Zaldivar vs.

Gonzales, 166 SCRA 316 (1988)

Fast facts: Zaldivar (pet) is one of several defedants in Criminal Cases Nos. 12159-12161 and 12163-
12177 (for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) pending before
the Sandiganbayan. The Office of the Tanod bayan conducted the preliminary investigation
and filed the criminal information in those cases.
Contention c/o Zaldivar: Gonzales (resp), as Tanodbayan and under the provisions of the 1987
Constitution, was no longer vested with power and authority independently to investigate and to
institute cases for graft and corruption against public officials and employees, and hence that
the information filed in the aforementioned Criminal Cases were all null and void.
Philippine Daily Globe article. Tanod Scores SC for Quashing Graft Case Gonzales is quoted in many
occasions saying that stopping him from investigating graft cases, like that involving Zaldivar, can
aggravate the thought that affluent persons can prevent the progress of trialWhat I am afraid of
(with the issuance of the order) is that it appears that while rich and influential persons get favorable
actions from the SC, it is difficult for an ordinary litigant to get his petition to be given due course. He
continues to accuse that this issue will promote further lack of confidence in the judiciary. While he
has been supposedly been assigned by President Aquino to preside over graft cases as
Tanodbayan, the SC has been continually preventing him to do so.
April 27, 1988 SC Decision. Order Gonzales too cease and desist from conducting investigations and
filing criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan or otherwise exercising the powers and functions of the
Ombudsman.
Statements in MFR filed by Gonzales on April 28, 1988.
1. That he had been approached by a leading member fo the SC and he was asked to go slow on
Zaldivar and not be too hard on him
2. That he was approached and asked to refrain from investigating the COA report on illegal
disbursements in the SC because it will embarrass this Court
3. That in several instances, the respondent was called over the phone by a leading
member of the SC and was asked to dismiss cases against 2 members of the Court
Authority to discipline. The SC, as regulator and guardian of the legal profession, has plenary
disciplinary authority over attorneys. The authority to discipline lawyers stems from the Court s
constitutional mandate to regulate admission to the practice of law, which includes as well
authority to regulate the practice itself of law.
Contentions c/o Gonzales
-Members of the court should inhibit themselves as they were biased and prejudiced against him.
-The issues of the proceeding should be passed upon the IBP because he does not expect due process
from the SC, that the SC has become incapable of judging him impartially and fairly.
-The SC deliberately rendered an erroneous decision when it rendered its Decision on April 27, 1988
-That decision was rendered in retaliation by the SC against him for the position he had taken that
the SC Justices cannot claim immunity from suit or investigation by government prosecutors, and in
order to stop respondent from investigating cases against some of the protgs or friends of some SC
Justices.
-The members of the SC have improperly pressured him to render decisions favorable to their
colleagues and friends, including dismissal of cases against 2 of its own members.
Held & Ratio: Considering the kinds of statements of lawyers discussed above which the Court has in
the past penalized as contemptuous or as warranting application of disciplinary sanctions, the SC
holds that the statements made by Gonzales clearly constitute contempt and call for the exercise of the
disciplinary authority of the SC. The statements, especially the one which mentions that the SC made a
deliberately erroneous decision, constitute the grossest disrespect for the Court. Such statements very
clearly debase and degrade the SC and, through the SC, the entire system of administration of justice
in the country.
Dispositive Atty. Raul M. Gonzales is suspended from the practice of law indefinitely and until further
orders from the SC, the suspensions to take effect immediately.

