Russia Development Index 2013-2014

RUSSIA DEVELOPMENT
INDEX 20132014
Expert Opinion Poll
of the Valdai Discussion Club
Moscow, October 2014
valdaiclub.com
Russia Development Index 20132014
3

EXPERT OPINION POLL OF THE
VALDAI DISCUSSION CLUB
The Valdai International Discussion Club
held its fifth annual poll of Russian and
foreign experts on changes in Russias
domestic policy and economy, societal
development, and position in the world.
The results are used to produce the Rus-
sia Development Index, also known as
the Valdai Index.
Based on the results of the August
2014 poll, the overall value of the
index stands at 0.2, continuing the
negative trend observed in previous
years. This trend has been exacerbated
by the Ukraine crisis and the informa-
tion war unleashed against Russia in
response.
The Ukraine crisis accounts for the stark
differences in assessments offered by
experts from NATO and non-NATO
countries. Their diametrically opposed
views on Russias development are a
function of both geographical and politi-
cal proximity.
In 2014, the negative trend for views of
the Russian political system began to
0,4
0,3
1,1
0,1
0
0,2
0,9
0,8
0,4
0,4
0,4
0,1
0,8
0,4
0,9
0,4
0,4
0,2
Russia Development Index: Expert opinion
poll of the Valdai Discussion Club
Module 1. The Russian political system
Module 2. The Russian economy
Module 3. The Russian human dimension
Module 4. Russian science and the countrys
innovative development
Module 5. Russia in the system of national,
regional and global security
Module 6. Russian diplomatic activity
on the international scene
Module 7. Russias openness to the world
Module 8. Soft power
NATO Non-NATO
Overview of Poll Results
4 MOSCOW, OCTOBER 2014
level off: the resultant value is still nega-
tive (0.1) but it is clearly better than it
was last year (0.3).
This change is due primarily to improved
assessments of the Russian president:
86% of respondents said that he had
increased his influence within the politi-
cal system, 52% agreed that policy devel-
opment and implementation had become
more efficient, and 91% noted that he
enjoys greater public trust. The general
indicator for the president is 1.5. Clearly,
Vladimir Putins reputation as a strong
leader has helped him against the back-
drop of foreign political instability and
risks at home.
At the same time, views of all other com-
ponents of the political system are uni-
formly negative the Government, Par-
liament, political parties, the opposition,
and civil society. Although the majority
of experts did not point to any significant
changes in their activities and role, nega-
tive ratings exceeded positive ratings.
The opposition outside of the politi-
cal system received the lowest marks.
Its influence, effectiveness and public
trust were judged to be in decline by
67.1%, 59.5%, and 64.5% of respondents,
respectively. Two years ago, roughly the
same percentage of experts stated that
all these indicators were on the upswing.
In addition, the opposition outside of
the political system is the only element
of the political system whose index was
below 1, bottoming out at 1.1. The sur-
veyed experts were not optimistic about
the development of civil society either,
with many noting a decline in respect for
human rights and civil liberties.
As was to be expected, the majority of the
experts evaluating changes in Russias
political system pointed to the Ukraine
crisis. One expert summed up the general
impression shared by numerous respon-
dents: There has been a substantial
increase in the influence of the president
in most areas of public life, including
a definite improvement in public trust.
This seems to be mainly due to the events
in Ukraine, while there has not been a
substantial increase in the efficiency of
policy development and implementation,
especially with respect to economic and
political reforms. The rest of the political
system seems to be undergoing a period
of stagnation.
The lowest marks were given in the
economic module (0.8 compared
to 0.3 last year). Macroeconom-
ic indicators were rated at 1. This is
explained by Ukraine-related sanctions
against Russia and the general growth of
tensions in relations with some interna-
tional partners.
The Russian political system
1,6
1,2
0,8
0,4
0
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
0,5
0,4
0,3
0,3
0,1
Russia Development Index
0,4
0,3
0,2
0,1
0
0,1
0,2
0,3
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
0,2
0,1
0,2
0
0,2
5
The majority of experts noted a consider-
able worsening of the Russian investment
climate: 84.8% say the level of Russias
integration in the global economy has
declined, 76% believe that the Russian
market has become more introverted,
over 80% hold that the Russian economy
has lost some of its promise for direct
and portfolio investments, and 82.3%
believe the business climate has dete-
riorated. Last year, the majority believed
that these indicators were at the same
level.
However the negative trend in the econ-
omy is influenced by some domestic
factors, too. As one expert noted: Prom-
ised reforms have not been undertaken,
the state continues to play a large (and
perhaps even growing) role in economic
life, and small business creation has
stagnated or declined. Reliance on high
oil prices and on the cushion provided
by various reserve funds has reduced
the effect of these trends, but many Rus-
sian economists have pointed to the lack
of investment in education, health, and
infrastructure as likely to have a long-
term negative impact on future growth.
In fact, a near majority of respondents
(49.4%) believe that the economy has
become less diversified (although 34.2%
are of the view that nothing has changed).
Meanwhile, 59.5% think that economic
modernization measures have become
less effective, and 57% predict a bleak
future for Russias balance of payments.
The performance of certain economic
sectors is also worrisome. Unlike last
year, none of the sectors has demon-
strated an upward trend in the view of
the experts surveyed.
Given the decline in most indicators,
the positive value for the Russian
human dimension (0,1) provides
some encouragement. The last time it
was positive was in 2010, followed by
negative results in 2011 and 2012 (0.3),
and a value of zero in 2013. At the same
time, many experts noted how regional
variations in Russia complicated their
assessments.
Standard-of-living indicators have large-
ly remained the same. However, opin-
ion is split almost evenly on feeling of
safety/security, with 34.2% claiming a
decline, 27.8% seeing no change, and
34.3% noticing some improvement. No
serious changes have been recorded on
the environment, healthcare and pov-
erty/prosperity.
A considerable number of experts see a
negative trend in education, although the
majority believes that education indica-
tors have remained at the same level.
The Russian economy
1,2
0,8
0,4
0
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
0,1
0,1
0,3
0,8
0
The Russian human dimension
0,6
0,5
0,4
0,3
0,2
0,1
0
0,1
0,2
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
0,1
0,3
0,3
0
0,1
The most progress is evident in ideol-
ogy and politics, as observed in com-
ments by experts who withheld comment
on other areas. The respondents were
almost unanimous in their assessment
of the level of patriotism: 96.2% of those
polled pointed to Russians enhanced
feelings of national pride. According to
the poll, the level of mutual trust and the
level of good will, support to compatriots
and compassion in society have grown,
while the general cultural level remains
unchanged.
At the same time, experts claim that Rus-
sians feel less free and are less tolerant.
Naturally, all these changes are linked to
events in Ukraine. Crimeas reunification
with Russia has contributed significantly
to the resurgence of patriotism. In his
commentary on these developments, one
expert points to dangerous new tenden-
cies: Russia has experienced a surge
