CIVIL LAW

Juanita Trinidad Ramos, et al. v. Danilo Pangilinan et al.

G.R. No. 185920, 20 July 2010, THIRD DII!I"N, #$ar%io&'oral(s, J.)
There being absolutely no proof that the Pandacan property was
judicially or extrajudicially constituted as the Ramos family home, the laws
protective mantle cannot be availed of by Ramos, et. al.
Respondents Danilo Pangilinan, et. al. fled a complaint of illegal
dismissal before the Labor Arbiter against E.M. Ramos Electric, Inc. which was
owned by Ernesto M. Ramos Ramos!. "he Labor Arbiter decided the case in
fa#or of Pangilinan, et. al. and ordered Ramos to pay the latter their
bac$wages, separation pay, %&
th
month pay, and ser#ice incenti#e pay. Ramos'
property in Pandacan, Manila was ordered to be le#ied. (owe#er, it was alleged
by Ramos that the Pandacan property is a family home and therefore e)empted
from e)ec*tion to satisfy the +*dgment award. Pangilinan, et. al. co*ntered that
s*ch property is not a family home beca*se it bears the address of the company
and, s*pposing it is a family home, only P&,,,,,, is e)empt from e)ec*tion.
D*ring Ramos' appeal to the -o*rt of Appeals, he passed away and he
was thereafter s*bstit*ted by .*anita "rinidad Ramos, et. al., the herein
petitioners. "he -o*rt of Appeals held that the Pandacan property was not
e)empted from e)ec*tion notwithstanding Article %/& of the 0amily -ode which
pro#ides that the family home is deemed constit*ted on a ho*se and lot from
the time it is occ*pied as a family residence. "he article, howe#er, has no
retroacti#e e1ect. Moreo#er, it was also held that the applicable laws were
Articles 223 to 2/% of the -i#il -ode which re4*ire that it is necessary to either
+*dicially or e)tra+*dicially constit*te the Pandacan property as their family
home prior to its e)emption. Ramos, et. al. *nfort*nately failed to comply with
the re4*irement res*lting to the denial of the motion to 4*ash the writ of
e)ec*tion. (ence, this petition.

I556E7
8hether or not the -o*rt of Appeals erred in holding the le#y *pon the
Pandacan property.
(ELD7
P(tition D*NI*D.
0or the family home to be e)empt from e)ec*tion, distinction m*st be
made as to what law applies based on +,(n it was constit*ted and what
re4*irements m*st be complied with by the +*dgment debtor or his s*ccessors
claiming s*ch pri#ilege. (ence, two sets of r*les are applicable.
If the family home was constr*cted before the e1ecti#ity of the 0amily
-ode or before A*g*st &, %9::, t,(n it must ,a-( .((n /onstitut(d (it,(r
0udi/ially or (1tra&0udi/ially as %ro-id(d und(r 2rti/l(s 225, 229&231
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and 233 o4 t,( $i-il $od(. .*dicial constit*tion of the family home re4*ires
the fling of a #erifed petition before the co*rts and the registration of the
co*rt's order with the Registry of Deeds of the area where the property is
located. Meanwhile, e)tra+*dicial constit*tion is go#erned by Articles 23, to
232 of the -i#il -ode and in#ol#es the e)ec*tion of a p*blic instr*ment which
m*st also be registered with the Registry of Property. 0ail*re to comply with
either one of these two modes of constit*tion will bar a +*dgment debtor from
a#ailing of the pri#ilege.

;n the other hand, for family homes constr*cted after the e1ecti#ity of
the 0amily -ode on A*g*st &, %9::, there is no n((d to /onstitut(
(1tra0udi/ially or 0udi/ially, and the e)emption is e1ecti#e from the time it
was constit*ted and lasts as long as any of its benefciaries *nder Art.
