Tarun Singh

TF: Kerstin Haase

On The Ontological Argument and its Objections

In this paper I will explain put forth Anselm’s ontological argument for the

existence of God. and Tthen, I will turn toexplain why this argument is convincing,

despite what I deem to be the tthe best objection to it to it, Gaunilo’s objection. To

explain Anselm’s argument for the existence of God, I will explain how Anselm uses

a reductio ad absurdum to prove the existence of God. In order to show why

objections to Anselm’s argument is are unconvincing, I will focus on Gaunilo’s

objection that Anselm’s argument can be altered to prove the existence of any

being simply by using the definition that the being is greater than all other beings

which can be conceived, and Gaunilo’s insistence that the existence of a being be

proven before it can be defined.

Anselm begins his argument by stating that even “the fool” who claims God

does not exist, “when he hears of this being of which I speak – a being than which

nothing greater can conceived – understands what he hears, and what he

understands is in his understanding; although he does not understand it to exist.” In

order to prove the existence of God, Anselm adopts the fool’s position as his

assumption for the reductio. That is, Anselm does not believe the fool’s position is

correct, but uses it to show that if God exists in understanding then he must exist in

realityIn order to prove the existence of God Anselm uses this argument as his

assumption for the reductio, meaning Anselm does not believe it is true but is using

it to show that God does in fact exist. Next, Anselm defines God as a being than

which nothing greater can be conceived. Anselm follows this definition with the

premise that if a being exists in the understanding, but not in fact, then a greater

being can be conceived. To assert this point Anselm argues “For suppose it exists in
the understanding alone: then it can be conceived to exist in reality; which is

greater.” Thus using the assumption for the reductio and the last premise that if a

being exists only in understanding then a greater being exists, Anselm reaches the

conclusion that a greater being than God can be conceived. Anselm does not

believe that this conclusion is true, but is trying to show that if one understands God

to be the greatest being and only exist in understanding and not reality then the

conclusion reached violates these premises. Thus Anselm is arguing that because

the definition of God is not in question, “the fool” must be incorrect in assuming

that God only exists in the understanding. Therefore, God must exist in both the

understanding and in reality.

The most convincing rebuttal of Anselm’s approach to proving the existence

of Godargument is that the same logical reasoning can be used to prove things that

we are certain do not exist. This is the same objection that Gaunilo expresses when

he arguesing about the existence of a super-island. Gaunilo’s proof of the super-

island follows the same logical reasoning as Anselm’s. by starting He starts with the

premise that the super-island exists in the understanding but not in reality, the

super-island is by definition an island being than which nothing no greater island

can be conceived, and that if a perfect island being exists in understanding but not

in fact a greater being island can be conceived, therefore a greater being island

than the super-island can be conceived. Thus, using the same logical argument as

Anselm, Gaunilo has shown that the super-island must exist in both the

understanding and reality for the same reasons as why God must exist in the

understanding and the reality in Anselm’s example. According to Gaunilo, iIf one

accepts Anselm’s argument as being goodvalid,, then one must accept the super-

island argument of being good valid as well. Both arguments are valid since if the
premises are true then both conclusions must be true. Furthermore, the only critical

difference between Anselm’s premises argument and Gaunilo’s argument is the use

of word super-island in place of God and island in place of being. Thus if Anselm’s

method of reasoning is deemed appropriate, then Gaunilo’s must be appropriate as

well. Yet, Gaunilo states that this proof of the existence of a super-island is

unconvincing. It is only the definition of it being a beinasg than which nothing

greater can be conceived that allows Anselm and Gaunilo to logically prove the

existence of God and the super-island respectively.

What Gaunilo fails to recognize is that instead of proving the existence of a

super-island he has instead proven the existence of Godby proving the existence of

a super-island using the same argument structure as Anselm he has violated the

definition of an island. By changing the word “God” to “Super-Island” what Gaunilo

has done is no different from replacing “God” with “Allah.” This is made more

evident if we assume that both the definitions of God and the super-island are

correct. If God is defined as a being than which nothing greater can be conceived

and the super-island is defined the same way then it logically follows that God and

super-island are the same thing. This is made evident when contemplating what a

perfect island would be like. In order for the super-island to be perfect its attributes

must be perfect as well. Any deviation would make the existence of a greater island

possible. Furthermore, the super-island can be made greater in a quantitative sense

if it was simply a square foot larger – this would follow until the super-island

becomes infinitely large.Gaunilo’s confusion comes from the fact that he doesn’t

believe that a super-island is actually defined as a being than which nothing greater

