Third World Quarterly

Women's Rights in the Muslim World: Reform or Reconstruction?

Author(s): Rebecca Barlow and Shahram Akbarzadeh
Source: Third World Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 8 (2006), pp. 1481-1494
Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.
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ThirdWorldQuarterly, Vol. 27, No. 8, pp 1481-1494, 2006

Women's
World:

Rights
reform

in
or

the

Taylor&FrancisoGroup

Muslim

reconstruction?

REBECCA BARLOW & SHAHRAM

AKBARZADEH

The issue of gender inequality is an acute problem in countries

where women's lives are governed by laws, and configured by customs and
traditions,said to derivefrom Islam. In the second half of the 20th century, two
Muslim feminist paradigms have emerged in response to this malaise. Islamic
feminists aim to establish women's rights within the Islamic framework by reinterpretingIslam's holy sources. In contrast, secular feminists challenge the
particularistic nature of the Islamicframework and advocate the application of
a set of standard universal rights for Muslim and non-Muslim women. This
article focuses on the writings of the Moroccan feminist Fatima Mernissi,
tracing her evolution from advocating secular reconstruction of Muslim
societies to a position that resembles Islamic reformism.
ABSTRACT

The questionof women'shumanrightsis arguablyone of the most complex

and controversialsocial problemsfor Muslimsocieties.The adoptionof the
Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discriminationagainst
Women (CEDAW) by the United Nations General Assembly (1979)
emphasisedthe universalapplicabilityof women's rights. Yet a numberof
Muslim states, including Sudan, have declined to join the convention,
makinga self-righteousclaim to an alternativeset of rightsthat are derived
from the holy texts of Islam. This dissension has led many observersto
point to a profound intellectualgap that allegedly separatesMuslim and
Western thinkers on the question of universal human rights. Yet
perspectivesin the Muslimworld, and for that matterin the West, are far
from uniform.
The so-called 'Muslimworld-view'is nothing short of a mythicalbeast,
since Muslimshave adoptedconflictingpositions on key social and political
questions. When faced with the challenge of modernity, Muslims have
demonstratedthat they span the full spectrumof opinions.Whiletraditional
Muslimshavetriedto insulatethemselvesfromforeigninfluencesin whatcan
only be describedas a rearguardaction, Muslim reformershave tried to
identify points of connection between Islam and the modern world,
representedas colonial and postcolonial Europe (and later the USA).
Rebecca Barlow and Shahram Akbarzadeh are in the School of Political and Social Inquiry, Monash
University, Melbourne, Victoria 3800, Australia. Email: Rebecca.Barlow@arts.monash.edu.au.
ISSN 0143-6597 print/ISSN 1360-2241 online/06/081481-14 ? 2006 ThirdWorldQuarterly

DOI: 10.1080/01436590601027321

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1481

REBECCA BARLOW & SHAHRAM AKBARZADEH

Muslim reformers have not shied away from questioning aspects of Islam and
local traditions, although such a response often falls short of challenging the
fundamental pillars of religion and belief. A new generation of Muslim
thinkers has shifted the conceptual parameters of the debate on Islam and
modernity by rejecting the above approaches and insisting on a genuine
Islamic framework for social organisation. Thinkers like Sayid Qutb and
Maulana Mawdudi laid the theoretical foundation for Islamism as a system
of thought that sees in Islam a blueprint for action. 'Islam is the solution' has
become the rallying call for Islamists and encapsulates the extent to which
Islam is viewed as a comprehensive system of thought, values and guidelines
to govern a contemporary state.
In relation to women's rights Muslim actors exhibit a similar diversity of
opinion as above. Islamic feminists tend to draw from the intellectual
foundation of Islamism and relate to a particular view of Islam as the source
of knowledge on contemporary issues, including women's issues. Needless to
say not all Muslim women identify with this perspective. A cultural and
religious background in Islam does not make Muslim women chained to an
'Islamic perspective'. Rather, Muslim women engaged in advocacy of
women's rights and freedoms constitute a loose, and ideologically elastic,
movement of Muslim feminism. Muslim feminism is not necessarily bound
by Islam, or by what Islamists proclaim to be Islam. This tension has proved
persistent in the Muslim Middle East and provides the background to the
central theme in the present paper.
Some Muslim advocates of women's rights have adopted a confrontational
position to Islamism and lobbied for the applicability of universal standards
and rights for Muslim and non-Muslim women. In this perspective, which
could be dubbed 'secular Muslim feminism', the existing social practices in
the Muslim world and the nominal defence of women in Islam serve as a
hindrance to the realisation of women's rights. Consequently, any meaningful move towards the implementation of these rights will require a major
social and intellectual overhaul, which, by necessity, will involve going
beyond the restrictive framework of Islam. This does not mean a rejection of
all Muslim traditions, but it does mean a definitive step away from the set of
duties and obligations enshrined in Islamic teachings.
The debate between Islamic and Muslim feminisms is not new. The
Muslim Middle East has witnessed the ebb and flow of these competing
movements for the past four decades. Nowhere are the dynamics of these
two paradigms more evident than in the writings of Fatima Mernissi. Over
the extended course of her community and intellectual work on women in
Muslim societies, Mernissi has come to personalise the evolution of
feminism from a movement premised on the rejection of the status quo to
one of accommodation and reform. This paper focuses on Mernissi's
writings on women's rights and traces her evolution from a secular
advocate of conceptual revolution to a champion of reform in Islam and its
traditions. Mernissi's vision is still within the broad spectrum of Muslim
feminism, but it appears to have been significantly shifted towards a more
extreme end.
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WOMEN'S RIGHTS IN THE MUSLIM WORLD