%/3 act*ally resides therein. Moreo#er, the family home sho*ld belong to the
absol*te comm*nity or con+*gal partnership, or if e)cl*si#ely by one spo*se,
its constit*tion m*st ha#e been with consent of the other, and its
#al*e m*st not e)ceed certain amo*nts depending *pon the area where it is
located. 0*rther, the debts inc*rred for which the e)emption does not apply as
pro#ided *nder Art. %// for which the family home is made answerable m*st
ha#e been inc*rred after A*g*st &, %9::.

And in both cases, whether *nder the -i#il -ode or the 0amily -ode, it is
not s*1icient that the person claiming e)emption merely alleges that s*ch
property is a family home. "his claim for e)emption m*st be set *p and
pro#ed.

In the present case, since Ramos, et. al. claim that the family home was
constit*ted prior to A*g*st &, %9::, or as early as %933, they m*st comply with
the proced*re mandated by the -i#il -ode. "here being absol*tely no proof
that the Pandacan property was +*dicially or e)tra+*dicially constit*ted as the
Ramos' family home, the law's protecti#e mantle cannot be a#ailed of by
Ramos, et. al. Parenthetically, the records show that the sheri1 e)ha*sted all
means to e)ec*te the +*dgment b*t failed beca*se Ramos' ban$ acco*nts were
already closed while other properties in his or the company's name had already
been transferred, and the only property left was the Pandacan property.
PATRICIO VS. DARIO
NOVEMBER 20, 2006
FACTS:
Facts:
Marcelino V. Dario died intestate. He was survived by his wife, petitioner erla
!. atricio and their two sons, Marcelino Marc Dario and private respondent
Marcelino !. Dario III.
CIVIL LAW
He left a residential house and a pre"school buildin# situated at Cubao,
$ue%on City.
etitioner, Marcelino Marc and private respondent, e&tra 'udicially settled the
estate of Marcelino V. Dario.
etitioner and Marcelino Marc for(ally advised private respondent of their
intention to partition the sub'ect property and ter(inate the co"ownership.
o rivate responded refused to partition the property.
o etitioner and Marcelino Marc )led an action for partition before *+C
$ue%on City
+rial court ordered the partition of the property.
o rivate respondent,s (otion for reconsideration denied.
Appeal to the Court of Appeals denied-
o .pon (otion for reconsideration, CA dis(issed the petitioner,s (otion
for partition.
It held that fa(ily ho(e should continue despite the death of
one or both spouses as lon# as there is a (inor bene)ciary
thereof. +he heirs could not partition the property unless the
court found co(pellin# reasons to rule otherwise. /0on of the
private respondent was a (inor bene)ciary of the fa(ily home]
ISSUE:
Whether the partition of the family home is proper where one of the co-
owners refuse to accede to such a partition on the ground that a minor
beneficiary still resides in the said home.
HELD:
To be a beneficiary of the family home, three requisites must concur: (1)
they must be among the relationships enumerated in rt. 1!" of the #amily
$ode% (&) they li'e in the family home% and (() they are dependent for legal
support upon the head of the family.
s to the first requisite, the beneficiaries of the family home are: (1) The
husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of a family% and
(&) Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether
the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate. The term )descendants)
contemplates all descendants of the person or persons who constituted the
family home without distinction% hence, it must necessarily include the
grandchildren and great grandchildren of the spouses who constitute a
family home. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire debemos. Where the
law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish. Thus, pri'ate
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respondent)s minor son, who is also the grandchild of the deceased satisfies
the first requisite.
s to the second requisite, minor beneficiaries must be actually li'ing in the
family home to a'ail of the benefits deri'ed from rt. 1!*. The son of pri'ate
respondent and grandson of the decedent has been li'ing in the family
home since 1**", or within 1+ years from the death of the decedent, hence,
he satisfies the second requisite.
