TRIAL

Trial by Commissioner or Ex Parte Hearing Before Clerk of

Court
Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete
ISSUE: May ex-parte hearing before a clerk of court be motu
proprio ordered by the Judge upon default of the defendant or
some of the defendants?

RULING: No. Parties must agree in writing

NOTE: But trial by Commissioner may be made upon consent
of parties or upon the discretion of the court

Continental Bank v. Tiangco
FACTS: The CFI of Manila rendered a decision, ordering
Income and Acceptance Corporation, Star Life Insurance
Corporation and Primitive E. Domingo to pay solidarily Lo the
Continental Bank the sum of P46,300.81, with twelve percent
interest per annum until the principal has been fully paid, plus
attorney's fees of three thousand pesos and the costs.
That judgment was rendered on the basis of the evidence
which was presented before the deputy clerk of court who
was commissioned. Lo received the same after the defendants
were declared in default for nonappearance at the pre-trial. As
no appeal was interposed from the said judgment, it became
final and executory. It was not satisfied.

ISSUE: Whether or not a judgment rendered by the Clerk of
Court acting as Commissioner is valid.

RULING: Yes. The defendants or private respondents did not
question in the lower court its delegation to the deputy clerk
of court of the duty to receive plaintiff's evidence. There is no
showing that they were prejudiced by such a procedure, that
the commissioner committed any mistake or abuse of
discretion, or that the proceedings were vitiated by collusion
and collateral fraud. It is too late at this hour for them to
question the reception of plantiff's evidence by the deputy
clerk of court acting as commissioner.

NHA v. CA
FACTS: At the pre-trial, the PHHC presented its evidence, all
documentary exhibits (A, B, C, D, & E). Defendant MENDIOLA
likewise marked his evidence (Exhibits "1-5"). Thereafter, upon
agreement of the parties, the Trial Court appointed a
commissioner to receive the evidence for the defendant.

ISSUE: Whether or not the lack of written consent to be
referred to trial by Commissioner invalidates the judgment.

RULING: Rule 33 provides:
SECTION 1. Reference by consent. By written consent of
both parties, filed with the clerk, the court may order any or
all of the issues in a case to be referred to a commissioner to
be agreed upon by the parties or to be appointed by the court.
As used in these rules the word 'commissioner' includes a
referee, an auditor and an examiner.

Although admittedly there was no written consent by both
parties, that issue was raised only in the Court of Appeals. It
was not even set up in the motion for reconsideration of the
Trial Court's decision filed by PHHC. Besides, the alleged lack
of written consent does not invalidate the proceedings.

NOTE: It is true that lack of written consent invalidates the
findings done on a trial by Commissioner; however, such issue
may not be raised for the first time on appeal.

Gochangco v. CFI of Negros Occidental
ISSUE: Whether or not the ex-parte reception of evidence
before the Clerk of Court is null and void.

RULING: No. That declaration (declaration that reception of
evidence by Clerk of Court is null and void) does not reflect
long observed and established judicial practice with respect to
default cases. It is not quite consistent, too, with the several
explicitly authorized instances under the Rules where the
function of receiving evidence and even of making
recommendatory findings of facts on the basis thereof may be
delegated to commissioners, inclusive of the Clerk of Court.
These instances are set out in Rule 33, treating of presentation
of evidence before commissioners, etc., in particular
situations, such as (1) when the trial of an issue of fact
requires the examination of a long account, or (2) when the
taking of an account is necessary for the information of the
court, or (3) when issues of fact arise otherwise than upon the
pleadings or while carrying a judgment or order into effect.

DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE

Definition
Heirs of Emilio Santioque v. Heirs of Emilio Calma
Demurrer to evidence authorizes a judgment on the merits of
the case without the defendant having to submit evidence on
his part as he would ordinarily have to do, if it is shown by
plaintiffs evidence that the latter is not entitled to the relief
sought.

In the present case, petitioners failed to prove the material
allegations in their complaint that Emilio Santioque applied for
and was granted Patent No. 18577 and that OCT No. 1112 was
issued on the basis thereof.

Petitioners rely on the tax documents to substantiate their
claim over the subject property. However, it is axiomatic that
tax receipts and tax declarations of ownership for taxation
purposes do not constitute sufficient proof of ownership. They
must be supported by other effective proofs.

Radiowealth Finance Co. v. Del Rosario
When a demurrer to evidence granted by a trial court is
reversed on appeal, the reviewing court cannot remand the
case for further proceedings. Rather, it should render
judgment on the basis of the evidence proffered by the
plaintiff. Inasmuch as defendants in the present case
admitted the due execution of the Promissory Note both in
their Answer and during the pretrial, the appellate court
should have rendered judgment on the bases of that Note and
on the other pieces of evidence adduced during the trial.

In the case at bar, the trial court, acting on respondents
demurrer to evidence, dismissed the Complaint on the ground
that the plaintiff had adduced mere hearsay evidence.
However, on appeal, the appellate court reversed the trial
court because the genuineness and the due execution of the
disputed pieces of evidence had in fact been admitted by
defendants.

Applying Rule 33, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Court, the CA
should have rendered judgment on the basis of the evidence
submitted by the petitioner. While the appellate court
correctly ruled that the documentary evidence submitted by
the [petitioner] should have been allowed and appreciated
xxx, and that the petitioner presented quite a number of
documentary exhibits xxx enumerated in the appealed order,
we agree with petitioner that the CA had sufficient evidence
on record to decide the collection suit. A remand is not only
frowned upon by the Rules, it is also logically unnecessary on
the basis of the facts on record.

Siayngco v. Castibolo
Rule 35 provides:
SECTION 1. Effect of judgment on demurrer to evidence.
After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his
evidence, the defendant without waiving his right to offer
evidence in the event the motion is not granted, may move for
a dismissal or the ground that upon the facts and the law the
plaintiff has shown no right to relief. However, if the motion is
granted and the order of dismissal is reversed on appeal, the
movant loses his right to present evidence in his behalf.

In the cited case, applying the rule on demurrer to evidence as
thus restated, this Court held that the trial court after denying
the motion to dismiss for insufficiency of plaintiff's evidence or
demurrer to the evidence, should permit the defendant to
present his own evidence and give him his day in court,
regardless of whether or not the defendant has made a
reservation of his right to present his evidence in the event of
denial of his motion or demurrer.

Nepomuceno v. COMELEC
ISSUE: Whether or not there is grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the COMELEC in simply dismissing the motion to
dismiss for its failure to state the facts and the law on which
its order denying petitioners' demurrer to evidence.

RULING: In Estrada vs. Sto. Domingo, We have ruled that "...
Section 12, Article VIII, Constitution and Section 1, Rule 36,
Rules of Court, which require express findings of fact in a
decision, have no application to the questioned Order. Here
involved is not a decision on the merits but a mere order upon
a motion to reconsider. The judge could simply dish out a
routine capsule form order denied for lack of merit' or 'motion
for reconsideration denied.' And yet, that kind of order would
serve to immunize the judge against an unlawful neglect of
duty charge. ..."

The challenged order being merely an interlocutory order and
not a final judgment or decision, no abuse of discretion was
committed by respondent Comelec in its failure to state the
facts and the law on which its order denying petitioners'
demurrer to evidence is based.

Bautista v. Sarmiento
ISSUE: Whether or not there is grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the Judge in ordering the defendant to present his
evidence after the denial of demurrer to evidence, thus,
relying on the weakness of the defenses evidence rather than
the strength of the plaintiffs case.

RULING: We find petitioners' aforesaid submission utterly
devoid of merit. Such a procedure finds support in the case of
Arbriol vs. Homeres wherein we held that

Now that the Government cannot appeal in criminal cases if
the defendant would be placed thereby in double jeopardy
(Sec. 2, Rule 118), the dismissal of the case for insufficiency of
the evidence after the prosecution has rested terminates the
case then and there. But if the motion for dismissal is denied,
the court should proceed to hear the evidence for the defense
before entering judgment regardless of whether or not the
defense had reserved its right to present evidence in the event
its motion for dismissal be denied. The reason is that it is the
constitutional right of the accused to be heard in his defense
before sentence is pronounced on him. Of course if the
accused has no evidence to present or expressly waives the
right to present it, the court has no alternative but to decide
the case upon the evidence presented by the prosecution
alone. (Emphasis supplied)

David v. Rivera
It may be well to point out that certiorari does not lie to
review an interlocutory order denying a motion to dismiss,
even if it is in the form of a demurrer to evidence filed after
the plaintiff had presented his evidence and rested his case.
Being interlocutory, an order denying a demurrer to evidence
is not appealable. Neither can it be the subject of a petition
for certiorari. After such denial, the petitioners should present
their evidence and if the decision of the trial judge would be
adverse to them, they could raise on appeal the same issues
raised in the demurrer. However, it is also settled that the rule
admits of an exception, i.e., when the denial of a demurrer is
tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.

JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

Falcasantos v. How Suy Ching
It is already a rule in this jurisdiction that one who prays for
judgment on the pleadings without offering proof as to the
truth of his own allegations, and without giving the opposing
party an opportunity to introduce evidence, must be
understood to admit the truth of all the material and relevant
allegations of the opposing party, and to rest his motion for
judgment on those allegations taken together with such of his
own as are admitted in the pleadings. (Evangelista vs. De la
Rosa) As the parties had submitted the case at bar on the
pleadings without introducing any evidence, the plaintiff must
be considered as having admitted the material allegation in
the answer that he had known of the sale in question long
before nine days prior to the filing of the complain. It may be
argued that, under section 1 of Rule 11 of the Rules of Court, if
the plaintiff fails to make a reply, as in the case at bar, all the
new matters alleged in the answer are deemed controverted;
but are of the opinion that said provision is not applicable to
cases submitted on the pleadings. The reason is obvious.
Where the parties pursue the course of a regular trial, the
plaintiff may disprove by competent evidence any new matter
alleged in the answer, while the defendant may establish also
by competent evidence his own allegation. In other words, the
opportunity is mutual for each party to prove or disprove any
new fact deemed to be controverted by the failure of the
plaintiff to file a reply to an answer.

Evangelista v. Dela Rosa
While the pleadings involved in the case just cited were the
plaintiff's complaint and the answer of the defendant Enrique
Carmelo, the reasons therein given in support of the holding
that the party who prayed for judgment on the pleadings
therein without offering proof as to the truth of his own
allegations and without giving the opposing party an
opportunity to introduce evidence, must be understood to
admit the truth of all the material and relevant allegations of
the opposing party and to rest his motion for judgment on
those allegations taken together with such of his own as are
admitted in the pleadings, are equally applicable to the
present case where the movant submitted his motion without
offering proof as to the truth of the allegations contained
therein, even only in the form of affidavits or depositions, and
without giving the opposing party an opportunity to introduce
evidence in rebuttal.

Marcys Inc. v. Verde
While it is true that a motion for judgment on the pleadings is
understood to be an admission by the movant of the truth of
all the material and relevant allegations of the party, and that
he (movant) rest his motion for judgment on those allegations
taken together with such of his own as are admitted in the
pleadings, the admission refers only to allegations of fact and
cannot be made to include conclusions of law. In this case, the
statements constituting defendants-appellants' special and
affirmative defenses are not just factual declarations, but
conclusions of law premised on the assumption that under the
stipulation of the contract, the lease provided for a
conventional term of indefinite duration terminable only upon
the will of the lessees. (The provision that the contract of lease
shall be impliedly renewed and be deemed to be on monthly
basis is not admitted because it is also a conclusion of law)

Rodriguez v. Llorente
This is a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, the RD, and one Juliana
Moreno. The respondents filed a lengthy answer in which
they, without specifically denying any of the allegations of the
petition, set forth very fully their version of the facts of the
case. To this answer the petitioners demurred, but upon
hearing, counsel for the petitioners moved for judgment on
the pleadings, which is equivalent to a withdrawal of the
demurrer.

Araneta vs. Perez
Irrelevant matters on the pleadings are not deemed admitted
even if a motion for judgment on the pleadings is filed.

Abubakar Tan v. Tian Ho
There are questions of fact that have to be clarified before the
court may adjudge the herein defendant liable to the plaintiff
for the amount claimed by the latter. There is, therefore, no
occasion in this case for rendering a judgment on the
pleadings, considering that defendant, in his answer, tenders
an issue which cannot be brushed aside without the
presentation of evidence.

The rule is settled that judgment on the pleadings can only be
rendered when the pleading of the party against whom the
motion is directed, be he the plaintiff or defendant, does not
tender any issue, or admits all the material allegations of the
pleading of the movant. Otherwise, judgment on the pleadings
cannot be rendered.

Taleon v. Sec. of Public Works
Now the Rules of Court authorizes the trial court to render
judgment on the pleadings or a summary judgment, as justice
may require, if at the pre-trial it finds that facts exist which
would warrant such judgment. All the necessary facts being
already before the court a quo, no further trial was required.
Its decision rendered at that stage was therefore sanctioned
by the Rules.

