HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF LOGIC, 26 (September 2005), 211 228

Godel and the objective existence of mathematical

objects1
Pierre Cassou-Nogue`s
CNRS, UMR 8519, University of Lille III, Lille, France
Received 24 May 2004

Revised 3 March 2005

This paper is a discussion of Godels arguments for a Platonistic conception of mathematical objects. I
review the arguments that Godel offers in different papers, and compare them to unpublished material
(from Godels Nachlass). My claim is that Godels later arguments simply intend to establish that
mathematical knowledge cannot be accounted for by a reflexive analysis of our mental acts. In other
words, there is at the basis of mathematics some data whose constitution cannot be explained by
introspective analysis. This does not mean that mathematics is independent of the human mind, but only
that it is independent of our conscious acts and decisions, to use Godels own words. Mathematical
objects may then have been created by the human mind, but if so, the process of creation cannot be
completely analysed and re-enacted. Such a thesis is weaker than some of the statements that Godel made
about his conceptual realism. However, there is evidence that Godel seriously considered this weak thesis,
or a position depending only on this weak thesis. He also criticized Husserls Phenomenology from this
point of view.

1. Godel and the objective existence of mathematical objects

This paper is a discussion of Godels arguments for a Platonistic conception of
mathematical objects. I will review Godels arguments from a historical perspective. I
will not try to assess their truth but only attempt to make clear what they say and
what kind of views they lead to. To begin with, there are Godels famous statements
on the reality of mathematical objects:
[. . .] the Platonistic view is the only one tenable. Thereby, I mean the view that
mathematics describes a non-sensual reality, which exists independently both of
the acts and [of] the dispositions of the human mind and is only perceived, and
probably perceived very incompletely, by the human mind.
[it] seems to imply that mathematical objects and facts (or at least something in
them) exist objectively and independently of our mental acts and decisions, that is
to say, [it seems to imply] some form or other of Platonism or realism as to the
mathematical objects.2
I will use Godels own words, Platonism or realism, Platonistic or realistic,
to refer to his position as described in these quotations. However, my claim is that
these two quotations are not equivalent and that only the second one accurately
1

This paper uses unpublished material from Godels papers which I was able to study in February 2004 thanks to a
Fellowship from the Society of the Friends of Princeton University Library. It was also presented at a workshop
organized by M. Panza at the REHSEIS, in Paris, France, and in M. Di Franscecos seminar at the University of Eastern
Piedmont in Vercelli, Italy, through the Erasmus Programme. It was substantially revised after the reports of two referees.
2
Godel (*1951), in Godel (19862003), III, pp. 311312, 323.
History and Philosophy of Logic ISSN 0144-5340 print/ISSN 1464-5149 online 2005 Taylor & Francis Group Ltd
http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals DOI: 10.1080/01445340500112124

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Pierre Cassou-Nogue`s

expresses the conclusion of Godels arguments. Moreover, Godel is ready, if not to

accept, at least to consider seriously positions corresponding to the second, weaker,
thesis. Such a position could be far removed from the clear-cut realism that is
formulated in the first quotation and for which Godel is well known.3 The difference
between the two quotations is that, in the second, mathematical objects are described
as existing independently of what we are conscious of, namely, acts and decisions.
But this leaves open the possibility that they are created on the basis of some
disposition of our mind which cannot be analysed in terms of conscious acts or
positive decisions.
Let me sketch out my point. Above all, it seems that the question of Platonism, in
Godels later writings, is not merely the question of the existence of mathematical
objects. Rather, Godel thinks that he can disprove what he calls nominalistic views,
such as Hilberts and Carnaps, which attempt to reduce mathematics to a game of
symbols. We have to attach meaning to the symbols (or to some symbols) that we
use. It cannot be denied that, when we do mathematics, we think about something
and, in that sense, have a relationship to, or acquaintance with, some objects. That is
enough to establish that mathematical objects have some kind of existence as
correlates of our thoughts. Here, Godel simply takes a phenomenological standpoint.
In Husserls phenomenology, when we think about something, that something is
not an element in our mind. It is an object, different from our thoughts, which our
thoughts aim at. The same would be true if we imagined a unicorn. It would be
posited outside our mind as an imaginary object. The problem then is to assess the
reality of the objects of our thoughts or, as Godel puts it, the objective existence of
the objects of mathematical intuition.4 That there is a mathematical intuition is a
mere psychological fact,5 and there are mathematical objects correlated to these acts
of intuition. The problem is to understand what kind of reality they have. Now, in
Godels arguments, the objective existence, or reality, of mathematical objects
comes from the factand essentially meansthat mathematical objects cannot be
created out of nothing (to use Godels own words). One cannot retrace a process,
isolate a set of mental acts, that would be sufficient to recreate or re-invent
mathematical objects. It follows, first, that in so far as Godel takes a
phenomenological standpoint, he does not embrace a strictly Husserlian conception
(which would, indeed, require that the constitution of objects be recounted on the
basis of a reflexive analysis of mathematical intuition6). Second, Godels arguments
do not imply the sharp realism of the first quotation, as will become apparent. In
fact, his arguments do not even imply that mathematical objects were not created or
3
I must mention in particular Kohler (2002) and Balaguer (1998). In a remarkable paper, based on both published and
unpublished material from the archives in Princeton, E. Kohler gives a detailed description of Godels Platonism in its
metaphysical context. E. Kohlers paper is illuminating on Godels beliefs. However, only the last section of the paper is
concerned with Godels arguments for his Platonism. Now, a more careful study of Godels arguments explains several
features of his views on the reality of mathematical objects. For example, it explains why one can accept as weak realism,
in Godels sense, other positions such as Brouwers (see Kohler 2002, p. 372, see below). They simply agree with Godels
arguments. I wish then to attempt a precise analysis of Godels arguments to get to the core of Godels position and,
hopefully, offer a different perspective on Godels Platonism. M. Balaguer also refers to Godel as an example of a clearcut Platonism which he then refutes (Balaguer 1998, pp. 2528). My aim, here, is to show that Godels arguments, though
they could lead to such a Platonism, could also lead to different and much more qualified positions. This discussion, from
a historical point of view, does not dispute Balaguers refutation of the clear-cut Platonism that he attributes to Godel.
4
Godel (1964), in Godel (19862003, II, p. 268). Emphasis is mine.
5
Idem.
6
For a recent study of Godels Husserlianism, see van Atten and Kennedy (2003). See also Cassou-Nogue`s (2004).

