great
crises, an d the ch oice very m u ch depends on the form s o f institutionalized
c o m p ro m ise w h ich the d o m in a tin g c la sse s are c a p a b le o f p ro p o sin g or
im posing.
5) The Theory o f Passage
W hat is m ost strik in g about the p reced in g e x p lic a tio n s is the stran ge
a p p e a ra n c e o f h is t o r ic a l m a te r ia lis m . T h e A lt h u s s e r ia n sc h o o l h a s
brought a quantity o f concepts depictin g a static reality up to date, b u t it
seem s th a t th is could be to th e d e trim en t o f w h at h as passed as th e very
originality o f M arxism : a theory o f variables, even a ten tative absolute
h istoricization of w h atever seem s ete rn al in th e d o m in an t ideology.
B alibar an d A lth usser do n ot co n ceal it: their reading o f Capital is first a
c o n d e m n a t io n o f e v o l u t i o n is m . M a r x t o ld us t h a t a ll m o d e s o f
produ ction are historical m om ents; he did n ot tell us th at these m om ents
en g e n d e re d on e a n o th e r ... here th e id e n tity o f c h ro n o lo g y an d o f an
internal law o f the developm ent o f form s is found broken (L L C , II, p. 112).
A n d B alib ar recognized th at h istorical m aterialism , reduced to the single
co n cep t o f m odes o f p rodu ction con ceived as com bin ation s, should be found
in the im possibility o f thinking at the sam e th eoretical level the passage o f
one co m b in atio n to anoth er (L L C , II, p. 157). H ence the n ecessity o f a
second co n cep t: th at o f p assage , analysis o f the transition betw een two
m odes, thus o f the form ation an d dissolution o f m odes. B alib ar (in L L C )
provides th e prin cipal contribution on th is poin t.
T h e m o de o f production is in effect first a reproduction o f th e p la ce s o f
th e various elem en ts o f the structure: production o f o b je cts a n d individuals
fo r social relation s, a p rodu ction in w h ich in d iv id uals are determ in ed to

FROM A LT H U SSE R IA N ISM TO R EG U LA TIO N THEORY

115

produce and ob jects to be produced in a specific form for social relation s

(L L C , II, p. 175). T h is is why the th eory o f reprodu ction is conceptualized
n ot in tim e but in a p la n w hich translates the eternalization o f th e m ode
and o f its p la ce s. Production is a process without a su b ject, or perhaps
(but this m eans n o th in g), the su bject is the relations o f production th at set
in to m o tio n the workers w h o are already defined as proletarian before bein g
sold to a particular fun ction ary o f cap ital.
T o co n ceiv e o f the structure as reproduction, an d reproduction (o f social
relation s) as th e co n d itio n o f p ro d u ctio n (o f o b jects), is n ot on ly to m ake
the m ode o f p roduction the very co n cept o f historical continuity, but also to
p revent th in k in g th e passage betw een two m odes as an irrational gap, in
w hich on e stops and sees w hat on e will do n ext (since to live it is certainly
necessary to produce, hence to reproduce the conditions o f produ ction ), and
inversely to p revent th inking the passage to an o th er structure by the sam e
fu n c tio n in g o f the p reviou s stru ctu re (w h ich would on ly be know n as a
reproduction o f itself: we know o f the A lth u sserian s affection fo r Spin oza).
T h e result: each passage is a revolution, and one does n ot slip insensibly
from on e m ode to an oth er; each begin n in g is a discovery." T h e new m ode
n eeds to fin d ele m en ts in th e d isso lu tio n o f the on e p reced in g; each
tran sition is a quasi-m ode o f p ro d u ctio n , w ith its specific structure and
reproduction.
a) A T h e o ry o f O rigins
T o form ulate a theory o f the origins o f a m ode is to take a retrospective.
W e know the structural elem ents o f this m ode: thus, we know the theoretical
presuppositions o f the app earan ce o f this m ode. If they are reun ited, the
m ode can begin its greater reproduction. But w hence com es the reunion?
C eta in ly n ot from th e m ode itself, but as a p rodu ct o f th e social form ation
under the do m in ation o f the precedin g m ode, w hich constitutes the historical
conditions o f th e a p p e a ra n c e o f the m o d e, an d o f th e re a liz a tio n o f its
th eo retical p resupposition s. T h ese elem en ts a re defined in the n ew world
bu t born separately in the an cien t on e and are thus susceptible to a geneology
w h ich is indifferent to its m eans o f arrival: it will forget its origin, and
from th ere se v e ra l series o f h isto r ic a l c o n d itio n s c a n satisfy the sam e
presup position s (L L C , II, p. 184ff).
T h is is far from ev o lu tio n ism . C a p ita lism , contrary to w hat S ta lin ist
M arxism thought, do es n o t descend from feudalism as m a n descended from
the ape in vulgar Darwinism . T h ese presuppositions can be satisfied as well
by the dissolution o f the A sia tic m ode o f produ ction as by the u n leash in g o f
a dictatorsh ip o f the p roletariat.

116

THE A LTH U SSERIA N LEGACY

b) T h e T h eo ry o f T en d en cies
Let us im agine the problem in the other sense (th e end o f a m ode). T h e
question is very different: it ignores som e elem en ts it acts to create (they are
defined only by the structure o f the follow ing m o de). W e can at the m ost
see w hat elem en ts o f the present m ode tend to becom e.
N ow these are defined in th e sp ace-p lan o f the repro du ctio n o f their
structure, the synchrony w hich the co n cep t co n stitu tes o f their relation s.
T h e fu n citon in g o f th a t structure is th e dyn am ic o f the structure, that
is, its existence in tim e (L L C , II, p. 194). Is this dynam ic sim ultaneously
th e history o f the structure, the en gin e o f its o b so lescen ce ? N o. T h e
co n trad ictio n announced by M arx in the C M P betw een the socialization
o f productive forces an d th e private ch aracter o f the relation s o f production
is only, fo r B alibar, th a t the structure itself developed in time; in fact it is
m an ifested on ly as a co n trad ictio n by the d isso ciatio n in th ou gh t o f the
co n trad icto ry effects o f the structure. T h e representation o f laws o f the
dyn am ic as ten d en cies is coupled with co u n ter-ten den cies: in fact, the
tendency (o f the decline o f the rate o f profit, for exam ple) is the sam e law
in h eren t to the structure, coupled w ith th e in ternal determ in ation o f the
rhythm o f the app earan ce o f its effects (pp. 198-99), th at is, o f the definition
o f its tem porality.
T h u s, the co n trad iction is only betw een effects, but it is n ot original, the
cause is n ot divided in itself, it c a n n o t be analyzed in an tago n istic term s (p.
201). N otably , the two relations o f the econ om ic base (relation s o f property
and p ossession) are in relations o f reciprocal lim itatio n , they co-determ ine
th e su b m issio n o f labor to c a p ita l: we thus re d isc o v e r h ere, n ot the
co n trad iction , bu t the com plexity o f the m ode o f produ ction , [its] double
a rticu lation (p. 204).
L e t us sp ecify a t o n c e th a t, for u s, B a lib a r m ark s h e re th e p o in t o f
inversion o f classical A lth usserian ism , and the substitution o f structure
for co n trad ictio n as a fun dam en tal category will n ot be lon g in m ak in g its
effects felt: the return to n on-dialectical m aterialism , w ith ch aracteristically
th e c h a n g e b y th e e x t e r n a l c a u s e s w h ic h w ill a p p e a r in th e n e x t
paragraph.
Bu t before surpassin g Balibar, we will subscribe to the conclusion o f his
th e o ry o f te n d e n c ie s: th e c o n t r a d ic t io n b e tw e e n the e ffe c ts o f th e
im m an en t law s o f econ om ic structure can n o t, o f itself, elicit th e m ode o f its
ow n nature; b ein g th e very fun ction o f structure, it c a n o n ly arrive at an
equilibrium, even in the form o f prolonged or cy clical crises. But the effects
o f e c o n o m ic s can be th e m a te r ia l b a s e o f o th e r re su lts, su c h as th e
co n stitu tion o f reform ative or revolutionary so c ia l forces, in other instances
endow ed w ith their tem porality. T o understand th at these tem poralities can
be b orn in th e u n ity o f a c o n ju n c tu re is an o th er p ro b lem , ex te rio r and

FROM A LT H U SSE R IA N ISM T O R EG U LA TIO N TH EO RY

117

econ om ic. It m ust be supposed th at in add ition one rethinks relation s in

term s o f contradiction s, but the analysis o f B alibar is p erfectly pertinent to
the critique o f the econ om ic determ inism o f frozen M arxism , as it is to the
catastro ph ism o f R o sa Luxem burg.
T h e re g u la tio n ists rem ain faith fu l on th is poin t to th e A lth u sseria n
co n trib u tion . In fact, their ob jects will n ot be m odes o f p rod u ction , but
the m odes o f particular form s o f capitalism , the m odels o f develo pm en t,
a n a ly z e d as c o m b in a t io n s o f a t e c h n o lo g i c a l p a r a d ig m , a re g im e o f
accu m u latio n , a m ode o f regu lation . T h e y will m ain tain th e d istin ctio n
b e tw e e n th e a n a ly sis o f th e o r e tic a l p r e s u p p o s itio n s o f a m o d e l, th e
d isco v e ry o f its h isto rical c o n d itio n s, th e ten d e n c ie s co n d u cive to its
crisis; but th e y will refuse, ag a in st for ex am p le th e theory o f lo n g cycles, to
th in k th a t m odels o f developm ent are lin k ed to o n e anoth er according to
som e tran sh istorical (tech n ological?) determ in ism . In m arking a m ore and
more pronounced skepticism tow ards the idea o f the em ergence o f a new
mode o f produ ction at the horizon o f their ow n tim e, they will insist on the
profusion o f ruptures (great crises, institutionalized com prom ises) separating
the consecu tive m odels o f developm en t.9 In return, all their effort against
the A lth u sserian heritage will consist o f show ing th at the co n trad iction s o f a
m odel o f developm en t are original, inscribed in its structure, and th at it is a
veritable m iracle (a fin d) th at a m ode o f regulation should have been able
to be establish ed as a resolution, over a lon g period, o f these contradiction s.
Before ev o k in g their solutions, it is n ecessary to pass to a m ore sym ptom atic
c r it iq u e o f c l a s s i c a l A lt h u s s e r ia n is m . B u t fir s t le t us sh o w w h a t is
b e q u e a th e d , to th e e c o n o m ists o f M a r x ist in sp ira tio n w ho h a v e h a d to
confron t the crisis o f the 1970s, by the A lth u sserian school, in m atters o f
predictive m ethodology.
6) Prediction
W ith th e two fu n d a m e n ta l c o n c e p ts w h ich resu m e th e A lth u sse ria n
co n cep tion o f tim e, th a t o f th e dynam ic as th e existen ce o f a structure in
tim e and th at o f overdeterm ination, we h ave two tools at our disposal (to
com bin e) fo r thinking evolution and m utation.
a) T h e T e n d e n tia l A n aly sis
T h e first type o f re su lt is produ ced by a th e o re tic a l re flection on an
a b stract stru ctu re (th e C M P , or the econ om y in the C M P ). It expresses the
develo pm en t o f the structure in a tem porality w hich is proper to it. T h a t is
to say that such a state o f the structure can be found as m uch in the future
as in th e p ast or even never to be a ttain ed ! Everything depen d s on the
co n crete diach ron y in w hich th is dyn am ic is articulated. T h e process th at
consists o f d ev elo p in g the in tern al dyn am ic in th ou gh t up to its u ltim ate

118

TH E A LTH U SSERIA N LEGA CY

form th e n takes on th e allure o f a sc ie n tific a lly estb lish e d p ro p h ecy , a

prophecy that m ay or m ay n ot be realized but w hich in all rigor is perhaps
written as m uch in the p ast as in the future. T h is type o f prophecy, frequent
in the texts o f M arx, founded on a very p rofound co m p reh en sio n o f the
e sse n c e o f th e m ode o f p ro d u ctio n , L ip ietz and R o u ille a u lt (1972) ca ll
prophetic analysis or ten den ciality .
T h e m ost celeb rated prophetic analysis is the Communist Manifesto (first
ch apter) o f M arx and Engels, w ritten in 1848. It described in a stupefying
fashion the great traits o f the contem porary world. It is written entirely in the
p ast tense. B y e x p lo itin g the g lo b a l m a rk e t, the b o u rg e o isie g iv e s a
cosm opolitan ch aracter to production and con sum p tion ... It h as rem oved
industry from its n ation al base. T h e old industries h ave been destroyed and
replaced by new on es w hich do n ot use indigenous m aterials, but m aterials
w h ic h c o m e fro m th e m o st d is ta n t r e g io n s , an d w h o se p ro d u c ts are
co n su m e d in a ll p a rts o f th e g lo b e ... In p la c e o f a n c ie n t iso la tio n a
universal interdependen ce betw een n ation s is developed ... In a word the
b o u rg e o isie fa sh io n s a w orld in its ow n im age ... T h e d e v e lo p m e n t o f
m a c h in e ry and the d iv isio n o f lab or, re m o v e s fro m the w orker all th e
auton om ous characters o f his work, all its attraction. T h e producer becom es
a m ere accessory to the m ach in e, etc.
A t th e lim it we can say th a t th e verification or n on -verification o f these
prophecies has no im portance, any more th an the law o f gravity is disproven
by th e fligh t o f o b je c ts h e a v ie r th a n a ir . T h e n o n - v e r ific a tio n o f a
prophetic analysis invites us sim ply to search for, in the com plex whole in
d o m in an ce, th e cau ses w hich have fettered the a rticu lated dy n am ic in a
c o n c r e te d ic h o to m y , c a u se s t h a t p r e d ic tio n se e k s in the a n a ly sis o f a
c o n ju n c u tu r e in o rd e r to su p p o rt its p r o g n o stic s w ith a sc ie n t ific a lly
produced diagnostic.
Sim ply : th at is already a great deal. T h e great error o f the m ajority o f
M arxists is to take ten den tial analyses literally. T h e y have good reason at
certain m om ents. But n ot always. N e x t to the gen ial prophecies such as we
h ave cited, M arx is responsible fo r celebrated errors (social bipolarization,
th e d e v e lo p m e n t o f I n d ia , e t c . ) . M o r e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s t i l l is th e
c a t a s t r o p h is m o f R o s a L u x e m b u rg . It is p re c ise ly w ith t h e p r o o f o f
d e v ia tio n betw een the ten d e n tial scen ario and reality (for ex am p le the
e m e rg e n c e o f the N e w In d u str ia l N a t io n s , the a b s e n c e o f a c r isis o f
overproduction in 1945 and 1979) th at the work o f the regulationist begins.
T o u n d erstan d how an exp losive ten d e n c y h as b een in h ib ited is the first
step in understanding crisis.
b) T h e D iagnostic o f C on jun cture
T o u n d e rsta n d th e re a lity o f p a st d ia c h r o n ie s ( t h a t is, o f c o n c r e te
h isto rie s) or to e v a lu a te th e p ossib ility o f future d ia ch ro n ie s, suppose,

FROM A LTH U SSE R IA N ISM T O REG U LA TIO N TH EO RY

119

A lthusser tells us (L L C ), th at we must rid o f our m inds the linear time in

w h ic h e v e n t s u n f o l d . It is f ir s t o f a l l n e c e s s a r y to c o n s t r u c t th e
tem poralities o f ea c h structure o r con trad iction a s a whole, b u t above a ll to
ex a m in e carefully how e a c h structure is co n d itio n e d , ov erd eterm in ed by
others, specified in th e whole w h ich is alw ays already given us, a n d th a t in a
very p rec ise conjuncture: th at w h ich L e n in ca lls th e p resen t m o m e n t.
From this m om ent, it is possible to see how each dynam ic is articulated w ith
the dyn am ic o f oth er co n trad iction s, and to co n stru ct co n crete h istorical
tim e.
If a gen eral synchrony existed, th a t is, if all p ast a n d future structures
were articulated as in a p la n , it w ould th en be theoretically p ossible to
leave the actual m om en t, to deduce the follow ing m om ents and begin again.
T h is is n ot possible fo r several reasons. P ractical reasons first: analysis can
be in fin in tely co n crete only by being put into the form o f the general
e q u a t i o n w h ic h w o u ld r e q u ir e B a l i b a r s d e m o n to f o r e s e e th e
transform ation o f societies just a s L a p la c e s dem on foresaw the ev olution
o f m e ch a n ic a l systems. R e aso n s o f principle also: co n trad ictio n s do n ot
d is p la c e t h e m s e lv e s ; they c a n , a s A lt h u s s e r w o u ld say , f u s e in to
exp lo siv e co n ju n ctu re s o n the oth er side o f w h ich the co m plex w hole is
restru ctu red in an o th er illu m in a tio n , in a ra d ic ally d ifferen t stru ctu re
w h ich redefines all contradiction s. T h e n e x t R ev o lu tio n or great crisis o f
a m odel o f develo pm en t would appear as the closure o f the field w hich the
A lth usserian sch ool open ed in the exp loration o f the future.
C on seq u en tly , the prediciton m ust lim it its am bition s (but this is already
an enorm ous task) to the analysis o f the conjuncture, from the p oin t o f view o f
the reciprocal co n d ition in g o f the dynam ics o f diverse con trad iction s w hich
present them selves. T h is operation is w hat L en in calls th e living soul o f
M arxism : the con crete analysis o f the co n crete situ a tio n , and w h at we
sim ply call diagnostic.
T h e first step o f th e diagn otic is to grasp th e prin cipal con trad iction in a
c o n ju n c t u r e . T h e s e c o n d is to d e te r m in e the st a t e o f the p r in c ip a l
c o n t r a d ic t io n , t h a t is, th e m o d a lity o f its o v e r d e t e r m in a t io n b y th e
c o n d i t i o n s (t h e o t h e r c o n t r a d i c t i o n s ) : by d i s p l a c e m e n t (n o n a n t a g o n i s t i c c o n t r a d ic t i o n , q u a n t i t a t i v e v a r i a t io n s ) , o r by f u s io n
(an tag on istic co n trad iction s can be resolved only by a qu alitative ch an ge).
S u c h , a t le a s t , is t h e m e t h o d o lo g y w h ic h is i m p lic it ly u s e d by th e
regulationists in the analysis o f the present crisis.10
T h e problem o f A lth u sserian ism is th at the ossification o f the category o f
co n tra d ictio n w ith in th e category o f stru ctu re n o longer allows th in k in g
fusion, explosion , the qu alitativ e good, excep t by inserting every structure
into a gen eralized stru ctu re co m p risin g th e su cc essio n o f stru ctu res as a
variation. Balibar (L L C ) slips toward one such solution: the transition from

120

TH E A LTH U SSE R IA N LEGACY

one structure to an o th er is there conceived as an effect o f the m ode to com e

(e .g . c a p it a lis m ) o n the a n te r io r m o d e (e .g . fe u d a lis m ) . T h is is the
theoretical m yth o f generalized synchrony.
P o ulan tzas in trod u ces a n au d aciou s so lu tio n . In th e so cial w h ole, an
in stan ce (the political) is the strategic site w here th e p rin cipal contradiction
will be condensed w hen it is antagonistic. B ut the structure o f politics has
for h im re a c h e d su c h a p o in t o f o s s if ic a t io n t h a t it is c o n fu se d w ith
in stitu tio n s. H ow , as the p o litic a l structure b ec o m e s p rin c ip a l, c a n it
reverse the so cial w hole? H e is obliged to rein trod uce the n otion o f the
p ra ctic e o f agen t-bearers co n stituted in cla sses, classes defin ed by the
effect, on the practice o f agent-bearers, o f the w hole o f the structure. From
this is drawn a field o f practice, projected shadow o f the field o f structures'
(w ith all possible displacem ents: it is n ot a H egelian expressivity). T h is field
is th at o f class struggle because all classes are there defined in relation s of
opposition (here at least contradiction reigns). It is determ ined by the field
o f structures (classes are not subjects, even so !), in the form o f lim its to the
v a ria tio n s o f cla ss stru ggle, b it it h as its own effe ctiv ity on th e fie ld o f
structures at the level o f the political instance. T h e effectivity o f structure on
the field o f practice is thus itself lim ited by the intervention, in the structure,
o f political p ractice (1 9 6 8 ,1, p. 97).
W h a t a stra n g e c o n s tr u c tio n ! It is in t h i s w a y th a t th e sh a d o w s
p rojected on P lato s C av e by the H eav en o f Structures h ad the capacity to be
autonom ized in order to change the constellation o f structures! It is certainly
som ew hat in this m an ner th at the regulationists con ceive putting in place
new m odels o f developm ent. B ut from th e beginning, they h ave adm itted
th at social groups, how ever constituted by and in ancient relations, can be
su b je c ts o f c o n tra d ic to ry a m b itio n s, a n d th u s c a p a b le o f c o n flic ts and
com prom ise.
c) C a n W e M ak e a Prediction in the Future A n terio r ?
Sco ffin g at H egelian dialectic, where w hat is obsolete is also saved, and
where the p ast thus fin ds its key to the ev en in g o f absolu te k now ledge,
A lth usser refuses history in the p a st anterior, where each era h ad already
prepared and an n ou n ced the future period. N everth eless, we know how to
m ake a geneology o f the elements o f a mode. But it is necessary n ot to forget
that the theory o f origins is a prehistory, a retrospective. T h is m eans th at
we know the structural elem ents o f a m ode and we will search fo r them in the
products o f the dissolution o f the previous m ode. B ut for any structure, the
new m ode is n ot p ro d u c e d by th e a n te rio r m o d e : its c o n s tit u t io n is a
discovery, and, from the phase o f reproduction, it radically forgets the
occasion al origins o f its elements. T h e retrospective (genealogy elem ent by
elem ent) thus has n o th in g to do with a ten den tial prediction applied in the
past.

FROM A LTH U SSE R IA N ISM T O R E G U LA T IO N TH EO RY

121

W ill it n ot b e possible then to apply the m ethods o f retrospection to the

fu tu re ? T h a t is: k n o w in g th e th e o re tic a l p resu p p o sitio n s o f th e future
m ode, to search for the h istorical co n d itio n s in the present? A readin g o f
th e presen t to illu m in ate the future? A p red iction o f the future an terior
( the p resen t will h av e prepared the fu tu re )? T h is would be a pow erful
guide in the analysis o f the conjuncture. Su ch an elem en t obeys less and
less the dyn am ic o f the structure from w hich it issues; it begins to follow
an o th e r dynam ic, th a t o f a structure w hich will rem ain do m in an t tomorrow.
T h is is w hat L en in m eant w hen, in response to the Friends o f the P eople
on th e d e v e lo p m e n t o f c a p ita lism in R u ssia, he referred to rural a rtisan
p ro d u c tio n as th a t w h ich s t ill p ro d u ced u n d er co m m a n d a n d w h ich
already produced for th e m arket. B u t he h a d th e con ceptu al know ledge o f
w hat h ad to develop: capitalism . T h is is w here the problem lies.
A fte r th ey h a d m ad e a precise en ough co n cep tu al idea o f th e dom in an t
capitalist m ode o f developm en t after the Seco n d W orld W ar, a m odel called
Fordism in hom age to G ram sci, the regulationists un d ertook the genealogy
o f its different elem ents: T aylorism , collective co n ven tion s, welfare state,
m o n ey credit, etc. R o b e rt B o y er" in p articu lar will show at w h at p oin t the
origin o f th ese elem en ts was h eterogen eous, hazardous, a n d n o t in th e least
h a v in g in m in d the in stig a tio n o f F o rd ism . But as a result, n um erou s
so cial forces gain ed an idea o f th e co n tra d ictio n s w h ich th e crisis o f 1930
revealed , and a d v an ce d p ro p o sitio n s o f w hich som e h ad a nearly Fordist
allure (as m u ch for fascists as for social dem ocrats a n d com m unists). T h e
p rojects they advan ced often in d icated a rupture with the representations
w hich were form ed in the p recedin g period (Lipietz, 1985).
S in c e the regulations tried to perform again the sam e operation on the
contem porary crisis, they had to com bine two steps anew:
A n A lth u sseria n analysis o f the p resen t m om ent, but tak in g seriously
into co n sid eration the contradictory character o f the real, and the different
possible solutions fo r stabilizing it;
A location o f th e social forces cap ab le o f bringing a specific solution to
th e located contradiction s.
E xam p les o f the ab o v e c a n be fou n d in L eb o rgn e an d Lipietz (1987),
M a h o n (19 8 7 ), N o e l (1 9 8 8 ). S t ill, it is n ece ssary t o tak e seriou sly th e
n o tio n s o f co n trad ictio n an d su b ject. A n d th e n to go beyond th e lim its
o f A lth usserian ism .

II. The Trouble With Althusserianism

R e je ctio n o f C on trad iction and the S u b ject: these two censures seem to
be the ransom in classical A lth u sserian ism for the em ergence o f the concept
o f R eprodu ction. T h is co n n ectio n is particularly clear in the contribution

122

TH E A LTH U SSER IA N LEGACY

o f B a l i b a r to R e a d in g C a p it a l.

H is a n a ly s is o f c a p i t a l i s t e c o n o m ic

re p ro d u c tio n fu rn ish e s a p ro to ty p e w h ich in v o lv e s a w h ole v isio n o f

history and hum ans.
1. Fecundity and Failings o f the Category o f Reproduction
In reading into cap italist produ ction the reproduction o f social relations,
B alibar brings to light a very fertile idea in M arx. In the cap italist process o f
the produ ction o f things, seen from the p oin t o f view o f the w hole, from the
p o in t o f view o f results, w hat fun dam en tally occurs is the reproduction o f
places in th e sy n ch ro n ic stru ctu re o f the m o d e, a p la ce from w hich the
stru ctu re d eterm in es the functions in the rep ro d u ctio n o f the m ode. For\
exam ple, at the end o f the cycle, Sector I h as reproduced all the co n stan t
cap ital and S ecto r II all the variable capital, but above all the cap italist class
is re p ro d u ced w ith th e ow n ersh ip o f the m e a n s o f p ro d u ctio n , an d the
p ro le ta ria t is re p ro d u ced always also d isp o sse sse d . T h e re p ro d u ctio n o f
p eop le a n d th in g s th u s determ ines th em to p rod u ce a n d to be products.
W h ere we can n o t agree is w here reprodu ction b ecom es the fou ndation o f
p rod u ction (d eterm in es m en to p rodu ce), when the p rod u ction o f th in gs
becom es a p p earan ce and reprodu ction reality , th e effectivity (II, pp.
174-5). W e disagree th at M arx institutes a rupture betw een p rodu ction as
an a c t, o b je c tific a tio n o f a s u b je c t, a n d th e c o n c e p t o f a p ro d u c tio n
w ith ou t a su bject, w hich determ ines as a resu lt certain cla sses as th eir own
fu n ction s (p. 171).
In a celebrated text (O n Contradiction, 1937), w h ich served as a point of
d e p a rtu re for For M a r x , M ao T s e - tu n g o p p o se s th e tw o fu n d a m e n ta l
co n c e p ts o f d e v e lo p m e n t. T h e first sees th e c a u se s o f d e v e lo p m e n t o f
th in g s fro m th e o u tsid e, in th e a c tio n o f ex terior fo rc e s. T h e seco n d
th in k s th a t th e d e v e lo p m e n t o f o b je c ts is su sta in e d by th eir in te rn a l
co n trad iction s. D o e s th is exclude th e extern al cau ses? N o t at all. T h e
external causes con stitute the con d ition s o f change, the internal causes are
its base, and the extern al causes operate by the interm ediary o f the internal
cau ses. W h at is this for Balibar, w ho sees in the m atrix o f the C M P (the
hom ology o f the relation s o f ownership and possession ) a n on-contradictory
stru ctu re? H e is o bliged to th in k ch an ge by the effectiv ity o f a relation
(o w n e rsh ip ) over a n o th e r (p o s se s sio n ), o f an in s ta n c e ( p o litic a l) over
an oth er (e con om ic), o f a new m ode (the C M P ) ov er the a n c ie n t (the feudal
m ode o f produ ction ) ... an d o f structures over their supports.
W h a t B a lib a r does n o t see is th a t th e b a se o f th e e ffe c tiv ity o f the
e x te r n a l c a u se is in te r n a l to e a c h stru c tu re u n d er c o n s id e r a tio n . H e
specifically forgets three things:
First, th at the relation o f possession is contradictory. It would be m ore

FROM A LTH U SSE R IA N ISM T O REG U LA TIO N TH EO RY

123

correct to speak o f the im plication /con trol co n trad icito n . In depriving the
d irect p rodu cer o f in tellec tu a l m astery o f th e o p eration s (for ex am p le in
T ay lo rism ), the cap italist sacrifices the efficiency o f w hich the producer w ho
is i m p lic a t e d in h is w o rk is c a p a b le (w h ic h S w e d ish an d J a p a n e s e
e m p lo y e rs k n o w v e ry w e ll), b u t in v e r s e ly th e p r o d u c e r im p lic a t e d
increases h is cap acity to co n trol (w hich T ay lor understood to o w ell). T h e
dispossession o f the direct producer thus is n o t the u n ivocal dynam ic o f
th e c a p ita lis t o rg a n iz atio n o f lab o r; T a y lo rism is n o t the u n su rp assab le
horizon o f p rofession al relations (Leborgne, Lipietz, 1987).
N e x t, B alib ar forgets the ex iste n c e o f m ark et relation s.

T h e cap italist

producer is also a vendor w h o m ust find clien ts, for exam ple w ith th e w age
workers.
It follow s th at thus overdeterm ined, the relation o f exp loitation is highly
unstable: to o m u ch surplus-value is extorted, and there are n o lon ger enough
clients.
O n e m ore word: eac h o f th e elem entary structures o f cap italism is itself a
con trad iction . A n d at bottom , it is this way because contradiction unites
and opposes hu m an bearers o f projects w h ich are only co m patib le w ithin
n arrow lim its. T h e c o n tra d ic tio n is o r ig in a l (n o t on ly in its effe cts)
because at the origin a so cial structure does n o t u nite p laces but opposes
objective su b jects, bein gs as cap ab le o f routine activity as o f deviance.
2. The Problematic o f the Objective Subject
A n o th e r reading o f C ap ital is in effect possible. O u r p oin t o f departure,
said M arx, is labor in a form belon gin g exclusively to m an .... W h a t first
distin gu ish es th e w orst a rch ite ct from the m ost expert bee is th at h e h as
co n stru cted the ch am b er in his h e ad b efo re building it in the hive. T h e
result tow ard w hich the w orker m oves ideally pre-exists in the im agination
o f the worker.... H e realizes there his ow n goal o f w h ich he is conscious,
w h ic h d e te r m in e s h is m o d e o f a c t io n as law , an d to w h ic h h e m u st
subordinate h is will. A n d this subordination is n ot m om entary .... It is even
m ore exactin g as the w ork is less attractiv e (B o o k I, C h ap ter VII, P 1).
It is t h is t h e s is o f M a r x , a t h e s is o f p h il o s o p h i c a l a n t h r o p o lo g y ,
u n c h a n g e d fro m th e m a n u s c r ip ts o f 1844 to th e C ritiqu e o f the G o th a
Program, th a t replaces th e o th e r th eses w h ich found the category o f m an as
o b je ctiv e su b je ct a n d as so cial b ein g, h isto ric al an d p red ictiv e , w hich
L ab riola (1899) and K osik (1968) develop, for ex am p le.12
In this problem atic, m an (philosoph ically ) appears w ith a double aspect:
Subjective being: he in trod u ces a m ediation. betw een his n eeds and
th eir satisfaction, he forges for h im self an artificial m ilieu, and to produce
o b je c ts he is p ro d u ce d an d re p ro d u ced h im se lf as a so cial b ein g.

H is

124

TH E A LTH U SSERIA N LEG A CY

nature is thus the produ ct o f h is activity, the objective world o f m en and

their produ cts an originally contradictory world.
Objective being: h e obeys the laws o f nature such as they are (in clud in g
his n atu re); h e evolves in this objective an d con trad ictory world w hich
determ ines the m ode o f satisfaction o f his needs.
F rom the secon d aspect it is possible to produce the social sciences, and
th is is why ec o n o m ics takes th e d o m in an t role in them . From the first
asp ect m an could be k n o w n as a historical being, liable to a past, a future, a
project, a prediction.
.
T h e problem atic o f the objective subject, according to w hich, as Labriola
(p. 2 3 7 ) said , m an is d e v e lo p e d or produces h im self, n o t as an en tity,
generically provided with certain attributes, w ho repeats him self or develops
h im self accordin g to a ration al rhythm , but is produced an d developed at
o n c e a s c a u se a n d e ffe c t, as a u th o r a n d c o n s e q u e n c e o f d e te r m in e d
c o n d itio n s, thus opens on to two dialectically con n ected poin ts o f view:
T h a t o f th e objectifyin g p ractice: th e m ovem en t by w h ich hum an s are
produced and engendered their future routines.
T h a t o f the objectified p ractice, th e state o f social m an produ ced in this
way, o f h is m aterial p ro d u ctio n as well as his routine p ra ctic e s in so cial
relations, w hich are n ow presented as co n d itio n s.
K osik com pares th is doubling to S pin ozas categories o f n atu ra n atu ran s
an d n atu ra n a tu r a ta . A n d righ tly so: th e q u e stio n is n e ith e r o f tw o
d ifferen t m o m en ts (h u m an s w ill so m etim es be follow ers o f ro u tin e, an d
so m e tim e s in n o v a to r s ), n or o f a d iv isio n o f h u m a n ity in to tw o gro u p s
( lead ers a n d sh ee p ), bu t in to two aspects, alw ays c o e x istin g in variab le
prop ortio n s, in all h u m an p ractice. S u ch is the op position currently used
(from P oulantzas to G id d en s) betw een structure a n d p ractice. B ecau se in
the sam e way th a t practice is determ ined by con d ition s, the trajectories o f
th ese p ra c tic e s are m e ch a n ic a lly o b tain e d by a d u a lity a p art from the
kn o w led ge o f stru ctu res, an d re cip ro ca lly so c ia l stru ctu res are on ly the
p attern for these objectified p ractices (Lipietz, 1988b).
K now ledge o f so cial reality as co n d ition s is thus a m om en t (but only a
m o m e n t) o f the k n o w le d g e o f the s o c ia l b e in g o f m an . A g a in it is
necessary, as K osikrem in ds us, n ot to forget th at co n d ition s are n ot b ein g
an d th at these co n d ition s are p rodu cts: so cial b ein g is n o t con tain ed , but
sim ply fixed, in econ om ic categories a n d their articulation. For the analysis
to grasp social bein g in the system o f econ om ic categories, it m ust dissolve
its fixity and co n ceiv e o f it as the exp ression o f th e objective activity o f
m en (1968, p. 135).
It is thus necessary n ot to confuse the m ethodology o f the analysis of the
conditions o f o b je c tifie d p r a c tic e w ith th e m e ta p h y s ic a l o n to lo g y th a t

FROM A LTH U SSE R IA N ISM T O R EG U LA TIO N THEORY

125

c o n f u s e s th e e x i s t e n c e o f m a n w ith c o n d i t i o n s . In m y s e n s e , th e
A lth u s se r ia n sc h o o l is par excellence th e sc h o o l o f th e m e th o d o lo g y o f
co n d itio n s; in th is regard, a re n a issan ce o f h isto ric a l m aterislism can be
legitim ately atttributed to it. U nfortun ately, it slipped from m ethodology to
on tology. It h as thus rem ained cap ab le o f analyzing p ast co n d ition s (the
retrosp ective b ran ch o f being) bu t fin ds itself pow erless to app reh en d the
new, hum anity in the process o f m ak ing the world. H av in g dissolved the
v u l g a r p s e u d o - c o n c r e t e , it f e t i s h i z e s , in an a c a d e m ic m o d e , th e
co n d itio n s th at it has analyzed so well, by denying th at the co n d itio n s
should th em selves be the p rodu ct o f subjects. It h as tak e n co n d itio n s for
bein g.
W e saw, how ever, th a t P o u lan tzas rein troduced, in th e shadow o f the
field o f structures, a field o f practice determ ined by the effect o f the field o f
structures on the agen t-bearers. Let us note first o f all the advan tages o f
this co n ce p tu alizatio n . It exclu d es the em piricism w hich w ould read off
from th e re latio n s o f p ro d u ctio n th e e x iste n c e of a cla ss in i t s e l f (th e
p roletariat), w hich Would b ecom e (the co n cep t was developing in the real
and was self-conscious) a class fo r itse lf susceptible to political autonom y.
It instituted a field o f analysis where con trad iction reigned. It reintroduced,
in m ak in g the class the effect o f the totality o f instances, an entity w hich,
w ithout being a pars totalis o f the expressive to tality , at least h as the
ch a ra cteristic o f b ein g p resen t (th a t is to say, co n tem p o ran eo u s) in all
in stan ces (econ om ic, ideological, p o litical).
T h ese advan tages, w e h ave said, are m et w ith a singular oddity. W h at
are th e se stru ctu res? W h at do they stru ctu re? A re they em pty form s, a
co n tain er w h ich inform s the co n ten ts? A n d p ractice? Is it n ot structured?
If the structures are n ot those o f the p ractice and Poulantzas takes great
care to affirm the relative auton om y o f the two fields, the first only im poses
lim its on the other then m ust structures be represented as a too-large
garm ent in w hich practice sw im s?
E ffe c tiv e ly , it seem s th a t th e sta k e sh o u ld be th e effect so u g h t by
Poulantzas in the distin ction o f fields. It is a qu estio n o f bein g given w ith
th e p ractic es th a t w h ich is fo rb id d en to lon e structures: to th in k th eir
overturning. T h e p ractices appear as an escape h a tch for structuralism .
But P o u lan tz as takes great care to re stra in th e m : they are d e term in ed
(lim ited) by th e field o f structures, a n d c a n o n ly h a v e effectivity o n the
field o f structures at the level o f the p o litical instance. Poulantzas tim idly
recon n ects w ith th e T h ird T h e sis on Feuerbach: the m aterialist doctrine
w hich w ould h ave m an be the product o f circum stance and education ...
forgets th at it is precisely the m en w ho transform circum stance and th at the
educator h im self needs to be ed u cated ....T h e co existen ce o f the ch an ge in
circu m stan ces and hum an activity or self-ch ange, can only be considered

126

TH E A LTH U SSERIA N LEGA CY

and co m preh en d ed to the sam e degree as is revolution ary practice. In an

o s s if ie d fo rm , he th u s r e t r ie v e s th e tw o f iu n d a m e n t a l id e a s o f th e \
p ro b lem atic o f the o b je ctiv e su b ject: it is a hum an p ractice th at m akes
history, but n ot all practices are transform ing.
B ut it is still necessary to th in k practice auth en tically, as K osik rem inds
us:

E v e n a to ta lity th o u g h t as a r tic u la tio n o f c o n tra d ic tio n s rem ain s

abstract, if o n e d o es n o t show th a t m an , as a re a l su b ject o f history, created

th e b a se an d s u p e r s tr u c tu r e , an d in th e p r o c e s s o f p r o d u c t io n a n d
re p ro d u c tio n , e la b o r a t e s so c ia l re a lity as a to t a lit y o f s o c ia l re la tio n s,
in stitution s and ideas, and, in this fash ion in g o f social objective reality, was
him self created at the sam e tim e as a historical and social being .... Lack in g
w hich, he pursues, O n e falls into the snare o f fetishism , o f w hich the fruit is
th e false totality. S o c ia l reality th en is co n ceiv ed as th e sum o f autonom ous
structures w hich influence on e anoth er. T h e su b ject h as disappeared, or
b e tte r, the a c tu a l su b je c t is re p lace d by a m y th ica l su b je c t, reified and
fetishized, o f know ledge: by the auton om ous m ovem en t o f the structure (p.
42). O n e thus finds o n eself facin g the follow ing dilem m a: A t one o f the
p oles relation s (c o n d itio n s) are petrified, and at the other, the spirit, the
psyche. Either the con d ition s are passive, su ch th at the spirit, the psyche,
sets th em in m o tion and gives them a m eaning; or else the con d ition s are
active and them selves becom e subjects, whereas the psychic elem ent or the
co n scio u sn e ss h as as a fu n ctio n only to know in an e x a c t, or m ystified,
m an ner th eir n atural or scientific law s (p. 9 2 ). T h is tak e s yet anoth er form:
T h e altern ative, either mechanical causality, w here one factor is cause and
the o th e r e ffe c t, or plu ralist in te r a c tio n , sim p le re c ip ro c a l c o n n e c tio n
exclu d in g all actu al causality ... ; th is altern ative is already th e consequ en ce
o f a d e term in ed v isio n o f reality w h ich , apart from so c ia l re a litie s, h as
e la b o ra te d iso la te d a b stra c tio n s o f w h ich it m a k es o n to lo g ic a l esse n c es
(factors) .... M etaphysics b ases all its prem ises on this p rob lem atic (p. 79).
H ere w e are precisely a t the heart o f the co n trad iction betw een Balibar
and Poulantzas, on the co m m on terrain inaugurated by A lth usser. B alibar
c h o se the c o m p le te a u to n o m y o f th e m o v e m e n t o f the str u c tu r e o f
structures, o f generalized synchrony, w ith its consequ en ce, rallying around
m echanical causality ( o n e stru ctu re o v e r the o th e r ). P o u la n tz a s, w ho
can n o t resort to this, introduces p o litica l struggle as the m o to r o f history,
p o litic a l stru ggle d e te rm in e d by th e to ta lity o f th e stru ctu re, th u s by a
plurality o f re la tiv e ly a u to n o m o u s in sta n ce s. B u t are th ese in sta n c e s so
different from the fa cto rs against w hich Labriola and K osik polem icize?
In fact, this dilem m a ( sym ptom atic form o f ideological qu estio n s, said
A lth u sser) alread y fin d s its so urce in the fa m o u s critiq u e o f th e sim ple
re v ersa l o f th e H e g e lia n d ia le c t ic . In p o sitin g reality as a n etw ork o f
d e ce n tered c irc le s, o f au to n o m o u s c o n tra d ic tio n s, For M a r x sh atte red

FROM A LT H U SSE R IA N ISM T O R EG U LA TIO N THEORY

127

H egelian and S ta lin ist mythology, but, failing to put in place an organizing
s u b je c t , A lt h u s s e r r e jo in e d th e w o rld v ie w o f the 18th c e n tu ry : th e
k a le id e s c o p e o f D id e r o t . F o r i f th e c ir c le s a re d e c e n t e r e d , fo r th e
c o n tra d ictio n s to co n d en se, it is n ecessary e ith e r for th e m to be set into
p l a c e by p u r e c h a n c e an d to be c o n t e n t w it h a m e re h i s t o r y o f
c o m b in a tio n s , or to im agin e a stru ctu re o f all structures sim ilar to the
dream o f th e single eq uation o f m o d em physics, or to rein troduce structure
by m ean s o f a subject endow ed w ith the contem poraneity o f all instances.
A t the heart o f classical A lth usserian ism , the first solution seem s to be th at
o f A lth usser, the secon d the tem p tation o f Balibar, the third describes well
en o u g h the attem p t o f P oulantzas, w ith his class-effects o f th e en sem b le o f
structures, an d their p ractices w h ich are co n d en sed in the single p o litical
in stan ce.

III. The Regulationist Surpassing

W h en in the first h a lf o f the 1970s econ om ists o f M arxist inspiration h ad
to th in k the crisis, there rem ained a f first, for m an y o f them , to surpass the
A l t h u s s e r i a n h e r i t a g e . A p p r o a c h e s in te r m s o f r e g u l a t i o n h a v e
co rresp o n d ed , for m an y a m o n g us, to th is n eed . T h e results h av e sin ce
m ostly been p ublished, an d it is n o t a qu estio n o f exp licatin g th e m here. I
n ev e rth e le ss w ish to try to re a lig n a b it b etter these results with th eir
h eritage. T o do this, I w ill resituate th e em ergen ce o f th e regu lation ist
approaches in the intellectual co n te x t o f the 1970s, a n d th e n I will respond
to the n otion o f reproduction as I h ave extracted it from Balibar, precisely
from econ om ic production.
1. Confronting the Heritage
From the precedin g lon g critical analysis, we can summ arize w hat helped
us an d w hat hindered us in four m ain th eses.
a ) S o c ia l reality is a fabric, a n a rticu la tio n o f relatively au ton om ou s and
sp ec ific re la tio n s, o v erd eterm in in g on e a n o th e r (e v e n if som e are more
fu n dam en tal th an others): an always already given, overdeterm ined whole,
in d o m in a n ce.
b ) E ach o f these social relation s is reproduced a s a result o f the action o f its
b e a re rs ( stru ctu re e x ists as a re su lt ), in p lacin g th e b earers in to the
co n trad iction s o f reproducing it, in d ep en den t o f their subjectivity.
T o th ese fu n d am en tal m e th o d o lo g ica l theses, the sch o o l o f A lth u sser
associates, in a m ore or less c o n tin g e n t or h aphazard way, two im portant
theses for econ om ists:
c) Productive forces th em selves are the m aterialization o f social relation s of
produ ction (a them e developed by B alib ar and B ettelh eim ).

128

THE A LTH U SSE R IA N LEG A CY

d) T h e co n trad icto ry character o f the relations o f exch an ge is su perficial and

se c o n d a ry (a th e m e affirm ed fo rcefu lly by A lth u s se r and d e v e lo p e d by
Balibar, but rejected by B ettelh eim ).
W e will n ot discuss any further the fertility o f T h esis (a ). N e ith e r will we
discuss further the fecundity o f T h esis (c), w h ich is su b jacen t to all our work
on T aylorist organization o f labor, its crisis an d its overcom ing.
T h e sis (b ), on th e oth er hand, an d T h e sis (d ), w hich is b a sic a lly its
corollary and its illustration, constitute the b ad sid e o f A lth usserian ism , by
w h ich it p articip ate s in th e structuralist hegem on y o f its e p o c h w h ich , from
L vi-Strau ss to L a c a n , everyw here pum m els th e su b je ct. Individualism ,
th e su b je ctiv ism o f th e c a p ta in o f in d u stry , fo r ex a m p le, fin d s its first
illu stra tio n (an d p e rh ap s its e c o n o m ic d e te rm in a n t) in th e ex iste n c e o f
m a r k e t r e la t i o n s , an d in th e a u to n o m y o f p r iv a t e la b o r s e x e c u t e d
in d ep en d en tly o f on e a n o th e r and w h ich se a rch after th e fact for th eir
so cial v a lid a tio n in C h a p te r O n e o f C ap ital. T h ro w in g o n to th is first
ch apter th e m a n tle o f N o a h , A lth u sser erased in a single stroke th e subject,
co n trad iction , an d m arket relation s. D ev elo p in g this idea, B alibar cam e to
deny th e ex iste n c e o f stru ctu ral co n tra d ic tio n a t th e o rigin o f crises: a
structure h as as its m ission to persevere in its being.
F rom h ere to th in k th a t all is d o n e for th is, it was on ly a short step to
fun ction alism . T h is is w h at T erray (1977) e x p la in ed quite well: we h ave
f r e q u e n t l y s e e n t h e r in t r o d u c t i o n , in f a v o r o f c o n s i d e r a t i o n s o n
r e p r o d u c t io n , o f th e w h o le o u t - o f - d a t e a r s e n a l o f f u n c t i o n a l i s t
interpretation s: reproduction is conceived a s a fin al cause from w hich the
ensem ble o f structures and analyzed institutions proceeds.... T o avoid this
error, it is necessary to recall first o f all th at reproduction can only be a goal:
only a su bject can p rop ose a goal. S ociety is n ot a subject. It is n ecessary to
recall above all th a t w h at is reproduced is precisely a n d before everything
else a con trad iction .... C on sequen tly, to be p laced at the point o f view o f
reproduction is defin itively to understand how the same cycle o f p roduction
an d d istr ib u tio n c o n s ta n tly re p la c e s in p re se n c e th e tw o term s o f the
con trad iction w hich is the fun dam en tal relation o f production: dom in an t
an d dom inated, exploiter and exploited; how th e first attem pts to em bellish
the crises to w hich this co n trad iction leads so th at it could be surm ounted or
resolved, how the secon d is a ttach ed to the contrary, m ore or less concisely,
to abolish or in vad e it. R eprodu ction in its totality is at on ce the stak e o f
their con fron tation a n d its result.
R etrospectively, we consider the lon g period o f Fordist ex p an sio n w ith
out a crisis in c irc u la tio n to be th e m ost sign ifican t p art o f th e fu n ctio n
alist illusion. C ircu latio n ism was th u s on e insult in th e debates betw een
M arxists (in p articular in th e critique o f R o sa Lu xem burg, but also in th e
analysis o f center-periph ery relation s). It began to be applied to produ c
tion, to labor-capital relations.

FROM A LT H U SSE R IA N ISM T O R EG U LA TIO N TH EO RY

12 9

T h e sem in al thesis o f M ich el A g lie tta (1974) sacrificed a t this altar: it

was necessary to work th ro u gh hundreds o f pages dedicated to the analysis o f
the lab or/capital relations, but fortu n ately diffracted in a relation o f labor
organ ization an d a relation o f distrib u tion o f the value added (p ossession
a n d p ro p rie to rsh ip ) before th e e x iste n c e o f a u to n o m o u s c a p ita ls w ould
app ear. B ut this diffraction sufficed to b rin g ab o u t th e contradiction in the
repro d u ctio n o f this co m p lex re lation , hence the p ossibility o f crisis, and
hence the problem o f regulation. It was tim e: the crisis o f Fordism was about
to erupt.
Let us adm it: the in trod u ctio n o f the term regu latio n does n ot at all
su ffice to d issip a te th e fu n c tio n a list a m b ig u itie s c o n n o te d by th e term
re p ro d u c tio n . In som e o f our fo rm u la tio n s, re g u la tio n is d e sig n a te d
sim ply w h at is n eeded for repro d u ctio n to w ork however. Eviden tly, to
explain the crisis we sought to explain what, first o f all, was n o t in crisis,
Fordism . T h e m o d e o f regulation w as hence freed for p ub lic diffusion in
th e form o f its result, rath er th a n startin g w ith a discussion previous to the
h ow ever, to the con trad iction and the tendency to crisis (w hich it h as to
inh ibit as an unstable result):
after th e fa c t.

one can rigorously speak o f fun ction alism

2. From Reproduction to Regulation

W e i n s is t on t h is p o in t : it is a p r o p o s o f p r o b le m s o f c a p i t a l i s t
accum u lation th at the passage o f the n o tio n o f reproduction m akes way for
th at o f regulation. Let us return in effect for an instan t to the em blem atic
exam ple o f th e reprodu ction o f p laces (cap italist/p ro le tarian ) in B a lib a rs
read in g o f Capital. H e h as clearly underscrored th e fact th a t th e circulation
o f m e rc h a n d ise b e tw e e n c a p it a lis t s an d p r o le ta ria n s w ould re su lt in a
reproduction o f the structure o f the wage relation . T h e conditions o f the
re latio n (a n d o f the c irc u la tio n it in d u ces) ap p ear in effect id e n tica l in
result:
A

P[$ . . M

Capitalist

Moneycapital

C onditions
of
production

Proletarian

Labourpower

Money
V

A' . . . .
Money

Products

fA
( pi
Moneycapital

Subsistence Labourpower
goods
_

M ............. F

Figure 1: R eprodu ction o f the W age R elation

130

TH E A LTH U SSE R IA N LEGACY

T h is ch art m ay be read in two ways.

S h o u ld one be interested in the

re p ro d u ctio n o f p o sitio n s (v e rtic a l, sy n ch ro n ic, p arad ig m a tic , h arm o n ic

readin gs):

Figure 2: T h e Structure in T im e
S h o u ld on e b e in t e r e s te d in th e tr a je c t o r y o f a g e n t s (h o r iz o n ta l,
diach ron ic, syn tagm a tic, coun terpointed readings):

-I------------ time

t2
Figure 3: T rajecto ries

FROM A LTH U SSE R IA N ISM T O R EG U LA TIO N TH EO RY

131

F ro m th e se fig u re s, th e A lth u s se r ia n s h a v e e sse n tia lly re ta in e d th e

v e rtic a l d im e n sio n (th e sy stem o f p la c e s). It is in effect su fficie n t to
consider the first ch art head o n (th at is, w ith tim e m ovin g tow ards us) and
not lon gitudinally (w ith time from left to right) to obtain the fam ous figure
eigh t o f reproduction:
C A P IT A L IS T S

Figure 4: T h e Figure E igh t

S e e n from this angle, reprodu ction app ears in effect n on-contradictory.
A ll the w ork o f regulationists can thus be un d erstood as a triple effort:
to show that capitalist reproduction d o esn t run by its e lf;
to show why, for vast periods o f tim e, it is pursued h ow ever;
to show why, at the end o f a certain tim e, a great crisis erupts.
T h e se th in gs are know n today. First, the sim ple reality o f th e m arket
relatio n , th e u n certain ty o f th e ca p ita list producer co n cern in g the so cial
v a lid ity o f th e m e rc h a n d ise o ffe re d , in tro d u c e s a r a d ic a l d issy m m e try
b etw een m e rch a n d ise a n d m o n ey : m o n ey is a g e n e ra l u n c o n d itio n a l
eq u ivalen t o f m erchandise; th e realization o f m erch andise in m oney is on
th e c o n t r a r y a p e r ilo u s l e a p , in d ic a t e d in F ig u re 4 b y th e sig n Z,
dan gerous turn . T h e flow o f m erch andise goin g out at the northeast end
o f the sch em a m ust be correctly p roportioned ( in volum e an d value) to the
d e m a n d w h ich is ex p ressed in th e so u th e a st lo o p , but also in th e nonr e p r e se n te d lo o p s, in p a r tic u la r the a c c u m u la tio n - in v e s t m e n t lo o p
(p u rc h a se o f p ro d u c tiv e g o o d s by c a p ita lists).. T h e u n c e rta in ty in th is
su b je c t c o n s tit u t e s th e fo rm a l p o s s ib ilit y o f c r ise s. Its n e c e s s it y is
introduced by accum u lation itself, w h ich tends to inflate th e flow com ing

TH E A LTH U SSE R IA N LEGA CY

132

ou t o f the n orth east, all in co n tain in g the grow th o f th e southeast loop.

