The Gender Gap in Economists' Beliefs

ARE DISAGREEMENTS AMONG MALE AND FEMALE ECONOMISTS
MARGINAL AT BEST?: A SURVEY OF AEA MEMBERS AND THEIR VIEWS

ON ECONOMICS AND ECONOMIC POLICY
ANN MARI MAY, MARY G. MCGARVEY, and ROBERT WHAPLES
The authors survey economists in the United States holding membership in the
American Economic Association (AEA) to determine if there are signicant differences
in views between male and female economists on important policy issues. Controlling
for place of current employment (academic institution with graduate program,
academic institutionundergraduate only, government, for-prot institution) and
decade of PhD, the authors nd many areas in which economists agree. However,
important differences exist in the views of male and female economists on issues
including the minimum wage, views on labor standards, health insurance, and
especially on explanations for the gender wage gap and issues of equal opportunity
in the labor market and the economics profession itself. These results lend support to
the notion that gender diversity in policy-making circles may be an important aspect
in broadening the menu of public policy choices. (JEL A11, J78, A14)
I. INTRODUCTION
Few changes in the demographics of higher
education in the United States have been as
pronounced as the increasing percentage of doc-
toral degrees awarded to women in the past
40 years. In 1975, men received the majority
of bachelors, masters, and doctoral degrees; by
2000, the majority of bachelors and masters
degrees were awarded to women. In 2002, for
the rst time in U.S. history, more American
women than American men received doctoral
degrees from U.S. universities and today more
The authors would like to thank Professor Julia McQuil-