Background
Fatima Mernissi was born in Morocco and, through her extensive work on the
plight of Muslim women, has gained an international reputation as an
authority on feminism in the Muslim world. Yet Mernissi's position has
evolved over the years, exhibiting a qualitative shift from Muslim feminism to
Islamic feminism. In Beyond the Veil, first published in 1975, Mernissi made
her intellectual presence felt when she argued that Muslim women's feminist
goals should be 'phrased in terms of a global rejection of established sexual
patterns ... this implies a revolutionary reorganization of the entire [Muslim}
society, starting from the economic structure and ending with its grammar'.
This was a revolutionary assault on the social, political and religious
establishment, as Mernissi presented the liberation of Muslim women as part
and parcel of a broader movement to stimulate stagnant Muslim societies and
to drag them from under the yoke of tradition and Islamic orthodoxy. This
challenge to the status quo did not reject the Islamic heritage of Muslim
women, but it did reject aspects of Islam which Mernissi deemed misogynous.
Less than two decades later Memissi seemed to argue a very differentcase. In
The Veil and the Male Elite (1991), Mernissi tones down her revolutionary
message. Rather than advocating a major overhaul of Muslim societies to
addressthe plight of Muslim women, she arguesfor a re-evaluationof the Islamic
heritage.The problematicposition of women in Muslim societies, she argues,is a
result of male-dominated (mis)interpretationof the holy texts of Islam, rather
than of the essence of Islam itself.2 By engaging in a search of historical
documents, Mernissi has sought to locate pre-modern Islamic traditions that
support feminist beliefs and women's rights in the currentera. This representsa
shift from Mernissi'searlierworks, in which she argued that the establishmentof
women's rights in Muslim societies would necessitategoing beyond the limits of
Islamic discourse. In The Veiland the Male Elite Memissi reveals her preference
for a reformistapproach to Islam and the sociopolitical establishment.
Islam and patriarchy:case for reconstruction
In the introduction to Beyond the Veil, entitled 'Roots of the modern
situation', Mernissi refers the reader to the seventh century shari'a. She
asserts that in Islam the 'Muslim's allegiance is not to a secular power, be it
state or legislators, but to the Shari'a, which transcends both humanity and
temporality'.3 God is the only legislator: his law is unalterable and eternal,
and there can be no human legislation. Mernissi laments that:
The Shari'ahas shapedthe legal and ideologicalhistory of the Muslimfamily
structureand consequentlyof relationsbetween the sexes. One of the most
enduringcharacteristicsof this history is that the family is assumed to be
unchangeable,for it is consideredto be divine.4
Here, Mernissi presents the shari'a as uncompromising and rigid. In the same
book Mernissi criticises the constraints placed on Muslim women, who
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REBECCA BARLOW & SHAHRAM AKBARZADEH

appear to be shackled by the norms of seventh century Arabia. Mernissi thus

makes clear her preference for reconstructing Muslim societies, as opposed to
reforming them within the Islamic framework. In the following passage, she
indicates her doubt that the Islamic framework could ever accommodate a
fully desegregated society:
Controversyhas ragedthroughoutthis centurybetweenthe traditionalistswho
claim that Islam prohibitsany changein sex roles, and modernistswho claim
that Islamallowsfor the liberationof women... but both factionsagreeon one
thing: Islam should remainthe basis of society. In this book I want to argue
that there is a fundamentalcontradiction between Islam... and equality
betweenthe sexes. Sexual equalityviolates Islam'spremises,actualizedin its
laws, that heterosexuallove is dangerousto Allah'sorder.Muslimmarriageis
based on male dominance.The desegregationof the sexes violates Islam's
ideologyon women'spositionin the social order:that womenshouldbe under
the authorityof fathers,brothersor husbands.5
This passage predicates Mernissi's forthcoming attempts to establish
ideological links between Islam and patriarchy. She compares the degree of
female self-determination in pre-Islamic to that in Islamic Arabia, painting a
picture in which women had far more control over their sexuality in the
former. Mernissi believes that the position of women in pre-Islamic Arabia
was generally superior to that of their Islamic descendants. This is a striking
departure from the conventional view on this matter. Most other writers on
Islam contend that Quranic reforms freed women from pre-Islamic tribal ties
and practices, in which 'women were treated as chattel, as property with no
rights in a totally male-dominated society'.6 How does Mernissi make her
departure from this dominant belief?
The era before the introduction of Islam is known as jahiliya-a time of
barbarism and ignorance. Mernissi constructs the 'barbarism' referred to in
dominant (male) versions of Muslim - Arab history as a dysphemism for
sexual self-expression. A fundamental discrepancy of the Islamic transition to
'civilisation' was that it was characterised by the suppression of female, but
not male, sexuality. Mernissi suggests a close causal link between the monotheistic nature of Islam and the suppression of the woman. According to this
hypothesis, to end the pre-Islamic Arabian belief in polytheism, Islam found it
not only necessary to purge all divinities that might threaten Allah's monopoly, but also to end the autonomy of women. Within the conjugal unit the
woman has the potential to interfere in Allah's direct relationship with man,
threatening his divine monopoly. In order to abate this threat, revelations
have been utilised to establish and entrench men's control over women.
The Quranic injunction on polygamy allows the man to marry up to four
wives so long as he believes he can do "justice'to each one of them. The
Quranic injunction on repudiation allows the man to divorce his wife simply
by stating 'I divorce thee' three times; this decision does not have to be
reviewed by a court or judge. Finally, the Quranic injunction to recognize the
idda period obliges a widowed or divorced woman to wait several menstrual
cycles before remarrying. In the event that the widowed or divorced woman
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WOMEN'S RIGHTS IN THE MUSLIM WORLD

