CHAPTER FOUR

CORRUPTION IN NANGGROE ACEH DARUSSALAM BEFORE

DECENTRALISATION
Introduction
This chapter explores factors that cause corruption in the Aceh before the endorsement
of law on local government in Indonesia with special emphasis on the impact of the
kleprocratic elites and politics of neo-patrimonialism in the central government on the
local politics and the prevalence of corruption in Aceh.
The proponent of kleptocratic approach argued that corrupt is due to the
selfishness and greediness of the leader who used political power for his personal
enrichment.
260
In the pursuance of self enrichment, the kliptocrat leader might set up a
political sstem that could maximise the economic interest of himself and his loalist
elite group. The act li!e a private monopolist that strives for productivit efficienc,
while restricting the output of monopol so that their profit could be maximised.
26"
The do formulate laws and regulations, such as taxes, subsidies and even
privatisation, but these regulations are not for the necessities of the welfare of the
public at large, rather to maximise their own profits.
262
#owever, not all kleptocrats
want a strong role of state in econom. $ome kleptocrats prefer to open mar!et sstem
and liberali%e the econom to increase the productivit of the countr. As the
productivit of the countr increases that might also increase their profit, for in
260
$ee, Andres!i, $tanislav, &'rivatel provided public goods in a large econom( The limits of
altruism), in The African predicament: A study in the pathology of modernization, ed., $tanislav
Andres!i *+ew ,or!( Atherton "-6./
26"
0lson, 1ancur, &2ictatorship, democrac, and 2evelopment,) American Political Science Review,
vol. .3 *"--4/( 563-535.
262
$ee, 6ose-Ac!erman, Corruption and overnment!, ""3
"2.
kleptocratic state, there is no perfect mar!et as such.
264
Those kleptocrats would ma!e
sure that the sstem wor! for their own benefit. The !leptocrats could manipulate
contract and the process of privatisation of state-own enterprises. The might award
the contract and privatisation to part who is willing pa highest bribe to public
official, or in return of the award of privatisation and contracts, the official might
oblige the winner of the tender to have partnership with local companies belong to
their families or close friend.
267
In this strand, the kleptocrat often practiced the so called politics of neo-
patrimonialism as the wa to remain in control of political power. This concept is
originated from 8eber9s concept of patrimonilism which tries to explain a pattern of
political sstem where the power of the leader derived primaril from his abilit to
manipulate political condition to win and retain the loalt of dominant section of the
political elite. It is assumed that politics is characteri%ed b elite-rival factions and
cli:ues whom principall competing for obtaining influence and the distribution of
spoil, in such condition, for the patrimonialist leader to remain in power is b
satisfing the material interest of this particular segment of political elite especiall
through the distribution of privileges, such as fiefs and benefices.
265

1oreover, in such political setting, there is no separation of the &private) and
the &public sphere); therefore it might perpetuate the practice of extortion on a mass-
scale basis. 6ent-see!ing behaviour is not legall condemned as corruption, rather it is
encouraged b the existing norms;
266
in return to their loalties to the ruling elite.
#ence, corruption might serve as an effective mean for political stabilit and
264
Ibid., "".
267
Ibid., ""-
265
$ee 2wight , <ing, &=orruption in Indonesia( A curable cancer>) "ournal of #nternational Affairs,
vol. 54, issue 2, *$pring 2000 a/( 604-625
266
$ee, ?erhald @. Aens!i and Bean Aens!i, $uman Societies: An #ntroduction to Sociology *+ew ,or!(
1c?raw #ill, Inc, 5th edn., "-.3/, "-4
"2-
particular for the ruler to remain in power.
263
These two approaches are ver useful for
analsing the problem of corruption in Indonesia n Aceh in particular. It addresses
:uestion how $uharto abused his political power and state governance in Indonesia for
his own interest and cronies. Also it addresses :uestion how $uharto maintained his
political control on the government of Indonesia to protect the interest of his famil
and cronies.
Corruption during the Ne Order! the I"p#ct o$ the Kleptocratic
Le#der #nd Po%itic& o$ Neo'P#tri"oni#%i&"
The end of the 0ld 0rder did not reduce corruption
26.
; it rather remained endemic
during the +ew 0rder regime C a bureaucratic-authoritarian regime. =orruption had
become worse; $uharto graduall emerged as an authoritarian ruler and kleptocrat
leader, resembling the ancient Bavanese rulers who distributed national resources to
famil members and other cronies for remaining in power.
26-

The +ew 0rder regime was concerned with the problem of underdevelopment
and political instabilit. The answer to this problem was b initiating a total
restructuring polic that emphasi%ed securit, stabilit and economic development.
$uharto made use of the dual%function of AD6I *Armed Eorces of 6epublic of
Indonesia/ as a strong bac!bone of his regime. The dual function of AD6I stipulated
that militar should pla integral role in national politics side b side the senior
263
$ee <litgaard, 42
26.
=orruption was an important factor that led the 0ld 0rder to collapse, especiall when $u!arno
introduced the so-called guided democrac coupled with a defensive polic *politik banteng/, where the
state monopoli%ed the state econom and nationalised all foreign assets. The polic had caused a
serious inflation in the modern Indonesian histor, which reach almost "000F. Inflation had
significantl affected the live of the public officials and the people at large. In order to maintain a
decent life-stle, public officials were involved in rent-see!ing activities, ma!ing corruption almost
endemic in the countr. $ee, 2ani 8. 1unggoro, et.al., &engugat industri pertam'angan di #ndonesia#
*Dogor( A$'', 8alhi, Aatin dan 'i!ul, "---/, .-"0
26-
It was practiced in the pre-modern histor of Indonesia, that !ing was in the exalted position with an
ultimate political authorit to dispense personal favour to his own famil or loal supporters. see
Alatas, .0-.",
"40
bureaucratic and technocrats, particularl in the decision-ma!ing process. The
involvement of the militar in politics and civil administration had strengthened the
control over state enterprises b the militar and rendered militar power absolute.
#arold =rouch states(
After "-66, $uharto graduall tightened his hold on the armed forcesG
with appointments to civil posts that offer prospects of material gains.
H8hileI other officers were encouraged to go into business, with the
promise of help from the administrationGlicenses, credits, or
contractG.
230

The installment of militar elite at the !e position of the bureaucrac had
transformed the sprawling government bureaucrac becoming less an area of
contending political forces and more an instrument of power for the ruling elites.
Apart of controlling militar forces, $uharto too! ?ol!ar
23"
as the base for his
political support. As a result, when the first general election under the +ew 0rder in
"-3", whereb "0 parties too! part in the election, the ?ol!ar won 62 percent of the
vote which was more that enough to form a strong government under the leadership
of $uharto.