,owe'er, as to the third requisite, the grandson cannot demand support
from his paternal grandmother if he has parents who are capable of
supporting him. The liability for legal support falls primarily on his parents,
especially his father, herein pri'ate respondent who is the head of his
immediate family. The law first imposes the obligation of legal support upon
the shoulders of the parents, especially the father, and only in their default is
the obligation imposed on the grandparents.
$a.ang -s 5asay
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to annul and set aside
the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. !55
"
dated #a$ %"& '((
'
which reversed
the )rder
%
of the Re*ional Trial Court of #olave& +a,-oan*a Del .ur& /ranch '% in Civil Case No.
00-'(-"' which denied respondents1 ,otion for e2ecution on the *round that petitioners1 fa,il$
ho,e was still su-sistin*. Also assailed is the Resolution dated .epte,-er '"& '(( den$in* the
,otion for reconsideration.
The facts as su,,ari3ed -$ the appellate court4
Deceased 5eli2 )don* was the re*istered owner of 6ot No. & Ts- ''' located in #olave&
+a,-oan*a del .ur. .aid lot was covered -$ )ri*inal Certificate of Title No. (-'&!7 pursuant to
Decree No. N-!4 and issued on #arch 0& "0!!. 8owever& 5eli2 )don* and his heirs never occupied
nor took possession of the lot.
)n 9une "!& "07& plaintiff-appellants -ou*ht said real propert$ fro, the heirs of 5eli2 )don* for
:7&(((.((. Conse;uentl$& )CT No. (-'&!7 was cancelled and in its stead& Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-''&(47 was issued on Au*ust !& "07 in the na,e of plaintiff-appellants. The latter also
did not occup$ the said propert$.
Defendant-appellees& on the other hand& had -een in continuous& open& peaceful and adverse
possession of the sa,e parcel of land since "05! up to the present. The$ were the awardees in the
cadastral proceedin*s of 6ot No. 7 of the #olave Townsite& Ts-'''. Durin* the said cadastral
proceedin*s& defendant-appellees clai,ed 6ot No. 7 on the -elief that the area the$ were
actuall$ occup$in* was 6ot No. 7. As it turned out& however& when the #unicipalit$ of #olave
relocated the townsite lots in the area in "00' as a -i* portion of 6ot No. 7 was used -$ the
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*overn,ent as a pu-lic road and as there were ,an$ discrepancies in the areas occupied& it was
then discovered that defendant-appellees were actuall$ occup$in* 6ot No. .
)n 9une '%& "00'& plaintiff-appellants filed a Co,plaint docketed as Civil Case No. 0'-'(-"' for
Recover$ of :ropert$ a*ainst defendant-appellees.
)n 9ul$ "0& "00!& the trial court rendered its decision& the dispositive portion of which reads& thus4
<8=R=5)R=& >ud*,ent is here-$ rendered in favor of the defendants and a*ainst the plaintiff ?
". 8oldin* that the ri*hts of the plaintiffs to recover the land re*istered in their na,es& have
-een effectivel$ -arred -$ laches@ and
'. )rderin* the dis,issal of the a-ove-entitled case.
No pronounce,ent as to cost.
.) )RD=R=D.
A**rieved& plaintiff-appellants filed an appeal -efore the Court of Appeals assailin* the a-ove-
decision. .aid appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 55'(.
)n Dece,-er '%& "007& the Court of Appeals& throu*h the then .econd Division& rendered a
Decision reversin* the assailed decision and decreed as follows4
<8=R=5)R=& the >ud*,ent herein appealed fro, is here-$ R=V=R.=D& and >ud*,ent is here-$
rendered declarin* the plaintiffs-appellants to -e entitled to the possession of 6ot No. of the
#olave Townsite& su->ect to the ri*hts of the defendants-appellees under Article AsicB 447& 54!& 54
and 547 of the New Civil Code.
The records of this case are here-$ ordered re,anded to the court of ori*in for further proceedin*s
to deter,ine the ri*hts of the defendants-appellees under the aforesaid article AsicB of the New Civil
Code& and to render >ud*,ent thereon in accordance with the evidence and this decision.
