It is widely agreed that knowledge requires truth.

In the analysis of knowledge, does truth need

to be understood in a non-epistemic correspondence sense? Or may truth be understood in an
epistemic sense?
Clarisse Thomas 2490 words

In this essay, I will consider the debate between epistemic and non-epistemic theories of
truth and argue for non-epistemic theories of truth. I will conduct my analysis for the appropriate
theory of truth through metaphysics, and specifically the debate between Realism and anti-Realism.
I will defend Realism against two of Putnams arguments against Realism, and will classify Putnam as
anti-Realist. This may be a controversial move, however I am uninterested in how Putnams
arguments can be metaphysically classified, I am interested in their effects on Realism.
I will define an epistemic theory of truth as one where truth is a form of epistemic
justification (e.g. idealised warranted assertability or empirical adequacy or coherence). I will
define a non-epistemic theory of truth as one where truth is distinct from any epistemic notion and
thus a statement can be true without being justified. I will conduct my epistemological analysis in
terms of the Justified True Belief account of knowledge.


Firstly, I will briefly address and dismiss an epistemological objection to an epistemic theory
of truth, the claim that it leads to no difference between a justified belief and item of knowledge. It
is argued that this is problematic since justification for a proposition may change as its evidence
changes, and intuition tells us that our knowledge of a proposition does not vary with evidence if
we cannot assert a proposition as an item of knowledge now, then we were incorrect in asserting it
as an item of knowledge previously.
However, to argue this is to misunderstand what essentially characterises an epistemic theory
of truth, which is that truth is defined in terms of satisfaction of epistemic conditions this leaves
open what those epistemic conditions are and whether they are identical with the ones required for
justification. For example, Putnams epistemic theory of truth as idealised rational assertability may
present justification as simply rational assertability justification has a lower epistemic standard
than truth. Other theories may well give identical epistemic conditions for justification and truth (e.g.
coherence theory of truth and epistemic justification), however I will ignore these for the purposes
of this paper.

Now I will move onto my analysis of epistemic versus non-epistemic theories of truth as
conducted from metaphysics. This connection between truth and metaphysics is achieved through
Tarskis semantic definition of truth or material adequacy condition.
He claims that a correct definition of truth must be materially adequate, and a definition of
truth is materially adequate if the equivalence (T) X is true iff p can be asserted for any p where p is
a sentence in the language referred to by true, and X is the name of the sentence. In order for this
condition to hold, p must make an ontological claim to the effect that the conditions which are the
sentences truth condition obtain. However, this is does not necessarily posit a correspondence
theory of truth, since the conditions being obtained may be epistemic or non-epistemic (e.g.
coherence with a belief system, idealised rational acceptability, or states of affairs in the external
world). Thus, the truth conditions of all possible sentences p define all the possible conditions which
metaphysically obtain, and any theory which defines truth also defines metaphysics. (Tarski, 1944)
The result of this is that any epistemic theory of truth will lead to some form of anti-Realist
metaphysics where the world is constrained by epistemic conditions. This is anti-Realist since any
construal of epistemic conditions must be made with reference to a thinking subject, and so any
world which is constrained by epistemic conditions is also constrained by thought.
Thus, in order to discuss the merits of an epistemic versus non-epistemic theory of truth
through metaphysics, the central difference between Realism and anti-Realism will be taken as one
which concerns whether the world is constrained by epistemic conditions.
It should be noted that this construal of Realism (as the metaphysical position which claims
that the world is not constrained by epistemic conditions), makes significantly fewer positive claims
about the world than Putnam (1981) would want to attribute to Realism. Therefore, his argument
that Realism is untenable because it requires a Gods eye point-of-view and an ontology of objects
is rejected ex hypothesi.
1


Before I present Putnams argument against Realism, I will briefly address and dismiss the
claim that epistemic theories of truth are untenable since they lead to idealism. This claim is
unreasonable, since just as I have explained, epistemic theories of truth would only lead to the
metaphysical position that the world has epistemic constraints, or must be understood in epistemic
terms. This clearly is not equivalent to idealism. Putnams internal realism can be given as a
counterexample it is derived from an epistemic theory of truth (idealised rational acceptability),
however successfully preserves the commonsense realist intuition that everyday objects such as
tables and chairs exist. (Putnam, 1987)