Eurthermore, being aware of political challenge coming from the other
political parties, especiall the 1uslim part *1asumi/, $uharto with the support of
2'6, where b ?ol!ar controlled the 60 percent of the seats plus those seats that
were reserved for the militar representative, initiated a drastic restructuring of the
political part sstem, reformulated regulation of election and part candidac. In
order to !eep all political parties in close government control, in "-34 $uharto
230
#arold =rouch, &'atrimonialism and 1ilitar 6ule in Indonesia,) in The State and (evelopment in
the Third )ord, ed., Atul <ohli *J$( 'rinceton Jniversit 'ress, "-.6/, 273-27..
23"
The ?ol!ar had its root bac! in the late $u!arno9s ?uided 2emocrac. It was not a political part
rather it was a militar-sponsored functional grouping of more than "00 anticommunist organi%ations.
This group had a diversified membership composing of militar officers, civil servants, trade unions,
students and women. It was a platform for militar to mobili%e civilian support communist. $ince "-66,
under the ?eneral Ali 1urtopo, ?ol!ar too! part in the election and became an ostensibl nonpartisan
civilian constituenc for +ew 0rder9s authorit until the end of the regime.
"4"
introduced a restructuring polic of political part sstem. #e reduced the number of
political parties into three dominant political parties, the ''', '2I and ?ol!ar.
Thence, with the legislation of the 'olitical 'art Dill of "-35, he reconciled these
parties to the re:uirement of Pancasila (emocracy
232
, b imposing pancasila as the
sole foundation of these political parties. #e also imposed tight screening
234
on all
candidates of the opposition parties b the election commission, whose members
were appointed b the ministr of home affairs.
In addition, $uharto was directl involved in the organi%ational structure of
?ol!ar and he appointed senior militar officers, cabinet ministers and leading
technocrats as the member of the organi%ation9s top advisor leadership. #e also
forced government9s officials, civil servants and emploees of state enterprise,
including their famil to be loal supporters of ?ol!ar. In addition to state apparatus9
supports and militar, the ?ol!ar received a large amount of financial support from
state revenue, and full media coverage from the local state control press. +o doubt,
that it performed ver well in ever election during the +ew 0rder.
237
*$ee table 7."
to 7.5/
#aving ?ol!ar as the dominant political parties in the state legislative
assembl, $uharto conceived an absolute political power in the countr. #e
established a ver strong political networ!ing until no bod dared to :uestion his
decision and polic in governing the countr.
T#(%e )*+! +,-- Gener#% E%ection
232
The term 'ancasila 2emocrac was used b $uharto to silent an political oppositions that either
came from Islamic stream or socialist faction, which he considered as against the 'ancalisa.
234
The screening process as such, became political tool for the government to control and minimised
the sense of opposition within those two political parties.
237
$ee, 2wight , <ing, 1. 6aas 6asKid. LAandslide for ?0A<A6 in the "-.3 Indonesian elections(
The case of Aceh,L Asian Survey, vol. 2., +o. - *$eptember "-../( -"6--25.
"42
+o 'art Mote F $eat F *"-3"/ 6emar!
" ?ol!ar 39.750.096 62,11 232 62,80 - 0,69
2 PPP 18.743.491 29,29 99 27,12 + 2,17
4 PDI 5.504.757 8,60 29 10,08 - 1,48
Total 63.998.344 100,00 360 100,00
T#(%e )*.! +,/. Gener#% E%ection
+o 'art Mote F $eat F *"-3"/ 6emar!
" ?ol!ar 48.334.724 64,34 242 62,11 + 2,23
2 PPP 20.871.880 27,78 94 29,29 - 1,51
4 PDI 5.919.702 7,88 24 8,60 - 0,72
Total 35."26.406 "00,00 467 "00,00
T#(%e )*0! +,/-Gener#% E%ection
+o 'art Mote F $eat F *"-3"/ 6emar!
" ?ol!ar 62.783.680 73,16 299 68,34 + 8,82
2 PPP 13.701.428 15,97 61 27,78 - 11,81
4 PDI 9.384.708 10,87 40 7,88 + 2,99
Total
85.869.816
100,0
0
400
T#(%e )*)! +,,.Gener#% E%ection
+o 'art Mote F $eat F *"-3"/ 6emar!
" ?ol!ar 66.599.331 68,10 282 73,16 - 5,06
2 PPP 16.624.647 17,01 62 15,97 + 1,04
4 PDI 14.565.556 14,89 56 10,87 + 4.02
Total
97.789.534
100,0
0
400 100,00
T#(%e )*1! +,,- Gener#% E%ection
"44
+o 'art Mote F $eat F *"-3"/ 6emar!
" ?ol!ar 84.187.907 74,51 325 68,10 + 6,41
2 PPP 25.340.028 22,43 89 17,00 + 5,43
4
PDI 3.463.225 3,06 11 14,90
-
11,84
Total
112.991.150
100,0
0 425 100,00
$ources( <'J **omisi Pemilihan +mum #ndonesia, Indonesian ?eneral @lection
=ommission/
235
The Po%itic& o$ Nepoti&"! An Opportunit2 $or Corruption
The restructuring polic had profound effects on governmental administration as a
whole and ultimatel on corruption. $uharto appointed man of loalist militar
officers as cabinet ministers, high-ran!ing bureaucrats, and directors of state-owned
enterprises. As it was practiced in the past, these officers had the opportunit to enrich
themselves while the were holding these positions. D rewarding these officers with
economic favors, politicall $uharto benefited a lot, because the would not rebel
against him, instead remained politicall loal to him.
236
#e also rewarded those loal
bureaucrats and technocrats with special privileges to earn extra incomes from the
public purse b mar!ing up price of commodities in the procurement of public office
and public development proKect. 8hile for the ordinar civil servant, $uharto allowed
them ta!e in rent-see!ing activities and demanded illegal administrative fee for an
services rendered to the public. $uharto had never considered rent-see!ing activities in
235
$ee, #istorical development of election in Indonesia,
Nhttp(OOwww.!pu.go.idO$eKarahOpemilu"-33.shtmlP, *accessed 24 Banuar 2006/
236
$ee, 1cAeod, 6oss. &?overnment-Dusiness 6elations in Indonesia) in Reform and recovery in -ast
Asia: The role of the state and economic enterprise, ed., 'eter 2rsdale *Aondon( 6outledge, 2000/,
"76-"6.; $oesastro, #adi &?overnance and the crisis in Indonesia) Ibid., "20-"75.

"47
the public services as corruption, as long as it was properl done and did not disturb
the securit, stabilit and development of the countr, corruption was alright.
The militar elites plaed a dominant role in awarding contracts, licenses and
developmental proKects. The established a Koint venture the =hinese businessmen or
what was commonl !nown as cukong in state economic activities. 1an top militar
officials had established their own companies, which generall became the mas!
&topeng) of the companies that were financiall supported b =hinese businessmen.