In re : Cunanan, 94 Phil. 534 (1954)
Fast facts: The case at bar deals with an RA that, when effected, result in the passage and admittance
to the practice of law of people who have previously flunked the bar exams. The enactment of
the RA will result in the admittance of additional 1, 094candidates. RA 972 An Act to Fix the
Passing Marks for Bar Examinations from 1946 up to and including 1955. Those who deemed to
have passed by virtue of the RA shall be allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding
oath of office as member of the Philippine Bar. OBJECTIVE: to admit to the bar those candidates
who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation.
Issue. (WON)RA 972 is constitutional.
Requirement of legal profession. The public interest demands of legal profession adequate
preparation and efficiency, precisely more so as legal problem evolved by the times become more
difficult. An adequate legal preparations one of the vital requisites for the practice of law that should
be developed constantly and maintained firmly. To the legal profession is entrusted the protection of
property, life, honor, and civil liberties.
Admission to the practice of law. The admission, suspension, disbarment, and reinstatement
of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession their supervision have been indisputably
a judicial function and responsibility.
Role of Congress. May repeal, alter, and supplement the rules promulgated by the Court,
but the authority and responsibility over the admission, suspension, disbarment, and
reinstatement of attorneys at law and their supervision remain vested in the SC.
Discussion of the issue. The law is contrary to public interest because it qualifies 1,094 law graduates
who confessedly had inadequate preparation for the practice of the profession. To approve officially of
those inadequately prepared individual to dedicate themselves to such a delicate mission is to create a
serious social danger. In decreeing that bar candidates who obtained in the bar exams of 1946
to 1952, a general average of 70%...be admitted in mass to the practice of law, the disputed law is not
a legislation; it is a judgment revoking those promulgated by the Court during the aforecited year
affecting the bar candidates concerned. Although the Court can certainly revoke these judgments, it is
no less certain that only the Court, and not the legislative (by virtue of RA) or executive (EO)
department may do so. Otherwise, it will be a usurpation of functions.
Resolution. The RA is partly unconstitutional and constitutional, the latter being caused by lack
of unanimity among the presiding justices.
Notes in class
A law enacted in 1953 (It revoked the judgments the SC has made before as regards the lawyers they
have admitted), applied retroactively will in effect give the Congress the power that should have been
vested solely in the judiciary: violates separation of powers.

People v. Sola, 103 SCRA 393 (1981)
Fast facts. CFI Negros Occidental issued a search warrant for the search and seizure of the deceased
bodies of 7 persons believed in the possession of the accused Pablo Sola in his hacienda at Sta. Isabel,
Kabankalan, Negros Occidental.

Contentions c/o witnesses in the murder cases. They were in fear that if the trial is held at the CFI
branch in Himamaylan which is but 10km from Kabankalan, their safety could be jeopardized. At least
2 of the accused are official with power and influence in Kabankalan and they have been released on
bail. In addition, most of the accused remained at large. There have been reports made to police
authorities of threats made on the families of the witnesses.
General rule. The primordial aim and intent of the Constitution must ever be kept in mind. In case of
doubt, it should be resolved in favor of a change of venue.
Held & Ratio. Change of venue has become moot and academic. However, the case proceeds
with this discussion: To compel the prosecution to proceed to trial in a locality where its
witnesses will not be at liberty to reveal what they know is to make a mockery of the judicial process,
and to betray the very purpose for which courts have been established. The witnesses in the case are
fearful of their lives. They are afraid they would be killed on their way to or from Himamaylan during
any of the days of trial. Because of this fear, they may either refuse to testify or testify falsely to save
their lives.


Meralco vs. Pasay Trans Co., 57 Phil. 600 (1932)
Fast facts. The case at bar relates with a petition of the Manila Electric Company (MEC, pet),
requesting the members of the SC, sitting as a board of arbitrators, to fix the terms upon which certain
transportation companies shall be permitted to use the Pasig bridge of the MEC and the compensation
to be paid to the MEC by such transportation companies.
Act NO. 1446, Section 11Relates with the legal act of the members of the SC, sitting as a board of
arbitrators, to act on the petition.
Issue.Concerns the legal right of the members of the SC, sitting as a board of arbitrators the decision of
a majority of whom shall be final, to act in that capacity.
Held & Ratio. Act 1446, Section 11 contravenes the maxims which guide the operation of a
democratic government constitutionally established, and that it would be improper and
illegal for the members of the SC, sitting as a board or arbitrators, the decision of a majority
of whom shall be final, to act on the petition of the MEC. The decisions of the Board of Arbitration shall
go through the regular court system (Trial Courts Court of Appeals SC).They will be reviewed by
the lower courts and will ultimately be reviewed by themselves. The SC cannot sit as members of the
Board of Arbitration because it is not within their jurisdiction to decide on cases on purely contractual
situations.

Garcia vs. Macaraig, 30 SCRA 106 (1971)
Administrative charge filed against Judge Catalino Macaraig, Jr. (resp) for alleged dishonesty,
violation of his oath
of of f i ce as j udge . . . gr os s i ncompet ence, vi ol at i on of Republ i c Act 296 or t he J u
di ci ar y Act of 1948, as amended, (particularly) Sections 5, 55 and 58 thereof, committed
(allegedly).