T h is co n trad iction is at the heart o f the wage relation. It can be summarized
in one phrase: either the price o f exp loitation is too h igh and the crisis o f
o v e r p r o d u c t i o n t h r e a t e n s , or e ls e it is t o o lo w an d th e c r is is o f
u n derinvestm en t threatens. T h is price is itself a fu n ction on one h an d o f
the relation s o f distribution (norm s o f con sum p tion ), and on the other h an d
o f th e tr a n s fo r m a t io n s in p r o d u c tio n (n o rm s o f p r o d u c t io n ), and in
p articular o f gains in productivity and changes in th e organic com position o f
capitals.
A m ode o f tran sform ation co n jo in ed to and co m p atib le w ith n orm s o f
p rod u ction an d co n su m p tio n is called a regime o f accumulation. T h is regim e
can be described as th e given rep etitio n o f the p rod u ction o f sections or
p ro d u ctiv e b ra n c h e s an d o f th e co rre sp o n d in g d e m a n d : w hat is c a lle d
sch em a o f reproduction or m acroecon om ic structure. W e h a v e show n th at
the F ord ist regim e could be described as a parallelism o f the increase o f
p r o d u c t iv ity , th e n o rm o f c o n s u m p tio n o f w a g e -w o rk e rs, and o f th e
co m po sition o f cap ital. S a id anoth er w ay, it follow s a schem a o f intensive
reproduction w ith in crease o f wage-worker con sum p tion such th at a parallel
increase occurs in the volum e o f the n et p rodu ct o f S ec tio n s I an d II, related
in n um ber to productive wage-workers. T h is regim e o f accum u lation thus is
a kind o f c h a in 15 o f possible capitalist reproduction:

V alue added in Secto r I

Value added in Secto r II

I___________ I______

Purchasing pow er o f salaries

------ 1---------------- 1---------------- 1--------- '------- ( - - time

to
t,
t2
t3

Figure 5: Regim e o f A ccu m u latio n as a C h ain

B ut let us return to Figure 1. T h e question is w hether to take sriously the
l o n g it u d i n a l d im e n s io n o f t h is c h a r t .

T h e a g e n ts (c a p ita lists and

proletarians) can be considered th e proprietors o f value in p rocess, th at is,

o f th e flow o f values o f respective generic forms:

FROM A LTH U SSE R IA N ISM T O REG U LA TIO N TH EO RY

and

133

>A
> A' >P. . .
... > F > S > M ...F > S ...

T h is co n cep t o f values in process m etam orph osin g from form to form is

introduced in the third ch apter o f C ap ital an d gradually developed through
out B o ok II. T h ese m illions o f individual flows constitute the thread of
eco n o m ic reality. In everyday life (Alltagsleben) they are even the only
positive reality. A t the heart o f this tide, the values in process change their
form s, as is seen developing in tim e in Figure 4, the figure eigh t. In reality,
the two spirals o f this figure are com posed o f m yriads o f individual spirals:
the tide. Ex p o st, w hen the regim e o f accu m u lation is stabilized, this tide,
in its structure, m ust fit exactly th e proportions repetitively described by th e
sc h e m a o f reproduction.
Bu t ex an te, the tide is guided by m illions o f individuals, each respon
sib le for h is v a lu e in p ro c e ss, an d m o st p a r tic u la rly the w e ll-n am ed
c a p ta in s o f in d u stry . T o gu ide th e m se lv e s, th ey m a k e use o f m a p s,
Representations (Darstellungen) o f their insertion in the tide, and their errors
are s a n c t io n e d by slu m p s or u n e m p lo y m e n t. C a n we th e n c o m p a r e
in d iv id u als to a u to m a to n s re ceiv in g in fo rm a tio n a l in p u t o f w h ich the
ou tp u t is beh avio r conform ing to reproduction? By no m eans.
T h e possibility o f a satisfactory reproduction is only designated by M arx
in the celebrated schem as o f rep ro d u ctio n and in his reflection on the
price o f production (Lipietz, 1983 ). B ut this possibility does n ot imply any
guarantee o f a happy ending. It suffices th at the assum ed laws o f form ation
o f w ages and n om in al p rofit are n ot be adapted to the evolution o f norm s o f
production , fo r im balan ces appear. T h e tide o f values in process thus seem s
to ov erflow the increase in value o f the schem a o f reproduction, or on the
contrary to prove inferior to the p o ten tial increase. In the econ om ic fabric,
w rinkles or h o les app ear: inflation or overproduction. T h is th e n poses th e
p ro b le m o f th e a d a p t a t io n o f th e tid e to th e re g im e , or, to keep the
S m ith ian m etaph or o f w eaving, th e w o of to th e warp. T h is adap tation is
the effect o f regulation in action , w hich plays, in the m etaphor o f weaving,
the role o f warps, or the invisible h a n d o f A d a m Sm ith .
T h e w hole effo rt o f e c o n o m ic w ork s in term s o f re g u la tio n , a n d in
particu lar o f the C E P R E M A P report (1977) an d its derivatives, has co nsisted
o f sh ow in g th at this invisible h a n d w as n ot the transhistorical m echan ism
o f con cu rren ce pure and simple. T h e m ode o f regulation includes, am ong
o th e rs, d ire c t and in d ir e c t fo rm s o f d e te r m in a tio n o f w ages, o f in tere n te rp rise c o n c u rr e n c e a n d o f in c re a se a n d se lf-g u id a n c e o f v a lu e s in
process. A s th e regim e o f accu m u lation is itself transform ed, great crises can
arise from the inadequacy o f the m ode o f regulation. T h ese great crises (like
the current crisis, or that o f the 1930s) are to be distinguished from cyclical
sm all crises, w hich are the sam e form o f the action o f regulation in the

134

TH E A LTH U SSERIA N LEGA CY

m odes called co m p e titiv e. A s for the in ten tio n ality o f p uttin g in place
an ad ap ted m ode o f regulation, as in the m o n o p o list re gu latio n fo r the
Fordist regim e, we h ave been able to show th at historically the question has
m ost o ften been one o f discoveries, w hich in the thread o f tim e h ave been
able to be consciously co n so lid ated , by K ey n esian th e o re tician s o f Fordist
regu latio n , by reform ist unions, an d by g o v ern m en ts seek in g to preserve
so cial consensus.
Inversely, to u n derstan d how the great crisis o f Fordism (for ex am p le)
appears, how th e fabric is torn, im plies a double labor. O n o n e h an d , at a
profound level, the progressive deform ation o f the m acro-econom ic structure:
d eclin e o f gains in produ ctivity , slu ggish n ess o f the organic co m po sition ,
increased internationalization. O n th e other h a n d , at an eso teric level, we
seek to sh ow how socioecon om ic actio n s, in th eir struggles to m odify the
given , at the very interior o f the logic o f the m odel o f developm ent, but also
in their efforts to transform it in the nam e o f a natu re incom patible with
this m odel, h ave accu m u lated d ivergen ces. T h e u n ion s h ave sough t to
render wage increases m ore an d m ore autom atic, to consolidate the assets of
the welfare state: offensives internal to the m odel. But workers h ave resisted
m ore an d m ore alien atin g form s o f Fordist organization o f work. T o oppose
th e se t e n d e n c ie s , e n t r e p e n e u r s h a v e s o u g h t to e n la r g e th e s c a le o f
p roduction , to accelerate autom ation (a strategy internal to Fordist logic),
but also to transfer production to countries w ith m odes o f regulation more
favorable to profit, to distort so cial legislation by the du alizatio n o f the
lab o r m ark e t: a form o f a v o id in g by flig h t the in stitu tio n a liz e d F ord ist
com prom ises. R egu lation h a s given way to crisis.
T h e result o f th ese divergent strategies is k n ow n . T h e essential th in g is
to u n d e rsta n d th at it is n ot a q u e s tio n o f a re g r e tta b le w e a k e n in g o f
c o n s e n s u s t h a t a b it o f g o o d w ill w o u ld be a b le to s m o o t h o u t .
C o n trad ic tio n is internal to the regim e itself.

Conclusion
In F ran ce tod ay , A lth u sser is, as H egel on ce w as, treated like a dead
d o g . H e an d his sc h o o l bear ce rtain re sp o n sib ilities, d eriv in g from the
structuralist deform ation im posed on th e readin g o f M arx. F orgettin g the
su b je c t, fo r g e ttin g c o n tr a d ic tio n , h y p o sta s is o f r e p ro d u c tio n : all th is
p revents th in k in g th e crisis, th inking th e p o sitiv e v a lu e o f individualism .
A lth u sseria n ism was thus con d em n ed by th e 1970s. U n fo rtu n ately, those
w ho to d a y f o r g e t A lt h u s s e r in fa c t fo r g e t M a r x , the e x is te n c e o f
structures o f exp loitation , the w eight o f social relations.
I h ave attem p ted to show th a t in classical A lth u sserian ism th ere was
m u ch to save: th e irreducible m u ltip licity o f the relation s w h ich w eave
social reality, ov erd eterm in ation o f these relations, and, for the little w h ich

FROM A LT H U SSE R IA N ISM T O R EG U LA TIO N THEORY

135

can b e tak en in to co n sid era tio n ab ou t th eir co n trad icto ry ch aracter, the
m ultiplicity o f possible conjunctures.
I h av e recalled th at the re gu latio n ists b eg an in the sc h o o l o f A lth u s
serianism in the co m preh en sio n o f n o tio n s such as productive forces, social
form ation s, state/eco n o m ic relations.
I u n d ertoo k to show th at the n o tio n o f regulation literally con stituted a
su rp assin g (A ufhebung) o f re p ro d u ctio n : the unity o f o p p o sitio n and
identity at the heart o f a contradictory structure, the m om en t dialectically
opposed to th at o f th e crisis o f the structure. I did it, like Balibar, through
the exam ple o f econom ic reproduction o f capitalism . I was equally able to
evoke the regulationist surpassing o f the reflections o f Poulantzas, w h ich is
begin n in g today (Jenson, 1988; Lipietz, 1988b).
B u t I w ish to conclude b y recallin g w hat rem ains for m e the fun dam en tal
lesson o f A lthusser: simply the m ethodological theses 0, 1 and 2. T h e real
e x ists indep en d e n tly o f our th o u g h ts. T h e c o n ce p ts th ro ugh w hich we
p reten d to know it e x ist only in our m in ds. T h eir a d e q u a tio n to other
practices at the heart o f the real is only a m atter o f pertinence. O r again, as
U m berto Eco, author o f The Absent Structure, m ade the hero o f The N am e o f
the Rose say: T h e concepts w h ich we fabricate are only ladders, threads by
w hich to grasp som ething. A fte r w hich, they can be thrown into the fire.
S h a ll w e on e day throw into the fire M ode o f Production, R eproduction,
Fordism , and Peripheral Fordism ? C ertain ly . B u t they can be useful in the
m eantim e.
T ran slated by E rik a T h om as

N otes
1. T h e w ork s o f referen c e o f th is sc h o o l are:

A g lie t ta (1 9 7 6 ), B o y er (19 8 7 ), B o y er an d

M istral (1 9 7 8 ), C .E .P .R .E .M .A .P . (1 9 7 7 ), C o ria t (1 9 7 9 ), Lipietz (1979, 1983, 1 9 8 5 a), w h ic h all

m a k e c r i t i c a l r e f e r e n c e , i m p l i c i t l y o r e x p l i c i t l y ( m in e in p a r t i c u l a r ) to A l t h u s s e r i a n
c o n t r i b u t i o n s . A n I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o n g r e s s o n R e g u l a t i o n T h e o r y , u n it in g e c o n o m is t s ,
g e o g r a p h e r s a n d s o c i a l a n d p o lit ic a l s c ie n t is t s o f a ll c o n t in e n t s , w a s h e ld in J u n e 1988 in
B a r c e lo n a . In m y c o n t r ib u t io n (1 9 8 8 a ) I r e m a r k e d t h a t A n g l o - S a x o n g e o g r a p h e r s m a k in g
re fe re n c e to th e th e o ry o f s t r u c tu r a tio n o f A n t o n y G id d e n s (1984) th e m se lv e s also p r a c tic e d a
fo rm o f c ritic a l A lth u sse r ia n ism .
2. F o r th is I b a se d m y se lf o n w o rk s (L ip ie tz a n d R o u ille au lt, 1972; L ip ietz 1973) re p re se n tin g
m y o w n ru p tu re w ith th e F a th e r.
3. A c c o r d in g to th e A lth u s s e r ia n d is tin c tio n , d ia le c tic a l m a te ria lism is th e sp o n ta n e o u s
p h ilo so p h y o f sc ie n tists, p ra c titio n e rs o f th e sc ie n c e o f h isto ry , i.e., H is to r ic a l M aterialism .
4 . P o u r M a rx (A lth u sse r, 1 9 6 5 ), p p . 187 ff. F o r th e re m a in d e r o f th is article th e b o o k w ill
b e d e sig n a te d P M . 5. L ire le C ap ital (A lth u sse r et a l., 1 9 6 5 ), to m e I, p p . 6 7 ff. F or the rem ain d e r o f th is a rtic le
th e b o o k w ill be d e sig n a te d L L C .

TH E A LTH U SSE R IA N LEGA CY

136

6. In n u m e r a b le r e fe r e n c e s in P M a n d L L C : th is is th e t h e o r e t ic a l a n t i- h u m a n i s m
c o m m o n to a ll stru ctu ralism .
7. R a n c i re tr a n sla te s w ith th is sin gle term D arstellu n g a n d V orstellung in M a r x , w ith o u t
in q u irin g w h e th e r th ey m e a n e x a c tly th e sam e th in g.
8 . S e e e sp e c ia lly B a lib a r ( L L C , p p . 2 1 4 ff-) a n d B e tte lh e im ( 1 9 7 0 ) .
9. S e e , for e x a m p le , B o y er (1986), L ip ie tz (1 9 8 5 b ) .
10. T h u s, G ly n et al. (1 9 8 6 ) a n d Lipietz ( 1 9 8 5 a ) h a v e an aly z ed th e c u rre n t crisis as a crisis
o f th e F o r d is t m o d e l ( n o t a b ly in th e r e la t io n o f p o s s e s s i o n ), o v e r d e t e r m i n e d by th e
c o n tr a d ic tio n b e tw e e n th e m o r e a n d m o r e in te rn a tio n a liz e d c h a ra c te r o f p r o d u c tio n a n d the
n a tio n a l ch a ra c te r o f th e m o d e o f regu la tio n .
1 1. S e e h is n u m e ro u s h isto ric a l a rtic le s, in p a rtic u la r h is c o n trib u tio n to th e C E P R E M A P
(1 9 7 7 ) rep ort.
12. T h e c o n c e p t o f th e o b je c tiv e su b je c t is d e v e lo p e d by K o sik (1 9 6 8 ). T h e r e is a lo n g
M a r x ist tr a d itio n th at d e riv e s (v ia G r a m sc i an d L a b rio la ) from th e M arx o f th e J8 th Brum aire
( M e n m ake h isto ry , b u t o n the b asis o f g iv e n c o n d it io n s ) an d a b o v e all th e Third Thesis on
F eu erbach.

T h e se two th e se s o f M a rx are the p o in t o f d e p artu re re c laim e d by the th e o ry o f

s tru c tu r a tio n o f G id d e n s (1 9 84 ) a n d o f th e g e n e tic stru c tu re o f B o u rd ie u (1 9 8 7 ) a s w ell a s my

ow n th e o ry o f re g u la tio n (1 9 8 8 ).
L e t us rem ark , fo r th e b e n e fit o f A n g lo - S a x o n fe m in ists, th a t th e g e n e ric term h o m m e (o f
m a scu lin e g en d e r) h as been m o n o p o liz e d by m a le s in F ra n c e (th e L atin ro o t v ir ex istin g o n ly
in th e a d je c t iv e v ir ile ), w h ile in E n g lish m e n h a v e in v ersely im p o se d th e g e n e r ic n e ss o f
their n a m e to th e e n tirety o f h u m a n b e in g s. It is n o t as easy to d isto rt so c ial r e la tio n s o f
gen der in th e F re n c h lan g u age a s it is in En glish. A s a ll effo rts bein g m a d e h e re are b o u n d to
fail, I k e e p th e m a sc u lin e to r e fe r to t h e p h ilo so p h ic a l c o n c e p t o f m a n (a n d th e fe m in in e for
t h a t o f n a t u r e : all is e v id e n tly n o t n e u tra l).
13. O n th e w arp /w o o f d u a lity , see L ip ietz ( 1 9 8 3 ,1986b).

W o r k s C ite d
A g lie t ta , M . (1974)
A ccu m u latio n et R gulation du capitalism e en longue periode. E x am p le des E tats-U n is (187019 7 0 ), T h e s e P aris I, m im e o .
A g lie tta , M. (1 976)
Regulation an d C rises o f C apitalism , C a lm a n n -L v y , P aris. E n g lish tr a n sla tio n : V e rso .
A lth u ss e r , L . (1 965)
P o u r M a r x , F. M asp ero , P aris.

A lth u sse r, L . (1970)

Lire le C a p ita l, F. M a s p e r o , P a r is .

C i t e d a c c o r d in g to L a P e t i t e C o lle c t i o n M a s p r o , 4

V o lu m e s.
B e tte lh e im , C . (1970)
C a lc u l conom ique et form es de proprit, S e u il- M a sp e ro , P aris.
B o u rd ieu , P. (1987)
C h o ses dites, M in u it, P aris.
B o y er, R.; M istral, J. (1987)
A ccu m u latio n , inflation, crises, P .U .F ., Paris.

FROM A LTH U SSE R IA N ISM T O REG U LA TIO N TH EO RY

137

C .E .P .R .E .M .A .P . (1977)
A pproches d e l'inflation : lexam ple fr a n a is, rep o rt to C O R D E S b y J .P . B en assy , R . B o y er,
R .M . G e lip , A . L ip ietz , J. M istra l, J. M u n o z , C . O m in a m i. P aris, m im eo .
C o r ia t, B . (1 979)
L atlier e tle chronomtr, B o u rg e o is, P aris.
D e lo rm , R .; A n d r , C . (1983)
L tat et lconom ie, Seu il, P aris.
G id d e n s, A . (1 9 8 3 )
T h e C onstitution o f Society, P o lity P ress.
G ly n , A ., et al. (1 9 8 7 )
Th e Rise an d F a llo ft h e G olden A g e , W I D E R /O x fo rd U n iv e rsity P ress.
J e n s o n ,] . (1 9 8 8 )
D iffe r e n t b u t n o t E x c e p t i o n a l :

C a n a d a s P e r m e a b le

F o r d is m , C a n a d ia n Review o f

Sociology an d Anthropology, S p e c ia l Issue o n C o m p a r a tiv e M a c r o so c io lo g y .

K o S ik , K . (1 9 6 8 )
L a dialectique d u concret, M a sp e ro , Paris.
L a b r io la (1 8 9 9 )
E ssa is su r l a conception m atrialiste d e lhistoire, e d . G o r d o n &. B re a c h , L o n d o n -P a ris, 1980.
L e b o r g n e , D ., L ip ietz, A . (1 9 7 3 )
L a p rs-fo rd ism e et s o n e s p a c e , L e s T em p s M odernes, A p r il.E n g lish tra n sla tio n : Society an d
Space, v o l. 6, 1988.
L ip ietz, A . (1 9 7 3 )
D A lth u s s e r M a o ? , L es T e m p s M od ern es, N o v e m b e r.
L ip ietz , A . (1 9 7 9 )
C rise et inflation: pourqu oi? F. M a sp e ro , P aris.
L ip ietz , A . (1 9 8 3 )
L e M on de enchant: d e l a valeur a lnvol inflationniste. F . M a sp e r o L a D c o u v e rte , P aris.
E n g lish tra n sla tio n : V e r s o ,L o n d o n ( 1 9 8 5 ) .
L ip ietz , A . (1 9 8 5 a )
M iracles et m irages: problmes de UndustraUsation dan s le T iers-M o n d e. L a D c o u v e rte , P aris.
E n lg ish tra n sla tio n : V e rso , L o n d o n (1 9 8 7 ) .
L ip ie tz , A . (1 9 8 5 b )
R f le x io n a u t o u r d u n e fa b le . P o u r u n s t a t u t m a r x is t e d e s c o n c e p t s d e r g u la tio n et
d a c c u m u la tio n , C ouverture O ran ge , C E P R E M A P n o . 8 5 3 0 . E n g lish tra n sla tio n : Studies in
Political E con om e, n o. 2 6 , 1988.
L ip ietz , A . (1 9 8 5 c )
T r o is c r is e s , c o n t r ib u t io n t o th e c o llo q u iu m T h e C u rr e n t C r isis in Relation to P revious
C r is e s , B in g h a m to n ( U S A ) , N o v e m b e r , C o u v e rtu re O ran ge, C E P R E M A P n o. 8 5 2 8 .

138

TH E A LTH U SSE R IA N LEGA CY

Lip ietz, A . (1 9 8 6 a )
L e s c o n d itio n s d e la c r a tio n d u n m o u v e m e n t a lt e r n a t if e n F ra n c e , c o n tr ib u tio n to the
C o llo q u iu m o f th e A s s o c ia t io n o f In st it u tio n a l an d P o lit ic a l S tu d ie s a n d R e se a r c h , Les
enjeux institutionnels et politiques de M a r s 1986, Jan u ary .
in Rethinking M arx ism .

E n glish tr a n sla tio n : rev ised v e rsio n

L ip ietz, A . (1 9 8 6 b )
A s p e c ts s c u laire s et c o n jo n c tu re ls de lin te rv e n tio n c o n o m iq u e de l t a t , c o n tr ib u tio n
to th e c o llo q u iu m E stad o y E c o n o m ia, M ed e llin ( C o lo m b ia ), S e p te m b e r , C ouverture O ran ge,
no. 8621.

L ip ie t z ,A . (1 9 8 8 a )
L a t r a m e , la c h a n e e t la r g u l a t i n : u n o u t i l p o u r le s s c i e n c e s s o c i a l e s , C o n g r s
in te r n a tio n a le d e la T h o r ie de la R g u la tio n , D e c e m b e r, C ouvertu re O ran ge, C E P R E M A P
n o . 8816.
L ip ie tz , A . (1988b)
G o u v e r n e r l c o n o m ie , fac e a u x d fis in te rn a tio n a u x : du d v e lo p p e m e n tism e n a tio n a liste
la crise n a t io n a le , c o n trib u tio n to th e co llo q u iu m In Search o f the N ew F ran ce, B ran d eis
U n iv e r sity ( U S A ) , C o u v e rtu re O ra n g e , C E P R E M A P n o . 8815.
L ip ietz, A . a n d R o u ille a u lt (1972)
S u r les pratiques et les concepts prospectifs d u m atrialism e historique, D .E . S . P aris I, m im eo .
M a h o n , R . (1987)
F ro m F o rd ism to N e w T e c h n o lo g ie s, L a b o r M ark e ts a n d U n io n s , Econom ic a n d Industrial
D em ocracy, vol. 8, pp. 5 -6 0 : S ag e , B everly H ills, C A .
N o l, A . (1988)
A c t io n c o lle c tiv e , p artis p o litiq u e s e t re la tio n s in d u strie lle s:

u n e lo g iq u e p o u r la p p ro c h e

de la r g u la tio n , International C ongress on Regulation T h eory, B a rc e lo n a , Ju n e .

P o u lan tz as, N . (1968)
P ouvoir politique et classes sociales, F. M a sp e ro , P aris (c ite d a c c o r d in g to L a P e tite M a sp e ro , 2
v o lu m e s).
R e y , P. P. (1969)
S u r l a r t ic u l a t i o n d e s m o d e s d e p r o d u c t io n , p u b lis h e d in L e s a llia n c e s de c la sse s, F.
M a s p e ro , P aris.
T e r r a y , E. (19 77)
D e le x p lo ita tio n . E l m e n ts d u n b ila n c ritiq u e , D ialectiques, n o . 21.

Rastko Mocnik

Ideology and Fantasy

L idologie interpelle les individus en su jets.
A lthusser
I is this -here, as well as the universal I.
Hegel

T h e w hole problem o f ideology consists in the interpretation o f the m ost

inn ocent-lookin g word in Louis A lth ussers p roposition: en. T h is little word
c o n d e n s e s a g r e a t p r o b le m t h a t se e m s a s te a d y , if o fte n u n n o t ic e d ,
c o m p a n io n to a n y a tte m p t a t a s o c ia l s c ie n c e . A t t h e b e g in n in g s o f
a c a d e m ic so cio lo g y , it to o k t h e form o f th e d e b a te b etw een le T a r d s
p sych ological individualism and D urkh eim s spiritualist collectivism ; it later
gave birth to epistem ological am biguities in social psychology and reached
its several paroxysm s in reason ab le attem p ts, from R e ich to M arcuse and
o t h e r s , to c o m b in e th e b e s t t h a t b o t h s i d e s h a v e to o f f e r , i.e .
p sy c h o a n a ly sis a n d h is t o r ic a l m a te r ia lism . T h e su c c e ssiv e fa ilu re s o f
activism , still seem ed to im ply only a n egativ e epistem ological m oral n o
trespassing. Even worse, the p roject o f the science o f the social seems to
t a k e th e fo rm o f a d i a l e c t i c a l in v e r s io n o f G r o u c h o M a r x s d ic tu m
co n ce rn in g the n atu re o f so cial in stitu tion s ( If y o u are in trouble, get a
lawyer; then youll h ave m ore trouble, but at least youll h ave a lawyer ): if
you w ant to h ave a fair social science, then don t enter into the qu estion o f
the individual subject; but you w on t have a social science until you solve
this very question.
T h e present state o f the problem b ecom es clear if we look at th e possible
ways to tra n sla te A lt h u s s e r s th e sis. If A lth u s se r m ean s th a t id e o lo g y
in terpellates in d ivid uals as su bjects, th en the su b ject h as to be, in a way,
alread y th ere w h en ideology com es upofi her/him a n d hits her/him w ith its
interpellation: in this case, th e co n stitu tion o f the su bject w ould escape th e
epistem ic pow er o f h istorical m aterialism . A ssu m in g w ith L a c a n (an d this is
already an im plication o f B en v en istes structural linguistics) th at the subject
is an effect o f discourse, we would then face the qu estion: w h ich discourse is
the oth er discourse th at co n stitu tes th e subject? T h is question has two
equally unsatisfactory answers, and is therefore badly posed.
If this oth er discourse is not ideological, we are confron ted by an uneasy

140

TH E A LTH U SSERIA N LEGACY

q u estio n ab o u t a u n iv ersal, yet n o n -id eo lo g ica l discou rse u n d erlyin g the

w h ole fie ld o f in te r su b je c tiv ity . T h is d e m a n d s at le a st th at h isto r ic a l
m aterialism should define its articulation with its specific exterior; a t most,
it underm ines the h istorical m aterialist project itself.
If this o th e r d iscou rse is id eo lo gical, th e n eith e r we get trapp ed in a
viciou s circle (an ideology would then always already presuppose anoth er
id e o lo g y ),1 or we h a v e to tra n sla te A lt h u s s e r s th e sis as m e a n in g th a t
ideology interpellates individuals into subjects. B ut sh ou ld th e consequen ce
o f th is in te rp re ta tio n be th at there are as m any su b je c ts as there are
id e o lo g ie s ?
T h is se e m s an u n a c c e p ta b le c o n c lu s io n : 1) b e c a u s e it
conceives o f the subject as trapp ed into a certain ideology as soon as an
individual constitutes h er/h im self as a subject, there is no way for her/him to
say n o to the constitutive ideology, and thus there is n o way for her/him to
say anything but as a subject of an ideology; 2 ) because it also co n ceives of
the ideology in an au tistic m anner. It either breaks dow n the ideological
universe into as m an y com m unities as there are ideologies (an d, from the
proposition to each ideology a certain type o f su b ject,2 follows the evidently false propostion to each com m unity one a n d only o n e ideology );
o r it p ostulates a transversal function linking togeth er different ideological
discourses. T h is tran sversal function (securing the effect o f social totality)
can easily be recognized as th e do m in an t ideology but th e n the question
arises: how does the d o m in an t ideology exercise its tran sversal fun ction ;
how does it c a tc h individuals, if n o t by interpellatin g th em into subjects?
T h e m ost prom isin g line to approach th e problem o f interpellation then
seems to take us back to the initial question. T h is essay will deal w ith this
apparen t short-circuit. H olding with A lth usser th at ideological interpella
tion is su b jectivation , we propose to view it as com posed o f two in terdepen
dent m echan ism s: subjectivation proper, a purely form al sym bolic m ech an ism
t h a t h as alw a y s the sa m e ste r e o ty p ic stru c tu re ; a n d iden tificatio n , an
im aginary relation con cern ed with ideological co n ten ts, w here th e ideo
logical conflict as an in stan ce o f class struggle is b ein g carried out. Ideologi
cal interpellation w orks by establish in g the relation o f iden tification ; but
its success d ep en d s u pon its cap acity to trigger the su b je c tiv a tin g m e ch
anism . T h e ap o retic ch aracter o f our p roblem h old s to this double n atu re o f
the id e o logical process: since ideology op erates w ithin two registers, the
im aginary an d the sym bolic, it always fun ction s as its ow n oth er discourse.
B e c a u se th e sy m b o lic m e c h a n ism is ste reo ty p ed an d m o n o to n o u s, its
a n alysis is id e o lo gically n o n -d isc rim in a tin g a n d p resen ts a false p o litic a l
n eutrality; w hile th e an aly sis o f th e im aginary re latio n m ay well do justice to
th e richness o f th e p o litical conflict, it m isses th e su b je ctiv atin g effect and
rem ains theoretically unsatisfactory.

IDEOLOGY A N D FA N TA SY

141

T o secure a solid basis for the analysis, w e will first sk etch a theory o f
in t e r p r e t a tio n , in s p ire d by r e c e n t d e v e lo p m e n t s in p o s t - s t r u c t u r a l
lin gu istics an d an aly tic ph ilo sop h y o f langu age; we w ill th en p resen t two
solutions to our problem th at seem instructive fo r their very failure; finally,
we w ill indicate the direction w hich a future theory o f ideology m ay take.
1. A Theory o f Interpretation
L in g u istic (D u c r o t) and p h ilo so p h ic a l ( G r ic e ) a p p ra o c h e s to in te r
p retatio n usually proceed from a general principle o f com m u n ication w hich
we can render in the form o f a syllogism :3 if an u tterance is m eaningful,
then there m ust be a way to understand it, and this particular utterance is
m eaningful, sin ce its speaker h as offered it as such, so let us try and fin d the
way to understand it.
U su ally , th e problem o f in terpretation is a trivial on e: every u tterance is
u ttered w ithin a co n crete in tersu b jective co m m u n icatio n al situ ation over
w h ich b o th the sp eak er an d the in terp re ter h av e su fficien t co n tro l the
speaker to provide her/his sayings w ith appropriate clu es; the interpreter to
c a t c h t h e m a d e q u a t e l y . S t i l l , th e p r a c t i c a l s u c c e s s o f e v e r y d a y
c o m m u n ic a t io n s h o u ld n o t b lin d us to its t h e o r e tic a l p ro b le m s. A n
interpreter m a y figure o u t the m ean in g o f a n u tterance if (s)h e is able to
produce a suitable defin ition o f the intersubjective situation in w hich it has
b een uttered. But sin ce this situ atio n is structured by the utterance itself,
a n d its o n ly a v a ila b le in d ic a tio n is its ca u se , i.e., the u tte ra n c e u n d er
interpretation (fallin g b a c k on th e n o tio n o f th e co n te x t would n o t help,
for it sim ply m ean s m ore u tteran ces), the interpreter seem s to be trap p ed in
a vicious circle: the key to the m ean in g o f an utterance is the defin ition o f
the intersubjective structure, and this structure is defin ed by the m ean in g o f
the u tterance.
T h e situation would be hopeless if b oth the interpreter a n d the speaker
were n ot caught in the sam e trap, and if they b o th did n ot know it: they are
th e re b y fo rced in to c o m m u n ic a tiv e so lid a r ity , a n d th is so lid a r ity is a
solidarity o f beliefs. T h is form al constrain t already indicates that ideology is
a b so lu te ly n e ce ssary for an y h u m a n re la tio n to be p o ssib le . S in c e the
sp eak er b e lie v e s th at it is p o ssib le to u n d erstan d h is/h er u tte ra n c e, and
m aterializes th is belief in his/h er effort to produce a w ell-form ed strin g o f
signifiers, so m ust the interpreter believe th at it is possible to understan d the
u tterance, this b elief being ju stified by the utterance h av in g been offered as
u n d erstan d ab le. B o th th e sp eak ers an d the in terp reters m in im al beliefs
m ay be view ed as supported by a sim ilar relation the relation to a third and
n e u t r a l in s ta n c e c o m m a n d in g th e c o m m u n ic a t io n a l s it u a t io n a n d
m e d ia tin g its in tersu b jec tiv e stru ctu re: the relation o f identification to the
subject supposed to believe. T h e su b ject supposed to believe operates in the

142

T H E A LTH U SSE R IA N LEGA CY

m odality o f the p ossib le: it is possible th at this string o f signifiers m akes

sen se.
W e c a n illustrate th e function o f the su b ject supposed to b eliev e by the
self-fulfilling nature o f collective delusions. If, in an appropriately unstable
social situation, the rum or starts th at the oil (or sugar. . . ) is going to run
o u t, this rum or m ay n ot be true at the m om en t o f its launching (th e stocks
o f oil bein g sufficient for the norm al trend o f its con sum p tion ); but when
people start acting upon this (originally false ) rumor, it m ay well becom e
true. H ow do people act upon such a rum or? Suppose I am enlightened
en ough n ot to believe the rumor. I m ay even p ositively know it to be false.
B ut n o tw ith sta n d in g my ratio n ality an d /o r k n o w led ge, I w ill reason this
way: I k n ow th e rum or to be false; bu t other people m ay beleive it; acting
upon their (false) belief, they will rush out an d pile up private stocks; and
the oil is likely to run out. S o I better rush to the store m yself and get som e
o il. E ven under the supposition th at everybody in the p opu lation reasons
this way, the im plicit consensus as to the falsity o f the prediction will n ot
p revent its fin ally com ing true; the general recogn ition th at it is possible to
believe the rumor, i.e., the identification o f every m em ber o f the population
w ith the subject supposed to believe, will do the trick.
T h e id e n tific a tio n w ith the su b je c t su p p osed to b e lie v e is a forced
m ove in the co m m u n icatio n al gam e, a n d further n ecessitates an ex post facto
ju stific a tio n . T h is j u s t i f i c a t i o n m a y n o t b e e x p l i c i t ( t y p ic a l l y it is
sp o n tan e o u s ), bu t can be articu lated by the interpreter if asked for the
reason s why (s)h e interprets an utterance in a certain way; this ju stification
m ust be a proposition th at refers both to the utterance and to the intersubjective
situation. W e w ill c a ll th is m in im a l d e sc rip tio n o f th e in te rsu b je c tiv e
structure a n d o f th e utterance in it the principle o f interpretation (P I).
1 ) L et a hundred flowers bloom .
W e autom atically interpret 1) as a piece o f p o litical discourse, for we rely
upon the PI M ao Z edong said 1 ). But suppose we were told th at it was Pu
Ji w ho said it. W e would be at a loss, an d even the addition al inform ation
th at Pu Ji w as the last Em peror o f C h in a would n o t be o f m uch help, since
the interpretation would depend on the tim e o f u tterance: if Pu Ji said 1)
w hile bein g re-educated at the Fushu prison, we w ould b et th at 1) was a
q u o t a t io n from M a o ; if he sa id it la te r w h e n he d e v o te d h im s e lf to
gardening, w e m ight op t to read it a s a gard en ers profession de foi.
2) C o m rad e Z hdan ov said: Let a hundred flowers b loom .

IDEOLOGY A N D FA N TA SY

143

T h e reference to the speaker fun ction s as a sort o f PI here, an d th e very

parad ox this funciton entails illustrates well the nature o f PI, for w hoever
would correctly interpret 2) would also ch allenge it: But he did n o t m ean
it! By his/her rejection o f the attribu tion, the interpreter would prove that
(s)h e h as got 2) correctly: the n am e o f Z h d an ov situates 2) w ithin a
p articu lar debate about cultural p olitics, and thus yields the PI (the sam e
would be ach ie v ed by a co m m u n ist lead er or by a co m rad e ), fo r it is
possible th a t Z hdan ov said so m eth in g like 1 ). T h e m eaning, determ ined on
the basis o f the PI, suggested by the n am e, th e n falsifies the attribution o f 1)
to the bearer o f the nam e, sin ce we know (if we know about Z hdanovism
but this know ledge is necessary to produce a proper PI in the first p lace) th at
Z hdan ov did n ot say 1 ) or, had h e ever said it, that he could n ot h ave m eant
it.
B esid es its fun ction in g w ith in th e re a lm o f th e possible, th e principle of
in te r p re ta tio n d e riv e s its str e n g th from a featu re we m ig h t c a ll the
econ om y o f co m m u n ication . C o n sid e r this line:
3 ) B rle de plus de feux que je n en allum ai.
T h e A le x an d rin e verse, th e first p erson sin gular, a n d a general au ra o f
n o b ilit y in d u c e us to in te r p r e t th e f ir e s as m e a n in g th e p a n g s o f
u n re q u ite d lo v e ev en a b u siv ely in th e su b o rd in a te c la s s s use, fo r th e
cu ltu ral (id eological) prejudice lin k in g th e effects o f fire w ith th e feelings o f
u n r e c ip o r c a t e d lo v e is a c o m m o n e n o u g h h e r ita g e , w h ile p a r tic u la r
in form ation about the speaker o f the line (Pyrrhus) to the effect th a t he
e x c e lle d a t b u rn in g dow n T r o y , is n e e d e d in o rd er to a p p r e c ia te th is
s y l l e p s i s o f m e t a p h o r , a s F o n t a n ie r c a l l s it. T h is s p o n t a n e o u s
m is in t e r p r e t a t io n sh o w s th e im p o r t a n t p r o p e r ty o f th e p r in c ip le o f
in terpretation th at it ten ds to ex te n d its pow er beyond a scope th at may,
under an aly sis, app ear as its legitim ate dom ain. In 3 ), the m etap h o rical
m ean in g o f feu x im posed itself abusively also in the subordinate, because it
was supported by an ideology th a t still dom inates literary studies ( ro m an ti
cism ); to do ju stice to the double m ean in g o f the word, it is necessary to
introduce anoth er PI, brough t in from anoth er ideology (G reek m ythology).
F ascin ate d b y the id e o logical gratificatio n o f g e ttin g the m e an in g , the
reader m ay easily yield to interpretation by clich (w hich, w ith respect to
R a c in e , is q u ite c o n tin g e n t), an d m iss th e o th e r in te r p e lla tio n eq u ally
available in 3 ). In this case, th e reader is delu d ed by an im plicitly operating
e t h ic a l m a x im o f c o m m u n ic a tio n : su p p o rt your in te r p re ta tio n by a
m in im al interpretation al base.
W e m ay co n clu d e that, correspondin g to the id e o logical interpellation,
veh icu lated by the u tterance, there com es from the interpretin g individual

144

TH E A LTH U SSERIA N LEGACY

(the p o ten tial su bject) a demand fo r the sense th at is actually a readiness to

subm it to in terpellation . T h is dem and is rigid: it passes, on ce satisfied.
W h at we h ave called the econ om y o f co m m u n ication or its m inim alistic
p r a c t i c a l e t h i c s is a s t r u c t u r a l f e a t u r e o f s u b j e c t i v a t i o n : o n c e
su b jectiv ated you c a n t su b jectiv ate again. A ltern atively , there is only
on e su bject to every particular ideology. A lth ou g h this is a form al feature o f
the su b jectiv atin g m echan ism , it m akes the individual swallow ideological
con ten ts. A h eadlin e in the Y ugoslav daily Delo (4 /3 0 /8 7 ), follow ing the
ban n in g o f W ald h eim from th e U n ited S tate s, offers a striking illustration o f
this m echanism :
4) W ald h eim and the A u strian s are deeply hurt.
O n e m ay argue th at 4) is a co n d en satio n o f two utterances: W ald h eim
is hurt (in his feelin gs). T h e A ustrian s are hurt (in their in tern atio n al intere sts). T h e co n d en satio n would then derive from the h o m on ym y o f predi
cates, rather th an from their synonymy. But the ten dency o f 4) is precisely
to p revent the reader from this line o f reasoning: its PI p ostulates the exis
tence o f a m odality o f bein g hurt th at con stitutes the im aginary com m unity
W ald h eim and th e A u strian s precisely the affective state th at served as
the m aterial basis fo r the result o f the last p residen tial electio n in A ustria.
W h a t to a th e o r e tic a l eye m ay a p p e a r a v ic io u s c irc le is the b a sic
ideological m ech an ism th at M ich el Pcheux called the Munchhausen effect:4
in utterances like 4) there is som eth in g lackin g; th is la ck is an obstacle to
their m aking sense. B ut then 4) h as been offered as u nderstan dable, so let us
look fo r a way to understand it; an d the interpreter produces an appropriate
PI. In this way, the very lack, the sense-insufficiency o f 4), beom es the
w arrant o f its m ak in g sense, its in terp ellativ e c a tc h , an d the trigger o f
su bjectivation . A s soon as the interpreter perceives the sem an tic trait th at
m akes 4) understan dable, (s)h e constitutes h er/h im self as a m em ber o f an
im aginary com m unity. T h e trait, Zug, th at lin ks her/him to the leader is the
sam e as the trait th at h old s togeth er the m em bers o f the com m unity: it is
the trait o f recogn ition , the Freu dian Einziger Zug o f m ass psychology. But
first o f all it is the trait o f identification o f the interpreter w ith the subject
su p posed to believe. T h is identification proceeds by way o f search in g for the
p r in c ip le o f in t e r p r e t a t io n , w h o se p r o d u c t io n is, on th e p a r t o f th e
interpellated subject, always a petitio principii.
T h e dram a o f p h en om en a like 4 ) derives from their not being a picture
o f so m e ex tra-d iscu rsive reality; on the con trary, th ey are constructive o f
social reality, i.e., they establish the basis o f the (id eological) self-evidence
upon w ich social relations are built. O n ly as fa r as it goes w ithout saying
does an ideology h ave interpellative force.5

IDEOLOGY A N D FA N TA SY

145

T h e m e ch a n ism o f id e o lo g ical in terp e llatio n m ay be describ ed in the

follow ing way: in order to p ron oun ce a m eaningful utterance, the speaker
identifies h e r/h im se lf w ith a stru ctu ra l p o sitio n (th e su b je ct su p p osed to
b e lie v e ) from w h ich a m ean in g fu l, i.e. in terp e lla tiv e, u tterance might be
pronounced. T h is identification with the A lth u sserian S u b jec t o f ideology
is a p recon d ition fo r the utterance to be profferred at all. T h e interpellated
in d iv id u al identifies h er/h im self w ith the sam e instance w hich, from her/his
side, operates as the position from w hich it m ay be believed th at the utterance
m akes sen se. T h e m utual recogn ition o f the two parties is thus m ediated
by a third instan ce w ith w h om th ey b o th activ ely identify. T h is active
stan ce o f th e sp eak er has been tradition ally recognized a n d elaborated as th e
art o f rhetoric. T h e contribution o f the add ressee m ay h a v e attracted less
a tte n tio n . O ur description stresses the central feature th a t y ielding to an
ideological in terpellatio n is som eth in g th a t th e interpreter actively achieves.
S t i l l , th e i n t e r p e ll a t io n is doubly p r o d u c t iv e : it is n o t on ly a se lfp ro d u ctio n o f the co n scio u s self, but also a cau satio n o f the unconscious
subject. W e h ave to articulate the two co n trad icto ry effects o f ideological
interpellation. W h ile identifying h er/h is conscious se lf w ith a presum ably
universal instan ce o f the u nderstan din g speaker-hearer ( the subject supposed
to b e lie v e ), th e u n c o n s c io u s su b je c t (e ffe c t o f an alw ay s idiosyncratic
m ech an ism ) arises at a p lace th a t su p ports the identifying operation.
T h e necessary co n d ition fo r iden tification is the existence o f a com m on
lan gu age : still, it is n ot a sufficient condition, fo r the m ost an interpreter
can ach ieve on the purely linguistic level is to form ulate a dilemma as to the
m eaning: 1) is either horticultural advice or a p o litical slogan; fires in 3)
m ean either a war crim e or a priv ate feeling. M ore generally: either PI1 or
P I2, but not both . But it suffices to introduce a purely illusionary element,
th at o f belief, and the m ean in g m agically arises. T h e necessary con d ition
opens directly on to the securing o f the sufficient con d ition , for it defin es the
locus where the p oin t o f solidarity ca n be established. Just as the speaker
b eliev es th at it is possible to believe th at the hearer will u n derstan d her/his
u tteran ce, because (s)h e has produced a (reasonably) well-form ed string o f
signifiers, so the hearer belie-ves th at it is possible to believe th at the utterance
m a k e s s e n s e , b e c a u s e it is ( r e a s o n a b l y ) w e ll- fo r m e d . T h e m u t u a l
iden tification o f the two co m m u n icative agen ts has a m aterial support in the
lin gu istic structure, but is actu ally ach ie v ed only if m ed iated by a third
p a r ty , th e su b je c t su p p osed to b e lie v e or th e A lth u sse ria n S u b je c t o f
ideology.
T h e q u e s t io n now a r ise s how to a r t ic u la t e th e s o c ia lly fo r m a tiv e
m ech an ism o f identification w ith the individually-focused ( idiosyncratic )
m e ch a n ism o f su b je c tiv a tio n prop er. T o a p p ro a c h th is p rob lem w e will
introduce a new concept: th e Freudian co n cep t o f fan tasy .

146

TH E A LTH U SSERIA N LEGA CY

2. Fantasy
5 ) I w o n t be the first President to lose a war.
T h ere are two interpretations o f this utterance o f L.B . Jo h n so n , and they
are exclu siv e o f each other. T h e y depen d on two differen t p rin ciples o f
interpretation:
5a) 5) & L .B .J. h as a specific in terpretation o f U .S . history.
5b) 5) & the U .S . h as n ever lost a war.
A cco rd in g to our defin ition o f PI, 5a) should h ave a m uch better ch an ce to
im pose itself, for it m ay be justified by a prop osition th at refers b oth to the
u tte ra n c e an d (v ia the m e n tio n o f th e sp ea k er) to th e in te r-su b je c tiv e
co m m u n icative situation . S till, intuition tells us a n d history teach es us that
5b) is m uch stron ger, although its PI is eviden tly deficient. It is precisely
this d eficien cy th a t m akes for the strength o f 5 b ); on a closer look, we see
th a t 5a) already im plicityly refers to 5b) as to a universally accepted truth
th at can only be challenged by a specific ju stification . W hile 5b) im plicitly
gives itself as universal, 5 a) explicitly presen ts itself as specific; while 5b) is
void a n d d irectly o p erative, 5a) o p en s in to a m atter-of-fact argum ent and
m ay be o p e ra tiv e only if the a rgu m e n t is p e rsu a siv e ; w h ile 5 b ) in v ite s
intuitive agreem ent and precludes any an alytical approach, 5 a) depends on
analytic argum ent and m akes intuition irrelevant. T h e relation betw een 5b)
a n d 5 a ) is th e r e la t io n b e tw e e n th e d o m in a n t id e o lo g y a n d a n o n h egem on ic ideology, w here the dom in an t ideology defines the field o f the
a rg u m e n t, w h ile the b u rd e n o f ju s t ific a t io n fa lls on the su b o rd in a te d
ideology.
T h e PI in 5 b ) is a c o m m o n p la c e , a n d it is p r e c is e ly w h at m ay b e
irrational in it th at m akes for its ideological appeal: stereotypes o f this kind
can on ly be accepted in the modality o f sheer belief. T o the intepreter, they
p ose a ra d ic al d ilem m a: is this n o n sen se , or is it to be b eliev ed ? T h is is
precisely the basic dilem m a an interpreter faces with every utterance (s)he
w ants to u n d erstan d, because every utterance fun dam en tally involves this
p ro b le m . T h e s p o n ta n e o u s a ttitu d e o f a n in te r p re te r is to sa v e th e
m e a n in g an d to lo o k for a p rin cip le o f interpretation th a t w ould ren d er the
u tte ra n c e m e a n in g fu l. W h en (s)h e co m es a cro ss th is sam e p ro b lem in
re gard to the P I, (s)h e has already solved it: if (s )h e h ad n ot alread y
p o sitiv e ly re sp o n d ed to th e se n se/n o n sen se a lte rn a tiv e , (s)h e w ould n ot
h a v e co m e acro ss a p o ssib le PI at all. In a sp o n ta n e o u s (id e o lo g ic a l)
reading, th e radical dilem m a (non sense/belief) is n ever p osed : its p ositiv e
re so lu tio n , i.e ., th e in te r p r e te r s h a v in g o p te d fo r th e b e lie f , is th e
stru ctu ral c o n d itio n th a t th e PI b e re a ch e d at all.

T h e o p e n in g o f th e

IDEOLOGY A N D FA N TA SY

147

rad ical dilem m a is structurally self-defeating: it can n o t b e opened unless it

h as alread y been liquidated in a previous phase. T h e PI o f this ideologically
p riv ile g e d k in d in v o lv e s th e fa m ilia r nachtrglichkeit lo g ic o f p sy c h ic
processes: it is on ly after h a v in g iden tified w ith th e su b ject supposed to
believe th at the interpreter discovers w hat h ad been the m aterial basis for
h e r/h is id e n tific a tio n . T h is m a te r ia l b a sis, w h ose c o n te n ts h a v e b e e n
sw allow ed by the interpreter d u e to structural constrain t, is a n elem ent that
com prises the form al necessity th at it be an ob ject o f belief.
It is p recisely at this p o in t that th e o re tic a l in terv en tio n can produ ce
d ire c t id e o lo g ic a l effects. First o f a ll d e stru ctiv e effects: it b reaks the
stru ctu ra l in te rd e p e n d e n ce th a t is n ecessary fo r an in te rp e lla tio n to be
su cc essfu l, th e lin k b etw een (im agin ary ) id e n tifica tio n a n d (sy m b olic)
su bjectiv ation . W hile recognizing the structural (form al) necessity o f the
su b jectiv atin g m achine, a th eoretical approach refuses the pseudo-autom atic
en dorsem ent o f the ideological co n ten ts veh icu lated by identification and
its b e lie f- c o m p o n e n t. T h e v ery p o ssib ility o f any critiq u e o f id e o lo gy
p resup poses an active introduction o f th is discontinuity, th e breaking down
o f id e o lo g ica l sp o n tan e ity an d th at is why every critiqu e o f ideology
en tails a gen u in e th e o re tica l co m m itm en t. Still, an ex p licity th eoretical
th em atizatio n o f th is rupture is n ot a n ecessary co n d ition for a su ccessful
critique o f ideology, a n d a th eory o f th e su b jectiv atin g m echan ism even less
so. T h e sam e d isru p tiv e o p e ra tio n m ay be su ccessfu lly p erform ed by a
vicario u s strategy by a n aiv e endorsem ent o f an ideological critique
th at is obtain ed at the exp en se o f the th eoretical insight into the workings
o f the id e o lo g ic a l m e c h a n ism . It is th is p o in t o f im m e d ia te p r a c tic a l
inciden ce o f theory th at is theoretically crucial and a lso th e m ost difficult.
W e m ay p ro c e e d by d is tin g u ish in g tw o e le m e n ts w ith in th e a d hoc
co n cep t o f the principle o f interpretation: one is the defin ition a speaker or
an in te rp re te r h e r/h im se lf g iv es o f th e c o m m u n ic a tio n a l situ a tio n (th is
co m p o n en t h a s a ll the ch aracteristics o f a ration alization ); the other is its
belief-nucleus, the elem en t th a t com prises th e form al necessity th a t it be an
ob je ct o f belief. T h is feature o f th e secon d co m po n en t m ak es it a p oin t at
w h ic h desire ( t h a t a n u t t e r a n c e be m e a n in g fu l) an d c o n strain t (t h e
com pu lsion to believe) coincide. It h as the structure o f Freudian fantasy.
H avin g introduced the concept o f fantasy, we can and m ust refine our
n o tio n o f interpretation al principle: as fa r as it is the ju stification th at the
interpreter can provide fo r her/his interpretation o f an utterance, it depends
on the interpreters iden tification w ith the subject supposed to believe; this
is id e o lo g y in th e fa m ilia r se n se (sy ste m a tiz a tio n , ra tio n a liz a tio n , selfd e lu sio n e tc .). B u t sin ce it d e p e n d s upon a m e ch a n ism o f tran sferen ce
(id e n tific a tio n ), th e p rin cip le o f in te rp re ta tio n n ece ssarily com prises an
articulation o f social demand (the b asic relation o f a subject to the other )

148

THE A LTH U SSER IA N LEGACY

w ith individual desire (th e basic relation o f a subject to her/him self, i.e., the
level o f the co n stitu tion o f the su b ject). T h e locus o f this articulation is the
secon d co m p o n e n t o f the interpretational principle, its belief-nucleus or, in
Freudian terms, the fantasy. A s a form al matrix o f the sense/nonsen se altern ative th at b oth im poses the co n strain t o f belief on the subject and responds
to her/h is desire,6 fantasy is the material basis o f the id en tification p rocess
fo r it is su b je c t-c o n stitu tiv e .