of patriotic feelingbut there has been
very little discussion or debate about
the cost of intervention and reconstruc-
tion (if we are speaking about Ukraine),
about how displaced people will be cared
for when their needs will compete with
the needs of the Russian population, or
about the burden that sanctions (includ-
ing the ban on imports of foodstuff)
will impose on the Russian consumer.
The level of tolerance for those express-
ing other opinions whether about the
annexation of Crimea and the invasion
of Ukraine or the growing restrictions on
political expression and the media has
decreased markedly both on official lev-
els and in society.
There were no substantial changes for
Russian science and the countrys
innovative development. The major-
ity of experts see no change in the com-
petitiveness of Russian higher educa-
tion, post-graduate and doctoral pro-
grams (44.3%), the creative potential
of academics/scientists (36.7), the cre-
ative potential of engineers (39.2%),
infrastructure incentives for innovation
(38%), venture investment in R&D proj-
ects (31.6%), the existence of competi-
tive innovation projects (35.4%), and the
extent to which R&D results are applied
in the economy (39.2%).
Experts also believe that the business
community is less willing to engage in
venture investment: 35.4% note a decline,
25.3% see no change, 25.8% see progress,
and 16.5% did not express an opinion.
Like last year, the lowest indicator is
associated with brain drain: 49.4% of
respondents believe that Russia contin-
ues to lose researchers and scientists.
Positive change was observed in state
financing for science: 38.3% note an
improvement in this area, 30.4% believe
Russia in the system of national,
regional and global security
0
0,4
0,8
1,2
1,6
2,0
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
1,0
0
0,1
0,3
0,4
Russian science and the countrys
innovative development
0,12
0,10
0,08
0,06
0,04
0,02
0
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
0,1
0 0
0 0
7
funding has remained at the same level,
and 19% claim that there has been a
decline.
As a result, Russian science remains at
the same level for the fourth time in the
five-year history of the poll. Experts cited
the traditionally high level of Russian
science and the governments efforts to
modernize scientific infrastructure. But
they also warned of dangers inherent in
the politicization of science and pointed
to the more attractive conditions available
to scientists abroad. Both these factors, in
their view, contribute to brain drain.
The module on Russia in the system
of national, regional and global
security has demonstrated consistently
positive results (0.4), not once venturing
into negative territory in five years.
It is noteworthy that, despite the direct
bearing of the Ukraine crisis on Rus-
sias external security, experts focused on
other factors in this section, such as Rus-
sias stance on developments in Syria, the
growing threat posed by Afghanistan as
Western forces begin to withdraw, and
the continuing modernization of the Rus-
sian Armed Forces.
Despite the overall positive dynamics of
the military indicator, experts cited a
considerable deterioration in a number
of parameters resulting from the Ukraine
crisis. These include external border
security (59.5%), Russia as a potential
threat to peace (45.6%), Russia as a guar-
antor of international security (52%),
and military cooperation with foreign
countries (62%).
An overwhelming majority of respon-
dents note positive changes in such
parameters as the level to which the
Russian Armed Forces are equipped with
modern weapons (89.9%), the level of
advanced military R&D projects (69.6%),
professional qualities of officers and
commanders (70.9%), professional qual-
ities of Russian soldiers (67.1%), the abil-
ity to quickly respond to a threat from
abroad (78.5%), the ability to respond
to a threat which arises within Russia
(51.9%), the ability to conduct operations
outside Russia (83.5%), and the ability to
combat a terror threat (82.3%).
An all-time low was recorded on the issue
of Russian diplomatic activity, with
this years indicator standing at 0.5.
At the same time, many experts observe
that trends are moving in opposite direc-
tions in the Western and non-Western
worlds. While there are serious tensions
in Russias relations with the EU and the
USA, and Russias influence on decision-
making in Western organizations has
sunk to a critical level, Moscows coop-
eration with the rest of the world has
only intensified.
Roughly equal numbers of respondents
see Russias international influence as
declining (45.6%) and growing (49.4%),
which is also true for Russias mediation
efforts to resolve international conflicts
(46.8% vs. 43.1%).
Many experts note that the Ukraine crisis
has overshadowed positive Russian ini-
tiatives, such as its role in nuclear nego-
tiations with Iran and its efforts to settle
the crisis in Syria, as well as its assis-
tance during the withdrawal of Western
forces from Afghanistan. Western media,
which dominates global media, not only
demonizes Russia in the West, it influ-
Russian diplomatic activity
0
0,2
0,4
0,6
0,8
1,0
1,2
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
0,8
0,2
0,1
0,2
0,5
ences mass perceptions in other regions,
Asia included. It is not surprising, there-
fore, that the majority of respondents
see a marked decline in the perception
of Russia abroad (75.8%) and in Russias
diplomatic initiatives indicator (48.2%).
Given the suspension of Russias G8
membership in March 2014, its entirely
logical that the overwhelming majority
of respondents (93.7%) believe its role in
that organization had diminished. Rising
tensions in relations with the West have
also impacted Russias cooperation with
the G20, OECD, OSCE and the Council
of Europe, as noted by 59.4%, 62%, 62%
and 86% of respondents, respectively.
The situation in the CIS, of which Ukraine
was a member before March 2014, is only
slightly better: 40.5% of respondents
point to a decline, 26.6% see no change,
and 31.6% believe it has improved. About
half of respondents (48.1%) assess Rus-
sias UN involvement as unchanged, 33%
as diminished and 19.1% as increased.
The majority of respondents rate
as unchanged or expanded Moscows
involvement in the SCO (44.3% and
49.4%), APEC (45.6% and 34.2%) and
CSTO (49.4% and 29.2%).
We should once again note, as the experts
themselves did, that there are significant
regional variations in Russian foreign
policy, and therefore the general indica-
tor is not fully reflective of the reality.
Its negative value is due to the fact that
Russias relations with the West are in
decline, while the Western communitys
international role is still considerable.
But there are other countries with which
Russia continues to deepen cooperation.
Like its international engagement,
Russias openness to the world has
declined in the index, dropping to 0.5
after a slight uptick last year.
While the majority of respondents
declined to comment on this point, the
few who did mentioned the direct and
indirect influence of the sanctions against
Russia and the Ukraine crisis as a whole.
As one respondent explained, Attitudes
towards foreigners are influenced by
statements from the center and what is
shown in the media, and what has been
said or shown in past months is almost
entirely negativeThe attitude towards
Russian citizens abroad has not been
affected, since most people understand
that Russian policies, with which there
may be disagreement, are not decided
by tourists or students, and, in general,
the same is also true about Americans/
Europeans traveling in Russia.
According to 45.5% of respondents, there
are fewer Russians traveling abroad. At
Russias openness to the world
0,3
0,2
0,1
0
0,1
0,2
0,3
0,4
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
0,2
0,1
0,1
0,1
0,5
Soft Power
0,6
0,5
0,4
0,3
0,2
0,1
0 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
0
0,2
0,2
0,1
0,2
9

