SOLIVEN vs.

MAKASIAR
14 November 1988 | Per Curiam
G.R. No. 82585,
Petitioner: Maximo V. Soliven, Antonio V. Roces, Frederick K. Agcaoli, And Godofredo L.
Manzanas
Respondents: The Hon. Ramon P. Makasiar, Presiding Judge Of The Regional Trial Court
Of Manila, Branch 35, Undersecretary Silvestre Bello III, Of The
Department Of Justice, Luis C. Victor, The City Fiscal Of Manila And
President Corazon C. Aquino
G.R. No. 82827, G.R. No. 83979
Petitioner: Luis D. Beltran
Respondents: Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, Secretary Of Justice Sedfrey
Ordoez, Undersecretary Of Justice Silvestre Bello Iii, The City Fiscal Of Manila Jesus F.
Guerrero, And Judge Ramon P. Makasiar, Presiding Judge Of Branch 35 Of The Regional
Trial Court, At Manila, Respondents.
DOCTRINE Immunity from suit
There is no Constitutional provision providing for such, but there exists
Executive immunity from suit
BRIEF
Pres. Corazon Aquino filed a complaint against Luis Beltran for libel. Luis
Beltran claims that the President may not file a complaint since it would go
against the presidential immunity from suit. The Court ruled that the President
may waive her right, but that it cannot be invoked by any other person on her
behalf.
FACTS
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Luis Beltran together with others, was charged with libel by the then president
Corzaon Aquino.
Cory herself filed a complaint-affidavit against him and others.
It was averred that Cory cannot file a complaint affidavit because this would
defeat her immunity from suit.
March 30, 1988: Secretary of Justice denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration
April 7, 1988: A second motion for reconsideration filed petitioner Beltran was
denied by Secretary of Justice
May 2, 1988: On appeal, the President, through Executive Secretary, affirmed
the resolution of the Secretary of Justice
May 16, 1988: Motion for reconsideration was denied by the Executive
Secretary

Supreme Court: ISSUES of the CASE

ISSUE:WON petitioners were denied due process when informations for libel were filed
against them although the finding of the existence of a prima facie case was still under
review by the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by the President? (MOOT)

RATIO
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Issue is moot and academic

Instead of submitting his counter-affidavits, petitioner filed a "Motion to
Declare Proceedings Closed," in effect waiving his right to refute the complaint
by filing counter-affidavits.
Due process of law does not require that the respondent in a criminal case
actually file his counter-affidavits before the preliminary investigation is
deemed completed. All that is required is that the respondent (herein
petitioner) be given the opportunity to submit counter-affidavits if he is so
minded.

ISSUE: WON the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge
issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the
witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause (NO [all caps])
RATIO
1. Art 3 Sec 2 of the Constitution1 provides for the issuance of warrants of arrest
2. The Constitution does not require the judge to personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses
3. The judge is, however, required to
a. personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents
submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and,
on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or
b. he may disregard the fiscals report and require the submission of
supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a
conclusion as to the existence of probable cause if he finds no
probable cause
4. On June 30, 1987, the Supreme Court unanimously adopted Circular No. 12,
setting down guidelines for the issuance of warrants of arrest
5. It has not been shown that respondent judge has deviated from the
prescribed procedure.
ISSUE: WON the President of the Philippines, under the Constitution, may initiate criminal
proceedings against the petitioners through the filing of a complaint-affidavit, (YES)
RATIO
1. The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from
suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any
hindrance or distraction
2. Petitioner Beltran argues that
a. the reasons which necessitate presidential immunity from suit
impose a correlative disability to file suit
b. if criminal proceedings ensue by virtue of the President's filing of her
complaint-affidavit, she may have to be a witness for the prosecution,
bringing her under the trial court's jurisdiction. This would be an
1

Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

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indirect way defeat her privilege of immunity from suit, as by

testifying on the witness stand, she would be exposing herself to
possible contempt of court or perjury
The Court ruled that the immunity from suit may be invoked only by the holder
of the office; not by any other person in the President's behalf.
An accused in a criminal case in which the President is complainant cannot
raise the presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from
proceeding against such accused.
The President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and submit to
the court's jurisdiction.
The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the
President's prerogative.

Obiter Dictum:
1. The court is not a trier of facts and the issue of whether Beltran could be held
liable for libel is best left to the trial court
2. The Court also finds no basis to rule on Beltrans claim that to allow the libel
case to proceed would produce a chilling effect on press freedom
RULING: Petitions DISMISSED, The Order to maintain the status quo contained in the
Resolution of the Court en banc dated April 7, 1988 and reiterated in the Resolution
dated April 26, 1988 is LIFTED.