No pronounce,ent as to costs.
.) )RD=R=D.
Defendant-appellees thereafter filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court -efore the .upre,e Court docketed as G.R. No. "%0!(". )n )cto-er "7& "000& the .upre,e
Court issued a Resolution den$in* the petition for late filin* and lack of appropriate service.
.u-se;uentl$& or on 5e-ruar$ "5& '(((& the .upre,e Court Resolution had -eco,e final and
e2ecutor$.
Conse;uentl$& the case was re,anded to the court a ;uo and the latter co,,issioned the #unicipal
Assessor of #olave& +a,-oan*a del .ur to deter,ine the value of the i,prove,ents introduced -$
the defendant-appellees.
CIVIL LAW
The Co,,issioner1s Report deter,ined that at the ti,e of ocular inspection& there were three A%B
residential -uildin*s constructed on the propert$ in liti*ation. Durin* the ocular inspection& plaintiff-
appellants1 son& Gil /asa$& defendant-appellee Vir*inia Ca-an*& and one /ernardo #ende3& an
occupant of the lot& were present. Cn the report& the followin* appraised value of the i,prove,ents
were deter,ined& thus4
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)wner 6ot No. Area As;.,.B C,prove,ent Appraised Value
Vir*inia Ca-an* %'.55 /uildin* :'"&57(.!5
9ovencio Capuno "5.5 /uildin* "7&!!%.5
A,elito #ata "4.(( /uildin* 5&!57."(
Toilet "&5((.((
:lants D Trees '&"!4.((
T)TA6 :40&5!!.5(
Thereafter& upon ver-al re;uest of defendant-appellees& the court a ;uo in its )rder declared that the
tie point of the surve$ should -e the /66# A/ureau of 6ands 6ocation #onu,entB and authori3ed
the official surve$or of the /ureau of 6ands to conduct the surve$ of the liti*ated propert$.
:ursuant to the a-ove )rder& the Co,,unit$ =nviron,ent and Natural Resources )ffice AC=NR)B
of the Depart,ent of =nviron,ent and Natural Resources AD=NRB-Re*ion EC desi*nated Geodetic
=n*ineer Diosdado 6. de Gu3,an to FactG as the official surve$or. )n #arch '(('& =n*r. De Gu3,an
su-,itted his surve$ report which stated& inter alia4
". That on .epte,-er "7& '(("& the undersi*ned had conducted verification surve$ of 6ot
& Ts-''' and the ad>acent lots for reference purposes-with -oth parties present on the
surve$@
'. That the surve$ was started fro, /66# H%4& as directed -$ the )rder& takin* sideshots of
lot corners& e2istin* concrete fence& road and *oin* -ack to /66# H%4& a point of reference@
%. Considerin* that there was onl$ one /66# e2istin* on the *round& the undersi*ned
conducted astrono,ical o-servation on Dece,-er '& '((" in order to check the carried
A3i,uth of the traverse@
4. That per result of the surve$ conducted& it was found out and ascertained that the area
occupied -$ #rs. Vir*inia Ca-an* is a portion of 6ot & with lot assi*n,ent to -e known
as 6ot -A with an area of %(% s;uare ,eters and portion of 6ot 7 with lot assi*n,ent
to -e known as 6ot 7-A with an area of ! s;uare ,eters. )n the sa,e lot& portion of
which is also occupied -$ #r. /ernardo #ende3 with lot assi*n,ent to -e known as 6ot
-/ with an area of '%! s;uare ,eters and 6ot 7-/ with an area of '4% s;uare
,eters as shown on the attached sketch for read$ reference@
5. That there were three A%B houses ,ade of li*ht ,aterial erected inside 6ot No. -A&
which is owned -$ #rs. Vir*inia Ca-an* and also a concrete house erected -oth on portion
of 6ot No. -/ and 6ot No. 7-/& which is owned -$ #r. /ernardo #ende3. 2 2 2@
CIVIL LAW
!. That the e2istin* road had -een traversin* on a portion of 6ot 7 to -e know AsicB as 6ot
7-CA-G.R. .: No. with an area of ""! s;uare ,eters as shown on attached sketch plan.