the same time, 46.8% of experts believe
that the inflow of foreigners to Russia
has remained unchanged. Many (53.2%)
believe that Russian attitudes toward
foreigners have become more negative,
as have foreign perceptions of Russian
citizens (82.3%).
The vast majority of experts (82.3% com-
pared to 65.4% in the last poll) say that
Russia is regarded as a progressively less
open country. Many (46.8%) also believe
that the accessibility of information on
Russia to foreign citizens has declined,
but 25.3% are certain that it is the same
or even higher.
Influenced by international tensions and
the Ukraine crisis, the soft power mod-
ule stands at 0.2 in 2014 (down from
0.1 last year). The 2014 Olympic Games
in Sochi, meant to improve Russias
image in the world, were quickly over-
shadowed by subsequent international
events.
While the majority of indicators in this
module remain at the same level, 67.1%
of experts say that the appeal of Russias
cultural and civilizational models has
been tarnished, and 62% of respondents
say the same of Russias appeal as a place
of permanent residence.
Understandably, the national idea
parameter has grown considerably (62%),
and yet the experts warn about potential
pitfalls. One said that the development
of Russias National Idea seems to have
become more and more an expression of
Russian Exceptionalism a development
which is quite ironic given the nega-
tive attitudes expressed about American
Exceptionalism, and which is also mak-
ing neighboring countries more nervous
about Russias intentions.
CONCLUSION
Although last year was certainly exceptional due to the dramatic surge in international
tensions and Russias involvement in the Ukraine crisis, the indicators for the eight
main Russia development parameters are, on the whole, consistent with the trend of
previous years.
There is a continuing economic decline that to some extent has been exacerbated by
EU and US sanctions against Russia, Moscows response measures, and the long-term
concerns this has stoked. But experts also pointed to some internal factors, such as
corruption, lack of support for small businesses, excessive government regulation,
overreliance on extractive industries, etc. Stagnation in the scientific sphere does not
inspire optimism either.
Despite a slight improvement in living standards, the lack of economic growth over the
long term is likely to affect indicators in this area as well. If this trend is not reversed,
Russias international position is likely to decline. Russia must back up its political
tools and military might (as confirmed by the poll results) with meaningful economic
success.
The experts believe that the key to change lies with the Kremlin. The presidents great-
er influence and unprecedented level of public trust make him the one figure capable
of making the necessary course correction.
11