T o the fo rm al crite rio n fo r th e su ccess o f

id e o lo g ica l in te rp e lla tio n (th a t it should open into th e se n se/n o n sen se

altern ative), we m ust therefore add anoth er one: if a fantasy is to be socially
(i.e., id e o lo g ically ) o p erativ e, it m ust be cap ab le o f ca tch in g th e always
idiosyncratic individual u nconscious fantasies. It m ust be able to fun ction as
a cloaca maxima drain in g individual fantasies into a so cial dim ension.
M u ch h as been said about th e relationship betw een ideology an d reality;
sym ptom atically, no atte m p t to define it can avoid som e co n trd iction .7 T h is
n ecessary co n trad ictio n derives from the co n trad icto ry n atu re o f ideology
itself from its bein g a part o f the very reality upon w hich it operates. In
a d d itio n to E n g e ls m o d el o f W iederspiegeln a n d A lt h u s s e r s c o n c e p t o f
reprsentation imaginaire, there is a m uch better way to think this parad oxical
re latio n , a way w hich n ot only em braces b o th these co n cepts but also has
the adv an tage not to presuppose a difference o f nature between ideology and the
material upon which it operates: it is to think ideology through the Freudian
co n cept o f sekundre Bearbeitung (usually translated as secondary .revision;
alth o u g h m istran slatio n u nderlines an im portant dim ension o f the co n cept,
we prefer the m ore literal on e secondary elab oration ).
3. Ideology as Secondary Elaboration
S e c o n d a ry e la b o r a tio n is a d rea m m e c h a n ism th a t unifies the dream
m a t e r ia l.8 F reu d d e sc rib e s it, a lm o st in M a r x is t sty le, as a tendentious
revision ,9 a n d h as so m e trouble in situ atin g it.10 T h is difficulty derives from
the n ature o f secondary elab oration itself:
1. O n the one h an d, it is already an interpretation: it interprets the results
o f the dream -work, an d is therefore no part o f it.
2. O n the other han d, it is a ten dentious or a deformed interpretation; the
ch aracter o f distortion assim ilates it to th e dream -work.
Seco n d ary elaboration thus presen ts a sense o f the dream but this is a
false sense. W ithout it, the dream is a heap o f discon n ected fragm ents; w ith
it, it h as a sense, but n ot the true one. W ith secon d ary elab oration , we get a
sense, but this is n ot the sense o f the dream ; it m akes us lose the sense. T h e
on ly m o tive for secon dary ela b o ratio n is th e claim o f intelligibility o f the
dream -m aterial; and its only achievem ent is a faltification o f w hat is there to
be understood. T h e fascin atin g result o f secondary elaboration is th at the
intelligibility blocks the understanding.

IDEOLOGY A ND FA N TA SY

149

Freud stresses that before we start u pon the analysis o f a dream , we have
to clear the ground o f this attem p t at an in tep retation , and explain s this
p arad ox by an analogy:
It [secondary elaboration] beh aves tow ards the dream -conten t lying
before it ju st as our norm al psychic activity b eh aves in general tow ards
any perceptual co n ten t th at m ay be presented to it. It understands th at
co n ten t on the basis o f certain an ticipatory ideas, and arranges it, even
in th e m om en t o f p e rc e iv e in g it, on the p resu p p o sitio n o f its b ein g
intelligible; in so do in g, it ru n s a risk o f falsifying it, a n d in fact, if it
c a n n o t bring it into line w ith anythin g fam iliar, is prey to th e strangest
m isu n d erstan d in gs. A s is well know n, we are in c ap ab le o f se ein g a
series o f unfam iliar signs or o f hearing a succession o f unknow n words,
w ith o u t at o n c e fa lsify in g the p e r c e p tio n fro m c o n s id e r a tio n s o f
intelligibility, on the basis o f som eth in g already know n to us.
T h is is Freud the m aterialist at work: th e w h ole is the untrue. T h e
analogy w ith the M arxist problem o f the illusion o f totality as the result o f
ideological totalization is m ore th an an analogy. T h e illusion o f totality is a
lie , but this lie is a part o f the n on-totalizable m aterial itself. D ream s,
d ic t a t e d by se x u a l d e sire , are as n o n - t o t a liz a b le as so c ie ty , torn and
co nstituted by class struggle. S tru ctu re is n ot a w hole precisely because
the illusion o f its w holeness is a part o f it.
T h is, o f course, is only the leftist elem en t in Freud; to stop here would be
to yield to th e infantile m alady o f m aterialism . Freuds genius w as to carry
on the analysis, and to do it, he was obliged to introduce a new concept, the
co n cep t o f Phantasie, wishful fantasy.
T h e in t e r p r e t a t i o n p r e s e n te d by s e c o n d a r y e la b o r a t io n is a fa lse
in terpretation ; insofar a s it is false, it is n o interpretation, b u t part o f the
dream -w ork; and insofar as it is a p art o f the dream-work, it is a p art o f the
truth o f the dream. Th erefore, the result o f secondary elaboration is true
p recisely (a n d only) in asm u ch as it is fa lse . A lth o u g h th is m ay be an
ex c essiv ely lo gistic d e d u ctio n , it n ev e rth e le ss e x a c tly reprodu ces F reu d s
poin t: w h at is false in th e distortin g operation is n ot th e distortion itself,
but its interpretative ch aracter. T h e con sid eration o f intelligibility, the
claim o f a sen se is w hat is fa lse.
A c c o r d i n g to F re u d , s e c o n d a r y e la b o r a t io n b u ild s u p a f a c a d e o f
coh eren ce for the dream : this facade h as to be broken in order to g e t to the
latent dream -conten t. S till, this does n ot m ean it should be discounted: its
fram ew ork is not accidental, but is m ade o f pre-fabricated dream m aterial:

150

THE A LTH U SSER IA N LEGA CY

It would be a m istak e, how ever, to su p p o se th at these d ream
fa c a d e s are n o th in g o th e r th a n m ista k e n a n d so m e w h a t a rb itra ry
revisions o f th e dream -conten t by th e co n scio u s agen cy o f our m ental
life. In the erection o f a dream -facade, use is n o t infrequently m ade o f
wishful p h an tasies which are present in the dream -thoughts in a pre
co n stru cted form , and are o f the sam e ch aracter as the appropriately
n a m e d d a y - d r e a m s fa m ilia r to us in w a k in g life . T h e w ish fu l
p h a n ta sie s revealed by analysis in n igh t-d ream s o ften turn o u t to b e
repetition s o r m odified versions o f scenes from infancy; thus, in som e
c a se s, th e fa ca d e o f the d re a m d ire c tly r e v e a ls th e d r e a m s a c tu a l
nucleus, distorted by a n adm ixture o f other m aterial." T h e labour of, as
it w ere, bu ildin g up a facade o f the dream the case, nam ely, in w hich
a form ation o f th at kind already exists, availab le fo r use in the m aterial
o f the dream -thoughts . I am in the h abit o f describin g the elem en t in
the dream -thoughts w hich I h ave in m ind as a p h an tasy (P h a n ta sie ).12

T h e ph an tasy is thus w hat L acan calls the point de capiton, the qu ilting
p oin t, an elem en t co m m o n b oth to the facade an d to w h at it conceals.
T h e response to an ideological in terpellatio n is also m ade in the n am e o f
a claim o f sense: it is this presupposition o f intelligibility th at pushes the
interpellated individual towards an identification with the subject supposed
to believe. T h e active part played by the interpellated individual consists
precisely in her/h is helpin g to establish a facad e an ideological effect of
coheren ce. T h e interpellated individual certainly interprets on the basis of
certain anticipatory ideas, but (s)h e ascribes th em to the su bject supposed
to b eliev e, and thus co n fers an a priori social status on them . M isu n der
stan din g and falsifaction are, o f course, alw ays possible, but this possibility
h as a p o sitiv e th e o re tic a l m ean in g: it d em on strates th a t every in terp re
tation , be it adequate to th e origin al speakers in ten tio n or not, is socially,
i.e., ideologically, motivated. In this sense (an d on this level), the interpreting
in d iv id u a l is alw ays a lre a d y a su b je c t, th at is, h a s alw ays a lrea d y b ee n
interpellated by a n ideology. T h is level (o f L ebensweit, o f th e background
b e lie fs a sc r ib e d to th e s u b je c t su p p o se d to b e lie v e ) p r e s u p p o s e s th e
in terp ellatio n already co n su m m ated , i and its co n ten ts are in p a r t trivial
a n d ab stract,13 in p art specifically ideological. In 4) ab ove, the trivial and
abstract (ideologically n on -sp ecific) part o f the backgroun d b eliefs would,
am on g others, com prise th e b elief in th e existen ce o f certain k in ds o f m ental
even ts or sta te s (e m o tio n s), th e p o stu la tio n o f a causal relaio n betw een
ce rta in ev en ts in th e o u te r world (like th e b an n in g o f W ald h eim from the
U .S .A .) and a certain type o f u n p leasan t em otio n , etc.; the ideologically
specific belief-background would be an intim ate n o tio n o f the p o litical life
(a typical exam ple o f reified con sciousn ess la G o ld m a n n ) and, o f course,

IDEOLOGY A N D FA N TA SY

151

the new ly p rodu ced se m a n tic featu re. T h e individual a ct o f id e n tification

w ith the social in stan ce o f the subject supposed to believe (the A lth usserian
S u b je c t o f ideology), m akes the individual accede to the social dim ension of
id e o lo g ica l beliefs (H a b e rm a ss Lebenswelt), and assum e them for her/h is
ow n a c c o u n t. B u t th e a ct o f id e n tific a tio n is im p o ssib le if, w ith in the
so c ia lly p re - e x iste n t b elief-b a ck g ro u n d , it c a n n o t fin d su p port fo r the
in d iv id u a ls id io sy n cratic w ishful fa n ta sie s if th e u tterance offered to
in terp retation does n o t tou ch u pon the in d iv id uals (u ncon sciou s) su b jec
tiv a tin g fan tasy . T h e ge n e ral, a b stra c t an d so cially -orien ted demand for
sense m ust find a way to tran slate itself into the in d iv id uals u nconscious
an d sp ecific desire, supported by h er/h is fantasy. T h is is an absolute co n d i
tio n for the success o f an ideological interpellation. T h e phantasy (w hich is
a petrified string o f signifiers, offering itself to different interpretations th at
depend on different successive lib idin al organizations in the history o f the
s u b je c t ) 14 is th u s an e le m e n t th a t h as a double statu s: it figures in the
fa cad e o f coheren ce (our p rin cip le o f in terp re ta tio n ), in the co n scio u s
belief-netw ork th a t ration alizes th e identification-process, as well as in th e
in d iv id u als u n co n sciou s desire. F an tasy is the p o in t w here th e conscious
d em an d fo r sense tra n sla te s itse lf in to the u n co n scio u s su b je c ts desire,
w h ic h su p p o r ts th e id e n tific a t io n - p r o c e s s . W e c o u ld sa y t h a t in th e
id e o lo gical process, th e in d iv id u a ls dem an d b ou n ces off th e S u b je c t of
ideology and returns to the individual subject in a n on-inverted form the
u n c o n s c io u s t r a je c t o r y f a n t a s y - d e s i r e - i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , w h ic h is th e
m ech an ism o f su bjectiv ation , b e in g the m aterial basis o f th is process.
Ideology as an effort to build up a facad e o f coherence, as a totalizing
enterprise guided by co n sid eratio n s o f in telligib ility , therefore does n ot
w ork directly u pon so cial reality : it w orks u p o n fantasy, a n d its effort
aim s at in co rp o ratin g fantasy. W ith in the co h eren ce-facad e o f ideology,
fantasy represents the n on-totalizable n atu re o f th e social structure (w ithout
g o in g in t o d e t a il s , le t us in d ic a t e t h a t o u r th e o r y e n t a ils an ir o n ic
reform ulation o f E n gels and A lth u ssers form ula). T h e elem ent o f fantasy is
typically void o f any ex p licit class-co n te n t or ten d en cy 15 and presen ts the
sam e confu sing m ixture o f u n iversal p reten sion and singular idiocy as the
Freudian Phantasie. (A n analysis o f 4) above would probably poin t to the
fantasy o f the hum iliated father. In 5 ), we referred to the fantasy o f the
invin cibility o f western im perialism ; we could put on the sam e list the fantasy
o f the d eclin e o f the W est, or the fan tasy o f O rien tal despotism , and any
n um ber o f racist stereo ty p es.) B e in g a q u iltin g p o in t, fantasy p un ctually
co n n ects the ideological facade w ith its sp ecific exterior: so-called social
reality. It is typically an in ert strin g o f signifier^, capable o f being inserted
in to differen t facad e in terpretation s; behind this set o f signifiers, there is

152

TH E A LTH U SSER IA N LEGACY

n o th in g n oth in g but the hiatus th at m akes the social structure unwhole,

the hiatus o f the class-struggle.
4. (O pen) Problems an d (Unsatisfactory) Solutions
T h e introdu ction o f the co n cept o f fantasy seems to be a m ixed blessing:
a lth o u g h it gives a fairly satisfa cto ry g e n e ra l d e sc rip tio n , it o p en s the
d iffic u lt q u e stio n o f w here to situ a te this c o n c e p t w ith in th e fie ld o f
h isto ric al m aterialism if this co n cept c a n figure w ithin this field at all.
Solution I
T h is h as been im plicit throughout the preceding discussion. It presents
the id eological universe (the background netw ork o f beliefs) as structured
around the fantasy as its um bilical p oin t: the interpretation proceeds by
reading an utterance in the light o f this b ack gro un d o f beliefs; it is m ade
possible by the interpreters yielding to the ideological interpellation. T h e
in te rp e lla tio n , in turn, is m e d iated by th e m e c h a n ism o f id e n tifica tio n ,
w h ich d e p e n d s u pon th e individual su b jects desire b ein g cau gh t by the
ideological fantasy.
T h e Objection to S o lu tio n I is: are we to a c c e p t the n o tio n o f so cial
fan tasy ? If th e an sw er is Y E S , th e n h ow are we to re late th is so -called
s o c ia l fa n ta sy to in d iv id u a l fa n ta sie s? F or it is c le a r th a t th e grip o f
ideology will o n ly h o ld if it succeeds:
either in in d ucin g the individual to en tertain the so cial fantasy as her/his
ow n individual fantasy;
or to establish a strong en ou gh relation betw een the two.
T h is altern ative brings us back to our initial problem o f the articulation
betw een the social and the individual, and on ly p resen ts it in a different
term in ology . S o lu tio n I seem s on ly a Verstellung, a d isp la cem en t o f the
problem . If we are n ot to accep t the n otion o f social fantasy, we are led to
take a different direction.
Solution II
T h is consists in reversing th e perspective on th e m o d el o f th e classical
Freudian treatm en t o f fantasy (cf. A C h ild is B ein g B e a te n . ) In Freud,
fantasy as a petrified string o f signifiers takes on differen t m eanings under
the im pact o f the backgroun d beliefs th at depend on the specific libidinal
econ om y at successive stages o f the individuals developm en t. T h e sentence
(a well-form ed string o f lexical item s) could then be view ed as fun ction in g
in the m ode o f fantasy, acquiring m ean in g only w hen inserted into a c o n
crete inter-subjective situation , i.e., only after h avin g b ecom e an utterance
(assum ed by a speaker determ ined by her/his situ ation al status and addres

IDEOLOGY AND FA N TA SY

153

sin g h e r/h im se lf to an eq ually d eterm in ed ad d ressee.) T h e oth er side o f

interpellation would th en be the de-fantasizing o f the exch an ged linguistic
form ation.
T h e O bjection to S o lu tio n II is o b v io u s even b efo re we w ork ou t its
im plications: th ere are sim ply to o m an y fantasies circu latin g around. T h e
p rob lem o f the p assage from the in d iv id u al to the so cial or, in H eg elian
term s, from the singular to the u niversal, is reso lv ed in a m ech an ical way:
S o lu tio n II m ak es ev ery sin g u la r se n te n c e im m e d ia te ly u n iv e rsa l, and
co n ceals this quid pro quo under the n am e o f fantasy. Solu tio n II turn s out
to be ju st an o th er k in d o f V erstellung: it m ak es the in terp re ta tio n o f a
fa n ta sy -se n te n c e d ep en d on a b ack gro u n d n etw ork o f b eliefs, w ith ou t
g iv in g a th e o re tic a l sta tu s to th is b a ck g ro u n d . S in c e th e b a c k g ro u n d
c a n n o t be anyth in g else bu t ideology, S o lu tio n II falsely pretends to have
solved the problem o f ideology by introducing a new nam e for it.
Solution III
T h e qu estion a b o u t th e p ossib ility o f an individuals active stan ce as to
the in terpellation can be put in a sim pler, and a m ore precise way: how are
we ab le to u n d e rsta n d (to in te rp re t) u tte ra n c e s w ith o u t (n e c e ssa rily )
yielding to their interpellation? W e said th at interpretation depended on, or
could at least be supported by, a p rin cip le o f in terpretation . T h e PI is a
ration alization o f the interpreters identification with the subject supposed
to believe: it is a coh eren t part o f a structured n etw ork o f the background
beliefs ascribed to the su bject supposed to believe. O ur thesis has been th at
the choice o f a particular PI an ticip ates the rest o f the connected beliefs,
and th a t all belief-im plications m ay n o t be, and typically are not, accessible
to the interpreter. Further, we h ave m ain tain ed th at w ithin th e n etw ork o f
b ack gro un d beliefs, there is a n u cle u s th a t h as all the properties o f a
Freudian fantasy; th at an expansion o f the PI necessarily touches upon this
fantasy-nucleus; and th at the fantasy-nucleus is the interpellative c a tch .
W e h av e also stressed th a t the in terp re tatio n d o es n o t dem an d th at th e
in terp reter actu ally en d o rse th e PI an d th e b eliefs co n n ecte d w ith it: it
suffices th at the interpreter co n ce d e s as possible the beliefs required to m ake
an u tteran ce m ake sen se. C on seq uen tly , a conditional identification (w ith
th e su b ject su p posed to b eliev e) is all th a t is n eed ed for u n d erstan din g;
th e re is th e n a discontinuity b e tw e e n id e n tific a tio n a n d su b je c tiv a tio n
proper: an (id eological) exch an ge m ay be carried on w ithout th e fantasyn ucleus h av in g been m ade explicit. T h is is even the typical case, exposin g
th e c h a r a c te r is tic in sid io u sn e ss o f th e id e o lo g ic a l p ro ce ss: the p artie s
involved n o t only do n o t conrol the efficacity o f the fantasy-nucleus, they
are usually n ot even aware o f it. Id eological transactions are being carried
out on the level o f iden tification and its rationalizations, and even political

THE A LTH U SSERIA N LEGA CY

154

th eory u su ally re m ain s on this lev e l, w h ich f a c t does n ot d im in ish the

ev en tu a l force an d ratio n ality o f its argum ents it on ly sh ow s th a t it does
n o t n ecessarily (an d does n ot usually) h an d le its ideological effects. T h e
triggerin g o f the interpellative catch rem ains beyond its control.
C onversely, this exp lain s the relative facility o f everyday com m u nication
t h a t h as r e m a in e d a n e n g im a in the lig h t o f our th e o ry : a m b ig u ity ,
am phibology, etc. very often arise w ithin the field dom inated b y the sam e
fantasy-nucleus. T h is is even ch aracteristic o f strong ideological utterances
w hich, offerin g a se em in g freedom o f in terp re tatio n , covertly defin e the
space w here this freedom m ay be exercised.
6) Look, Im n ot goin g to pick on an invalid.
R on ald R e agan
A lin gu istic analysis la D ucrot w ould d em on strate th at 6) entails an
in fam ou s p re su p p o sitio n , lik e: D u k a k is is a n in v a lid . S till, th e sam e
sentence (i.e., th e sam e linguistic form ation ) co u ld be used in an utterance
entailing the opposite presupposition, and w hose developed form could be
rendered in this way:
6 a) I am n o t goin g to pick on an invalid w hen I am goin g to encourage
D ukakis to release his m edical records, for he is perfectly O .K ., as far as I
know.
N o tw ith stan d in g the essential difference in the sense the sam e sentence
can acquire in utterances 6) an d 6 a), they are b o th dom inated by the sam e
fantasy or b elief nuclei: th at there is som eth in g disqualifying in seeking
p sy ch iatric a ssista n c e . T h e c o n c e p t o f fa n ta sy or b e lie f n u cle u s h as
n ev erth eless m o st p ro b ab ly b een w eaken ed an d co n ce p tu a liz ed n o t as a
strictly defined fantasy, but as a delim itatio n o f a place where individuals are
invited to insert their idiosyncratic ph an tasies p ro p er.16
T h e tw o m e a n in g s o f 5 ) a re eq u a lly d o m in a te d by th e sa m e b eliefnucleus: th at there is som eth in g fatally an d personally degradin g in losin g a
war. Ju st as 5) would preferably attract n arcissistic fantasies, 6) would appeal
to fantasies related to the castration -com plex.
T h e Objection to S o lu tio n III would be th at it ten ds to ex p lain ideological
in terp e lla tio n by in d iv id u al p sy ch o lo gical ch a ra cte ristics, rath er th an by
objective so cial p ositions. T h e answ er w ould be th a t we sh o u ld view so cial
p ositio n s as m ed iated by the individual p syche as an ideological ph en om e
n on. A theory alon g these lines should further develop indication s in note
16 below , and m igh t resolve the false dilem m a w h ether social co n d ition s
deform individual psych ologies (a basically ro m an tic or R ousseau ist thesis)
or h ave a selective effect on the n atu ral offer o f ch aracters (a thesis la

IDEOLOGY A N D FA N TA SY

155

T a in e ), or depend on differences in the social ch aracter (a very old thesis

th at can be found, e.g., already in the 4th-century writer Julian A p o state .)

N o te s
1. T h is se e m s to b e th e tro u b le w ith H a b e r m a ss L ebensweit h e rm e n e u tics: an in d iv id u al
m ay su b m it to in te r p e lla tio n o n ly u n d e r th e c o n d itio n o f h a v in g alw ay s a lre a d y su b m itte d to it.
2. A c e r ta in ty p e o f p o st- M a r x ism (a w h o le sa le m a r k e tin g b r a n d o f p o st-stru c tu ra lism )
c h e e r fu lly ta k e s up th is p o sitio n : W h e n e v e r w e use th e c a teg o ry o f s u b je c t in th is te x t, w e
w ill d o so in th e se n se o f su b je c t p o s itio n s w ith in th e d isc u rsiv e stru c tu re (E . L a c la u a n d C h .
M o u ffe , Hegem ony a n d Socialist Strategy [L o n d o n , 1 9 8 5 ], p . 11 ). T h is e ith e r le a d s in to th e trap
w e d iscu ssed s u p r a u n d e r 1); o r (a s in th e c a se o f th e q u o te d a u th o r s), it m e an s giv in g up any
a tte m p t to w ork ou t a th eo ry o f th e su b je c t, w hich fin ally leads to a th e o r e tic a l c a p itu la tio n ,
m a sq u e ra d in g its o p p o r tu n istic re la tiv ism w ith a h e av y se m io tic co sm e tic s.
3 . 0 . D u c ro t, L e dire et le dit, P aris 1 9 8 4 ; H .P . G r ic e , L o g ic a n d C o n v e r s a t io n , Syn tax an d
Sem an tics, [V o l. 3], Speech A c ts, P. C o le an d J .L . M o rg a n (e d s) [A c a d e m ic P ress, 1 9 7 5 ]. T h is
p r in c ip le is so g e n e r a l th a t it u n d e rlie s o th e rw ise d iffe r e n t a n d e v e n c o n tr a r y e p iste m o lo g ic a l
p ro ce d u re s; c o m p a r e , e .g ., S e a r le s tre a tm e n t o f in d ir e c t sp e e c h a c ts (Expression a n d M eanin g
[C a m b rid g e , 1 9 7 9 ]), w ith D u c r o ts theory o f p re su p p o sitio n s a n d sou s'en ten du s (w h ic h d e n ie s
b o th p h e n o m e n a l a n d th e o r e tic a l sta tu s to in d ire c t sp e e c h a c ts ).
4- M . P e c h e u x , L es vrits de la Palice [P aris, 1975].
5. T h e p h r a se it g o e s w ith o u t s a y in g str ik e s a t t h e h e a r t o f t h e m a tte r :

a n id e o lo g y

su g g e sts h o w w h at is said is to b e ta k e n . It o fte n su ffices to m a k e it sp e a k o u t to d e str o y its

in te r p e lla tiv e m a g ic . A s f o r th e p o ssib ility th a t a n id e o lo g y c o n s t r u c t s th e o u te r s o c ia l
w o r ld , w e m a y d e m o n s tr a te o u r p o in t in t r a d it io n a l te r m s: t r a d it io n a ll y sp e a k in g , th e
d iffe re n c e b e tw e e n t h e in n e r a n d t h e o u t e r w orld is t h a t, u n lik e t h e latter, t h e fo rm er do es
n o t k n o w th e e sse n c e /a p p e a ra n c e d istin c tio n , so th at in n er th in g s are w h at th ey see m to be.
Id e o lo g y a c ts u p o n th e in n e r w o rld by in d u c in g a p p e a r a n c e s t h a t in s t a n tly tu rn in to
e s se n c e s. In th is m e th o d o lo g ic a lly s o lip s is tic m a n n e r, w e m ay m in im a listic a lly c la im t h a t th e
se lf-d e fin itio n (or se lf-p e rc e p tio n ) o f a su b je c t e n te rs in to h e r/h is in te rsu b je c tiv e r e la tio n s. A s
w e h av e ad m itte d that this se lf-d e fin itio n o f a su b je c t is a n id e o lo g ic a l p ro d u ct, we h av e th u s
d e m o n stra te d th at, e v e n u n d e r th o se e x tre m e ly u n su itab le e p iste m o lo g ic a l p re su p p o sitio n s, it
fo llo w s th a t id eo lo gy is c o n stru c tiv e o f s o c ia l reality .
6. B e lie f is th e p riv ile g e d (a n d m a y b e th e o n ly ) self-fu lfillin g m o d a lity o f desire: an y form o f
r e n u n c ia tio n is su p p o rted by th e b e lie f th a t it g iv e s so m e o n e else p le a su re , an d is gratified by th is
m e re su p p o sitio n . T h e lib id in a l e c o n o m y o f b e lie f m a k e s th e su b je ct su p p o se d to e n jo y a n e c
e ssa ry co m p le m e n t to th e su b je c t su p p o se d to b e lie v e . (O n th e m e c h a n ism s o f r e n u n c ia tio n
an d th e co m p le m e n ta ry su p p o se d p leasu re, see A . G ro sric h a rd , L a Structure du srail).
7. T h is is a r e c e n t e x a m p le , c o m in g fro m a n h i s t o r ia n w h o ta k e s id e o lo g y se r io u sly :
Id e o lo g y , as w e k n o w , is n o t a re fle c tio n o f reality , b u t a w ay to a c t u p o n it. F o r t h is a c tio n to
h a v e a t le a s t s o m e e f f e c t , t h e r e s h o u ld n o t b e t o o la r g e a g a p b e t w e e n th e il lu s io n a r y
re p r e se n ta tio n a n d th e r e a lity o f l i f e . (G . D u b y , L Im aginaire d u fodalism e [P a r is, 1 9 7 8 ]).
Id eo lo g y is p o site d b o th o u tsid e th e so c ia l reality ( a s a n in stru m e n t t o ac t u p o n i t ) a n d in sid e it
(its im p o rta n c e fo r a h isto ria n c o m e s fro m its b e in g a so c ia l fa c t a m o n g o th e r s). T h e s o lu tio n o f
situ a tin g id eo lo gy a t a n in te rm e d ia te d ista n c e n o t to o clo se , n o t to o far from th e reality , is
sy m p to m a tic o f its u to p ia n in d e te rm in a tio n .
8. T h e th in g th a t d istin g u ish e s an d a t th e sam e tim e rev eals th is p art o f th e d re a m -w o rk is
its p u rp o se. T h is fu n c t io n b e h a v e s in th e m a n n e r w h ic h th e p o et m a lic io u sly a sc r ib e s to
p h ilo so p h e rs: it fills u p th e g a p s in th e d re a m -stru c tu re w ith sh re d s an d p a tc h e s (H e in e , D ie
H e im k e h r ). A s a r e s u lt o f its e ffo r t s , th e d re a m lo se s its a p p e a r a n c e o f a b s u r d ity a n d
d isc o n n e c te d n e s s a n d a p p r o x im a te s to th e m o d e l o f a n in te llig ib le e x p e r ie n c e . . . . D re a m s
a p p e a r to h a v e a m e a n in g , but th a t m e a n in g is as f a r r e m o v e d a s p o ssib le fro m th e ir true
sig n ific a n c e . (S . F reu d , T h e Interpretatin o f D ream s).

156

TH E A LTH U SSE R IA N LEGACY

9. Ibid.
10. In T h e Interpretation o f D ream s (1 9 0 0 ) a n d in O n D ream s ( 1 9 0 1 ) , se c o n d a ry e la b o r a tio n
is su p p o se d to be a p a r t o f th e d rea m -w o rk , e v e n t h o u g h its less im p o r ta n t p art, n o t e v e n
n e c e ssa rily p re se n t in ev ery d rea m . In A n Evidential D ream (E in T r a u m a ls Bew eism ittel, 1 9 1 3 ),
Freu d alre a d y d o u b ts i f se c o n d ary e la b o ra tio n fo rm s a p a rt o f th e d ream -w o rk p ro p e r, an d fin d s a
S o lo m o n ic so lu tio n to g e t rid o f th e p ro b lem : S e c o n d a r y rev isio n by th e c o n sc io u s ag e n c y is
h e re r e c k o n e d as p art o f th e d rea m -w o rk . E v e n if o n e w ere to se p a ra te it, th is w o u ld n o t in v o lv e
an y a lte r a tio n in ou r c o n c e p tio n . W e sh o u ld th e n h a v e to say: d re a m s in th e a n a ly tic se n se
c o m p r is e t h e d r e a m - w o r k p ro p e r t o g e t h e r w ith th e s e c o n d a r y r e v is io n o f its p r o d u c t s .
( S t a n d a r d E d i t io n , X I I , 2 7 4 - 2 7 5 .)

In h i s a r t ic le o n P s y c h o - A n a ly s is ,

c o n t r ib u t e d to

M a r c u se s H an dw rterbu ch , F r e u d s t a te s t h a t stric tly s p e a k in g , s e c o n d a r y e la b o r a tio n d o e s

n o t fo rm a p a rt o f th e d re a m -w o r k (Ib id , 2 4 1 ) F re u d s h e sita tio n c a n b e b est sh o w n if w e
ju x ta p o se th e fo llo w in g tw o p assag e s: A r e w e to su p p o se th a t w h at h a p p e n s is th a t in th e first
in sta n c e th e dream c o n stru c tin g fac to rs . . . put to g e th e r a p ro v isio n a l d r e a m -c o n te n t out o f
th e m a te ria l p ro v id e d , a n d th at this c o n te n t is su b se q u e n tly re-c ast so as to c o n fo rm so far as
p o ssib le to th e d e m a n d s o f a secon d agen cy? T h is is sc arce ly p ro b a b le . W e m ust a ssu m e rath e r
th a t fr o m th e v ery first th e d e m an d s o f th is se c o n d fa c to r c o n s t it u te o n e o f th e c o n d itio n s
w h ic h th e d re a m m u st s a t is f y a n d th a t th is c o n d it io n . . . o p e r a te s s im u lt a n e o u s ly in a
co n d u c tiv e a n d sele ctiv e m a n n e r (S ta n d a rd E d ition , V , 4 9 9 ). I sh all n o t d e a l e x h a u stiv e ly
w ith th is p a r t o f th e d rea m -w o rk , an d will th e rfo re m e re ly r e m a r k th a t th e e a s ie s t w ay o f
fo rm in g a n id ea o f its n atu re is to su p p o se th o u g h th e su p p o sitio n p ro b a b ly d o e s n o t m e et the
f a c t s t h a t it o n y c o m e s in t o o p e r a t i o n A F T E R th e d r e a m - c o n t e n t h a s a lr e a d y b e e n
c o n str u c te d (Ib id ., 6 6 6 ).
11. T h is p a ra g ra p h a d d e d t o O n D ream s in 1 9 11; S ta n d a r d E d itio n , V , 6 6 7 .
12. L a t e r in th is te x t (T h e Interpretation o f D ream s, S ta n d a r d E d itio n V , 4 9 1 ) , w e c o m e
a c r o ss th is im p o r ta n t state m en t: H y sterical sy m p to m s are n o t a tta c h e d to ac tu al m e m o ries,
b u t to p h a n ta sie s ere c te d o n th e b asis o f m e m o rie s. In a n a d d e n d u m to h is le tte r to F liess o f
M ay 2, 1 8 9 7 , Freu d alre a d y sp e cifie d th a t idea: F a n ta sie s are p sy c h ic a l fac ad e s c o n stru c te d in
o rd e r to b ar th e w ay to th e se m e m o rie s [o f p rim al sc e n e s].
13. D . D a v id so n , in Inquiries into T ruth and Interpretation, p e rsu a siv e ly d e m o n str a te s th a t
m o st o f th e b a c k g r o u n d b e lie fs n ece ssary f o r a c o m m u n ic a tio n are shared a n d true; th e y are also
triv ial (b e lie f in th e e x iste n c e o f m a cro -p h y sic al o b je c ts, tim e - sp a c e c o o rd in a te s, c e r ta in c a u sa l
r e la tio n s e t c .). A n a ly tic p h ilo so p h y re d u c e s all id e o lo g y to th is sp o n ta n e o u s an th r o p o lo g ic a l
m e ta p h y s ic s ; th e c h o ic e o f its e x a m p le s b etray s w ell its id e o lo g ic a l b ia s : in te n d e d to be
n e u tra l, th ey are su c h th a t co u ld o n ly e x c e p tio n a lly fig u re in an y r e a l e v e rd a y co n v e rsa tio n .
14- C f . F re u d s essay E in K in d w ird g e sc h la g e n ( A C h ild is B e in g B e a t e n ) , S ta n d a r d
E d itio n X V II.
15. A n a l y s in g t h e B e lg r a d e trial a g a in s t t h e six d issid e n t in t e lle c t u a ls ( 1 9 8 4 - 1 9 8 5 ) , we
d isc o v e re d th is e le m e n t in th e p o p u la r fa n ta sy o f a fo o tb a ll (so c c e r ) m a tc h A la Y o u g o sla v e
(Problem i n o . 2 5 7 , 1 9 8 5 ).
16. T h e fa c t th a t fa n ta sie s are rigid n o t o n ly in tra -su b je c tiv e ly b u t in te r -su b je c tiv e ly as
w ell, su p ports our thesis rath er th a n d e fe a ts it. T h e fa c t th at th e fa n ta sy o f th e p rim al scen e
tak e s th e sam e asp ect w ith m o st n e u ro tic s, i.e., th e fo rm o f a coitus a tergo, c o n fu se d Freu d in h is
e n d e a v o r to d e te r m in e w h e th e r th e se fa n ta sie s a re r e c o lle c tio n s o f r e a l p e r c e p tio n s o r ju st
c o n s t r u c t io n s . ( C f. W o lfsm a n n , w h ere h is fin a l v e r d ic t is n o n liqu et.) T h e p r o b le m o f
in d iv id u a l p sy c h o lo g y is th e sam e as the p ro b le m o f id eo lo gy : the fan tasy is the p lace w here
p e r c e p t u a l ( o r f a c t u a l ) m a t e r ia l m e e ts w ith s e m io t i c c o n s t r a in t s . N e u r o t ic s n e e d to
fa n ta siz e a c o ita l p o s itio n that m a x im a lly e x p o se s the d iffe re n c e o f the s e x u a l o rgan s in an
u n d e c id a b le in terplay.

Tom Lewis

The Marxist Thing

I w a n t to th a n k e v e ry o n e w h o h a s h a d a h a n d in o r g a n iz in g th is
con feren ce and also a ll o f those p an elists and aud ience m em bers w ho h ave
p articip ated in it by sh arin g their ideas w ith the rest o f us. I h ave learn ed a
lot, and, ju st as im portantly, I h av e sensed here a cam araderie th at is alltoo-easy to lose sigh t o f in th e A cad em y . O u t on th e prairie we often k eep
this cam arad erie alive, b o th in the u n iversities and in the b road er public
s p h e r e , t h r o u g h s i g n if i c a n t in t e r a c t io n s w ith th e r h e t o r ic o f an d
so m etim e s th ro u gh strategic in terv en tio n s in to the p o litics o f good o l
m idw estern populism . A fte r all, in Politics an d Ideology in M arxist Theory,
E r n e s t o L a c l a u d id s u c c e e d in d e m o n s t r a t in g t h a t p o p u lis m a i n t
necessarily bad!
M ost o f us can agree th at it would be just great if there really were a
p o p u la r -d e m o c ra tic m o v e m e n t in th e U n ite d S ta te s , on e th at m igh t
prove cap ab le o f remotivating a few ideological signifiers here and there in the
interests o f h elp in g to articulate a co un ter-h egem on ic p o litical p ractice. O f
course, such a m ovem en t h as b een underw ay sin ce 1983. Yet m any o f us
still resist u n d erstan din g its sign ifican ce accord in g to L a c la u s precise term s
and p refer too o fte n to go on livin g som ew here over the R ain b o w . I know
you realize I m ean the R ain b o w C o a litio n , and I will agree with you th at
R ain bow p o litic s ain t n o re v o lu tio n ary so c ia list p o litics: truth b e told,
rainbows result from reform ist refractions. It would be to m istake a reality
fo r an illusion, how ever, to th in k th a t socialism in the U n ite d S ta te s could
e ver be w on in splendid isolation from a m o vem en t such as th e R ain bow
C o a li t io n . L a c l a u s le s so n s a b o u t th e n e e d to a r t ic u la t e p o p u la r d e m o c r a tic in t e r p e lla t io n s in r e la tio n to w o rk in g -c la ss in te r e s ts an d
revolu tion ary organization s are in d eed m u ch m ore to th e poin t.
I d o n t d a r e c a l l w h a t y o u re a b o u t to h e a r w o r k - in - p r o g r e s s .
So m etim e dow n the line I w ant to write a b ook called M arxism and C haos,
an d I th in k th at A lth u sserian theory h as su b stan tial contribution s to m ake
to such a book. I b ecam e interested in this th eoretical top ic because lately
I h av e been trying to figure ou t w h at the so-called S p a n ish R e v o lu tio n o f
1 8 5 4 was and m eant. It lasted two years until 1856 assum ing th at IT
really was a re v o lu tio n . W h atever it was, tw entieth-century h istorian s
h a v e gen erally view ed it as a m ere lo c a l even t, a blip on the screen o f

THE A LTH U SSERIA N LEGA CY

158

P C time, w ithout profound ram ification s o f its ow n in S p a n ish history.

In ways I only suspect a n d c a n n o t yet explain , how ever, I believe th a t the
course o f S p a n ish h istory was altered by it sign ifican tly. M y only so lace at
the m o m en t is th a t M arx and E n gels pub lish ed 2 0 8 p ages o f jo u rn alistic
a r t ic le s a b o u t w h at M a r x h im s e lf e n t h u s ia s t ic a lly (th o u g h so m e w h a t
p rem atu rely !) c a lle d th e R e v o lu tio n in S p a in . If its still feasible to me
after m ore research, I inten d to argue those p ages into a M arxist theory of
c h a o s.
A s a sort o f inform al p rolegom en on to such a p roject, I w ant to try this
a fte rn o o n to ov erlap a v o cab u lary derived from ch a o s th eory as it h as
been developed in the n atu ral sciences w ith w h at I take to be som e o f those
s t i l l l iv in g in s ig h t s o f A l t h u s s e r s (a s A l e x C a l l i n i c o s c a l l e d th e m
yesterday). C h a o s theory m ay well be new to m an y o f you, and I bovinely
co n fess th at Im in sufficiently k n ow led geable ab ou t m any o f its co n cepts
and im plication s. Y et Id like to offer a lim ited set o f ru m in ation s the
verb to ru m in ate, by the way, origin ally h ad to do with cow s ch ew in g
th e ir cu ds for w h ich th e fo llo w in g tw o c ita tio n s from Ja m e s G le ic k s
C h aos: M aking a N e w Science m ay serve as epigraphs:
T h e m ore [scien tists] h ad th ou gh t ab ou t n on lin earity , the m ore
[they] felt the force o f . . . universality. (G le ic k 1988: 183)
In scien ce as in life, it is well know n th a t a ch ain o f ev en ts can
h a v e a p o in t o f crisis th a t could m agn ify sm all ch an ge s. But ch ao s
m e a n t th at su ch p oin ts were everyw here. T h e y were p ervasiv e. In
system s like the w eath er, sen sitiv e d ep en d en ce on in itia l co n d itio n s
w as an in escap ab le co n seq u en ce o f the way sm all scales in tertw in ed
w ith larg e .(G le ick 1988: 23)
P lease allow m e to an te up tw o m ore citation s, which, alth ou gh taken
from different sources, m ay serve to indicate the stakes (steak s?) in these
ru m in ation s. I d o n t know how m an y o f you m ay h av e h ad o c c a sio n to
listen to a so n g called T a lk in B out A R e v o lu tio n .
D o n t you know
T h e y re talkin about a revolu tion
It sounds like a w hisper
W h ile theyre stan d in g in the w elfare lines
C ry in g at the doorsteps o f th ose arm ies o f
salv atio n
W astin g tim e in the u n em p loy m en t lines
S ittin g arou n d w aitin g for a prom o tion
D o n t you know

TH E M A R X IST TH ING

159

T h e y re talk in about a revolu tion

It sounds like a w hisper
P oor p eop le gon n a rise up
A n d get their share
Poor people gon n a rise up
A n d take w h ats theirs . . .
Yes, finally, the tables are startin g to turn.
W ere you ab le to hear IT ? I T so u n d s lik e a w h isper. T h a t s T ra c y
C h a p m a n o ff h er 1988 alb u m Tracy Chapm an (side 1, b a n d 1). T h is is now
V in ce n t D esco m b es in his 1979 b o o k M odern French Philosphy: In brief,
A lth u sse rs en terp rise im plies th a t in the lo n g [run] the word d ia le c tic
sh o u ld be d isc a rd e d a p ro je c t w h ich co u ld n o t be d isclo se d u n til th e
ground h ad been prepared for its re cep tio n (1 2 2 ).
T h is aftern oon I sh all en deavor to explore the c h a o tic con sequ en ces o f
th e se la st two p assa g e s. Im g o in g to su g g e st in fact th a t they tak e us
directly to th e M arxist thing: ch aos in history.
A ctu ally , Ive alread y told you th at m u ch w hen I cited T a lk in B out A
R e v o lu tio n . A lth o u g h you m ay already understand w hat I m ean by the
M arxist th in g, nam ely, re volu tion you still m ay w onder w hat I m ean
by c h a o s. For starters, I m ean by ch aos the notion th at com plexity and
u n p re d ic ta b ility a rise in sim p le , d e te rm in istic , n o n lin e a r sy stem s th a t
m an ifest sensitive dependence on initial conditions (G le ic k 1988: 2 3 ). I a lso
m e a n th a t sim p le processes c a n produ ce m agn ificen t edifices o f com plexity
without ran d o m n e ss (G le ic k 1988: 3 0 6 ).
F or e x a m p le , th e h isto ry o f a ll h ith e rto e x istin g so ciety is q u ite
sim ply th e history o f class stru ggles. Y et it is a lso true th at history gives
rise to h igh ly co m p le x so cial form ation s a n d th a t it perm its on ly relatively
s m a ll w in d o w s o f p r e d i c t a b i l i t y w it h r e s p e c t to t h e e m e r g e n c e ,
develo pm en t, or dem ise o f such form ation s.
A ch ao tic M arxism th u s en th u siastically recognizes determination, a n d it
does so p r e c is e ly in th e str o n g p h ilo s o p h ic a l se n s e . B e c a u se it a lso
u n d e rsta n d s h isto ry a n a lo g ic a lly or m e ta p h o ric a lly , if y ou w ill as a
nonlinear d e te rm in istic system , a c h a o tic M a rx ism recogn izes, to o , th a t
co m p lexity a n d u np red ictab ility are co n stitu tiv e o f history in fu n ction o f
th e se n s itiv e d e p e n d e n c e o f h is t o r ic a l p h e n o m e n a on v a ria b le in it ia l
co n d itio n s th at do n o t ch an ge at th e sam e ra te. T h e expression variable
in itia l co n d itio n s here sh ou ld b e ta k e n to suggest n o t only the ob viou s
p o in t th a t differen t so cial form ation s m ay origin ate from different in itial
c o n d itio n s, bu t also th e p erh ap s less ob v io u s p o in t th at th e sam e social
fo rm a tio n c o n s ta n tly is e x p o se d to n ew in itia l c o n d itio n s. In itia l
c o n d itio n s , th e refo re, a re n o t f ix e d o n c e a n d for a ll at a h y p o th e tic a l

160

THE A LTH U SSERIA N LEGACY

m om en t o f o rigin but are co n stan tly eith er rep ro d u ced or ch a n g e d in a

relatio n o f co m p lex and uneven d ev elo p m en t.
O n e co u ld say th a t a c h a o tic M a rx ist, lik e a c h a o tic m e te o ro lo g ist,
en vision s system s as con ju n ctures, sin ce co n ju n ctu res display n o necessary
fe a tu re s o f c lo su r e , h o m o g e n e ity , or te le o lo g y . E v e n th o se contingent
fe a tu re s o f c lo su r e , h o m o g e n e ity , or te le o lo g y th a t c o n ju n c tu r e s m ay
display, m oreover, rem ain vo latile in space-tim e p recisely b ecau se th e y are
sen sitively d epen d en t u pon in itial co ndtion s. For exam ple, w hen certain
in itia l co n d ition s are satisfied, it will rain. B u t it w on t n ecessarily rain
forever. T h is was Y ah w eh s com fort to N o a h (a t a tim e w hen th ere were
n o h o les in th e ozone layer!).
D oes a ch a o tic M arxism hold to a view o f eco n o m ic determ in ism ? You
b et! A n d it even h old s to views o f p o litical and id e o logical determ inism !
Its just th at it co n sid ers th a t all th o se deb ates over th e last in sta n c e or
th e first in s ta n c e im p lic itly re m a in as d e p e n d e n t on n ow o u tw o rn ,
in effective tem p oral m etap h o rs, as older d e b a tes on th e p rim acy o f the
base vs. the relative auton om y o f the su perstructu re im plicitly rem ain
d e p e n d e n t o n now o u tw o rn , in e ffe c tiv e s p a t ia l m e ta p h o rs. H a p p ily ,
m oreover, y o u w ill discover th at i f you d o n t use th ose m etap h o rs you w on t
n eed th e d ia le c tic a term w h ich p recisely im p o se s u p o n ra g ta g an d
b o b ta il re v o lu tio n a rie s su ch d iscre e tly an d even ch a rm in g ly sa c e rd o ta l
qu estion s as a lp h a or om ega?, hu m an or d ivin e?, or tw o-in-on e?. (It
ended up anyw ay as th ree-in -on e, or so said A u g u stin e !)
W e n eed a better way to u n d erstan d w hat is correctly if in adequ ately
en cap su lated by the expression relative au ton om y .
A cco rd in g to M ik e D avis, one o f the th in g s L en in ev en tu ally cam e to
u n d e r s t a n d w a s t h a t p o l i t i c a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s g r o w s o u t o f th e
o v erd eterm in atio n o f the econ om ic class struggle by oth er co n trad ictio n s
a n d fo rm s o f o p p p r e s sio n (1 9 8 6 : 3 0 8 ). M ic h a e l B u raw o y h a s argu ed
sim ilarly th a t you c a n t c o n stitu te th e e c o n o m ic as a th in g in M arxist
theory indep en den tly o f th o se th in g s we h ab itu ally refer to as p olitics and
ideology (1 9 8 5 ). N o r v ice versa, v ice versa, v ic e v ersa. N o w , you can
sh oeh orn D a v iss a n d B u raw oys in sigh ts into a H eg elian M arxist theory o f
d ialectics if you wish, but this w ould be to fudge th e th in g in the sam e
way scientists often fudge solu tions to n on lin ear eq uation s by decidin g, say,
to fo rg e t abou t f r ic tio n re sista n c e w h en c a lc u la tin g th e a m o u n t o f
energy n e c e ssa ry to a c c e le ra te a h ock ey p u ck . If ) u j take a c c o u n t o f
friction , w hat otherw ise can be represented as a linear system can only be
represented as a n o n lin ear system , w here th e relation sh ips a m o n g elem en ts
are n ot strictly p rop ortio n al an d gen erally the elem en ts d o n t all add up.
T h e te le o lo g y o f lin e a r sy ste m s vs. th e u n p r e d ic ta b ility o f n o n lin e a r
system s? T h e expressive sym m etries and even h o m ologies o f lin ear system s

TH E M A R X IST TH IN G

161

vs. the structural asym m etries and ev en overd eterm in ation s o f n on lin ear
system s? T h e totalization s o f lin ear system s vs. the general im possibility o f
add in g togeth er n o n lin ear system s? A m o n g oth er th in gs, n on lin earity
m eans th a t the act o f playing the gam e h as a way o f ch a n g in g the rules
(G le ic k 1988: 24).
S o I ta k e D a v i s s a n d B u ra w o y s in s ig h ts t o m e a n t h a t h is t o r ic a l
t h in g s a t le a st t h in g s as v iew ed by h isto r ic a l m a te r ia lism show
sen sitive depen d en ce on in itial co n d itio n s. Yet, if th is is so, th o se th in gs
still m ust be theorized as b o u n d ed th a t is, as h a v in g en tered or as h avin g
been en tered in to various determ in ate relation s (th is is the definition o f
b o u n d ed in m odern m ath em atics as well as in m odern lin gu istics). M en
[sic] m ak e their ow n history, bu t th ey do n o t m ak e it just as th ey please;
th ey do n ot m ak e it under circu m stan ces ch o se n by th em selves, but under
given circum stances directly en co un tered and inh erited from the p ast. T o
put this in the language o f chaos, h u m an b ein gs h ave freedom . T h ey are
free precisely in the sense th at h u m an agen cy m ay be said to con stitute the
eq u ivalen t o f a v ariab le in a m ath em atical equation or a co o rd in ate in
a graph. A ctually, alth ou gh som e o f you m ay fin d this overture to science
in itially disturbing, you m ay be pleased to recall from h igh sc h o o l or college
th a t a v a r ia b le in m a t h e m a t ic s is d e fin e d p r e c ise ly as a d e g re e o f
fre ed o m . E con om y , p olitics, ideology. G e n d er, race, class. D egrees o f
freedom , yes, but woefully undertheorized as re lativ e auton om y.
W hy? B ecau se in som e real sense so cialist revolu tion requires n-dim ension ality. S im p ly put, th e fam ous th ree structural in sta n ce s o f M arxism
ec o n o m y , p o litic s, a n d id e o lo g y are autonom ous. Like a n y th in g else,
how ever including classes, id e as, and even in d iv id u als a s n-num ber
o f agencies also co n stitu tin g n-num ber o f auton om ies o f various scale the
p ossible guarantees o f their effects alw ays lie elsew here. T h u s, n-dim ensionality, is to be u n d ersto od as in fin ite p o ssib ility in a fin ite space. T h a t s
a n o th e r de fin itio n o f chaos.
E very p ie ce o f a d y n a m ica l system th a t can m o ve in d ep en den tly is
a n o th er variable, a n o th er degree o f freedom . Every degree o f freedom
requires an o th er dim en sio n in p h ase space, to m ak e sure th a t a single
p o in t co n tain s en ou gh in form ation to detem in e th e state o f the system
uniquely. . . . M ath e m atician s h ad to accep t the fact th a t system s w ith
in fin itely m an y degrees o f freedo m un tram m eled n ature exp ressin g
itself in a tu rbu len t w a te rfall or an u n p red ictab le b ra in required a
p h a se sp ace o f in fin ite d im e n sio n s. But w h o co u ld h a n d le such a
thing? (G le ic k 1988: 137)

162

TH E A LTH U SSER IA N LEGACY

A n d m aybe th ats also as good a m etap h o rical defin ition o f revolu tion as
any. A s w ell as o f the problem s that ruling classes E ast and W est have in
im agin in g that IT could ever h ap pen again: It was a hydra, m erciless and
u n co n tro llable, an d it was L a n d a u s [1959] image for turbulence: infinite
m o d es, in fin ite d egrees o f freed o m , in finite d im e n sio n s (G le ic k 1988:
13 7 ). In a n y c a s e , w h e t h e r in n a t u r e or h is t o r y , c h a o s is a t o n c e
determ in istic and u npredictable. W h at ch aos is n ot, o f course, is random.
W h at IT is, is su b ject and structure together: the sen sitive depen d en ce o f
n o n lin ear determ in istic system s on in itial co n d ition s.
In the 1960s, A lth u sser set out to destroy ep istem ology: a n ob le and
necessary m ission. Yet he wrote so m uch epistem ology in the process that,
arguably, h e en ded up doin g m ore to p erp etu ate e p istem o lo gy th a n any
oth er M arxist born this century. In the m ost general sense in our current
co n ju n c tu re , that is the legacy o f A lth u sser: M a rx ist epistemology. I say
M arxist epistem ology and n o t M arxist philosophy w hich is w hat A lth u sser
said h e w an ted to fou nd, system atize, and b eq u e a th b ecau se A lth u sser
m ad e his co n tribu tion to M arx ist ph ilosoph y largely in the form o f a First
P h ilosop h y . First P h ilosop h y is a term in th e A n g lo -A m eric an tradition
o f an aly tic philosophy, w here it is used to co n v ey the idea th a t the role and
goal o f ph ilo sop h y is to provide the truth about . : . truth its origin and
ex ten t, its ground and nature. [First] Ph ilosophy as th e theory o f theory, or
th e s c ie n c e o f s c ie n c e , is sim p ly p h ilo s o p h y as the th e o ry o f t r u t h
(R o m a n o s 1983: 188).
N ow , t h a t s G e o rg e D . R o m a n o s ta lk in but h e s n o t e x a c tly ta lk in
b o u t n o r e v o lu t io n . ( H e r e I w a n t to a d d t h a t I v e ry m u ch a d m ir e
R o m a n o s s 1 9 8 3 b o o k e n t it le d Q u in e and A n a ly tic P h ilosop h y.) Y et
R o m a n o s so u n d s a lo t lik e h e s d e sc rib in g A lth u s se r in F o r M a rx an d
Reading C apital, n est-ce p a s1 Indeed, w ell-in ten tio n ed as A lth u sser w as as
a su b je ct, now here did A lth u sse r en ter in to greater co m plicity w ith the
st r u c t u r e o f m id d le - c la ss p h ilo so p h y th an in h is c o n c e rn to d e fin e
T h eo ry (w ith a c a p ita l T ) , [as] general theory, . . . w h ic h transform s into
k n o w le d g e s ( s c i e n t if i c t r u th s ) th e id e o l o g i c a l p r o d u c t o f e x is t in g
em p irical p ractices (th e con crete activity o f m e n [sic]) (A lth u sser 1965:
168). T h is T h eo ry , o f course, is also said by A lth u sser to be id en tical to
th e m a t e r ia lis t dialectic w h ic h [itself] is n o n e o th e r th a n d ia le c t ic a l
m aterialism (A lth u sse r 1965: 168).
O r so A lth u sser thou gh t an d often p racticed . Yet, in the m ost specific
future co n ju n ctu ral sense, the other and b etter A lth u sserian legacy is th at
there a in t no m ore d ialectic n eith er idealist n or m aterialist n o flavor,
no persuasion thereof. D on t you know. Theyre talkin about a revolution. It
sounds like a whisper.