Durin* the hearin* on #a$ "(& '(('& plaintiff-appellants1 offer to pa$ :'"&(((.(( for the
i,prove,ent of the lot in ;uestion was re>ected -$ defendant-appellees. The court a ;uo disclosed
its difficult$ in resolvin* whether or not the houses ,a$ -e su->ect of an order of e2ecution it -ein* a
fa,il$ ho,e.
)n 9une "7& '(('& plaintiff-appellants filed their #anifestation and #otion for =2ecution alle*in*
therein that defendant-appellees refused to accept pa$,ent of the i,prove,ents as deter,ined -$
the court appointed Co,,issioner& thus& the$ should now -e ordered to re,ove said i,prove,ents
at their e2pense or if the$ refused& an )rder of De,olition -e issued.
)n .epte,-er !& '(('& the court a ;uo issued the herein assailed )rder den$in* the ,otion for
e2ecution.
4
Respondents thereafter elevated their cause to the appellate court which reversed the trial court in
its #a$ %"& '(( Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. !55. :etitioners1 #otion for Reconsideration was
denied -$ the Court of Appeals in its Resolution
5
dated .epte,-er '"& '((.
8ence& this petition.
:etitioners insist that the propert$ su->ect of the controvers$ is a dul$ constituted fa,il$ ho,e which
is not su->ect to e2ecution& thus& the$ ar*ue that the appellate tri-unal erred in reversin* the
>ud*,ent of the trial court.
The petition lacks ,erit.
Ct -ears stressin* that the purpose for which the records of the case were re,anded to the court of
ori*in was for the enforce,ent of the appellate court1s final and e2ecutor$ >ud*,ent
!
in CA-G.R. CV
No. 55'( which& a,on* others& declared herein respondents entitled to the possession of 6ot No.
of the #olave Townsite su->ect to the provisions of Articles 447&

54!&
7
54
0
an 547
"(
of the Civil
Code. Cndeed& the decision e2plicitl$ decreed that the re,and of the records of the case was for the
court of ori*in IFtGo deter,ine the ri*hts of the defendants-appellees under the aforesaid articleFsG of
the New Civil Code& and to render >ud*,ent thereon in accordance with the evidence and this
decision.I
A final and e2ecutor$ >ud*,ent ,a$ no lon*er -e ,odified in an$ respect& even if the ,odification is
,eant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will -e ,ade -$ the court that
rendered it or -$ the hi*hest court in the land.
""
The onl$ e2ceptions to this rule are the correction of
A"B clerical errors@ A'B the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no pre>udice to an$ part$& and
A%B void >ud*,ents.
"'
<ell-settled is the rule that there can -e no e2ecution until and unless the >ud*,ent has -eco,e
final and e2ecutor$& i.e. the period of appeal has lapsed without an appeal havin* -een taken& or&
havin* -een taken& the appeal has -een resolved and the records of the case have -een returned to
the court of ori*in& in which event& e2ecution shall issue as a ,atter of ri*ht.
"%
Cn short& once a
>ud*,ent -eco,es final& the winnin* part$ is entitled to a writ of e2ecution and the issuance thereof
-eco,es a court1s ,inisterial dut$.
"4
CIVIL LAW
5urther,ore& as a ,atter of settled le*al principle& a writ of e2ecution ,ust adhere to ever$ essential
particulars of the >ud*,ent sou*ht to -e e2ecuted.
"5
An order of e2ecution ,a$ not var$ or *o
-e$ond the terns of the >ud*,ent it seeks to enforce.
"!