Inuence within the
political system
Efciency of policy
development and implementation
Public trust
No change
% % %
1,3
0,0
5,1
6,3
7,6
38,0
40,5
1,3
5,1
6,3
10,1
22,8
21,5
22,8
7,6
3,8
2,5
0,0
2,5
2,5
16,5
31,6
43,0
1,3
1.1. | 01
Very substantial deterioration
Substantial deterioration
Slight deterioration
Slight improvement
Substantial improvement
Very substantial improvement
Dont know/ Cant assess
1.1. The President
1.2.1. | 02
% % %
5,1
19,0
20,3
30,4
13,9
7,6
0,0
3,8
5,1
19,0
17,7
35,4
13,9
5,1
1,3
2,5
6,3
8,9
13,9
38,0
22,8
5,1
2,5
2,5
Slight improvement
No change
Inuence within the
political system
Efciency of policy
Public trust
1.2. The executive branch
1.2.1. The Prime Minister
1. The Russian political system
1.2.2. | 03
% % %
1,3
11,4
15,2
45,6
15,2
6,3
2,5
2,5
3,8
15,2
15,2
43,0
10,1
6,3
3,8
2,5
3,8
6,3
15,2
40,5
16,5
8,9
5,1
3,8
Slight improvement
No change
Inuence within the
political system
Efciency of policy
Public trust
1.2.2. The Russian Government
1.2.2. ( ,
, ) | 04
% % %
1,3
2,5
22,8
38,0
17,7
1,3
0,0
16,5
1,3
6,3
21,5
40,5
10,1
2,5
0,0
17,7
1,3
2,5
16,5
41,8
20,3
1,3
0,0
16,5
Slight improvement
No change
Inuence within the
political system
Efciency of policy
Public trust
1.2.3. The regional executive branch (Plenipotentiary Representatives,
Governors, Mayors)
1.3.1. | 05
% % %
6,3
11,4
15,2
40,5
19,0
2,5
1,3
3,8
8,9
16,5
16,5
40,5
8,9
1,3
1,3
6,3
7,6
8,9
20,3
39,2
13,9
2,5
1,3
6,3
Slight improvement
No change
Inuence within the
political system
Efciency of policy
Public trust
1.3. The legislative branch
1.3.1. The State Duma
13