lan, Director of the Bureau for Sociological Research, Uni-
versity of Nebraska-Lincoln for her helpful suggestions
on the survey questionnaire, Michael L. May, Swarthmore
College 11 for his research assistance, and the Research
Fund of the Department of Economics at the University of
Nebraska-Lincoln for assistance in funding a portion of this
research. We also thank three anonymous referees for their
very helpful comments and suggestions.
May: Professor of Economics, Department of Economics,
University of Nebraska-Lincoln, Lincoln, NE 68588-
0489. Phone 402-472-3369, E-mail amay1@unl.edu
McGarvey: Associate Professor, Department of Economics,
University of Nebraska-Lincoln, Lincoln, NE 68588-
0489. Phone 402-472-9415, E-mail mmcgarvey@
unl.edu
Whaples: Professor of Economics, Department of Eco-
nomics, Wake Forest University, Winston-Salem, NC
27109-7505. Phone 336-758-4916, E-mail whaples@
wfu.edu
doctorates are awarded to women than to men
at U.S. universities.
1
Although the proportion of women in eco-
nomics continues to lag behind that of other
social science disciplines, data from the Survey
of Earned Doctorates show that women rep-
resent 34.4% of new doctorates in economics
from U.S. universities in 2011, up from 28.1%
in 2001 (Doctorate Recipients from U.S. Uni-
versities 2011: Table 14 National Science Foun-
dation 2012). This represents a 6.3 percentage
point increase over the period as compared
with an average 2.5 percentage point increase
for all elds. As a result, increasing num-
bers of female economists are actively involved
1. Earned Degrees Conferred: 18702000, Postsec-
ondary Education Opportunity, Number 116, February 2002
available at http://www.eric.ed.gov/ERICWebPortal/custom/
portlets/recordDetails/detailmini.jsp?_nfpb=true&_&ERIC
ExtSearch_SearchValue_0=ED473779&ERICExtSearch_
SearchType_0=no&accno=ED473779. Accessed December
6, 2009.
ABBREVIATIONS
AEA: American Economic Association
GDP: Gross Domestic Product
GLS: Generalized Least Squares
OLS: Ordinary Least Squares
SUR: Seeming Unrelated Regression
111
Contemporary Economic Policy (ISSN 1465-7287)
Vol. 32, No. 1, January 2014, 111132
Online Early publication February 25, 2013
doi:10.1111/coep.12004
2013 Western Economic Association International
112 CONTEMPORARY ECONOMIC POLICY
in research and policy making on a variety
of levels including the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve Bank to the Coun-
cil of Economic Advisors. But does it make
any difference if men or women are at the
table when economic policies are debated and
alternatives considered? Or, are disagreements
between male and female economists marginal
at best?
In this study, we survey male and female
economists who are members of the Ameri-
can Economic Association (AEA) and provide
what is the rst systematic study of the views
of male and female economists on a wide vari-
ety of policy issues to determine if there are
differences in the views of male and female
economists after controlling for place of current
employment (academic institution with graduate
program, academic institutionundergraduate
only, government, for-prot institution) and
decade of PhD.
A. Consensus and the Economics Profession
Numerous studies using survey data to exam-
ine the degree of consensus among economists
have been published over the past 25 years
(Alston, Kearl, and Vaughan 1992; Frey et al.
1984; Fuller and Geide-Stevenson 2003; Kearl
et al. 1979; Whaples 2006). While these sur-
veys appeared relatively late in economics
as compared with other social science disci-
plines, the importance of consensus within the
discipline has a long history. In fact, con-
cern over consensus dates back to the ori-
gins of the AEA where the annual meeting
offered a forum for developing consensus in
a discipline thought to reect a sometimes
embarrassingly wide array of views on eco-
nomic policy questions. Economists, in particu-
lar, had much to gain in the professionalization
of higher education and the lack of consensus
on economic questions served as yet one more
reminder of the possibly less-than-scientic
nature of a discipline aspiring to be scientic
(Coats 1993).
Recent studies examine consensus among
economists by focusing on underlying assump-
tions, methodology, and policy issues. The
results of these studies indicate that economists
are less supportive of government interven-
tion in the economy than their counterparts in
other social science disciplines (Klein and Stern
2005, 2007) and that a fair degree of con-
sensus exists among economists. Kearl et al.
(1979, 36) in their study of U.S. economists in
a survey conducted in 1976 report more con-
sensus on microeconomic than macroeconomic
issues, but overall report that the perceptions of
widespread disagreement are simply wrong. In
a follow-up study, Alston, Kearl, and Vaughan
(1992) nd that although opinions of U.S.
economists on particular issues had shifted, a
similar pattern of consensus emerged with the
caveat that degree vintage and subgroup (AEA
membership, government economists, business
economists, teachers of principles of economics
courses at 4-year institutions, and institutional
economists) are also important determinants of
consensus on various questions. Alston, Kearl,
and Vaughan (1992) nd considerable consen-
sus among economists overall. Yet, as Fuchs
et al. (1998) later point out, the seven ques-
tions about policy in Alston, Kearl, and Vaughan
(1992) show a very high level of disagreement.
In their own study Fuchs et al. (1998) nd con-
siderable disagreement between labor and public
economists about policy proposals in their areas
of specialization. In an additional study, Fuchs
(1996) surveyed health economists and found
considerable disagreement about major issues of
health policy.
Other studies have examined the inuence
of international differences (Frey et al. 1984),
age differences or age upon receipt of degree
(Alston, Kearl, and Vaughan 1992; Klein and
Stern 2005), political party and voting pat-
terns (Klein and Stern 2005, 2007), school
of thought (Alston and Vaughan 1993), and
economic eld (Fuller and Geide-Stevenson
2003; Kearl et al. 1979) to determine if these
factors produce differences in the views of
economists. Yet, absent from these discussions
is any examination of gender differences among
economists.
In contrast to these previous studies, only few
studies examine gender differences in opinions
of economists.
2
Davis (1997), in his study of
AEA members, examines economists views of
methodology, the social value of research, per-
ceptions about the publication of that research,
and perceptions about the inuence of race and
gender on economic research. He reports that
there are signicant differences in the views
of male and female economists with respect
to whether author recognition among profes-
sional economists inuences the probability of
2. Some studies on gender differences in economic
policy on single issues offer similarly interesting results.
See, for example, Burgoon and Niscox (2012).
MAY, MCGARVEY & WHAPLES: AEA MEMBERS VIEWS 113
an articles acceptance in refereed economics
journals in the United States, whether there is a
good-old-boy network in the economics pro-
fession, and whether economists are amenable
to interdisciplinary research approaches. Specif-
ically, Davis nds that although the majority of
male and female economists have similar opin-
ions, women typically reach a much stronger
consensusparticularly on issues of equity and
fairness in the economics profession.
In her study of AEA economists conducted
in 1992, Albelda (1997) examines a variety of
questions concerning gender and the economics
profession. According to her, men were much
less interested than women in having more atten-
tion paid to topics such as womens labor force
participation, the impact of scal and mone-
tary policies on women and the family structure,
wage discrimination, and the economic status of
minority women (Albelda 1997, 7980). More-
over, there was little support for the notion
that feminism has impacted the discipline of
economicsnor did economists express much
interest in seeing more feminist economic anal-
ysis. Most notable, however, were the large
gender gaps in response to questions about the
treatment of women in the economics profession
(Albelda 1997, 69). As she reports, almost one-
third of male respondents agree with the state-
ment that it is easier for women to get tenure
and promotions than it is for men, while less
than 4% of women agreed with the statement
(Albelda 1997, 81).
Hedengren, Klein, and Milton (2010) exam-
ine gender differences in policy-oriented peti-
tions endorsed by economists, nding that
men are much more likely to sign liberty-
enhancing petitions, which call for a smaller
role for the state, while women economists are
somewhat more likely to endorse petitions call-
ing for greater governmental intervention. Davis
et al. (2011) conduct a survey on a wide range
of issues (including favorite economic thinkers,
economics journals, and blogs) and nd that
women economists are much more likely than
men to be members of the Democratic Party and
to favor policies that restrict individual liberty.
In addition, Stastny (2010) nds that women
economists in the Czech Republic tend to favor
much more government intervention than do
male economists.
Although these studies offer important
insights into gender differences on views of the
economics profession, they ask a fairly narrow
range of questions and are not designed to sys-
tematically explore the nuances of differences
between male and female economists. Given
the changing demographics of the economics
profession over the past 30 years, these differ-
ences, if they exist, may have signicant impli-
cations for policy-making outcomes.
B. Gender and Economics in the United States
Although the gender gap in voting and
party identication has been a topic of wide-
spread interest since the 1980 election, less
attention has been paid to gender differences in
policy preferences. Yet, several studies indicate
that gender differences in policy preferences
exist in the United States and have increased
since the 1970s (Ingelhart and Norris 2000; Pew
Research Center 2009; Saad 2003; Shapiro and
Mahajan 1986; Smith 1984). While disagree-
ment exists as to the cause of these differences
in voting patterns, party identication, and pub-
lic opinion surveys on policy issues, women and
men appear to differ most on matters concern-
ing violence and force and so-called compassion
issues concerning aid to the poor, unemployed,
sick, and others in need, and in their views on
regulatory policies (Shapiro and Mahajan 1986,
4445).
Although gender differences in the general
population are well studied, gender differences
in the views of economists have received little
attention. In fact, no systematic study of gender
differences in views of American economists on
a wide variety of economic policy issues has yet
been undertaken. Our study attempts to remedy
this by examining the views of male and female
economists who are members of the AEA in
the United States. Using survey data on core
precepts and approaches in economics, views
on market solutions and government interven-
tion, specic policy issues, and gender equality
in economics and society we ask the question,
Do male and female economists share the same
views on underlying assumptions, methodologi-
cal approaches, policy solutions, perceived prob-
lems in economics, and equal opportunity in
society and the economics profession? Because
survey data from noneconomists indicate that
there are often signicant gender differences
in views on policy issues (Saad 2003), we
are interested to see if these differences disap-
pear among economists with shared training and
backgrounds.
II. METHODOLOGY
A. Data and Descriptive Statistics
Our goal is to estimate the extent of dif-
ferences in opinions on economic methodology
and policy issues between male and female
economists with doctoral degrees who are mem-
bers of the AEA. The population from which
we sampled is the list of members in the 2007
AEA Directory who received both their under-
graduate and PhD degrees from U.S. insti-
tutions.
3
The selection process yielded 202
randomly selected male members and 202 ran-
domly selected female members to whom the
survey was mailed in early November 2008. The
overall response rate was 35.4% which is similar
to previous surveys.
4
Table 1 contains descriptive statistics (overall
and disaggregated by sex) for the entire sam-
ple, for the 143 members who returned usable
surveys, and for the 261 nonresponders. Char-
acteristics of the AEA members include demo-
graphic information on sex, year of PhD, and
current type of employment. This information
was obtained from survey responses of those
who returned the surveys and from the AEA
directory entries of the nonresponders. Addition-
ally, Table 1 reports whether or not the AEA
member chose to list his/her research interests
in the 2007 AEA directory. This information
was included as an indication not only of the
economists research activity, but also the will-
ingness of the individual to respond to survey
questions.
The original, random sample of AEA mem-
bers was evenly divided between men and
women by design. Approximately 67% of those
sampled are employed in academic institutions
with 41% teaching in graduate programs and
26% in undergraduate programs. Fourteen per-
cent of those sampled work in the for-prot
3. The 2007 AEA membership directory has 1,116 pages
of members. To create a sample of approximately 200 male
and 200 female members we randomly picked a starting
page between 1 and 5 and then selected the rst male and the
rst female to meet the selection criteria. (Many members
do not list information regarding their degrees and had to be
skipped.) The search procedure was repeated by fth/sixth
page thereafter. This yielded 202 males and 202 females (in
one instance there was a stretch of six pages over which no
female met the criteria). Sex was usually obvious from the
individuals rst name, but an Internet search of individuals
was conducted in cases of ambiguity.
4. Response rates among AEA member in recent sur-
veys include 34.4% in Alston, Kearl, and Vaughan (1992),
30.8% in Fuller and Geide-Stevenson (2003), 36.3% in
Whaples and Heckelman (2005), 26.6% in Klein and Stern
(2005), and 40.0% in Whaples (2006).
sector and 11% are employed by the govern-
ment. The remaining 8% are either retired, not in
the formal labor market, or working in the non-
prot sector. Although, in our sample, it is more
likely for women to be employed in academic
institutions than men, and more likely for men
to work in the government or for-prot sectors
than women, these differences in employment
rates are not statistically signicantly different
from 0. The economists in the AEA survey
earned their doctoral degrees about 22 years
ago with womens degrees earned about 5 years
more recently than mens and the average differ-
ence is statistically signicant. It is interesting
that, in our random sample of AEA members,
male economists are more likely to list their
research interests in the AEA directory than
female economists. The 10 percentage point dif-
ference is also statistically signicant.
A comparison of the responders and nonre-
sponders descriptive statistics shows that most
of the characteristics are similar. Forty-ve per-
cent of those responding to the survey are
women, whereas 52% of the nonresponders are
women. The distribution of overall employment
across sectors is roughly the same with the
exception of employment in an academic institu-
tion with a graduate program. Formal statistical
tests nd evidence that the overall proportions
of economists teaching in graduate institutions
differ for the responders and nonresponders
(.35 vs. .44) and that it is the male respon-
ders who are statistically signicantly less likely
(by 11 percentage points) to teach in graduate
institutions than the male nonresponders. The
proportion of economists who list their research
interests in the AEA directory is 55% for the
responders and 62% for the nonresponders. On
average, those responding to the survey received
their PhDs about two and a half years more
recently than those not responding and this dif-
ference is statistically signicant. A smaller pro-
portion of those economists who responded to
the survey received their degrees in the 1970s
than those who did not respond.
Most of the statistically signicant male and
female differences in the original random sam-
ple remain signicant in the sample of respon-
ders. Male economists are more likely to list
their current research in the AEA directory
and received their PhDs earlier than female
economists. In the responders sample, male
economists are more than twice as likely to be
working in the governmental sector as female
economists. Although this relative difference in
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.
government employment exists in the original
random sample, it is larger and statistically sig-
nicant among the responders.
Our statistical analysis of gender differences
in economists opinions on methodology and
policy issues is based on the responses of those
who returned their surveys; we do not know
the opinions of the nonresponders. It is possi-
ble that estimation using only the observable
survey responses will lead to inconsistent esti-
mates of the gender effect. We address this
issue in the next section by estimating the
decision to respond to the survey as a probit
model and testing for nonresponse bias in our
estimation of gender differences in the group-
level scaled answers using Heckmans (1979)
procedure.
B. Scaled Responses to Group Questions and
Test for Selection Bias
The survey questions can be classied into
ve groups, each group designed to ascertain
the respondents views about different types of
issues. The rst group of questions relate to core
principles in economics and economic method-
ology. The second through fourth groups exam-
ine views on market solutions and government
intervention, government spending, taxing, and
redistribution, and the environment. The fth
group of questions asks specically about equal
opportunity in society and gender equality in
the economics profession. The wide variety of
policy-related questions allows us to examine
possible gender differences on a host of the
most important and topical issues currently fac-
ing economists.
Before examining gender differences in ans-
wers to specic questions, we rst construct an
overall measure of the economists opinion on
each of the ve group topics. The Appendix
describes the construction of each scaled opin-
ion measure and the survey questions upon
which each is based. Tables A1 and A2 provide
descriptive statistics of the opinion measures and
correlations of the responses between topics. We
nd that the Cronbachs values are greater
than .70 for each of the scaled answers, indicat-
ing that each is a reliable measure of the overall
opinion on the group topic.
Our goal is to estimate the mean difference
in opinion on economic methodology and pol-
icy issues of male and female PhD economists
who received their educational training in the
United States. To better isolate the effect of
gender on economists opinions, we need to
control for those variables that are both cor-
related with the economists opinions on pol-
icy and methodology and with the economists
gender. Because female economists received
their terminal degrees more recently, on aver-
age, than male economists, and opinions might
be related to degree vintage, we include four
binary indicators of the decade the PhD was
received as one of our control variables. The
omitted category of economists contains those
who received their PhDs prior to 1970. We
also include controls for the economists place
of employment. Although there were no sta-
tistically signicant differences in the propor-
tions of men and women employed in graduate
or undergraduate-only academic institutions, nor
in the for-prot sectors, there might be differ-
ences in types of employment by gender after
accounting for degree vintage. The economists
opinions on policy issues and methodology
might reasonably be related to, or inuenced
by, their type of work. For these reasons, we
also include the mutually exclusive employment
category variables, graduate, for prot, govern-
ment, and undergrad as control variables in
the regression. The omitted category includes
employment in the nonprot, nonacademic, non-
government sector, not currently employed,
or retired.
We base our inference on the estimated
coefcient on the binary indicator, female, in
the model,
y
i,j
=
j1
female
i
+
j2
PhD1970s
i
(1)
+
j3
PhD1980s
i
+
j4
PhD1990s
i
+
j5
PhD2000s
i
+
j6
graduate
i
+
j7
government
i
+
j8
for prot
i
+
j9
undergrad
i
+
j0
+
i,j
,
where i denotes the ith economist and j denotes
the jth question or group of questions. Because
we cannot observe the survey answers of those
economists who did not respond, even if the
regression error is independent of the control
variables, it is possible that estimation of
j1
using only the responders observations will
produce inconsistent and biased estimates of the
gender effect. We test the null hypothesis of no
selection bias using the Heckman (1979) two-
stage procedure.
We assume that the decision to respond
to the survey follows a probit model, P(s
i
=
1|x
i
) = P(Z x
i
), where s
i
= 1 if individual
TABLE 2
Probit Estimation of Probability of Response to
AEA survey, N = 391
X Variables Coefcients
Female 0.245
(0.136)
Graduate 0.684
(0.292)
Undergraduate 0.471 (0.308)
Government 0.528 (0.340)
For Prot 1.101
(0.399)
Listed Research 0.263
(0.149)
For Prot Listed Research 0.828
(0.388)
PhD1970s 0.075 (0.293)
PhD1980s 0.253 (0.289)
PhD1990s 0.444 (0.300)
PhD2000s 0.566
(0.314)
Constant 0.166 (0.0305)
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.
The symbols