The objective existence of mathematical objects

213

invented by the human mind, but only that, if mathematical objects are products of
the human mind, their genesis cannot be completely analysed. Godels arguments
could then lead to a whole range of different views. It is not simply that Godel fails to
establish the clear-cut conceptual realism that he holds. There are different views
(such as Brouwers account of the origin of arithmetic, suitably interpreted) which
rely on the same thesis, and which Godel seems to find acceptable. The thesis that
Godel does defend is that mathematical knowledge cannot be accounted for by a
reflexive analysis of mental acts. Mathematics is objective in the sense that it is
independent of our acts and decisions but not necessarily independent of the
dispositions of the human mind.
I will illustrate this distinction by means of several examples taken from Godels
writings. I will examine the published texts in their chronological order and discuss
the different arguments used by Godel to support his Platonism. In doing so, I will
often refer to Godels conversations with Hao Wang and to unpublished material
from the Godel Papers kept at Princeton University Library.

2. The initial Platonism

Godel seems always to have held a Platonistic conception of mathematical
objects, independently of any definite philosophical influences. On several occasions,
Godel traced his Platonism back to his student years in Vienna. In particular, in a
letter to Barry Smith, he wrote, I can say that my conceptual realism, which I [have
held] since about 1925, was in no way brought about by phenomenology;7 and in his
answer to the questionnaire that B. D. Grandjean sent him in 1975, Godel again
averred that he was a conceptual and mathematical realist since 1925.8
These recollections are backed up by Godels account, in his letters to Wang, of
the role of his Platonism in his work in logic. For example, the completeness of
predicate calculus, which Godel established in 1929, can be derived from an earlier
result of Skolem. But the proof uses a non-finitary inference. And, according to
Godel, that is why other logicians had overlooked this consequence of Skolems
result. The formalist point of view made non-finitary reasoning meaningful only in so
far as it could be justified by a finitary metamathematicsa view that almost
unavoidably leads to an exclusion of non-finitary reasoning from metamathematics.
Conversely, it seems, it was a Platonistic conception that convinced Godel that such
reasoning had meaning in itself and, therefore, could be used in metamathematics.
I may add, continues Godel, that my objectivistic conception of mathematics
and metamathematics in general, and of transfinite reasoning in particular, was
fundamental also to my other work in logic.9 In particular, with regard to his
incompleteness theorem of 1931 and the consistency result of 1938, Godel noted that
the formalist point of view did not make [such proofs] impossible. It only made them
much harder to discover, because they are not congenial to this attitude of mind.10
In the draft of that same letter, he explained that as a matter of fact, [the formalist
point of view] only made it much more difficult by the influence it had on the

Godels Papers, Godel to Barry Smith (1975) box 3b, folder 167.
Godel to Grandjean (1975), in Godel (19862003, IV, p. 444).
9
Godel to Wang (1967), in Godel (19862003, V, pp. 397398). See also Wang (1974).
10
Godel to Wang (1968), in Godel (19862003, V, p. 404). See also Wang (1974).
8

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Pierre Cassou-Nogue`s

subconscious working of [crossed out: the mind] mathematical thinking, because it

fixed attention in a wrong direction.11
In his conversations and in his letters to Wang, Godel stressed the role of his
realism in his work in logic from 1929 onwards: his Platonism kept him free from the
subconscious working of the formalist view on the mind of mathematicians.
However, his early convictions might not have been so settled, for, in a lecture of
1933, he spoke of a Platonism, which cannot satisfy any critical mind.12
At the very beginning of that text, Godel divides the problem of foundation into
two parts: first, to give a precise system in which mathematics can be expressed;
second, to seek a foundation for that system. Godel then sketches a theory of types,
somewhat modified from that in Principia Mathematica. He concludes: our
formalism works perfectly well and is perfectly unobjectionable as long as we
consider it as a mere game with symbols, but as soon as we come to attach a meaning
to our symbols serious difficulties arise.13 There are three such difficulties. The first
concerns arithmetic and the principle of the excluded middle, when, for example, we
deduce the existence of an integer which has a certain property P without being able
to calculate the integer. The second difficulty comes from impredicative definitions.
And the third, which is only mentioned, concerns the axiom of choice in set theory.
Godel argues, very briefly, that the law of excluded middle, impredicative definitions
and the axiom of choice are only acceptable if one admits that mathematical
questions are settled and that mathematical objects exist independently of our
knowledge and definitions. Therefore, our axioms, if interpreted as meaningful
statements, necessarily presuppose a kind of Platonism, which cannot satisfy any
critical mind and which does not even produce the conviction that they are
consistent. Or, as he put it in the first draft of the lecture: As soon as we attempt to
attach a meaning to the symbols of our system, we become entangled hopelessly in a
kind of Platonism which obviously doesnt give any guarantee against contradiction.14
Here, Godel seems to repeat the arguments of the intuitionists and of those who
are now called semi-intuitionists. Brouwers arguments against the excluded middle,
Poincares arguments against impredicative definitions, and the arguments of the
French analysts, Borel and Lebesgue, against the axiom of choice all aimed to show
that the methods of classical mathematics require a realistic conception of
mathematical objects. This implication was considered sufficient to reject the
methods of classical mathematics. For example, Brouwer rejected the excluded
middle in part because its use is only justified by the postulate that infinite systems
are similar to finite systems in so far as their objects have well-defined properties
independently of our constructions.15 Note that, conversely, this implication could be
considered as an argument for Platonism. If, likewise, impredicative definitions are
only justified in a Platonistic context, and if one believes that impredicative
definitions are indispensable, then one has to accept some kind of Platonism. As we
will see, Godel will use this argument. But in the lecture of 1933, he does not. Indeed,
that argument would presuppose that the formulas of the system in which
11

Draft of Godel to Wang, box 3c, folder 202. Also, but crossed out by Godel: these reasons worked subconsciously in
the mind of mathematicians.
12
Godel (*1933), in Godel (19862003, III, p. 50).
13
Godel (*1933), in Godel (19862003, III, p. 49).
14
Godel (*1933), in Godel (19862003, III, p. 50); Godels Papers, box 7b, folder 26.
15
Brouwer (1908, 1912).