1.3.1. | 06
% % %
3,8
8,9
12,7
49,4
13,9
3,8
1,3
6,3
6,3
8,9
8,9
58,2
6,3
2,5
1,3
7,6
5,1
6,3
11,4
54,4
11,4
3,8
1,3
6,3
Slight improvement
No change
Inuence within the
political system
Efciency of policy
Public trust
1.3.2. The Federation Council
1.4.1. , | 07
% % %
1,3
5,1
16,5
51,9
11,4
2,5
0,0
11,4
1,3
10,1
15,2
49,4
8,9
2,5
0,0
12,7
1,3
7,6
15,2
46,8
13,9
2,5
0,0
12,7
Slight improvement
No change
Inuence within the
political system
Efciency of policy
Public trust
1.4. The judicial system
1.4.1. The courts of general jurisdiction, the Supreme Court
% % %
1,3
3,8
11,4
59,5
5,1
1,3
0,0
17,7
1,3
3,8
8,9
59,5
6,3
2,5
0,0
17,7
0,0
2,5
8,9
62,0
6,3
1,3
0,0
19,0
1.4.2. | 08
Slight improvement
No change
Inuence within the
political system
Efciency of policy
Public trust
1.4.2. The Constitutional Court
% % %
10,1
7,6
3,8
39,2
11,4
1,3
0,0
26,6
7,6
5,1
3,8
49,4
6,3
1,3
0,0
26,6
7,6
5,1
3,8
49,4
6,3
1,3
0,0
26,6
1.4.3. , | 09
Slight improvement
No change
Inuence within the
political system
Efciency of policy
Public trust
1.4.3. Arbitration tribunals, the Supreme Arbitration Court
% % %
6,3
10,1
25,3
27,8
22,8
7,6
0,0
0,0
7,6
11,4
27,8
35,4
8,9
7,6
0,0
1,3
7,6
10,1
25,3
26,6
22,8
6,3
0,0
1,3
1.5.1. | 10
Slight improvement
No change
Inuence within the
political system
Efciency of policy
Public trust
1.5. Political parties and the political system
1.5.1. The ruling party
% % %
8,9
16,5
24,1
36,7
11,4
1,3
1,3
0,0
11,4
12,7
29,1
40,5
5,1
1,3
0,0
0,0
10,1
10,1
24,1
45,6
5,1
2,5
0,0
2,5
1.5.2. | 11
Slight improvement
No change
Inuence within the
political system
Efciency of policy
Public trust
1.5.2. Parliamentary opposition
15

% % %
15,2
29,1
22,8
22,8
2,5
0,0
1,3
6,3
13,9
30,4
15,2
30,4
1,3
1,3
1,3
6,3
11,4
31,6
21,5
25,3
2,5
1,3
0,0
6,3
1.5.3. | 12
Slight improvement
No change
Inuence within the
political system
Efciency of policy
Public trust
1.5.3. Extra-parliamentary opposition
% % %
8,9
16,5
29,1
29,1
13,9
1,3
1,3
0,0
15,2
19,0
30,4
20,3
12,7
1,3
1,3
0,0
10,1
8,9
26,6
35,4
16,5
1,3
1,3
0,0
1.6.1. | 13
Slight improvement
No change
Inuence within the
political system
Efciency of policy
Public trust
1.6. The role of civil society
1.6.1. Civil society development level
% % %
2,5
5,1
25,3
41,8
16,5
5,1
1,3
2,5
5,1
11,4
24,1
36,7
12,7
5,1
1,3
3,8
0,0
1,3
13,9
54,4
16,5
6,3
3,8
3,8
1.6.2. | 14
Slight improvement
No change
Inuence within the
political system
Efciency of policy
Public trust
1.6.2. The electoral process
% % %
5,1
34,2
26,6
20,3
10,1
2,5
0,0
1,3
3,8
19,0
30,4
30,4
13,9
0,0
1,3
1,3
8,9
16,5
20,3
36,7
15,2
0,0
0,0
2,5
1.6.3. | 15
Slight improvement
No change
Inuence within the
political system
Efciency of policy
Public trust
1.6.3. The role of non-governmental organizations
% % %
0,0
10,1
19,0
40,5
15,2
2,5
0,0
12,7
1,3
12,7
12,7
48,1
10,1
2,5
0,0
12,7
3,8
8,9
17,7
45,6
10,1
0,0
1,3
12,7
1.6.3. | 16
Slight improvement
No change
Inuence within the
political system
Efciency of policy
Public trust
1.6.4. The role of the Russian Public Chamber