0ne of the most prominent cukong was Aim $ioe Aiong. As a result, a new pattern of
corruption emerged out of this Koint venture or Ali Daba econom. The Ali Daba
econom had mutuall benefited the cukong, $uharto and his cronies. The cukong had
not onl obtained favour for government contract, but also received the !ic! bac!s
from the militar; and that made them become ver affluent and dominated a
significant portion of state econom.
233
The issue of corruption that came into public spot light was the case of
corruption in the state oil compan, the 'ertamina. The compan had Kust experienced
windfall profits following the global oil price hi!es in "-30s. At that particular time,
$uharto was at the earl stage of his presidenc and was in need of huge financial
resources to strengthen his political power. D hoo! or b croo!, he had to ma!e sure
that ?ol!ar should win the coming election in "-3". As stated b 6obison that
'ertamina had become the primar source of revenues of government to finance its
political cost.
23.
$uharto used Ibn $utowo to divert the oil revenues to support his
political loalists and cronies. 2ue to lac! of accountabilit and transparenc, which
!ept awa 'ertamina from public watch, it had become the nest of corruption in "-35-
233
$ee, 8illiam 6. Aiddle, .eadership and culture in #ndonesian politics *Australia( Allen Q Jnwin,
"--3/
23.
$ee, 6ichard 6obison, #ndonesia: the Rise of capital of capital *Australia( Allen Q Jnwin, "-.6/
"45
"-36. As the result, 'ertamina collapsed and was declared ban!rupt with J$2 "0
million deficits9 and according to the =ommission IM9s investigation,
23-
the deficits
was due to the manipulation of the oil revenues b the regime to finance its political
cost. $everal prominent individuals were involved in the scandal, including Ibnu
$utowo, Aiem $ioe Aiong, Ibu tien *the first lad/, $uharto and his famil.
2.0

2espite the assurance of the president, the practice of corruption continued to
prevail, giving an impression that corruption had become a set of norms in the
administration of public affairs. As corruption had been spreading not onl within top
militar elites and the top of bureaucrac, but also had been practiced b the
'resident9s famil, the first lad, 1adam Tien $uharto. In the mid "-30s, there was a
popular term !nown as &1adam Ten 'ercent). The term emerged because of the
dominant involvement of the first lad in the issuance of licenses and contracts, in
which she used to as! for "0 to "5 F share of an proKect or contracts; such as the
building of a mega proKect of Indonesia 1ini Indah Theme 'ar!.
2."

Eollowing the ban!ruptc of 'ertamina and the decline of oil price at the end of
"-30s, the +ew 0rder regime turned its face toward forestr as the main source of
revenue. It was !nown as the &?reen ?old). $uharto and his cronies began to exploit
the rain forest in the countr, which contributed the second largest Indonesian export
revenue after the oil and gas.
2avid 8. Drown, who did research on tropical rain forest in Indonesia, found
that starting from the earl "-.0s up to "--5 the area of forest exploitation or
concessions for forest exploitationO hak pengelolan hutan *#'#/ had reached 62
million acres. Almost 40F or ". million acres of the 62 million acres were under the
23-
The =ommission IM was created b $uharto to investigate the accusation of corruption within
'ertamina b a number of student associations who went out on the street in "-30. #e also appointed
1ohd. #atta, the former vice president, to chair the commission.
2.0
1uhammad #usni, ., see also <ing, 6aas 6asKid, 3
2."
$ee $uminarto, Sawito: Ratu adil, guru/i, Tertuduh *$emarang( =M. Ane!a, "-3./
"46
concessions of the big five companies, namel( 'acific Darito, 2KaKanti, Alas <usuma,
<au Aapis Indonesia *<AI/ and Dob #asan9s groups, while the rest were shared b
another 5.5 small companies.
2.2

The provision of logging concessions depended strongl on the closeness of
each logging compan9s relationship to the centre of political power. The cases of Dob
#asan9s ?roup, $alim ?roup of the Aiem $ioe Aiong9s corporate empire, and the
'acific Darito of 'raKogo 'agestu ?roup, might be good examples of the croniesm
practice.
2.4
These corporations obtained privileges b creating Koint venture business with
$uharto9s children who obtained :uite big shares in the Koint ventures, ranging from "5
to 40 percents of the total share. Eor instance, 'raKogo had given $uharto9s elder
daughter, $iti #ardiKanti 6u!man *1ba! Tutut/ "5 percent of the share of the 'T.
TanKung Aestari, a compan that produced pulp and 45 percent of the 'T. 1usi #utan
'ersada, a compan that provide raw material for pulp production. Doth even, had
Kointl established one of the largest sugar plantations in $ulawesi.
2.7
These cronies9 corporations were also involved in financing political
campaigns. The had contributed huge funds to $uharto9s foundation *yayasan/ as the
wa to maintain their relation with the ruling elites, especiall with $uharto. In "--",
Darito Kointl with $alim ?roup, had to provide a large sum of mone, J$2 220
million, to bail out 2uta Dan! owned b +usamba #oldings whereb .0 percent of its
2.2
$ee 2avid 8. Drown, &Addicted to rent corporate and spatial distribution of forest resource in
Indonesia; implication of forest sustainabilit and government polic,) #ndonesia%+* Tropical 0orest
&anagement Programme, Ba!arta *$eptember "---/
2.4
#asan and Aiem9s tie with $uharto extend bac! in "-50s when $uharto was a staff in command of
the 2iponegoro division. Aeim was the sole supplier for arm of his division, while #asan was his
sugar smuggling partner, which eventuall led to his removal from the position, but their relationship
continued. 8hen $uharto sei%ed the political power, Aiem and #asan became &the most visible
beneficiaries of $uharto9s patronage), Adam $chwar%, A nation in waiting *Doulder( 8estview 'ress,
2000/, "0-
2.7
Ibid., "7"
"43
shares belonged to the three social foundations owned b $uharto. Darito also bailed
out Astra, which was almost ban!rupt, because of the failure of the Koint venture
proKect on village ban!ing sstem between the $umma Dan! and +ahdatul Jlama.
In return for this huge financial contribution to support $uharto9s famil
business empire, Darito gained special privileges from the government. 8ith the help
of $uharto, Darito was able to purchase 45 logging concessions from other logging
companies. Darito also obtained eas loan from three prominent state ban!s, Dumi
2aa Dan!, Dapindo Dan!, and 2agang +egara Dan!. In "--", Darito received
subsidies fund from the state forestr compan, Inhutani II, which amounted to J$2
75 millions and Dumi 2aa Dan! approved its J$2 550 millions loan. $uch huge
amount of fund had enabled Darito to expand its business empire.