Judgment on the Pleadings vs. Summary Judgment
Narra Integrated Corp. v. CA
The existence or appearance of ostensible issues in the
pleadings, on the one hand, and their sham or fictitious
character, on the other, are what distinguish a proper case for
summary judgment from one for a judgment on the pleadings.
In a proper case for judgment on the pleadings, there is no
ostensible issue at all because of the failure of the defending
partys answer to raise an issue. On the other hand, in the
case of a summary judgment, issues apparently exist i.e.
facts are asserted in the complaint regarding which there is as
yet no admission, disavowal or qualification; or specific denials
or affirmative defenses are in truth set out in the answer but
the issues thus arising from the pleadings are sham, fictitious
or not genuine, as shown by affidavits, depositions, or
admissions. In other words, a judgment on the pleadings is a
judgment on the facts as pleaded, while a summary judgment
is a judgment on the facts as summarily proven by affidavits,
depositions, or admissions.

As such, even if the answer does tender issues and
therefore a judgment on the pleadings is not proper a
summary judgment may still be rendered on the plaintiff's
motion if he can show that the issues thus tendered are not
genuine, sham, fictitious, contrived, set up in bad faith, or
patently unsubstantial. The trial court can determine whether
there is a genuine issue on the basis of the pleadings,
admissions, documents, affidavits and/or counter-affidavits
submitted by the parties to the court.

SUMMARY JUDGMENTS

Ontimare v. Elep
For summary judgment to be proper, two (2) requisites must
concur, to wit: (1) there must be no genuine issue on any
material fact, except for the amount of damages; and (2) the
moving party must be entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.

Roque v. Encarnacion
The plaintiff does not deny the fact that she was married to
Policarpio Bayore in the year 1930, and that the latter is alive
and the marriage still subsisting. May this counterclaim be
decided by the summary judgment proceeding? Our answer
must be in the negative, first, because an action to annul a
marriage is not an action to "recover upon a claim" or "to
obtain a declaratory relief," and second, because it is the
avowed policy of the State of prohibit annulment of marriages
by summary proceedings. An action "to recover upon a claim"
means an action to recover a debt or liquidated demand for
money. This is the restricted application of the rule in
jurisdictions where the proceeding has been adopted.

Agcanas v. Nagum
Rule 34, section 3 categorically provides that summary
judgments may be rendered upon motion and after hearing
only "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file
together with the affidavits, show that, except as to the
amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law."

It is evident under this rule that a summary judgment can be
rendered only where there are no questions of fact in issue or
where the material allegations of the pleadings are not
disputed.

SolidBank v. CA
Rule 34, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides two (2)
requisites for summary judgment to be proper: (1) there must
be no genuine issue as to any material fact, except for the
amount of damages; and (2) the party presenting the motion
for summary judgment must be entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.

In the case at bar, it cannot be said that the foregoing
requisites are present. There is a genuine issue, the resolution
of which requires the presentation of evidence, i.e., whether
or not Solidbanks claim is included in the purchase agreement
as among the properties and items purchased and assumed by
FEBTC from Pacific Bank/Central Bank. While the counsel for
FEBTC did say that in principle he is not objecting to the
motion for summary judgment and that they will have no
objection if the Court will just require the parties to submit
affidavit and counter-affidavits in support to their respective
contentions, this should not be taken out of context for in the
same manifestation, said counsel clearly expressed that he
does not agree that there are no material issues raised in the
pleadings.

Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. Guerero
The Bank filed its motion for partial summary judgment
pursuant to Section 2, Rule 34 of the old Rules of Court which
reads:

Section 2. Summary judgment for defending party. A party
against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted
or a declaratory relief is sought may, at any time, move with
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to
all or any part thereof.

A court may grant a summary judgment to settle expeditiously
a case if, on motion of either party, there appears from the
pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits that no
important issues of fact are involved, except the amount of
damages. In such event, the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.

In a motion for summary judgment, the crucial question is: are
the issues raised in the pleadings genuine, sham or fictitious,
as shown by affidavits, depositions or admissions
accompanying the motion?

A genuine issue means an issue of fact which calls for the
presentation of evidence as distinguished from an issue which
is fictitious or contrived so as not to constitute a genuine issue
for trial.

A perusal of the parties respective pleadings would show that
there are genuine issues of fact that necessitate formal trial.
Guerreros complaint before the RTC contains a statement of
the ultimate facts on which he relies for his claim for damages.
He is seeking damages for what he asserts as illegally
withheld taxes charged against interests on his checking
account with the Bank, a returned check worth US$18,000.00
due to signature verification problems, and unauthorized
conversion of his account. In its Answer, the Bank set up its
defense that the agreed foreign law to govern their
contractual relation bars the recovery of damages other than
actual. Apparently, facts are asserted in Guerreros complaint
while specific denials and affirmative defenses are set out in
the Banks answer.

True, the court can determine whether there are genuine
issues in a case based merely on the affidavits or counter-
affidavits submitted by the parties to the court. However, as
correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, the Banks motion for
partial summary judgment as supported by the Walden
affidavit does not demonstrate that Guerreros claims are
sham, fictitious or contrived. On the contrary, the Walden
affidavit shows that the facts and material allegations as
pleaded by the parties are disputed and there are substantial
triable issues necessitating a formal trial.

Guevara v. CA
A granted partial motion for summary judgment, being merely
interlocutory and not a final judgment, does not become final
and executory due to failure to appeal said judgment. Thus,
said judgment may still be set aside or annulled.

Tamo v. Gironella
1. Respondent judge's summary dismissal of the case
without trial on the misconception that there were
no factual issues between the contending parties (as
against his own statement in the same decision that
respondent Claro Gonzales "specifically denied the
rest of plaintiff's allegations" other than the parties'
legal capacity and residence and that he was a co-
defendant in Civil Case No. 743) was plainly issued
without basis in fact and in law and with grave
abuse of discretion since it amounted to capricious
and whimsical action (summary dismissal must have
factual and legal basis)
2. Now if at the pre-trial "all the facts ... were all
admitted by the defendant Claro Gonzales leaving no
factual issues to be resolved except the legal issue
whether defendant Claro Gonzales is bound by the
judgment in Civil Case No. 781 or not", then the
summary judgment that should have been rendered
by him not one of dismissal of the case but judgment
for the petitioner (plaintiff) as prayed for in the
complaint. (If there is no genuine issue, summary
judgment should be made and not dismissal of the
case)

Cadirao v Estenzo
Summary judgment cannot be promulgated (or motion must
not be granted) when there is an issue regarding true owner of
a parcel of land in an action to quiet title.

Estrada v. Consolacion
"A trial court in granting summary judgment should file
findings of fact and conclusion of law or a memorandum
opinion so as to disclose grounds upon which the trial court
reached its determination."

Motor Service Co. vs. Yellow Taxicab
Depositions or admissions of parties are better than and may
be used in place of affidavits in support of a motion for
summary judgment.

Jugador v. De Vera
In our opinion the lower court acted properly. Under section 3
of Rule 36 of the Rules of Court, a summary judgment "shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, and
admission on file, together with the affidavits, show that,
except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
a judgment as to a matter of law." As may be gleaned from the
plaintiff's complaint, the defendant's amended answer, and
the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment with supporting
affidavit, there is no question that the defendant is indebted
to the plaintiff for the construction of the former's house.
Indeed, although the defendant alleged that his agreement
was with Jugador Construction, the point is not now urged it
being merely claimed that there is an issue relating to the
exact amount still unpaid, the defendant contending that it is
only P2,400 instead of P2,600 as sued by the plaintiff in his
complaint. As to this detail, however, we are confronted by
the allegations both in the complaint and in the plaintiff's
affidavit supporting the motion for summary judgment; and
the defendant did not even attempt to file opposing affidavits
authorized under section 3 of Rule 36. As pointed out by Chief
Justice Moran in his Comments on the Rules of Court, 1952
ed., Vol. I, pages 729-730, "if the defendant does not oppose
the motion by counter-affidavits, and, in all probability he will
not, if the debt is not yet paid a summary judgment may be
rendered."

Gatchalian v. Pavillin
IMPROPRIETY OF JUDGMENT IF QUESTION OF FACT STILL
UNRESOLVED. A trial is indispensable, and a summary
judgment is improper, if, as in the case at bar, the conflicting
claims of the parties plainly require the exact delimitation of
the areas covered by the title of the plaintiff and those
occupied by the defendants in order to find out if they
overlap, because questions of law should be resolved after,
and not before, the questions of fact are properly litigated,
since the facts proved may well affect the legal provisions
applicable.

JUDGMENTS, FINAL ORDERS AND ENTRY THEREOF

When there is conflict between the fallo and the body of the
decision
Millare v. Millare
The statements "the judgment or fallo is found in the
dispositive part of the decision" (Government v. Ramon y
Vasquez Et. Al., 73 Phil. 669) and "there is a distinction
between the findings and conclusions of a court and its
judgment as expressed in the dispositive part, so called, of
the decision" (Contreras Et. Al. v. Felix Et. Al., 78 Phil. 570), are
correct when considered in the light of the facts of those cases
or in cases of similar facts. But they cannot be lifted out of
context and applied as inflexible doctrines in all situations. A
reading of those decisions will reveal their limited application;
the Ramon case, to cases where the dispositive part is not
ambiguous or is a complete adjudication by itself, and the
Contreras case, to "lapses, findings, loose statements and
generalities which do not bear on the issues or are apparently
opposed to the otherwise sound and considered result
reached by the court as expressed in the dispositive part, so
called, of the decision." In the present case, the dispositive
parts of the decision of both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals while not ambiguous, are, by themselves alone, far
from being complete and final adjudications of the issues
involved. The findings and conclusions contained in the body
of the decisions are, not only not opposed to the result
reached by the court but precisely the very basis thereof, the
very ratio decidendi of the judgment dismissing the complaint
in intervention, and of the affirmance by the appellate court of
that appealed judgment. The aforesaid citation of authorities
are, therefore, inapplicable.

Chung v. China National Cereals
While the general rule is that the portion of a decision that
becomes the subject of execution is that ordained or decreed
in the dispositive part thereof, there are exceptions to this
rule.

The exceptions where the dispositive part of the judgment
does not always prevail over the body of the opinion are:
(a) where there is AMBIGUITY or uncertainty, the body
of the opinion may be referred to for purposes of
construing the judgment because the dispositive part
of a decision must find support from the decision's
ratio decidendi;
(b) where extensive and explicit discussion and
SETTLEMENT OF THE ISSUE IS FOUND IN THE BODY of
the decision.

Considering the circumstances of the instant case, the Court
finds that the exception to the general rule applies to the
instant case. Since the statement of the Court of Appeals
regarding the prayer for the dismissal of the case seemingly
gave the Manila court the discretion to dismiss not to dismiss
Civil Case No. 94-68836, the Manila court should have referred
to the body of the decision for purposes of construing the
issue of whether or not the complaint should be dismissed,
because the dispositive part of a decision must find support
from the decision's ratio decidendi. Findings of the court are
to be considered in the interpretation of the dispositive
portion of the judgment.

Judgment by compromise v. Judgment by confession
Pamintuan v. Muoz
Regarding the first point, it is by now axiomatic that a
judgment on a compromise like the one in the case at bar
is at once final and immediately executory. Also of the same
stature is the rule that once a judgment becomes final and
executory, the prevailing party can have it executed as a
matter of right and the granting of execution becomes a
ministerial duty of the court. Otherwise stated, once sought by
the prevailing party, execution of a final judgment will just
follow as a matter of course. Hence, the judgment debtor
need not be given advance notice of the application for
execution nor be afforded prior hearing. This renders of little
significance than the fact alleged by petitioners that they
received copy of respondent's motion for execution only on
the afternoon of the day set for its hearing.

Pasay City v. CFI of Manila
Art. 2041. If one of the parties fails or refuses to abide
by the compromise, the other party may either enforce the
compromise or regard it as rescinded and insist upon his
original demand.

It is obvious that the respondent-appellee did not only
succeed in enforcing the compromise but said plaintiff-
appellee likewise wants to rescind the said compromise. It is
clear from the language of the law, specifically Article 2041 of
the New Civil Code that one of the parties to a compromise
has two options: 1) to enforce the compromise; or 2) to
rescind the same and insist upon his original demand. The
respondent-appellee in the case herein before Us wants to
avail of both of these options. This cannot be done. The
respondent-appellee cannot ask for rescission of the
compromise agreement after it has already enjoyed the first
option of enforcing the compromise by asking for a writ of
execution resulting thereby in the garnishment of the Pasay
City funds deposited with the Philippine National Bank which
eventually was delivered to the respondent-appellee.

