The new problems of scale and scope of defense analysis present a double bind.

At
precisely the time when defense sectors are more difcult to manage, the demands for
effective performance have become a great deal more serious. The familiar parameters
of modern defense the widespread application of advanced technology, increasing
specialization in the labor force, the integrative effects of rapid communications, etc.
all serve to increase complexity in defense analysis. Defense analysts are now under
pressure to frame problems that they did not worry about twenty years ago, and many
of these problems seem decidedly greater in their inherent difculty.
The most telling basis for judging the complexity of todays defense analysis is the
higher degree of uncertainty in the defense mission objective, dened in terms of a
varying political culture, evolving technological possibilities and resource allocation
priorities within the context of defense reviews. Nothing is more mistaken than to
assume that a defense review is a sort of autonomous movement with
an implacable will of its own, that the variable elements interact so as to
determine the outcome, that the participants are dominated by the system in such
a way that their moves are either mere responses to its dictates or exercises in irrel-
evance or self-defeat when they go against the systems logic.
1
While the term defense review sounds to some like budget cutting, to others it
foreshadows an aggressive approach for achieving military superiority and an organiza-
tional build-up. In the best sense of the term, it is neither; rather, it is simply an attempt
(often driven by necessity) to break out of a stagnant situation, generally reecting the
recognition that one has fallen behind. In this case, the measure of behind is not
limited to ones neighbors. It can simply reect the realization of ones inability to
Defense & Security Analysis Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 6778, March 2005
ISSN 1475-1798 print; 1475-1801 online/05/010067-12 2005 Taylor & Francis Ltd 67
DOI: 10.1080/1475179042000305804
The Security and Defense Matrix:
Concepts Matter in Defense Analysis?
*
Salvador G. Raza
Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, National Defense University, U.S. Coast Guard
Headquarters Building, 2100 Second Street SW, Suite 4118, Washington, DC 20593-0001
* The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reect the ofcial policy or position of
the National Defense University, the US Department of Defense, or the US Government.
21-1 Master 17/1/05 5:13 PM Page 67
accomplish previously acknowledged goals or aims with respect to national defense in
light of todays technology and/or uncertainties.
The edging power of the evidences for defense reviews confronts facts that defense
analysis everywhere are currently at a loss as to the best approach for regulating defense
demands against security assessment. There are few established assessment guidelines
from which agreement might be reached, and those are based on an insufcient
knowledge of what defense and security are.
2
DEVELOPING THE MATRIX
The security environment is a socially built political reality. Transaction costs in this
environment vary according to the valuation of interests in the conict and the plastic-
ity of its attributes (perceived threats and opportunities). These attributes are placed
into hierarchical order and prioritized in terms of the perceptions of the possibilities
and probabilities that indicate a given acceptable defense alternative threshold at each
stage of this hierarchy.
For policy formulation purposes, a state of security can be dened simply to mean a
perceived or intended state of equilibrium between the desired way of life of a society
and predicted threats to statecraft, organizations and means that afford the feasibility of
the maintenance of that desired way of life.
3
Defense alternatives are the possible array
of human, material, organizational and information resources developed, sustained
and used by the state to maintain a desired state of security. In short, a state of security
exists when a state of equilibrium can be maintained for a desired way of life.
It must be recognized that any perceived or intended state of security is a transitory
condition about which there is a collectively agreed-upon recognition and expectation.
The expression of a nationally intended state of security is arrived at in the political
arena and (generally) pertains monopolistically to the currently empowered govern-
ment. It is a matter of politics that some states of security are preferred (prioritized)
above others and it is also a matter of policy whether or not certain defense alternatives
are to be banned entirely in the context of the intended state of security. Alan K.
Simpson explains the nature of the politics, which informs policy formulation: In
politics there are no right answers, only a continuing series of compromises between
groups resulting in a changing, cloudy and ambiguous series of public decisions, where
appetite and ambition compete openly with knowledge and wisdom. Thats politics.