may be pregnant, the idda serves to guarantee biological paternity. It

manifests the emphasis placed on paternity in Muslim societies. Taken
together, these Quranic injunctions represent the nature of the new familial
and social structure that Islam introduced into Arabian society. According to
Mernissi, they constitute a 'revolution in the mores of pre-Islamic society':
Polygamy,repudiation... and the guaranteesof paternitywere all designedto
foster the transition from a family based on some degree of female selfdeterminationto a family based on male control. The Prophet saw the establishmentof the male-dominatedMuslimfamilyas crucialto the establishment
of Islam.7
Mernissi compares the male-dominated Muslim family to pre-Islamic forms
of marriage. According to her 'readings of the historical evidence', before
Islam matriliny was emphasised; polyandrous marriages were common; and
uxorilocal marriages, wherein the married couple stayed with the woman's
tribe, were quite acceptable.8 Discussing 'Women's resistance to Islam',
Mernissi makes her most earnest attempt at proving the superiority of the
position of women before the advent of Islam. She recounts the movements
of apostasy that swept the Arabian Peninsula after the Prophet's death in
632 AD. One of these movements was led by a group of women. According to
historical sources, the harlots of Hadramaut 'dyed their hands with henna
and played the tambourine' upon news of the death of Muhammad.9
Mernissi believes that these celebrations show 'that some women opposed
Islam because it jeopardized their position. Whatever that position was, it
was evidently more advantageous than the one Islam granted them'.10
This is an unambiguous position. For Mernissi, Islamic tradition rests on
patriarchy, institutionalised and reproduced over the centuries. Modern
states that have emerged in the Middle East are firmly rooted in a patriarchal
system. The failure of these states to uphold women's rights in accordance
with international standards is generally presented in terms of the rejection of
Western cultural hegemony on the one hand, and of the urgency of cultural
and ideological self-reliance and protection of cultural authenticity on the
other. Mernissi does not challenge this dichotomy. She treats the concept of
women's rights enshrined in international conventions as Western in origin.
As a result, she concludes that adhering to and promoting women's human
rights would entail a dramatic reconstruction of Muslim societies. In arguing
her case for the adoption of Western-originated norms on human rights and
discarding the rigid Islamic practices that have served to entrench patriarchy
in Muslim societies, Mernissi is acting as an agent for modernity. In Beyond
the Veil Mernissi's position is categorical: 'Muslim societies cannot afford to
be reformist... A superficial replastering of the system is not a possible
solution for them'.1 The implication is that Muslim societies should
unequivocally accept and integrate 'the elements of Western democracy
generally grouped under the label "human rights"', and comply with the
international treaties that have been constructed on those foundations.12 This
would involve discarding certain tenets of shari'a law. Consequently,
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REBECCA BARLOW & SHAHRAM AKBARZADEH