Upon the issuance of the writ of execution, the petitioner-
appellants moved for its quashal alleging among other things
the exemption of the government from execution. This move
on the part of the petitioner-appellant is at first glance
laudable for "all government funds deposited with the
Philippine National Bank by any agency or instrumentality of
the government, whether by way of general or special deposit,
remain government funds and may not be subject to
garnishment or levy (Commissioner of Public Highways vs. San
Diego, L-30098, 31 SCRA 616 [Feb. 18, 1970]). But, inasmuch
as an ordinance has already been enacted expressly
appropriating the amount of P613,096.00 of payment to the
respondent-appellee, then the herein case is covered by the
exception to the general rule stated in the case of Republic vs.
Palacio (L-20322, 23 SCRA 899 [May 29,1968]), to wit:

Having established that the compromise agreement was final
and immediately executory, and in fact was already enforced,
the respondent Court was in error when it still entertained the
supplemental complaint filed by the respondent-appellee for
by then the respondent Court had no more jurisdiction over
the subject matter. When a decision has become final and
executory, the court no longer has the power and jurisdiction
to alter, amend or revoke, and its only power thereof is to
order its execution (Ocampo vs. Caluag, L-21113, 19 SCRA 791
[April 27, 1967]).

Cadano v. Cadano
ISSUE: The only issue submitted for judicial review is the
jurisdictional authority of the Court of First Instance of Leyte in
Civil Case No. 3417 to revive its judgment rendered in an
earlier case (Civil Case No. 856) approving a compromise
agreement dividing the conjugal partnership properties,
between the plaintiffs as heirs of their deceased mother and
the defendant as surviving spouse, which agreement although
formally submitted by the parties to the court does not bear
the signature of either defendant Juan Cadano or his counsel.

RULING: Yes. The revival of judgment was proper. While it is
true that on account of its consensual character a
compromise, such as that involved in the case a bar, to be
valid and effective requires the consent and express
authorization of all of the parties such consent and
authorization by defendant-appellant is shown not only by the
fact that the "partition agreement" was submitted to the trial
court for Approval on September 8, 1951 by "the parties (the
plaintiffs Conchita and Gerardo Cadano and their father,
defendant Juan Cadano), ... duly represented by their
respective counsel ...," but also by the circumstance that the
hearing for its approval on September 16, 1955 was precisely
set upon petition of both the plaintiffs and defendant in said
Civil Case No. 856 "with the understanding that if the
defendant would fail to appear, the case would be submitted
for decision on the basis of the partition agreement."
Certainly knowing of the nature of the hearing, Juan Cadano
could have on said date, objected to the approval of the
"partition agreement" by the court if it was true that the same
did not bear his approval or conformity. That he chose not to
interpose any objection to its approval is a patent indication of
his conformity to the agreement. Again even after said
defendant-appellant received through his counsel on
September 26, 1955 a copy of the decision in Civil Case No.
856 containing in toto the "partition agreement," he never
bothered to have it reconsidered or to appeal from such
judgment, within the reglementary period or to have the same
set aside under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court.

Defendant-appellant not only failed to avail himself of those
procedural remedies but has remained silent. His inaction for
over a period of nearly eight years, after becoming aware of
the "partition agreement" and of the judgment based thereon,
amounts to a ratification on his part of the said agreement.
For laches may operate to validate an agreement otherwise
invalid at its inception as when the party on becoming aware
of the compromise fails to repudiate it promptly. Such
ratification is presumed from his inaction.

Mabale v. Alipasok
A compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority of
res judicata. " A judicial compromise may be enforced by writ
of execution. However, a compromise in which there is
mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation, undue influence, or
falsity of documents may be annulled. If a party fails or refuses
to abide by the compromise, the other party may either
enforce the compromise or regard it as rescinded and insist
upon his original-demand. (Arts. 2087, 2038 and 2041, Civil
Code).

A judgment based upon a compromise is more than a mere
contract and, with more reason, it has also the force of res
judicata. Without legal cause, it cannot be unilaterally
repudiated by a party (Katipunan Labor Union vs. Caltex
[Philippines], Inc., 101 Phil. 1224).

As a rule, "a judgment on compromise is not appealable and is
immediately executory unless a motion is filed to set aside the
compromise on the ground of fraud, mistake or duress, in
which event an appeal may be taken from the order denying
the motion" (De los Reyes vs. Ugarte, 75 Phil. 505 and
Enriquez vs. Padilla 77 Phil. 373).

As noted in the Ugarte case, the reason for the rule is that
when both parties enter into an agreement to end a pending
litigation and request that a decision be rendered approving
said agreement, it is only natural to presume that such action
constitutes an implicit waiver of the right to appeal from the
decision which waiver is as undeniable as an express waiver.
For a party to a compromise to reserve the right to appeal
from the said decision "is to adopt an attitude of bad faith
which courts cannot countenance."

To be entitled to appeal from a judgment approving a
compromise, a party must move not only to set aside the
judgment but also to annul or set aside the compromise itself
on the ground of fraud, mistake or duress vitiating his consent
to the compromise (Serrano vs. Reyes, 110 Phil. 536, 542). To
set it aside under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, the petition for
relief must be filed within six months from the date the
judgment was entered (Bodiogan vs. Ceniza, 102 Phil. 750).

Romula Mabale did not seasonably move for the setting aside
of the compromise and the judgment based upon it. Instead
her children, pretending to be the unregistered owners of Lot
No. 1592, filed a separate action against Tan Tian Tiong and
his wife for the recovery of Lot No. 1592 (Civil Case No. 3216).
Romula and her children filed a second case to rescind the
compromise and annul the judgment (Civil Case No. 3256).

In this appeal from respondent Judge's order in Civil Case No.
2711 upholding the compromise and the judgment based
thereon, Romula Mabale contends that Tan Tian Tiong, being
an alien, was incapacitated to acquire Lot No. 1592. That
contention is wrong.

Before approving the compromise, the trial court required Tan
Tian Tiong to prove his Philippine citizenship. He submitted to
the court a certified copy of his Certificate of Naturalization
No. 32 issued by the clerk of court of the lower court on his
oath of allegiance of the same date. His Philippine citizenship
is an indisputable fact.

Manufacturers Bank and Trust v. Woodworks, Inc.
Judgment upon confession is one which is rendered against a
party upon his petition or consent. It usually happens when
the defendant appears in court and confesses the right of the
plaintiff to judgment or files a pleading expressly agreeing to
the plaintiffs demand. There is no showing on record of
either. It has likewise been held by this Court that a judgment
upon confession stands upon the same footing as a judgment
upon agreements or compromise. If a compromise may not be
effected by counsel without special authority, neither may a
judgment upon confession be entered against a client by mere
agreement of counsel except with the knowledge and at the
instance of such client. No such authority for defendants
counsel to compromise the case was here proved or shown.

Samonte v. Samonte
A more incisive reading of Section 1, Rule 37 of the Rules of
Court will reveal that only when a judgment is not yet final and
therefore appealable may the aggrieved party move the trial
court to set aside the judgment and grant new trial. However,
when the judgment has already become final and executory
because the period for perfecting the appeal has already
prescribed, the aggrieved party can no longer avail himself of
the remedy provided in Rule 37. It is by now a well established
doctrine that a judgment of the court approving a compromise
agreement is final and immediately executory. In the words of
the Supreme Court it is "right there and then writes finish to
the controversy." The reason why a judgment based on a
compromise agreement is final and immediately executory is
that when the parties agree to settle their differences to end
up a litigation and request the court to render judgment on
the basis of their agreement, there is an implied waiver of
their right to appeal from the judgment. But of course there is
an exception to this rule. A party to a compromise agreement
may move to set it aside on the ground of fraud, mistake or
duress in which case an appeal may be taken from the order
denying the motion.

Vda. De Corpuz v. Phodaca-Anbrosio
Since the validity of the compromise agreement was not
assailed in the lower court, such question may not be raised
for the first time in this appeal.

NEW TRIAL OR RECONSDERATION

Requisites of Newly-Discovered Evidence
Georgia Tumang v. CA
A motion for new trial upon the ground of newly discovered
evidence, is properly granted where there is concurrence of
the following requisites, namely: a) the evidence had been
discovered after trial; b) the evidence could not have been
discovered and produced during trial even with the exercise of
reasonable diligence; and c) the evidence is material, and not
merely corroborative, cumulative, or impeaching and is of
such weight that if admitted, would probably alter the result.

Petitioner does not dispute that the receipts which
respondents intend to submit as new evidence were found
subsequent to the trial. Petitioner, however, chiefly argues
that the receipts do not constitute newly discovered evidence
but are merely "forgotten evidence," being already in
existence during trial and which could have been discovered
and there presented by the respondents had they exercised
due diligence in searching for such receipts.

Newly discovered evidence, under prevailing jurisprudence,
need not be newly created evidence; newly discovered
evidence in other words, may and does commonly refer to
evidence already in existence prior or during the trial but
which could not have been secured and presented during the
trial despite reasonable diligence on the part of the litigant
offering it or his counsel. Newly discovered evidence, again, is
not limited to evidence which, though already in existence
before or during trial was not known to the offering litigant.
So-called "forgotten" evidence may, upon the other hand, be
seen to refer to evidence already in existence or available
before or during trial, which was known to and obtainable by
the party offering it and, which could have been presented
and offered in a seasonable manner were it not for the
oversight or forgetfullness of such party or his counsel.

In order that a particular piece of evidence may be properly
regarded as "newly discovered" for purposes of a grant of new
trial, what is essential is not so much the time when the
evidence offered first sprang into existence nor the time when
it first came to the knowledge of the party now submitting it;
what it essential is, rather, that the offering party had
exercised reasonable diligence in seeking to locate such
evidence before or during trial but had nonetheless failed to
secure it. Thus, a party who, prior to the trial had, no means of
knowing that a specific piece of evidence existed and was in
fact obtainable, can scarcely be charged with lack of diligence.
It is commonplace to observe that the term "diligence" is a
relative and variable one, not capable of exact definition and
the contents of which must depend entirely on the particular
configuration of facts obtaining in each case.

In the case at bar, the receipts which the Court of Appeals
considered newly discovered evidence were found by
respondent Daniel del Mundo, according to his affidavit of
merit attached to the Motion for Reconsideration and for New
Trial, on 4 October 1986 in their residence at No. 3905
Marigold Road, Paraaque, Metro Manila, when, in the course
of a "general cleaning and re-arrangement" of their house
necessitated by floods caused by heavy rains, he happened to
look into an old desk in his "study cubicle." He sorted out
various items "such as old cards, letters, memorabilia,
pamphlets, brochures, and similar miscellaneous things
accumulated through the years." He found in "the bottom
back portion of a drawer in said desk an old envelope
containing "a bunch of documents" among which, it turned
out, were the receipts issued by petitioner Dr. Georgia
Tumang to respondent spouses. The latter had "believed these
receipts to have been lost and no longer existing," having been
unable to locate them "despite diligent effort[s] to search all
documents and files in our possession."

We agree with the Court of Appeals that the receipts
submitted by the respondents spouses are properly regarded
as newly discovered evidence warranting the grant of a new
trial.

RELIEF FROM JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, OR OTHER
PROCEEDINGS

Relief from Judgments, when proper
Datu Eduardo Ampo v. CA
A petition for relief from judgment is the proper remedy of a
party seeking to set aside a judgment rendered against him by
a court whenever he was unjustly deprived of a hearing or was
prevented from taking an appeal, in either case, because of
fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect. The petition for
relief should be filed within 60 days after the petitioner learns
of the judgment or order, or other proceeding to be set aside,
and not more than six months after such judgment. Both
periods must concur and are not extendible and never
interrupted. Strict compliance with these periods stems from
the equitable character and nature of the petition for relief.
Indeed, relief is allowed only in exceptional cases as when
there is no other available or adequate remedy. A petition for
relief is actually the last chance given by law to litigants to
question a final judgment or order. Failure to avail of such
last chance within the grace period fixed by the Rules of
Court is fatal.

In the case at bar, the evidence shows that the instant petition
was filed on June 17, 2005, definitely beyond the six-month
period from entry of judgment on November 21, 2002.

We are not persuaded by petitioners argument that he was
not aware that his counsel had died or that an adverse
judgment had already been rendered until he received the
notice of promulgation from the RTC of Butuan City on April
20, 2005. Time and again we have stated that equity aids the
vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights. Petitioner
should have taken it upon himself to periodically keep in touch
with his counsel, check with the court, and inquire about the
status of the case. Had petitioner been more prudent, he
would have found out sooner about the death of his counsel
and would have taken the necessary steps to prevent his
present predicament.