4
The denition of defense alternatives in association with possible states of security
reflects a mutually complementary relationship: as each sought-after defense is
measured, it changes security goals, whereas each state of security exists in the present
and extends into the future, subject to the feasibility of capabilities and the acceptabil-
ity of risks
5
derived from the selected defense alternative.
Defense analysis seeks to assess the extent to which defense alternatives are in accor-
dance with a states political goals and priorities, as reected in its intended state of
security. The nature of the security goals and the instrumental effects of defense alter-
natives nd a common denominator in the democratic political process, a process that
measures the coherence of purpose each time the populace makes a choice that grass
roots assessment that ordains the defense.
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The range of states of security and associated defense alternatives establishes two
spectrums of possibilities, dened by their logical extremes. These spectrums, logically,
are not a hypothesis and therefore can be neither true nor false, but rather valid or
invalid depending on their utility for understanding reality.
6
This means that they have
their own conditions for possibility; contains their own principle of constitution, encap-
sulating a conjunct of dened concepts created accordingly to the necessity of the
investigation, that can be used or not as an example with which to compare
empirical data drawn from reality.
Table 1: Security and defense spectrum
The typology expressed in Figure 1 provides a framework for plotting the choices
and actions of any state (or a range of states) with regard to defense alternatives and
political goals, based on measured estimates.
The following pages present notional charts that characterize the countries within
this hemisphere, circa 1970 and 2002. Security goals are plotted on the x-axis; defense
alternatives are plotted on the y-axis. To facilitate discussion, it would be useful to
contrast the range of security and defense positions shown in the logical extremes found
within two of the four quadrants depicted in Figure 1.
Quadrants (1) and (4) are the logical extremes of security and defense, contrasting
the exclusiveness and inclusiveness criteria in their relationship.
Exclusiveness narrows the state of security to one qualifying criterion only, namely
the absence of war (hence the term narrow security). Inclusiveness broadens the state
of security to include a perhaps imprecisely dened and/or all-encompassing common
good (hence the term broad security).
THE SECURITY AND DEFENSE MATRIX 69
Security states spectrum
This spectrum of possibilities is dened as
falling between the Broad Security and
Narrow Security states.
Broad Security
Describes a state of equilibrium where
individuals perceive themselves as having
the freedom to access information,
products and processes they consider
proper for fostering their development,
expressing their political preferences and
deciding about the social and economic
organization required to produce it, feeling
satised with the results.
Narrow Security
Describes a state of equilibrium not
menaced by the eminent possibility of
having to wage an external war or confront
an internal convolution for its mainte-
nance.
Defense alternatives spectrum
This spectrum of possibilities is dened as
falling between Broad Defense and Narrow
Defense.
Broad Defense
Encompasses all available human, material,
organizational and information resources,
everything that a state can use to protect itself
from external attacks and domestic insurrec-
tion, including but not limited to the Armed
Forces instrumentality.
Narrow Defense
Restrictively denes the instrumental capabil-
ity of the Armed Forces to conduct wars only
in the pursuance of the intended state of
security.
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Thus it can be seen that in Quadrant (1), Broad Defense alternatives are inclusive of
everything that contributes to obtaining security, whereas security is everything that
renders defense unnecessary. In contrast, within Quadrant (4), the Narrow Security
state is exclusive of any parametric variable other than war. The Narrow Defense
alternative is dened exclusively in terms of the armed forces required to provide an
understanding of the security with which it is associated.
It is particularly relevant to note an additional overriding aspect of these two extreme
positions. Within both Quadrants (1) and (4), the distinction between military
functions and responsibilities becomes implicitly blurred into national governance,
despite the fact that they appear to be at polar opposites on the graph. That is, in
Quadrant (1), defense merges into security; and in Quadrant (4), security merges into
defense. The result is a surprising degree of socio-political similarity, despite different
choices made regarding states of security and defense alternatives.