TH E M ARXIST TH IN G

163

A n d , I would suggest, good riddance to the D ialectic! Because, you see,

w hen you dum p the n o tio n o f ep istem ology as First P h ilosoph y as you
must also dum p the d ia lectic. D ia le ctic except, o f course, in M a rx s
usage has always been the n am e o f a First Philosophy. A n d its h ard for
me to im a g in e an y fu tu re c o n t e x t in w h ich it c o u ld n am e a d iffe re n t
fun ction .
In h is late w orks at least in o n e o f th em , T h e T r a n sfo rm a tio n o f
P h ilo so p h y A lth u sser realized this about the D ia le c tic and really and
tr u ly d u m p e d F ir s t P h ilo s o p h y . T h e r e h e d o e s n t talk m u c h a b o u t
d iale ctic spcifically, though. In on e way this m atters, because A lth u sser
n ever explicitly aban d on ed d ia le ctic, as far as I know. A n d it would h ave
b een easier for ev eryone if h e d ju st com e out an d said it. Yet, then again,
m aybe he didn t know w hat he was doin g. O r, again, m aybe he (sub ject)
c o u ld n t guarantee th e effects (structure) o f w h at he was d o in g th e n . In
an o th er way, o f course, it sim ply d o esn t m atter, because he (su b ject) did do
it (structure). T h e groundw ork for g e ttin g rid o f d ialectic was laid early
on in his C o n tra d ic tio n and O v e rd e term in a tio n (A lth u sse r 1965: 87127). T h a t it was unlikely th is would h ave been recognized a t the tim e o f
th e p u b lic a tio n o f For M arx p ro b a b ly had so m e th in g to do w ith th e
a p p earan ce in th e sam e v o lu m e o f an en gagin g bu t p ositiv ely u n ch ao tic
essay, O n the M aterialist D ialectic (A lth u sser 1965: 161-219). N o doubt
a num ber o f oth er in itial conditions, m uch as those G re g E lliott discussed
yesterday, h ad so m eth in g to do w ith it as well.
W h a ts w ron g w ith the dialectic? M arx answ ers th at its upside dow n.
A lth u sser replies th at M a rx s answ er w on t do b ecause you c a n t ju st invert
the d ialectic: youve g o t to ov erdeterm ine it. A n d this can be done only
by u n d erstan din g so m eth in g quite specific. A lth o u g h exegetically it m ay
be tr u e as A lt h u s s e r sa y s in O n the M a t e r ia l i s t D i a l e c t i c t h a t
d ia le ctic is the study o f co n trad icio n in the very essence o f o b je cts, or
w h a t co m es to th e sa m e th in g, th e d o ctrin e o f th e u n ity o f o p p o site s
(A lth u sse r 1965: 1 9 3 ), you still m ust u n derstan d co n trad ictio n in su ch a
way th at as A lth u sser says in C o n tra d ic tio n and O verd eterm in ation
it appears [as] overdetermined in the direction o f a historical inhibition, a real
b lo ck for the co n trad icito n . . . , or in the direction o f revolutionary rupture
. . . , b u t in n e ith e r c o n d itio n is it ever found in the p ure state" (1 0 6 ).
S en sitiv e depen d en ce on in itial co n d ition s? F riction m ak ing an otherw ise
lin ear solu tion to the h ock ey -pu ck -acceleration eq uation a little m ore, sh all
IT be said, problmatique1
In my view, the answer A lth u sser should h ave given . . . wait, stop de
p u ck in g tape a m init. W h at A lth u sser d id n t say bu t w h ich he en ables to
be said today is this: co n trad ictio n h as n oth in g w h atsoever to do with the
esse n c e o f objects. N e ith e r does co n trad ictio n h ave anyth in g to do with

164

THE A LTH U SSERIA N LEGA CY

d ia le c tic . A n d it h as ev en less to do w ith th e do ctrin e o f the unity o f

o p p o s it e s , w h ic h is as m y s tic a l a d o c tr in e as th e C h r is t ia n T r in ity .
A lth u sser should h ave answ ered th at M arxism was the th in g o f history as
a chaotic dynamical system. O f history as a weird flow, aperiodic insofar as
its represen tation displays n eith er a fixed point n or a lim it cycle, a sim ple
determ in istic system th at gives rise to trem en do u s com plexity an d quickly
attain s u n predictability. W eath er is n atu res c h a o tic beh av io r as history is
h u m a n ity s c h a o tic b eh a v io r. S im p le , d e te rm in istic , d y n a m ica l system s
sh ow ing sen sitive depen d en ce o n in itial co n d ition s. Your calculations can
never be local enough, just as your big picture is still, and rightly so, your big
picture. A littler big picture th at is also a bigger little picture. S en sitiv e
d e p e n d en ce on in itial co n d itio n s was an in e scap ab le co n sequ en ce o f the
way sm all scales intertw ined with large (G le ic k 1988: 23).
T a lk ab ou t mystical ideas: a littler b ig picture th at is also a bigger little
p ictu re!? C a n you ch an ge the big picture? Finally, the tables are startin g
to turn. W hy? B ecau se the dialectic is m astersu b latin g ? N o w hispers
there. O n ly talk in g h e ad s. T h e n talk to me ab ou t a revolu tion . T h a t s
ju st talk. H ow can you talk to m e? W h y are you talk in g to m e? W here
can we talk? In Benson hurst. H ow ard Beach. A t clinic defenses. O n the
picket lines. A t the schools. S ta n d in g togeth er sh o u tin g in the M igras
fa c e . W h ile s t a n d in g in th e w e lfa re l in e s . W a s t in g tim e in th e
u nem ploym en t lin es. E ast a n d W est. W o m e n an d M en . B lack , L atin o ,
A sia n , an d W h ite. N o t th e lau n dry lis t, but W o rk ers Power. Initial
conditions are also conditional initiatives. N o t ra n d o m on es. M u ch less
sporad ic on es. L e t s Party!
Structure an d S u b je c t: m any o f us have co m e to recognize th a t th is is a
false dichotom y, and we are trying to fin d a language o f concepts and actions
to express this recognition (see, for exam ple, C allin ico s 1988). T h e subject is
structured, and in the strong sense: freedom. M ust it continue to be N ature
vs. C ulture or vice versa; C lass vs. Individual or vice versa; Stru cture vs.
S u b ject or vice versa; Effect vs. A gen t or vice versa? V ice is som etim es nice,
d e p e n d in g on co n d itio n s, an d v e rsa a in t alw ays n o virtu e anyw ay. T ry
chaos: ordered disorder. In som e ways th a ts a contradictory term. B ut not, I
will add, a con trad iction in terms. Because it thoroughly recast our notions
o f order and disorder, o f determ inism and freedom . H ow c est?
A lth u sser left us fu n ctio n alism w hich is p o ten tially en ab lin g under
fa v o ra b le c o n d itio n s for to m o rro w s w eath er bu t h e left us fu n c tio n
a lis m la rg e ly as an in su ffic ie n tly p ro b le m a tiz e d so lu tio n to a h o st o f
problem s to be solved. Im sure a ll o f you in th is aud ien ce know h ow the
forecast against a blusterin g fu n ction alism reads. W ith in any establish ed
m ode o f p rodu ction , forces a n d relation s o f p rodu ction traditio n ally are said
to correspo n d , a n d each is said to fulfill specific fun ction s th a t en able the

TH E M A R X IST TH IN G

165

m ain ten an ce o f the m ode o f p rod u ction as a w hole. If these fun ction s are
taken as p rovidin g the fully adequ ate co n cepts o f the forces and relation s of
p ro d u c tio n , h o w ev er, and if su c h fu n c tio n s are c o n c e iv e d o f as b e in g
essentially reprodu ctive in n atu re, th e n a fu n ctio n alist view o f th e so cial
form ation arises necessarily (see H in d ess a n d H irst 1975).
For exam ple, M arx m ain tain s th a t the in itial an d indispensable fun ction
o f produ ction w ithin any m ode o f produ ction is the repro du ctio n o f the
m eans (fo rces) o f p ro d u ctio n . A lth u sse r m ain ta in s, m oreover, th a t the
fu n ction o f ideology w ithin an y m ode o f p rod u ction is th e reproduction o f
th e re la tio n s o f p ro d u c tio n ( 1 9 6 8 9 7 0 ) . N o w , if th ese fu n c tio n s are
c o n s tr u e d as c o m p le te ly d e t e r m in a n t o f th e ir c o n c e p t s , an d i f th e se
c o n c e p t s a lso a re a r t ic u la t e d in a r e la t io n o f c o rre sp o n d e n c e to o n e
a n o t h e r , th e n th e c o n c e p t m o d e o f p r o d u c t i o n m u st be s e e n as
d e s i g n a t i n g a n etern al stru c tu re . T h a t is, o n c e it is c o n c e iv e d t h a t
p ro d u ctiv e forces and re la tio n s c o rre sp o n d and th a t they fu n ctio n ally
re p ro d u c e th e m se lv e s in a re la tio n o f c o r r e sp o n d e n c e , it b e c o m e s
im p o ssib le to th e o rize a n y c o n d itio n s u n d er w h ic h so m e th in g on th e
(d is )o r d e r o f e v e n a t r a n s itio n a l p h a se o f n o n - c o rre s p o n d e n c e c a n
o ccu r. T h is m eans, o f course, n o t o n ly t h a t n o accou n t c a n be rendered o f
p a s t h is t o r ic a l c h a n g e b u t a lso t h a t n o stra te g y c a n be c a lc u la te d for
p ro m o tin g future h isto rical ch an ge. A n d that ex p lain s why the issue o f
f u n c t io n a ls im is so c r u c ia l fo r the im p o r t a n t p r o je c t o f r e t h in k in g
M a r x is m to d ay . If we try, we o u g h t to be a b le to t h in k fu n c tio n s
w ith o u t d o in g fu n c t io n a lis m . W h a t s t o p s fu n c t io n a lis m w ith o u t
d isap p earin g fun ction s? S en sitiv e depen d en ce on initial con d ition s. T h e
now then A lth u sserian L e gacy .
T h re e days ago I d iscovered th a t my talk h ad b een sch edu led for the
s e s s io n o f t h is c o n f e r e n c e e n t it l e d R e p r e s e n t a t i o n / I n t e r p r e t a t i o n :
A lt h u s s e r a n d L ite ra r y T h e o r y . I re ra n t h e t a p e , a n d it f i t R e p r e
s e n t a t i o n / I n t e r p r e t a t i o n . T h e r e w as a b ig lit t le lit t le b ig p ro b le m ,
how ever, as far as the sessio n s su b title, A lth u sser and Literary T h e o ry ,
w as c o n c e r n e d . S o I w o u ld lik e to c lo s e w ith so m e th in g a b o u t th e
im p lic a tio n s o f c h a o s in re la tio n to M a rx ist literary th eory. D o n 't you
know. Im suddenly v isite d by th e m em ory th a t ch aos w as K A O S for A g e n t
86 in G e t Sm art.
N o m ean in gs are intrinsic to texts. T o th in k otherw ise is to step in a
l i t c r i t v e r s io n o f the c o w p ie W it t g e n s t e in d o d g e d w h e n he a rg u e d
successfully again st the p ossibility o f p riv ate languages. T e x tu a l m eanings
depen d on co n tex t. Ergo, oh ! ego, M acherey (1 9 6 6 ) h as en join ed us to
an aly ze an d to e x p la in the in itia l c o n d itio n s o f lite ra ry p r o d u c tio n .
O t h e r s h a v e s h o w n t h a t t h is is a c t u a l l y a r e f o r m is t r a t h e r t h a n a
revolu tion ary m oo-ve, how ever, if in itial h istorical co n tex t the m om ent

166

THE A LTH U SSE R IA N LEGACY

o f p rodu ction is to be defin ed as the latest in a lon g line o f can didates for
th e tra d itio n a l o ffic e of e p iste m o lo g ic a l g u a ra n to r . O f c o a r se , the
analysis and e x p la n a tio n o f the in itial co n d ition s o f literary p rod u ction can
be O K , if it is u n d ersto od th a t the co n d itio n s o f any sp ecific p rocess o f
p r o d u c tio n a lso in c lu d e th o se o f t e n n o n lin e a r c o n d itio n s k n o w n as
co n su m p tio n . Yet ev en this reform ulation rem ains inadequate, unless it
is affirm ed as w ell th a t initial conditions are co n stan tly either reproduced or
ch anged. T h u s the m e an in g s o f literary texts m ust be theorized as show ing
sen sitive dependen ce on variable in itial conditions th at do n o t necessarily
ch a n g e at th e sam e ra te .
T h e m ost u se-valu able goal o f literary criticism tod ay is to develop new
y o u se s for te x ts w ith in the b ro a d e r so c ia l p ro c e ss (se e , fo r e x a m p le ,
B e n n ett 1 9 7 9 ). F ollow ing A lth u sser, I would suggest th at literary criticism
does h av e m an y co n stitu tiv ely unpredictable objectifs, w h ich , depen d in g on
co n d ition s, m ay be righ t on! or righ t wing! B e n n e tts (1 9 7 9 ) a n d E a g le to n s
( 1 9 7 6 , 1 9 8 1 , an d 1 9 8 4 ) m o st v ir t u o u s v ic e , t h e r e f o r e , h as b e e n to
d e m o n strate . T o d e m o n strate th a t literature an d literary criticism form
p art o f id e o lo gical p ractice.

W orks Cited
A lth u ss e r , L . (1 9 6 5 ) F o r M a rx , trans. B e n B rew ster, N e w Y o rk: R a n d o m H o u se, 1 9 7 0 .
___ . (1 9 6 8 ) R eadin g C a p ita l, t r a n s . B e n B rew ste r, L o n d o n : N e w L e ft B o o k s, 1 9 7 5 .
___ . (1 9 6 8 - 1 9 7 0 ) L en in an d Philosophy an d O th er E ssa y s, tran s.
L o n d o n : M o n th ly R ev iew P ress, 1 9 71.

B e n B rew ste r, N e w Y o rk an d

___ . (1 9 7 6 ) T h e T r a n s f o r m a t io n o f P h ilo so p h y , P/iiiosop/i^ an d the Spo n tan eo u s Philosophy o f

the Scientists, ed. w ith in tro . G re g o ry E llio tt, trans. T h o m a s E L e w is, L o n d o n a n d N e w
Y o rk : V e rs o , 1 9 9 0 .
B e n n e tt, T . (1 9 7 9 ) Form alism a n d M arx ism , L o n d o n an d N e w Y o rk : M e th u e n .
B u raw o y , M . (1 9 8 5 ) Th e Politics o f P roduction, L o n d o n : V e rso .
C a llin ic o s , A . (1 9 8 8 ) M ak in g H istory. A gen cy, Structure a n d C h an ge in S o c ia l Th eory, Ith a c a ,
N Y : C o r n e ll U n iv e r sity P ress.
C h a p m a n , T . (1 9 8 8 ) T rac y C h ap m a n , N e w Y o rk: E le c t r a R e c o r d s.
D a v is, M . (1 9 8 6 ) Prisoners o f the A m erican D ream , L o n d o n : V e rso .
D e s c o m b e s , V . ( 1 9 7 9 ) M o d e rn F re n c h P h ilosoph y, tran s. L. S c o t t - F o x a n d J . M . H a r d in g ,
C a m b r id g e , a n d N e w Y o r k : C a m b r id g e U n iv e r sity P re ss, 19 8 0 .
E a g l e t o n ,T . (1 9 7 6 ) C riticism a n d Ideology, L o n d o n : N e w L e f t B o o k s.
___ . (1 9 8 1 ) W alter B en jam in , or, T o w ard s a Revolutionary C riticism , L o n d o n a n d N e w Y o rk:
N e w L e ft B o o k s.
___ . (1 9 8 4 ) Th e Function o f C riticism . From the Spectator to P o st-Stru ctu ralism , L o n d o n : V e rso .
G le ic k , J. (1 9 8 8 ) C h a o s. M a k in g a N e w Science, N e w Y ork: V ik in g .
H in d e ss, B . a n d H irst, P .Q . (1 9 7 5 ) P re O a p ita list M od es o f P roduction, L o n d o n , B o s t o n , a n d
H e n ley : R o u tle d g e a n d K e g a n P au l.
L a c la u , E.

( 1 9 ) Politics a n d Ideology in M a r x is t T h eo ry .

C ap italism F a sc ism P opulism ,

L o n d o n : V e rs o , 1 9 79.
L o ren z , E. (1 9 6 3 ) D e te r m in istic n o n p e rio d ic flo w , J o u m a l o f A tm ospheric Sciences 2 0 : 1 3 0 -1 4 1
___ . (1 9 6 3 ) T h e m e c h a n ic s o f v a s c illa tio n , Jo u r n a l o f A tm ospheric Sciences 2 0 : 4 4 8 -4 6 4 -

TH E M A R X IST TH IN G

167

___ . (1 9 6 4 ) T h e p ro b le m o f d e d u cin g th e clim ate fro m th e g o v e r n in g e q u a tio n s , T ellu s 16:

1- 11.
M a c h e re y , P . (1 9 6 6 ) A Theory o f L iterary Production, C h ic a g o :
19 78.
M a r x , K . a n d E n g e ls , F. ( 1 9 7 5 - ) C o lle c te d W o rk s,
M o sc o w a n d L o n d o n : P ro gress P u b lish ers.

U n iv e r sity o f C h ic a g o P ress,

5 0 v o ls , p u b lis h e d o r in p r e p a r a t io n ,

R e sn ic k , S . A . a n d W o lff, R .D . (1 9 8 7 ) Know ledge a n d C la ss. A M arx ian C ritique o f Political

E con om y, C h ic a g o : U n iv e rsity o f C h ic a g o P ress.
R o m a n o s, G .D . (1 9 8 3 ) Q u in e an d A n alytic Philosophy, C a m b r id g e , M A : T h e M I T P ress.
W i t t g e n s t e in , L . ( 1 9 5 3 ) P h ilosoph ical in v e stig a tio n s, tran s. G .E .M . A n s c o m b e , N e w Y o rk :
M a c m illa n , 1 9 7 3 .

Michle Barrett

Althussers Marx, Althussers Lacan

If th e A lth u sserian engine was running out o f steam at the end o f the
6 0s, it received a m assive new burst o f energy with the p u b lication o f what
w as to b e c o m e k n o w n u b iq u it o u s ly in E n g lis h as th e I S A s e s s a y :
Id eology and Ideo lo gical S ta te A p p ara tu se s. ' T h e essay is divided into
tw o parts, and the division is, I sh all argue, n o t m erely one o f co n ven ien ce;
it reflects the profoundly divided and co n trad icto ry n atu re o f the argum ent
A lth usser w as attem ptin g to m ake. In the first p art o f the essay A lth u sser
a d v a n c e d a n id e a t h a t was to b r in g a b o u t a r e v o lu tio n in M a r x is t
th o u g h t: th e th e sis th a t we h a d to u n d e rsta n d re p ro d u c tio n , a n d in
p articu lar the way a so cial form ation m ust reproduce itself over tim e, and
n ot restrict ourselves to an analysis o f produ ction . S in ce classical M arxism
h ad co n ce n trate d alm ost exclusively on p rodu ction , in b o th its so ciological
analysis and its w orkplace-based political p ractice, A lth u ssers argu m en t hit
a raw n e r v e an d m o v e d t h e d i s c u s s i o n in M a r x is m aw ay fr o m th e
p r o d u c tiv ism t h a t h a d d e fin e d E u ro p e a n M a r x ism from th e S e c o n d
In tern atio n al onw ards. A lth u sser (as ever) sough t tex tu al authority from
M arx, citin g an 1868 letter to K u gelm an n as proof that M arx understood
but su bsequ en t M arxists h ad n eglected the im portance o f u nderstan din g
th e n eed fo r a society to reproduce its conditions o f p rodu ction as w ell as
sim ply to carry on producing.
In practice, A lth u sser cam e up w ith a surprisingly sociological acco u n t
o f produ ction , focusin g on th e d ivision o f labor an d the role o f the fam ily in
reproducing labor pow er and the relations o f production rather loosely
d e fin e d . P u rsu in g G r a m s c is d is tin c t io n b e tw e e n th e sta te a n d c iv il
so c ie ty , A lth u sse r drew a so m ew h a t d iffe re n t d istin c tio n b etw een the
re p re ssiv e a p p a ra tu se s o f th e sta te (a rm y , p o lic e , e tc .) an d th e s t a t e s
id eological apparatuses, w hich, in h is m odel, resem bled the in stitution s o f
G r a m sc is c iv il so ciety : p o litic a l p arties, the ch u rch , e d u catio n , fam ily,
m ed ia, trade u n ion s a n d so on .
In th e secon d p a rt o f th e essay, w h ic h b egin s w ith th e subheading O n
Id eology , A lth u sser elab orates th e theory o f ideology put forward in earlier
w orks (ideology as the lived relation sh ip o f individuals to their h istorical
co n d ition s o f existen ce) through an exp osition , in a L a c a n ia n co n text, o f
the idea o f in terp ellatio n . A s we sh all see in a m om en t, his argum ent on
the qu estio n o f su bjectivity is b est read in co n ju n ctio n with the co m p an io n

170

THE A LTH U SSERIA N LEGACY

essay, Freud an d L a c a n . In general, in the first p art o f the essay we are

invited to see ideology as an aspect o f the reprodu ction o f class relation s in
c a p it a l is m , w h ile in the s e c o n d p a r t we are in v it e d to u n d e r s ta n d
su b je c tiv ity th ro u g h F reu d s sc ie n c e o f t h e u n c o n s c io u s . A lt h u s s e r s
fa ilu re to re c o n c ile th e se tw o p e rsp e c tiv e s, in w h at w as to b e c o m e an
extraordin arily influential essay, h a s contributed in n o sm all m easure to a
co n tin u in g divide betw een two traditions o f w ork on ideology: those who
see ideology as fu n ctio n al to the reproduction o f cap italism and those who
see ideology as a key to the u nderstan din g o f su b jectiv ity as an im portant
question in its ow n right.
I w ant to take the so cial reprodu ction thesis first. W ith in M arxism
g en erally , p erh ap s th e m ost typical (n o n -A lth u sse ria n ) response w as to
regard th e a rg u m e n t a s u n d u ly f u n c tio n a list in stre ssin g th e sm o o th
reprodu ction o f th e ideological relation s o f th e so c ia l form ation , A lth u sser
h ad le ft n o ro om fo r resistance, co n testatio n and struggle. H en ce, those
w ho felt th a t their tireless activ ities, in su ch organ ization s as sch ools or
trade u n io n s, were p o litic a lly w orthw h ile took e x c e p tio n to A lth u sse rs
a c c o u n t o f th e ir ro le a s m o re or le ss t h a t o f c o g s in th e c a p it a lis t
m ach in e. R ich ard Jo h n so n , criticizing A lth u sser o n this poin t, suggested
that the term repro d u ctio n is con ceptu alized very differently by G ram sci
as a h a rd an d constan tly-resisted labor, a p o litica l an d id eological w ork for
c a p it a lis m a n d fo r th e d o m in a n t c la ss e s , on v e ry o b s tin a te m a te r ia ls
in d eed.2
O n e p la c e w h e r e t h e s o c i a l r e p r o d u c t i o n m o d e l w a s t a k e n up
en th u siastically was, p arad ox ically it m ight seem now , in fem inism . In the
1970s m an y s o c ia lis t an d M a r x is t fe m in is ts u se d the th e o ry o f s o c ia l
repro du ctio n , an d particu larly A lth u sse rs reference to th e sch ool/fam ily
co u p le , as a m ean s o f in teg ratin g a discussion o f gen d er an d th e sex u al
division o f lab o r w ith a M arxist a c c o u n t o f cap italism . It seem ed at th at
poin t as if M arxism was, finally, goin g to m ove into a co n sid eration o f the
h o m e as well as the w o rk place, rep ro d u ctio n as well as p ro d u ctio n , the
p riv a te as well as th e p u b lic and so on; very d e ta iled d e b ates about the
analysis o f b o th w age and d o m estic labor in cap italist econom ies flourished
at the tim e.3
A s I h a v e s u g g e ste d e lse w h e re , h o w e v e r, th e p r o je c t o f u sin g an
A lth u sserian co n ce p t o f reprodu ction to e x p la in the p osition o f w om en
in cap italism is a v exed an d ill-fated o n e.4 In the first p lace, a lth o u g h there
is an obviou s lin k betw een biological reprodu ction a n d the p rovision o f the
n ex t gen eration o f workers (i.e., the repro du ctio n o f labor pow er in M arxist
term s), th ere is n o n ecessary link betw een this p rocreative process and the
division o f labor or th e division o f the p op u lation into the class relation s

A L T H U SSE R S M ARX, A L T H U SSE R S LA CA N

171

c h a ra c te ristic o f c a p ita list p ro d u ctio n . A s we know , class p o sitio n is in

practice h e a v ily affected by b irth (a so c io lo g ists b est ad v ice to so m eo n e
w an tin g to g e t ric h is still fin d y o u rself so m e rich p a r e n ts ), b u t it is
n everth eless theoretically in d ep en den t o f biolo gical reproduction. C la s s is a
p u r e ly s o c i a l c a t e g o r y , w h e r e a s th e d i v i s i o n o f la b o r in b i o l o g i c a l
r e p r o d u c tio n h a s to b e th e o riz e d in te rm s t h a t r e fle c t t h e b io lo g ic a l
co m p o n e n t o f the process as w e ll as its social p lace and interpretation . S o
it is n o t c le a r t h a t a n in te r e s t in h o w c a p it a l is t s o c ie t ie s re p ro d u c e
t h e m s e lv e s is, a t a n y le v e l o th e r t h a n th e m o st o b v io u s o n e o f th e
biolo gical reproduction o f th e p o p u latio n from o n e gen eration to the n ext,
goin g to tell us m uch ab ou t how we sh ou ld analyze kin sh ip pattern s, the
eco n o m ic o rgan ization o f h o u seh o ld s or p revailin g ideologies o f fam ily and
se x u a l m ores in a giv en m ode o f p ro d u ctio n . In fact, a th e o re tica l link
b e t w e e n b i o l o g i c a l a n d s o c i a l r e p r o d u c t io n is sim p ly n o t m a d e in
A lth u sse rs essay.
L o o k in g b ack on the essay now , on e m ight even ask w hy it h ad been
t h o u g h t t h a t th e s o c ia l r e p r o d u c t io n t h e s is d id or m ig h t im p ly a
lo o s e n in g up o f an e x c lu s iv e fo c u s o n s o c ia l c la ss. P e rh ap s the m o st
dram atic rebuttal o f th is in terpretation c a n be found in th e postscript th at
A lth usser added in 1970, w here h e excludes from his defin ition o f w hat is
so c ia l everythin g excep t fo r class. A lth usser literally wrote, and here I
qu ote: "social ( = c la s s ) . N o th in g could be clearer th an this telegraph ic
form ulation , w h ich occurs in a passage w here h e is trying to dem on strate
th at th e poin t o f view o f repro du ctio n is an ab stract one, and its p ractical
e f f e c t s ( i t s r e a l i z a t i o n ) h a v e to be u n d e r s to o d in th e c o n t e x t o f
p ro d u ctio n a n d circ u la tio n .5 H is ce n tral co n ce rn in th e p o stscrip t is to
re d re ss th e b a la n c e o f h is a r g u m e n ts, in r e sp o n se to th e c r it ic is m s I
m en tion ed earlier, so that they can be construed as h avin g m ore purchase
on stru ggle and re sistan c e. H e is k een to em ph asize this facto r o f class
stru g g le , as o p p o se d to a m o re m e c h a n is tic a p p ro a c h , bu t in th e very
p r o c e s s o f d o in g so h e r u le s o u t a l o o s e r , l e s s c l a s s - r e d u c t i o n i s t ,
in te r p re ta tio n o f th e th e ses o n re p ro d u c tio n . In em p h asizin g th a t th e
th e ses are abou t class struggle, he at th e sam e tim e lim its th e reproduction
argu m en t to class struggle and clarifie s o n ce a n d fo r all th at we are n ot
sp eak in g o f a m ore general analysis of, say, the social relation s o f capitalism .
O n e sen ten ce will stan d in for th e m an y in this postscript o n e could quote
to d e m o n strate A lth u sse rs in siste n c e th a t n o so c ia l d iv isio n oth er th an
c la ss is o f an y c o n se q u e n c e to c a p ita lis m : In fact, th e S t a t e a n d its
A p p aratu ses only h ave m ean in g from th e p o in t o f view o f th e class struggle,
as an app aratus o f class struggle en su ring class oppression a n d gu aranteeing
the conditions o f e x p lo itatio n and its repro du ctio n .6

172

TH E A LTH U SSER IA N LEGACY

I m ake these points n o t fo r general interest (alth o u gh the m isreading o f

the reproduction thesis in an earlier period o f interpretation is interestin g),
but sim ply to show the backdrop again st w hich w e are goin g to h ave to set
th e se c o n d p art o f th e essay, w hich d e als w ith ideology, a n d subjectivity.
Before m o v in g to p art two, we m ight n o te th a t the p o stsc rip t appears in the
text n o t as an add en du m to part one, but at the end o f the essay after the
d iscussion o f su bjectivity w hich is cast in term s o f p sychoanalysis. It is as if
A lt h u s s e r f o r g o t p a r t two as so o n as h e h ad w r itte n it. A lt h u s s e r
rem ained locked in a co n ven tion ally class-based M arxism , w hich we m ight
i l l u s t r a t e by l o o k i n g at h is f o o t n o t e o n t h e f a m i l y . H e b e g in s
auspiciously: T h e fam ily obviously h as other fun ction s' th an th at o f an
I S A . C e r t a in ly , if o n e is e v e n v a g u e ly a ttu n e d to a p sy c h o a n a ly tic
p e rsp e ctiv e , th e fa m ily s fu n c tio n s a s a n a re n a for p sy ch ic d ram a and
co n flict, lib id in al ca th e x es, and p rocesses o f sexed id en tificatio n , am on g
others, leap to m ind rather starkly. B u t A lth u sser is th in k in g o f som eth in g
else entirely. H e co n tin u es: It interven es in the reproduction o f labor
power. In differen t m odes o f produ ction it is th e u nit o f produ ction and/or
th e u n it o f c o n s u m p t io n . 7 S c a r c e ly a m e e t in g o f th e M a r x is t a n d
p sy ch o an aly tic m in ds! T h is is sim ply a n illustration o f th e ex ten t to w hich,
a lth o u g h he used som e L a ca n ian ideas in th in k in g ab ou t ideology a n d the
su b je ct, A lth u sser rem ained com pletely u naffected by th em in goin g about
his usual th eoretical business as a M arxist.
A lth u s se rs o n e-sid e d n ess is co m p lem en ted by its do u b le:

Freu d an d

L a c a n do n o t write about class, a n d certain ly do n o t organize their theories

aro u n d class. T h ey h ave little co m m en t to m ak e on any class co m po n en t
in su bjectiv ity and even less on class in relation to the unconscious w hich
is th e c e n tr a l c a te g o ry o f th e ir th e o rie s. T h is is n o t a p r o b le m for
p sy ch o a n a ly sis; but it ce rta in ly p o se s a p ro b lem for th o se w ho w ant to
arrive at a th eory th at uses asp ects o f b o th M arxism an d p sychoanalysis.
M arx ism s ten dency h a s b ee n to th in k o f su b jectiv ity in th e narrow term s o f
c la ss c o n sc io u sn e ss n o t only em p h asizin g c o n sc io u sn e ss ra th e r th an
atta c h in g any w eight to the unconscious, but also u n d erstan din g conscious
th o u g h t an d exp erien ce p rin cipally in term s o f th e effects o f social class.
Psychoan alysis, on th e o th e r h a n d , em phasizes th e u n co n scious as th e key
to u n d erstan d in g su b je ctiv ity , an d h as tra d itio n a lly (th o u g h this is now
d eb ated ) cast the contents o f the u nconscious p rin cipally in term s o f sexual
difference. T h e re co n cilia tio n o f these two m odels is, obviously, n o t an
easy task.
A lth u sser begin s the secon d p art o f h is essay w ith a p arallel betw een
h im self a n d Freud. H is app roach to ideology is n o t on ly like F reu d s to the
un con scious, it is n ot u n related to it. T h e obliqu en ess o f the reference is

A L T H U SSE R S MARX, A L T H U SSE R S LA CA N

173

sy m ptom atic o f both A lth u sser's deference to Freud and the tendency he
h as to p roceed by way o f co m p arison and h om ology rather th an in terms o f
the c o n t e n t o f the a rg u m e n t. In fa c t , fo r h im to u se su c h a p a s siv e
form ulation as to sa y th at h is argum ent a n d Freu ds are n ot u n related is
extrem ely revealing: he can n o t state the co n n ectio n b u t he w ants to claim
it using the w ord ju stified tw ice in as m an y sen ten ces and th is is an
illu stration o f the fu n d am en tal p roblem w ith the w h ole thesis, as we sh all
see.
A lth u sser's first th esis is on e th at re cap itu lates a fam iliar argum ent, a n d
th erefore we will p ass over it rapidly: ideology represen ts th e im aginary
relation sh ip o f individuals to their real co n d ition s o f existence. It is w orth
n otin g, how ever, th at A lth u sser does tie these co n d ition s o f existen ce in
the proverbial last in stan ce to relation s o f p rodu ction . Sign ifican tly, he
p r e fa c e s th is p o in t w ith a s t a t e m e n t o f w h a t w o u ld n o rm a lly be th e
obviou s, reflectin g his re co gn itio n th at he is ab ou t to stray a little : T o
speak in a M arxist langu age . . . H is form ulation em erges as th e conclusion
th a t all ideology represents ... ab o v e all the (im agin ary ) relation sh ip o f
ind ivid uals to th e relation s o f p rod u ction and the relation s that derive from
th e m .8
A lth u sse r's se co n d th esis at th is p o in t th a t ideology always ex ists in
m a t e r ia l a p p a r a t u s e s , an d t h e ir p r a c t ic e s , an d th u s its e x i s t e n c e is
m a t e r ia l is a m o re n u a n c e d p r o p o sitio n t h a n t h e cru d e id e o lo g y is
m aterial slogan th a t em erged from early readings o f the essay. H e suggests
th a t m ateriality h as a variety o f m o d alities, w hich are le ft on on e side, bu t
th a t we sh o u ld a tte n d to th e p ra c tic e a n d ritu a ls o f ap p aratu ses su ch as
sch ools, ch u rch es an d so on.
T h e ce n tral thesis o f this p art o f the essay is as follow s: Ideology Interpellates Individuals as Subjects. U nder this h eadin g, A lth u sser exp lain s how
he sees the su b je ct as the co n stitu tiv e category o f all ideology: the action
o f ideology is to enable/ensure the su b je cts recogn ition o f itself as a subject,
a process th a t works th rough securing th e ob viou s. In o n e sen se, ideology
works by m ak in g the su b ject recognize itself in a certain sp ecific way, and
sim u ltan eously to construe th at sp ecificity as the obvious or natural on e for
itself. A fu n ction o f ideology is thus recognition, w h ich one can th in k o f as
a circu it o f recogn ition s by th e se lf and others th at b o th construct the
su b ject an d are p red icated u pon w hat A lth u sser describes as always already
su b je cts. T h is is an im po rtan t p o in t to u n tan gle, for A lth u sser is using a
careful co u n terp oin t here, an d in som e sense it is m erely a heuristic device
for h im to say th at the p rocess o f re co g n itio n co n stitutes the su bject since
he also w ants to say th at the p rocess o f recogn ition is n o t possible w ithout
an already co n stitu te d su b ject. A t th e least, we are sp eak in g here o f an

174

THE A LTH U SSER IA N LEGACY

on goin g co n stitu tio n and reconstitution, w ith n o app aren t fin ite p oin t o f
origin sin ce, as A lth u sser p oin ts out, the su bject is p o sitio n ed as such even
before birth.
A lth u sse r focu ssed his acc o u n t o f the id e o lo g ica l c o n stitu tio n o f the
s u b je c t o n the id e a o f i n t e r p e ll a t io n , w h ic h is in t r o d u c e d in th e
d e c e p tiv e ly sim p le te rm s o f h a ilin g so m e o n e in th e stre e t. In th e
m om en t o f ack n ow led gein g a shout o f hey, you th e re !, o f turning around
to respond to the call, o f confirm ation th at it really is h e w ho was hailed,
th e su b je c t is b o th p o sitio n e d in id e o lo g y a n d c o n firm e d in his ow n
r e c o g n itio n o f h im se lf. It is d iffic u lt to r e sist p o in t in g out h ere th e
g e n d e re d a sp e c t o f A lt h u s s e r s e x a m p le . E x p e r ie n c e sh ow s th a t th e
p ra c tic a l te lec o m m u n ic atio n s o f h a ilin g s are su ch th a t th ey h ard ly ever
m iss th eir m an: verb al call or w histle, th e o n e h ailed alw ays recogn ises th at
it is really him who is being h ailed .9 M any w om en m ight say th at their
ex p erie n ce o f b ein g h ailed (esp ecially by w h istlin g !) on th e stre et m ore
o fte n h as th e o p p o site e ffe c t o f d e n y in g th e ir in d iv id u a l id e n tity and
in terpellatin g them in unnervingly generic term s.
A lt h u s s e r u se s th e in te r p e lla tio n th e sis to m ove to w a rd s a way o f
th in k in g abou t the co n stru ction o f subjects th at is in d ebted to som e key
ideas o f th e p sy c h o a n a ly st Ja c q u e s L acan . E c h o in g L a c a n s c e le b ra te d
theory o f th e m irror p h a se as a crucial m om en t in th e co n struction o f the
c h ild s su b je ctiv ity , A lth u sse r argues th a t th e stru ctu re o f id e o lo gy is a
speculary one, sin ce there are processes o f m irroring involved. T h e first
aspect o f this is the way in w hich individual su bjects are con structed in the
im age of, or as reflections of, the dom in an t id eological S u b jec t which, in
A lth u sse rs exam ple o f C h ristian religious ideology, is G o d . S u b je c ts are
form ed, then, in a relation sh ip o f su b jectio n to the O th er, the S u b ject, and
this relation is a speculary (m irroring) one. T h e whole ideological process
is d o u b ly sp e c u la r, a c c o r d in g to A lth u s se r , sin c e th is m irro r im a g e is
necessary for subjects to recognize each oth er and th em selves as subjects.
F in a ll y , A l t h u s s e r c o n c l u d e s w ith a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c m i x t u r e o f a
q u i n t e s s e n t i a l l y L a c a n i a n p o i n t t h a t id e o l o g y is m isr e c o g n itio n
(m c o n n a is a n c e ), b u t o n e t h a t h e c a s t s in te r m s o f w h a t h a s to b e
m isrecognized or ignored in the last resort for the relation s o f produ ction
to be reproduced. W h eth er or n ot it m akes sense to try and com b in e th e
in s ig h ts o f L a c a n ia n is m w ith a f u n c t io n a lis t v e r sio n o f th e M a r x is t
reprodu ction thesis is a p oin t I sh all return to later.
Before doin g so it m ight be u sefu l to discuss briefly som e key p oin ts in
differen tiatin g L a c a n s th ou gh t from A lth u ssers. I h ave already suggested
th at the cen tral A lth u sserian co n cep t in this d iscu ssion is interpellation,
w h ich is n o t a L a c a n ian concept. H ow ever, A lth u s se rs exe ge sis o f the

A L T H U SSE R S MARX, A L T H U SSE R S LA CA N

175

sp e c u la ry n a tu re o f the (id e o lo g ic a l) c o n s tr u c tio n o f the su b je c t, h is

d e p lo y m en t o f the su b je c t/S u b je c t or su b je ct/O th e r d istin c tio n , an d his
reference to m isreco gn itio n , are all p o in ts w h ich render his analysis one
th at is closely draw n from L acan . O n e elem en tary difficulty, though, is
th at A lth u sser does n o t reproduce L a c a n s theories in a precise way, and
indeed uses m an y o f L a c a n s concepts very differently. A n obvious exam ple
is th e term im agin ary , w h ich can (lik e Laclau and M o uffes exp ression
th e J a c o b in im a g in a ry ) tra il L a c a n ia n re so n a n c e s in A lth u sser b u t is
fun dam en tally a different co n cept.
F or L a c a n th e im a g in a ry is on e o f th e th re e o rd e rs o f im a g in a ry ,
sym b olic an d real. T h e im agin ary order includes im ages and fan tasies,
b o th c o n sc io u s a n d u n c o n sc io u s; it is a k ey register o f th e eg o an d its
id e n tific a tio n s, e v o lv in g from th e m irro r sta g e bu t co n tin u in g in a d u lt
re la tio n sh ip s; it p articularly includes m aterial from pre-verbal experience.
T h e sym bolic order, on the oth er h an d, is the dom ain o f sym bolization
an d lan gu age, an d it is th ro u gh th e so c ia l an d cu ltu ral processes o f this
s y m b o l ic o r d e r t h a t t h e s u b je c t c a n r e p r e s e n t d e s ir e an d t h u s b e
c o n s t i t u t e d . T h e r e a l is d e f in e d a s t h a t w h ic h e x i s t s o u t s id e
sy m b o lizatio n , an d o u tsid e th e a n a ly tic e x p e rie n c e w h ich is n ece ssarily
co n ta in ed by th e lim its o f sp eech : it is th a t w h ich is form ally o u tsid e the
su bject. T h ese three orders are all in play in L a ca n s w ritings, alth ou gh the
defin ition s shift co n stan tly .10 A s fa r as A lth u sser is concerned, im aginary
m ight be reduced to liv ed : it is the dom ain o f em otion, affect, will an d
experience. H is usage is n o t the everyday m ean in g o f a fiction or m en tal
co n stru ct (n ot real ), bu t n eith er is it con sisten t w ith L a c a n s distin ction
b etw een im aginary, sym bolic an d real.
A se c o n d m a jo r p o in t o f d iffe r e n c e b e tw e e n L a c a n s th e o rie s an d
A lth u sse rs use (or m isuse) o f th em co n cern s th e issue o f recogn ition and
m isrecogn ition . For alth ou gh A lth u sser speaks o f m isrecognition, his entire
ap p ro ach is cast in term s o f th e p ro ce ss o f re c o g n itio n as the m eans by
w h ich th e su b je ct is co n stitu te d to itse lf an d to oth ers. H is use o f th e
v o c a b u la ry o f sp e c u la rity o f th e p ro c e ss o f m irro rin g o ccu rs in this
c o n tex t. Yet L a c a n s accou n t o f th e m irror p h a se could n ot stress more
u n e q u iv o ca lly that the fo u n d in g m o m en t is one o f m isreco gn itio n the
w hole p o in t o f his argum ent is to say th a t the in fan t falls fo r its im age in
the mirror becuse it offers a false represen tatio n o f a w hole body gestalt and
thus tran sce n d s the in fa n ts ow n know led ge o f p h y sical d ep en d en ce and
p sych ic frustration. T h e pleasures o f the im age in the mirror, for the infant,
are th u s pleasures o f a sense o f se lf th a t is founded on a m isrecognition of
itself. L a c a n describes the ju b ilan t assum ption o f his specular im age by the
ch ild at the infans stage, still sunk in his m otor in cap acity and n urslin g

176

THE A LTH U SSERIA N LEGACY

d epen d en ce
S o there is an im portant g u lf betw een the way in w hich
L a c a n d e v e lo p e d the th e o ry o f the m irro r s t a g e as sp e a k in g to th e
alie n a tin g d e stin atio n o f the I as w ell as its m en tal p erm an en ce and
A lth u sse rs use o f these ideas sim ply as m etaphors in the co n tex t o f a theory
th at em phasizes recogn ition rather th an m isrecognition.
A s A l t h u s s e r m a d e c l e a r at t h e e n d o f F r e u d a n d L a c a n , he
a p p reciated th is em ph asis in L a c a n s a cc o u n t o f th e ego; yet it is a m o ot
p o in t as to how well he tran slated the essen tial in stability o f the L acan ian
I into his a c c o u n t o f th e id e o lo g ic a l in te r p e lla tio n o f in d iv id u a ls as
appropriate su bjects in regard to system s o f production. T h e issue at stake
is n o t w h e t h e r A l t h u s s e r p r o p e r ly u n d e r s t o o d L a c a n s f o c u s on
m isreco gn itio n , bu t w h ether h e (or anyone else, in d eed ) could integrate
such an argu m ent into an accou n t w hose b ack d rop was the M arxist theory
o f reprodu ction o f the relations o f production . A t the en d o f Freud and
L a c a n , A lth u sse rs sum m ary o f F reu ds disco v eries w hich is in effect a
sum m ary o f Freud as read through the eyes o f L a c a n p laces a sign ifican t
em p h asis on m isre co g n itio n in th e fo rm atio n o f the ego: ...F re u d has
discovered fo r us th at the real subject, the in d iv id u al in his unique essence,
h as n ot the form o f an ego, cen tered on the eg o , on co n scio u sn ess or on
e x is te n c e ... th at th e h u m a n su b je c t is d e -c e n te re d , c o n stitu te d by a
s t r u c t u r e w h ic h h a s no c e n t e r e i t h e r , e x c e p t in t h e i m a g in a r y
m isreco gn itio n o f the e g o , i.e., in the id eological form ation s in w hich it
recogn izes itself. 12
T h is p assage is q u a lita tiv ely closer to L a c a n th a n an y th in g A lth u sser
said in the course o f the IS A s essay. T h e reason for the disparity is th at th e
fr a m e w o r k o f a t h e o r y o f s o c i a l r e p r o d u c t io n ( p a r t i c u l a r l y in th e
f u n c t io n a lis t fo rm in w h ic h A lth u s se r h ad a lre a d y a rg u ed th e th e sis)
pressures on e tow ards a n accoun t o f the psychic co n stru ction o f the subject
th a t fits th e se re q u ir e m e n ts. T h u s, fo r e x a m p le , A lth u s se r sp o k e o f
su bjects recognizing th em selv es in social categories: It really is m e, I am
here, a worker, a boss or a so ld ier! 15 T h ese social categories m ay fit the
M arxist fram ew ork in w hich A lth usser was operating in the essay, but they
d o n ot co rresp o n d a t any m e an in g fu l lev e l w ith th e c o n te n t o f L a c a n s
argum ents ab o u t the ego a n d its identifications.
T h ere are a n um ber o f further p oin ts th at on e could m ake to suggest
th a t A lth u sse rs b orrow in gs from L a c a n are h igh ly selective. O n e rather
light-hearted ad hominem exam ple would be the issue o f h u m an n atu re.
L a c a n is in g e n e ra l te rm s a n a n ti-h u m a n ist, b u t h e su g g e sts t h a t th e
discovery o f th e m irror-phase in h u m a n in fan ts sp ran g d ire ctly from the
co m p arison betw een their b eh avio r an d th at o f ch im pan zees w ho appear
n ot to recognize th em selves in a co m p arab le way. B en v en u to and K en n edy

A L T H U SSE R S M ARX, A L T H U SSE R S LA C A N

draw th e obviou s co n clu sion from L a c a n s remarks:

177

It m ight be th at the

ch im pan zee does n ot recognize w hat he sees as his ow n im age, unlike the
child, an d th at this is w hat distin guish es the h u m an as a su b ject from the
anim al w ho m erely rem ains fascin ated by reflectio n s. 14 It is n ot fiecessary
here to go into the details o f L a c a n s ca v e ats and q u alificatio n s as to w hat
m ight be m ean t by n atu re and so on; the irony lies in A lth u ssers m aking
use o f a theory w hose origins, acco rd in g to L a c a n him self, em erged from
p o sitiv ist h u m an /p rim ate co m parative psychology.
M ore seriously, perh aps, we sh ould address the qu estion as to w hether
th e th e o re tic a l p arad igm w ith in w h ich A lth u sse r w as w orking is in any
se n s e c o m p a t ib le w ith th e L a c a n i a n m o d e l a s a t h e o r e t ic a l sy ste m .
A lth u sser h im self was aware o f this problem , a t least a t the tim e o f writing
his essay on Freud an d L acan , but m an y o f th o se w ho felt th a t h e h ad
su c c e ssfu lly -b r o u g h t o f f an in tr o d u c tio n o f p sy c h o a n a ly tic th o u g h t to
M a r x ism were le ss d e te rre d by th e d iffic u lty . W ith th e a d v a n ta g e o f
h in d sigh t, the g u lf betw een A lth u sse r a n d L a c a n appears now as com pletely
u n b rid g eab le. A s an illu stra tio n we co u ld take th e co m m en t A lth u sse r
m ade in th e letter p u b lish ed w ith the E n g lish tra n sla tio n o f Freud and
L a c a n . A s is o ften th e case, th e in form al, c o n te x tu a liz in g style o f the
letter is extrem ely clarifying. In p articu lar, it show s th at A lth u ssers p roject
is w h at we m igh t now regard as an in tellectu ally co lo n ialist one: he w anted
to h arn ess L a ca n ian psychoanalysis to the project o f M arxism , even to the
point o f renam in g (alth o u gh he d o e sn t say why) the foundin g concept o f
p sychoanalysis. H e writes:
...t h e suggestions at th e en d o f th e article are correct a n d d eserve a
m u ch exten d ed treatm en t, th at is, the discussion o f the form s o f familial
ideology, an d o f the crucial role they play in in itiatin g the fun ction in g
o f the in stan ce th at Freud called th e u n co n scio u s, but w hich should
be re-christened as so on as a better term is found.
T h is m e n tio n o f th e fo rm s o f fa m ilia l ideology (th e ideology o f
p a te r n ity -m a te r n ity - c o n ju g a lity -in fa n c y a n d th e ir in te r a c tio n s ) is
crucial, fo r it im plies the follow in g co n clu sion th at L a ca n could n ot
ex p re ss, g iv e n his th e o re tic a l fo rm a tio n th a t is, th at no theory of
psycho-analysis can be produced without basing it on historical materialism
(o n w hich the theory o f the form ation s o f fam ilial ideology depends, in
the last in sta n c e ).15
T h e p assage is interestin g for sh ow in g how A lth u sser w anted to m ake
use o f L a c a n ian p sychoanalysis where possible w ithin the term s o f his own
theory, rather th an face up to its claim s in their own term s. W e are now,
certainly, m ore aw are o f the difficulties o f attem p tin g to do this. A lth usser
m ay h av e th ou gh t th at L a c a n co u ld n o t express the view th at the psychic

178

TH E A LTH U SSER IA N LEGACY

sh ould be theorized as reducible to the social, because o f his th eo retical

form ation as if ch ild h ood m easles had left h im w ith poor eyesight; the
truth o f the m atter is quite otherw ise. L acan h im se lf had little h esitatio n in
offering psych o an aly tic interpretation s or exp lan atio n s o f social b eh avior,
a n d th ere can be n o doub t th a t A lth usser, clu tch in g his grandiose p roject
o f h isto ric a l m aterialism , w ould fall under L a c a n s k n o w in g o b serv atio n
th a t we p lace n o trust in altru istic feeling, we w ho lay b are th e aggressivity
t h a t u n d e r lie s th e a c t i v i t y o f th e p h i l a n t h r o p i s t , t h e i d e a l i s t , th e
pedagogue, and even the reform er. 16
T h e problem s left in the wake o f the A lth u sserian revolu tion in term s
o f a M arxist theory o f ideology seem to m e to be tw ofold: on e concern s the
general way in w hich th e su b je ct is theorized; th e oth er co n ce rn s the
specific im p licatio n s o f w orking w ithin a p sy ch o an aly tic fram ew ork.
A
n um ber o f co m m e n ta to rs h ave draw n a tte n tio n to th e q u estio n o f w hat
general theory o f agen cy A lthusser is using in his thesis on in terpellation ,
a n d indeed this h as been a topic o f considerable dispute. A s I suggested
earlier, m any critics h ave found A lth u ssers acc o u n t to be on e th at strips
th e subject o f pow ers o f agen cy in its unduly m ech an istic a p p ro a c h to the
p r o c e ss w h ere b y in d iv id u a ls are c o n s tit u t e d as s u b je c t s in a s o c ia l
form ation .
P aul H irst, h ow ever, h as argued th a t A lth u sser was insufficiently critical
o f the legacy o f the su b ject th a t he h ad in h erited and suggests th a t he m ade
to o m an y p re su p p o sitio n s a b o u t th e c a p a c itie s o f th e n a s c e n t su b je c t.
A lth u s se r s th eory on ly w orks if, acc o rd in g to H irst, we fill th e c h ild s
c r a d le w ith a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l a s s u m p t i o n s . H ir s t o b s e r v e s t h a t in
A lth u s se r s m o d el th e su b je ct-to -b e is, o n a n a priori b a sis an d w ith ou t
ju s t i f ic a t i o n , c r e d it e d w ith c e r t a in c o g n it iv e a b ilit ie s , fo r th e se are
n e c e s s a r y fo r th e p r o c e ss o f r e c o g n itio n to o p e r a te in th e sp e c u la ry
stru ctu re . A t th e ro o t o f th e p ro b lem is A lt h u s s e r s in v o c a tio n o f an
in d iv id u al w ho is p re-id eo lo gical and indeed m ust be pre-ideological if
A lth u sse rs m ost fu n d am en tal thesis (th at ideology is th e process by w h ich
individuals are co n stitu ted as su b jects) is correct. A s H irst writes: th e
in d iv id u al w ho is prior to ideology a n d w hose pre-ideological attributes o f
su b je ctiv ity are n ecessary to its b eco m in g a su b je ct, ca n n o t be erased in
A lth u sse rs te x t . . . 17 H irsts critiqu e draw s a tte n tio n to w h at A lth u sser
ille g it im a t e ly p re su m e s ab o u t th e in d iv id u a l, ju s t as so c io lo g y , fo r
in sta n ce , h as o fte n w rongly presum ed th e e x iste n c e o f in d iv id u als w ith
certain attributes who are then socialized into so cial ro les.
It is tem ptin g to ad d at th is p o in t that A lth u sser h a s given us th e worst
o f all possible w orlds in presenting a m odel o f the su b ject th at m an ages to
strip away or w eaken adult powers o f p o litical agency at the sam e time that

A L T H U SSE R S MARX, A L T H U SSE R S LA CA N

179

it re tain s m e tap h y sic al and e sse n tia list assu m p tion s about the p re-so cial
c a p a c itie s o f th e in d iv id u a l c h ild . A lt h o u g h A lth u sse r h a d co rre c tly
identified a m ajor lacu n a in M arxist thinking about ideology, nam ely, the
u n s a tifa c to r y th e o r iz a tio n o f the su b je c t, it is hard to argu e th a t th e
form ulation he offered c a n ta k e it sign ifican tly forward.
In roun din g off this discussion o f A lth u sse rs use o f L acan , I w ant to take
up som e issu es re la tin g sp e c ific a lly to th e im p lic a tio n s o f the fa ct th a t
L a c a n w as a p sy ch o an aly st rath e r th a n a so c ia l th e o rist. T h e n am e o f
L a c a n is frequen tly cited, alon g w ith those o f D errida, L y otard or Foucault,
as an in tellectu al pillar o f post-stru cturalist th ou gh t, a n d indeed his work
shares some b asic them es o f post-stru cturalism . Yet there are dangers in
a ssim ilatin g his w ritings to this defin ition , and forgettin g th a t L acan was
also a clin ician an d teach er w hose project was to return to Freud. T o o
heavy a post^structuralist reading o f L a ca n can h ave the effect of d etach in g
h im from the p sych oan alytic tradition so dram atically as to render his work
a kind o f p ost-psych oan alysis, in the sense o f b ein g b oth a co n tin u ation
and a tran scen d en ce o f psychoanalysis. In term s o f psy ch o an aly tic theory
L a c a n is obviously m ost d istan t from th ose w ho operate w ith essen tialist
c a t e g o r i e s o r s i m p l i s t i c n o t i o n s o f p s y c h i c c a u s e o r o r ig i n . T h e
ch aracteristic em ph asis o n m en tal represen tation in L acan ian thou gh t h as
m ade L acan ian ism the b ra n ch o f p sychoanalysis th at is n earest to a project
o f cu ltu ral enquiry, and least w illing or able to defend in tellectually a clear
b o u n d a r y b e t w e e n c l i n i c a l a n d n o n - c l i n i c a l u s e s o f it s t h e o r y .
N e v erth eless, it would be a big m istake to d etach L a c a n too sharply from
th e h isto r ic a l in stitu tio n o f p sy c h o a n a ly sis ov er w h ich he had a very
co n sid erable in flu en ce1 and flo a t h im o ff as a th e o rist o f culture a n d the
psyche.
O n e aspect o f this h as a direct b earin g on A lth u sser. A s I h av e suggested
elsew here, there h as recently been a sign ifican t ch an ge in interpretation s o f
L acan , as w ell as a sign ifican t ch an ge in the p erception o f w hether som e
kind o f com patability exists betw een psych oan alysis an d a (M arxist) theory
o f ideology.1 Jacqu elin e R ose h as argued th at a concern w ith issues such as
sexuality, and a tendency to locate (as A lthusser had) psychoanalytic theory
within a theory o f ideology, had the effect o f displacin g the concept o f the
u nconscious from its rightful p lace at the center o f the debate.20 C ertain ly
one can say th at there h as been an increasin g ten dency in recent debates to
o f fe r a p s y c h o a n a l y t i c a p p r o a c h as an a l t e r n a t i v e , r a t h e r t h a n a
c o m p le m e n t , to s o c ia l a r g u m e n t a n d e x p la n a t io n .
T h is is p e rh a p s
p a r tic u la rly tru e in B r ita in , w h ere th e fe a r o f s o c io lo g ism in fe c tin g
psychoanalysis is great, less so in th e U n ite d S ta te s, where a more pluralist
an d eclectic approach h as ten ded to p revail in these m atters.