,

,

denote 10%, 5%, 1% signicance
levels from testing the null hypothesis that the coefcient
equals 0.
i responds to the survey and s
i
= 0, if not. The
(1 k) vector of variables, x
i
, that inuences
the choice to respond to the survey includes
the control variables in Equation (1). We also
include a binary control for whether or not
the economist lists his/her research interests
in the AEA 2007 directory (listed research)
and the interaction of listed research with for
prot to allow the effect of listed research on
the probability of response to differ for those
working in the for-prot sector.
In this framework, the economist responds
to the survey (s
i
= 1) if the unobservable net
benet from doing so (s
i
) is positive, or if s
i
=
x
i
+u
i
> 0, where u
i
is a standard normal ran-
dom variable and is distributed independently of
x
i
. Under these assumptions, consistent estima-
tion of the gender effect on economists opin-
ions on question j (
j1
) can be obtained using
only the responders information if the error
term in Equation (1) is uncorrelated with u
i
,
the error term in the response equation. We test
the hypothesis that these errors have zero cor-
relation by adding the estimated inverse Mills
ratio, IMR
i
= pdf
z
(x
i
)/CDF
z
(x
i
) as a regres-
sor in Equation (1) and testing that its coefcient
equals 0.
Table 2 reports the probit estimates of the
response equation. The results indicate that the
probability of responding to the survey is lower
for female economists relative to males and for
economists employed in two of the included
job categories relative to males and those
who are retired or employed in nonacademic,
nongovernment, or for-prot institutions. Those
economists who earned their PhD in the 2000s
are more likely to respond to the survey, relative
to those who earned their degrees prior to 1970.
Those economists who list their current research
interest in the AEA directory are less likely to
respond; however, those who work in for-prot
institutions and list their current research are
more likely to respond.
Table 3 presents the ordinary least squares
estimation of Equation (1) for each of the
ve topic groups, with and without the inclu-
sion of the estimated inverse Mills ratio. The
dependent variable is the scaled response to
the questions on each topic, standardized to
have zero mean and unit variance, so that
the coefcient on female is the average dif-
ference in female economists response rela-
tive to male economists in standard deviation
units. The results indicate that male and female
U.S.-trained AEA members generally agree on
core economic precepts and methodology and
on U.S. environmental policy, but differ on
issues related to market solutions and govern-
ment intervention, government-backed redistri-
bution, and the extent of gender inequity in
the U.S. labor market and within the economics
profession.
Tests of the null hypothesis of no selection
bias for each topic category provide no evi-
dence that the selection equation error is corre-
lated with the error in Equation (1); moreover,
the inclusion of the inverse Mills ratio in the
regressions has little effect on the ordinary least
squares (OLS) point estimates and estimated
standard errors. These results support the valid-
ity of our study using the sample of responding
economists to estimate model (1) and suggest
that our inference on gender differences will not
suffer from selection bias.
III. GENDER DIFFERENCES IN ECONOMISTS
VIEWS ON POLICY ISSUES
This section presents Seeming Unrelated
Regression (SUR) estimation results based on
the survey response to estimate gender dif-
ferences in economists views on economic
methodology and policy issues. The SUR model
is relevant when the regression errors are cor-
related across equations and have different vari-
ances. For convenience, we reproduce our model
T
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2
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N
1
1
3
1
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9
N
o
t
e
s
:
S
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
e
r
r
o
r
s
a
r
e
i
n
p
a
r
e
n
t
h
e
s
e
s
b
e
n
e
a
t
h
c
o
e
f
c
i
e
n
t
p
o
i
n
t
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s
.
T
h
e
s
y
m
b
o
l
s
d
e
n
o
t
e
1
0
%
,
5
%
,
1
%
s
i
g
n
i
c
a
n
c
e
l
e
v
e
l
s
f
r
o
m
t
e
s
t
i
n
g
t
h
e
n
u
l
l
h
y
p
o
t
h
e
s
i
s
t
h
a
t
t
h
e
p
o
p
u
l
a
t
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o
n
c
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f
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t
e
q
u
a
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s
0
.
of economist is response to question j (or topic
j) from the previous section,
y
i,j
=
j1
female
i
+
j2
PhD1970s
i
(2)
+
j3
PhD1980s
i
+
j4
PhD1990s
i
+
j5
PhD2000s
i
+
j6
graduate
i
+
j7
government
i
+
j8
for prot
i
+
j9
undergrad
i
+
j0
+
i,j
,
where we treat equation j as part of a SUR
system of equations. The error terms represent
those unobservable individual-specic factors
that affect opinions but are unrelated to gen-
der, decade in which the PhD is earned, and
type of employment. We allow the variances of
the errors to differ by question, the errors to be
correlated across questions, and the error covari-
ance matrices to differ for males and females.
The generalized least squares (GLS) method
increases the precision of our estimates by incor-
porating the estimated relationship among unob-
servable factors that form opinions on related
topics.
Our rst estimation strategy is to measure
gender differences in economists views on gen-
eral issues addressed by the ve groups of sur-
vey questions. This provides a more precise
measure of opinion on the issue by incorporating
repeated observations on the same topic (aver-
aging an individuals answers to all questions
within the group topic), but limits the sample to
individuals who answered all questions within
the ve groups. Our second strategy is to esti-
mate the extent of gender differences in average
responses to specic questions within a general
topic area. The dependent variable is individual
is response to question j. Although y
i,j
is a
less precise estimate of individual is opinion
(it is based on the response to only one question
rather than an average of repeated responses on
a topic), the sample size increases to the num-
ber of economists who answered all questions
in one group rather than all groups.
A. Views on General Topic Areas
The rst SUR system explains the standard-
ized, scaled answers that measure the deviations
from the average economists views on the ve
topics: core precepts and economic methodology;
market solutions and government intervention;
government spending, taxing, and redistribu-
tion; U.S. environmental policies; and gender
and equal opportunity. The optimal weighting
scheme incorporated in the GLS systems estima-
tion increases the efciency of the estimates over
the OLS method. The number of observations,
however, is smaller for the systems estimation
because it is based on the number of economists
that have complete information for all questions
in each of the ve groups.
Table 4 contains the GLS estimates of the
coefcients in Equation (1) for j = 1, 2, . . . ,5,
corresponding to the ve group topics. The
dependent variables are the scaled responses,
standardized to have zero mean and unit vari-
ance, so the coefcient on a binary control vari-
able (female, employment category, or decade
of PhD) is the average difference (in standard
deviation units) in the response of economists
who fall into the respective category relative to
those in the omitted category, given the other
controls. The GLS system results conrm the
conclusions based on the OLS and Heckit esti-
mates of Table 3. Male and female members of
the AEA with doctoral degrees from U.S. insti-
tutions appear to agree on core precepts and eco-
nomic methodology, whereas female economists
tend to favor government-backed redistribution
policies more than males, view gender inequality
as a problem in the U.S. labor market and eco-
nomics profession more than males, and favor
government intervention over market solutions
more than their male counterparts. The mean
gender differences in opinions on these topics
are relatively large. The mean views of women
economists on government spending, taxing,
and redistribution and on gender inequality are
both approximately one standard deviation away
from the mean opinion of male economists.
Although the divergence in magnitudes of the
GLS and OLS estimated gender difference in
opinion on U.S. environmental policies is not
large, the GLS estimate is statistically signi-
cant. The mean response of female economists
is about .45 standard deviations greater than the
mean male response, indicating that women tend
to favor an increase in U.S. environmental pro-
tection more than men.
Generally speaking, the demographic con-
trols contribute little to explaining views on
the ve group topics once one controls for
the economists gender.
5
The economists place
of employment appears to have no effect on
opinion once gender and degree vintage are
5. The joint null hypotheses that the coefcients on
PhD1970s, PhD1980s, PhD1990s, PhD2000s, Graduate,
Government, Forprot, and Undergrad equal 0 cannot be
rejected for each of the ve equations in the system.
T
A
B
L
E
4
G
L
S
S
y
s
t
e
m
E
s
t
i
m
a
t
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o
n
o
f
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
s
t
o
S
u
r
v
e
y
Q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
s
S
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
i
z
e
d
(
M
=
0
,
S
D
=
1
)
S
c
a
l
e
d
A
n
s
w
e
r
s
t
o
G
r
o
u
p
Q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
s
N
=
8
3
Q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
G
r
o
u
p
F
e
m
a
l
e
P
h
D
1
9
7
0
s
P
h
D
1
9
8
0
s
P
h
D
1
9
9
0
s
P
h
D
2
0
0
0
s
G
r
a
d
u
a
t
e
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o
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r
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m
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o
r
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r
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t
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n
d
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r
g
r
a
d
u
a
t
e
C
o
n
s
t
a
n
t
G
r
o
u
p
1
:
c
o
r
e
p
r
e
c
e
p
t
s
/
e
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
m
e
t
h
o
d
o
l
o
g
y
(
6
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
s
;
C
r
o
n
b
a
c
h
=
.
7
1
)
0
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2
7
1
.
2
0
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8
6
0
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4
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0
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2
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8
4
0
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3
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0