By the same measure, the choices that move a state into either Quadrant (2) or
Quadrant (3) do not share a common socio-political consequence. In Quadrant (2), the
instrumental role of the military comes dangerously close to national governance,
which in the extreme, entails the military control of politics. Quadrant (3) produces the
opposite effect, distancing the military role in politics to meanness.
Despite marked differences, force design theories can be applied in every case (the
term force design refers to the systematic and reective process of translating defense-
specific goals into planning requirements for the composite of materials, skills,
activities and information resources that makes defense capabilities). On the left side of
the diagram (along the y-axis), where Broad Security is the common denominator, force
design leans toward the role of support in military capabilities; on the right side (Narrow
Security), the combat role (making war and preventing war) is the dominant variable to
consider in force design. Similarly, within the upper portion of the diagram, where
Broad Defense is the common denominator, the tendency is to balance the functions of
70 SALVADOR G. RAZA
Figure 1: Security and defense matrix
21-1 Master 17/1/05 5:13 PM Page 70
the armed forces along multiple axes. Within the lower portion of the chart, designated
as Narrow Defense (along the x-axis), restricted combat capabilities become the
dening factor in achieving the denitions of armed forces roles and missions.
Inside these four quadrants, a spectrum of transitory states is dened. Each of these
states gains its individuality and relative permanence through an assemblage of defense
objectives that translate political will into pragmatic intention (missions). The potential
tasking of defense missions, therefore, requires that force design integrates those objec-
tives representative of a states position as it denes and accepts a security and defense
matrix.
From this analysis, it becomes apparent that the social implications of a states
choices within the security and defense matrix have a far-reaching (and sometimes
unforeseen) impact. When the relationship between a defense alternative and an
intended security state is broadened into Quadrant (1), military capabilities become an
instrument of a national development toward the envisioned common good with the
perhaps unintended result of forcing military capabilities to carry the weight of social
goals, as in disaster relief or other tasks in which a combat role is generally not required.
When those objectives move relationships near Quadrant (4), military capabilities have
no alternative but to become oriented toward war.
It can be seen that the variety of possible relationships between defense alternatives
and states of security can be reduced to a single point that can be plotted on a two-
dimensional matrix. Equally, it can be seen that there are consequences both within and
without the politicalmilitary context from the choices that are made. Like a metal ball
attracted simultaneously by four pulsating electro-magnets drawing it toward the
various quadrants, a states security/defense posture follows the combined effect of
politico/military relations and interagency dynamics, as well as the national will. The
military is a political actor within the defense policy formulation process. However
limited, it has both political identity and prerogatives. Nonetheless, the interagency
process is the larger stage on which it is but a player.
The policy formulation arena is an organizational culture with interests that shape
the very process it is said to serve. Without the tools provided by the perspicacity
afforded through the policy-formulation process, the voice of the military can be lost or
muffled by interagency bureaucratic interplay that imposes redundant planning,
assessment and reporting requirements on regulated parties (occasionally in conict,
thereby imposing uncertainties) and engage them in compliance enforcement in
isolation from one another.
Civilmilitary relations and interagency co-operation are specic elds of study,
each with its own analytical framework and working hypotheses, intermingled with
various concepts of force design in terms of its ability to explain and predict defense
objectives, outcomes and trends. Civilmilitary relations and interagency co-operation
endeavor to explain and anticipate possible tendencies in defense policies in a web of
competitive priorities, alternatives, attitudes and preferences. In this context, the true
task of force design is to structure and manage itself so as to mesh with, reinforce and
enhance defense capabilities. It must have the capability to direct thought towards pri-
orities since, at any time, when resources are diverted to low-priority objectives, other,
necessary capabilities will be neglected.
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The political environment continually forces countries to re-evaluate their under-
standing of security and the concept of defense, and to adjust their priorities in force
design accordingly. Understanding national preferences and their implications for
decision patterns (and biases) in the formulation of defense objectives is a prerequisite
to realizing the full potential of the security and defense matrix.