-Macaraig took his oath as Judge of the CFI of Laguna and San Pablo City on June 29, 1970. It was a
newly organized branch which had to establish its operations from scratch. The Municipal
Government of Calamba offered to supply the space for the courtroom and offices of the court,
, to utilize the financial assistance promised by the Laguna provincial government for the
purchase of the necessary supplies and materials and to rely on the national government
for the equipment needed by the court (Under Section 190 of the Revised Administrative Code, all
these items must be furnished by the provincial government The provincial officials of Laguna,
however, informed the respondent that the province was not in a position to do so).

-It took so much time for the branch to become established as it experienced difficulties in finding a
place to hold its office and finally use the amount appropriated for its expenses.

Contentions c/o Paz Garcia (pet) Macaraig has not submitted any monthly reports, certificate of
service, period of July 1, 1970 to February 28, 1971 Macaraig, despite knowing that he has not
been fulfilling his duties as judge, still received salaries for the period in question

Held & Ratio. Macaraig is not guilty of dishonesty and gross incompetence. He did not
violate his oath of office as judge. During the period in question, he simply could not carry out
his duties for the simple reason that he had no sala yet. The respondent took it upon himself to
personally work for early action on the part of the corresponding officials in this direction and, in his
spare time, made himself available to the Department of Justice to assist the Secretary, what with his
vast experience, having worked therein for sixteen years, is, far from being dishonesty, to
his credit. In the circumstances, it was certainly not improper that he rendered some kind of
service to the government, since he was receiving salaries, while being unable to perform his regular
duties as judge without any fault on his part. Judicial work encompasses only what is mentioned as
judicial power in the Constitution. Judges cannot be appointed to positions in other bodies, unless it
is provided by the Constitution or created by the SC.

Nitafan vs. Comm. of Internal Revenue, 152 SCRA 284 (1987)
1935 v 1973 v 19871935 jurisprudence says that deduction of withholding taxes erodes
independence of judiciary, exempt from taxation1973 judges are not exempt1987 silent
WON judges salaries are exempt from taxation, the provision of 1973 was specifically deleted.
Contention c/o Pet. Any tax withheld from their emoluments or compensation as judicial officers
constitutes a decrease or diminution of their salaries, contrary to the provision of Section
10, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution mandating that during their continuance in office,
their salary shall not be decreased. The 1987 provision should be interpreted the same way 1935 was
interpreted.

Held & Ratio The declared the salaries of members of the Judiciary are not exempt from payment of
the income tax and considered such payment as a diminution of their salaries during their
continuance in office. The Court hereby reiterates that the salaries of Justices and Judges are properly
subject to a general income tax law applicable to all income earners and that the payment of such
income tax by Justices and Judges does not fall within the constitutional protection against decrease of
their salaries during their continuance in office. As will be shown hereinafter, the clear intent of the
Constitutional Commission was to delete the proposed express grant of exemption from payment of
income tax to members of the Judiciary, so as to "give substance to equality among the three branches
of Government" in the words of Commissioner Rigos (uniformity of taxation). The framers actually
intended to include an express provision regarding the non-exemption of judges from taxation. They
intended to put it in a separate item, but were not able to follow through on that.

In Re Gonzales, 160 SCRA 771 (1988)
Fast facts. Raul Gonzales forwarded an anonymous letter by Concerned Employees of the Supreme
Court to Justice Fernan. The letter was addressed to Gonzales referring to charges for disbarment
brought by Miguel Cuenco against Justice Fernan and asking to do something about this. The
action against Fernan was filed in the Tanodbayan. Tanodbayan special prosecutor like a
fiscal; ombudsman. Administrative Case No. 3135. Resolution dated February 1988 entitled Miguel
Cuenco v Honorable Marcelo B. Fernan in which Resolution, the Court resolved to dismiss the
charges made by Cuenco against Fernan for utter lack of merit. The Court resolved to
require Cuenco to show cause why he should not be administratively dealt with for making
unfounded serious accusations against Fernan.

Important principles of AC 3135Article 8, Section 7 (1987 Constitution). A public officer
who under the Constitution is required to be a Member of the Philippine Bar as a
qualification for the office held by him and who may be removed from office only by impeachment
,cannot be charged with disbarment during the incumbency of such public officer.

Lecaroz v Sandiganbayan. Proscribes the removal from office of the aforementioned constitutional
officers by any other method; otherwise, to allow a public officer who may be removed solely by
impeachment to be charged criminally while holding his office with an offense that carries the penalty
of removal from office, would be violative of the clear mandate of the fundamental law.