EXECUTION, SATISFACTION, AND EFFECT OF JUDGMENTS

Test to Determine Whether a Judgment is Final or
Interlocutory
Dela Cruz v. Paras
Section 2, Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that
"(o)nly final judgments or orders shall be subject to appeal."
Interlocutory or incidental judgments or orders do not stay the
progress of an action nor are they subject of appeal "until final
judgment or order is rendered for one party or the other." The
test to determine whether an order or judgment is
interlocutory or final is this: "Does it leave something to be
done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case? If
it does, it is interlocutory; if it does not, it is final." A court
order is final in character if it puts an end to the particular
matter resolved or settles definitely the matter therein
disposed of, such that no further questions can come before
the court except the execution of the order. The term "final"
judgment or order signifies a judgment or an order which
disposes of the cause as to all the parties, reserving no further
questions or direction for future determination. The order or
judgment may validly refer to the entire controversy or to
some definite and separate branch thereof. "In the absence of
a statutory definition, a final judgment, order decree has been
held to be ... one that finally disposes of, adjudicates, or
determines the rights, or some right or rights of the parties,
either on the entire controversy or on some definite and
separate branch thereof, and which concludes them until it is
reversed or set aside. The central point to consider is,
therefore, the effects of the order on the rights of the parties.
A court order, on the other hand, is merely interlocutory in
character if it is provisional and leaves substantial proceeding
to be had in connection with its subject. The word
"interlocutory" refers to "something intervening between the
commencement and the end of a suit which decides some
point or matter but is not a final decision of the whole
controversy."

Perez v. Zulueta
For purposes of appeal, final judgment is one that disposes of
the issues completely so that nothing more can be done with
it in the trial court. As to its binding effect, a judgment will be
deemed final or executory only after the expiration of the time
for appeal therefrom, or, when appeal is perfected, after the
judgment is upheld in the appellate court.

Denso Phil., Inc. v. IAC
The concept of "final" judgment, as distinguished from one
which has "become final" (or "executory" as of right [final and
executory]), is definite and settled. A "final" judgment or order
is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more to
be done by the Court in respect thereto, e.g., an adjudication
on the merits which, on the basis of the evidence presented at
the trial, declares categorically what the rights and obligations
of the parties are and which party is in the right; or a judgment
or order that dismisses an action on the ground, for instance,
of res judicata or prescription. Once rendered, the task of the
Court is ended, as far as deciding the controversy or
determining the rights and liabilities of the litigants is
concerned. Nothing more remains to be done by the Court
except to await the parties' next move (which among others,
may consist of the filing of a motion for new trial or
reconsideration, or the taking of an appeal) and ultimately, of
course, to cause the execution of the judgment once it
becomes 'final' or, to use the established and more distinctive
term, "final and executory." ...

xxx xxx xxx

Conversely, an order that does not finally dispose of the case,
and does not end the Court's task of adjudicating the parties'
contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as
regards each other, but obviously indicates that other things
remain to be done by the Court, is "interlocutory," e.g., an
order denying a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules,
or granting a motion for extension of time to file a pleading, or
authorizing amendment thereof, or granting or denying
applications for postponement, or production or inspection of
documents or things, etc. Unlike a "final" judgment or order,
which is appealable, as above pointed out, an "interlocutory"
order may not be questioned on appeal except only as part of
an appeal that may eventually be taken from the final
judgment rendered in the case.

Execution of Judgment; Period to Execute
Tan Ching v. Magpalo
In a case involving a compromise agreement to pay a sum of
money within six (6) years, although a compromise agreement
is immediately executory, the period from when the execution
of the judgment, in case of breach of such agreement
(execution may be prayed for from the Court for the
compromise agreement was submitted to it), shall be counted
from the end of the due date, that is, the period within which
payment should be made. In this case, it is the end of the six
(6) years from the creation of the compromise agreement (as
stated in the agreement). Thus, in this case, the issuance of
writ of execution by the Court was proper, it being issued
within five (5) years after the lapse of the period of six years to
pay.

Far Eastern Surety & Insurance v. Vda. De Hernandez
ISSUE: Whether or not the absence of prior notice of an
application for the issuance of a writ of execution on a
judgment that is final and executory, absent any showing that
the other party will be prejudiced thereby, renders the
execution and subsequent proceedings there under void.

RULING: No. Section 1 of Rule 39 of The Revised Rules of Court
provides, as follows:

SECTION 1. Execution upon final judgments or orders.
Execution shall issue only upon a judgment or order that
finally disposes of the action or proceeding. Such execution
shall issue as a matter of right upon the expiration of the
period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has been duly
perfected.

If the judgment has been duly appealed, execution may issue
as a matter of right from the date of the service of the notice
provided in section 11 of Rule 51.

It is evident that section 1 of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of
Court does not prescribe that a copy of the motion for the
execution of a final and executory judgment be served on the
defeated party.

Pamintuan v. Muoz
We ruled that once a judgment becomes final and executory,
the prevailing party can have it executed as a matter of right,
and the judgment debtor need not be given advance notice of
the application for execution.

Also, absence of such advance notice to the judgment debtor
does not constitute an infringement of the constitutional
guarantee of due process.

Development Bank of Rizal v. CA
ISSUE: Whether or not a writ of execution needs to be heard
before its issuance.

RULING: No. A judgment on a compromise agreement is
immediately final and executory. A writ of execution,
therefore, may issue as a matter of right. A hearing is only
required when there is a compelling reason for the need of it.
Thus, unless there exists a compelling reason therefore, for
holding in abeyance the writ of execution, the same will issue
as a matter of right in favor of the prevailing party upon
finality of the decision.

When Court can refuse execution even if the decision is
executory
Butuan City v. Ortiz
FACTS: Soriano filed a petition for mandamus before the CFI
against the Municipal Board on the ground that the latter
failed to decide his case within 60 days from submission. Along
with the order to decide the case, the CFI also ordered the
reinstatement of Soriano because of such failure of the
Municipal Board. The Municipal Board, thereafter, dismissed
Soriano from service, and such decision was affirmed by CSC.
Thereafter, Soriano filed a motion for execution before the CFI
to execute the judgment of reinstatement. CFI ordered the
execution.

ISSUE: Whether or not writ of execution should issue.

RULING: No. The decision of the CSC finding Soriano guilty was
a valid impediment to the execution of the aforesaid decision
for reinstatement. In other words a supervening cause or
reason had arisen which has rendered the decision of the
court ordering reinstatement, no longer enforceable. It has
been repeatedly held, and it is now well-settled in this
jurisdiction, that when after judgment has been rendered and
the latter has become final, facts and circumstances transpire
which render its execution impossible or unjust, the interested
party may ask the court to modify or alter the judgment to
harmonize the same with justice and the facts.

Lipan v. Development Bank of Rizal
The main issue in this case is whether or not respondent judge
could legally stay execution of judgment that has already
become final and executory.

The answer is in the affirmative.

The rule that once a decision becomes final and executory, it is
the ministerial duty of the court to order its execution, admits
of certain exceptions as in cases of special and exceptional
nature where it becomes imperative in the higher interest of
justice to direct the suspension of its execution (Vecine vs.
Geronimo, 59 O.G. 579); whenever it is necessary to
accomplish the aims of justice (Pascual vs. Tan, 85 Phil. 164);
or when certain facts and circumstances transpired after the
judgment became final which could render the execution of
the judgment unjust (Cabrias vs. Adil, 135 SCRA 354).

In the instant case, the stay of the execution of judgment is
warranted by the fact that respondent bank was placed under
receivership. To execute the judgment would unduly deplete
the assets of respondent bank to the obvious prejudice of
other depositors and creditors, since, as aptly stated in Central
Bank of the Philippines vs. Morfe (63 SCRA 114), after the
Monetary Board has declared that a bank is insolvent and has
ordered it to cease operations, the Board becomes the trustee
of its assets for the equal benefit of all the creditors, including
depositors. The assets of the insolvent banking institution are
held in trust for the equal benefit of all creditors, and after its
insolvency, one cannot obtain an advantage or a preference
over another by an attachment, execution or otherwise.

Heirs of Pedro Guminpin v. CA
By enforcing the possessory right of petitioners over the
disputed land, although found to be rightfully theirs at the
beginning as ruled by the lower court and the Court of
Appeals, when the said land is already in the hands of a
purchaser for value by virtue of a sale on execution, would be
inequitable and unjust. The situation is not that the judgment
in the accion publiciana has lost its virtuality, but that the
plaintiffs, now petitioners, had ceased to be entitled to the
relief awarded by said judgment precisely because of the
material change in the situation of the parties. A supervening
cause or reason had arisen which has rendered the decision of
the court ordering respondents herein to vacate the disputed
land no longer enforceable. The "supervening cause" was a
superior cause, superseding the basis of the judgment and
making its execution untenable.

Luna v. IAC
ISSUE: The issue is whether or not procedural rules more
particularly the duty of lower courts to enforce a final decision
of appellate courts in child custody cases, should prevail over
and above the desire and preference of the child, to stay with
her grandparents instead of her biological parents and who
had signified her intention to kill herself or run away from
home if she should be separated from her grandparents and
forced to live with her biological parents.

RULING: No. The preference of the child prevails in this case.
The manifestation of the child Shirley that she would kill
herself or run away from home if she should be taken away
from the herein petitioners and forced to live with the private
respondents, made during the hearings on the petitioners'
motion to set aside the writ of execution and reiterated in her
letters to the members of the Court and during the hearing of
the case before this Court, is a circumstance that would make
the execution of the judgment rendered inequitable, unfair
and unjust, if not illegal. Article 363 of the Civil Code provides
that in all questions relating to the care, custody, education
and property of the children, the latter's welfare is paramount.
This means that the best interest of the minor can override
procedural rules and even the rights of parents to the custody
of their children.

Fua Cam Lu v. Yap Fauco
Writ of execution may not issue if the parties expressly
novated the decision of the Court thru a valid compromise
agreement among themselves. However, the compromise
agreement may be executed in case of breach of one of the
parties (in case the compromise agreement is submitted to
the Court and approved by it).

Cunanan v. CA
(This is an action for forcible entry) Writ of execution cannot
issue in this case because (a) there is already judgment on
compromise which is already complied with by the parties,
and (b) the five year period to apply for execution had already
lapsed. Instead, the litigant should have filed a motion to
revive judgment (within ten years from entry of judgment).

NOTE: Because of the subsequent breach of one of the parties
(the party entered the premises of the other), the case was
remanded to the CFI to hear the case for further proceedings.

Del Rosario v. Villegas
Writ of execution shall not issue (or if already issued, it may be
nullified) if the judgment is not clear such as in this case
wherein the Court failed to consider the inflation or change of
prices of fruits during the years that passed. (Here, the Court
nullified the writ of execution that he issued to the sheriff)

Cu Unjieng v. Mabalacat Sugar Co.
When the judgment is conditional and is not a final disposition
of the case a writ of execution shall not issue. An example of
this is when the decision states that The order provided that
the sum should be awarded to the appellee if Berkenkotter
should win the case, or to the appellant should Berkenkotter
lose the case in this Court. It is a statement which contains no
disposition at all and is a mere anticipation of what the court
shall do in the future.

When the execution may be quashed
Coob-Perez v. Lantin
Execution may be quashed when there is change in the
situation of the parties making the writ inequitable such as in
this case wherein the plaintiffs already abandoned the case or
their claim (they already chose cash dividends over levied
stocks).

Sandioco v. Piguing
Execution may be quashed if the judgment was already
satisfied. Here, there has been a novation of the decision thru
a compromise agreement of the parties to settle the payment
with a lower price. The novation here, thus, has the effect of
extinguishing the obligation.

Limpin v. IAC (memorize)
There may, to be sure, be instances when an error may be
committed in the course of execution proceedings prejudicial
to the rights of a party. These instances, rare though they may
be, do call for correction by a superior court, as where

1) the writ of execution varies the judgment

2) there has been a change in the situation of the
parties making execution inequitable or unjust;

3) execution is sought to be enforced against property
exempt from execution;

4) it appears that the controversy has never been
submitted to the judgment of the court;

5) the terms of the judgment are not clear enough and
there remains room for interpretation thereof; or,

6) it appears that the writ of execution has been
improvidently issued, or that it is defective in
substance, or is issued against the wrong party, or
that the judgment debt has been paid or otherwise
satisfied, or the writ was issued without authority;

Dispositive portion is the one to be executed, Exception
Chung v. Chinese National Cereals
While the general rule is that the portion of a decision that
becomes the subject of execution is that ordained or decreed
in the dispositive part thereof, there are exceptions to this
rule.

The exceptions where the dispositive part of the judgment
does not always prevail over the body of the opinion are:

(a)....where there is ambiguity or uncertainty, the body of the
opinion may be referred to for purposes of construing the
judgment because the dispositive part of a decision must find
support from the decisions ratio decidendi;

(b)....where extensive and explicit discussion and settlement
of the issue is found in the body of the decision.

Considering the circumstances of the instant case, the Court
finds that the exception to the general rule applies to the
instant case. Since the statement of the Court of Appeals
regarding the prayer for the dismissal of the case seemingly
gave the Manila court the discretion to dismiss or not to
dismiss Civil Case No. 94-68836, the Manila court should have
referred to the body of the decision for purposes of construing
the issue of whether or not the complaint should be
dismissed, because the dispositive part of a decision must find
support from the decisions ratio decidendi. Findings of the
court are to be considered in the interpretation of the
dispositive portion of the judgment.