APPLYING THE MODEL
Figure 2 shows two notional charts that plot the estimated position of Hemispheric
countries in this diagram in early 1970 and 2002
7
.
Contrasting these two charts, it would be possible to correlate the position of those
countries in the early 1970s in reaction to the conuence of, inter alia, the Soviet threat,
border disputes and internal conicts. These were primary forces shaping the concept
of security and defense toward the right side of the security and defense matrix, where
Narrow Security is dominant.
In early 2002, Colombia is isolated in the upper-right corner of the chart, struggling
to solve an internal conict by using not only the military but also every other resource
available, as reected in Plan Colombia. Costa Rica and Panama, formally without
armed forces, tend explicitly and emphatically toward a concept of wider defense.
Paraguay still has a strong perception of the inuence of its armed forces in providing
security goals, although moving rapidly toward a wider concept of defense. Brazils
declaratory posture of Do not directly involve the military in functions and roles other
than its professional combat orientation, keeps it in the lower part of the security and
defense matrix, where Narrow Defense is the predominant theme.
Moving distinctly toward the Broad Security/Narrow Defense quadrant since the 1970
72 SALVADOR G. RAZA
Figure 2: Comparative charts, 19702002
21-1 Master 17/1/05 5:13 PM Page 72
measure, the United States could be said (in terms of the analysis above) to have intro-
duced a greater degree of inclusiveness (broadening the state of intended security, i.e.,
Broadening Security) while restricting the capability of its armed forces (narrowing
defense alternatives toward that of conducting war, i.e., Narrowing Defense). (See the
discussion on the socio-political ramications associated with quadrant (3), above.)
One can easily dispute the relative position of any two countries on either chart.
However, two aspects are indisputable: rst, each states understanding of security and
concept of defense have evolved over the periods contrasted, pressed by, among other
things, its perception of the treaty environment and concomitant reassessment of
threat. Venezuela is a remarkable example, with its 1999 Constitution imposing upon
its armed forces a signicant role in the development of the country. Second, there is a
marked clustering of countries that are widening their concept of defense to include
other roles and functions for the armed forces, adjusting the design of their military
capability, accordingly.
The latter aspect provides an indication of a possible convergence of a group of
countries toward the Broad Defense/Broad Security alternative. Whether or not this
implies the possibility of a more peaceful world may be arguable. Nonetheless, it can be
said that Broad Security shifts the emphasis of force design from a war-oriented role for
the armed forces to one of supporting functions and activities, such as disaster relief
and law enforcement (a constabulary role).
The 19 September 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States presents an
excellent opportunity to illustrate an additional use of the security and defense matrix,
expanding it from a simple explicative (past-oriented) role to one of prediction. Figure
3 plots further US movement in the direction of Broad Security as it faces and meets
the challenges (and opportunities) of the twenty-first century. The US strategy
promises to use every tool in our arsenal from better homeland defense and law
enforcement to intelligence and cutting off terrorist financing (Introduction,
paragraph 4) against terrorism, assuring that once the regional campaign localizes the
threat to a particular state, we will help ensure the state has the military, law enforce-
THE SECURITY AND DEFENSE MATRIX 73
Figure 3: Plotting US movement in the security and defense matrix
21-1 Master 17/1/05 5:13 PM Page 73
ment, political, and nancial tools necessary to nish the task (Part III, Strengthen
Alliances to Defeat Global Terrorism and Work to Prevent Attacks Against Us and Our
Friends, paragraph 5).