2.5
2espites of strong criticism of the practice of cronism, $uharto continued
providing his cronies and famil members with huge business opportunities and
privileges from state regulation and revenues. D putting his loal technocrat in the
'ertamina, and +ational Aogistic Doard9s *DJA0?/, $uharto indirectl, support his
famil and cronies to monopolise the import and export commodit into and out of the
countr. Tomm $uharto, the oungest son, emerged as the sole monopolist of the
export and import of the commodit from the state corporation, especiall the
'ertamina. It was indirectl forced to sign long term contract for its export and import
commodities with the two shipping companies owned b Tomm; so did the DJA0?
which had to use those companies that belong to $alim ?roup in distributing its basic
commodities, including rice, wheat, sugar and sobean, through.
2.6
$igit #arKoKudanto, $uharto9s elder son was also given license for
monopoli%ing importation of plastic and its domestic product through a polethlene
2.5
Ibid., p. -
2.6
<ing, 6"7
"4.
whereb he owned partl of the shares.
2.3
A compan owned b $igit9s wife became
the onl authorised producer of mandator identification cards of Indonesia. Tutut,
was given the contracts to build and manage highwa proKects and the process of
driving licenses. Dambang 9s compan was given a contract to import the special
paper used b the national mint.
2..
#is compan also was given licenses for an
international direct dial operation and the first digital mobile phone networ! in
Indonesia.
2.-
$o did Tomm, who was given a chance to monopoli%e clove trade and
dut free importation of <orean cars, which was planned to be the &national car-
Timor.)
Accordingl, the two decades of rapid economic growth from "-.0s to
"--0s, had not onl given rise to a group of large famil-owned =hinese
conglomerates of $uharto9s cronies, but also paved the wa to the rapidl expanding
business empire of $uharto9s children.
2-0
Dased on the Time 1aga%ine report,
$uhartor9s offspring collectivel had significant e:uit sta!e in 567 companies within
Indonesia and hundreds in overseas. These companies put $uharto9s famil in control
of some 4.6 million hectares of real estate, an area larger than Delgium.
2-"
AditKondro
describes that $uharto9s administration has bred corruption and nepotism practices in
the government. It created cron businessmen. 1ost of them were =hinese and
2.3
6ichard Dorsu! &1ar!et( The limits of reforms) in #ndonesia 'eyond Suharto: Polity, economy,
society transition, *eds./ 2onal <. @mmerson, "5"
2..
Ibid., 6"3
2.-
2wight ,. <ing, &The political econom of the forest sector in Indonesia,) "ournal of -nvironment
and (evelopment, 5, +o. 2 *"--6 b/( 2"6-242
2-0
$ee, @mmarson, #ndonesia 'eyond Suhart111
2-"
Ibid., $uharto filed a law suit with the =entral 2istrict =ourt Ba!arta and the Ba!arta #igh =ourt
against the Time maga%ine9s Asia edition owned b Time Inc., fro defaming his name and reputation,
but both ruled in Time9s favour. 0n August 4", the $upreme =ourt Kudges overturned the decisions and
ordered Time9s Inc. Asia and six emploees to apologi%e in leading Indonesian maga%ines and
newspapers as well as Time9s Asian, @urope and America editions. The $upreme =ourt also ordered the
Time maga%ine to R"06 million for defaming $uharto. #owever, Time spo!esman 2aniel <ile said in
+ew ,or! hat the maga%ine had no comment since it had not received an notification from the court
about a ruling. #e said the maga%ine continued to stand b its stor. $ee, Ali <otarumalos &Time
maga%ine loses suit against $uharto). Nhttp(OOwww.sfgate.comOcgi-binOarticle.cgi>
fSOnOaO20030-O"0Ointer...P *accessed "0 $eptember 2003/
"4-
$uharto9s children and relative. The controlled national business activities and
created economic turbulence and developed &$uharto Inc).
2-2
#ow did $uharto build such huge business empire> $uharto ruled Indonesia
li!e a !ing in the Bavanese tradition. #e acted as semar, one of the characters in the
fol! drama &wayang) of the Bavanese tradition, who saved Indonesia from the threat
of communism and economic stagnation of the 0ld 0rder. #e restructured the whole
sstem of governance of Indonesia resembling the Bavanese !ingdom, b establishing
the intricate nationwide sstem of patronage in the modern era of Indonesia; and that
!ept him in power for 42 ears, the longest life serving president or !ing in the histor
of Indonesia.
2-4

The P#tri"oni#% S2&te" o$ Ad"ini&tr#tion #nd the Pre3#%ence
o$ Pett2 Corruption
Another significant impact of patrimonial sstem of administration is the prevalence
of pett corruption at all levels of government administration. This is due to the
incapabilit of the public servant to ma!e a distinction between public affairs and
personal affairs, in which most of the time the official mixes up the two affairs
together.
2-7
The inabilit of the public officials to differentiate between the two spheres
is strongl associated with the innate culture of the societ from which these public
officials are from. <ing argues that, at the individual level, the basic source of this
problem is the conflict between the legal norms of the government bureaucrac and
2-2
$ee, ?eorge B. AditKondro, &$oeharto Inc), in The last days of President Soeharto, ed., #erb Eeith,
and ?err van <lin!en *Australia( 1onash Asia Institute, "---/, ""3-"20
2-4
$ee $chwar, 77, it was ver hard to conceive that $uharto9s power collapsed at last. 6ashid 1oten
argues that the driving force that forced $uharto to resign was the combination of the grass root protest
and the declining of militar loalt toward $uharto during the last few ears of his tenure, as man of
new generation of militar elite came into political picture of Indonesia. 6ashid 1oten, a 'rofessor at
the 2epartment of 'olitical $cience, International Islamic Jniversit 1alasia, Interviewed b author,
?omba!, $elangor, "" Bune 2003.
2-7
Alatas, -2
"70
the fol! norms that various people share in the societ C the norm that governs various
informal social networ!s, such as !inship ties, cronism and patron-client.
2-5

Therefore, it depends on the individual9s conformit with either one of the two
norms. If the fol! norms are more dominant than the legal norms, corruption certainl
became prevalent. It is due to the practice of particularlism and instrumentalism C the
two components underling most sets of the fol! norms. Aee further explains that, on
the one hand, the practice of particularism might result in favorable or special
treatment of &insider) at the expense of fairness and honest to the &outsider); while
on the other the practice of instrumentalism, where the reali%ation of personal goals
with a minimum cost, regardless of legalit of the means used to achieve those
goals.
2-6
$uch assumption is ver much relevant to the case of bureaucratic sstem in
Indonesia, which seems to have been set in such awa that the legal norms is onl for
the formalit, while the fol! norms has been predominantl regulating the behavior of
the bureaucrats at all level of government. In such bureaucratic sstem, corruption
becomes the realit of life and as the wa to survive.
In addition to patrimonialist approach, the &fair wage-effort hpothesis),
assumed that pett corruption becomes prevalent is due to the socil condition in which
civil servants earn relativel lower than the level of satisfactor pament; and
therefore, the tend to engage in &satisficing) rather than &maximi%ing) behavior.
The involve in corruption to achieve a &fair) income, and therefore if the receive
proper or fair pament, the certainl ma let go the chance to practice corruption.