180

THE A LTH U SSERIA N LEGA CY

A risin g from the q u e stio n o f w h eth er a fo cu s on th e u n c o n sc io u s is

c o m p a t ib le w ith a m o re s o c io lo g ic a l a p p r o a c h su c h as a th e o ry o f
ideology is the issue o f how the conten ts o f th e u n co n scio u s are to be
theorized. O f p articu lar interest is the qu estion o f w hether p sych oanalytic
m e th o d can be u sed to c o n s id e r q u e s tio n s th a t h a v e a new p o lit ic a l
r e s o n a n c e in s o c ia l a n d p o lit ic a l th e o r y (r a c is m , or h e te r o se x ism , or
c h a n g in g c u ltu ra l d e fin itio n s o f m a scu lin ity w ould be g o o d e x a m p le s).
O ften th is will in volve regarding psychoanalysis as a m ethod, rather than
an accu rate accoun t o f the conten ts o f the u n co n scio u s p red icated upon
certain know n p rin ciples; opinion varies w idely on how flexibly the system
should be treated. W h ile th ere are obviously m ajor differences a m o n g th e
variou s sch oo ls o f psy ch o an aly tic thought as to w hat these p rin ciples are
(Freud an d the p sych ic con sequ en ces o f a n a to m ic al difference, K lein and
th e m o v e fr o m p a r a n o i d - s c h i z o i d to d e p r e s s i v e p o s i t i o n s , e t c . ) ,
n everth eless, n on e o f the classic foundin g thinkers o f psychoanalysis focus
on these new er them es I h ave m en tion ed. H ow m u ch licen se can be taken
with their ideas, and at w h at point are su b stan tiv e argum ents about the
co n te n ts o f th e u n co n scio u s b ein g reduced to m etap h ors allo w in g us to
consider quite oth er m aterial?
In th is c o n te x t th e re is a fu rth er d eb ate a ro u n d th e issue o f se x u a l
d if f e r e n c e . C o n t e m p o r a r y r e a d e r s o f A l t h u s s e r s w r it in g s w ill se e
im m ediately a degree o f sim ple sexism in the w ay h e writes, n o t to m ention
a su rp risin gly c o n v e n tio n a l ge n d ere d an d fa m ilia list v o c a b u la ry of, for
exam ple, theory as m ale. In L a c a n s case, the issue o f p h allo cen trism is a
m uch d e b a te d o n e . F e m in ists in B r ita in , n o ta b ly Ju lie t M itc h e ll and
J a c q u e lin e R o se , h a v e argu ed stro n g ly for a fe m in ist in te r p re ta tio n o f
L a c a n , a lth o u g h th e y h ave yet to re sp o n d to D a v id M a c e y s e lo q u e n t
c r it ic is m o f L a c a n s p h a llo c e n t r is m .21 In th e U n it e d S t a t e s , fe m in ist
app rop riation s o f p sychoanalysis are m uch less seduced by the ch arm s o f the
s o - c a lle d p a t r i a r c h a l t r a d it io n o f F re u d a n d L a c a n , w h e re s e x u a l
difference figures a s a n organizing prin ciple. H ere, m u ch greater atten tion
h as been p aid to v arian ts o f p sych oan alytic th ou gh t where m oth erin g, as
opposed to the o edipal role o f the father, or w here the psychic form ation o f
daughters rather th an sons, are m ajor co n cern s.22
It is useful to co n sid er th e h istorical sign ifican ce o f w h at I h a v e called
A lth u sse rs L a c a n . T h ere is, initially, th e qu estio n o f w h ether A lth u sser
m an aged to deliver a plausible a cc o u n t o f the co n stitu tio n o f subjectivity,
c o m b in in g a M arxist w ith a L a ca n ian p erspective. In my view , he did not:
th e IS A s essay is h o pelessly contradictory as betw een its two h alves, an d n o
serious resolu tion o f the problem o f how to square the reprodu ction th esis
w ith a L a ca n ian an aly sis is offered. In the essay itself, on e m igh t suggest

A L T H U SSE R S M ARX, A L T H U SSE R S LA CA N

181

th at A lth u sse rs use o f L a ca n was a very diluted one, prin cipally b ecause he
u se d c e r t a in id e a s m e t a p h o r ic a ll y as in h is v e ry lo o s e u se o f th e
v o ca b u la ry o f sp ec u la rity rath er t h a n t a k in g on b o a rd th e su b sta n tiv e
co n ten t o f L a c a n s argum ents.
N e v erth eless, A lth u ssers attempt to ju x tap o se these two bodies o f theory
w as, I th in k , e n o rm o u sly s ig n ific a n t a n d c o n tr ib u te d to so m e h ig h ly
in flu en tial trends in areas su ch as film a n d cu ltu ral studies, literary theory
and criticism , as well as in M arxisant bran ch es o f social science. Y et it is
easy to see th a t there w as a b ifu rc a tio n in th ose areas o f re se arch th at
reflected the very split separatin g the tw o h alves o f A lth u ssers essay. O n
the one h a n d , th e re are th o se who saw the th eory o f id e o lo g ic a l sta te
a p p a ra tu se s as a m e a n s to b rin g b a ck in to th e m a teria list fold aw kw ard
areas, such as cu ltu ral or fam ily for exam ple, th at threatened to subvert
M a r x is t c e r t a in t ie s . For th e m , th e I S A s e s sa y p r o v id e d a w e lc o m e
ju s t if ic a t io n fo r e x te n d in g th e sc o p e o f an e c o n o m ic a lly re d u c tio n ist
analysis into h ith erto u n reach able areas o f so cial life. For others, o n the
contrary, the secon d p art o f the IS A s essay seem ed to be encouraging them
to t a k e up issu e s o f s u b je c t iv it y a n d i d e n t it y o f th e str u c t u r e s o f
in terpellatio n o f individuals as su b jects as im portant in their own right.
For this categ ory o f in terpretation o f the essay, it was precisely A lth u sse rs
in v itatio n to m ove aw ay from a redu ctio n ist position th a t was attractiv e.
A lth u sse rs rise a n d fall is an interestin g a n d salutary o n e to study, partly,
n o d o u b t, b e c a u se th e c ir c u m s ta n c e s o f his d is a p p e a r a n c e fro m th e
in te lle c tu al scen e h a v e contributed to th e sense on e h as th a t th e legacy
o f A lth u sser h as n ot in the p ast been ration ally assessed in depth.

Notes
1. First published in France in 1970, the English translation (by Ben Brewster)
appears in Louis Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays (London: New
Left Books, 1971).
2. Richard Johnson, Histories o f Culture/Theories o f Ideology, in Ideology and
Cultural Production, ed. M ichle Barrett et al. (London: Croom Helm, 1979), p. 74.
3. S ee particularly th e essays in A n n e tte K uh n an d A n n M arie W o lpe, eds.
Feminism and Materialism (London: Routledge, 1978); M axine M olyneux, Beyond
the D om estic Labour D ebate, New Left Review 116 (July-A ugust 1979); V eronica
Beechey, O n Patriarchy, Feminist Review No. 3 (1979); and also the discussion of
these issues in T ed Benton, The Rise and Fall of Structural Marxism (M anchester:
M anchester UP, 1984), chapter 6.
4. See my Womens Oppression Today, rev. edn., (London: Verso, 1988) pp. 1929, and pp. xvi-xviii.
5. A lthusser, p. 171.
6. Ibid.

182

TH E A LTH U SSE R IA N LEGA CY

7. Ibid, p. 137, n. 8.
8. Ibid., p. 155.
9. Ibid., p. 163.
10. T h e se d efin itio n s are based on the tran slato rs note (A la n Sh erid an ) in
Jacques Lacan, Ecrits (London: Tavistock, 1977), pp. ix-x, an d.on Bice Benvenuto
and R oger Kennedy, The Works o f J acques Lacan (London: Free A ssociation Books,
1986), pp. 80-82.
11. T h e m irror sta g e as form ative o f th e fu n ctio n o f th e I as re v e a led in
psychoanalytic experience, in Ecrits, p. 2.
12. Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy, p. 201.
13. Ibid., ISA s, p. 166.
14. The Works of Jacques Lacan, p. 53.
15. Publishers n ote to Freud and L acan , pp. 177-8.
16. Ecrits, p. 7.
17. Paul' Hirst, A lthusser: T h e Theory of Ideology, Economy and Society, 5:4,
p. 406.
18. F o r an in fo r m a t iv e a c c o u n t o f L a c a n s ro le in .th e i n s t it u t io n s o f
psychoanalysis, see C h apter 11 in Benvenuto and Kennedy.
19. See T h e C on cept of Difference, Feminist Review 26 (1987), pp. 36-39; and
Womens Oppression Today, pp. xxix ff.
20. Jacqueline Rose, Sexuality in the Field of Vision (London: Verso, 1986), p. 89.
21. S ee particularly Ju lie t M itch ell an d Jacqu elin e R ose, Feminine Sexuality:
Jacques Lacan and the Ecole Freudienne (L on don , 1982); David M acey, Lacan in
Contexts (London: Verso, 1988), presents a detailed case for regarding L acan as a
writer who reproduces a basic heterosexism and a trivialization of feminism (207).
22. S e e N a n c y J. C h o d o r o w s e ssa y , P sy c h o a n a ly tic F e m in ism a n d the
Psychoanalytic Psychology of W om en, for a useful review of th e different schools
of thought in this area, in Feminism and Psychoanalytic Theory (O xford: Polity, 1989).

Politics and Friendship:

An Interview with Jacques Derrida
[Editorial N o te : T h e follow in g is the te x t o f an interview co n d u cted by
M ich a el S p rin k e r w ith Jacq u es D errid a in A p ril 1989, at the U n iversity o f
C a lifo rn ia at Irvine. S o m e w ritten qu estio n s were subm itted to Professor
D errid a beforeh an d, and these p rovided a ro u gh guide for the discussion.
But, as is custom ary on such o ccasion s, the co n versation w ent off in several
directions n o t d ictated by the w ritten questions. T h e te x t o f the interview
h as b een le ft largely as it was sp ok en (D errida m ostly in F ren ch , Sprin ker
alm ost exclusively in English) an d th e n transcribed by C c ile R iv o allan .
T h e gen eral to p ic m o tiv atin g th e en tire d iscu ssio n was th e relation sh ip
b e tw e e n so m e t h in g c a lle d A lt h u s s e r ia n is m a n d so m e t h in g c a lle d
d eco n stru ctio n .]
M S : Y o u c a m e to th e E c o le N o r m a le to t e a c h at th e i n v i t a t io n o f
H y ppolite a n d A lth u sser in th e early 1960s. Im su re you knew A lth u sser
or ab ou t h im an d p erh ap s knew som e o f his early w ork in the fifties. But
the first form al en gagem en t w hen there would h ave been an op po rtu n ity to
see h im on a regular basis a n d p erh ap s be close to his projects and so on,
w ould h ave b een w hen you cam e b ack to teach . Perhaps, then, you could
talk ab ou t th at period an d your relation sh ip to A lth usser, to his students,
and the relation sh ip o f your ow n w ork to A lth u sse rs p roject.
JD : In f a c t th in g s b e g a n m u c h e a r lie r th a n t h a t e v e n p h ilo so p h ic a l
m atters. I w as a stu den t at th e E cole N o rm ale Suprieure from 1952 until
1956. I m et A lth u sse r as so on as I go t th ere in fall 1952. Before th a t I
h a d n t even heard his nam e. O u r first encounter was in his office. H e had
already been teach in g fo r several years a t the E cole. In normalien slang, he
was a cam an, that is, a director o f study in p h ilosophy. During this first
en coun ter we discovered th at we were b o th born in A lgiers, tw elve years
apart: h e in 1918, I in 1930. I rem em ber th a t we thus began exch an gin g
re co llec tio n s trivial m atters. Its p arad o x ica l th at I never took a sin gle
course w ith A lth u sser. O n the on e h an d, he d evoted w h at little tim e he set
a sid e fo r te a c h in g to th ird -y ear stu d e n ts (th a t is, th o se p re p a rin g th e
agrgation); on th e o th e r, he was o ften ill, already (I d id n t know w h at his
illness w as som e sp ok e o f k id n ey disorder follow ing his tim e in cap tivity ).
H e d id n t teach m uch. T h u s, during the tim e I was a t the Ecole, w e h ad a

184

TH E A LTH U SSERIA N LEGACY

very friendly relation , but o n e w h ich h ad n oth in g to do with work. Excep t

this (I am trying to pick out som e p h ilo sop h ical sign s): w hen I w rote my
first agrgation p ap er fo r him, I h ad already, the previous year ...
M S : W h a t was th a t on? D o you rem em ber?
JD : Yes, it was in 1955.
M S : N o , I m ean t w hat topic? It d o esn t m atter i f you d o n t recall.

I was

ju st curious.
JD : I h ad alread y w orked for a year on th e p rob lem o f genesis in H usserl.
T h is w as fo r my D iplom e d tudes suprieures. M y p ap er on tim e w as, I
b e lie v e , a lr e a d y q u ite c o m p lic a t e d and m a rk e d by th is p r o b le m a t ic .
A lth u sser said to m e: I c a n t grade this. I t s too difficult, too obscure for
the agrgation. It m igh t be very dan gerous. B u t sin ce I d o n t feel I can
e v a lu a te it, Ill ask F o u c a u lts o p in io n . M ic h e l F o u c a u lt was th en an
a ssistan t p rofessor at L ille. H e cam e to the E c o le to give co urses and I
atten d ed som e o f them . I had a very good rapport with F oucault also. H e
h ad read and liked my work on H usserl. S o he read th is p ap er an d told me:
W ell, its either an F or an A + . I b ring up th is episode because it gives a
fair id ea o f my re latio n sh ip to a cad em ic au th o rity th a t represen ted by
agrgation e x a m in a tio n co m m itte es in p articu la r (I failed th e exam th at
sam e year) and because in the m idst o f this I wrote th a t 400-page study
on Husserl. It was a period w hen, in certain circles (even M arxist on es),
p eop le began tak in g a k een interest in H usserl I m ean a different type o f
in terest, d ifferen t from S a rtre an d M e rlea u -P o n ty s ways o f a p p ro ach in g
H usserl. A s for th e university a n d the agrgation com m ittee, H usserl was
still poorly k n o w n an d poorly received.
M S: Yes. In the fifties?
JD : I re m e m b e r T r a n - D u e T h a o s b o o k , Phenom enology and D ialectical
Materialism. T h is form er normalien w h o, after h a v in g graduated th e sam e
year as A lth usser, returned to V ietn am , h ad attem p ted a critical M arxist
a p p r o a c h to p h e n o m e n o lo g y a n d , f o llo w in g a p e r f e c t ly a c c e p t a b l e
com m en tary (w hich F oucault, I believe, h ad praised in a class o r in private
c o n v e rsa tio n ), p rop osed a d ia le c tic a l m a te ria list re in te rp re ta tio n o f the
p ro b lem s o f g e n e tic p h en o m e n o lo g y (p assiv e gen esis, tem porality, e tc .).
T h is b o o k p robably h a d a great in flu en ce u p o n m e: trace s o f it m ay be
found in my th esis on H usserl.

PO LIT IC S A N D FRIENDSHIP

185

T r a n - D u e T h a o w a s c r itic a l o f H u sse rl. B u t, a ro u n d th e th e m e o f

p h e n o m e n o lo g ic a l gen esis, he tried to translate, to transcode, on e m igh t
say, the M arxist p rob lem atic by h a v in g recou rse to gen etic psychology, to
P ia g e t, to a sc ie n c e o f p sy c h o g e n e tic , o n to g e n e tic , and p h y lo g e n e tic
d evelo pm en t. I n o longer rem em ber the b ook precisely, b u t a t th at tim e it
p oin ted to th e interest th at could arise in certain p h ilo sop h ical m ilieux for
u sin g H u sse rls tran sce n d en tal p ro b lem atic in order to p ose qu estio n s on
scien tificity, on the em ergen ce o f th eo retical p ractice, th at o f the cogn itive
attitude, qu estio n s on the possib ility o f scien tific objectivity, all in a nonform al, n o n -id ea list m an n er (in th e m an n er o f K a n t), w hile at the sam e
tim e m o v in g beyo n d em piricism , or at least a certain M arxist em piricism or
positiv ism , and m oving beyond p h en om en o lo gy as sim ply ph en om enology
o f p e rc e p tio n . T h e p h ilo so p h ica l and p o litic a l enem y o f M arx ists (an d
first o f all A lth u sse r an d th is u n til the en d ), th e ob sessive en em y was
M erleau-P on ty, the auth or o f a Phenomenology o f Perception. M oreover, he
h ad been a caman at the E cole before the W ar and all o f this sh ould be
resitu ated in the strange history o f this stran ge in stitu tion and the no less
stra n g e c o m m u n ity th a t it h o u s e d or, e v e n m o re p re c ise ly , in the
gen ealogy o f th e R u e d U lm p h ilosoph ers. A w ork yet to be u n d ertak en : it
w ould clarify a ce rtain n u m b er o f th in g s ab ou t life a n d ab o u t in tellectual
fash ion s in th is co u n try o v er several decades.
M y p erso n al relation sh ip w ith A lth u sser w as, at th a t tim e, very good,
a ffe c tio n a te ev en (it h a s alw ays re m a in e d so, even th ro u g h som e la te r
sh ock w av es). B u t p h ilo so p h ical ex ch an ges betw een us w ere rare, n o t to say
n o n -existen t. In any case they were purely im plicit (as they undoubtedly
alw ay s re m a in e d ). T h e n (to lin k up w ith the sta rtin g p o in t th a t you
su ggested ), I left th e E cole. A fte r th e agrgation, I spen t a year in th e U .S .,
a t H arvard (1 9 5 6 -1 9 5 7 ). T h e n I d id m y m ilitary service (as a teach er and
in civ ilian clo th es). T h e n I cam e b ack to Paris in 1960. A s an assistan t for
four years at the Sorb o n n e, I saw A lth u sser a few tim es. I rem em ber h av in g
giv en him the m an uscript o f my In trod u ction to the O rigin o f G eom etry
by H u sse rl in 1961. T h e b o o k ap p eared in 1962. A lth u sse r w rote me
som e very generous and en co u ragin g th in gs on th a t subject. O ne or two
years b efo re th at, he h ad published his first b ook on M ontesquieu. W e h ad
co rre sp o n d ed a b o u t it. H e was ill q u ite o ften an d o ften aw ay from the
Ecole. I still knew n o th in g o f w h at was afflictin g him.
invited m e to give courses at the Ecole.

In 1 9 63-1964 he

I su b stitu te d fo r h im o c c a s io n a lly b efo re m o v in g in to th e E c o le as

caiman in my tu rn (u po n his in v itatio n , seco n d ed by H y pp olite w ho h ad
le ft the E cole for the C o ll g e de Fran ce, bu t w h o h ad recom m en ded m e to
his su ccessor). I h ad an office there and took care o f agrgatifs. I h ad been

186

THE A LTH U SSERIA N LEGA CY

accepted to the C N R S , but I declined in order to be n am ed to the Ecole

N orm ale. S o , I m oved in O ctob er 1964 and stayed fo r tw enty years. Thus^
for tw enty years I was lucky en ou gh to be A lth u sse rs co lle ag u e . I now
know th at I h ave n ever h ad a n d n ever will h ave colleagues on a perm an en t
basis fo r as lon g a tim e (or at least n o t in the sam e F ren ch in stitu tion
H illis M ille r has b e e n m y co lle ag u e for tw en ty-tw o y ears, b u t in three
different u n iversities: Jo h n s H op kin s, Y ale, U .C . Irvin e). Before th at, in
1963, I h ad given courses at the E cole on H usserl.
M S: T h e se w ould be to som e o f th e sam e stu d en ts w ho co llab orated on Lire
le C ap ital Establet, R an cire, B alib ar . . .
JD : N o , n o. N o t E stab let. But B alibar, yes. M ach erey h ad already left the
Ecole. Badiou also. T h e y re a bit older th an B alib ar. B u t I m et Balibar and
R ancire w hen they were agrgatifs, as well as som e peop le I would guess
you d o n t know : Ja c q u e s-A la in M iller, w ho is a bit younger, M ich el T o rt,
P atrick G u y o m ard , C lau d e R ab an t, an d B ern ard P a u tra t m an y, m an y
o th e rs. B ut th e n , v ery q u ic k ly Im try in g to se le c t th in g s fro m th e
p e r s p e c t iv e y o u re in t e r e s te d in v ery q u ic k ly in 1 9 6 4 - 1 9 6 5 , a t th e
m o m en t I b eg an te a ch in g , there cam e th a t ju n cture: L a c a n started teach in g
at th e E c o le N o r m a le u pon A lth u s se r s in v ita tio n (th is in v ita tio n was
in itia te d by A lt h u s s e r as w ell as c e rta in stu d e n ts w h o were fo llo w in g
L a c a n s sem in ar), and A lth u sser b egan th e sem inars w h ich gave rise to For
M arx and Reading Capital. T h is co in cided with a period w hen he was in
rather g o o d form , very active, etc.
M S: C a n I stop you for a secon d? W ere you alread y in the fifties interested
in p sy ch o an aly sis and Freudianism ? Y ou were n atu rally receptive to this
c o n ju n c tio n or did your e n g a g e m en t w ith p sy c h o a n a ly sis b e g in at this
m om en t?
JD : I h ad h a rd ly re ad a n y th in g by L a c a n at t h a t tim e .
In sisten ce o f th e L e tte r, bu t I d o n t rem em ber w hen.

P e rh a p s T h e

M S: T h ere was n o th in g to read then! O r on ly a very little. T h e Ecrits were

published in 1966.
JD : Y es, b u t th ere w ere so m e fam ou s te x ts t h a t w ere alread y p u b lish ed :
T h e R o m e D iscou rse a n d T h e In sistence o f th e L e tte r.
M S : W ere th ese fam ous a n d celeb rated at th e tim e?

POLITICS AND FRIENDSHIP

187

JD : C eleb rate d ? ... W ell-kn ow n at least in these m ilieux. I h ad read only

T h e In sisten ce o f the L e tte r, p erh ap s also T h e R o m e D isco u rse, and
m ore or less superficially. But th e space, if you will, in w hich I was situated
w as a b it st r a n g e . I w as p u r s u in g m y w ork o n H u sse r l m ore or le ss
continu ously. I was teach in g a course on H istory in H eidegger during th at
year a course th at som e o f th ose sam e students took. M y relation s were
e x c e l l e n t w ith B a lib a r , R a n c i r e , a n d o th e r s I h ad p re p a re d fo r th e
agrgation th e y ear before. B ut p arad o xically in t h a t year, ju st as I b e g a n to
teach as caiman, t h a t sem inar by A lth u sser started a n d cap tivated all the
a tte n tio n o f those stu d e n ts. I felt q u ite ill-at-ease, you know, su dden ly
quite m argin alized. I a tte n d ed on e or two sessions o f A lth u sse rs sem inar:
R a n c i re s exposition , for exam ple. S o m e o f th em were later published.
H ow ever, from the p h ilo so p h ica l p o in t o f view , I felt as if I were in an
em barrassing" situation. T h a t w hole p rob lem atic seem ed to m e necessary,
n o doubt, within the M arxist field, w hich was also a political field, m arked
in p articu lar by th e relation with the Party o f w hich I was n ot a m em ber
and w h ich was slow ly m ovin g aw ay from S ta lin ism (an d w hich, w hile I was
a stu d en t there, m oreover, d o m in ated in a very ty ran n ical m an n er). Yet, at
the sam e tim e, I found th a t p ro b lem atic I w o uldn t say naive or lacking
culture, fa r from th at but too in sen sitive to critical, tran scen d en tal, and
o n to lo g ic a l q u e stio n s w h ich th e n se em ed to m e to be n ece ssary even
n ecessary again st H usserl and H eidegger, bu t in any case through them .
M S : W e ll talk a b o u t this a g a in a n d a g a in , but p e rh a p s we c a n b eg in
t a lk i n g a b o u t it n ow . W h a t w ere th e t h in g s t h a t y o u fo u n d m o st
p rob lem atic in th e th eoretical field sh all we call it in w hich A lth u sser
an d his stu den ts were w orking?
JD : T o review it very quickly, m any qu estion s seem ed to m e to h ave been
p assed over, n otably those ab ou t the historicity o f history or the co n ce p t o f
h istory . I was righ t in the m id st o f d e b a tin g o v er th ese q u estio n s (th e
c o n d it i o n s o f p o s s ib ilit y fo r a h is t o r y o f id e a l o b je c t iv it y , th u s o f a
h istoricity o f langu age an d scien ce, the n ecessity but also the lim its o f
id e a lis m a n d o f t r a n s c e n d e n t a l t e le o lo g y o f a H u s s e r lia n ty p e , th e
relation sh ip betw een historicity an d ob jectivity , e tc .). N o t from , let us say,
an a-h istorical p o in t o f view, bu t by settin g into m otion , on th e subject o f
h is t o r y s h is t o r ic it y a n d o f th e o b je c t s o b je c t iv it y , a n o th e r type o f
q u estio n in g (w h ich I believed to b e prelim inary, thus m ore radical, m ore
c r itic a l, m ore d e c o n str u c tiv e , th a t is, c r it ic a l e v e n w ith re sp e c t to
criticism an d M arxist critiq u e). I h ad the im pression that their co n cept o f
h isto ry should h ave passed th ro u gh th e test o f this q u estio n in g. A n d I

188

THE A LTH U SSERIA N LEGA CY

co n stan tly felt, n o t like raising o b je ctio n s, but like saying: You h a v e to
slow dow n. W h at is an o b je ct? W h at is a scien tific o b je ct? Th eir discourse
se em ed to m e to give w ay to a th e o re tic ism or a n ew fan gled sc ie n tism
w h ic h I c o u ld h a v e c h a lle n g e d . B u t, q u ite n a tu ra lly , I w as p araly zed
because at th e sam e tim e I d id n t w ant m y qu estio n s to be tak en for crude
a n d se lf-s e r v in g c r itic ism s c o n n e c te d w ith the R ig h t or th e L e ft in
p a r tic u la r w ith th e C o m m u n ist P arty. E v en th o u g h I w as n o t a Party
m e m b e r, I u n d e r s to o d th e s it u a t io n . I knew th a t th e a c c u s a t io n o f
th eoreticism or o f scien tism could be form ulated from th e Partys p oin t o f
view , for e x a m p le , an d , m o reo v er, it was fo rm u la te d by th e m in q u ite
sum m ary fashion or in term s, at least, to w hich I would h ave b e e n th e last
to subscribe.
I was thus paralyzed, silent, before so m eth in g th a t resem bled a sort o f
th eo reticism , a h y p ostasis o f T h e o ry w ith a cap ital T , before a bit too
em p h atic or gran d iloq u en t use o f cap ital letters w ith regard to the theory,
w ith regard to the sc ie n c e . A ll o f th a t seem ed to m e quite w orrisom e,
problem atic, p recritical, b u t from a perspective t h a t w as n o t th at o f som e
hu m an ism or em piricism . A lth usser was co n d u ctin g a struggle again st a
certain h egem on y w hich was at the sam e tim e a terrifying do gm atism or
p h ilo so p h ical stereotypism within the Party a struggle th a t seem ed to m e
(w ithin the lim its o f th at co n tex t) quite necessary. Yet, at the sam e time, I
did n ot wish to n or could I form ulate qu estions th at would h ave resem bled,
from afar, th ose from the M arxism again st w h ich A lth u sser w as fightin g.
E v e n th o u g h I t h o u g h t it in a n o th e r w ay, I c o u ld n o t say : Y es, i t s
th e o re ticism an d th erefore leads to a ce rta in p o litic a l p araly sis. I thus
found m y self w alled in by a sort o f to rm en ted silence. F urth erm ore, all th at
I am describin g was coupled, n aturally, w ith w h at oth ers h av e called an
in tellec tu a l, if n o t p erso n al, terrorism . I alw ays h ad very good p erson al
relation s w ith A lth u sser, B alibar, a n d others. B u t there was, le ts say, a sort
o f th e o re tical in tim idation: to form ulate qu estion s in a style th a t appeared,
s h a ll we say , p h e n o m e n o lo g ic a l, t r a n s c e n d e n t a l or o n t o l o g i c a l w as
im m ediately considered suspicious, backw ard, id ealistic, even reactionary.
A n d s in c e I w a s a lr e a d y f o r m u la t in g t h in g s in th e s e m a n n e r s , th is
app earan ce w as rendered co m plicated to the extrem e, th a t is, to the p oin t
o f m a k in g th e m u n r e a d a b le fo r th o s e a t w h o m th e y w ere d ir e c t e d .
N a tu ra lly , I d id n t th in k th o se fo rm u la tio n s w ere re a c tio n a ry , b u t th a t
in tim id atio n was there. I h a d at least as m an y virtu al qu estio n s ab ou t w hat
I was b egin n in g to p erceive in L acan ian ism .
M S: Y ou felt in tim id ate d by th eir m an n er o f h a n d lin g th in g s you were
interested in H usserl, H eidegger, a n d so on.

PO LITICS A N D FRIENDSHIP

189

JD : In tim id ated, but p rotestin g inside!

M S : E xactly, but, at the sam e tim e, you th ou gh t it was im portant th a t the
way in w hich A lth u sser and his stu den ts w ould talk about history, scien ce,
ob jectivity , an d so on n eed ed to en g a g e w ith this p ro b lem atic. B u t at this
p o in t you d id n t d eb ate these issues w ith th em directly.
JD : T h e so cial space d id n t allow m e to.
M S : B ecau se y ou also felt th at from inside the Party, w hat they were doing
was very h o p e fu l an d so you ob served a certain reticen ce then.
JD : Yes, th a ts right! I thus felt a bit isolated an d had the feelin g th at the
p r o b le m a tic in w h ic h I was e n g a g e d w ould b e, in th e lon g ru n , m ore
n ecessary , m ore in e v ita b le . N o n e th e le ss, at the sam e tim e, I th o u g h t I
n oticed so m eth in g th a ts m ore difficult to form ulate: a m ore or less avow ed,
m ore or less su rreptitious borrow in g n ot from m e, o f course but from
w h at m a tte r e d to m e m o st: H u sse rl a n d H e id e g g e r. It w as a p la c e d ,
d is p la c e d , r e p la c e d b o rr o w in g , a c o n t r a b a n d b o rro w in g . In s p ite o f
e v ery th in g, in sp ite o f th e d e n ia ls, in sp ite o f th e d e clare d re je c tio n o f
H u sserl a n d H eidegger, there w as an in corp oration (w hich I judged to be
to o h a sty a n d in su fficie n tly r e fin e d ) o f m o d els o f re a d in g a n d types o f
qu estio n s co m in g from th em . Q u estio n s like: U n d er w h at co n d ition s is th e
o b je c tiv ity o f th e o b je c t p o ssib le ? H ow c a n regio n s o f o b je c tiv ity (o f
k n o w le d g e or o f th e o ry ) by h ie r a rc h iz e d in o rd e r to su b je c t th e m to
G e n e r a l T h e o ry , e ith e r th ro u g h a F o rm a l or T r a n s c e n d e n ta l L o g ic or
th rough a F u n d am en tal O n to lo gy ? In th at th eoreticism th at was also an
ep istem ologism (th e price, alas, to be p aid for b reakin g with the dogm atic
em piricism reign in g in M arxist discou rse), it was indeed a m atter o f regions
o f ob jectivity , o f region al on to lo gies as theories o f ob jectivity w ithout any
question (o f H eideggerian type, fo r exam ple) ab ou t the d eterm in ation o f
t h e e n t it y as o b je c t , a b o u t h i s t o r y , a n d t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s o f t h i s
d eterm in ation . T h e avo id an ce o f m ak in g any o f this exp licit ann oyed me
in a way, especially since A lth u sser w as always fascin ated w ith H usserl and
H e i d e g g e r w it h o u t h is h a v i n g e v e r g iv e n a n y p u b l ic sig n for t h is
fascin ation .
M S : I d o n t recall these n am es ever occurring in an y o f his pub lish ed texts.
J D : F or A lth u s se r , if I m ay b e allo w ed to say it in su ch a b ru tal way,
H eid e g g e r is the great unavoidable thinker o f this century. B o th th e great
ad v ersary and also a sort o f e sse n tial ally or virtu al recou rse (A lth u sse rs

190

THE A LTH U SSERIA N LEGACY

en tire w ork sh ou ld be read follow in g this in d ic a tio n ). A s I said to you

b e fo re , we sp o k e v ery .little a b o u t p h ilo so p h y to g e th e r : o n ly in b rief,
e llip tic , iro n ic , so m e tim e s frien d ly , so m e tim e s less frien d ly e x c h a n g e s.
A lw ays again st a back groun d o f allu sion s and p rob ab ly also o f enorm ous
m isu nderstandin gs. A n d yet, how m any tim es did h e say to m e during the
last years in the ho sp ital: Listen , y ou ve got to talk to m e about H eidegger.
Y ou ve got to teach m e H eidegger. H e w as readin g h im a bit. H e picked
th in gs up an d th en dropped them .
M S: W h y do you th in k A lth u sser th o u g h t th a t H eid e gge r w as the m ost
im p o rtan t th in k er o f this era. S in c e he did n t read h im very m uch, w hat
force could he have exerted on A lth u ssers thinking?
JD : W e all h ave an idiosyn cratic or idiom atic way o f w orking, reading, n ot
readin g, o f readin g w ithout reading, n ot readin g w hile readin g, to avoid
w ithout avoidin g, to deny. A lth u sser h ad his. A n d to read an d interpret
h im requires, in turn, th at one bear in m ind, as in all cases, this singular
eco n o m y . But I could certainly co n firm th at H eidegger was a great (oral)
reference for him an d th a t he w as n ever o n e o f th o se w h o tried to denigrate
or disqualify H eid e gge rs thought, even for th e p o litica l reason s o f w hich
you are aware. But you are very well aw are th at a certain configuration ,
e v e n a r e c i p r o c a l f a s c i n a t i o n - r p u l s i o n b e t w e e n M a r x is m a n d
H eid eggerian ism is o n e o f the m ost sign ifican t p h en om en a o f this century.
A n d we h a v e n o t fin is h e d m e d it a tin g o n it, a ss u m in g th a t we h a v e
seriously begun to d o so.
M S : T h is is due to the influence o f Sartre? O fH y p p o lite ?
JD : T h e trajectories are n o doubt m ore co m plicated , m ore overdeterm ined,
as he would h ave said. But the shadow o f H eidegger is present n ot only in
A lth u sse rs work, but in all o f the w orks p ublished at th at tim e, th at is, For
M arx an d Reading C apital. I suggested in a n o te som ew here in Psych (in
D sistance) th at for a quarter century, H eidegger was never nam ed in any
book by those who, in Fran ce, were forced to recogn ize in p riv a te or in
p u b lic m u c h la te r t h a t he had p la y e d a m a jo r ro le in th e ir th o u g h t
(A lth u sser, F oucault, D eleuze, for ex am ple). A n o th e r program for anoth er
history o f in tellectu al France.
M S: I know w ithout h avin g the texts in front o f you and n ot h av in g read
th em recently this will be difficult, but can you th in k o f w here these traces
are visible? W here would you point to in A lth u sse rs texts?

POLITICS AND FRIENDSHIP

191

JD : L e ts take, for exam ple, a b ig ch un k like the critique o f hum anism . Ju st

a fte r th e war, th e Letter on H u m an ism d e n o u n c e s or d e c o n s tr u c ts a
p articu lar h u m an ism as m etaph ysical. In all his anti-h um an ist discourse,
A lth u sser never cites H eidegger. Y et to state, as h e does, th a t h u m an ism is
m e tap h y sic al or th at m etap h y sics is h u m an istic c a n n o t bu t co n serv e an
ech o o f th e H eideggerian m o m en t (I tried to form alize som e o f w h at was
h a p p e n in g at th a t tim e w ith m a n in France in T h e E n d s o f M a n ). T h e
tex t in w h ich H eid egger states th a t M arx is a great p h ilo sop h er, a great
m etap h y sician , a n d th a t th e M arxist co n c e p t o f w ork is on e o f th e great
in terp retation s o f being is indeed in the Letter on H um anism . In pay in g
h im som e h om age, H eidegger in a way declares th a t M arx is n ot essentially
a m ateria list or th a t his m aterialism is n o t a p h ilo sop h y of m atter, but
rath e r o f w ork. H e is n ot essen tially a thinker o f b ein g as m atter. H e is a
th in k e r o f b e in g as work. O n e m ust b eg in to in terp re t M arx from th e
p e r s p e c t iv e o f w ork a n d p r o d u c t io n a n d n o t fro m th a t o f m a t e r ia l
su b stan ce. T w en ty years later, its difficult to im agine th at all A lth u sserian
(but also F ou cald ian ) discourse again st h u m an ism at th e tim e was w ithout
relation sh ip w ith th is text. A ll th e m ore so for the fact th at the Letter on
H um anism was prob ab ly the m ost read text in F ran ce at the tim e (it s a text
m eant for France, for the Fren ch co n tex t, on e m ight say, as th at co n text
w as r e p r e s e n t e d or d e s c r ib e d to H e id e g g e r by B e a u f r e t , the l e t t e r s
addressee) an d the allu sion s to M arx h av e alw ays been n oticed.
H e id e g g e r was v ery p r e se n t e v e n at th e E co le N o r m a le , th a n k s in
p articu lar to H yppolite, w h o alw ays sp ok e a lot ab o u t him , an d to Beaufret
w ho tau gh t courses there. T h u s there was at least an im pregn ation . I d o n t
k n o w if th a ts a good w ord or w hat category to use here. I d o n t believe
A lth u sse r ever read H eidegger w ell. B u t th e re was th a t im pregn ation , th at
is, a c e r ta in p re se n c e , an a u th o rity , a le g itim a c y o f the H e id e g g e ria n
discourse th at was in the air, in references: im pregn ation a n d avo id an ce.
You k n ow th a t these m otifs w eigh u pon a p h ilo so p h ical discourse even if
on e d o e sn t read the author, even if on e d o e sn t com e to term s with the
letter o f the text as A lth u sser did with the letter o f M a rx s text and th at o f
a few others.
A t the tim e, I was sensitive to all this: the traffic o f th at surreptitious
circu lation w ithout rigorous reading. W h en ce a sort o f uneasin ess. Ill now
try to pursue this little n arrative. D urin g the n ex t year (1 9 6 5 ), I gave a
sem in ar on R o u sse au s Essay on the O rigins o f Languages. Les C ah ie rs pour
l A n a l y s e h a d ju s t b e e n in a u g u r a t e d . T h e c o n ju n c t i o n b e t w e e n
A lth u s se r ia n d isco u rse an d a c e rta in L a c a n ia n ism w as d o m in a n t in its
pages. E p istem ology w as th e b ig w ord: th e th in g perh aps fetishized more
th an p racticed . In Les C ah ie rs pour lA n a ly se I published my first text on

192

THE A LTH U SSE R IA N LEGACY

L v i-S tra u ss. S im u lta n e o u sly , the E ssay on the O rigin o f Languages was
published there. T h ere were som e curious crossin gs around the m otifs o f
t e x t and d e c ip h e r in g at that m o m en t w h ich w as a lso , for m e, th e
m o m en t o f th e tw o O f G ram m ato lo gy articles w h ere I b e g an to elaborate
a certain th in k in g on w riting an d reading. M y first year as caiman at the
E cole N o rm ale was a bit unhappy. I felt a little isolated. T h in g s were n ot
m uch better the follow ing year. W h at was called m y paralysis a while ago
was also a p o litic a l gesture: I d id n t w ant to raise o b je c tio n s that would
h ave ap p eared anti-M arxist. O n e m ust reflect on th at m om en t in French
p o litic a l h istory in w hich an o b je ctio n taken as a p o litic a l sign o f a n ti
com m u n ism was, in th e m ilieu th a t I lived in, very serious. A n d , righ t or
w ro n g , g iv in g in to b o t h p o l it i c a l c o n v i c t i o n a n d p r o b a b ly a ls o to
in tim id atio n , I alw ays ab stain ed from criticizin g M arx ism h ead-on . A n d I
stress h ead -o n . W here I explain m yself the best on th at su b ject is in Les
fin s de lh o m m e (P aris: G a lil e , 1981; A c te dun C o llo q u e de C erisy-laS a lle ). In a sem inar th ere, I tried to describ e th e situ atio n th at w as th en
m ine.
T o fo llo w th e o r d e r o f y o u r q u e s t io n s , l e t s ta k e th e e x a m p le o f
h istoricism again. T h e critique o f historicism is, in my ow n trajectory and
my ow n work, first a determ in in g m otif. A lth u sser was aware o f the p lace
th a t th is c r it iq u e h e ld fo r m e b e g in n in g w ith m y s tu d e n t w o rk and
develo ped in an essential a n d ce n tral way in my Introduction to the Origins of
Geometry begin n in g thus with my reading o f H u sserl (to my know ledge,
th e first p e rso n to h ave d e n o u n c e d [a g a in st D ilth e y ] h isto r ic is m in a
sy stem atic an d rigorous m an n er; a d e n u n ciatio n n am in g h istoricism ; the
first to have situated in such a critique o f h istoricism an d n ot o f history or
o f h isto ricity , o f course, to the co n trary ! th e co n d itio n o f an access to
science and p h ilo sop h y ). I do n ot w ish to recon stitu te these steps w hich
are the very object o f my Introduction to the Origins o f Geometry, but le ts
ju st say th a t for m e th is is th e first a x io m o f a n y p rob lem atic o f scientficity,
truth, o b jectiv ity in general, etc.
W h e n A lt h u s s e r c r it ic iz e s h is t o r ic is m ( G r a m s c i s, D e lla V o l p e s,
C o le ttis, o r th at o f others, o f Sartre also, I th in k ), h e can n o t ignore (since
he uses it) the p rin cip al basis o f this critique o f h istoricism : he goes b ack to
the first years o f this century. T h is was m uch discussed at the en d o f the
1950s and at the b egin n in g o f the 1960s in all the works on H u sserl (n ot
on ly m in e). T h is silen ce or foreclosure seem ed strange to me. It irritated
me even if I u n d ersto o d , w ith ou t a p p ro v in g o f it, the p o litic a l strategy
in vo lv ed . T a k in g in to accou n t th e co n text in w hich G ram sci was w riting,
I understood the n ecessity o f refounding the co n ce p t o f history after him ,
again st him. P ersonally, w hile ta k in g on th e critique o f h istoricism , I was

PO LITICS A N D FRIENDSHIP

193

also in terested in a ce rta in h isto ric ity the tra n sce n d e n ta l h isto ricity of
w h ich H u sserl speaks, a certain h istory o f the m ean in g o f bein g o f w hich
H e id e g g e r sp eak s, but also a h isto r ic ity th a t I w as trying to d e term in e
beyond, against and w ithout H usserl or H eidegger. I fou n d that A lth u sser
was su b tractin g som e th in gs from history too quickly: fo r exam ple, w hen he
said th at ideology h as no h istory . I fou nd his th eoreticism p roblem atic:
the m ove to elim in ate th eory w ith a ca p ita l T or th eory o f ideology as
w ell as ideology itse lf from history p ro b lem atic at least u ntil su ch tim e
th at a co n ce p t o f history were produced. It was probably necessary with
respect to a certain co n ce p t o f history, bu t n ot w ith respect to h istoricity in
g e n e r a l. T r a in e d to c r it iq u e h is t o r ic is m (a s r e la t iv is m , e m p iric ism ,
sk ep ticism , e tc .) in order to a cced e to a d im en sio n o f tra n sce n d en ta l or
even u ltratran scen d en tal h istoricity, I did n o t wish to give up history. T h e
destru ction o f th e m etap h y sical concept o f history did n ot m ean there is
n o h isto r y to m e. In A lth u s se r I did n ot see th e sam e m o v e m e n t or
sen sitivity to the n eed to th in k history otherw ise a n d this b oth ered me.
I w an ted to ask questions. A t every step, I would h ave liked to h ave had
a lo n g d iscu ssio n w ith him a n d his frien ds an d ask th em to respond to
q u estio n s I felt n ecessary . T h e fa c t is, as stran ge as it m igh t seem , th is
discussion n ev e r to o k place. A n d yet we lived in th e sam e h o u se where
we were co lleagues fo r tw enty years and his students and friends were often ,
in a n o th e r co n tex t, m in e. E veryth in g to o k p lace underground, in th e said
o f the unsaid. Its p art o f the F ren ch scen e a n d is n ot sim ply an ecd otal. A n
in tellectu al so ciology o f th is dim en sio n o f Fren ch in tellec tu a l or acad em ic
life rem ains to be u n d ertak en and n otab ly o f th at normalien m ilieu in w hich
the p ractice o f avoid an ce is stupefying. I im agine this appears incredible to
a n on -F ren ch person, especially an A m eric an , an d perh aps also to a few
Fren ch . But one has to take into co n sid eration a sort o f overtrain in g in the
tre a tm e n t o f p ro b lem s fro m an e c o n o m ic a l, p o te n tia l, a lg eb ra ic sta n d
p o in t like c h e ss players w h o d o n t n eed for th e gam e to actually advan ce
in order to a n tic ip a te the o p p o n e n ts m oves an d to respond in ad v an ce
virtually, to preinterpret fictively all possible m oves and to guess the o th e rs
strategy to the fin e st detail. A ll this is related to the th eory o f p h ilo so p h
ical gam es w ithin a tiny m ilieu ov ertrain ed in deciph erm en t.
M S: You said all this was p art o f the sociology o f F ren ch in tellectu al life. I
d o n 't know about all A lth u sse rs students, but certainly B aliber was in the
P arty at the tim e. W as it because you were n o t in the Party th at you felt
yourself to be outside the d o m ain o f their discussion

194

THE A LTH U SSE R IA N LEGACY

JD : Yes, probably, to a certain ex te n t. A n d th is fa c t m ust n ot b e insign ifican t or foreign to w hat Im describing. Perhaps th a t was also in p art my
fault. P erh ap s I sh o u ld h ave insisted on ta lk in g w ith them . B u t im plicitly,
underh an dedly, th ere was su ch a war, so m an y m an eu vers o f in tim idatio n ,
such a stru ggle for h egem on y th a t on e found o n e se lf easily discouraged.
M o reover, everyone was inevitably p arty to it. T h ere were cam ps, strategic
allian ces, m aneuvers o f en circlem en t an d exclusion . S o m e forces in this
m e rc ile s s K am p fp latz g ro u p e d a ro u n d L a c a n , o th e rs a ro u n d F o u c a u lt,
A lth u sse r, D eleuze. W h e n it h ad any, th a t p e rio d s d ip lo m a cy (w ar by
o th e r m e a n s) w as th a t o f a v o id a n c e : silen ce , o n e d o e sn t c ite o r n am e,
everyone distinguishes h im self an d everyth in g form s a sort o f arch ip elago of
d isco u rse w ith o u t ea rth ly c o m m u n ic a tio n , w ith o u t v isib le p assagew ay .
T o d a y th e se a b etw een th e se a rc h ip e la g o s sh o u ld be re co n stitu te d . In
app earan ce, n o o n e com m u n icated . N o o n e was tran slated. From tim e to
tim e, there w ere, from afar, signals in the n igh t: A lth u sser h ailin g L acan or
h ailin g F oucault w h o h a d h ailed L acan who h ailed Lvi-Strau ss. T h ere I
was, the new kid in a certain sense it w asnt my generation .
M S: A s we say in E n glish , you were th e new kid on the b lo ck .
JD : Yet, at the sam e tim e, th ere was n o declared h ostility. In spite o f th ese
differences an d d iffren d s, I was p art o f a great ca m p : we h ad com m on
en em ies a lot o f them . N ever, betw een A lth usser and me, fo r exam ple,
w as th e re an y p u b lic ly d e clare d h o stility . T h e r e w as p u b lic ly d e clare d
h o stility again st m e on th e p art o f so m an y oth ers (L v i-S trau ss, L a c a n ,
F o u cau lt later ... a n d th e list is far from sto p p in g th ere). For my p art there
w ere n e v e r any o b je c t io n s p u b lic ly a n d f r o n t a lly fo r m u la te d . I h a d
q u e stio n s t h a t I drew b a c k in sid e m y self a n d t h a t I still k eep to d a y for
myself. By the sam e token , on the other side, there was never any attack
upon w hat I was do in g rather avoidan ce.
M S: If I am w rong about this, co rrect me.