Mernissi's approach questions one of the most fundamental premises of

Islam: that God is the only lawmaker.
In the early post-Wolrd War II independence period Muslim feminists
couched their cause in what appeared to be Western terms.'3 They were
influenced by the Middle East's new secular elite, who led their countries in
the pursuit of modernisation models that were Western-informed.14
Traditional Islamic institutions were construed as obstacles to progress,
although modernist ruling elites (barring Ata Turkists) felt hostage to them.
The Moroccan experience followed this general pattern as the monarchy tried
to walk a fine line between modernisation and respect for Islamic traditions.
This was a sensitive issue, as the monarchy drew legitimacy from its lineage
to the prophet, but followed International Monetary Fund (IMF) recommendations on social investment and spending.
By the late 1970s and early 1980s it became clear that the modernisation
programme was resulting in devastating economic stagnation, coupled with
political oppression. In Morocco the economic crisis brought on by foreign
debt precipitated street riots. Tensions were exacerbated by widespread
dissatisfaction with the government's incompetence in providing comprehensive health and education services. Modernisation appeared to be faltering;
the ruling regime was clearly suffering from a legitimacy deficit. The Islamist
response to the failure of the modernisation paradigm in Morroco, as
elsewhere in the Middle East, was to reject the secular model and call for a
return to Islam. 'Islam is the solution' became the catch cry in response to all
social ills. By the same token, Western secularism was identified with the entire
range of problems that were being experienced in Muslim societies.
In this context there was a discernible shift in the approach of Muslim
feminists. The search for an authentic Muslim identity brought Islam to the
forefront of every issue. This was especially acute with regard to the role and
status of women: as the primary bearers of culture and the maintainers of
tradition, women in Muslim societies were charged with the task of being the
last bastions against foreign domination.15 Under the influence of Islamic
revivalism Muslim women across the Middle East began, once again, to don
Islamic dress as a symbol of their commitment to their faith. Muslim
feminists were compelled, or chose, to recognise the centrality of Islam to
Muslim identity, as well as its power as a source of legitimacy and popular
mobilisation. It appeared necessary for Fatima Mernissi to redefine her
feminist project in a manner that Muslim women perceived as a more
authentic accommodation of modernity to their religion and culture.
Muslim women's rights in Islam: case for reform
The impact of Islamic revivalism on Mernissi's feminism is manifest in
The Veil and the Male Elite. In the preface to that book Mernissi is confident
in her assertion that 'Muslim women can walk into the modern world with
pride, knowing that the quest for ... human rights ... stems from no imported
Western values, but is a true part of the Muslim tradition'.16 This presents a
departure from her conclusions in 1975. Then, Mernissi identified the concept
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WOMEN'S RIGHTS IN THE MUSLIM WORLD

of human rights as emanating from a western European tradition, and

advocated a fundamental restructuring of Muslim societies to facilitate their
adoption and integration.
The obvious intellectual gap between Mernissi's two conclusions is the
result of a striking methodological overhaul. In 1975 the focus of Mernissi's
work was on the actual impact of specific Quranic injunctions on Muslim
women. In 1991 her focus shifts further back in history. Here, she
contextualises verses of the Quran in the specific historico-political conditions
in which they were revealed. This approach, dubbed the 'contextualisation' of
Islamic teachings, allows Mernissi to decouple the Quran from patriarchal
practices. In this sense, opposing male domination does not equate with
opposing Islam. Instead, it injects intellectual energy into efforts to reform
Islam and purge its conservative aspects, which are commonly taken at
face value.
This is most evident in Mernissi's investigation of the revelation of the
Islamic hijab (veil). The Prophet's marriage to his cousin Zaynab is widely
recognised as the occasion for God's legislation on the hijab. The verse of the
hijab was revealed after a number of the wedding guests had overstayed their
welcome at the new couple's nuptial chamber. Quranic verse 53 of sura 33
reads:

O believers,do not enter the Prophet'shouses except that permissionis given

you for a meal... when you are invited enter, and when you have eaten,
disperse, without seeking familiarityfor talk... And if you ask them [the
women]for a thing, then ask them from behinda hijab.That is purerfor your
heartsand their hearts.17
According to Mernissi, the hijab can thus be interpreted as Allah's answer to
'a community that had become too invasive. . a community with boorish
manners whose lack of delicacy offended the Prophet whose politeness
bordered on timidity'.18
Whatever the earliest purposes of the hijab, Mernissi must grapple with the
fact that sura 33 has legitimated, for centuries, the strict relegation of Muslim
women to the private realm, and the refusal of their freedoms as such.
According to Mernissi, the extension of the hijab to connote women's
seclusion and physical covering-up must be understood in reference to the
sociopolitical circumstances in which the verse of the hijab was revealed. The
verse of the hijab descended in year five of the hijra. This was the year that
the hypocrites seized Medina, 'instigating disorder and stirring up
intercommunal fears'.19 The Quranic injunction that women stay in the
home and cover themselves when in public (verses 59 - 60 of sura 33) can thus
be seen as a protective measure designed for a specific time and place.
According to Margot Badran, the original purpose of the hijab was to enable
20
women to participate in public space free from fear and harassment. In fact,
her case study of gender politics in post-liberation Kuwait indicates that the
hijab can still function in this way, and for this reason many modern Islamic
women choose to wear it.21 Mernissi holds that it is only through male
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REBECCA BARLOW & SHAHRAM AKBARZADEH