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215

mathematical theories are expressed are regarded as meaningful, and not as mere
combinations of symbols. But nowhere in that lecture does Godel argue that we have
to abandon the formalist view. In the remainder of it, he discusses different
possibilities for proving the consistency of a formal system capable of expressing
elementary arithmetic. His theorem of 1931 rules out proving consistency by any
method expressible in the system (if the system is consistent). But in his paper of
1931, Godel had left open the possibility that there might be finitist methods which
could not be expressed in elementary arithmetic and which could be used in a
consistency proof.16 Now, in 1933, he gives a precise definition of the strictest form
of constructive mathematics and concludes that those finitist methods are
expressible in arithmetic and, therefore, are too restrictive to prove the consistency
of arithmetic. He also discusses intuitionist arithmetic, into which, as he had shown
that same year, 1933, classical arithmetic can be translated. However, the principles
of intuitionism are too broad, and founding classical arithmetic on intuitionist
arithmetic would be of doubtful value. Nevertheless, Godel concludes that there
remains the hope that in future one may find other and more satisfactory methods of
construction beyond the limits of the system A [finitism], which may enable us to
found classical arithmetic and analysis upon them.17
Godel believed that it might be possible to give a proper foundation for
elementary arithmetic and to prove the consistency of the underlying formal system,
by a method which would be more evident, more reliable, and which would
strengthen ones conviction. Could one then consider elementary arithmetic,
expressed in a formal system, as a game of symbols, deprived of meaning? It is not
clear. But the lecture of 1933, unlike later writings, does not claim that we have to
give meaning to the symbols of the formal systems representing classical
mathematics; Godel does not try to refute the formalist view. Nor does the lecture
of 1933 give any argument supporting Platonism. The expression used by Godel and
quoted above, a Platonism, which cannot satisfy any critical mind, could be
explained by the context: Godel is looking for a method of foundation, a method that
would prove the consistency of a formal system expressing elementary arithmetic;
and (as is made explicit in the second quotation) Platonism does not in itself give an
argument for consistency. Nevertheless, the lecture of 1933 does not defend a realistic
conception of mathematical objects. It bears no trace of Godels early convictions.

3. First arguments for Platonism

The first clear statement that Godel makes about his Platonistic conception of
mathematical objects is to be found in the article Russells mathematical logic, of
1944. Godel there uses an argument that surfaced in the lecture of 1933. He starts with
a careful discussion of impredicative definitions, in which he distinguishes in Russells
writings three forms of the vicious circle principle. The first form states that no
totality can contain members definable only in terms of the whole totality. It thus
forbids the use of impredicative definitions. Godel then makes the following claims:
(1)

16

It is demonstrable that the formalism of classical mathematics does not

satisfy the vicious circle principle in its first form, since the axioms imply the

Godel (1931), in Godel (19862003, I, pp. 194195).

Godel (*1933), in Godel (19862003, III, p. 53). See also Mancosu (1999).

17

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Pierre Cassou-Nogue`s
existence of real numbers definable in this formalism only by reference to all
real numbers . . . [and] I would consider this rather as a proof that the vicious
circle principle is false than that classical mathematics is false [. . .]18

Since the vicious circle principle, in its first form, does apply to constructed entities,
impredicative definitions [. . .] are inadmissible in constructivistic logic.19
[. . .] it seems that the vicious circle principle in its first form applies only if
one takes the constructivistic (or nominalistic) standpoint toward the
objects of logic and mathematics [. . .].20
One may use impredicative definitions, he asserts, if and only if one refuses the
constructivist conception of mathematical objects and, so it seems, accepts the
Platonistic view. But impredicative definitions are indispensable in classical
mathematics. Therefore, in order to save classical mathematics, one has to accept
the Platonistic view.
It is true that Godel does not present his Platonism as the conclusion of such an
argument, but rather as a complement of his analysis of impredicative definitions.
However, the claims quoted above do constitute a first argument for Platonism,
exactly the kind of argument that the lecture of 1933 could not use, for such
arguments presume, as that lecture shows, that the axioms of mathematics are
regarded as meaningful statements. Godel does not mention that point. Apparently,
he just follows Russell, who did not consider Principia Mathematica to be a formal
system, strictly speaking, and who gave meaning to the axioms.
It should also be noted that the argument is close to that of Poincare in Science et
methode.21 Godel takes the opposite direction but shares the same premise. Poincare
had already argued in 1906 that impredicative definitions require a realistic or
actualist conception of mathematical objects. But he rejected Platonism and,
therefore, impredicative definitions. Godel, who wants to keep impredicative
definitions, therefore needs some kind of Platonism.22
Here, Platonism appears as a philosophical hypothesis, which would justify, in a
broad sense, classical mathematics. Godel does give such a status to his Platonistic
view, though in a different argument.
(2)

18

It seems to me that the assumption of such objects [classes and

concepts. . .conceived as real objects. . .existing independently of our definitions and constructions] is quite as legitimate as the assumption of physical
bodies and there is quite as much reason to believe in their existence. They are

Godel (1944), in Godel (19862003, II, p. 127).

Godel (1944), in Godel (19862003, II, p. 129). Godel notes that he uses constructivism as a general term comprising
both [constructivistic and nominalistic] standpoints and also such tendencies as are embodied in Russells no class
theory. According to these tendencies, classes or concepts never exist as real objects (Godel 1944, in Godel 19862003,
II, pp. 128, 125).
20
Godel (*1944), in Godel (19862003, II, p. 128).
21
Poincare (1908, p. 163 sqq.).
22
Godel does not refer to Poincares analysis of impredicative definitions in his article on Russell. But in an earlier lecture,
he mentions Poincare as a source for Russells ramified type theory and for the vicious-circle principle (Godel *1939, in
Godel 19862003, III, pp. 132133).
19