The US intention of transforming its military forces in order to ensure their ability to
conduct rapid and precise operations capable of achieving decisive results can be
expected to guide the development of its defense capabilities in tune with its newly
dened overall security strategy goals. Nonetheless, a central theme of this paper is that
systems generally lack an institutional capacity to look at new ideas, assuring, therefore,
that past practices tend to maintain ownership and control over the mechanisms for
evaluating new goals. From a US perspective, success will depend on attaining a
common vocabulary and set of meanings about the specialized terms of defense and
security, both as the Executive stands before the Legislature in search of the resources
required for achieving its goals and as it announces the ranges of programs to its
Defense Department and its subparts. Success will take the form of adaptation, mod-
ernization and transformation if the power of effective communication is sufcient to
dislodge the inertial malaise of a bureaucratic structure. Ultimately, success will be
measured by the efciency, efcacy and economy of defense resource allocation or, by
way of a negative alternative, the degree of withering of the national will regarding the
desired state of security of the nation that the White Paper describes.
EXPLORING THE MODEL: DEALING WITH THE
FORMULATION OF DEFENSE OBJECTIVES
The security and defense matrix looks beyond the traditional bounding-threat
scenarios in order to determine newly emerging trends that underscore heightened sen-
sitivity for the need to have capabilities. The pay-off for using the security and defense
matrix is a recognition of the full dimension of uncertainties embedded in the changing
denition of security- and defense-practiced concepts, without being constrained by
the particular understanding embedded in previous defense policies.
With the diffusion of threat perception in a post-Cold War ambiance and in a glob-
alized world, however, defense policy development based upon a states geographic
position with the lingering inertia of past border disputes no longer rests upon a
valid criterion.
Because of this trend, it has become clear that the geographical/regional approach
increasingly becomes an inadequate criterion for defense policy formulation. Further-
more, there are cases where the use of force for non-regional goals is ordained as an
acceptable defense/security alternative, such as in a potentially contradictory defense
alliance situation where the conict is rooted beyond what was once considered a states
regional sphere. In such cases, it can be seen to threaten the national, indigenous per-
ception of a states desire for self-determination.
Whether or not good or bad, the clustering tendency of countries on a plot
depicting their security and defense matrix imposes changes (and therefore challenges)
to defense policy formulation. It is not the clustering aspect, however, that is
paramount to a states force design. It reects an evolution in the spectrum of desired
defense alternatives and states of security, an evolution that implies that country after
74 SALVADOR G. RAZA
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country has transformed their concept of defense to reect how they perceive the nexus
of threats surrounding their desired state of security.
Threats, therefore, are the parametric variable in force design. They are the antici-
pated relationship of possible events to the capabilities required so that an undesirable
result or consequence does not happen. Hence, force design begins by identifying and
assessing threats in order to nd out whether or not they have sufcient signicance to
warrant modifying military capabilities in order to preserve a states ability to attend to
defense objectives.
There are, of course, no abstract principles for designing defense objectives, and this
craft cannot be reduced to enforceable rules. This is historys warning to those practi-
tioners who search for objective-dening principles; it is a precaution to those who try
to conceptualize the relationships between their component processes.
The possibilities exist for transforming the rules for interaction and for the security
environment to change the context of choices, creating casual mechanisms that try to
relate defense alternatives that meet political preferences within this transformed envi-
ronment and reduce the costs of legitimization of these choices by using interaction
rules that are compatible with new perceptions of functionally excellent explanations
and vindications.
The developmental dynamics of defense objectives are characterized by an explicit
bargaining process in an ambiance dominated by inter-agency co-operation and
conict. The same values, ideologies and interests that have created political pluralism
also create relatively independent and specialized agencies that make collaboration
difcult in the formulation of defense objectives. Actors in this process are aware that
the resulting defense objectives will convey decisions over resource allocation and
strategic choice. In short, this is a policy formulation process eshed out from political
bargaining.
Described in this way, bargaining and interagency co-operation are natural aspects
of the policy formulation process.
8
In this context, the adequacy of the policy formula-
tion process can be judged according to its functional sufficiency for providing
guidelines for force design. This is a strong statement, yet reective of the fundamental
fact that any policy formulation process that is not up to the task of providing adequate
guidelines for defense and security objectives leaves defense ministries as a rudderless
ship in rough waters, facing strong winds and an unfriendly shore. Unfortunately,
policy formulation seems forever destined to be driven by the legacy of past practices;
inertia orients its conceptions and this environment tends to direct its attention and
purpose.