domination and manipulation of the Quran that the verse(s) of the hijab led
to the denial of women's movement in public, and the concomitant denial of
their rights and freedoms.
Barbara Stowasser's historical account of how the verse of the hijab has
come to legitimate the denial of women's freedoms supports Mernissi's
contention. Stowasser evokes the expansion of Islam into the areas formally
a part of the Byzantine and Persian empires. During this expansion the hijab
became a method of Muslim affiliation and recognition, and it was assumed
into the 'Islamic way of life'.22 According to Stowasser, this assumption
shaped the normative interpretations of Quranic gender laws as formulated
by medieval lawyer-theologians. According to Stowasser:
A chronologicalfactor appearsto have prevailed[in the medievalthinking]...
in that with the progressionof timeulamaopinionwithina particularmadhhab
could prescribethe female face as part of the obligatoryhijab in increasingly
absoluteand categoricalterms.23
The popular Quranic exegete Baydawi (d 1286) instructed that women should
conceal their entire bodies, including their face and hands, except during
prayer and in cases of 'necessity', such as a medical emergency.24This restrictive position was heightened and emphasised by a number of subsequent
Muslim scholars. Kafaji (d 1659) asserted that uncovering the woman's hands
and/or face in cases of 'necessity' was only 'marginally acceptable'.25
There appears to be some validity behind Mernissi's claim that the
problematic position of women in Muslim societies is a result of male
manipulation of the sacred texts. However, in the final pages of The Veil and
the Male Elite, Mernissi does not offer the same lucid conclusions regarding
how to establish women's rights in Muslim societies as she does in Beyond the
Veil. The entirety of The Veil and the Male Elite is devoted to locating and
describing pre-modern Islamic traditions that support women's human
rights. Mernissi does not offer a great amount in the way of what tangible,
practical possibilities these pre-modern traditions might have for modern
times. In her short conclusion, Mernissi recommends that:
The answer[to the problematicpositionof womenin Muslimsocieties]is to be
found in the time-mirrorwhereinthe Muslim looks at himself to foresee his
future.The imageof 'his'womanwill changewhenhe feels the pressingneed to
root his futurein a liberatingmemory.Perhapsthe womanshouldhelp him do
this throughdaily pressurefor equality,therebybringinghim into a fabulous
present.26
This approach is clearly one of Islamic reformism. Mernissi proposes that
Muslim societies should root their futures in 'a liberating memory' of Islam,
however much this 'memory' might deviate from the established sources
belonging to the male elite. Here, the establishment of women's rights in
Muslim societies does not necessitate a rejection of Islam. Rather, it
necessitates a thorough (re)investigation into the historical texts of Islam, in
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WOMEN'S RIGHTS IN THE MUSLIM WORLD

order to distinguish more appropriately between Allah's specific ordinances

and the transcendental spiritual message of Islam. Islamic reformists deem
the latter to be 'capable of infinite expansion to meet the socio-political needs
of every age'.27
Mernissi's intellectual evolution embodies two key approaches in Muslim
politics. The need for a radical reconstruction of Muslim societies to
challenge the patriarchal establishment entails a critical re-examination of
Islam and its relevance to contemporary experiences. This approach carries
the revolutionary message of social, cultural and economic overhaul, and
draws clear boundaries between Islam and public life. In the early 1970s
Mernissi was firmly located in this reconstructionist paradigm, and her
writings on feminism and patriarchy in the Muslim world reflected that
approach. But Mernissi's recent publications present a critique of her earlier
works. The fundamental sociopolitical overhaul entailed in the reconstructionist paradigm has now been replaced with a more modest agenda: that is,
reforming the existing patriarchal system. While once Mernissi rejected the
patriarchal status quo and its foundations in Islamic sources, she now rejects
the historical, misogynous practices that have evolved in spite of Islam. This
preference for social, political and religious reform to restore women's rights
and revitalise pride in the sense of Muslim self mirrors the intellectual shift in
the Muslim Middle East in the second half of the 20th century.
What is at stake?
Issues that sparked the fundamental shift in Mernissi's approach to Muslim
women"s human rights are the very issues that keep the debate on reform or
reconstruction alive today. The search for an authentic Muslim identity,
al asala, has been gaining momentum since the final decades of the 20th
century. The failure of the secular model of development to provide social
and spiritual protection to the population has led to widespread resentment
and disillusionment. The combination of incompetence, corruption and
structural global economic barriers to development have discredited ruling
regimes in the eyes of their subjects, and eroded their claim to legitimacy.
This has reflected badly on the West and its value system. As far as the
Muslim masses are concerned, their ruling regimes have bowed to pressure
from the West. As a result, the backlash against despotism, incompetence
and corruption has invariably displayed anti-Western undertones. The
rejection of ruling regimes in the Muslim Middle East has been coupled with
a rejection of the political and social ideas that emanate from the West.
In the search for authenticity women carry much of the ideological weight
involved in purifying tradition and culture. Most Muslim activists have
regarded the social and private activities of women and the etiquettes that
they perceive to be women's behaviour to be a front-line issue in challenging
Western domination. Nowhere is this issue more prominent than in the
Islamic Republic of Iran, where the regime enforced a strict dress code for
women, ostensibly to defend Islamic values. The regime accused Western
powers (the colonial masters of yesteryear) of trying to undermine Muslim
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REBECCA BARLOW & SHAHRAM AKBARZADEH

societies by corrupting their women. This excerpt from a women's journal in

Iran is revealing:
Colonialismwas fully aware of the sensitiveand vital role of woman in the
formationof the individualand of humansociety.Theyconsideredher the best
tool for subjugation of the nations... women serve as the unconscious
accomplicesof the powers-to-bein the destructionof indigenousculture...
womanis the best meansof destroyingthe indigenouscultureto the benefitof
imperialists.