can be conceived because he most likely sees the super-island as having to have

some resemblance to the definition of an island. However, an infinitely large super-

island is impossible, as an island, by definition, must be surrounded by water, and

something that is infinite cannot be surrounded. Thus, one can see why a perfect

island cannot be confined since any finite definition of a being will run into this

problem as it must contain characteristics which are quantitatively infinite. This

unconfined conception of the perfect island is essentially the conception of a perfect

being and thus would imply the greatest island would perfectly possess qualitative

qualities such as love, compassion and humility. If Gaunilo redefines an island so it

no longer is confined by any definition he has in essence reached a definition of a

being similar to the Anselm’s conception of God – a being which is the greatest in

both a quantitative and qualitative sense. In order for Gaunilo to use his argument

to prove the existence of the super-island he must either redefine what an island is

so that it can be infinite or he must use a different logical proof for why a super-

island exists. Using an infinite definition of an island causes the definitions of island

and God to converge; thereby Anselm’s argument is left intact. On the other hand, if

Gaunilo alters the structure of the argument to prove the super-island exists without

altering the definition of the super-island, his argument is no longer analogous to

Anselm’s and therefore doesn’t address why Anselm’s proof of God is illogical.Yet, if

we are to believe Gaunilo’s definition of the super-island it follows that the super-

island and God are not two different beings, but is rather similar to calling a rose by

another name.

Finally, another convincing seemingly compelling objection Gaunilo raises is

that Anselm’s proof of God is unconvincing because the definition of either Godany

or the super-island being greater than any other being can only be established after

the existence of God or the super-islandthat being has been previously established.

Gaunilo states “For it should be proved first that this being itself really exists
somewhere; and then, from the fact that it is greater than all, we shall not hesitate

to infer that it also subsists in itself.” Gaunilo’s criterion of existence preceding the

proof of greatness seems to hold in a quantitative sense when comparing a finite

number of objects with finite characteristics against one another. For instance,

given a few apples, one can compare characteristics, such as weight, of the apples

and determine which one is heavier than the others. Yet in the case of a being such

as God which is defined as being infinitely greater than any other being in an

infinite number of characteristics, Gaunilo’s criterion fails to hold. Although at first

this criterion of existence before definition appears to be This is because Anselm’s

definition of greater also applies to the qualitative sense of the word by suggesting

there is no better being with respect to any possible category. In this case, a given

quality of God may be God’s inconceivability. Yet for Gaunilo to grant that God is

the best at being inconceivable, he would first need to conceive of God. Thus, in

some way God is a special case in which Gaunilo’s criterion cannot be fairly applied

due to what is entailed in the infinite breadth of the qualitative greatness of

God.appealing, it fails to hold.

For instance, if I were to ask “What is the Santa Claus like?” most people

would be able to give me a definition description of Santa Claus. Yet even though no

one has ever furnished the real Santa Claus, Santa Claus can still be described as a

rotund old man with a white beard who wears a red suit. Just as it is ok to define

Santa Claus without ever seeing Santa Claus, it too must be ok to conceive of a

being which is greater than all others. Thus, the criterion of existence preceding

definition is not necessary as all that is necessary is a conception of the object or

being.
 In conclusion, Anselm is able to provide a logical proof of the existence of

God using a reductio ad absurdum. Anselm’s argument can be summarized by

stating that a) because God is defined as a being than which nothing greater can

exist, and b) because a being greater could be conceived if God only existed in the

understanding, therefore it follows that God must exist in both the understanding

and reality if the premise stating that God is defined as a being than which nothing

greater can exists is true. Gaunilo raises two wo compelling objections to Anselm’s

argument: that the existence of any object can be proven using Anselm’s argument

and that the object must exist before it can be defined. However, neither objection

is convincing: the first objection only undermines the definition of an island since a

super-island would be infinite in area and could not be surrounded by water, and if

one redefines super-island to as something not confined by a definitionreplaces the

word “God” with “super-island” this definition approaches the definition of God and

therefore Gaunilo is would just be renaming God as “super-island” and the second

objection fails to account for cases in which we know a being does not exist, such as

Santa Claus, but we can clearly define and describe that being.the special nature of

a being that is infinitely greater in a qualitative sense in an infinite number of

characteristics. Thus, I find Anselm’s argument is logically convincing and even the

most compelling objections against Anselm to be unconvincing.