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3
5
(
0
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2
3
)
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0
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5
4
)
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0
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1
)
(
0
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5
1
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5
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1
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)
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7
)
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0
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4
4
)
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0
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4
3
)
G
r
o
u
p
2
:
m
a
r
k
e
t
s
o
l
u
t
i
o
n
s
a
n
d
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
i
n
t
e
r
v
e
n
t
i
o
n
s
(
8
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
s
;
C
r
o
n
b
a
c
h
=
.
7
8
)
0
.
6
5
0
.
7
7
1
.
0
1
0
0
.
8
7
2
0
.
6
7
0
.
3
5
0
.
2
3
0
.
1
8
0
.
0
7
0
.
9
1
(
0
.
2
3
)
(
0
.
5
2
)
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0
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4
9
)
(
0
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9
)
(
0
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5
3
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9
)
(
0
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4
6
)
(
0
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4
6
)
(
0
.
4
3
)
(
0
.
4
1
)
G
r
o
u
p
3
:
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
s
p
e
n
d
i
n
g
,
t
a
x
i
n
g
,
&
r
e
d
i
s
t
r
i
b
u
t
i
o
n
(
9
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
s
;
C
r
o
n
b
a
c
h
=
.
9
2
)
0
.
9
1
0
.
7
8
0
.
8
3
1
0
.
6
3
0
.
7
3
0
.
2
6
0
.
1
9
0
.
1
0
0
.
2
9
0
.
8
8
(
0
.
2
2
)
(
0
.
5
1
)
(
0
.
4
8
)
(
0
.
4
8
)
(
0
.
5
2
)
(
0
.
3
8
)
(
0
.
4
5
)
(
0
.
4
5
)
(
0
.
4
2
)
(
0
.
4
0
)
G
r
o
u
p
4
:
t
h
e
e
n
v
i
r
o
n
m
e
n
t
(
4
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
s
;
C
r
o
n
b
a
c
h
=
.
7
3
)
0
.
4
3
1
.
0
2
5
0
.
7
9
0
.
8
7
4
0
.
8
0
0
.
4
6
0
.
0
7
0
.
3
6
0
.
4
9
0
.
6
3
(
0
.
2
4
)
(
0
.
5
5
)
(
0
.
5
2
)
(
0
.
5
2
)
(
0
.
5
7
)
(
0
.
4
2
)
(
0
.
4
9
)
(
0
.
4
9
)
(
0
.
4
5
)
(
0
.
4
4
)
G
r
o
u
p
5
:
g
e
n
d
e
r
a
n
d
e
q
u
a
l
o
p
p
o
r
t
u
n
i
t
y
(
6
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
s
;
C
r
o
n
b
a
c
h
=
.
9
3
)
1
.
0
8
0
.
6
0
0
.
3
9
0
.
2
8
0
.
6
6
0
.
0
2
0
.
5
4
0
.
4
7
0
.
2
2
1
.
0
2
(
0
.
2
1
)
(
0
.
4
8
)
(
0
.
4
5
)
(
0
.
4
5
)
(
0
.
4
9
)
(
0
.
3
6
)
(
0
.
4
2
)
(
0
.
4
2
)
(
0
.
3
9
)
(
0
.
3
8
)
N
o
t
e
s
:
S
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
e
r
r
o
r
s
a
r
e
i
n
p
a
r
e
n
t
h
e
s
e
s
b
e
n
e
a
t
h
c
o
e
f
c
i
e
n
t
p
o
i
n
t
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s
.
D
e
n
o
t
e
1
0
%
,
5
%
,
1
%
s
i
g
n
i
c
a
n
c
e
l
e
v
e
l
s
f
r
o
m
t
h
e
h
y
p
o
t
h
e
s
i
s
t
h
a
t
t
h
e
p
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
c
o
e
f
c
i
e
n
t
e
q
u
a
l
s
0
.
considered. The results indicate a statistically
signicant and relatively large difference in
opinion between those who earned their degrees
prior to 1970 and those who earned their degrees
more recently. Those who graduated in the
1970s or 1980s are less likely to agree with
core precepts and economic methodology than
economists who earned their degrees before
1970. The results also indicate that economists
with degrees from the 1980s are more likely
to favor government interventions over market
solutions than economists with degrees prior to
1970. Interestingly, the only characteristic that
matters for the scaled answer to the Gender and
Equal Opportunity questions is whether or not
the economist is female.
The results from system GLS estimation of
economists mean responses to the ve groups
of questions on economic methodology, the role
of government (in allocating resources, redis-
tributing wealth, protecting the environment),
and equal opportunity provide strong evidence
of gender differences. Female economists aver-
age responses differ from male economists by a
statistically signicant margin in four of the ve
topic areas after controlling for type of employ-
ment and degree vintage. Mean differences in
views on government-backed redistribution and
on gender and equal opportunity also differ by
a substantial marginabout one full standard
deviation.
B. Views on Core Precepts and Economic
Methodology
We include several questions designed to
address core economic preceptsone to exam-
ine the question of individuals as rational
utility-maximizers and another to examine the
assumption that human wants are unlimited.
Also included in this group are questions con-
cerning economic methodology that attempt
to ascertain views on mathematics in eco-
nomic modeling, deductive versus empirical
approaches to the study of economics, and two
questions that examine potential differences in
views on modeling of household decision mak-
ing and measuring aggregate economic output.
GLS estimation of a SUR system for responses
to the Group 1 questions indicate no difference
in mean opinions by gender after controlling for
degree vintage and place of employment.
6
6. The results of the full GLS estimation of Equation
(1) for each of the ve groups is available from the authors
upon request.
Economists mean responses indicate agree-
ment with the notions that individuals are
utility-maximizers and that human wants are
unlimited. Similarly, when examining method-
ological questions in the economics profession
there appears to be no signicant difference in
beliefs. On average, economists agree that math-
ematical modeling should be an important part
of economics and that research on households
should include intrahousehold decision making.
Economists mean response to Question 23 indi-
cates a neutral view on GDP being an insuf-
cient measure of overall economic performance.
The GLS estimation results for the response to
Question 39 indicate that, although there is no
difference in opinion based solely on gender,
those economists who work in the for-prot sec-
tor are more likely to believe that the profession
relies too much on empirical analysis and not
enough on deduction.
It would appear that on several core concepts
in economics and methodology, the beliefs of
male and female economists are very similar.
Male and female economists who are members
of the AEA appear to start from the same
assumptions about how people behave and how
to approach the study of economics.
C. Views on Market Solutions and Government
Intervention
Previous studies such as Klein and Stern
(2005) conrm that economists are less support-
ive of government intervention in the economy
than their counterparts in other social science
disciplines. Indeed, it is perhaps the penchant for
free market solutions that is the hallmark of the
discipline (Fourcade 2009). Yet, when we exam-
ine the question of support for market solutions
versus government intervention, interesting dif-
ferences between male and female economists
begin to emerge.
Despite the similarities in views on core prin-
ciples and methodological approaches to eco-
nomics, our study shows differences in the views
of male and female economists in their sup-
port of market solutions versus government reg-
ulation. The GLS estimation results indicate
that the mean responses of women economists
are signicantly lower than those of male
economists, suggesting women economists are
less supportive of market solutions over govern-
ment interventions than male economists. The
only exception is on the issue of whether the
government should tax unhealthy foods where
both men and women appear approximately
equal in their opposition.
Table 5 presents GLS estimates of male and
female economists expected response to each
proposition for which the estimated female mean
difference exceeds one-half a point on the
Likert-type scale. For those questions, the prob-
ability of responding disagree or strongly
disagree to the proposition conditional on gen-
der, degree vintage, and place of employment
is estimated by a linear probability model.
7
The table reports the estimated probabilities of
disagreeing with the proposition at the sam-
ple mean values of the PhD and place of
employment dummy variables for both male and
female economists. After controlling for PhD
vintage and type of employment, we nd that
women are more likely to disagree that either
the European Union or the United States has
excessive government regulations by about 20
percentage points. Female economists are 27
percentage points more likely to disagree that
parents should be given educational vouchers
and 14 percentage points more likely to dis-
agree that Wal-Mart generates positive net ben-
ets. In other words, evidence suggests that
male economists are more likely to prefer mar-
ket solutions to economic problems.
8
Although
the SUR estimated mean difference in opinion
on whether the United States should drill for
oil in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge indi-
cates a lower level of agreement for women, the
12 percentage point difference in the probabil-
ity of disagreement is not statistically signi-
cant. According to the SUR results, the largest
difference in the mean response is due to degree
7. We estimated the probability of disagreement using
a linear probability model rather than a logit or pro-
bit model in order to incorporate the error correlation
across responses using individual-clustered standard errors.
Because the explanatory variables are binary indicators, the
linear probability model estimated probabilities are bounded
between 0 and 1.
8. Also included in the original survey was a question
about the newly enacted bailout of nancial institutions. At
the time that this question was asked, the bailout was very
new and opinion quite uid. Not surprisingly perhaps, most
economists in our samplemale and femaleindicated
their support for the law and no gender differences were
apparent at that time. Similarly, our question about the
best way to deal with Social Securitys long-term funding
gap elicited a rather high number of none of the above
answers. As a result, we have concluded that this question
reveals little about the issue and have chosen to leave the
discussion of it out of our narrative. Along these same lines,
our questions about the impact of undocumented workers
on American-born workers in various income groups and
on returning to the gold standard produced no differences in
opinion between male and female economists.
TABLE 5
Gender Differences in Opinions on Market Solutions and Government Interventions
Group 2 Proposition: Market
Solutions and Government
Interventions N = 122 Gender E(R/X)
1
R
a
P(R/X)
1
The European Union has an excessive amount of
government regulation of economic activity
Female 3.11
0.54
1 or 2 0.33
0.19
(0.15) (0.19) (0.06) (0.08)