1
It should also be noted that any discussion of theories of truth from their metaphysical
consequences would place metaphysics before epistemology. This move may be questionable,
however for the purposes of this essay I shall assume it is legitimate.
Now I will move on to Putnams arguments against realism. The first argument I will consider
can be presented as: 1. Realism allows the possibility of a brain-in-vat scenario. 2. Brain-in-vat
scenarios are impossible, under any metaphysics. 3. Realism is incoherent. (from 1,2)
I shall now explicate his argument. Brain-in-vat scenarios are often invoked by sceptics to
generate the intuition that we can have no access to an external world. It is described as the
scenario where all ones sensory perceptions from birth are in fact generated by stimulation from a
computer which is wired into ones brain. Furthermore, the sensory perceptions generated are
phenomenally indistinguishable from those which would be experienced if one was not wired into
the computer and interacting with the real world.
Premise 1 of Putnams argument is reasonable, since the only way to deny the possibility of
brain-in-vat scenarios through metaphysics would be to epistemically constrain the relevant aspects
of the world such that they are metaphysically impossible, and Realism cannot do this.

Now I shall detail the reasoning for premise 2 of his argument. This premise assumes causal
constraint the notion that the reference of a statement is determined by appropriate causal
connection. Thus, if one were indeed a brain-in-a-vat, and one stated I am a brain-in-a-vat, then
the words in this statement would refer to whatever caused their utterance. Thus, brain would not
refer to a real brain, but stimulation from the computer causing the sensory perception of a brain, or
what Putnam terms brains in the image; this occurs similarly for the word vat. (Putnam, 1981)
(Hickey, 2014)
From this, his reasoning can be presented as follows.
1. Assume I am a brain-in-a-vat.
2. If I am a brain-in-a-vat, then the statement I am a brain-in-a-vat is true iff I have
stimulation from the computer causing sensory perception that I am a brain-in-a-vat.
3. If I am a brain-in-a-vat, I do not have stimulation from the computer causing sensory
perception that I am a brain-in-a-vat. This is because the situation has been set up such that
the brain in a vat experiences their body just as they would in the real world (i.e. with arms,
legs etc. and not wired into a computer).
4. If I am a brain-in-a-vat, then the statement I am a brain-in-a-vat is false. (from 2,3)
5. If I am a brain-in-a-vat, I am not a brain-in-a-vat. (from 4)

Although he does not present this part of the argument, it can be assumed that:
6. If I am not a brain-in-a-vat, then I am not a brain-in-a-vat.
Thus, Putnam concludes that since I am not a brain in a vat under all possible metaphysical
conditions (i.e. whether or not I am a brain in a vat), then the brain-in-vat scenario is
impossible.

Now I will present several objections to this argument:
Firstly, the jump from premise 4 to 5 requires an additional premise, since the falsity of the
statement I am a brain in a vat does not immediately entail the falsity of the proposition that I am
a brain in a vat. (Hickey, 2014)
The additional premise required is something like:
4a. The statement I am a brain-in-a-vat is true iff I am a brain-in-a-vat.
2

Thus, since the statement I am a brain-in-a-vat is false, the proposition that I am a brain-in-a
vat is also false.
However, in order to be used in this conditional argument, this premise also needs to hold under
the conditions where one is a brain-in-a-vat. Thus, we need
4b. If I am a brain-in-a-vat, the statement I am a brain-in-a-vat is true iff I am a brain-in-a-vat.