Remedy of the defeated party when the writ varies the terms
of the dispositive portion: Motion to Quash or Certiorari
Jaca v. Davao Lumber Co.
The remedies in this case is a motion to quash the writ of
execution, as already discussed, or certiorari. The case of Jaca
is a case wherein he availed of the wrong remedy.

In its answer to the petition, respondent lumber company
contends that petitioners, having availed of the remedy of
appeal are barred from filling a petition for certiorari.
Although Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides that
the special civil action of certiorari may only be invoked when
"there is no appeal, nor any plain speedy and adequate
remedy in the course of law," this rule is not without
exception. The availability of the ordinary course of appeal
does not constitute sufficient ground to prevent a party from
making use of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari where
the appeal is not an adequate remedy or equally beneficial,
speedy and sufficient. It is the inadequacy not the mere
absence of all other legal remedies and the danger of
failure of justice without the writ, that must usually determine
the propriety of certiorari.

In the case at bar, the remedy of appeal is inadequate. It will
not immediately relieve petitioners from the injurious effect of
the order granting execution. The slow and inexpensive
remedy of appeal will not prevent respondent judge from
executing his decision requiring petitioners to pay the huge
amount of P867,887.52. Moreover, to dismiss the petition on
the ground that petitioner has already availed of the remedy
of appeal will only aggravate the patent injustice already
inflicted on petitioners.

Jaca v. Davao Lumber Co.
GROUNDS SEC. 2. Execution pending appeal. On motion of
the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party the court
may, in its discretion, order execution to issue before the
expiration of the. time to appeal, upon good reasons to be
stated in a special order. If a record on appeal is filed
thereafter the motion and the special order shall be included
therein.

(a) In this same civil case,, the court issued an Order dated
November 17, 1964 directing the plaintiffs 'to deliver to the
receiver all the properties, chattels and equipment covered by
the Chattel Mortgage, the delivery to be made within thirty
(30) days', but plaintiffs did not, comply with said Order of
November 17, 1964.

(b) Defendant's counsel filed a 'Motion to Implement Order
ordering Urbano Jaca to deliver Chattels to Receiver' dated
July 28, 1965, but up this date, plaintiffs have not complied
with said Order.

(c) That there are various reports from the receiver, one of
them dated April 19, 1965, stating that the Receiver has not
taken custody of the mortgaged chattels due to the refusal or
inability to mortgagor Urbano Jaca to deliver the same to him.

(d) Despite the long lapse of time from the Order of November
17, 1964, the court in its Order of September 1, 1965, directed
said mortgagor Urbano Jaca to comply forthwith with the
Order dated November 17, 1964 'fifteen (15) days upon
receipt of this Order', but up to this date there has been
consistent refusal or failure to comply with said order of
delivery.

(2) Another good reason for execution pending appeal (Rule
39, Section 2) is the fact that plaintiff Urbano Jaca the
mortgagor in the deed of chattel mortgage dated January 24,
1961, has violated Article 319 of the Revised Penal Code, for
he has sold some of the mortgaged properties to third
persons, particularly, a wrecker, to Teodoro M. Alagon of
Davao City on February 12, 1962 for P10,000.00. A copy of the
letter-complaint addressed by defendant's counsel to the City
Fiscal of Davao, dated February 5, 1964 is attached hereto and
made an integral part of this Motion as Annex "A".

(3) Moreover, plaintiffs have not only failed to comply with the
Order of the Honorable Court for the delivery of the
properties under receivership to the Receiver (par. 3 of this
Motion) and in fact has violated the Chattel Mortgage contract
(Par. 4 of this Motion); but plaintiffs have no properties or
assets with which to satisfy the judgment of this Honorable
Court, which amounts to principal items of P756,326.52,
P91,651.00 and P20,000.00, or a total of P867,887.52.

(4) Obviously, the appeal interposed by the plaintiffs is to
delay the enforcement and/or execution of the decision
rendered by this Honorable Court, so that when the Decision
correctly rendered by this Honorable Court should be affirmed
on appeal the judgment will become nugatory.

CA, no authority to issue writ of execution
We emphatically rule that the Court of Appeals has no
authority to issue immediate execution pending appeal of its
own decision. Discretionary execution under Rule 39, Section
2 (a), 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, is allowed
pending appeal of a judgment or final order of the trial court,
upon good reasons to be stated in a special order after due
hearing. A judgment of the Court of Appeals cannot be
executed pending appeal. Once final and executory, the
judgment must be remanded to the lower court, where a
motion for its execution may be filed only after its entry. In
other words, before its finality, the judgment cannot be
executed. There can be no discretionary execution of a
decision of the Court of Appeals.

Judgments not stayed by appeal: injunction, receivership,
accounting, support, other judgments declared to be
immediately executory unless otherwise ordered by the
court, in a partition case where the appellant claims
exclusive ownership of the whole property and denies the
adverse partys right to any partition, where the lapse of
time would make the ultimate judgment ineffective, where
appeal is clearly dilatory, where the articles subject of the
case would deteriorate, where sufficient bond is posted.

Injunction: Aguilar v. Tan
The rule that an appeal does not stay execution of the
judgment decreeing the dissolution of a preliminary injunction
has a history in this country which dates back to 1902. That
was the ruling of this Court in Watson & Co., Limited vs.
Enriquez (November 13, 1902), 1 Phil. 480, 481-482, closely
followed on November 22 of the same year by Sitia Teco vs.
Ventura, 1 Phil. 497, 499.7

Support: Javier v. Lucero
Unquestionably, Alfredo Javier, Jr. is the son of petitioner
Alfredo Javier, and if financial assistance is to be rendered only
at the termination of the appeal his education, or the
completion thereof, would be unduly delayed. That is good
reason for immediate execution. Petitioner claims that
according to the records Alfredo Javier Jr. "is no longer
studying". Yet probably he stopped going to school due to lack
of means, since the petitioner himself admits that his son is
just a pre-law graduate.

Other judgments declared to be immediately executory, Eg.
Partition case where appellant claims exclusive ownership of
the whole property and denies the adverse partys right to
any partition: Garbo v. CA
The ruling in the cited cases, however, has been abandoned by
this Court in Miranda v. Court of Appeals, which expressly held
that the general rule of partition that an appeal will not lie
until the partition or distribution proceedings are terminated
will not apply where appellant claims exclusive ownership of
the whole property and denies the adverse partys right to any
partition. This ruling was reiterated in Valdez v. Bagaso and
Cease v. Court of Appeals.

Herein, petitioner precisely claims exclusive ownership of the
disputed property against the pro indiviso claim of private
respondents. The judgment of the Trial Court declaring that
the said property belongs to the estate of Francisco Garbo and
is, therefore, of common ownership to be partitioned share
and share alike, squarely resolved the very issue of ownership.
It is thus a definitive judgment as it decided the rights of the
parties upon the issue submitted by specifically granting the
remedy sought by the action. Thereby, it was not an
interlocutory order but a final judgment on the merits.

Other judgments declared to be immediately execuroty, Eg.
Where lapse of time would make the ultimate judgment
ineffective: Scottish Union & National Insurance Co. v.
Macadaeg
Section 2, Rule 39, of the Rules of Court, allows the issuance of
an advanced writ of execution for "good cause." This so-called
"good cause" does not have a definite meaning. It must be
interpreted in accordance with the circumstance of a
particular case. It is the opinion of this Court that when there
is danger for the judgment to be ineffective if and when it
becomes first, there is good cause to issue an advanced writ of
execution.

The defendants in these cases are all foreign corporations;
they may cease business operation and as a matter of fact,
defendants Scottish Union and National Insurance Co., London
and Scottish Assurance Corporation, Ltd., and St. Paul's Fire
and Marine Insurance. Co. did cease business operation. It
may be stated, in this connection that these defendants
ceased operation in the Philippines in accordance with law and
the other companies assumed their obligations. This, of
course, is perfectly legal in so far as business transaction is
concerned. Immediate relief must be given to the prevailing
party as soon as the judgment of the Court becomes
executory. Any delay to the granting of that relief should be
discouraged.

Under the circumstances of the instant case, justice and equity
demand that the right of the plaintiff be protected and
secured. The only way to secure and protect such right in the
issuance of a writ of execution or for the defendants to file
their respective bonds to stay execution. This holds true,
however, in so far as defendants Scottish Union and National
Insurance Co., London and Scottish Assurance Corporation,
Ltd., and St. Paul's Fire and Marine Insurance Co., are
concerned. They have ceased business without giving notice to
the Court, and the assuming companies also failed to do the
same. In so far as the latter are concerned, the Court has no
jurisdiction over them. And the Court feels that it would have
been a demonstration of good faith on the part of the
defendants Scottish Union and National Insurance Co., London
and Scottish Assurance Corporation, Ltd., and St. Paul's Fire
and Marine Insurance Co. and the assuming companies had
they given notice to the Court of their transaction. . . .

Other judgments declared to be immediately execuroty, Eg.
Where appeal is clearly dilatory: Rodriguez v. CA
It has been held that the dilatory nature of an appeal and the
filing of a bond by the appellee may be regarded as good and
special reason within the meaning of Rule 39, Section 2 the
Rules of Court:

The above section simplifies and clarifies the old provision. It
provides that prior to the expiration of the time to appeal, the
court may issue execution on motion of the prevailing party
and with notice to the adverse party, upon good reasons to be
stated in a special order, regardless of whether such order is
issued before or after the filing of the record on appeal. The
good reasons are required to be stated in the special order,
but it has been held that statement by reference is sufficient,
as when such reasons appear in a motion for execution, and
reference thereto is made in the special order of execution is
the existence of the good reasons if to an order of execution is
the existence of the good reasons if they may be found
distinctly somewhere in the record. In this connection, it has
been held that the filing of bond by the successful party is a
good reason for ordering execution. That the appeal is being
taken for purposes of delay, is also a good reason. (Moran,
Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. I, pp. 539-540, 1957
Edition; Emphasis supplied.)

Other judgments declared to be immediately executory, Eg.
Where the articles subject of the case would deteriorate:
Federation v. NAMARCO
In granting the special execution of the judgment question,
respondent Judge stated good reasons, in his special order of
execution, as required by the above-quoted provision of the
Rules of Court, namely: (1) consumers, not only in Manila, but
also in the neighboring provinces and cities will be benefited
by the marketing of the goods subject matter of the judgment;
(2) the public service which petitioner NAMARCO is required
by law to render, will be accomplished by the distribution of
said goods through respondents FEDERATION, et al.; (3) the
goods subject matter of the judgment will deteriorate during
the pendency of the appeal; (4) a slight deterioration of said
goods will be sufficient to impair their market value first-hand
goods, hence, keeping them in storage while petitioner
NAMARCO's appeal in Civil Case No. 42684 (G. No. L-17819)
will render the judgment in favor of respondents FEDERATION,
et al. ineffectual, as their interest in such goods is not that of
consuming, but of marketing them; (5) and the appeal in Civil
Case No. 42684 (G.R. No. L-17819) is frivolous and is being
taken only for the purpose of delay. And, in refusing petitioner
NAMARCO's offer to put up a supersedeas bond to stay said
special execution, the trial court reasoned out, and we believe
correctly, that there is no way of determining the prices at
which respondents FEDERATION, et al. will sell the goods
subject matter of the judgment, or of determining their
profits; consequently, there is no way determining the amount
of damage that respondents FEDERATION, et al. may suffer by
the stay of the special execution, and no amount can,
therefore, be fixed for the supersedeas bond. The trial court
went on to say that "the compelling urgent reasons for the
special execution of the judgment outweigh the stay thereof
by a supersedeas bond."

Other judgments declared to be immediately execuroty, Eg.
Where sufficient bond is posted (to execute pending appeal):
Lu v. Valeriano
Mere posting of bond is not a good reason to justify execution
pending appeal unless it is merely an additional factor.

Execution after appeal is finally resolved

If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, the
execution may forthwith be applied for in the court of origin,
on motion of the judgment obligee, submitting therewith
certified true copies of the judgment or judgments or final
order or orders sought to be enforced and of the entry
thereof, with notice to the adverse party.

Effect of Reversal of executed judgment
Po Pauco v. Tan Juco
We are of the opinion that no error was committed in giving
judgment against the plaintiff for the full value, at the time of
seizure, of the property purchased by him. Upon the reversal
of the judgment, it was primarily the duty of the plaintiff in the
execution to make specific restitution of the property which
the plaintiff had bought in, and to pay to the defendant
reasonable compensation for depriving him of its use in the
meantime, according to the doctrine stated in Hilario vs. Hicks
(40 Phil., 576, 584.) In accordance with this idea the
defendant, in his motion of January 16, 1924, demanded
restitution and an allowance for the use of this property. But
in the course of the trial of the case, it became evident that
specific restitution had become impracticable, owing partly to
the disposal or use of the property by the plaintiff. It is true
that just before that last trial an attempt was made by the
plaintiff to effect a tender of some of this property to the
defendant through the medium of the sheriff; but the sheriff
demanded payment of his fees by the defendant, and the
latter rightly refused to entertain the offer. Specific restitution
of the property having thus become impracticable, the
plaintiff was undoubtedly liable for the full value of the
property, and the court committed no error in holding him
liable for the value of the property, in lieu of specific
restitution.