A writ of e2ecution ,ust confor, to the
>ud*,ent and if it is different fro,& *oes -e$ond or varies the tenor of the >ud*,ent which *ives it
life& it is a nullit$.
"
)therwise stated& when the order of e2ecution and the correspondin* writ issued
pursuant thereto is not in har,on$ with and e2ceeds the >ud*,ent which *ives it life& the$ have pro
tanto no validit$
"7
? to ,aintain otherwise would -e to i*nore the constitutional provision a*ainst
deprivin* a person of his propert$ without due process of law.
"0
As aptl$ pointed out -$ the appellate court& fro, the inception of Civil Case No. 00-'(-"'& it was
alread$ of >udicial notice that the i,prove,ents introduced -$ petitioners on the liti*ated propert$ are
residential houses not fa,il$ ho,es. /elatedl$ interposin* such an e2traneous issue at such a late
sta*e of the proceedin* is tanta,ount to interferin* with and var$in* the ter,s of the final and
e2ecutor$ >ud*,ent and a violation of respondents1 ri*ht to due process -ecause ?
As a *eneral rule& points of law& theories and issues not -rou*ht to the attention of the trial court
cannot -e raised for the first ti,e on appeal. 5or a contrar$ rule would -e unfair to the adverse part$
who would have no opportunit$ to present further evidence ,aterial to the new theor$& which it could
have done had it -een aware of if at the ti,e of the hearin* -efore the trial court.
'(
l awphil .net
The refusal& therefore& of the trial court to enforce the e2ecution on the *round that the
i,prove,ents introduced on the liti*ated propert$ are fa,il$ ho,es *oes -e$ond the pale of what it
had -een e2pressl$ tasked to do& i.e. its ,inisterial dut$ of e2ecutin* the >ud*,ent in accordance
with its essential particulars. The fore*oin* factual& le*al and >urisprudential scenario reduces the
raisin* of the issue of whether or not the i,prove,ents introduced -$ petitioners are fa,il$ ho,es
into a ,ere afterthou*ht.
=ven s;uarel$ addressin* the issue of whether or not the i,prove,ents introduced -$ petitioners on
the su->ect land are fa,il$ ho,es will not e2tricate the, fro, their predica,ent.
As defined& IFTGhe fa,il$ ho,e is a sacred s$,-ol of fa,il$ love and is the repositor$ of cherished
,e,ories that last durin* one1s lifeti,e.
'"
Ct is the dwellin* house where the hus-and and wife& or an
un,arried head of a fa,il$ reside& includin* the land on which it is situated.
''
Ct is constituted >ointl$
-$ the hus-and and the wife or -$ an un,arried head of a fa,il$.I
'%
Article "5% of the 5a,il$ Code
provides that ?
The fa,il$ ho,e is dee,ed constituted fro, the ti,e it is occupied as a fa,il$ residence. 5ro, the
ti,e of its constitution and so lon* as an$ of its -eneficiaries actuall$ resides therein& the fa,il$
ho,e continues to -e such and is e2e,pt fro, e2ecution& forced sale or attach,ent e2cept as
hereinafter provided and to the e2tent of the value allowed -$ law.
The actual value of the fa,il$ ho,e shall not e2ceed& at the ti,e of its constitution& the a,ount of
:%((&(((.(( in ur-an areas and :'((&(((.(( in rural areas.
'4
Jnder the afore-;uoted provision& a
fa,il$ ho,e is dee,ed constituted on a house and a lot fro, the ti,e it is occupied as a fa,il$
residence. There is no need to constitute the sa,e >udiciall$ or e2tra->udiciall$.
'5
There can -e no ;uestion that a fa,il$ ho,e is *enerall$ e2e,pt fro, e2ecution&
'!
provided it was
dul$ constituted as such. Ct is likewise a *iven that the fa,il$ ho,e ,ust -e constituted on propert$
owned -$ the persons constitutin* it. Cndeed as pointed out in Kelle$& 9r. v. :lanters :roducts&
Cnc.