2-3

2-5
<ing *a/, 6".
2-6
$ee, 6ance '.A. Aee, &Dureaucratic corruption in Asia( The problem of incongruence between legal
norms and fol! norms) in 2ureaucratic Corruption in Asia, ed., Aedivina M. =arino*Tue%on =it( B1=
'ress "-.6/
2-3
$ee, =aroline M. 6iKc!eghem and Deatrice 8eder, Corruption and the Rate of Temptation: do low
wages in the civil services cause corruption, I1E 8or!ing 'aper, *Bune "--3/
"7"
Thus, b combining the above two approaches two sets of conditions might be
considered as reliable determinant factors contributing to the perpetuation of the pett
corruption in the public sector in Indonesia in general. The first set of condition is
pertaining to the social-economic status of the public officials. 'articularl before
reformation and the fall of $uharto, the salaries of public official were notoriousl
low, ma!ing them unable to !eep pace with the cost of living especiall in the maKor
cities. Eor instance, the lowest ran!ing public official earns as little as 6ps. "35,000
*e:uivalent to J$R 25/ per month plus a rice allotment and health insurances
*A$<@$/, meanwhile the highest-ran!ing public official earns as much as 6ps.
"500,000 of basic salar * e:uivalent to J$R "50/.
2-.

2espite of the notoriousl low salar, the public official is considered as a
highl prestigious profession and possesses considerable discretionar power; and
therefore the are expected b the societ to maintain a commensuratel prestigious
wa of life, and generousl provide assistance and support to their !ins, friends and
subordinates in time of need, such as authoritative bac! up and financial support. $uch
a combination of the low salar and considerable discretionar power creates a feeling
of personal discrepanc and paradox of role; and that ignites the feeling of the needs
to match their prestige and power that the possess. In order to match these two
paradoxes, some official might resort to rent-see!ing activities for additional income
to maintain a high standard of living, while for those who maintain their idealism and
professionalism the find their wa through self emploment such as farming,
opening a restaurant, or other legal business activities, however the number of such
people are few.
2-.
The have been paid additional honorarium for the position and famil, while A$<@$ it was
deducted from their salaries monthl, see the "akarta Post, "3 Banuar 2000, "
"72
Another set of condition which contributes to the prevalence of pett
corruption is ver much structural and institutional in nature. The public officials in
Indonesia consider themselves as the governing elite, more as masters than as
servants. $uch perception might be inherited from the colonial period or from the
traditional practice of administration in the histor of this nation. Eor instance the
traditional sstem of aristocrac which was perceived as the lord.
2--
@speciall, during
the +ew 0rder, the civil service was developed to be a political instrument and grew
as a strong and wide-ranging administrative apparatus. As political instrument, public
officials were obliged to be members of the ?ol!ar; and their careers depended on
their contribution to securing the part9s leading position. ?ol!ar used to win
normall 30 to 35 per cent of the vote in the regular general elections. In such
administrative sstem, a culture of unit and reciprocal benefits was established,
instead of distance and autonom between politicians and the bureaucrac.
400
As the
result, it created gaps between the bureaucrac and the public. Thus, as long as the
public official maintains such perception of their position as the aristocrat class of the
past certainl pett corruption remains as part of the rules of the game in public
administration. The public continues to provide the fee for an administrative service
received.
40"
Accordingl, corruption in Indonesia during the new order regime was not
onl perpetuated b the low salar of the public officials, but also b the need of the
respective presidents to remain in power b enabling loal figures in the bureaucrac
and militar to benefit from state econom.
2--
$ee, <ing *a/, 6"-
400
$tein <ristiansen and 1uhid 6amli, &Duing an income( the mar!et fro civil service positions in
Indonesia,) Contemporary Southeast Asia, 2..2 *August 2006/, pp. 203-22.
40"
$uch self perception obviousl contradicted with the idealism embodied in the basic principle of role
of public official as the servant of the state and servant of the public *u'di 3egara dan u'di
masyarakat/. As Acehnese use to moc! &ap dari nanggroue) and &ap dari masyarakat4 *rob the state
and rob the people/. A public official, Interviews b author, Aangsa, Aceh- Indonesia, 20 Banuar 2006.
"74
The P#tri"oni#% S2&te" o$ Ad"ini&tr#tion #nd Corruption in Aceh
As in other parts of Indonesia, the impact of the patrimonial sstem of government
under the +ew 0rder on the local politics in Aceh in particular was obvious.
402
The
creation of new +l56'alang *secular technocrats/ group as rival to the +lama has
fractured the communalism within the Acehnese communit and that has strengthened
the domination of central government in the local politics. As the agent of central
government, the new +l56'alang group enKoed wide range of socio-political and
economic privileges. $uharto seemed to close his ees on impact of unscrupulous civil
servant who were involved in rent-see!ing activities for self-enrichment on the local
development as along as it did not disturb the public affairs. $uch permissive attitude
was an effective tool for controlling the civil servants so that the remain loal to his
government. It created a paternalisatic stle of leadership whereb the children were
expected to show loalt to ma!e the father happ( &asal 'apak senang). As a result,
the problem of corruption began to encroach into the local politics of Aceh.
$ince the promise of development had never materialised, the third elite group
emerged and initiated a rebellion against the central government.
404
The central
government responded with the enforcement of militar rule and operations in the
region; a fact that rendered the life of the people in Aceh even worse. Therefore,
politicall the people of Aceh were placed in an aw!ward situation whereb their lives
and families were continuousl threatened b either the militar for being accused of
supporting the rebellion or the rebels for supporting the government. Ai!ewise, in the
economic field, their economic activities were restricted because of the night curfew
402
8ith regard to 0ld 0rder, the local politics in Aceh was dominated b a long period of (arl #slam
revolution, which had crippled the local government since most of the civil servants and regional
militar division under the command of Deureueh Koined the revolution against the central government.
404
$ee =hapter Two
"77
in addition to blac!mail and robber, which became dail occurrences. 1an of them
migrated either to the neighbouring provinces or to neighbouring countries such as
1alasia.
As the militar increased in the region, corruption, collusion and nepotism
began to infect the entire state apparatus. 1ilitar graduall influenced the local
government decision. As a result, the pillaging of public funds has continued
unabated. 1an of the people empowerment programs that government initiated had
become fertile ground for unscrupulous to shameless looting of the funds for self-
enrichment b those in positions of influence and militar officers to fund militar
operation in the region. The coalition between the local bureaucrats and militar
officers was possible because of the powerlessness of the local legislative assembl,
whose power had been neutrali%ed b the electoral sstem that based on the principle
of 2emocrac Pancasila.
Poer%e&&ne&& o$ the DPRD 4Peop%e5& Con&u%t#ti3e A&&e"(%26
The implication of strong centralised sstem of governance on the local politics in
Aceh was so profound. The downsi%ing of the political parties into three main political
parties had significantl affected the political aspirations of local politics in Aceh.