These characteristics of the policy process show that preferences for defense objec-
tives are built as soon as the policy-making process for designing defense alternatives is
developed. Moreover, these alternatives incorporate implicit theories about how to
meet the goals they establish, thus are similar to conceptual systems involving priorities
and perceptions of casual relations, of the political environment, and of the possibilities
of transformation.
The development of these policies, in accordance with these characteristics,
demands a huge amount of co-ordination, and encourages the reformulation of
causality architecture between:
THE SECURITY AND DEFENSE MATRIX 75
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1. Events external to the defense domain (changes in economic conditions, for
example).
2. Relatively stable parameters (a system of values) used in problem formulation,
building and evaluation of solution alternatives.
3. Norms and procedures ruling the dynamics of operating processes developed in a
decision-making subsystem. These basically focus on changes in the system of
values of political decision-makers and their inuence in the translation of national
policy guidelines into concrete decisions regarding budgetary programs and
demands.
This process calls for a critical review: of the nature of technical and operational infor-
mation; of processes and mechanisms; and of intra- and inter-institutional
co-ordination for the determination of the magnitude and form of the problem, its
causes and probable impact on various defense alternatives.
This is the case, for example, when reconsidering the relative importance of
economic development versus environmental protection, when reconsidering the per-
ception of attributes of problems (with the involvement or not of the armed forces in
ghting illicit drug trafcking), and when reconsidering the sharing of functional duties
and responsibilities and their causal relationship with the availability of other political
instruments. Along the same lines, one of the core aspects of these policies lies in the
denition of security and defense concepts and the relationship between them, keeping
in mind that these denitions imply a cutout of the scope of competence between
defense responsibilities.
FINAL COMMENTS
The Security and Defense Matrix provides a code that can be used to compare and
contrast defense objectives and provides the general elements that any defense analysis
methodology relevant to the same purpose would need to include. It thereby helps to
generate questions that need to be addressed in order to diagnose problems, explain its
processes and predict outcomes. It allows, therefore, precise assumptions to be made
about a limited set of parameters and variables that simplify the process of multiple,
interacting cycles involving numerous decisions at multiple organizational levels. They
also provide a stable conceptual environment in which stability and change coexist or
when alternated with either a number of modest adjustments having the same attrib-
utes used in structuring a choice or major changes in choices, with a radical departure
from the past. They permit parallel processing within the defense system so that oper-
ational process can be conceptualized as being linked to outcomes, thus allowing the
decision-making process to move outward, from the crafting of a narrow list of alterna-
tives from which a choice is to be made, to the actual choice itself.
Bearing in mind that the task of policy formulation carries the bulk of the weight for
creating and prioritizing stable, viable defense objectives, those tasked with such a
responsibility must be able to capture the position and trend of each country in terms
of its understanding of security and the concept of defense. Whatever compromises this
process might entail, those charged with engineering defense objectives cannot fail to
76 SALVADOR G. RAZA
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recognize that its practical achievement will run the gauntlet of civilmilitary relations
and the inter-agency bargaining process.
When policy formulation does not play its functional role in identifying adequate
defense objectives, the results are defective capabilities, inarticulate strategies and inad-
equate organizational structures that not only do not provide the required jointness, but
also mirror its own lack of functionality in the defense structure it created and priori-
tized.
One hypothetical chain depicts a sequence of events when a defective defense policy
results from a lack of internal and external coherence and sufciency when defense
purposes are not clearly dened and provoke vague and even conicting objectives. The
following scenario unfolds: without clearly dened objectives, the responsibilities of the
states agencies become blurred. Inter-agency conicts tend to stovepipe processes
according to their own operational procedures and institutional goals. The resulting
products of these stovepipe processes become inarticulate and even conicting.