2
It should be noted that this is often called a disquotation principle and may or may not be what Tarskis
theory of truth claims. (Mou, 2000)
Yet, the premise 4b clearly contradicts premise 2 since they provide different truth conditions
for the assertion of the statement I am a brain-in-a-vat. Furthermore, it would seem that premise
4b itself is incoherent, since according to Putnams previous causal constraint assumption, a brain in
a vat stating I am a brain-in-a-vat could not reference real brains and vats, which is required by
that premise.
So, it seems the required use of the disquotation principle in this argument attributes too strong
a relation between the assertion of the truth of the statement and the state of affairs obtained. Thus,
Putnams argument against Realism fails since he cannot show that brain-in-vat scenarios are
metaphysically impossible.
3


Furthermore, in order to rule in favour of anti-Realism, the ability of the anti-Realist to reject the
possibility of a brain-in-vat scenario must also be shown; yet this seems unlikely. The anti-Realist
must claim to be able to epistemically constrain the world in the relevant ways such that the
sceptical scenario is not possible, however it is not clear that this can be done without being ad hoc.
Perhaps some forms of anti-Realism based on a verificationist theory of truth might be able to claim
that since the sceptical scenario is in principle unverifiable, it must be false; and thus using Tarskis
material adequacy condition, metaphysically impossible. However, obviously not all epistemic
constraints are verificationist constraints: for example, ontologies based on a coherence theory of
truth could not rule out sceptical scenarios. Thus, only specific types of anti-Realism, and therefore
only specific types of epistemic theories of truth, would be able to survive Putnams argument that
the brain-in-vat scenario is impossible. (Forrai, 1996)


3
It is also significant that Putnam cannot show that other similar sceptical scenarios are impossible (scenarios
which the Realist would contend to be possible). This is because although his argument would work even if he
could show one sceptical scenario to be impossible (since it would entail that Realism is incoherent in that one
instance), it would make his argument seem ad hoc, and less forceful. One such similar sceptical scenario is
one where I became a brain in a vat last night, and thus am able to have the appropriate causal connection to
real brains and real vats, and thus able to reference them.

I will now present and respond to a second argument against Realism, as argued by Putnam: 1.
Realism requires determinate reference between at least some statements and states of affairs in
the world. 2. Determinacy of reference is never possible. 3. Realism is incorrect. (from 1,2)
Reasons for premise 1 can be given as follows: We access the world by making true statements
about it. If no determinate reference can be given between any statements and states of affairs in
the world, then we do not have access to the world, and cannot assert that it is epistemically
unconstrained. Note that this does not require the Realist to commit to a fixed ontology of objects;
they are just required to posit the existence of some epistemically unconstrained entities.

Putnams argument for the indeterminacy of reference (premise 2) is as follows:
1. The reference of a statement is determined by its truth value in different situations. E.g. If
the one-word statement Rabbit is true in the situation where a rabbit is hopping past me,
but false in the situation where a dog is running past me, then it can be determined that
reference of Rabbit is a rabbit.
2. According to the Incompleteness theorem, if a theory or statement S can be formalised in
first-order logic and is logically consistent, then it has a model.
3. According to the LwenheimSkolem theorem, if S has a model, then its model can be
mapped onto any possible world. (Khlentzos, 2011)
4. The terms of S are defined such that they map onto different subsets of objects in different
possible worlds, and this definition covers all possible worlds. The subsets of objects are also
defined such that they make S true in the same worlds where another statement R is true. R
posits the same properties and relations between its terms as S but has a non-disjunctive
definition for its terms. (Banach, 1987)
5. Since R and S have the same truth values in all possible worlds, is indeterminate as to
whether the terms of R refer to the terms of S.
6. All possible statements R can have a counterpart S defined like (4).
4


I will now present a response to this argument:
It can be claimed that the method of using truth values is not a sufficient condition to determine
reference (perhaps precisely because it cannot do so for statements such as R). An additional appeal
to the naturality of the reference is required. This position is called reference magnetism, and has
been developed by Sider (2011). He thinks that the criteria for the naturality of a reference would
have both a causal and metasemantical basis thus, more natural (or what he terms more joint-
carving) references are ones which are derived from an appropriate causal chain, and more
metasemantically virtuous (e.g. non-disjunctive).
In Putnams case, the indeterminate reference of R, as found using the truth-value method, is
due to the disjunctive definition of S. So, reference magnetism would deny that the subsets of
objects defined in the disjunctive definition are the correct references of the terms of R; instead, the
correct references are the objects defined in the non-disjunctive definition. (In the example
presented, this would be a cat, rather than cats in C-type worlds and cherries in A-or B-type worlds.)