'
IFTGhe fa,il$ ho,e ,ust -e part of the properties of the a-solute co,,unit$ or the con>u*al
partnership& or of the e2clusive properties of either spouse with the latter1s consent& or on the
propert$ of the un,arried head of the fa,il$.I
'7
Cn other words4
CIVIL LAW
The fa,il$ ho,e ,ust -e esta-lished on the properties of AaB the a-solute co,,unit$& or A-B the
con>u*al partnership& or AcB the e2clusive propert$ of either spouse with the consent of the other. Ct
cannot -e esta-lished on propert$ held in co-ownership with third persons. 8owever& it can -e
esta-lished partl$ on co,,unit$ propert$& or con>u*al propert$ and partl$ on the e2clusive propert$
of either spouse with the consent of the latter.1avvphi1
Cf constituted -$ an un,arried head of a fa,il$& where there is no co,,unal or con>u*al propert$
e2istin*& it can -e constituted onl$ on his or her own propert$.
'0
A=,phasis and italics suppliedB
Therein lies the fatal flaw in the postulate of petitioners. 5or all their ar*u,ents to the contrar$& the
stark and i,,uta-le fact is that the propert$ on which their alle*ed fa,il$ ho,e stands is owned -$
respondents and the ;uestion of ownership had -een lon* laid to rest with the finalit$ of the
appellate court1s >ud*,ent in CA-G.R. CV No. 55'(. Thus& petitioners1 continued sta$ on the
su->ect land is onl$ -$ ,ere tolerance of respondents.
All told& it is too late in the da$ for petitioners to raise this issue. <ithout dou-t& the instant case
where the fa,il$ ho,e issue has -een vi*orousl$ pursued -$ petitioners is -ut a clear-cut plo$
,eant to forestall the enforce,ent of an otherwise final and e2ecutor$ decision. The e2ecution of a
final >ud*,ent is a ,atter of ri*ht on the part of the prevailin* part$ whose i,ple,entation is
,andator$ and ,inisterial on the court or tri-unal issuin* the >ud*,ent.
%(
The ,ost i,portant phase of an$ proceedin* is the e2ecution of >ud*,ent.
%"
)nce a >ud*,ent
-eco,es final& the prevailin* part$ should not& throu*h so,e clever ,aneuvers devised -$ an
unsportin* loser& -e deprived of the fruits of the verdict.
%'
An un>ustified dela$ in the enforce,ent of a
>ud*,ent sets at nau*ht the role of courts in disposin* of >usticia-le controversies with
finalit$.
%%
5urther,ore& a >ud*,ent if not e2ecuted would >ust -e an e,pt$ victor$ for the prevailin*
part$ -ecause e2ecution is the fruit and end of the suit and ver$ aptl$ called the life of the law.
%4
The issue is ,oreover factual and& to repeat that trite refrain& the .upre,e Court is not a trier of
facts. Ct is not the function of the Court to review& e2a,ine and evaluate or wei*h the pro-ative value
of the evidence presented. A ;uestion of fact would arise in such event. Luestions of fact cannot -e
raised in an appeal via certiorari -efore the .upre,e Court and are not proper for its
consideration.
%5
The rationale -ehind this doctrine is that a review of the findin*s of fact of the
appellate tri-unal is not a function this Court nor,all$ undertakes. The Court will not wei*h the
evidence all over a*ain unless there is a showin* that the findin*s of the lower court are totall$
devoid of support or are clearl$ erroneous so as to constitute serious a-use of discretion.
%!
Althou*h
there are reco*ni3ed e2ceptions
%
to this rule& none e2ists in this case to >ustif$ a departure therefro,.
<8=R=5)R=& the petition is D=NC=D. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated #a$ %"& '(( in
CA-G.R. CV No. !55 declarin* respondents entitled to the writ of e2ecution and orderin*
petitioners to vacate the su->ect propert$& as well as the Resolution dated .epte,-er '"& '((
den$in* the ,otion for reconsideration& are A55CR#=D. Costs a*ainst petitioners.