The merging of the 1uslim political part and the Perti part into the ''' withered
the hope of the people in Aceh for an Islamic government, as the perceived obvious
factions of Islamic streams within the part. As there was no alternative 1uslim
political part, and the picture <a9bah as the smbol of the part, the people in Aceh
continued to support the ''' as part of their devotion to their religion CIslam; and
Aceh became one of the strongholds of the part. #owever, after the imposition of
'ancasila as the sole ideological foundation of all organisations in Indonesia, the '''
"75
was forbidden to use <a9bah as the smbol of the 'art, because it carried religious
affiliation and that was against 'ancasila. The part had to change its smbol to the
&star), and the part membership began to decline, as the people in Aceh saw it as no
different from ?ol!ar or '2I.
407
Desides the change of the smbol, the ''' loosened its grip in Aceh which
was due to the ineffectiveness of the part candidate to voice out the local aspirations
be it at the regional legislature level or at the centre. As the former regional head of
the ''', Abu 1uhammad ,us *Abu ,us/, said that, the presence of the ''' in the
legislative bod was no more than a group of dumber, who came for the meeting, to
sit, listen and no tal!. #e further implied that, at least, it was there to hold and put a
brea! in the program that was against the people9s interest; although graduall that
program continued to be implemented. +othing could stop the central government
from doing what it was planning to do in the region including the exploitation of the
natural resources in Aceh b the cron of the elite in Ba!arta. Abu ,us said that he
could onl shad tears for Aceh, how it was cruell exploited b the cronies and famil
of the ruling elites in Ba!arta.
405

After paral%ing the local legislative assembl, $uharto through his neo-
patrimonialism sstem of governance nurtured the emergence of an alternative
political force -the newl emerging class of secular technocrat, the new-+l56'alangs
407
$ince, "-3" election to "-.3 election the ''' was ahead of other two polities in winning the votes in
Aceh local election.; and the ?ol!ar was in the second place, in "-3" election ?ol!ar won 72F, 7"F in
"-36; 46F in "-.2. $tarting from "-.3 election after the prohibition of religious smbol in the political
part, ?ol!ar won 52F, 60F in "--2 60F and 62F in "--3 election. #owever, since ?ol!ar was in
collusion with AD6I faction, ?ol!ar has alwas the dominant political force at all level legislative bod
in the region. $ource, ''2O<'J *Panitia Pemilihan (aerah, *omisi Pemilihan +mum, Aocal @lection
=ommitteeO ?eneral @lection =ommittee/ Aceh.
405
1uhammad ,us, former chairman of the ''' of Aceh region, Interviewed b author, Dangsar, <uala
Aumpur, "0 $eptember "--7.
"76
to out-wit the local old elite1
406
The new elite group enKoed special political privileges
and economic benefits in return the had to serve the interest of the elites and their
cron in Ba!arta at the expense of the local communit. $uch political setting could be
illustrated b the procedure through which the regional head, governor, was
appointed. It was mandated that all candidates for governorship should pass the
screening process b the minister of home affairs and the short listed names would be
passed to the president for approval; and onl the one approved b the president could
be the governor. #aving control of the local legislature and local bureaucrac, it was
eas for $uharto to expand his cron and famil exploitation of the local resources
under the disguise of national development polic. In such an environment, $uharto9s
children and cron began to harvest the natural resource in Aceh for their own
enrichment.
403
E7p%oit#tion o$ Loc#% N#tur#% Re&ource& (2 the Ru%ing E%ite&
#nd Cronie& in Aceh
The involvement of $uharto9s cronies and famil in Aceh began after the discover of
huge mineral reserves in the region. Aceh had been !nown as one of the natural
resources rich regions in Indonesia, the main producer of natural gas. ?as from AcehUs
on- and off-shore fields was processed in A+? plants- 'T Arun at Aho!seumawe
made up 40F of IndonesiaUs total oil and gas exports. The A+? complex is operated
b @xxon 1obil and state oil compan- 'ertamina.
406
$ee =hapter Two; 1uhammad Abuba!ar; and Drown *"--7/.
403
=orruption was not !nown to the Acehness, until $uharto come to power that he introduced a
Bavanese culture of slave and master. #e said, $uharto had changed the mentalit of the local
bureaucrats from lordship into slave or in his word &kuli), a hard labour wor!er who has never felt
enough with what he gets. #e introduced corruption to the Acehnese, as the opening path for his famil
to enter and exploit Aceh for their own benefit. Abdullah Ara, a member of 2'62 at the @ast Aceh
regenc, Interviewed b author, Aangsa, Aceh-Indonesia, "" 2ecember 2003.
"73
The establishment of A+? plant in Aceh has brought fortune for the $uharto
famil and cron. $uharto appointed A. 6 6amli, an Acehnese conglomerate of the
2anitama ?roup, as the director of 'ertamina after Ibno $utowo. 6amli was one of the
most trusted Acehnese b the $uharto famil. 8ith 6amli as the director of 'ertamina,
$uharto9children, $igit #arKoKudanto, Dambang TrihatmodKo and Tomm, intensified
their business encroachment in Aceh. $igit and Tomm who owned the #umpuss
?roup used $uharto9s influence to manipulate the decision-ma!ing within the
'ertamina, in order to obtain license to use 'ertamina9s land to build 'T. #umpuss
Aromatic factor.
40.
The group obtained a letter of permission to use land as large as
one million m2 in +aleung 1ameh, @ast Datuphat and 8est Datuphat of the 1uara
2ua sub-district in +orth Aceh district belonged to 'ertamina, a contract letter +o. 2,
Banuar 2-, "--7. This contract was strengthened b the approval letter from the head
of D'+ *2adan Pertanahan 3asionalO +ational Aand Dureau/ in +orth Aceh. The
Aromatic factor received huge suppl of raw material from the A+? and made huge
profits. 1eanwhile, $uharto9s other son, Dambang who founded Dimantara group
established a giant gas and oil shipping compan, 0spre 1aritime Atd based in
$ingapore, and enKoed a 20 ear *"-.6-200./ contracts from 'ertamina and 1obil
0il for the shipment of A+? Arun to $outh <orea.
40-
In order to maintain the flow of revenue from the oil and gas to the central
government and the monopolies of his children and cronies, $uharto filled man of the
!e positions in 'T. Arun plant b the staff brought in from Bava and ver few of
which were held b the local staff. In addition to the unfair recruitment of emploees,
the unfair distribution of revenue between the local and central government, the
40.