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217

in the same sense necessary to obtain a satisfactory system of mathematics as

physical bodies are necessary for a satisfactory theory of our sense
perceptions and in both cases it is impossible to interpret the propositions
one wants to assert about these entities as propositions about the data, i.e.,
in the latter case the actually occurring sense perceptions.23
Platonism, the assumption that mathematical objects are independent of our own
constructions, is considered as a hypothesis in a non-mathematical theory about
mathematics. However, at first sight, this second argument has nothing to do with
impredicative definitions. The Platonistic assumption should be necessary to explain
the data of mathematics just as the assumption of physical bodies is necessary to
explain sense perceptions. (I use the word explain in a broad sense, as shorthand
for Godels expression necessary to obtain a satisfactory system of.) The problem is
first to identify the data of mathematics, which need such an explanation. Godel does
not give a straightforward answer to that in his article on Russell. However, in two
texts written by Wang but corrected by Godel, one of them entitled Quotations from
Godel, one finds the following note: According to Godel, he has in mind actual
simple computations with integers as data for mathematics and such an insertion
should be added near the end of the quoted statements.24
If we use this note to supplement the preceding statement, we obtain: (i) the
integers with the operations of addition and multiplication represent immediate data
comparable with sense-perceptions; (ii) mathematical propositions, propositions
that one wants to assert, cannot be reduced to propositions about integers; (iii) the
Platonistic hypothesis is necessary to explain simple computations in the same
manner as the assumption of physical bodies is necessary to explain sense data.
Obviously, the last point calls for further investigation, for in what sense do
numerical computations need an explanation? There is another paragraph in the
article on Russell which compares arithmetic, as data for mathematics, with sense
perceptions in physics. It is not directly connected with the problem of Platonism,
however.
(3)

23

[Russell] compares the axioms of logic and mathematics with laws of nature
and logical evidence with sense perception, so that the axioms need not
necessarily be evident in themselves, but rather their justification lies (exactly
as in physics) in the fact that they make it possible for these sense
perceptions to be deduced [. . .]. I think that [. . .] this view has been largely
justified by subsequent developments, and it is to be expected that it will be
still more so in the future. It has turned out that (under the assumption that
modern mathematics is consistent), the solution of certain arithmetical
problems requires the use of assumptions essentially transcending arithmetic,
i.e. the domain of the kind of elementary indisputable evidence that may be
most fittingly compared with sense perception.25

Godel (1944), in Godel (19862003, II, p. 128).

Wang has just quoted the above paragraph. Godels Papers (Box 3c, folder 207, item 013161). A similar statement is
made in a later text entitled Quotations from Godel (Box 3c, folder 207, item 016169) and, again, in Wang (1996, p. 231).
25
Godel (1944), in Godel (19862003, II, p. 121).
24

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Pierre Cassou-Nogue`s

Godel takes up the comparison between the evidence of arithmetic and that of
sense-perception. However, he does not mention here the Platonistic assumption of
mathematical objects but only the axioms of mathematics. Concerning mathematical axioms, a similar argument can be found in almost all Godels later texts.26
Quite generally, the idea is that the axioms of set theory can be justified, in the same
manner as the laws of physics, by their consequences or by their success. They might
permit one to demonstrate new conjectures or simplify the proof of some theorems in
other parts of mathematics, which have some intrinsic evidence: the mathematical
character of the axioms [. . .] appears in the circumstance that they have consequences
in that part of mathematics [. . .] whose primitive terms have an immediately
understandable clear meaning (e.g. [some] axioms of infinity [. . .] have numbertheoretical consequences).27 Godel usually identifies this process, of justifying an
axiom by its consequences, to induction in physics, where one justifies a law by
showing that it has observable consequences.
However, in his article on Russell (in the quotation above marked (3)), Godel
draws a precise analogy between axioms in mathematics and laws of physics, senseperceptions and arithmetical facts. I can only think of one way to understand this
analogy. Consider Goldbachs conjecture that every even number greater than two is
the sum of two primes. One can check this conjecture for different numbers. It works
for every number that one tests. These computations would have an immediate
evidence just as sense perception. However, one can only be sure that they will work
for any even number and, in that way, predict their outcome, if one proves the general
proposition. If, in this proof, one needs new axioms, outside arithmetic, these axioms
could be justified in so far as they allow us to predict the outcome of arithmetical
computations just as the laws of physics allow us to predict future occurrences of
sense-perceptions. In the same manner, take an arithmetical proposition that we know
is not demonstrable in elementary arithmetic but that we suspect is true (say a
particular S2 diophantine equation); the set theoretical axioms needed for its proof
would seem to have the same status with respect to arithmetical computations that the
laws of physics have with respect to sense perceptions.
The comparison between mathematics and physics, sense-perceptions and
arithmetical computations, may then help to justify the axioms of set theory. But
in the earlier quotation from the article on Russell ((2) above), this analogy was
intended to justify not a mathematical axiom but the Platonistic view of
mathematical objects. There are various ways to link the justification of
mathematical axioms and the justification of a Platonistic assumption. In fact, one
could say that an axiom that is an existential statement, such as an axiom of infinity,
is already a Platonistic assumption concerning a certain set. In any case, one needs
here an argument similar to the first one mentioned in the 1944 paper. One must say
that the axioms or, more generally, the principles that are needed to explain the
data of mathematics, i.e. the arithmetical computations, require/lead to/amount to
Platonistic assumptions. Earlier (in the quotations marked (1)), Godel did argue that
impredicative definitions require some Platonism and, if we add that the explanation
of the data requires impredicative definitions, then we get that the full explanation of
arithmetical computations requires the assumption of mathematical objects just as
26

Godel (*1951), in Godel (19862003, III, p. 347); Godel (1947), in Godel (19862003, II, 182); Godel (1964), in Godel
(19862003, II, p. 261).
27
Godel (*1951), in Godel (19862003, III, p. 347).

The objective existence of mathematical objects

219

the explanation of sense-perceptions requires the assumption of physical bodies. In

this alternative version, the second argument, based on the analogy between
mathematics and physics, already relies on something like the first argument that
impredicative definitions and set theoretical axioms require/lead to/ amount to
Platonistic assumptions.28
The lecture of 1933 mentioned, in the same discussion, that the excluded middle,
impredicative definitions and the axiom of choice require the Platonistic assumption
of mathematical objects. The first argument, which the Russell paper seems to draw,
concerning impredicative definitions, could then be extended to the axiom of choice
or other axioms of set theory. However, in his later writings Godel never again uses
this kind of arguments, neither with respect to impredicative definitions nor with
respect to the axioms of set theory. He does maintain that, if one accepts the
Platonistic assumption, one can rely on a mathematical intuition to find new axioms
and justify them. In this way, the Platonistic assumption is fruitful for set theory.
Godel also argues for the introduction of new axioms in set theory that might settle
the continuum problem. But he never again argues that set theory, with its axioms
and impredicative definitions, requires a Platonistic context. It may simply be that
this would weaken his case for new axioms, which would appear to require even
stronger Platonistic assumptions. It may be, so to speak, a strategic move in Godels
argumentation. Or there may be another reason. One can only observe that the first
argument of the Russell paper never seems to reappear. It is de facto abandoned. It is
not clear whether the second one, based on the analogy between mathematics and
physics, can be maintained without the first one. In that respect, the paper of 1944
does not seem to be conclusive. We must now look at the later texts for other
arguments on Platonism.

