Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
control of the floor. The ability to get the attention of employees and certaint
y of the leader's authority are benefits of this quality. However, a domineering
leader can also scare or oppress workers to the point they leave.
Decisive
Autocratic leaders are typically decisive. When faced with a dilemma or a comple
x situation, a leader with this style tends to be able to think quickly and act
swiftly. This is especially advantageous when time is of the essence or in a cri
sis. Employees rely on the autocratic leader to direct activities in a pinch. Ho
wever, efficient decision-making without the involvement of others in more stabl
e times can lead to negative feelings from employees.
Independent
Along with being decisive, autocratic leaders often prefer to operate or make de
cisions independently. They rarely listen to the input or ideas of other employe
es. This can severely inhibit the quality and quantities of ideas the leader has
to work with. Inability to share input also demotivates workers. In some compan
ies where routine tasks must be performed efficiently, the ability of leaders to
make fast, autonomous decisions is vital to consistency and uniformity in produ
ction.
Critical
Some autocratic leaders are also micromanagers, meaning they hover closely as em
ployees work. Others dictate and then give employees more freedom to work within
stated boundaries. Regardless, autocratic leaders are usually critical and dema
nding of employees. If employees make errors, produce insufficient work or don't
meet deadlines, they often face formal and informal consequences from the autoc
ratic leader. Regular criticism without a balance of positive reinforcement for
good work can cause employee frustration and stress.
What is it?
In an autocratic leadership style, the person in charge has total authority and
control over decision making. By virtue of their position and job responsibiliti
es, they not only control the efforts of the team, but monitor them for completi
on often under close scrutiny
This style is reminiscent of the earliest tribes and empires. Obviously, our his
torical movement toward democracy brings a negative connotation to autocracy, bu
t in some situations, it is the most appropriate type of leadership. That, of co
urse, doesn t mean a blank check to ignore the wellbeing of his subordinate.
When is it used?
The autocratic leadership style is best used in situations where control is nece
ssary, often where there is little margin for error. When conditions are dangero
us, rigid rules can keep people out of harm s way. Many times, the subordinate sta
ff is inexperienced or unfamiliar with the type of work and heavy oversight is n
ecessary.
Rigid organizations often use this style. It has been known to be very paternali
stic, and in highly-professional, independent minded teams, it can lead to resen
tment and strained morale.
Good fits for Autocratic Leadership:
Military
Manufacturing
Construction
Fhrerprinzip
How good was Hitler as a military commander? Was he, as his former subordinates
claimed after World War Two ended, a meddlesome amateur who kept them from condu
cting the war properly? What were his strengths and weaknesses, his goals and me
thods? The answers to these questions reveal a man who was indeed responsible fo
r Germany's downfall, though not entirely in the way that his generals claimed.
Hitler was ... determined to command personally.
Hitler was, first and foremost, determined to command personally. According to h
is so-called Leader Principle (Fhrerprinzip), ultimate authority rested with him
and extended downward. At each level, the superior was to give the orders, the s
ubordinates to follow them to the letter. In practice the command relationships
were more subtle and complex, especially at the lower levels, but Hitler did hav
e the final say on any subject in which he took a direct interest, including the
details of military operations, that is, the actual direction of armies in the
field.
Moreover, as time went on he took over positions that gave him ever more direct
control. From leader (Fhrer) of the German state in 1934, he went on to become co
mmander-in-chief of the armed forces in 1938, then commander-in-chief of the arm
y in 1941. Hitler wanted to be the Feldherr, the generalissimo, exercising direc
t control of the armies himself, in much the same sense that Wellington commande
d at Waterloo, albeit at a distance.
Top
Headquarters
Hitler, Field Marshal General Wilhelm Keitel and General of the Artillery Alfred
Jodl, discussing the war over maps in the Fhrer's headquarters, 1941 Adolf Hitle
r with Field Marshal General Wilhelm Keitel and General of the Artillery Alfred
Jodl, in the Fhrer's headquarters, 1941 Throughout World War Two Hitler worked f
rom one of several field headquarters, in contrast to other heads of state, who
remained in their capital cities. A small personal staff attended to him, and th
e army high command also kept its headquarters, with a much more substantial sta
ff, nearby. He held briefings with his senior military advisors, often in the co
mpany of Party officials and other hangers-on, each afternoon and late each nigh
t. His staff would present him with information on the status and actions of all
units down to division strength or lower, as well as on special subjects such a
s arms production or the technical specifications of new weapons.
... Hitler had an incredible memory for detail and would become annoyed at a
ny discrepancies.