Protecting Muslim women from Western influences, therefore, is an essential

tenet for Islamists. The urgency in distancing Muslim women from Western
values presents profound questions regarding the extent to which Muslim
women can and should draw on Western feminism and its guiding principles.
If women are a contested territory between Islamist puritans and Western
neo-imperialists, how may it be possible to extend universal women's rights
to Muslim women? How does Mernissi respond to this apparent contradiction?
Beyond the Veil presents an unequivocal endorsement of the international
human rights framework as the mechanism for the establishment of Muslim
women's rights. Mernissi does not find it hypocritical to subscribe to
concepts that have their origins in Western thought. Concepts of popular
sovereignty and individual rights were explored in the writings of John
Locke, Jean Jacques Rousseau and Immanuel Kant in the 17th and 18th
centuries. In the 20th century these concepts were expanded beyond the
constraints of the Western nation-state and made applicable to regional and
international frameworks. The United Nations' conventions on human rights
are informed by these principles. It is this framework that has formed the
basis of Mernissi's approach to Muslim women's rights in Beyond the Veil.
This categorical endorsement leaves Mernissi open to accusations of
betraying Islam and the charge that she follows the politically indefensible
position of the 'West is best for women' thesis.29 Alison Jaggar has argued
that the wholesale adoption of Western concepts for women in the Muslim
world could have negative repercussions, as it could seriously undermine the
social and ethical value systems of communities which rely on these for their
cohesion and regeneration. Instead, she argues that non-Western societies
need the space and freedom to 'look after their own affairs according to their
own values and priorities'.30
This culturally conscious position appears to have been at the heart of
Mernissi's move away from her earlier reconstructionist approach to women
and Islam. In her new feminism, encapsulated in The Veil and the Male Elite,
Mernissi is as much concerned with women's rights as she is with preserving
the Islamic frame of reference. This is an exercise in working within the
traditional Muslim context and expanding the boundaries from within an
'act of the possible'. In this paradigm Mernissi is sensitive to the escalating
movement for cultural authenticity. She places her feminism not in
opposition to it, but in reaffirmation of the push for the essence of Islam.
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WOMEN'S RIGHTS IN THE MUSLIM WORLD

The reformist approach has resonated with Muslim intellectuals. Shaheen

Sardar Ali, for example, has argued that, in attempting to provide a human
rights framework for Muslim women, Muslim feminists should not simply
adopt the dominant discourse on human rights. Rather, Muslims must find a
'homeomorphic equivalent' of human rights in their own cultural and
religious traditions.31For Ali this is necessary because, in Islam, sovereignty
rests with God alone, and secular laws are an unacceptable premise upon
which to establish any tenets of a Muslim society. In this paradigm 'any
human rights regime must therefore conform to those rights and duties,
privileges and obligations enjoined upon believers in the Quranic verses'.32It
is important to note that Ali does not advocate a categorical rejection of the
Western human rights tradition. Rather, the Western tradition is seen as a
useful starting point for the location of human rights within Islam:
It may be arguedthat, althoughthe concept of humanrightsas enunciatedin
post-1945 human rights documents emanating mainly from the United
Nations... may appear to reflect a purely 'Western'human rights discourse
in its formulationsnon-Westerntraditionssuch as the Islamictraditionclearly
have equivalents.33
This may be a tall order, but Mernissi has clearly taken it upon herself to
locate human rights equivalents within the Islamic tradition. The Veil and the
Male Elite is an important contribution to the debate on Muslim women's
rights. Identifying human rights equivalents within the Islamic framework
has major ramifications for the universality of those rights. The reformist
attempt to locate UN-proclaimed principles in an Islamic context has the
profound potential to render irrelevant the conventional dichotomy of
Islamic values versus Western values. However, the question remains as to
whether or not these human rights equivalents can actually be exercised
within the larger Islamic framework. Here lies the fundamental problem with
The Veil and the Male Elite. Mernissi's feminine ideal has never formed the
basis of a functional reality. In spite of 'homeomorphic equivalents' that may
be found between the Western human rights tradition and Islamic teachings,
there remain a number of Quranic verses that create unambiguous gender
hierarchies and legitimate discrimination against women. How could a
framework that allows for even the slightest possibility of denying women
their rights be used as the basis for the establishment of those rights?
A model of Muslim women's human rights that does not move beyond the
Islamic framework is hostage to the discriminatory aspects of the Islamic
legal framework. In The Veil and the Male Elite Mernissi attempts to explain
away the highly restrictive verses of the Quran by attributing them to sociomilitary conditions specific to the time in which they were revealed. She is
effectively asking her Muslim readers to ignore these verses and the
misogynistic traditions that they have created, on the premise that they do
not pertain to the greater spiritual message of Islam. But this reformist
reading of the Quran is highly problematic. It invites Muslims to ignore
unpalatable versus even though all Quranic verses are God's own words and,
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REBECCA BARLOW & SHAHRAM AKBARZADEH