Impeachment first, before criminal and other actions. There is fundamental procedural
requirement that must be observed before such liability may be determined and enforced.
The Court is not saying that a Member of the SC is absolutely
immune from disbarment and criminal actions against him. It is just that, this member must first be
removed from office via impeachment proceedings before other actions will prosper against him.
Should the tenure of the SC Justice be thus terminated by impeachment, he may then be held
to answer either criminally or administratively (by disbarment proceedings) for any misbehavior
that may be proven against him.

Reason for ruling. Without the rule, Members of the SC would be vulnerable to all manner of charges
which might be brought against them by unsuccessful litigants or their lawyers or by other parties
who, for any number of reasons might seek to affect the exercise of judicial authority by
the Court. Can judges be disbarred during their term? Yes. The only ones who could be disbarred are
the impeachable officers.

Maceda vs vasquez
Facts: Respondent Napoleon Abiera of PAO filed a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman
against petitioner RTC Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda. Respondent Abiera alleged that petitioner
Maceda has falsified his certificate of service by certifying that all civil and criminal cases which have
been submitted for decision for a period of 90 days have been determined and decided on or before
January 31, 1989, when in truth and in fact, petitioner Maceda knew that no decision had been
rendered in 5 civil and 10 criminal cases that have been submitted for decision. Respondent Abiera
alleged that petitioner Maceda falsified his certificates of service for 17 months.
Issue: Whether or not the investigation made by the Ombudsman constitutes an encroachment into
the SCs constitutional duty of supervision over all inferior courts
Held: A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is administratively liable to the SC for serious
misconduct and under Sec. 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and criminally liable to the State under
the Revised Penal Code for his felonious act.
In the absence of any administrative action taken against him by the Court with regard to his
certificates of service, the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the
Courts power of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the
doctrine of separation of powers.
Art. VIII, Sec. 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the SC administrative supervision over all
courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the CA down to the lowest municipal trial
court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the SC that can oversee the judges and court personnels
compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any
violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul
of the doctrine of separation of powers.
Where a criminal complaint against a judge or other court employee arises from their administrative
duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to the SC for
determination whether said judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their
administrative duties.


JUDGE CAOIBES, Jr vs. OMBUDSMANG.R. No. 132177, July 19, 2001
FACTS:

May 23, 1997, Respondent Alumbres, Presiding Judge of Branch 255 of the RTC of Las
Pinas City, filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, a Criminal Complaint for physical
injuries , malicious mischief for the destruction of complainants eyeglasses, and assault upon a
person in authority alleging that:
oHe requested petitioner on May 20, 1997 to return the executive table he borrowed
from respondent;
oPetitioner did not answer so respondent reiterated his request but before he could
finish talking, petitioner blurted "Tarantado ito ah, " and boxed him at his right eyebrow
and left lower jaw so that the right lens of his eyeglasses was thrown away, rendering his eyeglasses
unserviceable;
oRespondent had the incident blottered with the Las Pias Police Station. He prayed that
criminal charges be filed before the Sandiganbayan against the petitioner.
June 13, 1997, Respondent Judge lodged an administrati ve case with the SC praying for
thedi s mi ss al of pet i t i oner f r om t he j udi ci ar y on t he ground of gr ave mi sconduct
or conduct unbecoming a judicial officer using the same facts as above.
June 25, 1997, the Office of the Ombudsman required petitioner to file a counter-affidavit within10
days from receipt thereof.
-Petitioner filed on July 7, 1997 an "Ex-Parte Motion for Referral to the Honorable
Supreme Court, " praying that the Office of the Ombudsman hold its investigation of the
case, and refer the same to the SC which is already investigating what transpired on May 1997.

Pet i t i oner cont ended t hat t he SC, not t he Of f i ce of t he Ombuds man, has t he
authority to make a preliminary determination of the respective culpability
of pet i t i oner and respondent J udge who, bot h bei ng member s of t he bench, areu
nder its exclusive supervision and control.

August 22, 1997, the Office of the Ombudsman denied the motion for referral to the SC stating that it
is within its jurisdiction to investigate on the criminal charges.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the foregoing order that the criminal case be referred to t he
SC or wai t f or t he deci si on of t he admi ni st r at i ve cas e. Thi s i s t o avoi d an
abs ur d case wherein the Office of the Ombudsman files criminal charges while SC declares him
without fault.
December 22, 1997, the Office of the Ombudsman denied the motion for reconsideration and
required petitioner to submit a counter-affidavit within an inextendible period of five
(5) days from receipt thereof.