Male 3.65
0.14
(0.12) (0.04)
The United States has an excessive amount of
government regulation of economic activity
Female 2.38
0.55
1 or 2 0.62
0.21
(0.14) (0.21) (0.06) (0.09)

Male 2.93
0.41
(0.14) (0.06)
The United States should drill for oil in the Arctic
National Wildlife Refuge
Female 2.21
0.54
1 or 2 0.64
0.12
(0.18) (0.27) (0.06) (0.09)
Male 2.75
0.52
(0.20) (0.06)
Parents should be given educational vouchers which can
be used at government-run or privately run schools
Female 2.99
0.77
1 or 2 0.40
0.27
(0.18) (0.24) (0.06) (0.08)

Male 3.75
0.13
(0.16) (0.05)
A Wal-Mart store typically generates more benets to
society than costs
Female 3.30
0.77
1 or 2 0.22
0.14
(0.14) (0.20) (0.05) (0.06)
Male 4.07
0.008
(0.13) (0.03)
Notes: Linear Probability Model: P (opinion|female, X) =
1
female + X
2
.
Mean Response Model: E (R|female, X) =
1
+X
2
|X = decade of PhD (1970s, 1980s, 1990s, 2000s), type of
employment.
a
Unless otherwise noted, 1 = strongly disagree; 2 = disagree; 3 = neutral; 4 = agree; 5 = strongly agree.
Mean parameters were estimated by SUR methods with different covariance matrices for males and females. Linear
probability model parameters were estimated by OLS with clustered standard errors.
,

,

Denote 10%, 5%, 1% signicance levels from testing the null hypothesis that the coefcient equals 0.
vintage. Those economists who earned their
degrees in the 1980s or 1990s, regardless of their
gender or place of employment, are much more
likely to oppose drilling in the Arctic National
Wildlife Refuge than economists whose PhDs
were granted prior to 1970.
It is interesting that there appears to be
little disagreement between male and female
economists about the question of whether the
United States should impose taxes on unhealthy
foodswhat many in the popular press have
dubbed an example of the so-called nanny
state. Both male and female economists show
little support for the imposition of a tax on
unhealthy foods.
D. Views on Government Spending, Taxing,
and Redistribution
Differences in views between male and
female economists not only reect variations in
preferences for market solutions versus
government intervention, but also appear to
reect values differencessome of which
correspond to what have been called compas-
sion issues. These differences may not emerge
when we consider overall levels of government
spending or taxation, but may emerge more
clearly when we ask specic questions about
the nature of government spending, income dis-
tribution, revenue nancing options, as well as
evaluating the impact of various government
programs. The estimation results indicate sta-
tistically signicant gender differences in opin-
ions on each of the nine propositions; however,
Table 6 reports only those with mean differences
greater than one-half.
When asked their opinions about the size of
the government, the average male economists
response is closest to the too large choice,
whereas the average female economists respo-
nse is closest to the about right response.
Examination of the probability estimates shows
that women are 24 percentage points more likely
than men to believe the size of the government
is either about right, too small or much
too small. There are also statistically signi-
cant differences in mean responses between men
TABLE 6
Government Spending, Taxing, and Redistribution
Group 3 Proposition: Government Spending,
Taxing, & Redistribution N = 115 Gender E(R/X)
1
R
a
P(R/X)
1
The distribution of income in the United States should
be made more equal
Female 3.86
0.72
4 or 5 0.73
0.32
(0.16) (0.23) (0.06) (0.09)

Male 3.14
0.41
(0.16) (0.06)
Increases in the minimum wage will increase
unemployment among unskilled workers
Female 2.91
0.94
1 or 2 0.38
0.26
(0.17) (0.21) (0.07) (0.08)

Male 3.85
0.12
(0.12) (0.04)
The United States should link import openness to the
labor standards of its export partners
Female 3.34
0.94
4 or 5 0.52
0.30
(0.17) (0.23) (0.07) (0.09)

Male 2.41
0.22
(0.14) (0.05)
Employers in the United States should be required to
provide health insurance to their full-time employees
Female 3.31
0.92
4 or 5 0.47
0.31
(0.17) (0.23) (0.07) (0.08)

Male 2.39
0.16
(0.14) (0.04)
The United States should implement a tax on
consumption and rely less on income taxes for
revenue
Female 2.51
0.80
1 or 2 0.54
0.23
(0.16) (0.23) (0.07) (0.09)

Male 3.31
0.31
(0.16) (0.06)
The size of government in the United States is
1 = much too large, 2 = too large, 3 = about right,
4 = too small, 5 = much too small
Female 2.80
0.46
3,4 or 5 0.74
0.24
(0.11) (0.17) (0.06) (0.09)

Male 2.34
0.50
(0.12) (0.06)
The U.S. tax structure should be: 1 = made less
progressive, 2 = kept at its current level of
progressivity, 3 = made more progressive
Female 2.81
0.70
3 0.83
0.41
(0.08) (0.14) (0.05) (0.08)

Male 2.11
0.41
(0.11) (0.06)
Notes: Linear Probability Model: P (opinion|female, X) =
1
, female + X
2
.
Mean Response Model: E(R|female, X) =
1
+X
2
X = decade of PhD (1970s, 1980s, 1990s, 2000s), type of employment.
Mean parameters were estimated by SUR methods with different covariance matrices for males and females. Linear probability
model parameters were estimated by OLS with clustered standard errors.
a
,

,

and women economists in their views of the
composition of government spending and other
questions about redistribution. For example, the
mean response to Question 30 of a female
economist is almost 2.0, indicating that current
levels of military spending are too large while
the average male economists response is about
2.4, closer to the about right choice.
9
Con-
versely, when asked whether employers should
be required to provide health insurance for their
employees, the mean gender gap is almost one
9. The difference in opinion on military spending
attributable to degree vintage is much larger. Given gender
and type of employment, the mean response of economists
receiving their PhDs in the 1980s, 1990s, or 2000s is a full
point lower than those who graduated prior to 1980, indi-
cating that more recently minted PhD economists are more
likely to believe the size of military spending is too large.
full point on the opinion scale with the average
male response at 2.4 closer to the disagree
category. The estimated proportion of female
economists is .31 greater than the proportion of
male economists who agree or strongly agree
with the proposition.
Several questions asked about the distribu-
tion of income and the tax structure as it relates
to income distribution. The estimated mean
response of male economists indicates a belief
that the tax structure should remain at its cur-
rent level of progressivity, whereas the mean
response of female economists falls closer to
a belief that taxes should be more progressive.
In fact, women are 41 percentage points more
likely than men to favor a more progressive
tax structure. A comparison of economists
mean responses to the issue of whether the
U.S. income distribution should be more equal
shows that the average males opinion is closer
to neutral while females average response is
closer to agree. The linear probability model
estimates that women are 32 percentage points
more likely to agree or strongly agree with mak-
ing the U.S. income distribution more equal than
men. Along the same lines, there is disagreement
on whether the United States should implement
a tax on consumption and rely less on income
taxes for revenue. The average male economist
is closer to being neutral with a tax on con-
sumption while the average female economist
is closer to disagreeing. According to the point
estimates, 54% of female economists either dis-
agree or strongly disagree compared to 31% of
male economists. This result may not be sur-
prising given the difference between male and
female economists on the question of making
the tax structure more progressive.
We see the same gender differences in so-
called compassion issues in questions about
international trade and labor standards and the
impact of the minimum wage. When asked if
the United States should link import openness
to the labor standards of its export partners,
the average male economists response is closer
to disagreement, whereas the average female
economists response is closer to neutral. Female
economists are 30 percentage points more likely
to agree or strongly agree with linking open-
ness to labor standards than male economists.
The average female economists opinion on
the proposition that increasing the minimum
wage leads to increased unemployment among
unskilled workers is neutral whereas the average
male indicates agreement.
E. Views on Environmental Policy Issues
On environmental issues, we ask questions
about energy taxes in general, taxes on emis-
sions of greenhouse gases in particular, as well
as ethanol subsidies to gauge the degree to
which male and female economists agree on the
use of taxes and subsidies to discourage or shape
desired activities that may affect the environ-
ment. On this issue of taxes and subsidies, there
appears to be no signicant difference in the
opinions of male and female economists. On
the question of nudging environmental pol-
icy through various taxes, the average responses
of both male and female economists indicate
agreement that energy taxes should be increased
along with taxes on emissions of greenhouse
gases. Men and women also show no divergence
in average opinions on U.S. policies favoring
the environment over economic growth. Neither
male nor female economists indicate support for
an increase in ethanol taxes.
F. Views on Gender and Equal Opportunities
Although previous studies have not exam-
ined gender differences in views of economists
on policy issues, studies by Davis (1997) and
Albelda (1997) show differences in the views of
male and female economists concerning equity
and equal opportunity in the economics profes-
sion. In this section, we examine survey results
on a variety of questions related to notions of
equal opportunity and afrmative action policies
in the United States as well as questions of gen-
der equality in the economics profession. These
questions allow us to examine in more detail the
views of male and female economists on issues
of equal opportunity (Table 7).
The results of our survey of male and female
economists show that the area of largest dis-
agreement between men and women lies in
views on equal opportunity. These differences
reveal themselves not only in views of gender
equality in the economics profession, but in soci-
ety in general.
Large disparities in average responses bet-
ween male and female economists emerge in
response to the statement, Job opportunities
for men and women in the United States are
currently approximately equal. The estima-
tion results show the mean response of female
economists is one point (a full standard devia-
tion) lower than that of male economists after
controlling for degree vintage and employment
type. The average response of males is closer
to agree with the statement while the aver-
age response of females is closer to neutral.
The linear probability model, however, indicates
that 58% of female economists with the average
characteristics of the sample either disagree
or strongly disagree that job opportunities are
equal. Women are 42 percentage points more
likely to display this opinion than men.
As our previous results indicate, male econo-
mists appear more likely to prefer market solu-
tions to economic problems than do women. We
are interested to learn if male economists are
also more likely to see differences in outcomes,
such as variations in wages between men and
women in the United States, as an outcome of
choice or the free market versus other institu-
tional factors. When we ask if respondents agree
TABLE 7
Gender Differences in Opinions on Gender and Equal Opportunity
Group 5 Proposition: Gender & Equal
Opportunity N = 122 Gender E(R/X)
1
R
a
P(R/X)
1
Job opportunities for men and women in the United
States are currently approximately equal
Female 2.55
1.07
1 or 2 0.58
0.42
(0.17) (0.23) (0.07) (0.08)