Execution by motion or by independent action: 5 years to be
counted from date of entry of judgment, whether original
judgment or revived judgment: Tan Ching v. Magpalo
In a case involving a compromise agreement to pay a sum of
money within 6 years, although a compromise agreement is
immediately executory, the period from when the execution
of the judgment, in case of breach of such agreement
(execution may be prayed for from the Court for the
compromise agreement was submitted to it), shall be counted
from the end of the due date, that is, the period within which
payment should be made. In this case, it is the end of the 6
years from the creation of the compromise agreement (as
stated in the agreement). Thus, in this case, the issuance of
writ of execution by the Court was proper, it being issued
within 5 years after the lapse of the period of six years to pay.

Execution of judgment for specific acts
Fuentes v. Leviste
Under Sec. 13, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, it is not enough
for the sheriff, in the enforcement of a judgment for delivery
or restitution of property, to merely direct the defeated party
to effect such delivery or restitution. The refusal of the
defeated party to surrender the property to the winning party
upon the order of the sheriff does not constitute contempt.
The sheriff himself must oust the defeated party from the
property and effect the delivery or restitution by placing the
winning party in possession of the property (US v. Ramayat, 22
Phil. 183). However, if to place the winning party in
possession, the sheriff has to remove an improvement made
by the defeated party, he cannot do so, unless upon special
order of the court issuing the execution. And this order may
be granted only upon motion of the plaintiff with notice and
after hearing, and upon the defeated party's failure to remove
the improvement within the reasonable time given him by the
court (Guevara v. Laico, 64 Phil. 144). This is in accordance
with Sec. 14, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.

Execution of special judgments; special judgments defined
Chinese Commercial Property Co. v. Martinez, Caluag v.
Pecson, Sandico v. Piguing
Contempt is not a special judgment enforceable under Sec. 9
of Rule 9.

Notice of sale of property in execution; requirement of
notice
Ago v. CA
ISSUE: Is the order dictated in open court of the judgment of
the court, and is the fact that the petitioner herein was
present in open court when the judgment was dictated,
sufficient notice thereof?

RULING: The provisions of the Rules of Court decree
otherwise. Section 1 of Rule 35 describes the manner in which
judgment shall be rendered, thus:

SECTION 1. How judgment rendered. All judgments
determining the merits of cases shall be in writing personally
and directly prepared by the judge, and signed by him, stating
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based,
filed with the clerk of the court.

The court of first instance being a court of record, in order that
a judgment may be considered as rendered, must not only be
in writing, signed by the judge, but it must also be filed with
the clerk of court. The mere pronouncement of the judgment
in open court with the stenographer taking note thereof does
not, therefore, constitute a rendition of the judgment. It is the
filing of the signed decision with the clerk of court that
constitutes rendition. While it is to be presumed that the
judgment that was dictated in open court will be the judgment
of the court, the court may still modify said order as the same
is being put into writing. And even if the order or judgment
has already been put into writing and signed, while it has not
yet been delivered to the clerk for filing it is still subject to
amendment or change by the judge. It is only when the
judgment signed by the judge is actually filed with the clerk of
court that it becomes a valid and binding judgment. Prior
thereto, it could still be subject to amendment and change
and may not, therefore, constitute the real judgment of the
court.

Regarding the notice of judgment, the mere fact that a party
heard the judge dictating the judgment in open court, is not a
valid notice of said judgment. If rendition thereof is
constituted by the filing with the clerk of court of a signed
copy (of the judgment), it is evident that the fact that a party
or an attorney heard the order or judgment being dictated in
court cannot be considered as notice of the real judgment. No
judgment can be notified to the parties unless it has previously
been rendered. The notice, therefore, that a party has of a
judgment that was being dictated is of no effect because at
the time no judgment has as yet been signed by the judge and
filed with the clerk.

Besides, the Rules expressly require that final orders or
judgments be served personally or by registered mail. Section
7 of Rule 27 provides as follows:

SEC. 7. Service of final orders or judgments. Final orders
or judgments shall be served either personally or by registered
mail.

In accordance with this provision, a party is not considered as
having been served with the judgment merely because he
heard the judge dictating the said judgment in open court; it is
necessary that he be served with a copy of the signed
judgment that has been filed with the clerk in order that he
may legally be considered as having been served with the
judgment.

Proceedings where property is claimed by third party;
Remedies of a third party claimant
Bayer Phil. V. Agana
FACTS: In this resolution, the Court denied for lack of merit
the motion for reconsideration of Bayer Philippines, Inc. et. al.,
for its failure to consider that the validity of respondent
judges order of May 9,1974 in Civil Case No. Q-14029 was
necessarily placed in issue by the pleadings in two cases at
bar; for asking the Court to resolve the issue whether
summons were properly served on them when the question is
still pending before the court a quo and, therefore, premature;
and for contending that the lifting of the sheriffs levy
rendered the resolution of the questions of ownership and
damages over the properties in Civil Case No. Q-18881 moot
and academic, when the court a quo could still proceed with
the trial and decide said questions.

RULING: Where a court directs the sheriff to execute its
judgment, and in pursuance thereof the sheriff levied on
properties found in the premises of third-party claimants who,
asserting ownership over the properties, filed an action in
another court praying for issuance of injunction to restrain the
sheriff, the lifting of the sheriffs levy does not render the
question of ownership and damages over the properties moot
and academic, since the Court issuing the writ of execution
cannot decide the question of ownership between the
judgment creditor and the third party claimant, which
question shall have to be decided by the court where the third
party claim was filed, and the judgment creditor is not
precluded from securing from the second court appropriate
orders for the protection of its interests.

Ong v. Tating
(C)onstruing Section 17 of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of
Court, the rights of third-party claimant over certain
properties levied upon by the sheriff to satisfy the judgment
should not be decided in the action where the third- party
claims have been presented, but in the separate action
instituted by the claimants.

This is evident from the very nature of the proceedings. In
Herald Publishing, supra. We intimated that the levy by the
sheriff of a property by virtue of a writ of attachment may be
considered as made under authority of the court only when
the property levied upon unquestionably belongs to the
defendant. If he attaches properties other than those of the
defendant, he acts beyond the acts of his authority. Otherwise
stated, the court issuing a writ of execution is supposed to
enforce its authority only over properties of the judgment
debtor, and should a third party appear to claim the property
levied upon by the sheriff, the procedure laid down by the
Rules is that such claim should be the subject of a separate
and independent action.

As we explained in the Quebral case (Quebral v. Garduno, 67
Phil., 316), since the third-party claimant is not one of the
parties to the action, she could not strictly speaking, appeal
from the order denying her claim, but should file a separate
reivindicatory action against the execution creditor or the
purchaser of her property after the sale at public auction, or a
complaint for damages against the bond filed by the judgment
creditor in favor of the sheriff.

Lara v. Bayoba
The third-party claim filed should have alerted the purchasers
to the risk which they were taking when they took part in the
auction sale. Moreover, at an execution sale the buyers
acquire only the right of the judgment debtor which in this
case was a mere right or equity of redemption. The sale did
not extinguish the pre-existing mortgage lien.

Consolidated Bank and Trust Corp. v. CA
A person other than the judgment debtor who claims
ownership or right over levied properties is not precluded,
however, from taking other legal remedies to prosecute his
claim. Thus, in other cases, we ruled that a third person
claiming ownership or interest over levied properties on
execution may file a third-party claim in the same case under
special circumstances:

The contention of private respondents that petitioner is not
entitled to any relief as it was not a party in Civil Case No. Q-
16142 is not tenable. According to private respondent, if
complete relief is sought, petitioner should have brought a
separate and independent action as its claim involves an
important legal issue. (Memorandum for Private Respondents,
p. 7)

We do not agree. In Regino v. Estipona, the case relied upon
by petitioner to support its stand, the Court said:

Upon the levy by attachment of the property in question by
order of the court in Civil Case No. 4435, the said property fell
into the custodia legis of that court for the purposes of that
civil case only. Any relief against such attachment and the
execution and issuance of a writ of possession that ensued
subsequently could be disposed of only in that case. . .

As regards Felisa Rejuso who is a new party in Civil Case No.
5120, suffice it to say that her remedy, if it has not yet been
barred by the statute of limitations or become stale in some
other way is within Civil Case No. 4435. Indeed, it is
superfluous to start a new action on a matter which can be
more simply and conveniently litigated within a former
proceeding of which it is more logically and legally an integral
part.

Penalty for selling without notice, removing or defacing
notice
Ago v. Ca
The sale must be declared null and void

How property sold on execution; who may direct manner
and order of sale
Barrozo v. Macaraeg
Mere inadequacy of price which was the complaint's
allegation is not sufficient ground to annul the sale. It is
only where such inadequacy shocks the conscience that the
courts will intervene.

Redemption; When can redemption be made
Garcia v. Ocampo
We have held that the period of redemption "begins to run
not from the date of sale but from the time of registration of
the sale in the Office of the Register of Deed.

When principal bound by judgment against surety
Luzon Surety Co. v. Beson
A surety, as pointed out by us in a recent decision, must be
given "an opportunity ..." to be heard. Otherwise, in the
categorical language of Justice Dizon, who penned the
opinion, "the writ of execution issued thereunder [is] void.
(Mere notice to surety is not sufficient to bind the latter)

Res judicata in judgments in personam
Yusingco v. Ong Hing Liam
In the petition for reconstitution of certificates of title of the
lands in dispute, appellant Pelagio Yusingco not only asked for
the reconstitution of the certificates of title in the name of
Yusingco Hermanos but went further to pray that the
certificates, once reconstituted, be cancelled and new ones be
issued in the name of the heirs of Alfonso Yusingco (pp. 9-10,
rec. on appeal in CA G.R. No. 24964-R; pp. 73-74, rec. on
appeal in this case), asserting in effect their right of ownership
over the disputed parcels of lands, and the same was opposed
by Ong Hing Lian who also asserted his right of ownership over
the lands. It is patent that the issue of ownership became the
determinative factor in the success of the petition for
reconstitution.

The decision of the Court of Appeals in the previous case for
reconstitution of titles (C.A. G.R. 24964-R), now final and
unappealable, shows that petitioner Pelagio Yusingco
endeavored to obtain judgment in their favor by proving their
rights of ownership over the disputed parcels of land as
successors of the late Alfonso Yusingco and as organizers of
the Alfonso Yusingco Hermanos, while the oppositor claimed
ownership of the same as successor of the late Ong Bonpin;
and both parties freely offered evidence in support of their
respective positions. In that previous petition, petitioner
Pelagio Yusingco alleged that after Alfonso Yusingco died they
formed a partnership called the Alfonso Yusingco Hermanos,
that they are the children of the late Alfonso Yusingco that the
certificates of title covering disputed lots were transferred in
the name of the partnership, and that the said certificates of
title were lost and destroyed during the war. Said allegations
are substantially the same allegations made in the present
accion reivindictoria wherein appellant further alleged that
the appellees surreptitiously took possession of the parcels of
lands during the Japanese occupation by taking advantage of
absence of the Yusingco Hermanos.

From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that, as between the
two suits, there is identity of cause of action the plaintiffs-
appellants' claim of ownership over the disputed lots as
opposed by Ong Hing Lian.

Thus, the Court of Appeals, in the light of the evidence
presented by both parties, was able to determine the present
status of the disputed parcels of land, the previous liens and
encumbrances thereon as well as their present real owners. It
traced out how the predecessors of the herein appellants
disposed of their ownership, and how the processor of Ong
Hing Lian acquired ownership, over the directed parcels of
land.

What is different here is the form of action. But the
employment of two different forms of action, does not enable
one to escape the operation of the principle that one and the
same cause of action shall not be twice litigated.

But the parties in the two cases are not entirely identical. The
only petitioner in the reconstitution case was appellant
Pelagio Yusingco, one of the heirs of the late Alfonso Yusingco.
Although in his petition for reconstitution he prayed that the
certificates of title in the name of Yusingco Hermanos, once
reconstituted, be cancelled and new ones issued in the names
of the heirs of the late Alfonso Yusingco such circumstance did
not thereby implead his co-heirs as co-petitioners. The
pleadings in the reconstitution case and the action for
recovery of ownership neither state nor intimate that Pelagio
Yusingco was authorized expressly or impliedly by his co-heirs
to file the petition for reconstitution for and in behalf of all the
heirs of Alfonso Yusingco. The decision of the Court of Appeals
in the said reconstitution case, CA G.R. No. 24964, therefore
does not bind his co-heirs, his co-plaintiffs in the second case
for reivindicacion; said decision therefore can only be
considered as res judicata as far as Pelagio Yusingco is
concerned, but not as against his co-heirs.