ISSUE/HELD:
WON the Ombudsman has the jurisdiction over the administrative case between the two
judges.
NO, the Ombudsman DOES NOT have jurisdiction over the case.

RATIO:
Section 6, Art. VIII of the Constitution: SC is vested with exclusive administrative
supervision over all courts and its personnel.
Ombudsman cannot determine for itself and by itself whether a criminal complaint
against a judge, or court employee, involves an administrative matter.
The Ombudsman is duty bound to refer to the SC all cases against judges and court personnel filed
before it for determination as to whether and administrative aspect is involved therein.
The Ombudsman cannot dictate to, and bind the Court, to its findings that a case before it
does or does not have administrative implications.

To do so is to (1) deprive the Court of the exercise of its administrative prerogatives
and (2) to arrogate unto itself a power not constitutionally sanctioned.
This is a dangerous policy which impinges on judicial independence.
In Maceda vs. Vasquez, i t i s
on l y t h e S C t h a t c a n o v e r s e e t h e j u d g e s a n d c o u r t pers onnel scompl i ance
wi t h al l l aws, and t ake t he pr oper admi ni st r at i ve act i onagainst them if they
commit any violation thereof.
No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the
doctrine of separation of powers.

DECISION: WHEREFORE, the pet i t i on f or cert i orari i s hereby GRANTED The
ombudsman i s hereby directed to dismiss the complaint filed by respondent Judge Florentino M.
Alumbres and to refer the same to this Court for appropriate action.