17

%
5,1
20,3
59,5
3,8
2,5
5,1
0,0
3,8
2.1. ( , ,
, ) | 17 ( + 1 )
Macroeconomic
parameters
Slight improvement
No change
2.1. Macroeconomic parameters
(GDP trends, external debts, the trade balance and inflation)
% % %
0,0
6,3
40,5
25,3
11,4
3,8
1,3
11,4
2,5
15,2
26,6
26,6
12,7
5,1
1,3
10,1
2,5
13,9
40,5
15,2
12,7
5,1
1,3
8,9
2.2. | 18 (4 )
Financial services Innovation industries Producing and
Processing industries
Extraction industries
%
1,3
2,5
32,9
35,4
12,7
5,1
1,3
8,9
2.2. Development of economic sectors
2. The Russian economy
% % %
1,3
8,9
39,2
34,2
8,9
2,5
1,3
3,8
2,5
16,5
40,5
24,1
6,3
3,8
1,3
5,1
2,5
8,9
45,6
22,8
3,8
5,1
1,3
10,1
2.3. | 19
Level of diversication
of the economy
The efciency of measures
taken to modernize the economy
Russias balance of
payments forecast
Slight improvement
No change
2.3. Economic modernization
Level of Russias integration
in the global economy
The Russian markets
openness
Investment attractiveness
(direct investment)
% % %
15,2
35,4
34,2
7,6
3,8
1,3
0,0
2,5
11,4
30,4
34,2
11,4
7,6
2,5
0,0
2,5
24,1
36,7
24,1
0,0
5,1
3,8
0,0
6,3
2.4. | 20
Slight improvement
No change
2.4. The Russian investment climate
Investment attractiveness
(portfolio investment)
Tax legislation
development level
Business climate
% % %
20,3
38,0
24,1
3,8
2,5
5,1
0,0
6,3
1,3
10,1
21,5
43,0
12,7
2,5
0,0
8,9
12,7
32,9
36,7
6,3
5,1
3,8
0,0
2,5
2.4. | 21
Slight improvement
No change
19

Environment Public health Feeling of safety/security
% % %
0,0
1,3
11,4
62,0
15,2
3,8
0,0
6,3
0,0
2,5
16,5
41,8
29,1
2,5
0,0
7,6
3,8
11,4
19,0
27,8
20,3
12,7
1,3
3,8
3.1. | 22
Slight improvement
No change
3.1. Living standards
Poverty level Prosperity level
% %
1,3
2,5
21,5
43,0
25,3
1,3
0,0
5,1
0,0
3,8
20,3
46,8
19,0
3,8
1,3
5,1
3.1. | 23 ( + 2 )
Slight improvement
No change
3. The Russian human dimension
General education standards Professional/vocational
education standards
% %
2,5
1,3
25,3
44,3
13,9
6,3
0,0
6,3
2,5
2,5
19,0
44,3
17,7
6,3
0,0
7,6
3.2. | 24 ( + 2 )
Slight improvement
No change
3.2. Education standards
Level of national pride,
patriotism
Sense of freedom Level of mutual trust
% % %
0,0
0,0
0,0
1,3
11,4
55,7
29,1
2,5
1,3
10,1
38,0
26,6
12,7
7,6
1,3
2,5
0,0
8,9
20,3
35,4
19,0
12,7
1,3
2,5
3.3. | 25
Slight improvement
No change
3.3. Ideology and politics
% % %
0,0
3,8
2,5
22,8
41,8
20,3
7,6
1,3
8,9
17,7
25,3
27,8
16,5
1,3
1,3
1,3
0,0
5,1
10,1
65,8
8,9
6,3
1,3
2,5
3.3. | 26
Level of good will, support
to compatriots, compassion
Tolerance level Cultural level of
the population
Slight improvement
No change
21