Democratic political institutions, however desirable, suffer similarly from a tendency
toward deciency in the expression of their defense mission, because the more vague
the policy guidance, the more that autonomy ows to the armed forces. In the absence
of the benet of being able to see threats to survival dened and prioritized through
the workings of political processes, defense ministries are left with only the broadest
definition of threat and must prepare accordingly. They then often misallocate
resources away from those needed to meet a states ideal perception of threat.
NOTES
1. Stanley Hoffman, Gullivers Troubles, or the Setting of American Foreign Policy, New York:
MacGraw-Hill, 1968, p. 12, cited in R. Jervis, System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social
Life, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1997, p. 103. Jervis refers to
Hoffman in order to explain choices in the international relations arena. The structure of
these choices resembles defense reform decision-making key variables.
2. The epistemological question of what defense and security are is an ontological problem,
being outside the realm of this paper. The answer to this question would provide an expla-
nation for its nature. For the functional purposes of force design, the relevant idea is the
concept of defense as practiced by each country (each one being a particular manifestation
of a general phenomenon), how it evolves, and how this evolution inuences the conceptu-
alization and development of military capabilities. Other disciplines deal with these
ontological questions, establishing a theoretical and practical relationship between force
design and other areas of study.
3. Another common denition of security indicates the policing role of the provision of material
and individual safety, commonly referred to as public security. This restrictive and limited
meaning of security is specically not addressed in this paper.
4. Alan K. Simpson, former US Senator from Wyoming, and Lombard Chair at the John F.
Kennedy School of Government at Harvard. http://globetrotter. Berkeley.edu/conversa-
tions/Simpson/simpson4.html (24/11/01).
5. For a discussion on the term state of security, see W. Lippman, US Foreign Policy, Boston:
John Hopkins Press, 1943, p. 51. Wolfers uses Lippmans concepts to review the Defense
Policy of the US, see A. Wolfers, American Defense Policy, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press,
1965, p. 3. For the application of the term in the context of policy formulation, see D.
Proena, and E. Diniz, Poltica de Defesa no Brasil: Uma Anlise Crtica, Braslia: UNB, 1998,
p. 55.
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6. P. Bruyne, J. Herman and M. Schoutheete, Dinmica da Pesquisa em Cincias Sociais: Os Polos
da Prtica Metodolgica, (ed. Ruth Jofly), Rio de Janeiro: Francisco Alves, pp. 48, 182.
7. In developing these notional charts, the following aspects were considered: a) type of gov-
ernment; b) extent of military forces deployed abroad; c) degree of internal conict involving
military forces or policy; d) presence of active and latent border disputes; e) the
inclusion/exclusion of police forces within the structure of the armed forces; f) choice of a
civilian or a military ministry of defense; and g) the attribution of constabulary tasks to the
armed forces or police (federal police/gendarmerie/coast guard). All variables were equally
weighted from 5 to +5 for defense and security (5 Narrow, +5 Broad). Aggregated results
were plotted, using the standard deviation (the center of the matrix = 0,0 defense 0,0
security). The analytical value of the results is circumscribed to its notional purpose only,
limited by the analytical limits of a single valuator and the arbitrary aggregation criteria used.
The longer two arrows represent varying forms of thought over the period from 19702002
that (over time) resolved themselves into the state of thought represented by the 2002 matrix.
The single, shorter arrow, of course, represents time.
8. To further explore interagency issues, see E. Bardach, Getting Agencies to Work Together: The
Practice and Theory of Managerial Craftsmanship, Washington DC: Brookings Institution
Press, 1998. For the bargaining process see B. Mesquita, et al., An Institutional Explana-
tion of the Democratic Peace, American Political Science Review, Vol. 93 No. 4, 1999, pp.
791807. For an application of the bargainning model, see J. D. Fearon, Rationalist Expla-
nation for War, International Organizations, Vol. 49 No. 33, 1995, pp. 379414.
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