RE: REQUEST OF ACCUSED THROUGH COUNSEL FOR CREATION OF A SPECIAL DIVISION TO TRY
THE PLUNDER CASE (SB CRIM. CASE NO. 26558 AND RELATED CASES)
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This Court through its Oversight Committee received on 11 January 2002 Resolution No. 01-2002 of
the Sandiganbayan (En Banc) captioned Re: Request for the Creation of a Special Division to Try the
Plunder Case(SB Crim. Case No. 26558 and related cases affecting the accused). The Resolution was
promulgated on 8 and 11 January 2002 in response to the Request for Re-Raffle of the defense counsel
and the Opposition to Request for Re-Raffle of the Special Prosecution Panel.
Resolution No. 01-2002 recommends that "the cases against former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada
and those accused with him be referred to a special division created by constitutional authority of the
Supreme Court composed of three justices with two alternates in case of temporary absence of any of
the three to be chosen from among the present composition of this Court who will be able to
participate therein until the termination of said cases."
In its Request for Re-Raffle, the Defense alleges that it is made "for (a) better administration of justice"
in view of the "shifting and uncertain nature of (the) composition (of the Third Division)" to which the
"Plunder Case" was originally assigned, citing as based therefor the compulsory retirement of
Associate Justice Ricardo M. Ilarde on 27 November 2001, and the indefinite leave of absence of
Associate Justice Anacleto D. Badoy, Jr., pursuant to our Resolution of 11 December 2001, thereby
leaving a void in the composition of the regular Third Division. Only Associate Justice Teresita J.
Leonardo-De Castro remains as permanent member thereof. Associate Justices Narciso S. Nario, Sr.,
and Nicodemo T. Ferrer who were earlier designated to sit in the Third Division as special members or
so-called "warm bodies" are by the nature of their designations temporary therein.1wphi1.nt
On 9 January 2002 the Special Prosecution Panel filed an Opposition to Request for Re-Raffle arguing
that there was no assurance that the other divisions would have a complete set of members since
"[c]hanges in membership in any one of the divisions will surely occur every now and then occasioned
by death, resignation, optional or mandatory retirement, promotion or other causes x x x x"
This Court is informed that on the basis of the letter-request for re-raffle and the opposition thereto,
the Acting Presiding Justice of Sandiganbayan immediately called the parties through counsel to a
conference on the same date to give their comment and/or suggestion on how to resolve the issue at
hand.itc-a1f
On 10 January 2002 the Special Prosecution Panel filed its comment/suggestion maintaining that the
Third Division should continue hearing the Plunder Case, and to achieve constancy in the membership
of that division it recommended the creation of Special Third Division to be composed of the
remaining permanent member of the Third Division, Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, and two
(2) other justices who have heretofore at one time or another taken part in hearing the Plunder Case,
who are not retirable within the next three (3) years, and who are not appointees of the principal
accused.
The Defense Panel on the other hand, in its letter of 11 January 2002, argues that the creation of an Ad
Hoc Special Division "may create serious equal protection concerns and set a dangerous precedent that
may come back to haunt us." The Defense also manifests its "deep reservations" against the
participation of Justice Leonardo-De Castro "Being an object of an unresolved petition to recuse as
well as an administrative complaint." Consequently, it recommended the transfer of the "Estrada
Cases" to the Fifth Division composed of Acting Presiding Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario and Associate
Justices Ma. Cristina G. Cortez-Estrada and Francisco H. Villaruz, Jr., "a tribunal with a predictable,
stable, regular, permanent membership."
As a result of the 7 January 2002 meeting of the Oversight Committee with Acting Presiding Justice
and the Chairmen of the various divisions of the Sandiganbayan, it was learned that Justices Nicodemo
T. Ferrer, Catalino R. Castan eda, Jr., Anacleto D. Badoy, Jr., Narciso S. Nario, Sr. and Rodolfo G. Palattao
are retiring on 3 August 2002, 20 September 2002, 19 October 2002, 29 October 2002 and 14
December 2003, respectively. Associate Justices Godofredo L. Legaspi, Gregory S. Ong and Raoul V.
Victorino had expressed their preference not to be assigned to the Special Division to be created in
view of their close relationship and association with the accused and their families, while Associate
Justice Ma. Cristina G. Cortez-Estrada is an appointee of the principal accused. Associate Justices
Francisco H. Villaruz Jr. is a very recent appointee, while Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena is
devoting himself exclusively to decision writing under authority of A. M. No. 00-8-05-SC.
Thus, we are left with hardly any choice but to designate Acting Presiding Justice Minita v. Chico-
Nazario as Chairman, and Associate Justices Edilberto G. Sandoval and Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro
as Members of the Special Division to try and decide the Plunder Case (SB Crim. Case No. 26558 and
related cases).lawphi1.net
As regards Associate Justice Leonardo-De Castro, we do not find the objection of the Defense Panel
sufficient to disqualify her from the case.
Under Sec. 5,par. [5], Art. VIII, of the 1987 Constitution, the Supreme Court has the power to
promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights and procedure in
all courts, including the Sandiganbayan. Accordingly, given the nature of the Plunder Case and cases
related thereto, the prominence of the principal accused and the importance of the immediate
resolution of the cases to the Filipino people and the Philippine Government, this Court, in the interest
of justice and the speedy disposition of cases, with due regard to the procedural and substantive rights
of the accused, deems it best to create a Special Division of the Sandiganbayan to be composed of
members mentioned in the immediately preceding paragraph. This Special Division shall hear, try and
decide with dispatch the Plunder Case and all related cases filed or which may hereafter be filed
against former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada and those accused with him, until they are resolved,
decided and terminated.
The designation of temporary alternate members may be properly addressed later. Meanwhile, until
otherwise revoked, the Acting Presiding Justice is authorized to designate from time to time, an
alternate member to be drawn from the remaining members of the Sandiganbayan as the exigencies of
the service may require.
WHEREFORE, upon recommendation of the Oversight Committee of this Court, with due consideration
to the facts and all attendant circumstances, and in the interest of a speedy administration of justice,
this Court RESOLVES to CREATE, as it hereby creates, under its constitutional authority a Special
Division of the Sandiganbayan to be composed of Acting Presiding Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario as
Chairman, and Associate Justices Edilberto G. Sandoval and Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro as
Members, to hear, try and decide with dispatch the Plunder Case and all related cases filed or may
hereafter be filed against former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada and those accused with him, until
such cases are resolved, decided or otherwise finally terminated in the Sandiganbayan.
The Special Division may promulgate its own rules not otherwise inconsistent with or contrary to the
Rules of Court or the Rules of the Sandiganbayan to govern the proceedings in these cases taking into
consideration the constitutional rights of all the parties concerned.
The regular members of the Special Division shall hereafter be excluded from the regular raffle of
cases in the Sandiganbayan except those related cases herein before mentioned, until such time as this
Court or the Sandiganbayan may see fit to include them as existing conditions may warrant.
SO ORDERED.