It seem s to m e th at you h ave

observed a certain reticence ab ou t th e texts o f M arx in your writing. T h is is

n ot to say th at M arx is never cited. I was reading today th at one footn ote in
L a m ythologie blan ch e, w h ich I hope we will be able to com e back to
because it is a very im portant text you cite, a text from M arx on the G erm an
ideology; I would like to talk about that. C ertainly, unlike H eidegger, unlike
Husserl, unlike Plato, M allarm , B lan ch ot M arx never occupied a central
place in your writing. I can understand certain reasons for th at reticence, but
p erh aps, in this co n text, you could precise th em a bit. Let m e rem ind you
about the passage I have in mind. It occurs in Positions. You say: I h ave

PO LITICS A N D FRIENDSHIP

195

never found any satisfactory protocols for reading M arx. Tw o questions I

h ave about that: 1 )W hy do you think th at is the case, that you h ave never
found any satisfactory protocols fo r reading M arx? 2)Is th at still the case? D o
you still feel bereft o f th e p rotoco ls for reading th at would be required to
intervene in the texts o f M arx; or are there other reasons for having observed
this reticence? W e w on t call it a silence, because it is n ot a silence.
JD : For th is my answ er sh o u ld be a lo n g one. L e t s say th a t I was, at th e
least, reticen t. Indeed I told m yself: M a rx s text rem ain s m etaphysical, as
far as w hat I h ad read. For I did read M arx, you know .
M S: M o st certainly!
JD : I did n ot read h im enough. O n e n ever reads en ou gh M arx. B ut I did n t
sim p ly p a ss, h im b y. I h ad th e im p r e s sio n th a t it was st ill a la rg e ly
m etap h y sical text. T h e qu estion s th at interested m e, th at is, the history o f
th e essen ce o f bein g, o f the essen tial in terpretation o f being, o f b ein g as this
or th at (W h at is m atter? W h at is labor? W h a t is the b ein g o f ...?, e tc .)
those qu estio n s were eith er n ot posed or still largely depended u pon the
H eg elian legacy. N o t th at M arx is, for me, simply an inheritor o f H egel;
but he is so to a greater an d m o re essen tial ex ten t th a n it was ad m itted
th en (th ro u gh d en ial, it seem s to m e, if n o t th ro u gh m isu n d erstan d in g).
T h e q u e s tio n s I h a d e la b o r a te d w ith re sp e c t to H e g e l a n d t h a t I w as
fo rm u latin g at th at tim e (in several p la c e s: n otab ly in Introduction to the
Origins o f Geometry, in L a Diffrance, The Ends o f M an or The Pic and the
Pyramid) seem ed to m e to co n cern M arx as well. From th at perspective I
was n ot co n v in ced by w hat th en was referred to as ep istem ological b reak
(after an im portation o f the B ach elard ian c o n ce p t). I was n ot co n vin ced
t h a t t h e r e h a d b e e n r e a ll y tw o M a r x e s t h e s t i l l h u m a n is t i c ,
an th rop ological, all-too-H egelian or all-too-F eu erbach ian m etap h ysician o f
th e P aris M an u scrip ts; an d th e sc ie n tific M arx d eliv ered from all teleoesch atology . A s you know , t h a t d istin ctio n p lay ed an organizing ro le in
A lth u sse rs en tire discourse as well as th a t o f th e A lth u sserian s a t th at tim e.
I co u ld n t b rin g m yself to b e lie v in g it u p o n a sim p le reading. I to ld m yself,
O K , M arxs tex t is h etero gen eou s like all tex ts, bu t the co n cep t o f break
itself seem ed to m e incom patible w ith the m ean in g I get (an d to w hich I
h o ld ) from th at h e te ro g e n e ity , from th at n o n - o p p o sitio n a l d iffe re n c e .
P a ra d o x ica lly , th e b reak h o m o gen izes on b o t h sid es o f th e o p p o sitio n a l
b o rd er a n d fin ally assim ila tes the tw o sides, on e after th e other, betw een
th e m . T h is h o m o g e n iz a tio n th ro u g h o p p o sitio n is a ruse o f d ia le c tic s:
elsew h ere I h a v e tried to d e m o n stra te a n d form alize it p recisely w ith
regard to H eg el in G las. But th at is n o t the ob ject o f our interview .

196

THE A LTH U SSE R IA N LEG A CY

M S: W h at A lth u sser inten ds by the co n ce p t o f the ep istem ological b reak

is n ot th at at a certain point, M arx ceases to be th e h u m an ist M arx. W h at
he m ean s is th at the prob lem atic ch an ge s in certian determ in ate ways. I
would say th at the later texts, as A lth u sser says, are still co n tam in ated by
the ea rly M a r x , b u t w h at is im p o r ta n t is th e e m e r g e n c e o f d iffe re n t
discu rsive strata. In th a t case, I h av e alw ays th o u g h t, th o u g h A lth u sser
stages it in tem poral term s, that is n ot really w h at it is ab ou t. Isn t it really
about extractin g from M arx a different set o f co n cern s and problem s th at
had, for a variety o f reason s, at th at poin t, been subm erged in the ordinary
discourse on M arx? In th at sense, could n ot on e say th at you and A lth u sser
w ould n ot differ m uch on this point? O r would you disagree?
JD : W h a t you call the stagin g was very strong. E v en if the se co n d phase
(th e se c o n d stra tu m , if you p refe r to sp e a k in term s o f stru c tu re ) w as
c o n ta m in a te d by th e first, a new p ro b le m a tic w ould h a v e sp ru n g forth
w hich should, in prin ciple, n ot be co n tam in ated . A n d this secon d phase
was called scien tific. T h e order o f qu estions th at interested m e was n ot
p o litica l or scien tific in the last in sta n ce . T h e co n ce p t o f science was
n ot, fo r me, the last word. T o state th at a discourse is scien tific does n ot
m e a n t h a t it is a b o v e su sp ic io n or t h a t it is, fo r t h a t f a c t , r e fle c tiv e
(alth o u gh Ive n ever subscribed to the H eideggerian assertion accord in g to
w hich scien ce does n o t th in k w hich further co m p licates th e discourse
th at I am , th at I was alread y trying to m ak e h eard).
M S : In his texts, A lth u sser invokes the term sc ie n c e in such a way as to
m ake the crucial tex t fo r M arx Le C apital: A ll the labor o f these texts is
precisely to d eterm in e: w hat is the co n ce p t o f scien ce scien tificity would
be b etter w hich govern s M a rx s texts? N ow , it is p ossible, I think, for you
to say and I am alm ost certain you would say th at you are n o t satisfied
w ith the criteria o f scien tificity th at A lth u sser w orks w ith or develo ps in
these tex ts. B u t I th in k th a t fo r A lth u sser, w h at is sc ien tificity , indeed
w h at is an object, is the decisive question. A fte r all, w h at is the p oin t o f
th e d istin cto n betw een the o b je ct in theory and the o b je ct in reality? T h a t
very d istin c tio n is precisely the problem th at on e h as to work out. H ow do
we relate th eory to th in g s? H ow do we co rrelate th e o rie s w ith th in gs?
H ow , th erefore, ca n we p rod u ce criteria by w h ich we ju d ge th is theory
better th a n th a t th eory ? It is a q u e stio n I w ould like to co m e b a ck to
ev en tu ally . For now, I w ould sim ply w an t to insist on this p o in t: th a t for
A lth u sser, the problem o f scien tificity is ju st th at, a problem . For him , it is
not the last w ord. It sounds th at way in th ose texts, bu t I d o n t th in k it
is. W o u ld you disagree?

PO LITICS A N D FRIENDSHIP

197

JD : It seem ed to me th a t acc o rd in g to his read in g o f M arx, le ts say the

g o o d M arx is the on e w ho em erges beyond n eo -H ege lian m etaphysics,
beyond an th rop ology, etc., to fin a lly re ach a th eoretico -scien tific p ro b le
m atic. B u t I b eliev ed an d I still b eliev e now th a t on e m ust p ose m any
h isto rical or h isto rial qu estion s about the idea o f theory, about the idea o f
o b je c t i v i t y . W h e re d o e s it c o m e fro m ? H o w is o b je c t i v i t y 's v a lu e
c o n stitu te d ? H ow is th e o ry s o rd er or a u th o rity c o n stitu te d ? H ow did
theory b ecom e p revalen t in th e h istory o f E u ropean philosophy? e tc . A n d I
d id n o t se e t h e s e g e n e a l o g i c a l q u e s t io n s , so to s p e a k , on s c ie n c e ,
objectivity, etc. being posed by the A lth u sserian discourse, or at least n ot in
a m anner th at seem ed satisfactory to m e. From th at, it seem ed to m e that
his readin g o f M arx co nsisted in dropping a bad text or a pre- M arxist one,
le ts say, an d in c o n stitu tin g the M arxist te x t M a rx s te x t o f a fte r th e
b r e a k a s a t e x t t h a t h a d m o v e d b e y o n d m e t a p h y s ic a l s u s p i c i o n ,
u n tou ch able. M y reticen ce o n the order o f th ou gh t and about gen ealogical
q u e stio n in g w as also, by th e sam e stro k e, fo r th e sam e reason s, at least
virtually, a p o litic a l reticen ce. B e ca u se I th in k go o d p o litics n e v e r com es
fro m a lim it a t io n o n q u e s tio n in g or o n th e d e m a n d o f th o u g h t. M y
reservation s were n ot always o b jection s: I didn t w ant to say, Its n ot like
th at. W h at youre saying is w rong. I th o u g h t th at w hat he was saying was
n ot w ro n g n o t n e c e ssa rily , n ot alw a y s bu t th a t it was n e c e ssa ry to
fu rth er q u e stio n th e a x io m a tic o f d isco u rse. N o t the sc ie n tific b u t th e
t h in k in g a x io m a tic . For m e th e re re m a in s a d is tin c tio n b e tw e e n th e
p h ilo so p h ica l or th e sc ie n tific an d ev ery th in g I w ould ca ll th o u g h t in a
sense w here this d istin ctio n is n o t as H eideggerian as it seem s. T h a t s why
A lth u sse rs an d the A lth u sseria n s discourse seem ed a bit stiflin g to me: I
sensed a new scien tism in it, even th e refin em ent or the disguising o f (an d
this term would h ave m ade them scream ) a new p ositiv ism that repressed
th e p ossibility o f qu estion s like W h at is an ob ject? W here does the value
o f o b je c tiv ity or o f th e th e o re tic a l com e fro m ? etc. S in c e I c o u ld n t
f o r m u la t e s u c h q u e s t io n s w it h o u t a p p e a r in g to jo in th e c h o r u s o f
adversaries, I rem ained silent.
M S: Y our reticen ce, or as you said, your silen ce was, then, con ju n ctural.
JD : T h e silen ce was conju nctural. T h e fact o f n ot speaking, o f n ot lending,
m ore precisely, a certain public form was b oth a co n ju n ctu ral an d a political
gesture. In fact I th in k my texts a n d my b eh avio r sp o k e exp ressin g w hat
was necessary to have understood for those who were interested and knew
how to d e cip h er it. For all th a t, I d o n t say th a t silen ce was right or in
general the only possibility.

It was the one th at I believed right and the only

198

T H E A LTH U SSE R IA N LEGA CY

on e o f w hich I m yself at th at place an d tim e was capable. O n the French

scen e I d id n t w ish to a ttack , in a co n v e n tio n ally co d ed , utilizab le, and
m a n ip u la b le w ay, a M a r x ist d isco u rse th at se em ed , rig h tly or w rongly,
p ositive in sid e the Party, m ore intelligent and refined th a n w h at o n e usually
h eard . F u rth erm ore, as Ive said, I fe lt in tim id a te d . It w a sn t easy. It
seem ed th at m aybe silence would be m ore effective. I believe it w as n ot
w ithout effect. Now , you n ote th at the fact th at I was n o t a Party m em ber is
n ot insignificant. W hy didn t I join ? W h at history later m ade m ore obvious
and n otorious th an ever in France, w hat was already know n and accessible
to anyone w ho was n ot sleepin g or preten din g to sleep, w hat in the end will
h av e caused the d e ge n eratio n o f the Party and th e co verin g over o f the
A lth u sserian p roblem atic were th in gs th at I was sensitive to, as oth ers inside
or outside the Party, those w ho h ad ju st left or who were in the process o f
le a v in g it. I w as a n ti- S ta lin ist. I alread y h a d an im age o f th e F ren ch
C o m m u n ist Party, an d especially the S o v ie t U n io n , th a t seem ed in co m
patible with, lets say, the dem ocratic Left to w hich I h ave alw ays wished to
rem ain loyal.
But, again, I d id n t wish to form ulate these p o litical ob jection s an d risk
h av in g th em confused w ith co n servative reticence. I d id n t w ant that. I
realize th at others (few, in truth) found a clear way to take th at risk w hich I
did n t take. B ut I would say also th at they did so in a code and accordin g to
an axiom atic w ith w hich I w an ted n o th in g to do, w hich were n ot in tune
w ith the discourse th at I was elaborating. T h a t is the deepest reason for my
s i le n c e r a t h e r t h a n sh y n e s s or i n t im id a t io n . I n e v e r le t m y s e lf b e
intim idated w hen I can say w hat I w ant w ith the desired rigor. B asically
som e o f my silen ces or ab sten tion s still today m ay be exp lain ed thus: the
code in w hich I am asked to express m yself seem s laden w ith un accep tab le
presuppositions. It seem s already deconstructed, already decon structible to
me, in any case too inadequate (for there is no adequ ation possible or th at
h olds here) with respect to the code I seek to elaborate and w hich I know to
be both in d ispensable a n d yet im possible, n ot to be found.
M S: A t the tim e, roughly in the m iddle or late 60s, you saw A lth u sser as
in sid e the Party; y o u rse lf o u tside. A n d therefore it was d iffic u lt to see
A lth u s se r as a n y th in g b u t a k in d o f c o m m u n ist m ilita n t p h ilo so p h er, a
p ositio n about w hich you had certain doubts.
JD: It was the truth!
M S: But he w as alm ost throw n out in 1966!

POLITICS A N D FRIENDSHIP

199

JD : W h a t do you m ean by a lm o st ? Lots o f intellectuals were leavin g the

Party a t th at tim e! I c a n th in k o f other C o m m u n ist frien ds w ho did it
th em selves instead o f w aiting to be alm ost excluded. Y ou know, w hen I
was a stu d en t a t the Ecole N o rm a le (w e have to speak about this they
are n t a n e c d o te s), the sch o o ls C o m m u n ist group w as truly h e gem on ic
S ta lin ist an d hegem on ic. A n d it w as extrem ely difficult for som eon e on
the L eft (n eed I rem ind peop le th at Iv e always been on th e Left?) to be
thought o f only as a cry p to-C om m u n ist or a fellow -traveler. It was very
difficult n o t to jo in the Party. W ith the repression in H ungary in 1956,
som e o f th ose C o m m u n ist in tellectu als b egan to leave th e Party. A lth u sser
d id n t and, I th in k , n ever w ould h ave. G rard G en ette, who was a Party
m e m b e r u n t il 1 9 5 6 , told m e t h a t h e w e n t to see A lt h u s s e r a fte r th e
H u n garian revolt to im part his distress, anguish, reasons, and probably to
a sk h is advice. A lth u sser supposedly to ld h im : B u t if w hat y ou say were
true, th en the Party would be in the w rong. T h is seem ed to A lth usser to
be p re c lu d e d a n d h e p ro c e e d e d to d e m o n stra te ad absurdum th at w hat
G e n e tte was saying needed to be corrected. G e n e tte laugh ed w hen he told
m e: I drew m y c o n c lu sio n s fro m t h a t e x tr a o rd in a r y fo rm u la tio n an d
im m e d ia te ly le ft th e P a rty . A lth u s se r sta y e d in. I d o n t know u n til
w hen m aybe always in any case e v e n in th e worst m om ents. For h im
there w as on e th in g th at could n o t be done and th at w as leave th e Party.
T h u s, in spite o f everythin g, I consid ered h is struggle to be inside the Party.
I, o n the oth er h an d , was n ot a Party m em ber and so I co u ld n t even think
o f A lth usser as som eon e outside the Party also. H e was there; I was not.
D o you sense the difference? It can n o t be ignored.
M S: W e h ave m oved away from th e p h ilo sop h ical discussion, but we can
return. M y recollection is th at an d this w ould h ave b een som eth in g th at
would h ave brough t you close to g e th e r in th e late 5 0 s a n d early 6 0 s
A lth u sser was v ery m u ch again st th e Partys p o sitio n on A lgeria, because
the Party, as I recall, supported the A lg erian war.
JD : A t the very begin n in g, th at is, in 1 9 5 4 ' 1955, Party politics were, if I
rem em ber correctly, a bit cautious. T h e n the Party clearly took a p osition
again st the A lg e ria n W ar. U n d e r de G au lle th at p ositio n b ecam e m o re an d
m ore clear, a lth o u g h it was different from m ore rad ic al form s o f op p o sition
to th e A lg e r ia n W ar. A n d h e re , o n e sh ou ld d istin g u ish b e tw e e n th e
F re n c h P arty a n d th e A lg e ria n P arty w h ich h a d F re n c h from A lg e r ia
m e m b e r s w h o s e d e s t i n y w ill h a v e b e e n t r a g i c b e f o r e a n d a f t e r
ind ep en den ce, the new pow ers p ersecu tin g them in their turn.

200

TH E A LTH U SSE R IA N LEG A CY

M S: I was obviously m istak en ab ou t that. S o we will con tin u e w ith the

qu estion. A lth u sser never broke w ith the Party. In the middle to late 60s,
it would h a v e been difficult to see w h at would h ap p e n in 1978. H e w as in
th e en d very c r itic a l o f th e o rg an iz atio n o f th e Party, in th e Le Monde
articles on w h at can n o t endure in the PC F.
JD : A lth usser w as som eon e who, from inside the Party, sough t to transform
its p h ilo so p h ical and th eoretical discourse, b eliev in g that through the cause
and effect o f th is discourse he could ch an g e the P arty s politics. For my
little m ilieu th a t o f a sm all group o f ph ilosop h ers o f a certain Left this
A lth u sserian discourse was successful even if the b u reau cratic apparatus
o f th e Party d id n t accep t it. A m o n g those intellectuals, h e was dom in an t,
and the official Party ph ilosop h ers were consid ered poor retards n ot from
th e s t a n d p o in t o f the P a rty a p p a r a tu s , b u t from t h a t o f the M a r x is t
in telligen tsia. A lth o u g h a m inority voice m ore o r less ignored w ithin the
Party, th e A lth u sserian discourse, his style and p ro ject held m uch authority
in certain circles o f the M arxist in telligen tsia.
M S: In 1968?
JD : A b solu tely ! U n til 1968. T o me, it was n o t the discourse o f a m arginal
op po sition : it was a dom inant discourse. N o t from the stan d p oin t o f the
Party apparatus, but from th at o f a certain in telligen tsia of the Party. O n ce
a g a in , the P a r t y s o f f ic ia l p h ilo s o p h e r s w ere c o n s id e r e d a b u n c h o f
m ed iocrities. I saw the A lth u sseria n discourse as a h egem on ic discourse
inside the Party, n ot at all as on e persecu ted by the Party. It was rejected
by the app aratus, if you will, but n o t by th e m ost visible o f the C o m m u n ist
in tellectuals. It w as the in terestin g thing, the n ovelty, the b asic reference.
In Paris, w hen we th o u g h t o f M arxism and C om m u n ism , it was always
in relation sh ip to th at discourse.
M S: T o com e b ack to w here we b egan , was th e w ord th at I im posed u pon
you, w h ich you h esitated about, w h at I term ed your reticen ce ab ou t M arx,
M a r x is t t e x ts a n d so o n you said th a t p art o f th e r e tic e n c e v is- -v is
A lth u sser h ad to do with a notion o f scientificity, o f a certain epistem ology,
bein g the last word.
JD : T h e co n cep t o f produ ction ! For m e, th is co n ce p t was very im portant.
Bu t, at the sam e tim e, an d fo r th e sam e reason , it w as a co n c e p t w hose
p h ilo so p h ical gen ealog y presen ted m an y problem s for me. T h u s it was n ot
easy fo r me to use it, to entrust m yself to it, m ake it a key co n cept, as was

PO LITICS A N D FRIENDSHIP

201

the case for A lth u sse r an d h is frien d s. W h en on e is m istru stfu l o f the

c o n c e p t o f p ro d u ctio n , an e n tire d iscu rsiv e mass b ec o m e s p ro b le m a tic .
S in c e I w as a tte m p tin g to ela b o rate oth er q u estio n s and to a d v an ce my
d isc o u rse to w a rd a le v e l t h a t I c o n s id e re d (r ig h tly or w ro n g ly ) to be
p r e lim in a r y a n d m o re r a d ic a l in th e lo n g r u n , I d id n o t d e e m it
strategically ad v isab le to d ev o te a study to a te x t (th a t o f M arx and the
M arxists) w h ich staked everythin g u pon th at sem an tics, th at con ceptu ality.
A prelim inary w ork was indispensable, n o m atter how lon g or interm inable
it m igh t h av e seem ed. W h at I sough t to say w ould h ave been am algam ated
an d m assively tran slated too quickly into a problem atic th at dissatisfied me.
Y o u k n o w , so m e tim e s one p re fe rs to re m a in a lo n e , to n ot be read or
u n d e r s to o d , r a th e r th a n to be a s s im ila t e d to o fa st or m isu n d e r sto o d .
H ow ever, I m ean t to read M arx m y way w hen the tim e cam e. L ater o n , I
did som e sem inars on M arx. T h ere was one on ideology in 1976, I think. I
wrote som e texts on scien tism a t a time w hen the scene h ad ch an ged and
th e discou rse I was p ro p o sin g was su fficien tly articu la ted and know n for
c o n fu sio n s n o t to be so c e r t a in (b u t o n e is n e v e r su re o f a n y t h in g ).
M ean w h ile, before, I felt th at it was n o t advisable to m ove out on to that
terrain w hich was so busied with the A lth u sserian problem atic. L e ts call it
a reservatio n rather th an a reticen ce. If you wish, in order to ju m p a few
steps, today, w hen in France any reference to M arx has b ecom e forbidden,
im p o ssib le, im m e d iate ly ca ta lo g u e d , I h a v e a real desire to speak ab o u t
M arx, to te a c h M arx and I will if I can . A t th a t tim e, though, I m ust
h av e th ou gh t I could or sh o u ld n ot. It p erh aps w ould h a v e been b etter if I
h ad b een able to devote to M arx a great study in order to attem pt to read
him otherw ise, follow in g oth er, m ore a cc e p ta b le p rotoco ls (to m e). B u t
w h o know s? T h e fact is I b eliev ed I h a d slow er bu t a lso m ore urgent things
to do.
M S : L e t m e ta k e an o th er, re la te d q u e stio n b u t from a sligh tly d ifferen t
terrain. H ere is your interview w ith Jea n -L u c N a n cy , L e sujet est aussi un
prin cipe de calcu labilit. Il faut calcu ler . .
T h e n o tio n o f calcu latio n
in terests m e a great d eal for a w hole variety o f reason s. B u t let m e ask the
question in th is way, bexause it bears u pon w hat you were saying ab ou t the
p rob lem atic n ature o f A lth u ssers work. For exam ple, on the notion o f the
difference betw een an id eological and a scien tific problem atic.
JD : T o op en a p aren th esis: I h ad great reservation ab ou t the word an d the
co n ce p t o f ideology as well. T h e word h as an en orm ou s history from P lato
to th e F re n ch Ideologues. Y et I did n t see this history b ein g qu estion ed by
those w h o, around A lth u sser a n d , to b e g in w ith, A lth u sser him self, took

202

TH E A LTH U SSER IA N LEGACY

the word an d the co n c e p t p recisely as if th ey th e m se lv es h ad n o history

either! I believe th at ideology h as a history, th a t the co n cep t o f ideology
h as a history, th a t the word ideology h as a history a history th a t teach es
us to m istrust the sh arp break betw een science and ideology. T h is m akes
fo r a lot o f differences! A rou n d A lth u sser peop le acted as if the word and
the co n cep t o f ideology were co n ven tion ally defin ab le and as if they were
goin g to be able to start all over again in order to h ave them accom p lish a
new task w ithout q u estio n in g their genealogy. A s if the concept and the
w ord th e m se lv e s were g o in g to b e g in fu n c tio n in g by cutting themselves
(scien tifically ) o ff from their history, from se m a n tics sed im en ted w ithin it,
etc., as if o n e c o u ld o b ta in a n on -id eo logical, u n co n tam in ate d , scien tific
c o n c e p t o f id eology . M y w orry thus co n c e rn e d n ot o n ly the ideologysc ie n c e break, bu t also th e form ation o f th e co n ce p t o f ideology. T h e first
sem inar I did on M arx in th e 1970s co n cern ed the word and co n ce p t o f
ideology, the F ren ch Ideologues, etc. Its difficult to speak ab ou t it here in
detail or with rigor.
M S: H ow can on e d efen d A lth u sser on th at poin t? I d o n t try. B ut I would
lik e to co m e b a c k to th e p rob lem o f ideology in th e re la tio n ideologyscien ce. Perhaps I can put th e p ro b lem th is way, m ost econ om ically, from
the p o in t o f v iew o f the e m p ir ic a l s c ie n c e s . Y ou y o u r se lf m a d e th e
d istin c tio n earlier betw een m etap h y sical a n d scie n tific discou rse. T h ere
always are grounds for, in a giv en case, assertin g or d e cid in g th a t som e
c h o ice s are b etter th a t others. C alcu la tio n is n o t u ndeterm in ed in scien ce.
T h e m ost g e n e ra l qu estio n th a t I would ask o f you a n d o f your relation ship
to your w ork and your p h ilo so p h ical p roject is: w h at are the principles to be
observed in this respect to use a w ord th at you yourself h av e used w hat
are the p rotocols fo r ch o ice, decision , c a lcu la tio n th a t M a r x s scien tific
d i s c o u r s e h a s , as o p p o s e d to w h a t A lt h u s s e r c a lls an i d e o lo g ic a l
d isco u rse? It seem s to m e th a t on e can only p roceed o n the assum ption
th a t som e ch oices are b etter th a n others, and th a t there n eed to be som e
protoco ls for deciding. T h e core o f the scien tificity o f a science is its set o f
protoco ls for ruling certain kinds o f qu estions ou t o f court.
JD : Im en tirely in agreem en t. Its sim ply th at in an aly zin g the field o f
strategies or ch oices possible, it seem ed to m e there was room , in the lon g
ru n , fo r o th e r c h o ic e s th an A lth u s se r s. I h ave a lread y sta te d th at I
b eliev e in a certain co n te x tu a l n ecessity for his c h o ic e . But there was
also room for o th e r c h o ic e s ( I m p u ttin g th e word c h o ic e in scareq u o tes). It was u rg en t a n d im po rtan t th a t th e re be o th e r breakth rou gh s
an d my calcu latio n , in a co n tex t th at was precisely n o t determ ined in the

PO LITICS A N D FRIENDSHIP

203

sam e w ay (for all sorts o f reasons), w as other. It w as n o t my p lace. O n this,

A lth usser would agree: each su b je ct ( individual su b ject or su b ject trapped
in a collective field) evaluates the best strategy possible from his place, from
the interpellation th at situates him . For a thousand reasons th at should be
analyzed, my place was other. M y personal history, my analytical abilities, etc.
m ad e it so th a t I could n ot be a C o m m u n ist Party m em ber. A lth usser could
be and was. I h ad been plugged into anoth er type o f reading, questioning, and
style th at seem ed to m e just as necessary. A n d I told m yself that from the
sta n d p o in t o f my o w n ec o n o m y an d o f w hat I in terp re ted as b e in g a
p olitico-econom ic necessity, it was im portant th at I pose the questions th at I
posed. A n d th at the exp lan ation will have taken place. It takes/took place
alon g m ore or less identifiable and overdeterm ined trajectories, even if it has
n o t taken place overtly and directly betw een A lthusser and me. For it to take
place, it seem ed im portant to me th at the type o f problem atic I was trying to
con stitute fin d its place there. It is an unfinished, insufficient calculation. I
w ouldn t say th at I m ade it, but th at he calculated me in a certain sense. In
anoth er place, A lth u sser was the subject, th e ob je ct o f another calculation.
T h e A lthusserians also. L acan too. S o m any others. A ll the others, do n t you
agree? T h u s a field o f differences, o f different calcu latio n s, co n stitu tin g a
historical form ation (I do n t know how else to call it!) m ay be delim ited
em pirically, crudely, just like w hat h ap p en ed in France from 1960 to 19701975. It was a m ultiplicity o f concurren t strategic calculation s in search of
hegem ony. T h e form alization o f the law w ith regard to hegem ony is itself
part o f the process, len din g it its parad oxical form (I attem pted to describe
this parad oxical logic in The Postcard an d S o m e S tate m e n ts in The States
o f Theory). T h e always incom plete form alization o f that law is itself regulated,
w ith o u t an y p o ss ib le m e ta la n g u a g e , by the (m o r ta l) te n d e n c y to w ard
hegem on y, by th a t orig in al in stin ct fo r m astery th at Freud d iscu sses in
Beyond the Pleasure Principle. T h ere were also person al m otivations w hich
represented, as som e would say, socio-political forces an d groups o f force.
N o n e o f th e se discourses w ere reactionary, righ tist or co n servative in the
co d ed sen se o f these term s, but each p ro b ab ly re p re se n te d co n cu rren t
groups o f social forces th a t w ould be very difficult to identify. T h ere are no
categories for this. U sin g old categories, I would say th at they were sub-groups
o f F ren ch capitalist society w h ich were h avin g it out w ith each other at th at
tim e (here, I am pressing o n !). I felt, at least indistinctly, that, for exam ple,
th e category o f so c ia l class w as q u ite in a d e q u a te . E v en refin ed dow n to
overdeterm ined groups o f classes, the idea o f social class seem ed to m e more
a n d m ore in ap p ro p riate for u n d ersta n d in g th o se co n flic tin g stru ctu res. I
th o u g h t m uch m ore su b tle in stru m e n ts were n eed ed for d e fin in g th ose
things. W h e n he says: Ph ilosophy is th e class struggle in theory...

204

TH E A LTH U SSERIA N LEGA CY

M S: Yes, th at is the so-called secon d defin ition o f ph ilosop h y . . .

JD : A t least in an in d istin ct way, I felt th at the concept o f class struggle
an d e v e n the id e n tific a tio n o f a so c ia l c la ss w ere ru in e d by c a p it a lis t
m o d e r n it y . A s it f u n c t i o n e d in t h e A l t h u s s e r i a n d i s c o u r s e , t h a t
determ in in g reference to so cial class, to class struggle, appeared to m e to
belong to an oth er tim e. T h e co n cep t o f class struggle an d id en tification o f
a class are m uch m ore prob lem atic th an the A lth u sserian s thought at the
tim e. T h u s any sen ten ce in which so cial cla ss appeared was a problem atic
sen ten ce for m e. For the reason s expressed earlier, I could n o t say it in this
form . I believe in the gross existence o f so cial classes, bu t the m odernity o f
i n d u s t r ia l s o c i e t i e s ( n o t to m e n t io n th e T h ir d W o r ld ) c a n n o t b e
a p p r o a c h e d , an aly z ed , ta k e n in to a c c o u n t w ith in a p o lit ic a l stra te g y ,
startin g off from a concept w hose links are so loose. I h ad the im pression I
was still seein g m odels fo r so ciological and p o litica l analysis inh erited if n ot
from the n in eteen th , at least from the first h a lf o f the tw entieth century.
F ro m t h a t s t a n d p o i n t , t h e w ay in w h ic h t h e d i s c o u r s e o f c e r t a in
A lth u sserian s (B alibar, M acherey, R an cire) later broke open undoubtedly
m oved us closer togeth er. I feel closer to B alib ars discourse and interests
tod ay th a n to th e very b lu n t d isco u rse o f th a t p erio d . W h a t h a p p e n e d
follow ing the big A lth u sserian m om en t (th at is, after 1 9 6 6 9 6 8 ) at least
virtu ally m o v ed m e clo ser to a ll o f th em b e c a u se th ey w ere th e m se lv es
o b liged to co m p licate th eir discourse.
I believe th at an interest in w hat th e co n ce p t o f class stru ggle aim ed at,
an in t e r e s t in a n a ly z in g c o n f lic t s in s o c ia l fo r c e s , is s t i l l a b so lu te ly
in d isp e n sa b le . But Im n ot sure th a t the c o n c e p t o f c la ss, as i t s b e e n
i n h e r i t e d , is th e b e s t i n s t r u m e n t f o r th o s e a c t i v i t i e s , u n l e s s it is
co n sid e ra b ly d iffe re n tia te d . I felt th is alread y th e n . I c a n n o t co n stru c t
fin ish ed or p lau sible se n te n c es using the exp ressio n so cial cla ss. I d o n t
really k n o w w h at so cial class m eans. I know som e diction ary defin ition s,
but they d o n t se e m su ffic ie n t fo r u n d e rsta n d in g p a r tic u la r o v e rd e te rm in ation s (as we say in Fren ch ) o f the field. A n d if o n e takes the co n cep t
and logic o f ov erd eterm in atio n seriously (an d I h av e less reticence about
t h e m ) , t h e n t h is lo g ic c a n c o m e b a c k an d t h r e a t e n o r r u in a lm o s t
e v e r y th in g to w h ic h it a d h e re s in so m e w ay or a n o t h e r . E v e r y th in g
A lth u sser says about overd eterm in ation satisfies m e m ore th an th e rest
alas, this m eans th a t it satisfies m e to the detrim en t o f alm ost all the rest, in
p a r t ic u la r th e in th e la s t in s t a n c e d is c o u r se w h ic h I c o n s id e r th e
m etap h y sical an ch orin g o f the w hole enterprise.

PO LITICS A N D FRIENDSHIP

205

M S : I w an t to q u e stio n you on th a t, b e c a u se ev ery th in g you say ab o u t

c la ss c a n b e th ro w n o n to a d iffere n t level by ta lk in g ab ou t th e oth er
n o tio n th a t is lin k ed to o v erd eterm in atio n , n am ely , w h at A lth u sser ca lls
L a dernire in sta n c e , b u t as h e says, th e lonely h o u r o f the last instan ce
n ev e r c o m e s, it n ever so u n d s, it n e v e r answ ers th e b e ll. If you p u t
th e se tw o to g e th e r, it seem s to m e it is a very p ro b le m atic m o m e n t in
A lth u sser on e I so rt o f u n d erstan d but let us b eg in w ith th e first. You
said you would n ev e r affirm d e te rm in a tio n in th e last in sta n ce by the
econ om y . W hy?
JD : B asically, the concept o f last instance would be the general concept of
the deconstructible itself, if so m eth in g like that existed. T h is is why I saw in
it the m etaphysical an ch orin g p ar excellence. T o d econ struct substan tiality,
principality,. originarity, arch i-causality, etc. alw ays m eans to deco n stru ct or
dism an tle recourse to som e last in stan ce . T o say last instan ce instead o f
in frastru ctu re d o e sn t m ak e m u ch d ifferen ce an d it destroys or rad ically
r e la tiv iz e s th e w h ole a c c o u n t in g fo r o v e r d e te r m in a tio n s . E v e ry th in g
in t e r e s t i n g a n d fr u it f u l in th e lo g ic o f o v e r d e t e r m in a t io n b e c o m e s
co m p ro m ise d , redu ced , cru sh ed by th is d isco u rse o n th e last in sta n c e
w h ic h I h a v e alw ays b een tem p ted to in terp re t as a c o n c e ssio n to th e
eco n o m ist d o gm a o f M arxism if n o t th at o f the C o m m u n ist Party.
N e v erth eless if, instead o f th e econ om y is the last in stan ce, I now said
every last in sta n ce is e c o n o m ic , th is m igh t ju st ch an g e everything on
c o n d itio n t h a t I d e fin e e c o n o m y o th e rw ise , as I am te m p te d to do
o th e rw ise , th at is, th ro u g h the e x -a p p ro p ria tio n o f any re la tio n o f any
proper or o f any last instance to itself. A s you know, I use the concept o f
econ om y a lot. B ut I do so w ithout determ in in g it based on produ ction or
a p p r o p r ia tio n . G e n e r a l e c o n o m y a lso su p p o se s so m e th in g o th e r th a n
produ ctivity a n d , in th e eco n o m ic process, it ev en in corp orates (w ithout
b ein g cap ab le o f in teg ratin g it) a certain u n p rod u ctiven ess or even a n o n
p r o d u c t i v i t y s o m e t h in g h e t e r o g e n o u s b o t h to p r o d u c t i v i t y a n d
u n p ro d u c tiv e n e ss. M y re tic e n c e , th erefo re, tow ard th e ec o n o m y a s last
in stan ce is n o t o n ly aim ed at th e last in stan ce, but a lso at th e w ay in w hich
the econ om y is interpreted by M arxists like A lth usser. E ac h tim e I h ave
discussed econom y, I did so by b rin gin g in all sorts o f elem en ts th a t were
n o t sim ply fo rces o f p rodu ction or effects o f ow nership or app rop riation .
A n d n o n - p r o d u c tiv ity , n o n - a p p ro p ria tio n , w h at I call p a r a d o x ic a l e x
ap p ro p riatio n , t h a t m o v em en t o f th e proper ex p ro p riatin g itse lf th ro ugh
the v ery p ro c e ss o f a p p r o p r ia tio n n o n e o f th is is a n e g a tiv ity n or a
d ia le c t ic iz a b le c o n t r a d ic t io n n o r a d i a l e c t i c a l w o rk o f the n e g a t iv e .
Sim p lify in g things a bit, on e m ight say th at from this stan dp oin t I belong,

206

TH E A LTH U SSER IA N LEGA CY

to a certain extent, to the an ti-d iale ctic a l co n figu ration th at in France

brought together such p h ilosoph ers as Foucault, D eleuze, and others. I feel
less a n ti-d ia le c tic a l th a n th e m , bu t m o re so th a n A lth u sse r (w ho very
o c c a s i o n a l l y , c a p r ic io u s ly , w it h o u t d r a w in g an y in f e r e n c e fr o m it,
den igrated the d ialectic; this hap pen ed only in p riv ate a s far a s I know ).
M o re o v e r , n o n e o f t h i s is a q u e s tio n o f m o re o r le s s . B u t we c a n n o t
a p p ro a c h th e se th in g s th e m e a n in g o f p ro d u c tio n a n d p ro p e r so
quickly, by im provisation . A lth u sser, in an y case, rem ain s a dialectician .
E ven if he c o m p lica tes th in gs, even if he fought to co m plicate th e dialectic
by in tro d u c in g a p rin c ip le o f o v e rd e te r m in a tio n , th e d ia le c t ic a l m o tif
rem ain s d o m in a n t in his work. W h at my work aim s at also takes sh ape
a ro u n d a th in k in g o f th e econ om y but an econ om y th a t is n ot, at first
glance, th at o f w h ich M arxist econ om ists speak. T h e difference (w ith an
a ) is in an econ om y th at coun ts w ith the an econ om ic. B u t le ts leave th at
aside...
M S : I feel silly, o r em barrassed, in a way, b ecause I feel in the p ositio n o f
trying to speak for M arx and A lth usser, and I am insufficient to the task.
B u t w h at I w an t to do is sim ply to fo rm u late w h at I th in k are p o ssib le
ob jectio n s or p o in ts o f disagreem en t th at I feel w ould be raised by th e m , if
th e y w ere sp eak in g h ere. S o pardon me, I am n o t g o in g to do th is very well.
JD : D o you think th at A lth usser, B a lib a r or others w ould to d ay still say the
econ om ic in the last in stan ce ?
M S : B alib ar n ot, I th in k ; and I d o n t know ab ou t A lth u sser. A ll I know
about A lth usser is the published writings and m y reading o f his work. H e
never gives up on th at as far as I can tell. Perhaps th at is a m isreading, but
it w ould be my read in g. R a n ci re ce rtain ly n o t! B a lib ar is co m p lica ted ,
b ec au se he co m es to m ak e th at work in term s o f a cla ssic a l m o d el o f class
determ in ation . T h a t m oves into the difficult n o tio n o f the determ in ation
in the last in stan ce by the econom y. H e recen tly sen t m e his m ost recent
b o o k (d o n e w ith W a lle r s t e in ), w h ic h I h a v e lo a n e d to a frie n d a n d
therefore h a v e n o t h a d th e ch an ce to l o k at. Probably n ot, I w ould say, in
a n y sim ple way w ould he approve th e n o tio n o f d e term in a tio n in th e last
in sta n c e by th e eco n o m y . T h e way A lth u sse r form ulated it I put great
stress on the n o tio n as he says, T h e lo n ely hour o f th e last in sta n ce
n e v e r c o m e s . W h a t h e m e a n t by th a t is th a t th e e c o n o m y , in th e
trad itio n al topography o f th e contradictory unity o f th e relation s a n d the
forces o f p rodu ction , is never accessib le or it never op erates open ly; it is
never visible, it is never accessible to analysis in any kind o f pure state. You

POLITICS A N D FRIENDSHIP

207

c a n t sim ply take the class relation s and the produ ctive forces, the factories
an d so on. T h e y are alw ays co n tam in ated by w hat he calls the other levels
an d in stan ces: p olitics, ideology. T h erefore, w h at society is and A lth usser,
at on e point, recalls th at his only qu estio n is W h a t is society? it is the
co n trad icto ry unity o f all those things.
T h erefore, I w ant to reform ulate this slogan an d say: yes. A ll the th in gs
th a t you say ab ou t all o f th e u n p ro d u c tiv e n e ss, th e w aste, if you like,
th in g s th a t are d o n e w ith o u t an y sort o f im m e d iate m a te r ia l p ay -o ff or
so m eth in g like th a t all o f th ose th in gs are p a rt o f th e u n ity o f so ciety .
T h ere is a footn ote in th e first v o lu m e o f C apital where M arx says: In the
m id d le ages, it ap p ears th at re ligio n is the d o m in a n t in stan ce in feu d al
so ciety . B u t as he says, it is very clear th at feudal people could n ot live on
re lig io n alo n e . T h e y h ad to en g a g e in m a te ria l p ro d u ctio n , and in that
sense, to use-the phrase in the lon g ru n is ju st to indicate th at the lim it o f
w hat is p ossib le in giv en ep o c h is set by th e ec o n o m ic in stan ce. It puts
b ou n d aries around certain th in g s. D ete rm in atio n in th e la st in stan ce, I
think, sim ply m eans settin g a boundary.
L e t m e give you an exam ple to try to illustrate w h at I am talk in g about.
It w ould be possible, th in k ab le at least, for a n atio n or society today to try
to re in stitu te feu d al re latio n s, a g rarian re latio n s, to recaptu re th e feu dal
m ode o f production , in order, for instan ce, to co m b at industrial pollu tio n .
B ut it w ould n ot last, n ot for very long, because the force o f th e cap italist
m ode o f p ro d u ctio n glob ally is so en orm ou s. N o society can survive against
the trem en dous productivity o f cap italism . T h e y w ould do so inefficiently,
they w ould go broke. It is ex actly th a t k in d o f determ in ation in the last
in sta n ce , I th in k , th a t A lth u sser m eans. T h e r e is a limit, th ere is an outer
lim it o f w hat is p ossible in a given so cial form ation , an d th a t is set by the
relation s betw een the forces and the relation s o f p roduction . In th a t sense,
th e e c o n o m y does call th e tune. I presum e you are go in g to disagree w ith
th at, an d I am in terested to see w hat precisely you would disagree with.
JD : If I follow you a n d if on e assum es th at the last instan ce n ever com es or
appears as such, th at it rem ain s in visible, n on p h en om en al, on es discourse
m ust th en be adjusted to th is structure, to the possibility o f this h id d en god,
th is entity, th is causality, this th in g th e th in g itself (w ith its effects), a
th in g th a t can be nam ed w ith ou t our ever ga in in g access to it, itself, as
s u c h . W h a t d o e s i t s n e v e r a p p e a r i n g s i g n if y ? W h a t d o e s th e
in d e t e r m in a b ilit y o f a la s t in s ta n c e m e a n ? T h i s d is s im u la t io n , n o n p h en om en ality , this truth as dissim u lation leads us b ack tow ard previously
b e a t e n an d f a m i li a r p a t h s , t o w a r d n e a r ly c l a s s i c a l d i s c o u r s e s a n d
p r o b le m a t ic s w ith w h ic h A lt h u s s e r a n d th o se w h o w o rk e d w ith h im

208

TH E A LTH U SSER IA N LEGA CY

en gaged n o ex p lan atio n . If the econ om y as last in stan ce can n ever appear
as such, then to w hat co n cept o f presence, o f non-presen ce, o f p h en om e
n on or o f essence does on e h ave recourse? H ere again, som e en gagem en t
w ith H eidegger or a problem atic o f the H eideggerian type should h av e been
m a n d a to r y : it c a n be d o n e , sh o u ld h av e b e e n d o n e , a n d im p lie d no
p artic u la r a lle g ia n c e to a n y H eid e g g e rian ism . O n th e co n trary , th e re is
m u ch m ore allegian ce in avoid an ce th an in ex p lic it p roblem atization .
M S: You were saying th a t A lth u sser never really en gaged w ith w hat for you
is the fu n dam en tal p rob lem atic w hich is raised by th is n on -app earan ce o f
th e last in sta n ce .
JD : W ith o u t sp e a k in g o f th e c o n te n t o f th e d isco u rse , the fa ct th a t he
n ev e r tried to at least articulate a problem atic like th e on e I am p o in tin g
ou t (w h eth er re fe rrin g to H eid e gge r or o th e rs), ev en if it w ere on ly to
criticize th a t p ro b lem atic, th e fact th a t he n ever tried to read or to take
in to a c c o u n t a re a d in g o f te x ts o f th is ty pe a lre a d y se e m e d n e g a tiv e ,
w o r r iso m e , d i s a p p o in t in g to m e . I w o u ld h a v e b e t t e r u n d e r s to o d a
form ulated and argued disagreem en t or even an ex p lain ed refusal to engage
in problem s o f this type (assu m ing th at one is n ot alw ays already en gaged in
them , w h ether on e w an ts to be or n o t). I saw in this fligh t a fault, w hether
it was a m atter o f thou gh t or politics. Inseparably.
M S: W hy in politics?
JD : Because I saw these questions as unavoidable. B u t while they can n ot be
avoided, they can be repressed, denied. In th at case they resurface w ith their
p olitical consequences. T h ey have had the p olitical consequen ces we know.
B ut the failure to go quickly and to speak rather generally the fa ct that, in
spite o f everything, the A lth usserian discourse o f 1968 lacked the necessary
d u ration and vitality, b o th from the th eoretical stan d p o in t and especially
from th e stan dpoin t o f w h at was anticipated on th e field o f political com bat
(th at is, an effective transform ation o f C om m u n ist Party practice in France
and elsew here) these facts bear witness to its lim itation s.
M S: W ait a m in ute! You th in k th a t th e A lth u sserian s d id n t h ave a m ore
im p o rtan t effect on th e th e o re tica l app aratu s o f th e Party b ecau se they
didnt confron t H eidegger?
JD: E xp ressed in this form , I w ould agree it so u n d s ridiculous! But in his n o t
h a v in g p o se d f u n d a m e n t a l q u e s t io n s o r q u e s t io n s o n fo u n d a tio n s ,

POLITICS A N D FRIENDSHIP

209

q u estio n s o n h is ow n p rem ises, e v e n on h is a x io m a tic (o n W h a t d o es

p re se n t m e an ? W h at d o es p h en o m e n o n or truth m ean ? W h at does the
dissim u lation o f th e last instance m ean ? W h at is the m eaning o f b ein g
or e v e n t ? Im go in g to o fast, o f co u rse; surely Im b e in g u n ju st; th e
interview genre elicits th at; Id refin e this if we h ad th e tim e a n d the texts
in h a n d ), I th e n saw a lack o f radicality and a yet too d ogm atic relation to
his ow n discourse. A n d this could n ot be w ithout p o litica l con sequ en ces in
the lon g an d the short run. E v en m ore generally, this m ean t perh aps th at it
h a s alw ay s (o r at le a st th e n ) b e e n vain to h o pe to stay in th e F ren ch
C o m m u n ist Party in order to transform its discourse an d th o u g h t w ithout
givin g up p o sin g qu estions th a t th re a ten all dogm atism . Y ou ll urge m e to
say th at the fault lies in still h o p in g fo r so m eth in g from the C o m m u n ist
Party, but I w o n t state in th at form .
M S: E v en if we say th a t Im sorry if it was a crude way o f pu ttin g it still,
th e a c tu a l reason th e y d id n t h a v e a greater effect is b ec au se the apparatus
sim ply ch opp ed th em dow n, and n ot fo r p hilosophical reasons.
JD : If the Party ch opp ed th em dow n and th e Party ch o p p ed itself dow n, its
because the failure was n o t lim ited to A lth usserian ism : it was th e failu re o f
the F ren ch C o m m u n ist Party an d C o m m u n ist Parties in general. Its the
sign th at M arxist discourse o f the tim e, in clu din g its A lth u sserian b reach,
w as in cap ab le o f analyzin g the so cio-p olitico -econ om ic reality o f th a t tim e
and o f regulatin g its p ractice b ased on th a t analysis. I d o n t claim th a t if th e
C o m m u n ists h ad read H eidegger it w ould h a v e b een otherw ise: th a t w ould
be stu pid! W ell, m aybe n o t as stupid as all th at! B ut I do claim th a t their
co n cep ts were n o t refin ed or differentiated en ou gh an d th at cost them . It
cost th e m p olitically . It was already visib le from various perspectives. For
e x a m p le , fro m th e p e rsp e c tiv e o f p o lit ic a l th in k e rs on th e L eft, ev en
r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s w h o , in F r a n c e , h a d a lr e a d y th e n b ro k e n w ith th e
C o m m u n ist Party, w ith M arxist discourse or at le a st th at o f d o m in an t and
d o g m atic M arxism . By d o g m a tic I m e an w hen, at a giv en m o m en t, on e
ceases or proh ibits on eself from p o sin g a qu estion. T h is is a p ractical and
p o litic a l lim itatio n . T h a t s w hat I m ean t. H eid egger alone can n ot save
so m eo n e from th a t dogm atism . B u t ask in g m ore ge n ealog ical qu estions (in
a d e co n stru ctiv e , N ietzsch eo -H eid egg erian style or n ot and you know
very well th a t things are very co m p licated for m e on this p o in t but were
n ot here to speak o f m e...), ask in g m ore qu estion s on the origins o f o n e s
c o n c e p t s , o n th e w e ig h t o f t r a d it io n , o n th e n o t io n o f id e o lo g y , o f
p h en om en o n , o f p resen ce, o f tru th , m ak es all th e difference, dem on stratin g
o n e s read in ess to ch an ge, th a t tran sfo rm atio n is tak in g p lace or at least

210

TH E A LTH U SSER IA N LEGA CY

p o ss ib le . B u t w h a t I m e a n t was th a t the lim it a t io n s w ere n o t sim p ly

discursive o r th eoretical: they were also political. In th a t sense, I feel m ore
M arxist th an them. Im n o t saying the C o m m u n ist Party was stronger th an
they: it was w eaker th a n they. T h e proof? It was a t on ce a th e o re tica l,
p h ilo so p h ica l, a n d p o litica l d e b a cle n o t only in Europe but through ou t the
industrialized world. S om ew h at indistinctly, this debacle was pred ictab le in
th e 19 6 0 s. P e rso n a lly , I saw th e P arty as b e in g closed up in a su ic id a l
p o lit ic s a lre a d y th e n . It w as lo sin g . It h a d tw o a lte r n a tiv e s : e ith e r it
h ard en ed its S ta lin ism and would lose th ro ugh losin g its electo rate (an d
th e re fo re b e c o m e iso la te d in E u ro p e ) or e lse it w o u ld tra n sfo rm in to
reform ism , a m oderate so cialism o f the so cial dem ocratic type a n d would
lose also, sin ce the S o c ia list Party already occupied th at space. T h a t was
the dilem m a, the fatal aporia.
A l t h u s s e r i a n i s m s p a r a d o x w a s t h a t it c l a i m e d h a r d e n i n g a n d
tra n sfo rm atio n sim u ltan eo u sly . P h ilo so p h ic a lly a n d th e o re tic a lly it w as
h a rd e r t h a n th e p o l it i c a l p a r ty a t th e t im e h a rd e r a n d m o re o f an
adv o cate o f tran sform ation . B u t in b o th traits, a n d for th e reason s Ive just
ev ok ed , it was p lay in g to lose m ore a n d faster.
T h a t s an in terestin g in d icato r for follow ing th e co m p etition , sh all we
say, betw een the apparatus an d A lth u sserian ism . T h e apparatus renoun ced
its axiom s (class struggle, dictatorship o f th e p roletariat, etc .) faster than
A lth u sserian ism did. T h e y all ended up renoun cing them . In relatio n to the
a p p a r a t u s , A lt h u s s e r ia n d is c o u r se w as, at v a r io u s le v e ls , b o th m o re
in n o v ativ e a n d m ore radically, m ore rigidly co n serv ativ e, b o th m ore and
less ad ap ted in its analyses to current history.
M S : U n d e r F ren ch conditions.
JD : Yes, under F ren ch co n d ition s. A lth u sserian ism was a m o del for m any
th e o re tic ia n s a b ro a d , n o ta b ly in L a tin A m e r ic a , b u t it was also a very
P arisian , very F re n c h p ro d u ct th a t o n e c a n n o t fu lly u n d erstan d w ith ou t
know ing so m eth in g a b o u t th e history o f th e F ren ch C o m m u n ist Party and
the P arisian th e o re tical scen e. In a certain sen se, it represen ted a tou gh
current in the F ren ch C o m m u n ist Party. A n d from this stan d p oin t, it was
even m ore suicidal th an the Party. A lth o u g h in an o th er sense it was less so
b e c a u se it so u g h t to re g e n e rate a true th e o r e tic a l th in k in g to w h ich I
sincerely believe it is correct to pay hom age.
E v en before 1968 it w as visible to m e in any case, and probably fo r m an y
o th e rs, th at the F re n c h C o m m u n ist Party (I w o u ld n t say M arxism in
general) was b ein g draw n toward an irreversible d eclin e. It was b egin n in g to
lose out before 1968. A n d in 1968, it w as th e b ig loser. A t th e tim e o f the

POLITICS A N D FRIENDSHIP

211

P rogram m e C o m m u n in 1 9 7 2 , th e lo g ic o f th is c o n d e m n a t io n o f th e
C o m m u n is t P a rty w as o b v io u s . T h e tw o a lt e r n a t iv e s w ere: e ith e r it
h ard en ed a n d lo st o u t or e lse it so ften ed an d b len ded w ith the S o c ia list
P arty a n d th e re w ould be no m o re n eed for it no m ore th an as a slight
electo ral edge. T h e S o c ia list Party carried out the c o m m o n fun ction very
w ell w hile perversely m argin alizin g its C o m m u n ist ally. T h is was proved
true in 1 9 8 3 9 8 4 . D o g m a tism is n o t a c o n tr a d ic tio n in M a r c h a is or
so m e o n e e l s e s h e a d o r in th e th in k in g o f a p o lit ic a l a p p a r a tu s : th is
co n trad ictio n is in th in gs them selves, as one m igh t h ave said only a short
tim e a g o in th in g s an d in th e c o u rse o f h isto ry w ell b ey o n d F ra n c e .
W here E u ropean industrial society w as h eadin g, w hat the new resources o f
cap ita lism are: th ese are th e qu estio n s th at needed to b e analyzed. From
th at p o in t o f view , w h a ts h a p p e n in g rig h t n ow in th e S o v ie t U n io n
provides food, for thought. I can n o t say th at I w as ready to form ulate this
th e o re tica lly in the 1960s, but its certain th a t I was th in k in g th at way.
A n d th is d e te rm in e d my p o litic a l c h o ic e s: t h a ts why I w asn t a Party
m em ber. For so m eo n e like m e, it w ould h ave b een easy to be in th e P arty at
th at tim e. T h ere was no question o f being anyw here but on the L eft. M ost
o f my friends were Party m em bers. A n d the fa c t th at I w asnt didnt signify
a n y th in g like a class reactio n (w hich w ould be a stupid su p position ) n or
a n y th in g reactio n ary . It sim ply sign ified w hat Iv e b een ta lk in g about.
M S: I h ave two questions, on e o f w h ich I posed in th e initial set th a t I sent
you, and then anoth er one th at occurred to m e as I was taking notes in your
sem inar yesterday. T h ey are related, so why d o n t I give them both to you
and we can talk about them altern ately or together. T h e first question we
h ave already talked around a bit, an d you were just talking about it now: it
co n cern s the A lth usserian slogan th at philosophy is the class struggle at the
level o f theory. W h at I w ant to ask about is n ot so m uch your view on th at
particular w ay o f puttin g the m atter, but again to com e back to this problem
o f specific relations betw een philosophy and political activity. Philosophy as
a disciplin e what political effect does philosophizing have? H ow does on e
intervene in the political aren a from , in general, the poin t o f view o f a p h ilo
soph ical project th at you yourself h ave pursued? T h is is on e set o f questions.
T h e secon d set is as follow s. L iste n in g to you yesterday, I kept ask in g
m yself, sin ce the to p ic was th e p o litics o f frien dship: w hat exactly are the
p olitics licen sed or authorized (p erh aps these are n o t the best words, but Ill
use th em anyway) by the m an n er o f p roceed in g th at you pursued in these
p articu lar sem inars? O r, one could say, if you like, w hat k in d o f p o litical
a ctio n s are authorized by or are n ece ssita ted by decon struction ?