by definition, cannot be doubted.34 Mernissi's choice to revert back to the

Islamic framework imposes significant restrictions on the implementation of
her vision. An approach to establishing women's human rights that remains
within the Islamic framework could have adverse effects. By attempting to
validate the past in Islamic terms, Mernissi's reformist approach could result
in the reinforcement of those traditional patterns of authority that are
undeniably patriarchal, anti-democratic and unrepresentative.
Mernissi herself identified these traditional patterns in Beyond the Veil,
when she established causal links between the formation of Islam and the
Quranic injunctions on polygamy, repudiation and the idda. However, she is
silent on these issues in The Veil and the Male Elite, avoiding the question of
how an Islamic framework for women's human rights might deal with them.
In 1991 Mernissi presented a feminist ideal of how specific verses of the
Quran might be (re)interpreted to support women's liberation. Afshari has
argued that, by inserting a feminist consciousness into a revealed religion,
Mernissi further mystifies the past, rather than clarifying it.35 In 1975
Mernissi was far less concerned with textual interpretation and reinterpretation. In Beyond the Veil she was not interested in Islam's 'true' spiritual
message. She did not consider it pivotal to explore the male elite's
manipulation of the sacred texts, because the text itself was seen as
problematic, as were the practices that sprang from it. In Beyond the Veil
Mernissi dealt with the historical reality that, since Muhammad's own time,
Islam has served as a legitimiser for the subjugation of women. Her
preference for reconstruction underlies an awareness of the need to move
beyond assessing and reassessing Islam's holy texts into addressing the
practical realities of the modern Muslim woman's life.
Towards the end of Beyond the Veil Mernissi rejects the arguments of
traditionalist Muslims who argue that changes in the roles of women in
Muslim societies constitute a direct attack against Allah's order. Instead, she
links women's liberation to the broader socioeconomic issues that face
the Muslim world. Women's rights may be obtained in fundamental moves in
the way society is organised.
Changesin the twentiethcentury... have shownthat the liberationof womenis
predominantlyan economicissue. Liberationis a costly affairfor any societK,
and women'sliberationis primarilya questionof the allocationof resources.
The debate on the role of women within Islam is both closely linked to the
debate on Islam and the state, and bound-up in the Arab -Islamic search for
an authentic identity, political independence and economic self-reliance.37In
Beyond the Veil Mernissi attempts to break out of the limitations imposed by
these paradigms. In her call to Muslim states to accept the UN framework on
women's human rights, Mernissi separates the 'woman question' from the
stifling identity politics of the Muslim state. But in her later work, by
returning to the Islamic framework, Mernissi finds herself grappling with
differing interpretations of Islam, each with credible claims to authenticity.
Muslim reformist feminism, advocated in The Veil and the Male Elite, is
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WOMEN'S RIGHTS IN THE MUSLIM WORLD

constrained within an Islamic framework that had traditionally been

misogynist and is now being mobilised by cultural puritans in a grand clash
of values.
Conclusion
Mernissi's brand of Islamic feminism has an important place in the current
struggle for a more democratic and egalitarian Middle East. Her efforts to
subject the sacred texts of Islam to a feminist re-reading, to locate and
emphasise Islam's egalitarian precepts, are important to reformism. Islam
remains central to the Arab's and Muslim's way of life. Mernissi's reformist
approach to Muslim women's rights is, therefore, charged with relevance.
A reformist approach has the ability to make Muslim women (and men)
more aware of their potential to play different but synergistic roles.
However, under the rubric of reformism those roles can only extend within
the confines of Islam. Those confines suggest that the Muslim woman could
never enjoy complete legal equality (as the term has come to be understood in
modern day usage) with her male counterpart. Mernissi's attempts to dismiss
the patriarchal character of a number of Quranic verses by attributing them
to the sociopolitical context in which they were revealed fail to deal with the
practical realities of the Muslim woman's past and present. Mernissi's earlier
reconstructionist approach comes close to attending to this necessary and
urgent task. The critical analysis that she applied to Islam in 1975 reflected a
disillusioned detachment from the past, allowing her to identify ideological
links between Islam and patriarchy. She was thereby free to approach the
establishment of Muslim women's human rights outside the Islamic
framework.
Mernissi's early reconstructionist approach, however, faced the test of
relevance. If Muslim feminist theory is separated from its subjects and not
able to inspire and motivate Muslim women, then that theory is diminished
in relevance and effectiveness. This may have been a strong argument for
stepping back from outright rejection of Islam as inherently misogynistic and
patriarchal. The reformist approach may have overcome the hurdle of
relevance. By drawing on familiar Islamic teachings and imposing a reformist
interpretation on Islam, Mernissi appears to have significantly multiplied her
audience. Muslim reformist feminism has a far readier claim to authenticity,
which makes it much more appealing in Muslim societies than the secular
and revolutionary alternatives. The rise of the reformist approach has been
congruent with the growth of broad social disillusionment with the Western
model of development and a popular desire to return to Islam as the epitome
of pure national/cultural and religious authenticity. Mernissi's evolution
from a reconstructionist to a reformist Muslim feminist was a manifestation
of the above ideological transformation. By the same token, however, the
reformist approach is by definition locked in a perpetual battle to reinterpret
and expand the boundaries of acceptability. It is far from certain that this
approach has any better chances of improving the lot of Muslim women than
the more ambitious reconstructionist alternative.
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REBECCA BARLOW & SHAHRAM AKBARZADEH