'T #umpuss Aromatic was built b the Koin venture between #umpuss group and a ?erman based
compan, Thssen 6heinstall. $ee, AditKondro, Nhttp(OOwww.munindo.brd.deOgeorgeOAceh4.htmlP
*accessed 27 Banuar 2004/
40-
Ibid.,
"7.
discover of oil and gas has neither contributed to the development nor improved the
life :ualit of the local people in the region; and that has increased dissent among the
local people toward the central government. ,et, the +ew 0rder regime seemed to
close its ear upon the local complaint, giving impression, as if the central government
was intentionall creating an environment for conflict to occur in the region. That
could be a good reason for the deploment of militar forces into the region to protect
not onl the gas field, but also the cron interests in Aceh. The militar were given
full authorit to maintain political stabilit and ac:uired extra income from the oil
companies operated in the region. It wor!ed effectivel for $uharto to retain militar
loalt to his administration and maintains control over a resource rich region such as
Aceh.
1oreover, the militar and police forces had been incorporated into the forest
exploitation b the logging companies owned b $uharto9s cronies, especiall Dob
#asan.
4"0
2uring $uharto9s administration, the natural assets in the region have been
sstematicall stripped. Aarge forested areas whereb the indigenous people lived
have been carved into huge logging and plantation concessions, covering an estimated
35F of AcehUs total land area, ma!ing the indigenous farmers who traditionall owned
those forest areas deprived from their land and source of living. It has devastated the
life of the indigenous people. The were hopeless and powerless as the were forced
to leave b the militar and police in the name of national economic interest. The
4"0
Jnder $uharto9s administration, particularl during the militar operation in Aceh *$ee =haper Two/,
the militar was the main beneficiaries of the conflict. At least, three important interests of militar in
Aceh have been identified, namel( firstl, Aceh has been created as the militar training field;
secondl, it is the place for promotion and finall business for self enrichment. 1an officers who had
served in Aceh was promoted and later on post in the strategic position in the state bureaucrac in
Ba!arta. In term of business opportunit, militar involved in logging concessionaries as bac!ing forces
and protection against local protesters or the ?A1. In return the receive funds and protection mone
from those logging concessionaries operating in Aceh. $ee, &$elama 201 ada tiga !epentingan
militer), Seram'i #ndonesia, 2. 1a 2000, 4
"7-
were powerlessl watching their land being exploited b those logging and plantation
concessionaries owned b the Ba!arta-based business elite close to $uharto. *$ee Table
7.6/
T#(%e )*89 Logging Co"p#nie& Oper#ting in Aceh
Logging Co"p#nie& in Aceh Ti"(er E&t#te& 4HTI6
South Aceh! Other Di&trict& in Aceh Conce&&ion#rie&
'T. Asdal 'T. Aceh Inti Timber 'T. Aceh +usa Indra 'uri
*pulp/
'T. 2ina 1aKu 'T. Aceh 'rima 'lwood 'T. Aceh $wa!a 8ana
+usa *pulp/
'T. =itra ?raha 'T. Alas Aceh 'er!asa 'T. 6imba Timur $entosa
*transmigration/
'T ?ruti 'T. Alas #elau 'T. Tusam #utani Aestari
*pulp/
'T. #argas Industri Timber 'T. Dabem 8ola 'T. 'enangga Jtama
*transmigration/
'T. Aembah Da!ti 'T. Aamuri Timber
'T. 1edan 6emaKa Timber 'T. 6indu
'T. 8aKar =orp 'T. 0versea Aumber
Indonesia
'T. TKipta 6imba 6aa
'T. Truasamas <ara
'T. 8iralanu
$ource( 1inistr of Eorestr and 'lantations "--.; )aspada 26O-O-.
2espites of the devastated impact of deforestation on the local environment,
the logging companies operated freel. The clear-felling of the pine forests had caused
erosion and mud in local rivers. In =entral Aceh, the erosion had caused not onl
bringing mud into the Aaut Tawar, the onl source of clean water and fish, but also
had changed the local micro-climate that affected the coffee production in the vicinit.
The building of hundreds of !ilometres of haul road had created dust and noise
pollution affecting local crops and causing mudslides, which damage farmlands. In
addition, the local people were forced to sell the land for the road at a low price. It was
impossible for these logging companies to monopolise forest industries without the
"50
support of ruling elites in Ba!arta and the local militar and police who share the
benefits from the logging revenue.
4""
Pett2 Corruption #nd the Kleptocratic Bure#ucr#t& in Aceh
As in other regions in Indonesia, pett corruption in the civil service was also
prevalent in Aceh. The civil service had become a business firm for the civil servants
for maximi%ing their income and self-enrichment. =ivilians had to provide additional
fees for settling administrative matters from birth registrations to death registrations.
Driber became practical necessit for getting things done faster in business and
politics. If one followed the formal line the process ma be delaed or re:uested to
fulfil a long list of re:uirements. D Koining express line with a few thousand of
Indonesian 6upiah the matter might be processed faster and there was no need for
completing the long list of re:uirements. Eor instance, to get an identit card, without
fee it might ta!e a wee! to get it done, b Koining the express line it might ta!e onl
one hour or a da to get it dine. $imilarl, to get a driving licence, the formal line
re:uired a long list of re:uirements including regulations test and driving test. D Koin
express line, it might be read within an hour or two, without having to sit for an test.
In addition to that, the civil servants also nurtured the emergence of worms or
middlemen *+lat or calo/ in the government offices, who offered faster service to the
client who might be bus businessman or impatient civilians. These agents acted as
mediators between the clients and the officer in charge. After the Kob was done, the
4""
The bac!ing up of the ruling famil was obvious in the establishment of 'T. <ertas <raf Aceh in
"-.2 b Dob #asan with $igit #arKoKudanto and Ibn $utowo as the main investor. $ee Analisa, 5
Eebruar 2000, 4; =hristopher 1. Darr &Dob #asan, The rise of ap!indo, and the shifting dnamics of
control in IndonesiaUs timber $ectorL, S-AP #ndonesia "ournal, +o. 65, *April "--./; and Darr,
L2iscipline and accumulate( $tate practice and elite consolidation in IndonesiaUs timber sector, "-63-
"--.L *1aster Thesis, =ornell Jniversit "--./
"5"
clients usuall paid some amount of fees to the agents who might share fee with the
office in charge. $uch corrupt practice was common in the matters related for the
processing business license, road tax extension and passport. Eor instance, to get a
passport, through formal line it costs not more than 6p "50.000 to 2.0.000; b Koining
express line through the agent the cost might rise up to 6p 500.000 to "000.000. The
existence of an express line for settling the matters contributed to mutual benefits
between mostl the rich people and officers in charge. The rich people would bribe the
civil servants to ma!e regulations wor!s for his interest, and the officers would
maximise their income from the briber.