4
Putnams example uses the statement R The cat is on the mat, and statement S The cat* is on the mat*.
He defines cat* and mat* in terms of 3 possible worlds an A-type situation, where some cat is on some mat,
and some cherry is on some tree; B-type situation, where some cat is on some mat, and no cherry is on any
tree; C-type situation, where no cat is on any mat and some cherry is on some tree.
He then defines a cat* as a cherry in an A-type or C-type possible world, and as a cat in a B-type possible
world. He defines a mat* as a tree in an A-type possible world, as a mat in a B-type possible world, and as a
quark in a C-type possible world.
R and S have the same truth values in all possible worlds since in an A-type world, R is true, and so is S (since
cat* and mat* are defined as a cherry and a tree); in a B-type world, R is true, and so is S (since cat* and mat*
are defined as a cat and a mat); in a C-type world, R is false, and so is S (since cat* is defined as a cherry, and
mat* is defined as a quark).
In the final, D-type possible world, where no cat is on any mat and no cherry is on any tree, it is obvious that
both R and S are false, regardless of whether cat* is defined as a cat or a cherry, or mat* is defined as a mat or
a tree or a quark.
Thus, Putnam claims that it is indeterminate whether the term cat in R, refers to cat* in S; and so cat
in R could refer to cats or cherries. (Loux, 2006)
However, much work is yet to be done to determine what an appropriate causal connection is,
and what would be considered metasemantically virtuous. Nevertheless, this response to Putnam
does seem promising and so Putnams argument against Realism, and a non-epistemic theory of
truth, is at the very least, not fatal.

It is also interesting to note that Putnams previous brain-in-vat argument against Realism uses
the claim that reference is determined by an appropriate causal connection, yet premise 1 of this
referential indeterminacy argument against Realism should deny this. It seems invoking causal
constraint could do some work in determining reference in Putnams example, in the direction of
claiming that ones statement S was not appropriately caused by the real world; perhaps a stronger
cause was the artificial mappings of those subsets of objects in the real world to the statement S.
Thus, it seems that these two arguments of Putnams may refute one another.


In conclusion, I have analysed the debate between epistemic and non-epistemic theories of
truth from the metaphysical debate between Realism and anti-Realism. I have responded to two of
Putnams arguments against Realism: Firstly, Putnams argument that Realism is incoherent since it
allows the possibility of brain-in-vat scenarios when they are impossible is flawed because he
requires an additional premise which is itself incoherent. Furthermore, this argument is unable to
rule in favour of epistemic theories of truth. Secondly, Putnams argument that Realism is incorrect
since all statements are referentially indeterminate is not fatal against Realism. Thus, I conclude in
favour of the Realist position and therefore non-epistemic theories of truth.

References:
Banach, David (1987). Representing and Knowing. Saint Anselm College.
http://www.anselm.edu/homepage/dbanach/RepresentingandKnowing/chap7.htm#_edn8
Forrai, Gbor (1996). Internal Realism, Metaphysical Realism, and Brains in a Vat. Dialectica, vol.50
no.4, 259-274.
Hickey, Lance P. (2014). The Brain in a Vat Argument. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
http://www.iep.utm.edu/brainvat/
Khlentzos, Drew. (2011) "Challenges to Metaphysical Realism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (Spring 2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.),
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/realism-sem-challenge
Loux, Michael (2006). Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction (3
rd
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Putnam, Hilary (1981). Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Putnam, Hilary (1987). The Many Faces of Realism (The Paul Carus Lectures), Michigan: Open Court.
Sider, Theodore (2011). Writing the Book of the World, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Tarski, Alfred (1944). The Semantic Conception of Truth: And the foundations of semantics.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 4 no.3, 341-376.