212

TH E A LTH U SSE R IA N LEGA CY

So, those are the two sets o f questions. Y esterday, w hen we were w alking
to the car, I gave you a h in t o f w hat politics I th in k are authorized by your
work, m ainly by referrin g to S ain t-Ju st. B u t you d o n t h ave to pick up on
that.
JD : T h a t s very difficult.
M S : A ll th e im po rtan t qu estions are difficult.
JD : For an articulation betw een decon struction a n d p olitics to be possible
m ust im ply a radical reelaboration o f th e co n c e p t o f p olitics in its general
c irc u la tio n . P o litic s is a c o n c e p t h e a v ily m ark e d by a g re a t n u m b e r o f
tra d itio n a l a n d d eco n stru ctib le p h ilo so p h em es. T h e p o litic a l itse lf is a
p h ilo sop h em e quite an obscure one. O bviously n o d econ struction is, fo r all
th a t, a p o litic a l. But to say th at d e c o n stru c tio n is p o litic a l th ro u gh and
th ro ugh is too easy an answer. In any case, a d econ struction can n o t first be
otherw ise th a n a genealogy, a series o f ge n e alo g ical questions on the w hole
o f d isco u rse th at h as le n t ju stific a tio n to p o litic s, th at h a s co n stru c te d
p o litica l philosophy. F or exam ple, sin ce you alluded to it, th a t sem inar on
frien d sh ip is a t least an atte m p t, by fo llo w in g th a t g u id in g th o u g h t, to
recon stitu te th e m atrix o f a great num ber o f p o litic a l p h ilosophem es and to
place them in a netw ork. In this dom ain n o th in g is clear or given an y more
th a n in any o th e r. H o w e v e r, th is d o e s n o t sto p one fro m c a lc u la tin g
strategies and takin g decision s or responsibilities. I w ould even say th at it is
to th e exten t th at know ledge does n ot program everything in advan ce, to
th e exten t th a t know ledge rem ains suspended a n d u ndecided as to action, to
th e e x te n t th a t a responsible decision as su c h will never be m easured by any
form o f k n o w led ge, by a cle ar an d d istin c t c e rta in ty or by a th e o re tic a l
ju d gm en t, th a t th e re c a n a n d m ust be resp on sib ility or d ecision , be they
e th ic a l or p o litic a l. I am a citiz e n too. It h a p p e n s th a t I ta k e p o litico in stitution al initiatives, th a t I in terven e, so to speak. I v o te a n d do other
such activities in a co n text determ ined by old p o litical discourses. For the
tim e b ein g, I vote S o c ia lis t in F ran ce. But th is does n ot m ean th a t the
political p hilosophy o f the Socialist Party satisfies m e, n or th at it is one an d
h om ogenous. I h ave great stock s o f questions about all the words, sentences,
a n d c o n c e p t s u se d to d e fin e th e S o c i a l i s t P a rty p la tfo r m . O n e m u st
distinguish betw een levels o f analysis, critique, decon struction , action...
M S : I can u n derstan d th at. B u t I th in k there is a theory o f p o litica l action
th at is em erging ou t o f your discussion o f frien dship, and the key to it is the
n o t io n o f v io le n c e , stru g g le . I t h in k t h a t is th e w ord y ou u s e d its

PO LITICS A N D FRIENDSHIP

213

in e lu c ta b ility an d it s th a t I d lik e to get at. P erh ap s it s to o d iffic u lt

because you are in th e m iddle o f th in k in g ab ou t th is question.
JD : Yes, an d also Ive sp o k en a b o u t it on ly at a sin gle session , d u rin g a
r e a d in g o f H e id e g g e r . V e ry b rie fly , the se m in a r is o r ie n te d to w a rd a
th in k in g o f dem ocracy. But a dem ocracy for w hich the current co n cepts
th at serve to d efin e dem ocracy are insufficient. O n e m ight say th at its a
deco n stru ctio n o f w hat is called the giv en concept o f dem ocracy . T h is is
always very dangerous. Its always dan gerous to try to com e to term s w ith
H e id e g g e r. T h is is th e d a n g er th a t th e A lth u s s e r ia n s ig n o red . B u t in
th o u g h t, t h a t is an y w h ere, o n e m u st ru n risk s. O th e rw ise th e re is n o
responsibility. O n e m ust in vestigate in p la c e s where th ou gh t is exp osed to
w h at is th e worst, in p o litic a l term s. If n o t, th in gs get even w orse the
w orst a lo n g w ith good co n scien ce.
In th a t sem in ar, w h at in terests m e is to u n d erstan d how th e idea o f
d em ocracy arose in the W est and w hat can and should be conserved out o f
it. T h a t s why I have kept th e word dem ocracy an d why, for me, dem ocracy
is n o t ju st a m ode o f gov ern m en t, so cial organ ization or regim e am on gst
others. L e ts say th at there is an idea o f dem ocracy with respect to w hich all
o f the d eterm in ation s th a t there h av e b een o f it sin ce the E n ligh ten m en t,
the A m e ric an and F ren ch R ev o lu tio n s, different types o f d em ocracy h ave
all been inadequate. B u t they all refer to this idea th ro u gh a unique m ode
o f m em ory w h ich I am trying to analyze and w h ich justifies, to a certain
e xten t, why I keep this old word. T h e old word frien dsh ip as well, despite
all th e p h a llo g o c e n tr ic d e te rm in a tio n s (e sp e c ia lly in th e figure o f the
b roth er in the fratern alist sch em a) th at h av e d o m in ated it. Im trying to
th in k dem ocracy after d eco n stru ctio n startin g w ith A risto tle (but we are
a lso d is c u s s in g M o n t a ig n e , K a n t , N ie t z s c h e , S c h m id t w h o h im s e lf
discusses H eg el, M arx, and L e n in , am on gst oth ers B lan ch o t, and a few
others, to lim it ourselves to proper n am es), all th e p h ilosophem es, politicop h ilo sop h em es if you wish, th at h av e structured this th in k in g o f dem ocracy.
T h e g u id in g th o u g h t o f frie n d sh ip is very u se fu l fo r th is: it r e la te s to
everything. Im trying, for ex a m p le, to th in k ou t an equality th a t w ould n o t
be h o m o g e n e o u s, t h a t w ould ta k e h e te r o g e n e ity , in fin ite sin g u la rity ,
infinite alterity into accoun t. In m y o p in io n n eith er the m o tif o f equality
n or e v e n t h a t o f r e s p o n s ib i l it y is r e c o n c i l a b l e w ith th e c o n c e p t o f
su bjectiv ity or subjective identity (w h ich I believe to be de-responsibilizing
or bou nd, in any case, to lim it eth ico -p o litical responsibility in th e order o f
calcu lab le law ). O n th e co n trary , eq uality ca lls fo r a co n sid eratio n o f a
certain infinite heterogen eity, an infinite d istan ce. T h is is very difficult to
r e c o n c i l e w ith th e c u r r e n t d is c o u r s e on d e m o c r a c y . I t s n o t at a ll

214

TH E A LTH U SSER IA N LEGA CY

H eideggerian either. B ut I think one m ust app roach , cross th rough , and go
beyond H eid eggerian questions. T h is is w hat I attem p t to do elsewhere, in
any case, in p articu lar in th at sem inar w h ich I can n o t recon stitu te here.
W h a t I call d em ocracy to co m e, w h ich is n o t the future o f dem ocracy, is
w hat th is work is strivin g toward.
S o w hat p o litica l action is possible? For m e the p lace o f the p o litical is
th e p la c e o f negotiation b e tw e e n , l e t s say, th e o p en set o f p re se n t or
presen table d a ta su c h th at I c a n attem p t to analyze th em (alw ays a fin ite
an aly sis), and this dem ocracy to co m e w hich always rem ains inaccessible
n ot ju st as a regulating ideal, bu t also b ecause it is structured like a prom ise
and like a re latio n to alterity, because it n ever p o ssesses the iden tifiab le
fo rm o f th e p re se n c e or o f th e p resen ce to self. B ut th e ev en t o f th a t
p ro m ise ta k e s p la c e here, now in th e sin gularity o f a here-now w h ich , as
p arad o x ica l as it m igh t seem , I believe I m ust dissociate from the value o f
presen ce. E v ery th in g is at play in this p arad o x th at I c a n n o t develop here:
singularity is n ever present. It presents itself on ly in losin g or u n d oub lin g
itself in iterability, thus in th e m ark a n d the generality or ideality w hich,
m o reo v er (th r e a t or lu c k ), w ill allow later fo r a c a lc u la te d n e g o tia tio n
b e tw e e n th e p r e s e n ta b le an d th e n o n p r e s e n t a b le , th e su b je c t a n d asu b je ctiv e sin gularity , rights a n d a ju stice b ey o n d righ ts an d eth ics, and
perhaps even beyond politics (we can com e b ack to th is). T h e here-now
in d icates th at th is is n ot sim ply a qu estion o f utopia. T h ere is co n stan t an d
co n crete renew al o f the d em ocratic prom ise as there is o f the relation to
th e o t h e r as s u c h , o f th e r e la t io n to in f in it e d i s t a n c e , in c a lc u la b le
h e te ro g e n e ity , e tc . It is a m a tter, th e n , o f a n e g o tia tio n b etw een th a t
t h in k in g w h ich r e se m b le s so m e t h in g m e s s ia n ic (b u t I w o u ld n t say
m e ssia n ic in the c u rre n t sen se o f th e te rm ) an d the p re se n t g iv e n s o f
dem ocracy w hich are u nsatisfactory, but w hich rem ain (by using the sam e
w ord, th e sam e p ale o n y m ) m in d fu l o f th e prom ise o f a d e m o cracy to
com e. T h e y are the gu ardrails aga in st the w orst w h at I w ould ca ll the
worst. T o d a y I p refer d em ocracy as it is th e p resen t dem ocratic m odel to
m onarchy, oligarchy, etc. Y et this doesn t seem enough. T h ere is violen ce,
repression, a n d ev en the co n c e p t o f the ca lcu la b le subject, as I said before,
a p p e a r s in s u f f ic ie n t in s u f f ic ie n t ly d e m o c r a t ic . T h e r e is no la c k o f
c o n c r e t e sig n s o f n o n d e m o c r a c ie s in o u r s o c ie t ie s . T h e y a re e v e n
b eco m in g m ore and m ore generalized.
F or the p re se n t, to m e, d e m o c ra c y is th e p la c e o f a n e g o t ia t io n or
c o m p r o m ise b e tw e e n th e fie ld o f fo rc e s a s it e x is ts or p r e s e n ts it s e lf
c u r r e n tly ( in s u ff ic ie n t d e m o c r a c y , E u r o p e a n d e m o c r a c y , d e m o c r a c y
A m e r ic a n - sty le or F re n c h -sty le , for e x a m p le ) a n d th is d e m o c ra c y to
co m e. T h is n ego tiatio n m u st read ju st itse lf e a c h day in relation to differing

PO LITICS A N D FRIENDSHIP

215

p laces. T h e resp on sib ility on e m ust take for it is alw ays unique. P o litical
actio n for m e to d ay ca n n o t, m ust n o t be the sam e as th a t for anyone else in
a n o th e r p la c e , a n o th e r c la ss , a n o th e r c o u n try . From th is sta n d p o in t,
p o litica l actio n is n o t em pirical b u t co n stan tly strategic. For m e, the rule o f
this strategy would be th is dem ocracy to co m e. B u t this rule is n o t th a t o f
a calcu la tin g or calcu lable know ledge through and through. In this respect,
it is n o t a lto g eth e r a rule like oth er rules. R a th e r it is a law w ithout rule,
ev en w ith ou t ob ligatio n in the sense o f ob ligatio n to be, o b ligation to be
p re se n t. A le ap is n e c e ssa r y t h a t w ould lib e ra te o n e fro m th e ru le as
k n o w led g e, as a k n o w led g e fo re v er ord ered a ro u n d th e o b je c tiv ity o f a
p resen ce, around a theory, a logic or an on tology perhaps even around an
e th ical, ju rid ical or p o litica l system . V o tin g S o c ia list, w hich I said a while
ag o t h a t I do, is a p o lit ic a l g e stu re th a t I c a n on ly try to ju stify as a
c o m p ro m ise betw een th e sta te o f forces as I can analyze them from my
p ositio n in F ran ce and this in calcu lab le idea o f dem ocracy. T oday in F ran ce,
I th in k its better th a t the S o c ia list Party be in power th an the U D F or the
R P R . N o t th a t Im satisfied with it, but I b eliev e th a t this hegem ony in
i t s e l f is r a t h e r p lu r a l an d t h a t it le a v e s o p e n m o re o p p o r t u n it y fo r
d iscu ssion , p rotest, and, in th e en d, th a t dem ocracy to co m e th a n any
o th e r p arty . T h is is w here the p la c e o f p o lit ic a l a c tio n lie s. B ut if on
o ccasio n n o t o n ly I h a v e v o te d S o c ia list, subscribed to a discourse or even
publicly w ritten O n e m ust vo te M itterran d , p erh ap s the n ext day I m ight
say N o, we m ust n ot, we m ust n o lon ger do so . Its to be evalu ated at each
m o m en t fro m stan dpoin ts th at are finite.
I w ould n o t say th a t th e co n ce p t o f dem ocracy to c o m e is a political
co n cep t alone, th rough and through . A t this poin t its perh aps no lon ger a
qu estio n o f p o litics and th at the b e st or the least lousy politics order itself
w ith so m e th in g th a t e x c e e d s p o litic s. H ere th e term p o litic s itse lf is
su b ject to n ego tiatio n . Perhaps the term d em ocracy is n ot a good term.
For now its th e best term Ive found. But, for exam ple, on e day I gave a
lectu re a t Jo h n s H opkin s on these things and a stu den t said to me, W h at
you call dem ocracy is w hat H a n n a h A ren d t calls republic in order to p lace
it in op position to dem ocracy . W hy n ot? I am only em ploying the term
dem o cracy in a se n te n ce or a d isco u rse th at determ in es certain th ings. I
th in k that in the d iscu rsiv e c o n te x t th at d o m in a te s p o litic s tod ay , the
c h o ic e o f the te rm t h a t a p p e a r s in the m a jo r ity o f s e n te n c e s in th is
discourse is a good c h o ice its th e le a st lousy possible. A s a term , how ever,
its n o t sacred. I can , som e day or anoth er, say, N o, its n o t the right term .
T h e s it u a t io n a llo w s or d e m a n d s th a t we u se a n o th e r term in o th e r
se n te n c es. F o r n ow , its th e b est term for m e. A n d ch oosin g this term is
o b v io u sly a p o lit ic a l c h o ic e . I t s a p o l it i c a l a c t io n . T h e r e is n o th in g

216

TH E A LTH U SSE R IA N LEGA CY

re la tiv istic in w h at Im saying. O n the con trary. A n actio n th a t did n o t

t a k e a l l s i n g u l a r i t ie s in t o c o n s id e r a t i o n w o u ld be a d o g m a t ic a n d
irresponsible m ech an ics w h ich would drow n decision in the en viron m en t
o f a d o gm atic generality.
M S : W o u ld you o b je c t to c a llin g w h at you h av e b e e n referrin g to as
d e m o c ra c y to co m e w h at in th e M a rx ist le x ic o n w ould be called th e
classless society ?
JD : W h y n ot, if th e co n c e p t o f class is to ta lly re co n stru cted n o tin g the
reservations I form ulated a while ago with regard to the concept o f class.
W h a ts im p o rta n t in d e m o c ra cy to c o m e is n o t d e m o c ra c y , b u t to
c o m e . T h a t is, a th in k in g o f the ev e n t, o f w h at c o m es. I t s th e sp ace
o p en ed in ord er for th e re to be an ev en t, th e to-com e, so th at th e com ing
be th at o f the other. T h ere is n o co m in g or ev en t th a t is not, th at does n ot
im ply th e c o m in g o f th e h e te ro g e n e o u s, th e c o m in g o f th e other. T o
c o m e m eans future, n ot the present future, w h ich would be presen t and
p resen table tom orrow . It m eans the space o p en ed in order for the other and
others to co m e. N o n -d e m o cra tic system s are above all system s th at close
and close themselves o ff from this com ing o f the other. T h e y are system s o f
h om ogenization and o f integral calculability. In the en d and b eyond all the
classic al critiqu e o f fascist, N azi, and to talitarian violen ce in general, one
c a n say th at th e se are sy stem s th at clo se the to c o m e an d th at clo se
th e m se lv e s in to th e p re se n ta tio n o f th e p re se n ta b le . W h a t I h a v e said
e lse w h e re ab o u t th e c o m in g , th e e v e n t, th e c o m e h e re [viens] o f
diffrance a n d th e decon stru ction o f presen ce is where I w ould b egin to try
to articu late a th in k in g o f the p o litical.
M S: L e t m e ask you a sp ecific q u estio n a lo n g th a t lin e. W h e n I th in k about
politics, I th in k abou t th is and th at, very m u ch in the way you h av e said.
You are strategically in a different situ ation . Y ou h a v e b een very h o n e st
a n d forth righ t a b o u t p articu lar ch oices you m ade yourself. But, to ta k e an
ex a m p le, w h at ab o u t th e S an d in ista s? B e ca u se on e readin g o f th em , one
th at you m ig h t su p p o rt, w ould see in th e S a n d in ista d ic ta to rsh ip an d
th a ts w h at it is, after all a closin g, as you ju st said, o f the possibility o f
any k in d o f d em ocracy to c o m e . I w ould n o t read it th at way, but you
m ight, I guess. W h at do you th in k ab ou t the S an d in ista s?
JD : F ollow ing a rather sp on tan eo u s m o v e m e n t o f sym pathy, its c le ar th a t
Im a g ain st th e way th e A m eric an adm in istration tre ats th em . B u t I d o n t
h a v e ab so lu te co n fiden ce in them . I dem an d to be sh ow n, a n d perh aps my

POLITICS A N D FRIENDSHIP

217

p ositio n could ch an ge from on e day t o the n ext. Perhaps for a while I would
say U p to a certain point, they m ust be h e lp e d ; then, p erh ap s on e day, in
an o th er context, I m igh t say T h ey 've got to be fou gh t. I dem an d to be
show n. N o m ore here th an anyw here else does my reservation signify a dep o liticizatio n th at suspen ds. A s such, every p o litic a l q u estio n im plies an
extrem ely com plicated, constantly readjusted strategic analysis, and I have
no fixed response to the question you are asking me. I believe th at if I were
A m e r i c a n , I w o u ld f ig h t w h a t I u n d e r s t a n d a b o u t th e A m e r ic a n
ad m in istratio n s policies, but n ot in order to applaud a priori everything the
S a n d in istas do the S a n d in ista s w ho m ight tom orrow turn out to be the
en em y to be fou gh t. If you had ask ed m e W h a t do you think o f F id el
C astro ? I would h ave b ee n disturbed. N o n e o f w hat I c a n observe appears
very re a ssu rin g or a c c e p ta b le . T h is d o e s n t m ean that I a p p ro v e , from
b egin n in g to en d , o f th e A m erican policy w ith regard to C astro. T o m any
qu estions, I have com plicated , disturbed answers. W hen I have to vote, that
is, when the response is a binary yes or no, its rare th at Im sure. S in ce the
situation in France is basically relatively stable, clear enough, and n ot very
revolu tion ary , dom estic ch oices are, for the tim e being, rather easy. But
w hen it com es to burning questions, w hen analysis m ust be m icrological and
attu n ed to both geopolitical a n d local stakes, I h ave th e greatest difficulty
o rien tin g m yself. In these cases, th e cu rrent co des o f trad itio n al p o litica l
p rob lem atics ap p ea r insufficien t to me. B ut on th e S a n d in ista qu estion
th a t you ask ed me, an d to give a resp on se th a t is im m ediately decipherable
in th e current code, the m oderate and cautious stan dpoin t o f the F ren ch
govern m en t and o f the S o c ia list Party seem s to me, w ithin the lim its o f my
inform ation an d th ou gh t on the subject, acceptab le.
I too w a n t to ask you so m e q u e s t io n s . W h a t d o you th in k o f th e
S a n d in ista situ ation ? D o you h ave a clear a n d sim ple p osition?
M S : M y p o s it io n is v ery str a ig h tfo r w a r d , I th in k , a n d n o t e s p e c ia lly
co m p licated . O bviou sly y ou stop th e co n tra aid , and y ou resist the policy o f
the U n ite d S ta te s. B u t m y own fe e lin g w h atever reserv atio n s I m igh t
h a v e ab ou t this or th a t w h ich the S a n d in ista s h a v e done I feel th a t the
on ly p ossibility for an y k in d o f so cial am e lio ratio n in C e n tr a l A m e ric a is
som e k in d o f regionalization o f th e S a n d in ista re volu tion . T h e y c a n t go it
alon e. T h ere h ave to be revolu tion s in G u a tem a la , in El Salvador.
JD : O K . Y o u re g e n e ra lly lik e m e, lik e so m an y o th e rs, a g a in st N o r th
A m e ric a n im perialism . A n d first o f all in C e n tra l a n d S o u th A m erica. O K .
B ut now does this m e an th a t you support, at all cost, S a n d in ista policies,
from A to Z? T h a t s the qu estio n you ask ed me. T o th a t qu estion , I d o n t
h av e a firm an d fix e d answ er, so Im sen d in g it b ack to you.

218

THE A LTH U SSER IA N LEGA CY

M S: I understand and I respect people who say, L o ok , this is an extrem ely

c o m p lic a te d p ro c e ss . T h e r e are a lot o f re se rv a tio n s on e h a s. B ut m y
feelin g, p erh aps to o sim ple, is th a t th e S a n d in ista s at th is m om en t, given
the b alan ce o f forces on the o th e r side, h av e to be defen ded a t all costs.
W h a te v e r th ey do to defend their rev o lu tio n is ju stified. You said earlier
th a t you ob serv ed a c e rta in sile n c e a b o u t A lth u s se r b e c a u se o f c e rta in
critics. I would observe a certain sile n ce a b o u t so m e th in gs in S a n d in ista
N icaragu a, because the discourse o f an ti-com m u n ism is so pow erful in the
U .S ., m u ch m ore pow erful th a n it ever is in France, I th in k , because it h as a
longer traditio n and because the p o litical p ositio n o f the C o m m u n ist Party
in the U .S . h as n o t been w hat it was in France, for fifty years a t least.
J D : A w h ile a g o I sa id : if I w ere A m e r ic a n , if I sp ok e in a d isc o u rse
determ in ed by th e A m e ric an situation , perh aps it w ould be m ore M a rx ist,
but a M arxist d iscou rse w ith o th e r co n n o tatio n s. E v en if so m eth in g ca n be
e x p o r te d fro m it, m y d is c o u r s e is fo rm e d fro m a s it u a t io n in w h ic h
s o m e t h in g lik e W e s te rn E u ro p e e x is t s a n d c o n s t i t u t e s so m e so r t o f
co n tin e n t. If I were A m eric an , w ithout c o n tra d ictin g w h at I said o n the
su b ject o f p rin ciples, I would accen tu ate things differently. C ertainly as an
A m erican citizen! O f course I never speak as an A m eric an citizen.
M S : T h a t will ta k e us dow n anoth er p ath , but le ts pursue it anyway. I m ean,
its n ot my interview , but I feel very m u ch the obligation and Im sure Id
feel differently if I grew up in F ran ce or if I grew up anyw here in W estern
E u ro pe I feel th e absolu te o b ligation to, for exam ple, teach th e tex ts o f
M a rx , b e c a u se they are n ot w ell-k n o w n h e re, are n ot p art o f g e n e ra l
discou rse.
JD : I agree. But w h at allow s you to say th a t a discou rse like m ine teaches
M arx less th an som e other discou rse th a t cites M arx at eac h p age w hile
neutralizing, paralyzing, d o in g n oth ing w ith him ? I ask th is w ith ou t trying to
justify myself.
T h e m an ner in w h ich the discourse I fin d m yself en gaged in con stituted
itself historically a discourse w hose stability rem ains relative signifies for
som eone w ho know s how to read it th at M arx is always there. People who
d ecip h er my discourse on the Fren ch scene o f the 1960s know th at I speak
w ith M a rx ism , t h a t I e x p la in m y self, for e x a m p le , w ith re g a rd to th e
M a rx ist co n c e p t o f p ro d u ctio n . M arx is alw ays im m ed iately or v irtu ally
ta k e n in to accoun t. T h ere are trad itio n al or stereotyped discou rses th a t cite
M a rx at every page, bu t do n ot elicit a reading o f M arx or th a t w ould tend
to m ake on e forget ab ou t him. S o m e m ight even disgust people w ith M arx:

PO LITICS A N D FRIENDSHIP

219

look a t w h ats h ap p e n in g in the E astern E u ropean coun tries where the least
allu sion to the n am e o f M arx to d ay p rodu ces an ex p lo sio n o f an ger an d
re jectio n a m o n gst intellectuals people d o n t even w ant to h ear about him
an y m ore! M y am b itio n (w hich is p erh ap s excessive) is to call for a new
readin g o f M arx a greater a m b itio n th a n m an y M arx ists. A n d th e fact
th a t, for e x a m p le, on a regular basis, p eo p le c o m e a n d say to me, S o , w hat
abou t M arx? or Yes, but, in M arx th eres som eth in g... O n e m u st... m eans
th a t because the b lan k on M arx is situated in my tex t in a certain way, that
blank is n ot ju st any blank. T h a t b lan k corresponds neither to a distraction
nor to a repressive d en ial th a t it brings about, bu t rath er to an active callin g
into a cc o u n t o f the M arxian legacy. I feel as you do the ob ligation to h ave
M arx (an d a few others) read, but there is m ore th a n on e way to respond to
th is o b lig a tio n , n ot o n e! T h e b est way is n ot n ece ssarily to alw ays give
lesson s on M arx or to cite Capital.
M S : A greed , h avin g said one needs to read and teach M arx, the question
rem ains: w hat does it m ean to teach M arx? I accep t th at. W e are n o t in
disagreem en t on th at.
JD : L e ts take an o th e r p ath to resp on d briefly to the sam e question. W e are
b o th in acad em ic or in tellectu al in stitution s. You know very well th a t to a
larg e e x t e n t t r a d itio n a l M a r x is t d isc o u rse is a c c e p te d or ju d g e d to be
sufficiently reassuring th at, in sp ite o f everything, teach in g M arx is allow ed.
T h e r e is n o w ar or p ro h ib ition on M arxist professors or those w ho teach
M arx at least n eith er in the U .S . or in France. W h ereas decon structive
q u estio n s an d p ractices, while they enjoy a ce rtain su ccess, en co un ter a
greater an d increasin gly b itter resistan ce from the in stitution and thus from
d o m in an t in tellectu al n orm ativity . I could give you a th ou san d con crete
an d cu rrent in d ication s o f this, n otab ly in th is country in d ication s b oth
in sid e an d o u tsid e a ca d em ia . T h is p erh ap s m ean s that, ev en p o litically ,
d e c o n stru c tio n effects a n d d istu rb s th e a ca d e m ic in stitu tio n s d o m in a n t
discourse m u ch m ore th a n th e tran q u il in scription o f M arxist teach in gs or
M arx ist readings. I d o n t w an t to oversim plify: th ere is also a tranquilizing
legitim atio n o f decon stru ction w h ich interests m e very little. B u t w h at is
alive a n d at w ork in d econ stru ction seem s m u ch less tolerab le, by w h ich I
m ean th at it in cites m ore in to leran ce th a n trad itio n al M arxist discourse
w h ic h I b e lie v e to be largely a cad em ized . T h e p o litic a l im p lica tio n s o f
th ese tw o p h en om en a should be analyzed.
M S: In the U n ite d S tate s?

220

T H E A LTH U SSE R IA N LEGA CY

JD : In the U .S . and France as well.

M S : N o , n o t in th e U n ite d S tate s; there I disagree. If th e teach in g o f M arx
was n ot officially forbidden , it was virtually killed in th e 50s. Y ou know
abou t M cC arth y ism , but I think it would be im possible for you to register
th e to ta l id e o lo g ic a l e ffe ct o f th e first d e c a d e o f th e C o ld W ar on th e
A m eric an acad em y . M arxism was purged from in tellectu al life in A m eric a
in a very, very system atic way, in a way th at it really w as n o t in France.
T h a t is my im pression. It m akes an enorm ous difference.
JD : I th in k th at either in its tou gh or softer form , L e ft M arxist discourse is
very m arg in al. Its m u ch easier to digest, a c c e p t, in stitu tio n aliz e th a n a
certain M arxist practice.
M S : You are absolu tely righ t about that, but this is really the legacy o f th e
last tw enty years, on ly sin ce th e 60s. A n d w h at it h as n o t led to,. I think,
w ith only very, very few exceptions, is a serious reading on any level o f the
texts o f M arx him self. I think you are right. A certain g au ch isan t w hich
is really the word fo r it discourse is, if n ot h egem o n ic, very w idespread in
the U n ite d S ta te s. W h a t is n o t w idespread is the know ledge o f and the
so p h is tic a te d c o m m a n d o f C ap ita l, of, I d o n t k n o w , e v e n o f the 18th
Brum aire. T h ese are n o t tex ts th at h ave been w idely read and talked about.
JD : T h is state you describe c a n p erh ap s partially be exp lain ed by a widely
held co n v ictio n th at readin g M arx, as it h as b een p racticed u n til now , is no
lo n ger u sefu l in order to u n d ersta n d m o d ern e c o n o m ic s or g e o p o litic s,
literature or science (so cial o r n o t) today. E ith er to understan d th em or to
transform them . If today it were possible to produce a n ew readin g o f M arx
th a t would be n ecessary in order to u n d erstan d and tran sform , I would
subscribe to it with upen arms. If I could p articip ate in such a project, I
would do so with n o reservations. Is it, m oreover, certain th at I am doin g
n on e o f th a t now ? In any case, if so m eo n e did it well, I w ould follow . U p
till n ow , this h a s n o t ta k e n p la c e an d , in m y o p in io n , this is n o t ju st
co in cid en tal. B u t i f you can d o it, Ill follow you!
L e t m e say p a r e n th e tic a lly that I am sh o c k e d to see th a t after th e
e x tr a o rd in a r y su c c e ss o f M a rx ist d isco u rse (u n til th e b e g in n in g o f th e
1970s, n o ta b ly in F ra n c e , M arx ist d iscou rse h ad quite an au th ority), th e
p age h as been turned to th e p oin t th a t its a lm o st forbidden, con d em n ed or
ridicu led, old-fash ion ed to cite M arx. Im n o t say in g th is to please you, but
it ap p ears quite sh o c k in g a n d p o litically dan gerou s. I say so pub licly any
time the opportun ity arises. T h e sam e goes fo r Freud, and L acan a bit too.

PO LIT IC S A N D FRIENDSHIP

221

M S : Y ou said a m o m en t ago th a t you th ou gh t the bran ding o f M arx and

M arxism as old-fash ion ed in A m eric a was n ot sim ply by chance. N or is it
by ch ance in France. In France, it could be the d eclin e o f the auth ority o f
the C o m m u n ist Party. I would understan d that.
JD : W h ich is certain ly n o t a co in cid e n ce !
M S : B u t in A m erica, it c a n t be th at. W e d o n t h a v e th a t cause. A m o n g
even so-called left intellectuals, the sense th a t the classical texts o f M arx
are d p a ss s is very strong. I think that is p o litically and intellectually
d an gerous. I d o n t th in k we h ave gon e beyond the p ro b lem atic o f M arx in
any serious sense. Its n ot th at all the answ ers are there in M a rx s texts, but
we still m ust learn to read M arx.
J D : In r e r e a d in g the p a g e s y ou p h o t o c o p ie d in p r e p a r a t io n fo r th is
interview , I state that I consider m yself M arx ist to the ex te n t th a t I think
th at M arxs text is n ot an im m obile given , and th a t we m ust continue to
work, etc.
If the discourse o f an eco n o m ist in the M arxist tradition w ithstood the
test, le ts say, o f th e ec o n o m ic re alitie s o f our tim e, do you believe th at
d isco u rse w ould re m a in re p re ssed , u nknow n , m arg in aliz ed ? I th in k th e
re su lt w o u ld sta n d o n its o w n . I f a M a r x is t th e o r e tic ia n o f lite ra tu re
p ro d u ce d a d isco u rse effe c tiv e ly fo rm alizin g or m igh tily tra n sfo rm in g a
given situ ation , would we rem ain ignorant o f it because o f political censure?
I d o n t th in k so. If a d isc o u rse o f th at ty p e for e x a m p le , y ou rs can
effectively co n v in ce , its b ecause it h a s integrated, th eoretical or co n ceptu al
m otifs w hich are n o t exclusively M arxist. Its n o t certain th at the n ecessity
or p e rtin e n c e o f your d isco u rse co rre sp o n d s to its M a rx ist p ro je ct. T h e
references to M arx are n ot e n o u gh to p rove the contrary. N ow , if a new
th e o re tica l c o n fig u ratio n in teg rated ce rtain m o tifs w ith M arx ist on es, I
w ould n ot h ave the least o b je c tio n in p rin cip le. M in e (if on e c a p say
m in e ), well, w h at I try to do, integrates to a certain extent m otifs that
could be considered M arxist, w hich in any case owe som ething essen tial to
th at h eritage, to a p assin g from M arxism , through M arxism . Inasm uch, for
exam ple, as my discourse is freed from certain idealistic n aivets. B u t th a ts
n o t e n o u g h to c a ll it a M a r x is t d isc o u rse , d o n t you th in k ? I t s n o t a
discourse d o m in ated by the M arx ist reference. Its n ot a discourse foreign to
M arxism or an ti-M arxist either. M oreover, I will always wonder if the idea
o f M arxism the se lf identity o f a M arxist discou rse or system or ev en a
scie n ce or p h ilo so p h y is n o t in p rin cip le in co m p atib le w ith th e eventM arx.

222

TH E A LTH U SSER IA N LEGA CY

M S: M aybe by follow in g som e itinerary th ro u gh M arx, to the degree th at

Im capable o f producin g anyth in g new ab ou t Proust, fo r exam p le, I will
n ecessarily go b ey o n d cla ssic a l M a rx ist categories. Is th a t th e force o f what
you are saying?
JD: G o in g bey o n d c la ssic a l M arxist categories is p erh ap s an in ju n ctio n of
M arxism . A n in ju n ctio n in itself contradictory because there sh ould not be
a n y M a rx ist in ju n ctio n . S u c h an in ju n ctio n w ould produce dogm atism and
must therefore rem ain foreign to M arxist discourse.
M S : W ith th a t I agree. T h a t is probably right. If you co n tin u e to do an d
p ractice the form s o f in tellectu al inquiry th a t M arx w ould licen se in th e
U n ite d S ta te s th at, I th in k , rem ain s im portant for a variety o f reasons.
JD : I would quite agree. I believe in the p olitical n ecessity o f tak in g M arxist
argu m en tatio n or critique into accoun t, to listen to it an d to n ever close off
access to it, provided th at this M arxist critique itself rem ain alive, open,
th a t it n o t b ecom e sc le ro tic a lly d o g m a tic. I h a v e on o c c a sio n a ttack e d
caricatu res o f M arxism th at d id n t interest m e because I found them to lack
p ertin en ce. But I h av e never atta c k e d th e rad icality o f M arx ist critique as
such. I stress th e term critiqu e as a m otif from the E n ligh ten m en t: I hold
it to be e s se n tia l in M a r x s la n g u a g e a n d p ro je c t as w ell as a b so lu te ly
in dispensable today insufficient, but vitally necessary.
M S : L e t s lo o k at a sp e c ific text in w h ich you c ite M a r x s critiq u e o f
etym ologism . M aybe its a hostile question, I d o n t know , but Ill put it in a
way t h a t w ill p e rh a p s so u n d a b it le ss h o stile . In w h at se n se are th e
procedures th a t you y ou rself adopt w hen you read a te x t allow ed to escape
th at critique o f etym ologism w hich M arx levels a t S tirn e r et al.? S o m eo n e
like M arx or perh aps A lth u sser would say, T h ere is a sliding betw een
levels w hen you m ove fro m the linguistic descriptio n o f a ph en om en o n to
w hat th at description design ates. W e h ave talk ed in an d around this, and
you said, quite conspicuously, th at this is on e o f the cen tral questions for
you. H ow do you escape M a rx s ironic d e n u n ciatio n o f Stirner?
JD : I c a n n o t say th at I escape th a t criticism alto geth e r. W h o can say he
does? In fact, in fact and apparently, I am m ore co n cern ed w ith langu age
th a n w ith e c o n o m ic reality itself w hen I speak o f the proper [oikos]
w hich is n on eth eless ec on om ical through and through. T o the extent th at
there is this appearance, my tex t can n o t ab solu tely guard again st the risk
w hich you are ju stifiab ly d e n o u n cin g: I am n o t d irectly co n ce rn ed w ith

PO LITICS A ND FRIENDSHIP

223

w h at on e m ay call eco n o m ic reality in the strict and scien tific sense (if
th at exists, in depen den tly and o b jectiv ely ). N o one escapes this risk, n ot
even M arx.
N ow , furtherm ore, sin ce in the passage you quoted an d in m an y others:
1) I expressedly critique etym ology an d etym ologism ; 2) I critique or rather
deco n stru ct logocen trism , th a t is, the hypostasis o f langu age th rough the
re d u ctio n o f reality to lan gu age, etc.; 3 ) it should n o t be forgotten th an
d e co n stru ctio n starts with th e d e co n stru ctio n o f logocen trism , co n tin u es
w ith the elab oration o f a co n ce p t o f th e text th a t does n ot leave reality
outside, an d avoids redu ction to sim ple w riting [graphie] on a page or in a
book; 4) th em atically , clearly and insistently, I h ave form ulated a critique
o f lin gu isticism , rhetoricism , etym ologism , etc., w hich m eans th a t w hen I
speak o f the proper, I h ave already taken the precau tio n o f saying th at it is
n ot simply th e sem antics o f the proper or the word proper th at interest
m e th at w ould be w hat others would call reality. I am trying to show
precisely th e im possibility and the recurrent failure o f the reappropriation
o f the proper within the limits o f langu age or even sem antics. N aturally, for
me the problem o f reality is m ore co m p licated th an it is on the side o f those
w ho th in k they can throw it up to m e as an o b je ctio n . Precisely fo r the
re aso n th at th ro u gh diffrance, th e n ecessary reference to the other, the
im p o s s ib ility fo r a p r e s e n c e to g a th e r it s e l f in a se lf- id e n tity or in a
s u b sta n tia lity , c o m p e ls one to in sc rib e the re a lity e ffe c t in a g e n e ra l
textu ality or a differential p rocess w hich, again, is n o t lim ited to language
or w r it i n g as t h e y a re u n d e r s t o o d p r e - s c i e n t i f i c a l l y a n d p re g r a m m a t o lo g ic a lly . I h a v e e x p la in e d q u ite th o r o u g h ly e lse w h e re th e
n ece ssity (also strategic) o f elab oratin g th is new co n cep t o f th e text.
T h a t is w hy if on e th in k s th a t words are on on e side and th in gs or reality
on the oth er, on e is ju st as n aive. Furtherm ore, I believe th a t w h en M arx
righ tly criticizes Stirn er, h is discourse im plies at least th e possibility an d th e
a im o f a r e a p p r o p r i a t i o n ( c l a s s s t r u g g l e , e x p r o p r i a t i o n , f i n a l
re a p p ro p ria tio n , e tc .). H e th in k s th a t th e p rop er m ak es sen se a n d th at
app rop riation , reapp rop riation is n ot only possible, but th a t it is the m o tif
itself o f history as class struggle. In this, I am tem pted to decon struct th e
use M arx h im s e lf m a k e s o f p r o p e r ty v a lu e . A n d th a t c r itiq u e is n o t
lin gu istic. It is q u ite th e co n trary ! In b e lie v in g re ap p rop riation p ossible,
o n e rem ains, know ingly, w illingly or n o t w ith in th e logocen tric legacy.
S u c h w ould be my c ritiq u e o f M arx , or in any case my discrepancy
w ith respect to a certain M arxism or a certain M arxist-inspired on to-th eote le o lo g y . B e n ja m in h i m s e lf p e r h a p s d o e s n o t e s c a p e it, d e sp ite h is
h e t e r o d o x y . U n lik e A lt h u s s e r , I b e lie v e t h a t o n t o - t h e o - t e le o lo g y is
in eradicable in M arx. A lth u sser an d the A lth u sserian s say M arx is o r m ust

224

THE A LTH U SSERIA N LEGA CY

be M a rx , m inus th e o n to -th e o -te le o lo g y , M arx m inus th e e sc h a to lo g y

through a n op eration w h ich is no longer M arx ist, through th e coup de force
o f an artificial strategy (an d I have n o th in g again st this strategy as such,
because why should on e be strictly loyal to M arx, even- in interpretin g his
t e x ts ? ), th ro u gh an in te r p r e ta tiv e v io le n c e (b u t it w o u ld be b e tte r to
an n o u n c e it, to them atize a n d reflect w ithin its p o ssib ility ). N ow that is
in terestin g! I will be alw ays ready to subscribe to th a t gesture. But when
they do this, theres n o point in citin g M arx any m ore or to pretend th at
M arx m eant-to'say'this theres no poin t, in any case, in lending privilege
to th a t reference an d exclu d in g all others. T h e y could perform th a t gesture
w ithout M arx or else w ith so m any others. A n d th en on e w ould say th at at
least they do n t teach M arx. O n e could say to them: O K ! G o ah ead and
unfurl this an ti-o n to -th e o -te le o lo gical discourse if it s possib le, as w ell as
the d econ stru ction o f onto-th eo-teleology, o f property, o f the value o f the
proper (w hat I m yself try to do ), o f esch atology. B ut if you do, appealing to
M arx is a m ore th an p rob lem atical op eration w hich you would do well to
problem atize critically as su ch . Perhaps at a ce rta in m o m en t, giv en the
sta te o f p o litic a l forces, the h istory -of-th e-w ork ers-m o v e m e n t, classstru ggle, etc., it will h a v e b een im portant to refer or to pretend to refer to
M arx or to M a rx -L e n in in a d o m in a n t or e x c lu siv e way, a ll th e w h ile
say in g th in gs th at n eith er M arx n or Lenin ever said or could h ave said.
Perhaps th is w as necessary: I d o n t know ! Perhaps at a certain m om en t it
w as necessary to say yes to M arx , to soften, h a rd e n or v iolen tly transform
the readin g o f his w ritings in order to serve a cau se . But those w ho would
d econ stru ct the m o tif o f the proper or the idea o f a fin a l re ap p rop riation o f
the m eans o f p ro d u c tio n by th e p ro le ta ria t, fo r e x a m p le , w ould h a v e a
discourse th at is no longer M arxist or called M arxist only by m etonym y and
for reason s o f strategic co n ven tion . Besides, a sign ifican t d econ struction o f
property should n o longer m ake any reference to a discourse, a work or a
p ro p e r n a m e the d o m in a n t, h e g e m o n ic or e x c lu s iv e r e fe re n c e . N o n d ogm atic M arxists know this very well. T h ey know very w e ll the p olitical
co n sequ en ces o f the sacralizin g cap italization u pon a prop er nam e.
M S : I u n d erstan d. A ctu ally , w h at you said at the b eg in n in g was, N o on e
can escap e it entirely, n ot even M a rx . I th in k th a ts p ro b ab ly right. It lead s
to on e o f th e q u e stio n s th a t I gave you, to w h ich Id like to turn now.
A g a in , its a so rt o f m e th o d o lo g ic a l q u e stio n , d e a lin g w ith o n e o f the
passages th a t I x ero x ed for you from De la grammatologie on reading. A s you
know , its a frequently cited passage, and, if it is n o t the estab lish m en t o f a
set o f protocols or m ethods fo r reading, it is very close to being so. It m oves
in th at direction, you know. O kay, this is how you go about reading a text.