% % %
0,0
3,8
16,5
44,3
24,1
3,8
0,0
7,6
0,0
2,5
20,3
36,7
22,8
7,6
0,0
10,1
0,0
1,3
12,7
39,2
12,7
8,9
0,0
25,3
4. | 27
Competitiveness of Russian
higher education, post-graduate
and doctorate courses
The creative potential
of academics/scientists
The creative potential
of engineers
Slight improvement
No change
% % %
0,0
1,3
24,1
32,9
21,5
3,8
1,3
15,2
0,0
0,0
16,5
38,0
12,7
7,6
1,3
24,1
0,0
7,6
27,8
25,3
17,7
5,1
0,0
16,5
4. | 28
Infrastructure incentives
for innovation
Tax incentives
for innovation
The business communitys
willingness to be involved
in venture investment
Slight improvement
No change
4. Russian science and the
countrys innovative
development
% % %
0,0
10,1
21,5
31,6
11,4
5,1
1,3
19,0
5,1
10,1
34,2
26,6
11,4
5,1
1,3
6,3
0,0
5,1
13,9
30,4
30,4
6,3
1,3
12,7
4, 2 | 29
Venture investment
in R&D projects
The brain drain The level of state
nancing for science
Slight improvement
No change
% %
0,0
3,8
24,1
35,4
12,7
6,3
1,3
16,5
0,0
3,8
19,0
39,2
11,4
3,8
1,3
21,5
30 ( + 2 )
The existence of competitive
innovation projects
The extent to which R&D results are applied
in the economy/mechanisms governing the
commercialization of scientic innovations
Slight improvement
No change
23

% % %
10,1
16,5
32,9
16,5
11,4
8,9
1,3
2,5
0,0
0,0
1,3
7,6
64,6
21,5
3,8
1,3
0,0
0,0
1,3
12,7
54,4
8,9
6,3
16,5
5. ,
| 31
External border security Level to which the Russian
Armed Forces is equipped
with modern weapons
Level of advanced
military R&D projects
Slight improvement
No change
% % %
0,0
0,0
1,3
10,1
55,7
11,4
3,8
17,7
0,0
0,0
1,3
13,9
50,6
12,7
3,8
17,7
0,0
0,0
0,0
8,9
46,8
19,0
12,7
12,7
5. ,
| 32
Professional qualities of
ofcers and commanders
Professional qualities
of Russian soldiers
Ability to quickly respond
to a threat from abroad
Slight improvement
No change
5. Russia in the system of
national, regional and
global security
% % %
0,0
0,0
1,3
34,2
29,1
16,5
6,3
12,7
0,0
0,0
0,0
8,9
41,8
27,8
13,9
7,6
0,0
0,0
2,5
34,2
38,0
10,1
5,1
10,1
: 5, 2 | 33
Ability to respond to a threat
which arises within Russia
Ability to conduct
operations outside Russia
Ability to combat
the terror threat
Slight improvement
No change
: 5, 2 | 34 (4 )
% % %
13,9
12,7
19,0
26,6
6,3
6,3
6,3
8,9
16,5
15,2
20,3
19,0
12,7
6,3
5,1
5,1
13,9
31,6
16,5
16,5
11,4
5,1
2,5
2,5
Military cooperation
with foreign countries
and organizations
Russia as a guarantor of
international security, including
peacekeeping missions
Russia as a potential
threat to peace
Ability to conduct
a global war
%
0,0
1,3
8,9
38,0
22,8
10,1
3,8
15,2
25

6. Russian diplomatic activity on
the international scene
% % %
8,9
21,5
15,2
5,1
17,7
22,8
8,9
0,0
11,4
21,5
13,9
10,1
24,1
7,6
11,4
0,0
2,5
10,1
17,7
30,4
17,7
12,7
6,3
2,5
6.1. | 35
Russias international inuence Mediation work to resolve
international conicts
Involvement in
international aid efforts
Slight improvement
No change
6.1. General assessment of the Russian foreign policy
% %
36,7
26,6
16,5
3,8
7,6
3,8
5,1
0,0
8,9
16,5
22,8
12,7
17,7
12,7
7,6
1,3
6.1. | 36
Perception of Russia
abroad
Russias diplomatic
initiatives
Slight improvement
No change
% % %
68,4
17,7
7,6
3,8
1,3
0,0
1,3
0,0
6,3
25,3
27,8
26,6
7,6
1,3
3,8
1,3
17,7
17,7
26,6
29,1
2,5
2,5
2,5
1,3
6.2. | 37
Participation in the G8 Participation in the G20 The Organization for
Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD)
Slight improvement
No change
6.2.
% % %
0,0
0,0
5,1
44,3
34,2
3,8
11,4
1,3
0,0
1,3
13,9
45,6
25,3
1,3
7,6
5,1
2,5
19,0
19,0
26,6
17,7
3,8
10,1
1,3
6.2. | 38
The Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO)
The Asia-Pacic Economic
Cooperation (APEC)
The Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS)
Slight improvement
No change
6.2. | 39
% % %
15,2
13,9
32,9
17,7
12,7
2,5
3,8
1,3
2,5
6,3
10,1
49,4
16,5
5,1
7,6
2,5
29,1
31,6
25,3
8,9
0,0
2,5
2,5
0,0
The Council of Europe The Collective Security
Treaty Organization (CSTO)
Participation in Organization
for Security and Cooperation
in Europe (OSCE) activities
Participation in UN activities
%
1,3
8,9
22,8
48,1
12,7
1,3
5,1
0,0
27