4. Later arguments
The preceding discussion, about impredicative definitions, depended on ones
accepting that mathematical statements are meaningful, and are not mere
combinations of symbols in a formal system. In the lecture of 1933, Godel did not
maintain that one has to attach meaning to the mathematical statements. It is only
after the Russell article, in his Gibbs lecture of 1951 and in the article on Carnap, that
Godel explicitly defends this point in his refutation of what he calls the nominalistic
views. These replace mathematical theories by formal systems in which the symbols
are deprived of meaning and are simply used according to explicit conventions.
28
I must also mention another argument from the conversation with Wang. The idea is that, though the Platonistic
assumption is not a hypothesis in a mathematical theory but in the philosophy of mathematics, it has an influence on
mathematical work. The Platonistic assumption would then be a non-mathematical but mathematically fruitful
hypothesis. This fruitfulness, by itself, would give good reason for its admission, just as their successes justify the axioms.

Nobody denies the fact that in set theory one at least speaks as if there are sets and that psychologically such an
objectivist picture is of help in studying set theory. It is sometimes suggested that one only has to pretend that sets
exist. But by such pretending one can never arrive at the same degree of imagination as is obtained by some
objectivists. Success in the applications is the usual and most effective way of proving existence. It would indeed be
strange that one gets success from a wrong picture which is a mere pretension rather than from the real situation.
(Godels Papers, Box 3c, folder 207, item 016169, the text from Wang is entitled Quotations from Godel and is corrected
by Godel.) Similar statements occur in the items 016161, 016182.5 and are repeated in substance in Wang (1996, pp. 239
240).

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Pierre Cassou-Nogue`s

Godel intends to disprove these views, and, therefore, to show that meaning or
content cannot be dispensed with. I will not go into the details of the argument. The
core of the argument is that the reduction of a mathematical theory to a formal
system makes sense only if one can prove the consistency of the formal system. The
consistency is first necessary to justify the application of mathematics to physics,
since, in an inconsistent system, one could deduce any formula from any other so
that one could not make any prediction when the system is used in physics. But the
consistency is also necessary for pure mathematics. In order to replace mathematical
intuition by certain conventions, one has to prove that the conventions are
admissible and, at least, consistent: For, strictly speaking, conventions cannot even
be made without a foregoing proof of their admissibility, otherwise the term
convention would not be appropriate.29 Godel relies on his theorem of 1931 to
assert that, provided the system is consistent and contains elementary arithmetic, the
proof of its consistency requires concepts equally powerful to those that are
formalized. These concepts, used in the proof of consistency, must be given by an
immediate intuition. One has then succeeded only in replacing some concepts by
others but not in eliminating mathematical intuition. This reveals a general principle
which could perhaps be called the non-eliminability of the mathematical content of an
axiomatic system by the syntactical interpretation.30
All these points would need further elaboration. However, in his Gibbs lecture,
Godel does not consider this argument as a real proof of this view [Platonism] about
the nature of mathematics. The most [he] could assert would be to have disproved the
nominalistic view. 31 As I hinted at the beginning of this paper, this precaution is not
modesty or doubt. A disproof of the nominalistic view is not enough to establish the
Platonistic assumption. It shows that one cannot eliminate meaning or content. It
might also show that there is a mathematical intuition that gives content to our
formulas. One would then have to accept the existence (in some sense) of
mathematical objects correlated to our intuitions. But it would remain to investigate
the kind of reality that these objects have. Godel does distinguish the two questions
in the Supplement added in 1964 to the article What is Cantors continuum
problem?. He starts with the assertion that we do have something like a perception
also of the objects of set theory. The existence of an intuition is a mere
psychological fact. But this does not settle the question of the objective existence of
the objects of mathematical intuition.32 To settle this last question, that of the reality
of the objects of our intuition, Godel again uses an analogy between mathematical
intuition and empirical experience.
I dont see any reason why we should have less confidence in this kind of
perception, i.e. in mathematical intuition, than in sense perception. [. . .] It seems
that, as in the case of physical experience, we form our ideas also of those objects
on the basis of something else which is immediately given. Only this something
29

Godel (*1953/9), in Godel (19862003, III, p. 358).

Godel (*1953/9), in Godel (19862003, III, p. 345). Godel also notes that his argument (that in order to justify the
reduction of a mathematical theory to a formal system, one needs the same concepts or concepts equally powerful to the
concepts reduced) is substantially the same as the one which Poincare levelled against both Frege and Hilbert (319).
Again, Godel seems to use an argument close to those of Poincare but in the opposite direction, to uphold his Platonism
when Poincare defended a kind of constructivism.
31
Godel (*1951), in Godel (19862003, III, p. 322).
32
Godel (1964), in Godel (19862003, II, p. 268).
30

The objective existence of mathematical objects

221

else here is not, or not primarily, the sensations. That something besides the
sensations actually is immediately given follows [. . .] from the fact that even our
ideas referring to physical objects contain constituents qualitatively different from
sensations or mere combinations of sensations, e.g. the idea of object itself,
whereas, on the other hand, by our thinking we cannot create any qualitatively
new elements, but only reproduce and combine those that are given.
And in a footnote Godel adds there is a close relationship between the concept of
set [. . .] and the categories of pure understanding in Kants sense. Namely, the
function of both is synthesis, i.e. the generating of unities out of manifold.33
The analogy, in the footnote, between the concept of object and that of set in
their function of synthesis, comes from the fact that, according to Godel, a set is a
multiplicity of elements that is also a unity: A multitude of objects having the
property that the unity of the objects of the multitude exists is a set; a set is a unity
(or whole) of which the elements are constituents; a set is one object which contains
its many elements as constituents, i.e. a whole consisting of them.34 This idea, that a
set is a multiplicity of elements considered as a unity, comes back when Godel
discusses the axioms of set theory in his conversations with Wang. A criterion for the
existence of a set is that it is possible for an idealized mind to overview its range or
think of its elements together. However, the possibility that a multiplicity can be
thought of as one is not determined by our subjectivity, our mind and its properties.
It is a fact, and a fact which we have not made. A note from Wang corrected by
Godel is explicit: It is a surprising fact [Godel adds: and seemingly contradictory]
that multitudes can be unities (sets). This is the main [Godel adds: objective] fact
[Godel adds: which we have not made] for mathematics. [. . .] Multitudes are
themselves unities.35
Godel thinks of sets as unities made from the multiplicity of their elements.
Whatever might be the shortcomings of this concept of set, let us accept it in order to
follow the Supplement of 1964. The analogy between sets and objects consists in that
a set is a unity made from its elements just as the object is a unity made from its
aspects, i.e. our sensations: Sets are the limiting case of spatio-temporal objects [. . .]
an analogue of synthesizing aspects to get one object. But the possibility to
synthesize a set from its elements, or an object from its aspects, does not depend on
our subjectivity, as in Kants doctrine. It seems to be a fact that we meet in our
experience. A first problem concerns the relationship between this fact, that the
various aspects can be synthesized into an object, and the concept of object itself. The
reference to Kant would seem to indicate that the concept of object is needed in the
synthesis. In Kants doctrine, one needs the concept of object in order to be able to
refer the various aspects to one object, say the different appearances of a table to the
table itself. One would never know how to organize the various sensations and how