Male 3.62
0.16
(0.14) (0.05)
The gender wage gap is largely explained by
difference in human capital and voluntary
occupational choices
Female 2.22
1.24
1 or 2 0.74
0.51
(0.14) (0.21) (0.06) (0.08)

Male 3.46
0.23
(0.15) (0.05)
Opportunities for economics faculty in the United
States currently: 1. favor men a lot more than
women; 2. favor men a bit more than women; 3. are
approximately equal for men and women; 4. favor
women a bit more than men; 5. favor women a lot
more than men
Female 2.04
1.09
1 or 2 0.76
0.55
(0.12) (0.18) (0.06) (0.08)

Male 3.13
0.21
(0.13) (0.05)
Graduate education in economics in the United States
currently: 1. favors men a lot more than women; 2.
favors men a bit more than women; 3. is
approximately equal for men and women; 4. favors
women a bit more than men; 5. favors women a lot
more than men
Female 2.29
0.58
1 or 2 0.52
0.55
(0.12) (0.14) (0.06) (0.08)

Male 2.88
0.15
(0.08) (0.04)
Notes: Linear Probability Model: P(opinion|female, X=)
1
female + X
2
.
Mean Response Model: E(R| female, X) =
1
+ X
2
X = decade of PhD (1970s, 1980s, 1990s, 2000s), type of
employment. Mean response parameters were estimated by SUR methods with different covariance matrices for males and
females.
Linear probability model parameters were estimated by OLS with clustered standard errors.
a
,