Conclusiveness of judgment
Penalosa v. Tuason
Section 87 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not limit or
restrict the application of the above set out general rules
based on the doctrine of res judicata as developed in Anglo-
American jurisprudence in reliance on judgments in forcible
entry and detainer actions, save only so far as that section
expressly provides that such actions shall not be a bar to
another action respecting title to real estate, and so far as it
provides further that the facts found in the judgment in such
an action shall not be conclusive in another action between
the parties upon a different claim or demand, or upon a
different cause of action.

It is contended that, even under these rules, the judgment in
the action of unlawful detainer cannot be held as a bar to the
present action, because this is an action for specific
performance and for damages for nonfulfillment of a contract,
and therefore wholly different in form and not within the
jurisdiction of the justice of the peace who tried the former
action; and further because Demetrio Tuason appears to have
been the sole plaintiff in the former action, while in the
present action he is joined as defendant with the coowners of
the land in question.

Effect of Foreign Judgment
Mijares v. Ranada
There is an evident distinction between a foreign judgment in
an action in rem and one in personam. For an action in rem,
the foreign judgment is deemed conclusive upon the title to
the thing, while in an action in personam, the foreign
judgment is presumptive, and not conclusive, of a right as
between the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title. However, in both cases, the foreign
judgment is susceptible to impeachment in our local courts on
the grounds of want of jurisdiction or notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Thus, the party
aggrieved by the foreign judgment is entitled to defend
against the enforcement of such decision in the local forum. It
is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge
the foreign judgment, in order for the court in this jurisdiction
to properly determine its efficacy.

It is clear then that it is usually necessary for an action to be
filed in order to enforce a foreign judgment, even if such
judgment has conclusive effect as in the case of in rem actions,
if only for the purpose of allowing the losing party an
opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, and in order
for the court to properly determine its efficacy. Consequently,
the party attacking a foreign judgment has the burden of
overcoming the presumption of its validity.

The rules are silent as to what initiatory procedure must be
undertaken in order to enforce a foreign judgment in the
Philippines. But there is no question that the filing of a civil
complaint is an appropriate measure for such purpose. A civil
action is one by which a party sues another for the
enforcement or protection of a right, and clearly an action to
enforce a foreign judgment is in essence a vindication of a
right presciding either from a "conclusive judgment upon title"
or the "presumptive evidence of a right." Absent perhaps a
statutory grant of jurisdiction to a quasi-judicial body, the
claim for enforcement of judgment must be brought before
the regular courts.

APPEAL FROM FIRST LEVEL COURTS TO SECOND LEVEL
COURTS

Ordinary Mode of Appeal
Producers Bank of the Phil v. CA
Filing of appeal thirteen (13) days late from the last day of
filing constitutes gross negligence. The Legarda Case which
exempts the petitioner from the (simple or ordinary negligent)
acts of the Counsel does not apply.

Fresh Period Rule
Neypes v. CA
FACTS: Petitioners filed an action for annulment of judgment
and titles of land and/or reconveyance and/or reversion with
preliminary injunction before the RTC against the private
respondents. Later, in an order, the trial court dismissed
petitioners complaint on the ground that the action had
already prescribed. Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the
order of dismissal on March 3, 1998 and, on the 15th day
thereafter or on March 18, 1998, filed a motion for
reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the trial court issued another
order dismissing the motion for reconsideration which
petitioners received on July 22, 1998. Five days later, on July
27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice of appeal and paid the
appeal fees on August 3, 1998.

On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of
appeal, holding that it was filed eight days late. This was
received by petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed a
motion for reconsideration but this too was denied in an order
dated September 3, 1998. Via a petition for certiorari and
mandamus under Rule 65, petitioners assailed the dismissal of
the notice of appeal before the CA. In the appellate court,
petitioners claimed that they had seasonably filed their notice
of appeal. They argued that the 15-day reglementary period to
appeal started to run only on July 22, 1998 since this was the
day they received the final order of the trial court denying
their motion for reconsideration. When they filed their notice
of appeal on July 27, 1998, only five days had elapsed and they
were well within the reglementary period for appeal. On
September 16, 1999, the CA dismissed the petition. It ruled
that the 15-day period to appeal should have been reckoned
from March 3, 1998 or the day they received the February 12,
1998 order dismissing their complaint. According to the
appellate court, the order was the final order appealable
under the Rules.

ISSUE: Whether or not receipt of a final order triggers the start
of the 15-day reglementary period to appeal, the February 12,
1998 order dismissing the complaint or the July 1, 1998 order
dismissing the Motion for Reconsideration.

RULING: The July 1, 1998 order dismissing the motion for
reconsideration should be deemed as the final order. In the
case of Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc., the trial court
declared petitioner non-suited and accordingly dismissed his
complaint. Upon receipt of the order of dismissal, he filed an
omnibus motion to set it aside. When the omnibus motion
was filed, 12 days of the 15-day period to appeal the order had
lapsed. He later on received another order, this time
dismissing his omnibus motion. He then filed his notice of
appeal. But this was likewise dismissed for having been filed
out of time. The court a quo ruled that petitioner should have
appealed within 15 days after the dismissal of his complaint
since this was the final order that was appealable under the
Rules. The SC reversed the trial court and declared that it was
the denial of the motion for reconsideration of an order of
dismissal of a complaint which constituted the final order as it
was what ended the issues raised there. This pronouncement
was reiterated in the more recent case of Apuyan v. Haldeman
et al. where the SC again considered the order denying
petitioners motion for reconsideration as the final order
which finally disposed of the issues involved in the case. Based
on the aforementioned cases, the SC sustained petitioners
view that the order dated July 1, 1998 denying their motion
for reconsideration was the final order contemplated in the
Rules.

NOTE:

The FRESH PERIOD RULE does not apply to Rule 64 (Review
of Judgments and Final Orders or Resolutions of the
Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit)
because Rule 64 is derived from the Constitution. It is likewise
doubtful whether it will apply to criminal cases.

Procedure in the RTC in treating appeals
Alvir v. Vera
A case of unlawful detainer is a case under the jurisdiction of
the MTC. However, if the question of physical possession
could not properly be determined without settling that of
lawful or de jure possession and of ownership the jurisdiction
of the municipal court over the ejectment case would be lost
and the action should be dismissed. As a consequence,
respondent court (RTC or CFI in this case) would have no
jurisdiction over the case on appeal and it should have
dismissed the case as appealed from the municipal court.
(Here, the decision of CFI was revoked and the case was
remanded to CFI)

Appeal from the Regional Trial Courts
Suarez v. Villarama
1. The remedy against dismissal of a complaint is appeal
and not certiorari
2. In Murillo v. Consul, which was later adopted by the
1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, this Court had
the occasion to clarify the three (3) modes of appeal
from decisions of the RTC, namely: (1) ordinary
appeal or appeal by writ of error, where judgment
was rendered in a civil or criminal action by the RTC in
the exercise of original jurisdiction; (2) petition for
review, where judgment was rendered by the RTC in
the exercise of appellate jurisdiction; and (3) petition
for review to the Supreme Court.

The first mode of appeal, governed by Rule 41, is
taken to the Court of Appeals on questions of fact or
mixed questions of fact and law. The second mode of
appeal, covered by Rule 42, is brought to the Court of
Appeals on questions of fact, of law, or mixed
questions of fact and law. The third mode of appeal,
provided for by Rule 45, is elevated to the Supreme
Court only on questions of law.

Cases Where Multiple Appeals are Allowed
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. CA
Multiple appeals are allowed in special proceedings,[1] in
actions for recovery of property with accounting,[2] in actions
for partition of property with accounting,[3] in the special civil
actions of eminent domain[4] and foreclosure of mortgage.[5]
The rationale behind allowing more than one appeal in the
same case is to enable the rest of the case to proceed in the
event that a separate and distinct issue is resolved by the
court and held to be final.

The disputes in the case below for specific performance have
arisen from the demand to make adjustments on the property
where the adjacent owner is alleged to have usurped a part
thereof, the exercise of the right of pre-emption and the
payment of rental arrearages. A ruling on the issue of
encroachment will perforce be determinative of the issue of
unpaid rentals. These two points do not arise from two or
more causes of action, but from the same cause of action.
Hence, this suit does not require multiple appeals. There is no
ground for the splitting of appeals in this case, even if it
involves an Order granting (and denying) a motion to dismiss
and a Partial Judgment granting a motion for judgment on the
pleadings. The subject matter covered in the Order and in the
Partial Judgment pertain to the same lessor-lessee
relationship, lease contract and parcel of land. Splitting
appeals in the instant case would, in effect, be violative of the
rule against multiplicity of appeals.

PETITION FOR REVIEW FROM RTC TO CA

Effect of Failure to Comply with Requirements of petition for
review
Sps Abadilla v. Hofilena-EUROP
For failing to file an appeal before the appellate court within
the fifteen (15)-day reglementary period, the assailed ruling of
the RTC attained finality, thus, preventing this Court from
reviewing the merits of the instant petition. When a decision
becomes final and executory, the court loses jurisdiction over
the case and not even an appellate court would have the
power to review the said judgment. Otherwise, there would
be no end to litigation. It would set to naught the main role of
courts of justice to assist in the enforcement of the rule of law
and the maintenance of peace and order by settling justiciable
controversies with finality.

APPEALS FROM CTA AND QUASI-JUDICIAL BODIES TO CA

Golangco v. Fung
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over orders, directives
and decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in
administrative disciplinary cases only. It cannot, therefore,
review the orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman in criminal or non-administrative cases.

PROCEDURE IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

Appellants Brief; Contents
Guided by the foregoing precepts, we have ruled in a number
of cases that the appellate court is accorded a broad
discretionary power to waive the lack of proper assignment of
errors and to consider errors not assigned. It is clothed with
ample authority to review rulings even if they are not assigned
as errors in the appeal. Inasmuch as the Court of Appeals may
consider grounds other than those touched upon in the
decision of the trial court and uphold the same on the basis of
such other grounds, the Court of Appeals may, with no less
authority, reverse the decision of the trial court on the basis of
grounds other than those raised as errors on appeal. We have
applied this rule, as a matter of exception, in the following
instances:

(1) Grounds not assigned as errors but affecting
jurisdiction over the subject matter;

(2) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but are
evidently plain or clerical errors within contemplation of law;

(3) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but
consideration of which is necessary in arriving at a just
decision and complete resolution of the case or to serve the
interests of justice or to avoid dispensing piecemeal justice;

(4) Matters not specifically assigned as errors on appeal
but raised in the trial court and are matters of record having
some bearing on the issue submitted which the parties failed
to raise or which the lower court ignored;

(5) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but closely
related to an error assigned; and

(6) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but upon
which the determination of a question properly assigned, is
dependent.

The instant controversy falls squarely under the exception to
the general rule that only assigned errors may be passed upon
by the appellate court. A just, fair and complete resolution of
the present case necessitates the consideration and the
application of the doctrine of laches which is not the same as
but is undoubtedly closely related to, the issue of prescription
which was properly raised by private respondent before the
respondent Court of Appeals.

Appellants Reply Brief; Contents
When a case is appealed directly to the Supreme Court for the
reason that appellant is raising only a question of law, but
appellee in his brief raises questions of fact disputing the
findings of the trial Court, the appeal should be referred to the
Court of Appeals. An appellee who obtains a favorable
judgment is not called upon to appeal and attack a decision
that favors him; neither is he in a position to decide which
Court he wants the appeal of the appellant to go to, until the
(appellee) has read the brief of said appellant and appraised
himself of the issues raised, the arguments addressed, and the
chances of having the appealed decision reversed or modified
on those issues and arguments alone. Consequently, after
reading the appellant's brief, appellee may raise issues of fact
in his brief to maintain the judgment on other grounds
without the necessity, in such case, of appealing. And if
appellee, under such circumstances, does not raise questions
of fact in his brief it is proper to certify the whole case to the
Court of Appeals.

Questions that may be raised on appeal
De La Santa v. CA
May private respondents raise for the first time on appeal
before the Court of Appeals, as they did raise in their fourth
and fifth assigned errors, issues not raised before the lower
courts?

No. The fourth and fifth errors relating to the alleged
ownership of private respondent Balbino Deodoro before
respondent Court of Appeals (now Intermediate Appellate
Court), although averred in the answers of private
respondents in both cases, were never the subject of proof in,
nor considered by, the lower courts. They were new issues
discussed and considered for the first time on appeal in the
Court of Appeals. An issue which was neither averred in the
complaint nor raised during the trial in the court below cannot
be raised for the first time on appeal; because it would be
offensive to the basic rule of fair play and justice, and would
be violative of the constitutional right to due process of the
other party.