=ivil servants also controlled information on the development planning of
the region and information on the recruitment for civil service positions. In terms of
development program, the civil servants used to !eep the information among
themselves and cronies. The true figure of the total funds allocated for development
and the site for development were often !ept close to the public. 8ith regard to the
funds, it became common practice to embe%%le it not onl b the local officers but
also b the officer in charge at the ministerial offices at the central government. The
funds had never reached the people in full amount; it had been cut starting from the
1inister9s office in charge down to the village offices as a service or a commission
fee. $imilarl, to the information regarding the auctioning of land for development
which was closed to public so that the of land in each location could be purchased at a
low price. The public could onl raise :uestion wh civil servants bought land in a
particular deserted area. Eor instance, in Aangsa cit in "--5, man civil servants from
the Aand 2epartment bought lands in the swamp area in $iriget village.
4"2
It was hard
4"2
A%man, an officer in Aand 2epartment in @ast Aceh, Interviewed b author, Aangsa, Aceh-
Indonesia, "2 Banuar 2000
"52
for the public to imagine that a bus terminal would be built there. #aving no
information concerning development planning, the villagers sold their land at a low
price. At the beginning the thought the were fortunate for selling the land, but
following the beginning of construction of a bus station in that village, the price of
land in that area increased b one hundred percent. #ence, the villagers reali%ed that
the have been fooled b those buers who were mostl civil servants. It was
unfortunate for the citi%en who had no one in the bureaucrac. The were hopeless and
powerless, because there was no such a strong civil societ organisation with whom
the could cooperate to fight such inKustice.
Eurthermore, with regard to the information on recruitment for the civil
service positions, it was circulated within the officials themselves. Bobs had never
been openl exposed to the public. It was considered as reserved right of the officials
to recruit their famil members to an vacant position in the local government
regardless of their :ualifications. $ome time the position was secretl sold in the blac!
mar!et. The price varied depending on the position that was offered. To be an
emploee on the informal contract arrangement, the so called #0+2A *Pegawai
$onor (aerah, Aocal #onorar @mploee %/
4"4
, for those who had no famil members
holding high positions in the public service, the had to bribe the officer in charge.
The cost would go higher if man people were interested in that position. Eor the
honorar emploee the price ma reach up to 6p ".000.000, and for formal emploee
it ma go up to 6p 20.000.000. In order to secure the source of extra income, the
unscrupulous officer might ta!e whatever means to ma!e the recruitment in the public
4"4
The #onorar emploee is appointed b the local government and their pament is in the form of
honorarium and after several ears of service, heOshe might be promoted to the fulltime public servant.
"54
service become difficult such as creating a long list of re:uirements which would be
impossible to complete within two das period of registration.
2uring $uharto9s administration, it was almost impossible for ordinar citi%ens
to dream of becoming civil servants in Aceh, if the did not have mone to bribe
officials or connections in side the government. The civil service had become a
hereditar position. As the fol! said, &the profession for the fishermen9s famil is to be
a fisherman; and the profession of the vendor9s famil is to be a vendor in the
mar!et). =orruption has become sstemic, whereb scrupulous and honest officers
were despised and ridiculed, as &1ister =lean) *sok 'ersih/.
Conc%u&ion
The practice of neo-pratimonial sstem of government b a kleptocratic leadership
had significantl contributed to the prevalence of corruption in the countr. The
adoption of dual function of militar and enforcement of 'ancasila as the sole
ideolog of the state b the +ew 0rder had strengthened the grip of $uharto and the
militar, as the bac!bone of his administration, in the politics and econom, ma!ing
transparenc and accountabilit almost impossible in the state administration.
1oreover, $uharto restructured the political sstem in the countr and forced civil
servants to support his political part, ?ol!ar. =oupled with militar representative
support in the legislative assembl at nation and local government levels, he was able
not onl control the legislative assembl, but also to create a cooperation between the
militar and bureaucrats in governing the countr. 1an high ran! officers were
posted in the public offices, from the post of a minister to the lower post of chief of
the village. As it was practiced in the previous regime, the continued to ta!e part in
"57
the rent see!ing activities in term of issuance of business licenses and tenders. $ome
of them Kointl cooperated with =hinese business tcoon in the form of Ali Daba
corporations or plaed as a !ic!-bac! or protector of the =hinese business sites.
The problem of corruption graduall reached its grand scale particularl after
the ruling famil was involved in business with the help of long established $uharto9s
business cronies such as Aiem $ioe Aiong, Dob #asan and 'angestu. In order for these
tcoons to retain their control of state econom, the had offered shares between "0 to
"5 percent of the total shares in their respective companies to $uharto9s children,
within a decade $uharto9s children had build their own business empire in the countr
that control the suppl of most of state export and import commodities.
Eor 42 ears, $uharto ruled the countr resembling the ancient !ing of
Bavanese !ingdom. #e bestowed the loalist with privileges and opportunit for self-
enrichment at the expense of the citi%en at large. #e closed his ee to an complain of
corrupt practices b his indiscipline officers. =onse:uentl, grand corruption to pett
corruption wide spread all over the countr, ma!ing Indonesia as one of the most
corrupt countries in the world.
The implication of strong centralised sstem of government under the +ew
0rder regime was so profound in the local politics and state administration in Aceh.
0ne of the maKor problems in Aceh was corruption which was introduced b $uharto
through a patrimonial sstem of state administration which favoring !inship as the
wa to maintain subordinate loalties to the central leadership. In the case of Aceh,
corruption was introduced in order to trigger conflict in region, as $uharto !new that
Aceh was the most rebellious regions in Indonesia. D having conflict in the region,
he has the reason to obtain support from the central elite to send in militar forces as
"55
an additional force to help the local police force in maintaining peace, securit and
stabilit in the region.
$uharto then established a strong collaboration between the law enforcement,
civil servant, regional and local legislatures and the cron tcoons at the central that
include his own children to create a conducive condition for the exploitation of the
natural resources in the region. In return of such collaboration, the local elites have
been given privileges for self enrichment through the regional development program
fund, from which the could ta!e commission from government proKect for the
regional and local development. it has become a common secret that a contractor has
to give commission to the local governor, regents and maors, at least "0F of the total
funds that has been allocated for the proKect, without which might Keopardi%e its future
chance for the other proKect from the government. 1one has become the greas for
the smooth process of licensing and winning the tenders in the public sectors, down to
level of getting an identit card, mone might ma!e the process faster, in which with
out mone it might ta!e a wee! or has to fulfill a long list of administrative
re:uirement.
In addition, the practice of nepotism and cronism was not onl rampant at the
central government, but also rampant at the regional and local government. The
position and recruitment at the public office was closed to the public and strongl
controlled b the public officials, it had become their privileges that onl their famil
members and close associate has the access to such recruitment. @ven though it was
sold in the blac! mar!et, it should follow a proper line; otherwise it might end in vein.
2espites of it had become the public secret that the local enforcement, executive and
assemblmen had abused their authorit and embe%%led public fund for their own
enrichment, $uharto did not seem to show an interest to ta!e serious action against
"56
corruption. Eor him, corruption was not a crucial problem as long as it did not disturb
state administration and development of the countr. As a result, the practice of
corruption was so rampant and became sstemic in the countr.
"53