.) )RD=R=D.
-oncepcion #s -a
Facts:
Petitioner Gerardo B. Concepcion and Ma. Theresa Almonte were married on December 29, 1989.
They lived in Fairview, Quezon City and a year later on December 8, 1990, Ma. Theresa gave birth to
Jose Gerardo.
CIVIL LAW
On December 19, 1991, Gerardo fled a petition to have his marriage to Ma. Theresa annulled on the
ground of bigamy, alleging that her marriage with Mario Gopiao on December 10, 198- was never
annulled. Although Ma. Theresa did not deny marrying Mario, she averred that the marriage was a
sham and that she have never lived with Mario at all.
The trial court said otherwise, and ruled that Ma. Theresas marriage to Mario was valid and
subsisting, thus declaring her marriage to Gerardo as void ab initio. It deemed Jose Gerardo to be
an illegitimate child and the custody was awarded to Ma. Theresa while Gerardo was granted
visitation rights. Also, it allowed the child to use the surname of his father.
Ma. Theresa appealed and pleaded for the reverse of the courts decisions. The Court of Appeals
ruled that Jose Gerardo was not the son of Ma. Theresa by Gerardo but by Mario during her frst
marriage considering the fact that the second marriage was void from the beginning. Therefore, the
child Jose Gerardo under the law is the child of the legal and subsisting marriage between Ma.
Theresa and Mario Gopiao.
Gerardo Concepcion moved for the reconsideration of the decision.
Issue:
Whether the child is the legitimate child of Ma. Theresa and Gopiao or the illegimate child of Ma.
Theresa and Gerardo.
Held:
The child, Jose Gerardo, is the legitimate child of Ma. Theresa and Mario Gopiao.
The status and fliation of a child cannot be compromised as per Art. 164 of the Family Code which
states, A child who is conceived or born during the marriage of his parents is legitimate. It is fully
supported by Art. 167 of the Family Code which states, The child shall be considered legitimate
although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an
adulteress.. The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in favor of the legitimacy.
It is grounded on the policy to protect the innocent ofspring from the odium of illegitimacy.
Since the marriage of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was void from the very beginning, he never became
her husband and thus never acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of her child. The minor
cannot be deprived of his/her legitimate status on the bare declaration of the mother and/or even
much less, the supposed father. In fne, the law and only the law determines who are the legitimate
or illegitimate children for ones legitimacy or illegitimacy cannot ever be compromised. It should be
what the law says and not what a parent says it is. Additionally, public policy demands that there be
no compromise on the status and fliation of a child. Otherwise, the child will be at the mercy of those
who may be so minded to exploit his defenselessness.
CIVIL LAW
As a legitimate child, Jose Gerardo shall have the right to bear the surnames of his father Mario and
mother Ma. Theresa, in conformity with the provisions of the Civil Code on surnames. Also, there
being no such parent-child relationship between the child and Gerardo, Gerardo has no legally
demandable right to visit the child.
The State as parens patriae afords special protection to children from abuse, exploitation and other
conditions prejudicial to their development. It is mandated to provide protection to those of tender
years. Through its laws, the State safeguards them from every one, even their own parents, to the
end that their eventual development as responsible citizens and members of society shall not be
impeded, distracted or impaired by family acrimony. This is especially signifcant where, as in this
case, the issue concerns their fliation as it strikes at their very identity and lineage. The child, by
reason of his mental and physical immaturity, needs special safeguard and care, including
appropriate legal protection before as well as after birth. In case of assault on his rights by those who
take advantage of his innocence and vulnerability, the law will rise in his defense with the single-
minded purpose of upholding only his best interests.
WHEREFORE, the petition of Gerardo is hereby DENIED. The resolution of the Court of Appeals in
favor of respondents is AFFIRMED.