PO LITICS A N D FRIENDSHIP

225

A lso , I believe the section is en titled in French, Q u estion de m th od e

an obvious referen ce to Sartre.
N ow , o n ce on e reads A lth u sser, o n ce on e reads you, it is d ifficu lt to
separate w hat h e calls sym ptom atic reading from the kind o f procedures
o f reading th at you ad o pt or recom m end. I th in k A lth u ssers sym ptom atic
re a d in g is so m e th in g lik e a m e th o d , p ro v id e d we tak e m e th o d in a
slightly loose sense to include w hat on e m ight call a heuristic, in the sense
th at A risto tle th o u g h t rh etoric w as m ethodizable. It is n ot a science. T h a t
d o e sn t m ean it is ju st anything at all. T h ere are protocols.
P erh ap s I can get you to ta lk ab ou t th a t in re latio n sh ip to your ow n
p r a c t i c e . W h e n y o u g o to r e a d a t e x t , y o u do p r o c e e d , I t h i n k ,
s y s t e m a t i c a l l y , in a w a y t h a t is, i f n o t t h e s a m e , d o e s h a v e w h a t
W ittgen stein calls a fam ily resem b lan ce to readings o f previous texts. You
m ay h e sit a t e t o talk about this, bu t Id like to h ear w hat youd say. T o put it
in the sh arpest possible form ula and the sim plest (th at will probably be the
m ost erron eou s): is decon stru ction as you do it (to the degree th at it can be
d o n e) a m eth od o f reading in the loose sense Ive suggested? Is it a m ethod
fo r interpretin g, rem obilizing, recon figu ring the text?
JD : T h is is a qu estion to w hich on e can n o t furnish an adequate response
w ithout reth in k in g from top to b o tto m the co n ce p t o f m ethod, thus o f p ath
[voie], o f way [chemin], o f b ecom in g-m eth od o f the way (from P arm enides to
H eg el an d b eyo n d ). I h ave tried to suggest as m uch elsew here, with and
w ithout H eidegger...
M S : W ou ld you accep t the reform u lation th at I gave?
JD : If instead o f m ethod, you say h eu ristic and fam ily resem b lan ce, the
co n cept o f fam ily resem b lan ce is already absolutely devastatin g. It recalls
th a t there are n o th in g but differences. T h e m an n er in w hich resem blances
are co n stitu te d an d stabilized is relative, tem porary, precarious: on e m ust
tak e all sin g u la r o c c u r re n c e s into a c c o u n t. I realize th a t som e th in g s
overlap. B u t th e r u le s fo r th e se o v e r la p p in g s are n o t g e n e ra l ru le s,
app licab le from the outside. A relative gen erality strives each time to adjust
itself to a text, a case, a prob lem , a sin gularity. You say, if th e procedures o f
d e c o n stru c tio n are p o ssib le, s u c c e ssfu l. Im n o t sure d e co n stru ctio n is
p o s s ib le , th a t it is o f th e o rd e r o f th e p o s s ib le . O n th is q u e s t io n o f
possibility, on d econ stru ction as the ex p erie n ce o f the im possible, I h ave
exp lain ed m yself abun dan tly in Mmoires and in Psych.
D e c o n s t r u c t io n is n o t p o s s ib le i f p o s s ib l e m e a n s to w ork as a
tec h n ica l instrum en t fu n ction s or obeys a program . D econ stru ction is an

226

TH E A LTH U SSERIA N LEGACY

ex p lan atio n with, an exp erien ce o f the im possible. M oreover, it is to the

e x te n t th a t on e d o es m ore an d so m e th in g o th e r th a n d e v e lo p in g the
necessity and the p ossibilities o f a program th a t so m eth in g h ap pen s and a
form o f responsibility, a decision , an action takes place precisely w here one
begins to m ake out the lim its o f the possible. D eco n stru ctin g is n o t possible
in s o m e o n e s, a g r o u p s, a d is c o u r s e s, an i n s t i t u t i o n s m a s t e r in g a
m e th o d o lo g y or te c h n iq u e ap p lie d to m a k in g so m e th in g h a p p e n . T h is
decon structs. F ro m th is stan dp oin t, w hat is c a lle d d eco n stru ctio n in the
sense o f a relatively co h eren t set o f discursive rules at a given m om ent in
W estern discourse is only a sym ptom an effect o f decon stru ction at work
in what one might call history (all o f the geop o litical earth quakes: the 1917
re v o lu tio n , th e tw o w orld w ars, p sy c h o a n a ly sis, th e T h ir d W o rld , th e
te c h n o -e co n o m ico -scien tific a n d m ilitary m u tatio n s, etc., etc., e tc .). A ll
this, this open an d n on self-id en tical totality o f the world is decni struction.
Its a d econ stru ction in act or at work. A n d th is m ust be b rou gh t b ack in to
play w ithout recourse to either a th eory o f re fle ctio n or o f ideology (be it
refin ed to th e ex trem e ) in order to analyze th is re la tio n b etw een th ese
real decon stru ction s an d th e apparen tly a ca d e m ic discou rse to w h ich we
g ra n t th is n a m e an d w h ic h , m o re o v e r, is n o lo n g e r or n e v e r was as
acad em ic as som e people som etim es th ou gh t or allow ed it to be thought.
D eco n stru c tio n h ap pen s [a arrive] and it already hap pen ed in P la to s
discourse in an o th er form , w ith o th e r words perh aps, but th ere was already
an inadqu ation , a certain inability lo close itself off, to form , to form alize
itself, w h ich w as o f a d econ structive order. If it h as alw ays been at work
everyw here in p articu lar in the gran d p h ilo sop h ical discourses why does
it attem p t today to form alize an d them atize itself, to n am e itself as well, but
w ithout b ein g able to do so? I d o n t b eliev e th a t deco n stru ctio n c a n be
form alized . T h is a tte m p ts to form alize, th e m atize , n am e its e lf in th is
n am e. A n ex cellen t question would be: W h y does it take this form and this
n am e today? W ell, w hat I would like to call d econ stru ction w ould be above
all an e ffo rt to re sp o n d to th at q u e stio n or, ra th e r, to e la b o r a te it as
q u e stio n , in o rd er to p e rh ap s go b ey o n d th e e la b o r a tio n o f a q u e stio n
to w a rd th e p r e s u p p o s itio n s o f su c h a p r o b le m a t ic , e v e n to w a rd th e
problem atic and th e qu estion ab le in general. W h a t is h ap p e n in g today th at
cau ses d e c o n str u c tio n to b ec o m e a th e m e u n d er this n am e ? W h at is
to d ay ? Really, w hen I th in k ab ou t it, this is w hat interests m e and seem s
to m e to n o t h ave an y fixed lim it. W h a t interests m e, th a t is, w hat engages
m e before and beyond the question itself is n ot the success o f a m ethod, a
search or a pow erful discourse. R ath er, w hat interests m e is to try to think
about w h at h a p p e n s there, w hat h a p p e n s to thou ght as th o u gh t, w h ich
h e r e is e v e r y th in ^ , e x c e p t a s u b je c t i v e , s p e c u l a t i v e , t h e o r e t i c a l

PO LITICS A N D FRIENDSHIP

227

re p re se n tatio n o r a p h ilo so p h ico -a ca d e m ic discou rse. W h y is it n o t on ly

th a t we speak this way today, but w hy also are we n ot able to rid ourselves
o f th ese qu estio n s an d m otifs? W h y is it th at fo r decad es now we ca n m erely
d e cre e th a t we are fin ish e d w ith th em , th a t they are o u td a ted , as if to
e x o rc ise , in a k in d o f a n im ist d e n ia l, th e p e rsiste n t n e c e ssity o f th e se
d eco n stru ctiv e questions? Pow erlessness interests m e also: im possibility a t
le a s t a s m u c h a s p o s s ib ilit y . I s n t p o l it i c s or th e p o l i t i c a l a lso th is
en gagem en t w ith pow erlessness?
W h en I spoke a while ago about opening to the event, the com ing o f
the other, etc., th a t also is the exp erien ce o f th e im possible. Its the sole
true p ro v o catio n to be reflected upon. T h in k in g takes p lace n ot on w hat
we can do, but beg in n in g w ith w h at we c a n n o t do. A n d a d em ocracy in
w hich on e th in k s everything p ossible and th a t dem ocracy exists is already
gone. If I m ay be allow ed an aphorism , dem ocracy, fo r m e, is the p o litical
exp erie n ce o f th e im possible, th e p o litica l ex p erien ce o f op en in g to the
oth er as p ossibility o f im possibility. T h e ev en t on ly hap pen s under the aegis
o f th e im p o ss ib le . W h en a n e v e n t, e ffic ie n c y or a n y th in g is d e e m e d
p o s s i b l e , it m e a n s t h a t w e h a v e a l r e a d y m a s t e r e d , a n t i c i p a t e d ,
p reu nderstood an d reduced the ev en th ood o f the even t. O ur relation t o the
e v e n t as our r e la tio n to th e o th e r, th at is, as n o n v o id (th u s p o ssib le )
e x p e r i e n c e o f i m p o s s i b i l i t y t h i s p e r h a p s is a ( b a r e l y f ig u r a b l e ,
n o n r e p r e s e n ta b le ) fig u re o f d e c o n s t r u c t io n . It can ta k e m a n y o th e r
discu rsive form s, b u t, for m e, th e liv e lie st asp ect o f d econ stru ction , its
very resource, is this singular experience.
H ow ever, I m istrust the form ulas Ive ju st used. T a k e n in th em selves,
a lo n e , w ith o u t a n y o th e r c o n t e x t u a liz a t io n , w ith o u t su p p le m e n ta r y
discourse a n d p recau tion s, th e y c a n b ec o m e p olitically q u ite dangerous and
com prom ised with th at w h ich should h ave been avoided: open in g to the
o t h e r h a s a lr e a d y b e c o m e a m o ra liz in g and u n p a la t a b le ste r e o ty p e ;
possibility o f the im possible o r im possible p ossibility is n o t far from the
form ulas with w hich H eid egger defines bein g-for-death. W ith ou t w ishing
to set m yself in op p o sition eith er to the eth ics o f op en in g to th e oth er or to
the existen tial an aly tic o f D asein as b ein g-fo r-d eath (here associated in a
very sign ifican t way with the other and death), I would n ot w ant w hat Ive
ju st said a b o u t th e su bject o f th e im possible a n d o f th e o th e r to be sim ply
assim ilated to the discou rses I h av e evok ed . I will thus, for lack o f tim e,
s p a c e , a n d a p p r o p r ia te s it u a t io n , k e e p in re se rv e a g re a t n u m b e r o f
p re c a u tio n s n e c e ssa ry for a v o id in g th e se c o n fu sio n s p re c a u tio n s t h a t
w ould a lso be, to a certain ex ten t, p o litical. I believe th at those interested
in th is can find the prin ciple an d the d evelo pm en t in several o f my texts,
fo r e x a m p le , th o se o n H e id e g g e r a n d o n L e v in a s . I w o u ld add o th e r

228

T H E A LTH U SSE R IA N LEGA CY

p rotocols. T h e them es o f the im possible an d the in calcu lab le can allow for
the w orst abuses if they are not articulated carefully, I dare say if one does
n o t c a lc u la te t h e ir a r t i c u l a t i o n w ith c a l c u l a t i o n , th e p o s s ib le , th e
m e a s u r a b le , th e h o m o g e n e o u s , e tc . O n e m u st m a s te r a n d c a lc u la t e
dem ocratically also; there m ust be votes, thus iden tifiable su bjects, subjects
by r i g h t , m a j o r i t i e s , d e t e r m in a b l e l e g a l i t i e s , e t c . a p e r p e t u a l l y
in dispensable n eg o tiatio n betw een the singular op en in g to the im possible
w hich m ust be safeguarded an d th e m eth od , the right, the tech n ique, the
d e m o c r a tic c a lc u la tio n ; b e tw e e n d e m o c ra c y to co m e an d th e lim ite d
present o f dem ocratic reality. T h e law o f iterability w hich I recalled earlier,
but w h ich I ca n n o t explain here (cf. Signature Event Context and Limited
In c.) is decisive here fo r defin ing the possibility, ch an ce, risks involved in
such a n e g o tia tio n betw een sin gularity and c o n c e p t. T h is n e g o tia tio n is
in d ispen sable: it is in clu d ed w ith th e rules, but in the last in sta n c e (y es!);
it is w ithout rule and guaranteed rigor.
M S: Precisely.
JD : T h is is p erh ap s w h at p olitics is!
M S: W h at I was going to say in response to w hat you said earlier this is
L e n in s point an d this is also w hat A lth u sser picks up from Lenin in order
to realize th is sort o f sligh tly u n realizab le re v o lu tio n a ry d e m o c ra cy to
co m e, in order fo r th at to happen, there h as to be science.
JD : A bsolu tely .
M S: T h a t w h ich w ill b rin g th e in c a lc u la b le in to p la y w ill b e ra tio n a l
calcu latio n a b o u t th e p o ssib ility at an y giv en m om en t.
JD : E ach day, on e m ust ch an ge, fin d a way, attem p t to calcu late w ithout
ru le s a w ay b e tw e e n th e in c a lc u la b le an d th e c a lc u la b le . W h a t I c a ll
n e g o tia tio n d o e s n o t sim ply n egotiate th e n egotiab le, it n egotiates betw een
the n egotiab le and the n on n egotiab le, it n ego tiates tragically because it is
terrible and fatal (bu t w ould be at least as m u ch so otherw ise), it n egotiates
th e n o n n e g o tia b le . T h is n e g o tia tio n is e v ery th in g bu t a p o sitio n or an
assu ran ce , it a d v an ce s w ithout assu ran ce a fte r h a v in g exh au sted all the
p ossibilities o f calcu lation and, thus, o f scien ce.
M S : O n e m o re qu estio n very qu ick ly, a n d probably th e n we sh ou ld stop. I
kn o w th a t you th in k p h ilo s o p h ic a l d is c o u r se a n d th e r e a d in g o f

PO LITICS A N D FRIENDSHIP

229

p h ilo s o p h ic a l te x ts a n d th e a c tiv ity we are in g e n e ra l en g a g e d in are

im portant in terven tio n s in contem porary life. T h e qu estion I w ould want
to ask is: how do you th in k th e o re tical discourse intervenes in p o litical life?
A w h ile a g o , y ou sa id th a t t o so m e e x t e n t th e s to p p in g sh o rt o f th e
A lth u sserian s w as in p art resp on sib le for th e d em ise o f M arxism in France.
Y ou d id n t quite say that. B ut the im p licatio n is th at if they h ad thought
further, h ad they n o t simply draw n a lin e, th in gs m igh t h ave been different.
J D : Im still to o M arxist to th in k that. A t th at tim e, in the place they were,
and th u s w ho they were, interpellated an d situated as they were, they (those
su b je cts) could n ot th in k or act otherw ise, sin ce the general situ ation
the place in which they were inscribed did n ot allow it. Bad luck.
M S : T h a t i's w h a t I w o u ld sa y , b u t s t ill, i f we are in the b u sin e ss o f
producin g theoretical discourse, we w an t to say that th eoretical discourse
m atters. T h e qu estion is, precisely, how ? W h at is the w eight o f th eoretical
d isc o u rse in c o n te m p o ra ry p o lit ic a l life in p la c e s lik e F ra n c e a n d the
U n ite d Sta te s?
JD : M in im al. Iv e never thought or hoped (esp ecially n o t h o p e d !) th at a
d econ stru ctive p ractice (as such ) would invade the entire field and occupy
a d o m in an t p o sitio n fit for transform in g the ex iste n ce o f a party, n o t to
sp e a k o f all th e rest. It is a b so lu te ly in d isp e n sa b le th a t other ty pes o f
p r a c t ic e s s c ie n t i f ic or o t h e r w is e b e p u rsu e d . B u t the id e a t h a t a
d e c o n s t r u c t iv e d isc o u rse m ig h t c o m e to c o m m a n d an d re p la c e o th e r
p ractices, discursive or n o t, is a k in d o f m ad n ess or com ed y t h a t d o esn t
in terest m e in th e least. D e c o n s tru c tio n s m o tif, im pulse or stim u lu s is
d o u b tlessly n ecessary a n d a t w o rk in p la c e s o n e le a st ex p ec ts (to d a y in
n u m e ro u s n o n - lite ra ry a n d n o n - p h ilo s o p h ic a l fie ld s ), but w ith o u t its
re p lacin g or su bstitu tin g for an y th in g else. A s to th e effects o f th eoretical
discourse in general u pon p olitical reality, they can n o t be analyzed as they
were in th e n in eteen th century or even before W orld W ar II. E verythin g is
to be r e v a m p e d in t h i s r e s p e c t . A d e v e lo p e d c a p i t a l i s t s o c i e t y is
c h a ra c te riz e d by t h e fa c t t h a t t h e w o rld s o f e d u c a tio n , re se a rc h , an d
in fo rm a tio n (u n iv e rsitie s an d re se arc h in stitu te s) d ire ctly or in d irectly
irrigate the en tire so cial fabric. T h e circu latio n o f lan gu ages a n d id eas is
fo llo w in g a lto g e th e r d iffe re n t tra je c to rie s . A n d , p a r a d o x ic a lly , w h at is
c a lle d th e o re tica l discourse h as, I w ould say, n o m ore in flu en ce, but is
m ore d irectly in c o n ta c t w ith the d e cisio n -m a k in g in stan ce s it is b oth
m ore perm eable an d m ore p en etratin g. It co m m u n icates a lo n g new, more
diversified, m ore ov erdeterm ined trajectories with the gen eral discourse

230

T H E A LTH U SSE R IA N LEGA CY

o f society, w ith public o p in io n , w ith the discourse o f p olitician s, w ith the

m ilitary discourse, w ith the ju rid ical'd isco u rse. W e should n ot, therefore,
underestim ate w hat is h ap pen in g in places where this discourse appears to o
co m plicated or so ph isticated . It is indeed less deciph erab le, m ore confined,
more p r iv a te th an before o n a c c o u n t o f the m a ss-m e d ia tiz a tio n th a t
h o m o ge n izes, an d th u s sim p lifies a n d cen sors, m ore an d m ore. B u t the
in v e rse is a ls o tru e : it b e n e fits fro m a g ro w in g c a p illa r y a c t io n th a t
u n d oubtedly carries alo n g w ith it great w aste, bu t w hich, a ll to ld , causes
m ore co m m u n icatio n th a n before. O ur an aly ses m ust be adjusted to these
p arad oxes. W e m ust return to the infrastructure/superstructure m o d el(s),
the figure o f the in tellectual, the relation s betw een the university, the n o n
acad em ic research institutes and the so cio -p o litical sp ace and thereby so
m an y oth er things.
M S: W ell, tw o th in gs I w ould say at th is p o in t. W h a t you said, I th in k
th a ts true. Its w rong to u nd erestim ate the effects o f th eoretical discourse.
JD : N o t th e effects in the sense o f effects o f a cau se or in a sense where
th eoretical discourse would be the cause o f effects it would produce all by
itself, as a cause or as cau sa sui. T h e relation o f causality is to o overdeterm ined to en able us to say, T h is, w hich is this, identical to itself, h as m any
or few effects (i.e., th is or th at, w h ich is iden tical to itself) u pon th is or
th a t, e tc .
A sm all exam ple in closin g. I burst out lau gh in g w hen I read tw ice in
the press (n otably in the W all Street Journal) th at A lla n B loo m , the auth or
o f The Closing o f the A m erican Mind, accused Foucault and m e by n am e o f a
whole bu n ch o f n egativ e things in the U .S . like, for exam ple, Judge B o rk s
failure and the d estab ilization o f discussion s ab ou t origin al in ten t in the
C o n stitu tio n . T h en , after lau gh in g and ju d g in g I said to m yself, O f
co u rse ! N e ith e r F oucault, nor I, n or any in d ivid ual, n or deco n stru ctio n
is responsible fo r the fact th a t at the tim e o f the h earin gs all th ose questions
o n o r ig in a l in te n t to o k on th e p ro p o rtio n s they d id a n d led to th o se
con clu sion s. W e d id n t produce those questions: they were produced by a
g e n e ra l d e c o n str u c tio n where ev ery o n e asks h im self, W h a t is o rig in a l
in ten t? W h a t a x io m a tic en su re s its au th ority? W h a t in te re sts serve th is
a x io m a tic ? W h at is th e m eaning o f th e C o n stitu tio n ? T h e s e qu estion s are
n ot the effects o f a th eoretical discourse, but, rather, they are th eoretical or
th e o r e tic o - p o litic a l e v e n ts th a t h a p p e n and w h ic h c a n n o t be w ith o u t
relatio n to th e w o rk Foucault a n d I, am on gst others, took an interest in, the
work whose interest com m an ded the atte n tio n (an d n o t fortuitously) o f so
m any p eo p le work on in ten tio n ality , w ill to say [vouloir-dire], m ean in g

PO LITIC S A N D FRIENDSHIP

231

an d sign ification , the text, the concept o f the author, the theory and lim its
to the theorization o f sp ee ch acts, etc. N o n e o f th e se p ro jects are causes,
bu t they are n o t acc id en ts or isolatab le ep iph en o m en a either. B etw een the
co n stitu tio n al debates over origin al intent (w ith their enorm ous direct or
indirect stak es) an d a certain state o f gen ealogico-d econ stru ctiv e research,
t h e r e is a c e r t a i n c o n f i g u r a t i v i t y . T o s a y t h a t i t s F o u c a u l t s o r
d e co n stru ctio n s fault is stupid; bu t to claim th at there is no relation sh ip
an d to be insen sitive to this con figu ration w ould n ot be serious either.

T ran slated by R o b ert H arvey

* A related article, indirectlly referred to in this text, is Jacq u es D errida, T h e

Politics of Friendship, Journal of Philosophy 11 (N ovem ber 1988).

Gregory Elliott

The Lonely Hour of the Last Instance:

Louis Pierre Althusser, 1918-1990
A g a in st w h at co m m on sense, the com m on sense
o f fin an ciers a n d lawyers, tells us, th ere are m any
w ritin gs th at blow aw ay, but a few w ords th a t
r e m a in . N o d o u b t b e c a u s e th ey h a v e b e e n
inscribed in life and history.
Louis A lth u sser on Je a n H yppolite, 1968

T h e d e a th o f L o u is A lth u s se r C o m m u n ist, M a rx ist, p h ilo so p h e r

s c a r c e ly c o n s t it u t e s a h i s t o r ic a l f a c t by his ow n e x a c tin g c r it e r ia o f
h istoricity. W ith it, how ever, o n e o f th e m o st extraordin ary ch apters in
m odern in tellectu al history h a s fin ally com e to a close.
O f th e p rin cip a l represen tatives o f th e tw o m ajor traditions w ith w hich
he is asso ciated French S tru ctu ralism and W estern M arxism A lth usser
is survived only by C la u d e L v i-S trau ss and Jrgen H aberm as, respectively,
as b io g r a p h ic a l a c c id e n t su p e rv e n e s to c o m p o u n d th e p h ilo so p h ic o p o litical verdicts o f the postm odern ist 8 0 s on the marxisant 60s.
T o date, w ith th e e x c e p tio n o f T e d B e n t o n s adm irable n o tic e in the
Independent (2 7 /1 0 /9 0 ), obituaries on b o th sides o f the C h a n n e l h ave been
c h a r a c t e r is e d by a p e r v a s iv e , i f p r e d ic ta b le , a n ti- M a r x is m . E v id e n t
sym pathy for the m an, fon d m em ories o f the teach er, deep respect for the
matre, h av e been a cc o m p an ied w h ether in th e G u ardian, Le M onde or
Libration by th e co n v ictio n (state d or im plied) th a t A lth u ssers u ltim ate
sig n ific a n c e re sid e s in h is h a v in g d e m o n str a te d , n o t o n ly th a t it is n t
sim p le to b e a M a rx ist in p h ilo so p h y , b u t th a t it is q u ite im p o ssib le.
In d eed , d o u b tless pour dcourager les autres, som e h ave n o t h e sita te d to
id e n tify the d e a th o f H l n e A lth u s se r a t her h u sb a n d s h a n d s as th e
in evitable dnouement o f th e very endeavour. Faits divers, fait politique... A s
if all t h a t rem ained was th e w reckage o f a career tragically term in ated by an
indivisible a c t o f destru ction a n d self-destruction.

234

TH E A LTH U SSER IA N LEGA CY

B efore accoun ts can be settled, they m ust be accurately drafted. A n d we

h ave yet to settle our accoun ts w ith A lthusser. Buried in silence fo r the
last decade o f his life, the philosopher w ho w istfully observed o f h im self
th a t he was fam ous solely for b ein g n otoriou s but w h o was, by an y ju st
re ck on in g, o n e o f th e m o st im po rtan t M arx ist th in k ers o f th e tw en tieth
century deserves b etter on th e o c ca sio n o f h is passing.
T h e full, desperate story o f the life a n d d eath s o f Louis A lth u sser aw aits
its h istorian ; on e day it will h av e to be told. For, w h ilst it m ay n o t be
allo w ed to fu n ctio n surreptitiously or b la ta n tly , w ith re gre t or schaden
freude as a substitute fo r an adequate in tellectu al app reciation , nor should
it be evaded by anyone seeking to do elem entary ju stice to him. In truth, it
only serves to render his ach ievem en t the m ore rem arkable.
T h e bare ou tlin es o f w h at he once referred to as au toh eterob iograp h ical
circu m stan ces are clear enough. Born in Birm an dreis, A lgeria, in O cto b er
1918, A lt h u s s e r s you th was m ark ed by th e ov erw h elm in g in flu e n c e o f
tr a d itio n a l R o m an C a t h o lic is m first in th e sh a p e o f a p io u s m o th er,
L u cien n e, a n d th e n in th e strongly anti-P opular Fron t m ilieu o f th e Lyce
du Parc, Lyons, where fro m 1936 to 1939 he w as taugh t in the preparatory
c la ss for th e E c o le N o r m a le S u p rie u re ( E N S ) by J e a n G u it t o n , Je a n
L a c r o ix a n d J o s e p h H o u rs (in c o m m o n w ith c o n t e m p o r a r ie s th e re ,
A lth u sse r b elo n ge d to th e Jeunesse tudiante chrtienne). T ra in e d in the
kind o f sp iritu alist ph ilo sop h y he was su b sequ en tly to d isd ain , A lth u sser
cam e six th in th e h ig h ly co m p e titiv e e x a m in a tio n fo r th e E N S in Ju ly
1939 only to be called up fo r m ilitary service th at Sep tem b er. C ap tured
the follow ing summ er, he spen t close on five years as a prisoner o f war in
S ch le sw ig H olstein , years atten d ed by a loss o f fa ith a n d th e on set o f a long
history o f depressive illness.
U p o n his release A lth u sse r resum ed his form al e d u catio n , co m in g first in
the extrem ely dem an ding agrgation in philosophy in 1948, w ith a thesis
(su p e rv ise d by G a s to n B a c h e la rd ) on The N otion o f C ontent in H egel's
P h ilo so p h y . In N o v e m b e r 1 9 4 8 h e w as a p p o i n t e d caim an ( t e a c h e r
re sp o n s ib le for p re p a rin g stu d e n ts for th e agrgation ) a t th e E N S an d
rem ained there fo r the rest o f his active life, b ein g prom oted to Secretary o f
th e E co le in 1962. T h e sam e m o n th h e jo in e d th e F ren ch C o m m u n ist
Party, rallied from qu asi-h eretical, left-C ath o lic circles by th e b itter class
stru ggles o f th e C o ld W ar con ju n cture, th e p ro m p tin gs o f his p h ilo sop h ical
in tim ates (in p articu la r Ja c q u e s M artin the prin ce o f in te llig e n ce , in
M erleaU 'P on ty s words to w h om F or M arx is d e d icated ), a n d th e exam ple
o f H l n e L e g o t ie n (a lia s R y tm a n ) R e s ista n c e h e ro in e , C o m m u n ist
dissiden t, later a distinguish ed sociologist w hom he m et in the w inter o f
1945-46. A lth o u g h A lth u sser m ain tain ed co n ta c t w ith variou s C a th o lic

TH E LONELY H O U R OF TH E L A S T IN ST A N C E

235

circles through out h is life, the die was now cast; h e would n ever resign his
p arty card, adm ission tic k et to th e w orking-class m ovem en t, w h ich is our
on ly h o pe an d our destin y.
F ir st h o s p it a liz e d in 1 9 4 6 , a n d e v e n tu a lly d ia g n o s e d as a m a n ic depressive su bject to fits o f profound m elan ch oly, A lth u sser was obliged to
return to p sych iatric institution s with increasin g frequency over the years,
su b m ittin g to a ran ge o f treatm ents, from drugs to E C T , in search o f som e
respite from the fearful traum as th at plagued h im and induced a P ascalian
terror b efo re reality . A s his form er student, co llab orator, an d com rade,
E tie n n e B a lib a r , re m in d e d m ourn ers a t his fu n e ra l, A lth u s se r su ffered
terribly , te n a c io u sly w a g in g , b u t in e x o ra b ly lo sin g , th a t w ar w ith o u t
m em oirs or m em orials h e ev ok ed , in p la n g en t to n alitie s, in Freud and
L a c a n (1 9 6 4 ). W hen, in N o v em b e r 1980, defeat cam e, provoked in part
by th e p o litic a l se tb ack s o f th e late 70s, th e p itile ss form it to o k the
m urder o f his co m p an io n o f som e thirty-five years co n d em n ed h im to
o b liv io n thereafter: a living death, divided betw een a succession o f clinics
an d the obscurity o f the tw en tieth arrondissement o f Paris, n ou rish ed only
by the d evotion o f a few friends and dim in ish in g hopes o f on e day regain ing
h e a lth a n d resum ing work.
T h a t day n ever daw ned fo r th is doux matre la science pure et dure, w ho
n everth eless persevered in existence w ith a fortitude on e m ight be tem pted
to ca ll singular, were it n ot co m m on to all those fo r w h om H ell is n ot oth er
people, but so m eth in g infinitely m ore insidious and ineluctable: th eir own
su bjectivity.
T h is, th e n , was th e p ersonal backdrop to th e p ub lic career o f a thinker
who only em erged from the seclusion o f the rue d'U lm into the celebrity of
the Q uartier Latin after the Fourth R epu blic h ad succum bed to D e G au lle's
coup d tat a n d as the P C F sought to rechart its course am idst th e treacherous
currents o f de-Stalin ization and the consequent S in o -S o v ie t split. A g a in st
the current o f the p revalen t M arxist hum anism , predom inantly m oral in cast
a n d now b e in g a d o p te d in h o m e o p a th ic d o se s by the W e st E u ro p e a n
C om m u n ist Parties for official purposes, A lth usser essayed a reconstruction o f
h isto ric a l an d d ia le c tic a l m a te ria lism o f M a rx ist scien ce and M arxist
philosophy conducive to a left-wing critique o f Stalin ism ... th at w ould ...
h elp p u t som e su b stan ce b a ck in to th e revolu tion ary p ro ject h ere in the
W est. U n v eiled in 1965 in the tw o b ook s for w h ich he is renow ned the
c h a r a c te r is tic a lly la c o n ic a lly e n title d For M arx and R eading C a p ita l
A lt h u s s e r s M a rx ism re p re se n te d an a u d a c io u s c o m b in a tio n o f political
radicalism, advertising L eninist affiliations a n d intim ating M aoist sym pathies,
a n d philosophical m odernism , c o n ju g a t in g B a c h e la rd ia n c o n v e n tio n a list
epistem ology and Lacan ian structuralist psychoanalysis w ith the m aterialist
co n cep tio n o f history.

236

T H E ^ L T H U S S E R IA N LEGACY

A lth u s s e r was la te r to id e n tify S p in o z a a n d n o t S a u s su r e as th e

p h ilo so p h er-g en e ral w ho h a d inspired the n o v e l a cc e n ts an d d istin ctiv e
th e ses o f h is in terven tio n in M arxism . A t th e tim e, h ow ever, its austere
a n ti-e m p iric ism , its relen tless h o stility to h isto ric ism , an d its astrin gen t
theoretical a n ti-h u m a n ism p artially align ed it w ith the co n tem p o ran e o u s
en terprises o f L v i-S tra u ss and L a c a n , B a rth e s an d F o u c a u lt, and it was
rapid ly assim ilated to th e ascen den t structuralism .
H ig h A lt h u s s e r ia n is m e s s e n t ia lly e n c o m p a s s e d th r e e c o n v e r g in g
in itia tiv e s. F irst, it v e n tu red a re-read in g o f th e M a rx ist ca n o n , w h ich
re v o lv e d around the p o stu la te o f an e p istem o lo g ica l b re a k b etw een th e
id e o lo g ica l w ork s o f th e Y o u n g M a rx a n d th e sc ie n tific discou rse o f the
m a tu r e M a r x , r e sto r in g C a p ita l to p rid e o f p la c e a fte r its te m p o r a r y
d e m o litio n by th e P a ris M anuscripts. S ec o n d ly , it offered a n a lte rn ativ e
philosophy to D ia m a t positivism a n d W estern -M arxist an ti-n atu ralism
th e T h e o ry o f th e o re tic a l p ra c tic e , an ep iste m o lo g y w h ich sough t to
recon cile co n v e n tio n alist disclosure o f the h istorical, so cial a n d th eoretical
c h aracter o f scien ce w ith realist insistence on the existen ce o f real o b je cts
in d ep en den t o f, a n d irreducible to, theory. T h ird ly , it elab orated a n oneco n o m istic scie n ce o f th e history o f so cial form atio n s, com prisin g four
m ain co m p o n en ts: (1 ) an an ti-H egelian recastin g o f the d ialectic, w h ich
excised a b stract fatalism from a n d inscribed the n ecessity o f co n tin gen cy
in its str u c t u r e s , v ia th e c o n c e p t s o f c o n t r a d ic t i o n a n d o v e r d e t e r
m in atio n ; (2) a recon ceptualization o f the structure o f so cial form ation s
th a t cred ited their c o n stitu tiv e co m p lex ity by d isp la cin g th e b ase/su p er
s t r u c t u r e m o d e l in fa v o u r o f a s c h e d u le o f r e la t iv e ly a u t o n o m o u s
in s ta n c e s e c o n o m ic , p o litic a l, id e o lo p 'c a l g o v e rn e d b y a stru c tu ra l
ca u sa lity o f d e term in atio n in th e la st in sta n c e ; (3 ) an an ti-te leo lo gical
th eory o f m o des o f produ ction as articulated co m b in a tio n s o f re latio n s and
forces of produ ction , w hich eschew ed ev olu tion ism in the th eorization of
h isto ric al tran sition ; (4 ) finally and perhaps most controversially a re
th e o riz atio n o f id eology , n o t as false c o n sc io u sn e ss, b u t as n ecessary
illu sion p eop les im aginary relations to their real co n d itio n s o f existen ce,
w h ich m igh t be tran sform ed, but w h ich w ould n o t b e d issip ated , under
com m unism .
T h e e ffe ct o f A lth u s se r s th e o re tical d e -S ta lin iz a tio n , in an d beyond
F ran ce, was n o th in g sh ort o f electric. H is renew al o f M arxism represented
a lib e ra tio n for a you nger ge n e ratio n , spared the lo n g S ta lin is t n igh t o f
th e o ry fo r w h o se du ratio n C o m m u n ist in tellec tu als h a d been reduced to
id e o lo g ic a l o fficiators o f th e p arty lin e , b u t still invariably in tim idated
in to o ffic ia l p h ilo so p h y by in sin u a tio n s o f o r ig in a l so c ia l sin . T h is ,
crucially, was the sign ifican ce o f th e scan d alo u s A lth u sserian revin d ication

TH E LONELY H O U R OF TH E L A S T IN ST A N C E

237

o f the autonom y o f theory: n o t the self-elevatio n o f a scien tific elite w hich

h is d e tracto rs, w ilfully or carelessly , co n stru ed it as, n eglectin g his ow n
d e e p ly - fe lt ( a n d liv e d ) c o n t e x t u a l a llu s io n to th o se w h o se la b o u r ,
sufferings an d struggles ... n ourish and su stain our w hole p resen t and future,
all our argu m en ts for life a n d h o p e; bu t the d efen ce, again st the intrusions
(a n d p o t e n tia l d e p r e d a tio n s) o f S t a t e , Party or C la s s , o f th e c o g n itiv e
auton om y o f explanatory scien ce and h e n ce o f freedom o f research as a
prerequisite o f any em ancipatory p o litical p ractice. In short, C ae sa r non est
supra grammaticos; n o r is th e Politburo.
Q uite th e reverse o f the d o gm atist h e is so often portrayed as, A lth u sser
w as acu tely con scious o f the p ro b lem atic ch a ra cter o f h is altern atives to
actu ally ex istin g M arxism . N o so o n er h ad h e exp ou n d ed th em th an h e
em barked u pon a p rolon ged e x e rc ise in auto-critiqu e. F ro m th e lectures
e v e n tu a lly p u b lish e d as Philosophy and the Spontaneous Philosophy o f the
Scientists (1 9 6 7 ; 1 9 7 4 ), via Lenin an d Philosophy (1 9 6 8 ), to Reply to John
Lewis (1 9 7 2 ) and Elements o f Self-Criticism (1 9 7 4 ), h e return ed again an d
again to pon d er and rectify his origin al theses, in the process co n ce d in g the
u n ilateralism o f their form ation , yet defending the indispensability o f such
e x t r e m is m to a p r o p e r ly m a t e r ia l i s t p r a c t ic e o f p h ilo s o p h y o n e
co n cern ed , th at is, w ith its ex tra-p h ilo sop h ical effectivity.
T h e re d e fin itio n o f philosophy as class struggle in theory o ccu p ied m ost
o f the se co n d p h ase o f A lth u ssers career, but n ot to th e exclusion o f a last
se m in al co n trib u tio n to su b sta n tiv e so cial theory: the celeb rated e x trac t
from o n e o f m any ab ortive projects in this period, published as Ideology
an d Ideological S ta te A p p ara tu se s (1 9 7 0 ), w hich registered th e im pact o f
the C ultural R ev o lu tio n in C h in a an d M ay 68 in France, and proved to be
his sin gle m ost in flu en tial tex t. T h e re a fte r, in a third phase from 1976
o n w a rd s, A lth u s se r sim u lta n e o u sly d isp la y e d h is p o lit ic a l c r e d e n tia ls,
cu lm in atin g in h is philippic again st the leadership o f the P C F follow ing its
sabotage o f th e U n io n o f the L e ft in 1978 (W hat M ust Change in the Party),
an d set about a self-destruction o f A lth usserian ism (see especially Marxism
Today, 1978) as ruthless as anythin g u ndertaken by his critics.
V ariou s ex p la n a tio n s m ight be a d v an ce d fo r th is som bre developm ent.
N o doubt som e o v e rd e te r m in a tio n o f th e p h ilo so p h ic o - p o litic a l h o p e s
a g g ra v ate d a n alread y d e e p e n in g m e la n c h o lia . T h e future la sts a lon g
tim e, A lth u sser h a d incessantly cau tion ed those who lived politics in the
m ode o f su bjectiv e urgency. By the turn o f the decad e there was little
reason to suppose th at it w ould w itness les lendemains qui chantent.
Tw en ty-five- y ears on , w h a t en du res o f a th o u g h t th a t g u aran te es its
a u t h o r a n e x c e p t io n a l p o s it io n in c o n te m p o r a ry in te lle c tu a l h isto r y ,
p r e c a r io u s ly p o is e d b e tw e e n a M a r x is t t r a d it io n w h ic h he r a d ic a lly

238

T H E A LTH U SSE R IA N LEGA CY

criticized and recon stru cted fo r the sake o f the revolu tion ary cause, and a
p o s t - M a r x is m w h ic h h as d is a v o w e d h im , a lo n g w ith its e r stw h ile
p h ilo s o p h ic a l c o n s c ie n c e , in th e se new tim e s? W h a t p e r s is ts o f th e
A lth u sse r ia n re v o lu tio n , w h ic h for a d e c a d e sh ow ed sc a n t re sp e ct for
n a tio n a l borders or discip lin ary boundaries, spon sored a mass o f research
(m u ch o f it o f lastin g valu e), an d defined the term s o f th eo retical debate on
the Left? If m an y o f his w ritings h ave blow n away, are there a few words
th at rem ain, albeit screened by a co n ven ien t am n esia?
T h e r e is, first a n d forem ost, the fact th a t A lth u sse rs re-readin g o f th e
classics recon n ected M arxism w ith vital, n o n -M a rx ist currents o f thou gh t
(e.g., p sy ch o an aly sis a n d lin g u istic s), restorin g th e ir b rutally interrupted
c o m m u n icatio n and facilitatin g a series o f new departu res (especially in the
th eory o f ideology an d cu ltu ral criticism ). S ec o n d ly , his p h ilo so p h y for
scien ce at on ce registered the autonom y o f the natural and so cial sciences,
and vin d icated the possibility o f science as the (in term in ab le) p roduction
o f rectifiable, objective know ledge o f its ob ject. T h irdly, the A lth u sserian
critique o f the H eg elian dialectic (and its M arxist avatars) as intrinsically
teleo logical released M arxism from a series o f false prom issory n otes (the
in evitability o f so cialism as a fun ction o f lin ear econ om ic progression; the
p r o l e t a r i a t as th e u n i v e r s a l c l a s s in a s e c u l a r iz e d t h e o d i c y o f
(d e )alie n a tio n ; the h istorical m essian ism o f a n en d o f ideology ). Finally,
the system atic recon stru ction o f h istorical m aterialism reclaim ed it as an
op en s c ie n tific re se a r c h p ro g ra m m e , ta k in g d e a d ly aim a t a c r ip p lin g
e c o n o m ic d e te rm in ism a n d its co ro llary , e c o n o m ic re d u c tio n ism , as it
p e rta in e d to p o litic a l p ra c tic e a n d c u ltu ra l p ro d u c tio n alik e. In w h at is
a r g u a b ly th e q u i n t e s s e n t i a l A lt h u s s e r ia n e ssa y , C o n t r a d ic t i o n a n d
O v e rd e term in atio n (1 9 6 2 ), a gen eration found its licen ce and its charter:
In H istory ... the superstructures ... are n ever seen to step respectfully
aside w hen their work is done or, w hen the T im e com es, as his pure
p h en om en a, to scatter before H is M ajesty the E co n o m y as he strides
a lon g the royal road o f the D ialectic. From the first m om en t to the
last, the lon ely h our o f the last in sta n ce n ever com es.
T h e o re tic a l p ractic e ; ep istem ological b reak ; sym ptom atic read in g;
o v e r d e t e r m in a t io n ; d e t e r m in a t io n in th e la s t in s t a n c e ; r e la tiv e
a u to n o m y ; im agin ary re la tio n s ; id e o lo g ica l sta te a p p a ra tu se s ; class
stru ggle in th e o ry : a few words co n cepts a n d categories th a t rem ain,
in scribed in life an d history (an d better few er bu t b etter, as so m eo n e on ce
said ). For they opened up new horizons w ithin the co n tin e n t o f history,
restored the in tellectu al repu tation o f M arxism , m ade it, if n ot sim ple, then

TH E LONELY H O U R OF THE L A S T IN STA N C E

239

th at m u ch easier to be a M arx ist in philosophy, cultural studies, literary

c riticism , so cio lo gy , an th ro p o lo gy , p o litic a l th eory, etc. th a n it w ould
otherw ise h ave b een , H is im m ediate students w ere n o t th e only o n es for
w hom A lth u sser provided eith er a th eo retical form ation or a form ation for
theory. O thers, who n ever m et him , recognize the im m ense debt they owe
h im a n d c o u ld m ak e B a lib a r s a c k n o w le d g e m e n t th e ir ow n: I le a rn t
everything, if n o t from A lth usser, th e n th an ks to h im .
T h a t su ch a legacy sh ou ld h ave b ee n forged am id st such adversity
alm ost on borrow ed or stolen tim e can on ly e n h a n c e (a n d in no way
q u alify ) our ad m iratio n fo r L o u is A lth u sser. In the la st in stan ce, if n ot
befo re, we m ay be grateful to him .

Jacques Derrida

Text Read at Louis Althussers Funeral

I knew , in a d v an c e , th a t to d ay I w ould be in c ap a b le o f sp eak in g, o f
fin d in g the words, as it were.
E xcuse m e, therefore, if I read, and fo r readin g n o t w hat I believe I must
say (d oes on e ever know w hat on e m ust say in such a m om en t?), bu t sim ply
en ou gh to n o t let silen ce win out over ev ery th in g else ju st a few shreds o f
w hat I w as able to tear aw ay from th e silen ce in the depth s o f w hich I
w ould, like you, do u b tlessly , h a v e b een tem p ted to clo se m y self at th is
instan t.
I le a r n e d o f L o u i s d e a t h w ith in the la s t tw e n ty -fo u r h o u rs, u p o n
return in g from Prague and th e n am e o f th at city already seem s to m e so
violen t, alm ost un p ron oun ceab le. B u t I knew th at upon m y return I h a d to
call him : I h ad prom ised him I would.
So m eo n e p resen t here, w ho was n ear Lo uis w hen I last sp ok e to h im on
th e telep h o n e , probably rem em bers: w hen I p rom ised to call him and to
co m e and see him w hen I cam e b a ck from this trip, his last words, the last
w ords I will h ave h eard Louis p ro n o u n ce were, if Im still alive, yes, call
me an d com e over, hurry. I h ad answ ered h im in a jo cu lar tone in order to
hide som ew here above my an xiou sn ess and sadness, O K , Ill call and go
_
over.
Louis, th a t tim e is n o longer w ith us, I n o longer h a v e th e stren gth to
call you, to ta lk to an y on e even to you (you are at on ce to o a b se n t and
too close: in me, inside m e), and even less have I the strength to speak to
o th ers ab ou t you ev en if they be, as is the case today, your frien ds, our
friends.
I h a v e n t th e h eart either to recou n t an y th in g or to p ron oun ce a eulogy:
there w ould be too m uch to say an d this is n o t the m om en t. O ur friends,
your friends w ho are p resen t here k n ow w hy it is alm ost in d ecen t to speak
now and to co n tin u e to d irect our w ords to you. B u t silen ce is ju st as
u nbearable. I c a n n o t stan d th e idea o f silen ce, as if, w ithin me, you too
could n ot stan d the idea.
O n the d eath o f so m eo n e close or o f a friend, w hen on e h as sh ared so
m uch with him (an d, here, I h ave been lucky in that, for thirty-eight years,
my life h as been lin ked in a th o u sa n d stran ge ways w ith th a t o f L o u is
A lth u sser, sin c e 1952, w hen th e caman received in to his office th e young
student th at I was then, and since the tim e w hen, later, in the sam e place, I

242

T H E A LTH U SSE R IA N LEGACY

w orked by his side fo r nearly tw enty years), w hen on e rem em bers ju st as

well the light m om ents and the carefree laughter o f days th at pass by as one
d o e s the m o m e n ts s p e n t in in te n se w ork, t e a c h in g , th in k in g , in th e
p h ilo so p h ical a n d p olitical polemos, or further, th e w ounds a n d th e worst
w renching m om ents, the dram as an d the m ournings, at the d e ath o f this
friend, there is, you all know, as alw ays th a t p an g o f guilt, egotistical, to be
sure, n arcissistic also, but irrepressible, co n sistin g in co m p lain in g to o n eself
an d tak in g pity, th at is, takin g pity o n eself u pon oneself, an d saying (an d I
am d o in g ju s t t h i s , b e c a u s e t h i s c o n v e n t i o n a l p h r a s e n e v e r f a il s ,
n on eth eless, to tell the truth o f this co m p assio n ): a w hole part o f my life, a
long an d in ten se co u rsin g o f my liv in g self h a s b ee n in terru p ted today,
con clu des a n d th u s dies w ith Louis in order to co n tin u e to accom pan y him
as in th e p a s t, but n ow w ith o u t re tu rn a n d to th e lim its o f a b so lu te
obscurity. W h a t ends, w hat Louis takes away w ith h im is n ot only this or
th a t th in g h e re or th e re t h a t we w o u ld h a v e sh a re d at so m e tim e or
another, it is the world itself, a certain origin o f the world his world, o f
course, but also the on e in w h ich I h ave lived, in w h ich we h ad lived a
unique story, on e th at is, in any case, irreplaceable and w hich will h ave had
some sense or anoth er for either on e o f us, even if this sense could n o t be
the sam e either for h im or for me. It is a world th at is for us the world, the
only world, on e th at sinks in to an abyss from w hich no m em ory (even if we
keep the m em ory, and we will do so) can save it.
E v en th o u g h I d e te c t so m e in to le r a b le v io le n c e in th is m o v e m e n t
c o n sistin g in c o m p la in in g a b o u t o n e s ow n d e a th u p o n th e d e a th o f a
friend, I h ave n o desire to abstain from it: it is the only way rem aining to
keep Louis in me, to conserve m yself by co n servin g h im in m e just as, I am
sure, we are all doing, each w ith his m em ory, w h ich itself only exists with
this m o vem en t o f m ourning, w ith its piece o f torn -off history and this was
such a rich and sin gular history, a m urderous an d still unthinkable tragedy
so inseparable too from the history o f our tim e, so h eavy w ith the w hole
p h ilo so p h ic a l, p o litic a l, g e o p o litic a l h istory o f our tim e a h isto ry that
each o f us still app reh en ds w ith his own images. A n d there h ave been so
m an y im ages th e m o st b eau tifu l an d the m o st terrib le but all forever
in d issociable from the u nique adventure w h ich carries the n am e o f Louis
A lth u sser. I th in k I can sp eak for everyone here today w h en I say th a t our
b e lo n g in g to th is tim e w as in e r a d ic a b ly m a rk e d by h im , by w h at h e
search ed for, exp erim en ted w ith , risked at th e h igh est p ric e, by m eans o f all
m o v e m e n t s : d e t e r m in e d , s u s p e n d e d , a u t h o r i t a r i a n a n d p e r s o n a lly
co n cern ed a t t h e sam e tim e, co n trad icto ry , c o n seq u en tia l o r co n vu lsive,
extraordin arily im passioned as he was a passion th a t left h im no respite
because it sp ared h im n o th in g (w ith its th e a tric a l rhythm s, its deserts, its

T E X T READ A T LO U IS A LT H U SSE R 'S FUNERAL

243

g re a t sp ace s o f silen ce , vertigin ous retreats, th o se im pressive interruptions

th em selves interrupted in their turn by dem on stration s, forceful incursions,
and pow erful eruption s o f w h ich eac h o f his b ook s preserves the bu rn in g
trace for their h av in g first transform ed the lan d scap e aro u n d the vo lcan o .
L o u is
p e rso n a l,
inflected,
r a d ia tin g

A lt h u s s e r tra v e rse d so m an y liv e s o u rs, fir st o ff so m an y

h isto ric a l, p h ilo so p h ic a l, a n d p o litic a l ad v en tu res, he m arked,
an d influenced so m an y discourses, action s, a n d existen ces by the
and p r o v o c a tiv e force o f h is th o u g h t, h is m a n n e rs o f b ein g,

s p e a k i n g , t e a c h in g , t h a t e v e n th e m o s t d iv e r s e a n d c o n t r a d ic t o r y
testim o n ials could n ever exh au st their very source. T h e fact th at each o f us
h a d a d iffe re n t re la tio n sh ip w ith L o u is A lth u s se r (a n d I am n o t on ly
sp e a k in g o f p h ilo so p h y or p o litic s), th e fa ct th a t e a c h o f us know s th at,
th ro u g h his or her singular prism , he or she only cau gh t a glim pse o f but
on e secret (a n in exh au stib le secret for us, but also, an d in an alto geth er
d iffe re n t w ay, fa th o m le ss fo r h im ), th e fa c t th a t L o u is w as a lto g e th e r
differen t for o th e r peop le, in th e se tim es a n d in oth ers, w ith in acad em ia
a n d w ith o u t, a t th e rue d U lm a n d ev ery w h ere else in F ra n c e , in the
C o m m u n ist Party, the other parties and beyond all parties, w ithin Europe
an d w ithout, the fact th at eac h o f us loved a different Lo u is A lth usser, at
som e tim e, in s o i" ? decad e or a n o th er (as it was my fortune till the very
e n d ) th is gen ero u s m u ltip licity , th is very o v e ra b u n d an ce that was his
creates an ob ligatio n for us n o t to totalize, n o t to sim plify, n o t to sto p his
step, n o t to fix a trajectory, n o t to seek so m e advan tage, n o t to cross things
o u t or to g e t e v e n , an d e s p e c ia lly n o t to m a k e c a lc u la t io n s , n o t to
appropriate or reappropriate (e v en if it be th ro u gh th at p arad o x ical form o f
m an ip u latin g or calcu latin g reapp rop riation that is called rejectio n ), n ot to
seize w h a t was in a p p ro p ria b le and m u st re m a in so. E ac h o f us h as a
th ou san d faces, but those w ho knew L o u is A lth u sser know that, in him ,
th is law found a glittering, surprising a n d hyperbolic exam ple. H is work is,
in the first p lace, great by w h at it attests to a n d by w h at it risks, by w h at it
traversed w ith th a t plural, sh attered, and often tim es interrupted flash, by
th e very h igh risk tak en an d th e e n d u ra n ce a c c e p te d : his a d v en tu re is
sin gular, it belon gs to no one.
I h av e n o d ifficu lty sp eak in g (a s I m ust h e re ) a b o u t the th in g s th a t
te n d e d to se p a ra te h im a n d m e, ev en to o p p o se us (im p lic itly or n ot,
som etim es h arsh ly , on b o th sm all an d im p o rta n t m a tte rs) b ecau se they
n ever ch ip p e d aw ay at a friendship th at was the dearer to m e on accou n t o f
th ose differences. For at n o tim e could I consider th at w hat was h ap pen in g
to h im or w hat was h ap pen in g th rough him, in these p laces where I still
dw ell w ith him , as anyth in g o th e r th a n u ph eavals in series, earth quakes or
aw aken in gs o f v o lc an o s, the sin gu lar or co llectiv e tragedies o f our tim es

244

TH E A LTH U SSERIA N LEGACY

the tim e th at I will h ave, like you, shared w ith h im .

N e v er, in spite o f

everythin g that m ight h ave distan ced us from each other or separated us,
n e v e r w as I ab le or did I w ish to o b se rv e ( t h a t is, w ith a s p e c t a t o r s
n eu trality ) w h at w as h a p p e n in g to h im or w h at w as h a p p e n in g th ro ugh
him. A n d fo r everything w hich by his m eans or through him occupied my
w h ole adu lt life, even as far as the w renching trials that we are all th inking
of, I w ill alw ays remain, at the b ottom o f my heart, grateful. T h e sam e goes
fo r th a t w h ich is irre p laceab le . A n d o f co u rse, w h at rem ain s th e m ost
p resen t to my eyes, the m o st aliv e today, the clo sest a n d the m ost precious,
is h is fa c e , L o u i s h a n d s o m e f a c e w ith its h ig h fo r e h e a d , his sm ile ,
everyth in g w hich in him, in the m om en ts o f peace ( there were m om ents o f
p eace: m any o f you here know th at there w ere) everythin g that radiated
k in d n e s s, th e g ift a n d d e m a n d o f lo v e , m a n ife s tin g a n in c o m p a r a b le
atte n tiv e n e ss to th e youth o f th at w h ich is com ing, curiously vigilan t for
the daw n o f signs still w aiting to be understood, as to everythin g that upset
the order, the p rogram , facile co n son an ce a n d previsibility. W h a t to m e
rem ains today m ost alive is w hat in the ligh t o f th at face bespoke a lucidity
at on ce im placable and indulgent, by turns resigned or trium ph an t, as was
som etim es the case w ith the verve o f certain o f his outbursts. W h at 1 love
th e m ost in h im , p ro b a b ly b e c a u se th is w as h im , w h at f a sc in a te d m e
th ro ugh w h at o th e rs probably kn ew b etter th a n I, a n d from m u c h closer
th a n I, was th e sense and taste o f grandeur a certain grandeur, o f the great
th eater o f p o litical tragedy w here
p itilessly shatters the private body
W h en it arran ges th e ech oin g
arrow s or trails u p o n a territory

the greater-than-life en gages, deviates or

o f it actors.
o f proper n am es like so m any direction
to be o c c u p ie d , p u b lic d isco u rse ab o u t

A lth u sse r allo w s th e n am es o f M o n te sq u ie u , for e x a m p le , or R o u sse au ,

M a rx or L e n in to re so n a te . T h o se w h o, so m e tim e s b e h in d the g re a t
c u r t a in s o f t h a t p o l it i c a l t h e a t e r , a p p r o a c h e d A lt h u s s e r , th o se w h o
ap p roach ed th e h o sp ital room a n d th e b ed sid e know t h a t th e y ow e it to
truth to a lso n am e P ascal, for exam ple, a n d D ostoyevsky, a n d N ietzsch e
an d A rtaud .
D eep dow n inside, I realize th at Louis d o esn t h ear me: h e only hears me
inside me, inside us (we are, how ever, only ourselves from th at point within
us w here the other, the m ortal other, reson ates). A n d I know th at w ithin
m e his voice is insistin g th a t 1 d o n o t p reten d to sp eak to h im . 1 also know
th a t I h ave n othing to te a ch you w ho are here, since you are here.
But above this tom b an d a b o v e your heads, I dream o f addressing those
w ho com e after him, or after us already, an d w hom I see (alas, by several
sign s) as too m uch in a hurry to understan d, to interpret, to classify, fix,
reduce, sim plify, close off, a n d judge, th a t is, to m isunderstand that, here, it

T E X T READ A T LO U IS A LT H U SSE R 'S FUNERAL

245

is a qu estio n o f a n oh-so-singular destiny and o f th e trials o f existen ce, o f

th ou gh t,
ta k e th e
d e cip h er
th e life,

o f politics, inseparably. I w ould a sk them to stop a

tim e to listen to ou r tim e (w e h a d n o o th e r o n e ),
everythin g th a t from ou r tim e c o u ld b e ratified a n d
th e w ork, th e n am e o f L o u is A lth u sse r. N o t o n ly

m om ent, to
to p atien tly
prom ised in
b ecau se th e

dim en sio n s o f th is destiny sh o u ld co m m an d resp ect (also th e respect o f the

tim e from w hich em erge these oth er gen eratio n s, our gen eration ), but also
because the yet open w ounds, th e scars or h opes th a t th ey will recognize in
it and w h ich were an d are our scars and hopes, will certain ly teach them
so m eth in g essential o f w hat rem ains to be heard, read, th ou gh t, an d done.
A s lon g as I live, th at is, as lon g as the m em ory rem ains w ith me o f w hat
Louis A lth u sser gave m e to live w ith him , n ear him : this is w hat I would
like to recall to th ose who were n o t o f his tim e or w ho will n ot h ave taken
th e tim e to turn tow ard him . T h is is w hat I would h ope one day to express
m ore eloquently, w ithout bidding adieu, for Lo uis A lth usser.
A n d now I w an t to give h im b ack or lend h im the floor. For anoth er
last word: his again. R ereading som e o f his works late into last night, the
follow ing passage im posed itself u pon m e m ore th an I read it or elected it to
be resaid here. It is from on e o f h is first texts, Benolazzi et Brecht ( 1962 ):
Yes, w e are first u n ited b y th a t in stitu tion th a t th e sp ectacle is, but
we are m ore deeply un ited by th e sam e m yths, the sam e th em es th a t
gov ern us w ithout our adm itting it, by th e sam e spon tan eously lived
ideology. Yes, even th ou gh it is p a r excellence th a t o f the poor, as in El
N ost M ilan, we eat the sam e bread, exp erien ce the sam e angers, the
sa m e r e v o lt s , th e sa m e d e l ir ia ( a t le a s t in m e m o ry , w h e re th is
im m in en t p ossibility h au n ts us), n ot to m en tion the sam e despon dency
over a tim e th at n o H istory ca n m ove. Yes, like M other C ourage, we
h av e the sam e war at our doorstep, a h airsb read th away, even inside us,
the sam e horrible blin dn ess, th e sam e ashes in our eyes, the sam e earth
in our m ouths. W e possess th e sam e daw n an d th e sam e n igh t: our
u n c o n s c io u s n e s s . W e sh a r e th e sa m e sto r y a n d t h a t is w h ere
everythin g begins.
T ran slated by R o b ert H arvey