,

with the statement that the gender wage gap
is largely explained by differences in human
capital and voluntary occupational choices, the
results of our survey indicate a signicant dif-
ference between male and female economists
on this issue. When comparing economists with
the same employment status, who received their
PhD in the United States in the same decade, we
nd that the mean response of males is more
than a full standard deviation higher than that
of females. On average, women disagree that
the gender wage gap is due to choices and pro-
ductivity difference; the average man is more
likely to agree. The probability of disagreeing
or strongly disagreeing with the statement is 51
percentage points higher for female economists
than for male economists. Rent seeking, male
preferences for market solutions, and womens
views on gender equity may be reected in the
gender gap in responses.
As one of the most visible and controver-
sial solutions to the problem of discrimina-
tion and equal opportunity has been afrmative
action, we ask two questions about afrmative
action. Question 26 asks whether afrmative
action programs for women are a good idea and
Question 27 asks whether afrmative action pro-
grams for African Americans are a good idea.
Womens average responses to both questions
are statistically signicantly more favorable to
the use of Afrmative Action than mens; how-
ever, the magnitudes of the gender differences in
opinions are only about one-third of a standard
deviation.
Finally, we examine views on equal oppor-
tunity in the economics profession and examine
perceptions of equal opportunity for women as
graduate students and as faculty. The question
about graduate education asks respondents if
they believe that opportunities for women grad-
uate students in economics in the United States
currently favor men or women. After control-
ling for degree vintage and type of employ-
ment, we nd that the mean response of female
economists is closer to the favors men a
bit more choice and the mean response of
male economists is closer to the is approx-
imately equal for men and women choice.
According to the point estimates, 52% of
women and 15% of men believe graduate
education favors men either a bit more or a lot
more.
On the issue of gender equality as it relates
to women faculty in economics we ask respon-
dents if they believe that opportunities for eco-
nomics faculty in the United States currently
favor men or women or neither sex. We nd that
the average female economist believes opportu-
nities favor men more than women and this view
reects a full standard deviation difference in
opinion from the average male economist. The
average male response indicates a belief that
current opportunities for economics faculty in
the United States are equal, favoring neither men
nor women. Women are 55 percentage points
more likely to believe that opportunities for eco-
nomics faculty favor men a bit or a lot more than
women.
On four of the ve questions concerning gen-
der equality, male and female members of the
AEA have reached the opposite conclusion, with
statistically signicant and large differences of
opinion. More than 50% of female economists
believe that opportunities in the economics pro-
fession or in the job market in general favor
men whereas more than 75% of male economists
believe they are either equal or favor women.
IV. CONCLUSION
Our survey of AEA economists provides a
snapshot picture of the views of economists on
some of the core precepts and approaches to the
study of economics and a variety of important
and topical policy issues facing policy mak-
ers today. To isolate the difference in views
on overall topics and specic policy issues, our
statistical analysis controls for degree vintage
and type of employment. We estimate the mean
gender gap in opinions using system GLS meth-
ods that incorporate the estimated relationship
among unobservable factors that form opinions
on related topics.
It is important to note that on the core pre-
cepts and methodological approaches to eco-
nomics we found no signicant difference in
average opinion between male and female
economists after controlling for the decade the
PhD was granted and type of employment. Sta-
tistical tests based on GLS systems composed
of individual responses which support the con-
clusion that male and female economists share
the view that individuals are utility-maximizers,
human wants are unlimited, and that mathe-
matical modeling should be an important part
of economic modeling. Moreover, male and
female economists also embrace the notion that
research on household decision making should
include analysis of intrahousehold decision mak-
ing. In other words, male and female economists
appear to start with the same assumptions about
how people are expected to behave and how to
approach the study of economics.
Despite their similar academic training and
shared views about core precepts and methodol-
ogy in economics, our study reveals differences
in the views of male and female economists in
their support of market solutions versus gov-
ernment intervention, in their interpretation of
economic outcomes, and their views toward so-
called compassion issues. These results show
a greater willingness among male AEA mem-
bers to rely on markets and see problems from
interfering with market processesviews that
emerge when questions are put in general terms
and more clearly when they are put in terms of
specic policy issues.
Although male and female economists agree
that market solutions are most efcient, on the
issue of government regulation in general, male
AEA economists, on average, see government
regulation in both the EU and the United States
as more excessive than do female economists.
Moreover, male economists express greater sup-
port than women economists for reducing tariffs
and express greater opposition to linking trade
openness to partners labor policies and greater
opposition to mandating that employers provide
health insurance. Male economists report greater
support for the use of vouchers in education
and greater agreement that the competition pro-
vided by a Wal-Mart store benets society and
are far more likely to support drilling in the
Arctic National Wildlife Refuge. Not surpris-
ingly, male economists are more likely to see
the costs associated with government interven-
tion. For example, male economists are more
likely to see a loss of employment from raising
the minimum wage.
Another area where we nd some consen-
sus is on the environment. Here the aver-
age response of both male and female AEA
economists indicates support for increases in
energy taxes and taxes on greenhouse emissions
and recommend that ethanol subsidies be elim-
inated. It is important to recognize that value
differences associated with environmental issues
do emerge when we consider other areas of
market solutions versus governmental solutions.
Although the mean responses of both male and
female AEA economists suggest that policies in
the United States currently do too much to favor
economic growth at the expense of environmen-
tal quality, the average female AEA economist
disagrees more with drilling for oil in the Arctic
National Wildlife Refuge than the average male.
Our estimation results indicate the largest
gender gap in views among AEA economists
occurs around the issue of gender equality in
society and in the economics professionnot
surprising as this area goes to the heart of the
efciency of market solutions and may also
be inuenced by self-interest of both men and
women. After controlling for degree vintage and
type of employment, the system GLS results
show that the average male AEA economist is
neutral in his belief that job opportunities for
men and women in the United States are cur-
rently approximately equal, whereas the average
female economist disagrees with this view. Sim-
ilarly, the average male response suggests agree-
ment that the gender wage gap is explained by
differences in human capital and voluntary occu-
pational choices while the average female AEA
economist disagrees with this view. While both
male and female economists disagree that afr-
mative action for women or for African Ameri-
cans is a good idea, women, on average, disagree
less strongly than men.
A large difference in views between male and
female economists emerges on gender equality
in the economics professions itself. The GLS
system results show that women economists are
more likely to believe that opportunities for eco-
nomics faculty in the United States currently
favor men more than women. Approximately
76% of female economists share this view,
whereas only 21% of male economists hold this
opinion. The gender gaps in views on economic
policy that we have detected among economists
who study markets in their professional capac-
ity, suggest that many of the differences found
between men and women in the wider popula-
tion hold for economists as well. Our ndings of
signicant and large gender gaps in economists
views on the role of government intervention,
the desirability of governments role to promote
equality, and the lack of gender equality in labor
market opportunities and outcomes are impor-
tant for a variety of reasons.
First, these results suggest that it is crucial
to include both women and men economists at
the table when forming policy to ensure that a
variety of professional perspectives are included
in the discussion. If demographic differences,
such as sex, shape our views of policy-related
questions, it may be important that women be
included on boards and in policy-making circles
at all levels of decision making. While includ-
ing women in policy-making circles does not
prevent the selection of only those individuals
with shared beliefs, it nonetheless may increase
the possibility that diverse viewpoints will be
represented.
Second, the gender gap in economists views
may provide a possible explanation why women
are underrepresented in economics as faculty in
the leading research institutions. If women hold
views that shape their perspectives on research
issues and inform their thinking on policy con-
clusions that are at odds with the perspectives of
their male counterparts in areas that are at the
heart of a discipline, this may affect hiring and
promotion decisions in ways that disadvantage
women. In the nuanced process of hiring and
promoting of colleagues at research institutions,
these differences may result in fewer women on
dissertation committees, fewer courses related to
subjects on gender differences in economics, and
fewer women engaging in research that shapes
both theory and policy in the discipline.
Finally, differences in views on economic
policy between similarly trained men and
women may also inuence classroom materi-
als and discussion and ultimately the worldview
of students in these classes. If these differences
in views on policy contribute to the crowd-
ing out of women from research institutions
and crowding in of women into undergraduate
institutions, one would expect that they would
have increased inuence on undergraduate stu-
dentsespecially those unwilling or uninter-
ested in pursuing graduate training. Diversity
of faculty in higher education in general has
resulted in a change in what constitutes knowl-
edge in the various disciplines and will no doubt
continue to inuence students as future citizens
by at least providing a more complete menu
of perspectives about important aspects of eco-
nomic policy.
APPENDIX: SURVEY RESPONSES AND SCALED
MEASURES
The Appendix summarizes the survey results by percent-
age frequency distributions and describes the scaled mea-
sures of economists views on (1) Core Precepts and Eco-
nomic Methodology, (2) Market Solutions and Government
Interventions, (3) Government Spending, Taxing, and Redis-
tribution, (4) the Environment, and (5) Gender and Equal
Opportunity.
GROUP 1
Core Precepts and Economic Methodology: Distribution of Responses by Gender
a
Proposition Response 1 2 3 4 5
Individuals are rational utility-maximizers Female 3.2 15.9 17.5 55.6 7.9
Male 2.7 20.3 12.2 48.6 16.2
Human wants are unlimited Female 1.6 21.9 6.3 48.4 21.9
Male 2.6 17.1 7.9 44.7 27.6
Research on household decision making should
include analysis of intrahousehold decision making
Female 0.0 1.6 17.7 48.4 32.3
Male 0.0 1.6 29.7 46.9 21.9
Mathematical modeling should be an important part of
economic modeling
Female 0.0 7.8 21.9 50.0 20.3
Male 0.0 6.7 21.3 50.7 21.3
GDP is an insufcient measure of overall economic
performance
Female 1.7 11.7 20.0 50.0 16.7
Male 2.6 19.7 19.7 42.1 15.8
The economics profession in the United States
currently: 1. relies too much on deductive modeling
and not enough on empirical analysis; 2. has about
the right mix of empirical analysis and deductive
modeling; 3. relies too much on empirical analysis
and not enough on deductive modeling
Female 45.9 45.9 8.2
Male 41.3 48.0 10.7
a
A. Group 1: Core Precepts and Economic Methodology
The Adhere to Core Precepts and Economic Method-
ology variable is constructed from the responses to the
following questions:
1. Individuals are rational utility-maximizers.
2. Human wants are unlimited.
7. Research on household decision making should
include analysis of intrahousehold decision making.
8. Mathematical modeling should be an important part
of economic modeling.
23. GDP is an insufcient measure of overall economic
performance.
39. The economics profession in the United States cur-