Every point had to be correct and consistent with previous briefings, for Hitler
had an incredible memory for detail and would become annoyed at any discrepanci
es. He supplemented that information by consulting with his field commanders, on
very rare occasions at the front, more often by telephone or by summoning them
back to his headquarters. As the briefing went on he would state his instruction
s verbally for his staff to take down and then issue as written orders.
There were several broad sets of problems with Hitler's style of command. These
revolved around his personality, the depth of his knowledge, and his military ex
perience, and they exacerbated corresponding problems in the German command syst
em. After the war, the picture emerged of Hitler as a megalomaniac who refused t
o listen to his military experts and who, as a consequence, lost the war for Ger
many. That picture emerged due largely to the efforts of his former generals, wh
o had their own reputations to protect. The truth was more complicated, even if
Hitler's failings remained at the heart of it.
Top
Hitler's distrust of his generals
Hitler with his generals Keitel and Reichenau in 1939 Hitler with his generals K
eitel and Reichenau in 1939 Hitler did indeed distrust most of his generals - i
n part for good reason. He had to overcome a certain amount of timidity among hi
s senior officers before the war - during the reoccupation of the Rhineland, for
example - and his perception of them as over cautious set the tone for his rela
tions with them.
Certainly his operational decisions, especially early in the war, were sometimes
as good as, or better than, those of his generals. He was, after all, one of th
e two men who first thought up the campaign plan that the Wehrmacht (the German
army) used against France with such stunning success in 1940, and he had to push
hard before the General Staff would accept it. As time went on he came to belie
ve that Germany's victories were his alone and that most of his generals were na
rrow-minded, overly cautious and incapable.
... the generals expressed admiration for Hitler's political skills and goal
s.
For their part, the generals expressed admiration for Hitler's political skills
and goals. His defence minister from 1933 to 1938, General Werner von Blomberg,
said that Hitler's rise to power represented 'a broad national desire, and the r
ealisation of that towards which many of the best have been striving for years'.
Their attitude toward his military leadership, on the other hand, ran hot and c
old.
They often recognised his talents - far more than they later wanted to admit. At
other times they tried to resist him - though less often, less effectively, and
sometimes less justifiably than they later claimed. In any case, he grew ever m
ore distrustful and contemptuous of them as a group, despite the unflagging loya
lty that most of them displayed right to the end. As early as 1938 he was heard
to say that every general was either cowardly or stupid, and his opinion only wo
rsened with time.
Top
Reliance on instinct
Whatever the problems with his generals, however, there is no doubt that Hitler
lacked many of the qualities he needed to control military affairs with consiste
nt success. There have been examples - Churchill was one - of political leaders
who successfully interceded in the details of military strategy and operations,
but Hitler had neither the experience nor the personality for such a role. He sh
unned serious, comprehensive intellectual effort and was largely ignorant of mil
itary affairs and foreign cultures. He tended to reject any information that did
not fit with his (often wildly inaccurate) preconceptions. Instead he relied on
his 'instinct' and a belief that the will to win would overcome every obstacle
in the end.
No military leader can hope to understand the realities of the situation on
the ground from hundreds of miles away ...
His talents - or lack thereof - aside, Hitler took the practice of personal comm
and much too far. No military leader can hope to understand the realities of the
situation on the ground from hundreds of miles away, and yet he came to believe
that he could control all but the smallest units at the front. At the end of 19
42, for example, during the battle of Stalingrad, he actually had a street map o
f the city spread out before him so that he could follow the fighting, block by
block.
Similarly, near the end of the war he ordered that no unit could move without hi
s express permission, and he demanded lengthy reports on every armoured vehicle
and position that his forces lost. Such methods guaranteed that opportunities an
d dangers alike would go unnoticed, that good commanders would be trapped in imp
ossible situations and bad ones allowed to avoid responsibility.
Hitler also combined his insistence on personal control with a leadership style
that often consisted of equal parts indecisiveness and stubbornness. He sometime
s put off difficult decisions for weeks, especially as the military situation gr
ew worse. In 1943, for instance, his inability to make up his mind about an atta
ck at Kursk eventually pushed the attack back from April to July - by which time
the Soviets were well prepared.
Arguments among his commanders and advisors did not help the situation. By late
1942 Hitler's subordinates had split into cliques that competed for increasingly
scarce resources, while he remained the final arbiter of all disputes. His seni
or commanders felt free to contact him directly; they knew that the last man to
brief him often got what he wanted. At other times, though, Hitler would cling t
o a decision stubbornly, regardless of its merits. His decision to attack in the
Ardennes in 1944 is one good example: his commanders tried, both directly and i
ndirectly, to persuade him to adopt a more realistic plan, without success.
Top
Strategy