Notes
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35
36
37

Fatima Mernissi, Beyond the Veil, Cambridge, MA: Schenkman, 2003, p 176.
Fatima Mernissi, The Veil and the Male Elite, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1991.
Mernissi, Beyond the Veil, p 21.
Ibid, p 18.
Ibid, pp 18-19.
John L Esposito, 'Introduction: women in Islam and Muslim societies', in Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad &
John L Esposito (eds), Islam, Genderand Social Change, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, p xii.
Mernissi, Beyond the Veil, p 64.
Ibid, p 66.
Recorded in Ibn Habib al-Baghdadi's Kitab al Muhabbar, trans AFL Beeston, 'The so-called Harlots
of Hadramaut', Oriens, V, 1952, p 16, cited in Mernissi, Beyond the Veil, p 71.
Mernissi, Beyond the Veil, p 73.
Ibid, p 175 (emphasis in original).
Ibid, p 84.
Anne Sofie Roald, 'Feminist reinterpretation of Islamic sources: Muslim feminist theology in the light
of the Christian tradition of feminist thought', in Karin Ask & Marit Tjomsland (eds), Women and
Islamisation: Contemporary Dimensions of Discourse on Gender Relations, Oxford: Oxford International, 1998, p 17.
Esposito, 'Introduction', pp ix-x.
Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad, 'Islam and Gender: Dilemmas in the Changing Arab World', in Yvonne
Yazbeck Haddad and John L Esposito (eds), Islam, Gender and Social Change, Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1998, p 21.
Mernissi, The Veil and the Male Elite, p viii.
Cited in Barbara Freyer Stowasser, Women in the Qur'an, Traditions, and Interpretation, Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1994, p 90.
Mernissi, The Veil and the Male Elite, p 80.
Stowasser, Women in the Qur'an, p 91.
Margot Badran, 'Gender, Islam, and the state: Kuwaiti women in struggle, pre-invasion to
postliberation', in Haddad & Esposito, Islam, Gender and Social Change, pp 202-203.
Badran, 'Gender, Islam, and the state', pp 202-203.
Stowasser, Women in the Qur'an, p 92.
Ibid, p 93.
Baydawi, Anwar, Vol 2, p 20, in exegesis of the Qur'an 24:31, cited in Stowasser, Womenin the Qur'an,
p 94.
Ahmad ibn Muhammad al-Khafaji, Hashiyat al-Shihab al-musamma bi-Inayat al-qadi wa-kifayat alradi'ala tafsir al-Baydawi, Vol 6, Beruit: Dar Sadir, 1974, pp 371-373, cited in Stowasser, Women in
the Qur'an, p 94.
Mernissi, The Veil and the Male Elite, p 195.
Reza Afshari, 'Egalitarian Islam and misogynistic Islamic tradition: a critique of the feminist
reinterpretation of Islamic history and heritage', Institute for the Secularisation of Islamic Society, at
www.secularislam.org/women/afshari.htm, accessed 3 October 2005.
Mina Yadigar Azadi, 'Qizavat-i-zan [Part 2]', Zanan, 1 (5), 1992, pp 17-25, cited in Afsaneh
Najmabadi, 'Feminism in an Islamic Republic: "years of hardship, years of growth"', in Haddad &
Esposito, Islam, Gender and Social Change, p 60.
Alison Jaggar, "'Saving Amina": global justice for women and intercultural dialogue', in Andreas
Follesdal & Thomas Pogge (eds), Real World Justice: Grounds, Principles, Human Rights and Social
Institutions, Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Springer, p 55.
Ibid, p 61, emphasis added.
Shaheen Sardar Ali, Gender and Human Rights in Islam and International Law: Equal Before Allah,
Unequal Before Man?, The Hague: Kluwer, 2000, p 1.
Ibid, p 19.
Ibid,p41.
Marlene Kanawati, 'Review of Fatima Mernissi, The Veil and the Male Elite', InternationalJournal of
Middle East Studies, 25 (3), 1993, p 502.
Afshari, 'Egalitarian Islam and misogynistic Islamic tradition'.
Mernissi, Beyond the Veil, p 164.
Nadia Hijab, 'Islam, social change, and the reality of Arab women's lives', in Haddad & Esposito,
Islam, Gender and Social Change, p 48.

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