rently
a. Relies too much on deductive modeling and not
enough on empirical analysis
b. Has about the right mix of empirical analysis and
deductive modeling
c. Relies too much on empirical analysis and not
enough on deductive modeling.
We let the response strongly disagree equal 1, dis-
agree equal 2, neutral equal 3, agree equal 4, or
strongly agree equal 5 for questions 1, 2, 8, and we let
the reverse assignment hold for the response to Questions
7, 23. For Question 39, we let the response a equal 2, b
equal 3, and c equal 4. The value of the variable, Adhere
to Core Precepts and Economic Methodology, is the aver-
age of the values assigned to the question responses. The
standardized answer to Group 1 questions has zero mean
and unit variance. A higher value reects that the economist
more strongly agrees with traditional economic assumptions
and methodology. The standardized Cronbachs value is
.71 indicating a reliable measure.
GROUP 2
Market Solutions and Government Interventions: Distribution of Responses by Gender
a
Market solutions are the most efcient way to allocate
resources under most circumstances
Female 1.6 7.8 10.9 56.3 23.4
Male 0.0 2.6 9.0 46.2 42.3
The European Union has an excessive amount of government
regulation of economic activity
Female 6.7 26.7 20.0 41.7 5.0
Male 1.4 13.7 26.0 39.7 19.2
The United States has an excessive amount of government
regulation of economic activity
Female 17.5 47.6 20.6 12.7 1.6
Male 7.7 33.3 26.9 21.8 10.3
The United States should reduce tariffs and other barriers to
trade
Female 0.0 8.1 9.7 61.3 21.0
Male 0.0 1.3 7.8 44.2 46.8
The United States should drill for oil in the Arctic National
Wildlife Refuge
Female 39.7 27.0 14.3 14.3 4.8
Male 27.6 25.0 11.8 17.1 18.4
The United States should impose taxes on unhealthy foods Female 27.4 32.3 19.4 17.7 3.2
Male 32.0 30.7 13.3 17.3 6.7
Parents should be given educational vouchers which can be
used at government-run or privately run schools
Female 16.1 24.2 22.6 22.6 14.5
Male 6.5 7.8 24.7 28.6 32.5
A Wal-Mart store typically generates more benets to society
than costs
Female 5.0 16.7 28.3 41.7 8.3
Male 1.4 8.1 12.2 41.9 36.5
a
B. Group 2: Market Solutions and Government Intervention
The Favor Market Solutions over Government Interven-
tion variable is constructed from the responses to the fol-
lowing questions:
3. Market solutions are the most efcient way to allo-
cate resources under most circumstances.
5. The European Union has an excessive amount of
government regulation of economic activity.
6. The United States has an excessive amount of gov-
ernment regulation of economic activity.
10. The United States should reduce tariffs and other
barriers to trade.
13. The United States should drill for oil in the Arctic
National Wildlife Refuge.
16. The United States should impose taxes on unhealthy
foods.
18. Parents should be given educational vouchers which
can be used at government-run or privately-run schools.
21. A Wal-Mart store typically generates more benets
to society than costs.
strongly agree equal 5 for Questions 3, 5, 6, 10, 13,
18, 21, and we let the reverse assignment hold for the
response to Question 16. The variable, Favor Market Solu-
tions over Government Intervention, is the average of the
values assigned to the question responses. The standard-
ized answer to Group 2 questions has zero mean and unit
variance. A higher value reects that the economist more
strongly agrees with the policy conclusions predicted by
traditional economic assumptions and methodology. The
standardized Cronbachs value is .78 indicating a reliable
measure.
C. Group 3: Government Spending, Taxing, and
Redistribution
The Favor Limiting Government-backed Redistribution
variable is constructed from the responses to the following
questions:
4. The distribution of income in the United States
should be made more equal.
9. Increases in the minimum wage will increase unem-
ployment among unskilled workers.
11. The United States should link import openness to the
labor standards of its export partners.
15. Employers in the United States should be required to
provide health insurance to their full-time employees.
17. The United States should implement a tax on con-
sumption and rely less on income taxes for revenue.
29. The size of government in the United States is
a. Much too large
b. Too large
c. About right
d. Too small
e. Much too small
30. Current levels of U.S. military spending are
a. Much too large
b. Too large
c. About right
d. Too small
e. Much too small
31. The U.S. tax structure should be
a. Made less progressive
b. Kept at its current level of progressivity
c. Made more progressive
GROUP 3
Government Spending, Taxing, and Redistribution Distribution of Responses by Gender
a
The distribution of income in the United States should be
made more equal
Female 6.2 15.4 15.4 36.9 26.2
Male 9.2 19.7 26.3 30.3 14.5
Increases in the minimum wage will increase unemployment
among unskilled workers
Female 7.9 25.4 22.2 38.1 6.3
Male 1.3 13.2 15.8 47.4 22.4
The United States should link import openness to the labor
standards of its exports partners
Female 6.7 26.7 18.3 38.3 10.0
Male 21.9 38.4 16.4 20.5 2.7
Employers in the United States should be required to provide
health insurance to their full-time employees
Female 6.5 30.6 22.6 25.8 14.5
Male 24.7 26.0 28.6 14.3 6.5
The United States should implement a tax on consumption
and rely less on income taxes for revenue
Female 15.0 33.3 21.7 30.0 0.0
Male 10.4 27.3 20.8 23.4 18.2
The size of government in the United States is 1 = much too
large, 2 = too large, 3 = about right, 4 = too small, 5 =
much too small
Female 7.0 28.1 56.1 8.8 0.0
Male 24.7 23.4 40.3 11.7 0.0
Current levels of U.S. military spending are 1 = much too
large, 2 = too large, 3 = about right, 4 = too small, 5 =
much too small
Female 33.9 47.5 13.6 5.1 0.0
Male 14.5 50.0 26.3 7.9 1.3
The U.S. tax structure should be 1 = made less progressive, 2
= kept at its current level of progressivity, 3 = made more
progressive
Female 4.8 17.7 77.4
Male 28.6 28.6 42.9
The effect of moderate amounts of ination (<5%) on the
economy are 1 = very harmful, 2 = somewhat harmful, 3
= minimal, 4 = somewhat helpful, 5 = very helpful
Female 0.0 26.7 53.3 20.0 0.0
Male 6.5 35.1 45.5 13.0 0.0
a
GROUP 4
The Environment Distribution of Responses by Gender
a
The United States should increase energy taxes Female 3.3 8.3 6.7 48.3 33.3
Male 9.1 10.4 11.7 31.2 37.7
The United States should impose a tax on emissions of
greenhouse gases
Female 4.8 3.2 4.8 50.0 37.1
Male 9.3 1.3 13.3 40.0 36.0
Policies in the United States currently: 1. do too much to favor
environment quality at the expense of economic growth; 2.
strike approximately the right balance between environmental
quality and economic growth, 3. do too much to favor
economic growth at the expense of environmental quality
Female 6.9 20.7 72.4
Male 12.2 31.1 56.8
Ethanol subsidies in the United States should be: 1 =
eliminated, 2 = reduced, 3 = kept at the current level, 4 =
increased
Female 70.4 16.7 9.3 3.7
Male 76.3 18.4 2.6 2.6
a
36. The effect of moderate amounts of ination (<5%
per year) on the economy are:
a. Very harmful
b. Somewhat harmful
c. Minimal
d. Somewhat helpful
e. Very helpful
strongly agree equal 5 for Questions 9, 17, and we let
the reverse assignment hold for the response to Questions 4,
11, 15. For Questions 29, 36, we let the response a equal
5, b equal 4, c equal 3, d equal 2, and e equal 1. For
Question 30, we let the response a equal 1, b equal 2,
c equal 3, d equal 4, and e equal 5. For Question 31,
we let the response a equal 4, b equal 3, and c equal 2.
The variable, Favor Limiting Government-backed Redistri-
bution, is the average of the values assigned to the question
responses. The standardized answer to Group 3 questions
has zero mean and unit variance. A higher value reects
that the economist more strongly agrees that governments
role should be limited to public good provision and promo-
tion of free market outcomes rather than redistribution. The
measure.
D. Group 4: The Environment
The Favor Increased Environmental Protection variable
is constructed from the responses to the following questions:
12. The United States should increase energy taxes.
14. The United States should impose a tax on emissions
of greenhouse gases.
35. Policies in the United States currently
a. Do too much to favor environment quality at the
expense of economic growth
b. Strike approximately the right balance between
environmental quality and economic growth
c. Do too much to favor economic growth at the
expense of environmental quality
41. Ethanol subsidies in the United States should be:
a. Eliminated
b. Reduced
c. Kept at the current level
d. Increased
the response a equal 1, b equal 2, c equal 3, and
d equal 4 for Question 41. For Question 35, we let the
response a equal 4, b equal 3, and c equal 2. The
variable, Favor Increased Environmental Protection, is the
average of the values assigned to the question responses. The
standardized answer to Group 4 questions has zero mean
and unit variance. A higher value reects that the economist
more strongly agrees that government policies should pro-
tect the environment. The standardized Cronbachs value
is .73 indicating a reliable measure.
E. Group 5: Gender and Equal Opportunities
The Labor Market Opportunities Unequal variable is
constructed from the responses to the following questions:
25. Job opportunities for men and women in the United
States are currently approximately equal.
24. The gender wage gap is largely explained by differ-
ence in human capital and voluntary occupational choices.
26. Afrmative action programs for women are a good
idea.
27. Afrmative actions programs for African Americans
are a good idea.
37. Opportunities for economics faculty in the United
States currently
a. Favor men a lot more than women
b. Favor men a bit more than women
c. Are approximately equal for men and women
d. Favor women a bit more than men
e. Favor women a lot more than men
38. Graduate education in economics in the United States
currently
a. Favors men a lot more than women
b. Favors men a bit more than women
c. Favors neither men nor women
d. Favors women a bit more than men
e. Favors women a lot more than men.
GROUP 5
Gender and Equal Opportunity Distribution of Responses by Gender
a
Job opportunities for men and women in the United States are
currently approximately equal
Female 18.8 37.5 10.9 29.7 3.1
Male 4.1 15.1 19.2 45.2 16.4
The gender wage gap is largely explained by difference in
human capital and voluntary occupational choices
Female 16.1 53.2 16.1 12.9 1.6
Male 6.8 20.3 18.9 39.2 14.9
Afrmative action programs for women are a good idea Female 12.7 36.5 23.8 20.6 6.3
Male 25.0 30.3 25.0 19.7 0.0
Afrmative actions programs for African Americans are a
good idea
Female 9.5 28.6 23.8 30.2 7.9
Male 20.8 29.9 18.2 28.6 2.6
Opportunities for economics faculty in the United States
currently: 1. favor men a lot more than women; 2. favor
men a bit more than women; 3. are approximately equal for
men and women; 4. favor women a bit more than men; 5.
favor women a lot more than men
Female 22.0 54.2 16.9 6.8 0.0
Male 7.0 12.7 46.5 23.9 9.9
Graduate education in economics in the United States
currently: 1. favors men a lot more than women; 2. favors
men a bit more than women; 3. is approximately equal for
men and women; 4. favors women a bit more than men; 5.
favors women a lot more than men
Female 18.3 35.0 43.3 3.3 0.0
Male 5.6 9.7 77.8 5.6 1.4
a
TABLE A1
Descriptive Statistics of Group Questions Scaled Answers
by AEA Member Sample Value of 3.0 denotes Neutral
Variable All Females Males
Adhere to core precepts
and economic
methodology
N 115 53 62
M 3.01 2.97 3.05
SD 0.49 0.52 0.46
Min 1.33 1.33 2.00
Max 4.00 3.83 4.00
Favor market solutions
government-backed
interventions
N 125 54 71
M 2.70 2.57 2.81
SD 0.44 0.41 0.45
Min 1.75 1.75 1.75
Max 3.63 3.50 3.63
Favor limiting
Government| backed
redistribution
N 115 46 69
M 2.98 2.57 3.25
SD 0.68 0.51 0.65
Min 1.67 1.67 2.00
Max 4.67 4.00 4.67
Favor increased
environmental protection
N 119 48 71
M 3.21 3.31 3.14
SD 0.67 0.64 0.69
Min 1.25 1.25 1.25
Max 4.50 4.50 4.50
Labor market opportunities
unequal
N 122 56 66
M 3.04 3.44 2.69
SD 0.82 0.73 0.74
Min 1.17 2.00 1.17
Max 4.83 4.83 4.50
the reverse assignment hold for the response to Questions
24, 25. For Questions 37, 38, we let the response a equal
5, b equal 4, c equal 3, d equal 2, and e equal 1.
TABLE A2
Pairwise Correlations Group Questions Scaled Answers
Groups Correlation
1 1
2 0.36 1
3 0.41 0.68 1
4 0.41 0.52 0.67 1
5 0.29 0.46 0.63 0.43 1
Groups 1 2 3 4 5
The variable, Labor Market Opportunities Unequal, is the
average of the values assigned to the question responses.
The standardized answer to Group 5 questions has zero
mean and unit variance. A higher value reects that the
economist more strongly agrees that men and women do
not have equal job opportunities, afrmative action programs
are desirable, and graduate education and the academic job
market for economists tend to favor men over women. The
measure.
Tables A1 and A2 contain descriptive statistics and cor-
relations of the scaled answers to the ve groups of
questions.
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ARE DISAGREEMENTS AMONG MALE AND FEMALE ECONOMISTS

MARGINAL AT BEST?: A SURVEY OF AEA MEMBERS AND THEIR VIEWS

The authors would like to thank Professor Julia McQuil-

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