Gala v. Rodriguez and Cordero v. CFI of Rizal
While this case is not strictly in point in the resolution of the
question presented by counsel for the petitioners,
nevertheless, it touches a theory which has, in our judgment, a
strong bearing on the decision of that question. The question
whether all of the candidates were served with notice being
one of fact, it should have been presented to the trial court for
its consideration and determination. That court was in a better
position to determine that question than is this court. The
resolution of that question might require the determination of
a question of fact. If the question had been determined by the
trial court, its determination, under the case above cited,
would have been final, at least in the sense that it would not
be subjected to collateral attack. It is our opinion that the
question cannot be raised for the first time in this court, and
we must decline, therefore, to consider it.

Where the jurisdiction of a trial court depends upon a
question of law alone, as it usually does, the same rule would
not apply. We have held on several occasions that the
question of the jurisdiction of the court over the subject
matter can be raised at any time in any court where the lack of
jurisdiction appears on the fact of the record, as is almost
invariably the case, but, as is clear, the jurisdiction of a court
over the subject matter is in such case a question of law and
involves in its determination no question of fact. Where,
however, as here, the jurisdiction of the court depends upon a
question of fact, it must be first raised in that court and
therein determined.

APPEAL BY CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT

Del Rosario, Jr. v. People
This petition should be dismissed outright for adopting the
wrong mode of appeal. Petitioner is assailing the pre-trial
order of the Sandiganbayan. A petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 is inappropriate to assail an interlocutory order.
A pre-trial order is an interlocutory order since it is one which
does not finally determine a cause of action but only decides
some intervening matter pertaining to the cause and which
requires further steps to be taken in order to enable the court
to adjudicate the cause on the merits. The proper subject of a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is a final
judgment or order which finally disposes of a case, leaving
nothing more to be done by the Court in respect thereto.

Question of Law v. Question of Fact: Findings of Fact of the
CA are final and conclusive and cannot be reviewed on
appeal by SC
Ramos v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co.
Credibility of witness is not for SC to examine. And if CA found
that the testimony of a witness is credible, such finding cannot
be assailed before SC.

Exceptions to the General Rule that Findings of fact of CA
cannot be reviewed by SC: (memorize)
1. Grounded on speculations and surmises
2. Inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible
3. Grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts
4. Based on misappreciation of facts
5. Findings are conflicting
6. When outside the issues of the case and contrary to
the admissions of the parties
7. When relevant facts were overlooked
8. Where findings of the CA are contrary to findings of
the lower court and without citation of specific
evidence and where facts are not disputed by both
parties

ORIGINAL CASES

Substantial Compliance Rule
Balagtas Multi-Purpose Coop v. CA
The third paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of court
requires that the petitioner attach to the petition material
portions of the record as are referred to therein, and other
documents relevant or pertinent thereto, thus:

It shall be filed in seven (7) clearly legible copies together with
proof of service thereof on the respondent with the original
copy intended for the court indicated as such by the
petitioner, and shall be accompanied by a clearly legible
duplicate original or certified true copy of the judgment,
order, resolution, or ruling subject thereof, such material
portions of the record as are referred to therein, and other
documents relevant or pertinent thereto. The certification
shall be accomplished by the proper clerk of court or by his
duly authorized representative, or by the proper officer of the
court, tribunal, agency or office involved or by his duly
authorized representative. The other requisite number of
copies of the petition shall be accompanied by clearly legible
plain copies of all documents attached to the original.
[Underscoring supplied.]

The submission of said financial statement together with the
motion for reconsideration constitutes substantial compliance
with the requirements of Section 3, Rule 46. The rules of
procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid, technical
sense; rules of procedure are used only to help secure
substantial justice. If a technical and rigid enforcement of the
rules is made, their aim would be defeated.

Paras v. Baldado
In the instant case, the flaw consisted of the failure to attach
certified true copies of the impugned RTC orders to the
petition for certiorari. A certified true copy, as used in
Section 3, Rule 46 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, is one
the certification on which was made by the proper clerk of
court or his duly authorized representative. The Court of
Appeals was, therefore, correct in disregarding the copies of
the RTC orders certified to by a notary public as plain xerox
cop(ies). However, the records reveal that duplicate original
copies of the said RTC orders were in fact attached to one of
the seven copies of the petition filed with the Court of
Appeals; moreover, copies of the same orders, this time
accomplished by the clerk of court, were submitted by
petitioners in their motion for reconsideration. Thus, the
Court finds that there was substantial compliance with the
requirement and the Court of Appeals should have given the
petition due course.

Molina v. CA
1. We rule that in the present case, the alleged failure
to attach all pleadings and documents is not a
sufficient ground to dismiss the petition. In
appropriate cases, the courts may liberally construe
procedural rules in order to meet and advance the
cause of substantial justice.

2. It is not required under Rule 65, Section 1 of the Rules
of Court that the trial judge himself be impleaded in a
petition for certiorari. The rule clearly states that a
petition for certiorari may be filed against the
tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions. The inclusion of the tribunal, which
issued the decision, as nominal party, was
substantially complied with. When petitioners
mentioned the Regional Trial Court, Branch 21 of
Vigan, Ilocos Sur, they also referred necessarily to the
judge who issued the assailed resolutions.

NYK International Kniwear Corp v. NLRC
Submission of photocopied decision of NLRC to CA with a
stamp thereon saying certified true copy, although certified
by a notary public, is not a substantial compliance with the
Rules. This case is different from the Paras case because in
said case, one of the seven copies forwarded to the CA
properly complied with the requirement that certified true
copies of the resolution or decision of the tribunal or court
together with other documents shall be submitted. In this
case, not one of the seven required copies had complied.

ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENTS OR FINAL ORDERS AND
RESOLUTIONS

Where filed: Important conditions for the availment of this
remedy
Macalalag v. Ombudsman
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction
over actions for annulment of decisions or orders of the
Ombudsman in administrative cases.

RULING: No. Annulment of judgment is not applicable to
quasi-judicial bodies, such as the Ombudsman in this case. The
proper remedy should have been an appeal with the CA under
Rule 43 and not annulment of judgment under Rule 47.

Islamic DaWah Council of the Phil v. CA
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner in an action for annulment of
judgment need to be a party to the judgment sought to be
annulled for the petition to be valid.

RULING: No. A person need not be a party to the judgment
sought to be annulled. What is essential is that he can prove
his allegation that the judgment was obtained by the use of
fraud and collusion and he would be adversely affected
thereby.

NOTE: BP 129 lodged with CA the exclusive authority to take
cognizance of action for annulment of judgment or orders of
the RTC.

Alaban v. CA
ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for annulment of judgment is
proper in this case (on ground of extrinsic fraud for the reason
that the other heirs were not notified of the proceeding).

RULING: No. An action for annulment of judgment is a remedy
in law independent of the case where the judgment sought to
be annulled was rendered. The purpose of such action is to
have the final and executory judgment set aside so that there
will be a renewal of litigation. It is resorted to in cases where
the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief
from judgment, or other appropriate remedies are no longer
available through no fault of the petitioner, and is based on
only two grounds: extrinsic fraud, and lack of jurisdiction or
denial of due process. A person need not be a party to the
judgment sought to be annulled, and it is only essential that
he can prove his allegation that the judgment was obtained by
the use of fraud and collusion and he would be adversely
affected thereby.

An action to annul a final judgment on the ground of fraud lies
only if the fraud is extrinsic or collateral in character. Fraud is
regarded as extrinsic where it prevents a party from having a
trial or from presenting his entire case to the court, or where
it operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself
but to the manner in which it is procured. The overriding
consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the
fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party
from having his day in court.

To sustain their allegation of extrinsic fraud, petitioners assert
that as a result of respondents deliberate omission or
concealment of their names, ages and residences as the other
heirs of the decedent in his petition for allowance of the will,
they were not notified of the proceedings, and thus they were
denied their day in court. In addition, they claim that
respondents offer of a false compromise even before the
filing of the petition prevented them from appearing and
opposing the petition for probate.

According to the Rules, notice is required to be personally
given to known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator. A
perusal of the will shows that respondent was instituted as the
sole heir of the decedent. Petitioners, as nephews and nieces
of the decedent, are neither compulsory nor testate heirs who
are entitled to be notified of the probate proceedings under
the Rules. Respondent had no legal obligation to mention
petitioners in the petition for probate, or to personally notify
them of the same.

Besides, assuming arguendo that petitioners are entitled to be
so notified, the purported infirmity is cured by the publication
of the notice. After all, personal notice upon the heirs is a
matter of procedural convenience and not a jurisdictional
requisite. Thus, there is no fraud.

Definition of Extrinsic Fraud and Lack of jurisdiction
Joven v. Calilung
What extrinsic fraud means is explained in Macabingkil v.
Peoples Homesite and Housing Corporation:

It is only extrinsic or collateral fraud, as distinguished from
intrinsic fraud, however, that can serve as a basis for the
annulment of judgment. Fraud has been regarded as extrinsic
or collateral, within the meaning of the rule, where it is one
the effect of which prevents a party from having a trial, or a
real contest, or from presenting all of his case to the court, or
where it operates upon matters pertaining, not to the
judgment itself, but of the manner in which it was procured so
that there is not a fair submission of the controversy. In
other words, extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the
prevailing party in the litigation which is committed outside of
the trial of the case, whereby the defeated party has been
prevented from exhibiting fully his side of the case, by fraud or
deception practiced on him by his opponent.

Acts that shall warrant annulment of a judgment were further
explained by the Court in the case of Ybaez v. Court of
Appeals:

The kind of fraud that justifies the annulment of a judgment is
extrinsic fraud. This refers to some act or conduct of the
prevailing party which has prevented the aggrieved party from
having a trial or presenting his case to the court, or was used
to procure judgment without a fair submission of the
controversy. Extrinsic fraud refers to acts outside the trial.

In the case at bar, it is evident that extrinsic fraud has been
committed against Joven. The receipt of the money
demanded by Suriaga from Calilung (BRIBERY) is clearly an act
used to procure judgment without a fair submission of the
controversy. It was a fraudulent act of the prevailing party
done outside the trial which could not be litigated and
determined at the trial of the case.

Period within which to file Annulment of Judgment
Orbeta v. Sendiong
Neither laches nor estoppel serves as a bar. The petition for
annulment alleges that respondent learned of the existence of
Civil Case No. 10173 only in 1999, or one year after the
decision therein had been rendered. Since he was not
impleaded in Civil Case No. 10173, there is no basis to
presume that respondent was aware of the civil case during its
pendency before the RTC.

Indeed, a petition for annulment of judgment was, at that
point, the only viable remedy for respondent to avail of, and it
was utilized only one year after respondent learned of the
existence of Civil Case No. 10173. Laches has been defined as
the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained
length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence,
could or should have been done earliernegligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting
presumption that the party entitled to assert it has abandoned
it or declined to assert it. Considering that a petition for
annulment of judgment based on extrinsic fraud may be filed
within four (4) years from discovery of the fraud, a similar
petition based on lack of jurisdiction is generally not barred by
laches or estoppel if the petition is filed within one year after
petitioner learns of the questioned decision. This moreover
holds true, as in this case, since respondent is a foreign
resident restrained by time and distance to undertake an
immediate and proximate response, such as judicial recourse.

Does the SC have jurisdiction to entertain a petition for
annulment which was dismissed by the CA in the guise of a
petition for certiorari?

Lapu-Lapu Development v. Risos
No. This Court apparently has no Jurisdiction to entertain a
petition which is evidently another petition to annul the
Decision of the respondent Branch 27, Regional Trial Court of
Lapulapu City, it appearing that jurisdiction thereto properly
pertains to the Court of Appeals. Such a petition was brought
before the appellate court, but due to petitioner's failure to
nullify Judge Risos' Decision in said forum, LLDHC, apparently
at a loss as to what legal remedy to take, brought the instant
petition under the guise of a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 seeking once again to annul the judgment of Branch 27.

Instead of filing this petition for certiorari under Rule 65,
which is essentially another Petition to Annul Judgment,
petitioner LLDHC should have filed a timely Petition for Review
under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court of the decision of
the Court of Appeals, dismissing the Petition for Annulment of
Judgment filed by the petitioner LLDHC before the court a
quo.

PROCEDURE IN THE SUPREME COURT

Exception to the rule that SC cannot weigh evidence anew
Ganie P Olama v. PNB
While it is an established dictum that it is not the function of
the Supreme Court to analyze or weigh evidence anew,
however, this rule is not iron-clad. We have consistently
recognized several exceptional circumstances where we
disregarded the aforesaid tenet and proceeded to review the
findings of facts of the lower court such as: (1) when the
conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations,
surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference is manifestly
absurd, mistaken or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse
of discretion in the appreciation of facts; (4) when the
judgment is premised on a misapprehension of facts; (5)
when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when the Court
of Appeals in making its findings, went beyond the issues of
the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both
appellant and appellee; (7) when the Court of Appeals
manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by
the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion; and (8) when the findings of fact of the
Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court or are
mere conclusions without citation of specific evidence, or
where the facts set forth by the petitioner are not disputed
by the respondent, or where the findings of fact of the Court
of Appeals are premised on absence of evidence but are
contradicted by the evidence on record (such as in this case).