33

Godel (1964), in Godel (19862003, II, p. 268).

Godels Papers, Box, 3c, folder 207, item 013167; box, 3c, folder 207, item 013161; box 8c, folder 117, item 040398
35
Godels Papers, Box 3c, folder 207, item 013169, text entitled Quotations from Godel. The text continues:
34

This significant property of certain multitudes that they are unities must come from some more solid foundation than
the apparently trivial and arbitrary phenomenon that we can [Wang writes: overview, Godel corrects: think together]
the objects in each of these multiplicities. Without the objective picture, we do not seem to be able to exclude
complete arbitrariness [. . .].

222

Pierre Cassou-Nogue`s

to refer them to the object if one did not know, generally, what an object is. It then
follows that we already use the concept of object in our empirical experience.
The only thing that can be said for sure, considering the quotation above from
the text of 1964, is that the concept of object is an element immediately given, beside
the sensations. Elsewhere, Godel also remarks that the data of this second kind
represent an aspect of objective reality.36 But, at least in 1964, he does not clarify the
function of these data, such as the concept of object, in our empirical experience.
Nevertheless, the reference to Kant would lead to the conclusion that the possibility
of synthesizing different sensations in one object requires the concept of object,
which, contrary to Kants analysis, is not subjective but is an aspect of reality. This
would mean that the experience of an object, when I realize that my various
sensations refer to a single object, is made both from a multiplicity of sensations and
from the concept of object. Both must be given at the same time. The concept of
object then appears as an ingredient in our experience.
The quotation above, from the Supplement of 1964, raises other questions. Godel
relates the immediately given, let us say the data of mathematics, to the concept of
object, and then, in the footnote, compares the concept of object to the concept of
set. But, first, can the concept of set be considered as immediately given, as a datum
for mathematics? And, second, is it somehow contained in the concept of object? In
other words, can the concept of set be derived from the concept of object? Obviously,
we may have the concept of object, in the sense of being able to use the concept of
object in our empirical experience, without having the concept of set, in the sense of
being able to state a system of axioms for set theory. However, the concept of set
could be somehow abstracted, or produced, from the concept of object, as it is given
in our experience. Godel does not give any definite answers. Still, there is a text where
Godel seems to describe an object as an ordered set, which would make it possible to
abstract the concept of set from the concept of object:
In the generation of the idea of one object out of its various aspects, if we abstract
from the interrelations of the aspects, the one object generated would be the set of
which the aspects are constituents provided we thought of these aspects as
objects.37
Let us come back to the text of 1964. One can safely say that, according to Godel:
1. Mathematical objects are constructed from some data, which are immediately
given. This is a first analogy with sense-perception, which, apparently, is
enough to make the question of the existence of mathematical objects an exact
replica of the question of the existence of physical objects.
2. The mathematical data are related to the abstract elements contained in our
empirical ideas and, in particular, to the concept of object.
3. Sets and objects are analogous in the sense that they are unities made from a
multiplicity of constituents.
However, several questions remain unanswered. The text could admit different
interpretations. It would definitely not contradict its letter to claim:
36

Godels Papers, Box 3c, folder 207, item 016167. The text is entitled Quotations from Godel.
Godels Papers, Box 3c, folder 207, item 016167. The text is entitled Quotations from Godel. This part is not to be
found in Wang 1996.

37

The objective existence of mathematical objects

223

4. The concept of set is contained in the concept of object, in the sense that, if the
concept of set cannot be created out of nothing, it can be abstracted and, in
this way, re-created from the concept of object.
5. The concept of object is already given in the experience of an object. That is, in
order to be able to refer our various sensations to one object, an apple, a table,
we must be given, beside the sensations, the concept of an object, from which
the concept of set can be derived. The concept of set would then be an abstract
aspect of our empirical experience.
This would not lead too far from a naturalized Platonism. However, there is yet
another problem in this text. Godel intends to assert the reality, the objective
existence of mathematical objects by comparing mathematical intuition with sense
perception and by showing that, as sense perception, mathematical intuition relies on
some data, which are immediately given. There are conceptual data as there are
sense-data. But one should ask how it is to be ascertained that there are conceptual
data, given to us and not created by us. In the article on Russells mathematical
logic, Godel introduced the notion of mathematical data without any justification.
In the text of 1964, the mathematical data are related to the concept of object, which
is contained in our empirical ideas. Now, the concept of object must be given to us: it
is qualitatively different from sensations; and, by our thinking, we cannot create
any qualitatively new elements but only reproduce and combine those that are given.
The existence of mathematical data and the analogy between mathematical intuition
and sense perception depend on the assumption that our thinking by itself cannot
create new elements. This last claim is then at the very centre of Godels argument. It
is made explicit in the Gibbs Lecture.
In the Gibbs Lecture, 1951, Godel starts by giving a non-technical interpretation
of his incompleteness theorem. A Turing machine, deducing formulas according to a
certain program, will always leave undecided some arithmetical formulas and
diophantine problems. Therefore, either [. . .] the human mind [. . .] infinitely
surpasses the powers of any finite machine, or else there exist absolutely unsolvable
diophantine problems.38 Now, according to Godel, the two alternatives are opposed
to materialistic philosophy. On the one hand, Godel argues that the human brain
works like a discrete machine, a Turing machine. Therefore, the first part of the
alternative implies that the working of the human mind cannot be reduced to the
working of the brain. The human mind must contain a non-mechanizable part, which
has no correlate in the brain. On the other hand, the existence of unsolvable
problems is enough to imply the independent reality of mathematical objects. It
seems that we cannot have created mathematical objects:
For the creator necessarily knows all properties of his creatures, because they
cant have any others except those he has given to them. So, this alternative seems
to imply that mathematical objects and facts (or at least something in them) exist
objectively and independently of our mental acts and decisions [. . .] One might
object that the constructor need not necessarily know every property of what he
constructs. For example, we build machines and still cannot predict their
behaviour in every detail. But this objection is very poor. For we dont create the
machines out of nothing, but build them out of some given material. If the
38

Godel (*1951), in (Godel 19862003, III, p. 310).