7. Russias openness to the world
% % %
2,5
10,1
32,9
35,4
10,1
3,8
3,8
1,3
0,0
1,3
25,3
46,8
16,5
3,8
2,5
3,8
3,8
12,7
36,7
26,6
11,4
5,1
1,3
2,5
7. | 40
Degree to which Russian
citizens are free to travel
internationally
Degree to which foreign
citizens are free to travel
within Russia
The Russian populations
attitude toward foreign
citizens
Slight improvement
No change
% % %
8,9
21,5
43,0
13,9
6,3
5,1
1,3
0,0
15,2
38,0
29,1
6,3
8,9
1,3
1,3
0,0
7,6
13,9
25,3
25,3
19,0
5,1
1,3
2,5
7. | 41
Foreign perception
of Russian citizens
Foreign perception of Russia
as an open country
Accessibility of information
on Russia to foreign citizens
Slight improvement
No change
% %
2,5
6,3
27,8
35,4
13,9
1,3
1,3
11,4
2,5
3,8
21,5
38,0
11,4
1,3
1,3
20,3
7, 2 / 42 ( + 2 )
Openness and accessibility of
representatives of federal government
bodies to foreign citizens
Openness and accessibility of
representatives of regional government
bodies to foreign citizens
Slight improvement
No change
29

8. Soft power
% % %
12,7
29,1
25,3
15,2
8,9
6,3
2,5
0,0
1,3
11,4
8,9
24,1
29,1
20,3
3,8
1,3
2,5
2,5
11,4
15,2
26,6
27,8
7,6
6,3
8. | 43
The attractiveness of
Russias cultural and
civilizational models
The extent to which
Russias political values are
reected in its foreign policy
The national idea
(values that predominate
nationwide)
Slight improvement
No change
8. | 44 (4 )
% % %
2,5
8,9
24,1
46,8
16,5
0,0
1,3
0,0
11,4
19,0
31,6
22,8
11,4
0,0
1,3
2,5
0,0
10,1
29,1
44,3
8,9
0,0
1,3
6,3
Foreign perception
of Russian emigrants
Russias attractiveness
as a place of permanent
residence
The global popularity
of Russian culture
The global role of the
Russian language
%
1,3
2,5
20,3
50,6
21,5
1,3
1,3
1,3
Description and methodology
In August of each year, the Valdai International Discussion Club polls experts on Russia,
with the results forming the basis of the Russia Development Index (also known as the
Valdai Index). The index reflects Russias development dynamics relative to the preced-
ing year, with values varying from -3 to +3, where -3 represents serious deterioration,
+3 means considerable improvement, and zero shows no change.
The general index is calculated on the basis of eight modules: the Russian Political System,
the Russian Economy, the Russian Human Dimension, Russian Science and the Countrys
Innovative Development, Russia in the System of National, Regional and Global Security,
Russian Diplomatic Activity on the International Scene, Russias Openness to the World,
and Soft Power. Each module includes sets of parameters on which experts are asked to
assess Russias progress. For example, the economic module contains Macroeconomic
Parameters, Development of Economic Sectors, Economic Modernization, and the Russian
Investment Climate. Each of these may also include a number of sub-categories.
The large number of evaluation criteria provides more accurate results, as divergent
trends can be observed within a single set, e.g. rapid progress in one area and stagnation
in another.
The focus group for the 2013/2014 Index included 359 participants of the Valdai Interna-
tional Discussion Clubs conferences held in different years. The poll involved 79 respon-
dents from 23 countries: Austria, Armenia, Brazil, Hungary, the UK, Germany, India, Italy,
Iraq, Iran, China, Mexico, Norway, Poland, the Republic of Korea, Russia, Slovakia, the
USA, Ukraine, Finland, France, Switzerland, and Japan. The share of foreign respondents
was 67%.

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