224

Pierre Cassou-Nogue`s
situation were similar in mathematics, then this material or basis for our
constructions would be something objective and would force some realistic
viewpoint upon us even if certain other ingredients of mathematics were our own
creation. The same would be true if in our creations we were to use some
instrument in us but different from our ego (such as reason interpreted as
something like a thinking machine). For mathematical facts would then (at least
in part) express properties of this instrument, which would have an objective
existence.39

(The penultimate sentence was first written as: Similarly, of course, if

mathematics were not created by our acts (i.e. conscious acts of our ego) but by
some entity in us called reason, mathematical facts would be something objective
namely properties of this mind, which we could in no way determine by our
choices.40)
In the remainder of the Gibbs lecture and in the conversations with Wang, this
idea of creation is discussed for itself, outside the preceding dilemma (that one must
either recognize non-mechanizable processes in the mathematical mind or accept that
there are absolutely unsolvable problems in mathematics). Simply, the activity of the
mathematician shows very little of the freedom a creator should enjoy.41 But let us
discuss the original argument, in the lengthy quotation above. We cannot have
created mathematical objects because, if we had, we would know all their properties.
However, it remains possible (1) that mathematical objects are constructed on the
basis of some data, which are given to us from the outside, and (2) that we have
created mathematical objects but without knowing it, in a part of our mind unknown
to us or, to use Godels expression, in a part of our mind different from our ego. The
ego represents all the acts that we are conscious of, or that we can identify as ours.
But the mind may be more than the ego. The mind could be an ego plus a reason,
an ego using reason.42 This reason would then be a part of the mind, or an entity in
contact with our ego, but over which our ego has no control. The processes, which
happen inside this reason, could not be recaptured, reflected upon and analysed by
the ego. They would remain unknown to us. Now, it is a possibility that Godel leaves
open that mathematical objects are created in the human reason.
Mathematical objects are not our creations, but here, Godel uses creation in a
restricted sense. He means creation out of nothing, that is, creation without data,
and such a creation that the creator can reflect upon it and re-enact his creation.
Thus, the core of the argument, given in the Gibbs Lecture, is that we cannot have
created mathematical objects in such a way that we could completely analyse this
process of creation. There must be, so to speak, an opacity, which comes either from
the outside, if mathematical objects are constructed on the basis of external data (in
the manner that the physical objects are constructed on the basis of senseperceptions), or from the inside, if the process of creation takes place in a part of our
mind over which we have no control and upon which we cannot reflect. When Godel
asserts the reality of mathematical objects, he does not assert more than that: there is

39

Godel (*1951), in (Godel 19862003, III, pp. 311312).

Godels Papers, box 8b, folder 93, item 040294.
41
Godel (*1951), in (Godel 19862003, III, p. 314).
42
Godels Papers, box 8c, folder 117, item 040403.
40

The objective existence of mathematical objects

225

at the basis of mathematical knowledge some data, which either we have received
from the outside or we have formed in a part of our mind to which we have no access.
Thus, Godels views on the objectivity of mathematics are quite open. For
example, he considers that Brouwers account of the origin of integers is in agreement
with his requirement that mathematical objects are not created out of nothing.
Brouwer relates the creation of integers to the passing of time in the mind.43 The
mind, at first, is filled with a unique sensation but, as time passes, this sensation
divides itself in two: one sensation is past, and another is present. Again, this present
sensation divides itself in two, one sensation past and one sensation present, which
makes three sensations. And the process goes on ad infinitum. These sensations,
ordered in the passing of time, can be deprived of their peculiar characters. They then
represent the integers. In this way, the integers are created by the passing of time.
But, according to Godel, integers, in the Brouwerian view, are not created arbitrarily
but through a process, answering a principle, the division of the present, over which
we have no control. Mathematics remains objective. Godel seems to find Brouwers
account quite acceptable.44
In addition, there is a criticism of Husserl in the argument above from the Gibbs
lecture. In Husserls phenomenology, mathematical objects are given to us in a
specific intuition. But we can analyse this intuition, make clear each of its
components, and, in this way, disclose the constitution, or the creation, of
mathematical objects. But this is exactly what Godel denies. We cannot analyse
our mathematical intuition in such a way that we could explain the constitution of
mathematical objects. There must be a gap in this analysis.
The argument in the Gibbs Lecture establishes that there must be some data, of
which we cannot recall the genesis and which must either be given from the outside or
be produced by an unconscious process in what Godel calls reason. The first
possibility, the existence of external data, was the one explored in the Supplement of
1964 to the Cantor paper. There are several items in Godels Nachlass relating to the
second possibility, the existence of unconscious processes at the basis of
mathematical knowledge. I do not claim that this is Godels position nor that Godel
always uses the word reason in this sense. Still, it is a possibility that Godel seriously
contemplates.
The longer text is a draft written by Godel apparently for Wang (1974):
In the second alternative, mathematical objects cannot have been created by us,
our ego out of nothing, since, by this definition of creation, they cant have any
other properties except those we have given to them. [Here the following lines are
crossed out: Note that it doesnt follow from the second alternative that
mathematical objects cannot have been created by the human mind or by the ego
43

See Brouwer (1929).

A note from Wang, corrected by Godel:

44

Both Brouwer and Riemann speak of creating mathematical objects in our mind. But they do not mean or cannot
mean creations [Godel overwrites on Wangs text: out of nothing]. Rather they must mean creations [Godel adds: out
of some given elements] according to principles [Godel adds: which these elements permit]. The idea is analogous to
physical construction, where we can combine given materials to make new things [Godel adds: but we can combine
them only in ways permitted by these things (e.g. we cannot combine the hardness of the diamond and the chemical
composition of wood].
(Godels Papers, box 20, folder). See also Wang (1996, pp. 224225).

226

Pierre Cassou-Nogue`s
out of some given material because in this case math[ematical] objectivity (as
composed or being produced by something which we cannot change, over which
we have no control) would also have an objective character]. Note that the whole
argument would not go through if creation were defined to be construction out of
previously given elements or with the help of reason (supposed to be something
in us but different from our ego) [. . .]
In mathematics, [the] question is to find out what we have perhaps unconsciously
created [. . .]
[and written in the margin] Mind: an ego using reason. The ego uses an entity
different from it but in contact with it.45
But there are also shorter references to reason:
First of all, by mind here is meant an ego using reason or in its use of reason.46

Transc[endental] ego: ego in so far as it takes a cognitive attitude and in it is

guided by reason (with which it has contact) Husserl Ideas 80 inconsistent:
ego + reason; activity and passivity.47
The last item makes it clear that Godel moves away at least from the letter of
Husserls (1913) Phenomenology. In paragraph 80 of the Ideen zu einer reinen
Phaenomenologie, concerning the relation of life-experiences (Erlebnisse) to the pure
ego, Husserl distinguishes, on one side, life-experiences that have the character of an
act and in which the ego is present and, on the other side, life-experiences, such as the
Hyle, that are not acts but only form the surroundings, the Milieu of our acts.
Husserl adds that such life-experiences do not have the characteristic relation to the
ego [. . .] but they also belong to the ego, they are his. Now, in relation to the splitting
of the mind into an ego and a reason, Husserls remark might seem contradictory to
Godel. If some life-experiences or, in the case of mathematics, some concepts, some
thoughts, do not have an apparent relation to the ego and do not appear as ours,
then one should not make them part of the ego. As the Hyle with respect to sense
perception, there could then be at the basis of mathematical knowledge some data,
some thoughts, which do not belong to the ego, cannot be reflected upon and, in fact,
come from another part of the mind, different from the ego.
Though there are several items, in Godels papers, relating to this reason, its
nature remains quite obscure. One would like to know what this reason represents
and why its processes are inaccessible to the ego. I can only find a slight trail toward
an answer in Godels writings. One could imagine that mathematical data come from
a learning that happens during childhood and which cannot be re-enacted
afterwards. It is an idea that can often be found in Godels writings that the
primitive concepts of our sciences are constituted during childhood. For example,
Godel speaks of the conceptual outfit, which, in our culture, we acquire in about the
45

Godels Papers, box 8c, folder 117, item 040403.

Godels Papers, box 20, on the margin of the text from Wang.
47
Godels Papers, box 1c, folder 67, on the margin of a text from W.A. Howard.
46

The objective existence of mathematical objects

227

first 15 years of our life and which is in no way enlarged but only applied in a more
and more involved fashion by science today. Or, in another letter, [. . .] the primitive
terms of our thinking arrived [at] by the age of two or three [. . .] and then fortified by
const[ant] use for the description of objective facts.48 Of course, it would be absurd
to maintain that a child has already acquired the concept of set that is embodied by
the axioms of set theory. However, Godels curious idea might be linked to another
prospective thesis, which surfaced in the supplement of the Cantor paper, namely
that fundamental concepts such as the concept of set are related to and could be
derived from the abstract elements of our empirical experience, such as the concept
of object. We would acquire in early childhood the concept of object, which would
then remain an unanalysable datum, and from there, we would derive for ourselves
the concept of set. Godel alludes to such a process in his lecture of 1961.49 At least, it
could explain that, since the concepts at the basis of our sciences are acquired during
childhood, their source remains obscured to the adult mind and appears as part of an
unconscious reason, a reason separate from the ego.
If, in his later recollections, Godel traces his Platonism back to his student years,
he only started defending this position between 1933 and 1944, after he had
convinced himself that his theorem of 1931 implies that one cannot prove the
consistency of the formal systems representing mathematical theories without
introducing non-finitary concepts which must be given by an immediate intuition.
There is a mathematical intuition, and there are mathematical objects, correlated to
this intuition. The problem is then to investigate the reality of these objects. The
problem is that of the objective existence of mathematical objects. Godels
arguments all seem to deal with the data of mathematics. These data could be some
definite objects, such as the integers, or some primitive concepts, such as the concept
of set. But they are either received from the outside and immediately given, or
produced through processes that cannot be described in terms of mental acts. There
is something in our intuition of mathematical objects for which we cannot account or
which we cannot analyse. Mathematical objects have an opacity, which cannot be
reduced. This simply seems to be the core of Godels position.
At the very beginning of this paper, I gave two quotations on Godels Platonism.
It seems that Godels claim is more accurately expressed in the second quotation.
Mathematical objects are independent of our mental acts and decisions, since a
decision, in the usual sense of the word, is a conscious process, which can be
reflected upon. However, it is not clear in Godels arguments that mathematics is
independent of the dispositions of the human mind, since a disposition, in the
usual sense of the word, is not something that can be accounted for in terms of
conscious acts. It may be that Godel eventually adopted this position, according to
which mathematics is independent from human dispositions. But this position is not
48
Godels Papers, box 1c, folder 137, item 011853, draft of a letter to C. Reid, 1966; Godels Papers, box 1c, folder 138,
draft of a letter to Robinson, 1974.
49
Godel (*1961?), in Godel (19862003, III, pp. 383385). Godel distinguishes two directions in the development of a child:

on the one hand, experimenting with the objects of the external world and with its [own] sensory and motor organs,
on the other hand [. . .] coming to a better and better understanding of language, and that meansas soon as the
child is beyond the most primitive designating [of objects]of the basic concepts on which it rests.
The development of empirical science is a systematic and conscious extension of what the child does when it develops in
the first direction, whereas mathematics is a systematic and conscious advance in the second direction.

228

Pierre Cassou-Nogue`s

required by his arguments, nor is it the only position that he contemplates. As we

have seen, Godel can reinterpret Brouwers account of the origin of arithmetic so as
to make it acceptable and objective in his sense. What Godel demands from a
philosophy of mathematics is only that it acknowledges the independence of
mathematics relative to the ego, the sphere of consciousness, acts and decisions. But
it may find that the human mind is larger than this ego, and that mathematics
depends on some disposition of the human mind, unanalysable in terms of acts and
decisions.

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