PERALTA 2014 CASE DOCTRINES - CIVIL LAW

Elizabeth Del Carmen vs. Spouses Restituto Sabordo And Mima Mahilum-
Sabordo

Consignation [is] the act of depositing the thing due with the court or
judicial authorities whenever the creditor cannot accept or refuses to accept
payment, and it generally requires a prior tender of payment. It should be
distinguished from tender of payment which is the manifestation by the
debtor to the creditor of his desire to comply with his obligation, with the offer
of immediate performance.

Tender is the antecedent of consignation, that is, an act preparatory to the
consignation, which is the principal, and from which are derived the immediate
consequences which the debtor desires or seeks to obtain. Tender of payment may
be extrajudicial, while consignation is necessarily judicial, and the priority of the
first is the attempt to make a private settlement before proceeding to the
solemnities of consignation. Tender and consignation, where validly made,
produces the effect of payment and extinguishes the obligation.

Under Article 1256, the only instances where prior tender of payment is
excused are: (1) when the creditor is absent or unknown, or does not appear at the
place of payment; (2) when the creditor is incapacitated to receive the payment at
the time it is due; (3) when, without just cause, the creditor refuses to give a
receipt; (4) when two or more persons claim the same right to collect; and (5) when
the title of the obligation has been lost. None of these instances are present in the
instant case. Hence, the fact that the subject lots are in danger of being foreclosed
does not excuse petitioner and her co-heirs from tendering payment to respondents,
as directed by the court.

Leonardo C. Castillo vs. Security Bank Corporation

The following are the legal requisites for a mortgage to be valid:

(1) It must be constituted to secure the fulfillment of a principal obligation;

(2) The mortgagor must be the absolute owner of the thing mortgaged;

(3) The persons constituting the mortgage must have the free disposal of their
property, and in the absence thereof, they should be legally authorized for the
purpose.

***
It is a settled rule that allegations of forgery, like all other allegations, must
be proved by clear, positive, and convincing evidence by the party alleging it. It
should not be presumed, but must be established by comparing the alleged forged
signature with the genuine signatures.

***
Defective notarization will simply strip the document of its public character
and reduce it to a private instrument, but nonetheless, binding, provided its validity
is established by preponderance of evidence. Article 1358 of the Civil Code
requires that the form of a contract that transmits or extinguishes real rights over
immovable property should be in a public document, yet the failure to observe the
proper form does not render the transaction invalid.

The necessity of a public
document for said contracts is only for convenience; it is not essential for validity
or enforceability. Even a sale of real property, though not contained in a public
instrument or formal writing, is nevertheless valid and binding, for even a verbal
contract of sale or real estate produces legal effects between the parties.
Consequently, when there is a defect in the notarization of a document, the clear
and convincing evidentiary standard originally attached to a duly-notarized
document is dispensed with, and the measure to test the validity of such document
is preponderance of evidence.

Juanito M. Gopiao vs. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co.

Jurisprudence is replete with rulings that apply the double sales rule to cases
where one of the two sales was conducted in a public auction.

In fact, in Express credit Financing Corporation v. Spouses Velasco, we
applied the rule on double sales in determining the party who has preferential right
over the disputed property in question. In said case, the subject property was sold
first, to respondent spouses by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale and, second, to
petitioner corporation in a foreclosure sale of a real estate mortgage.

Spouses Florentino T. Mallari And Aurea V. Mallari vs. Prudential Bank

The Court finds that the 24% per annum interest rate, provided for in the
subject mortgage contracts for a loan of P225,000.00, may not be considered
unconscionable. Moreover, considering that the mortgage agreement was freely
entered into by both parties, the same is the law between them and they are bound
to comply with the provisions contained therein.

Clearly, jurisprudence establish that the 24% p.a. stipulated interest rate was
not considered unconscionable, thus, the 23% p.a. interest rate imposed on
petitioners' loan in this case can by no means be considered excessive or
unconscionable.

***
The 1% surcharge on the principal loan for every month of default is valid.
This surcharge or penalty stipulated in a loan agreement in case of default partakes
of the nature of liquidated damages under Art. 2227 of the New Civil Code, and is
separate and distinct from interest payment. Also referred to as a penalty clause, it
is expressly recognized by law. It is an accessory undertaking to assume greater
liability on the part of an obligor in case of breach of an obligation. The obligor
would then be bound to pay the stipulated amount of indemnity without the
necessity of proof on the existence and on the measure of damages caused by the
breach.

Spouses Deo Agner And Maricon Agner vs. Bpi Family Savings Bank, Inc.

The Civil Code in Article 1169 provides that one incurs in delay or is in
default from the time the obligor demands the fulfillment of the obligation from the
obligee. However, the law expressly provides that demand is not necessary under
certain circumstances, and one of these circumstances is when the parties expressly
waive demand. Hence, since the co-signors expressly waived demand in the
promissory notes, demand was unnecessary for them to be in default.

Further, the Court even ruled in Navarro v. Escobido
[15]
that prior demand is
not a condition precedent to an action for a writ of replevin, since there is nothing
in Section 2, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court that requires the applicant to make a
demand on the possessor of the property before an action for a writ of replevin
could be filed.

Skunac Corporation vs. Roberto S. Sylianteng And Caesar S. Sylianteng

The provision on double sale has no application in cases where the sales involved
were initiated not by just one but two vendors

Rodolfo V. Francisco vs. Emiliana M. Rojas

The decree of registration shall bind the land and quiet title thereto, subject
only to such exceptions or liens as may be provided by law. It shall be conclusive
upon and against all persons, including the National Government and all branches
thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application or notice, the same being
included in the general description "To all whom it may concern".

By express provision of Section 47 of P.D 1529, no title to registered land
in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or
adverse possession. To declare that the decree and its derivative titles is valid but
only with respect to the extent of the area described in the decree not possessed by
occupants with indefeasible registered titles or to possessors with such lengths of
possession which had ripened to ownership is to undermine the people's faith in the
torrens titles being conclusive as to all matters contained therein. The certificate
serves as evidence of an indefeasible title to the property in favor of the person
whose names appear therein. After the expiration of the one year period from the
issuance of the decree of registration upon which it is based, it becomes
incontrovertible, unless subsequent to the issuance of the decree a third party may
be able to show that he acquired title thereto by any of the means recognized by
law.

Iglesia Filipina Independiente vs. Heirs Of Bernardino Taeza

The Court finds it erroneous for the CA to ignore the fact that the laymen's
committee objected to the sale of the lot in question. The Canons require that ALL
the church entities listed in Article IV (a) thereof should give its approval to the
transaction. Thus, when the Supreme Bishop executed the contract of sale of
petitioner's lot despite the opposition made by the laymen's committee, he acted
beyond his powers.

This case clearly falls under the category of unenforceable contracts
mentioned in Article 1403, paragraph (1) of the Civil Code, which provides, thus:

Art. 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless
they are ratified:

(1) Those entered into in the name of another person by one
who has been given no authority or legal representation, or who has
acted beyond his powers;

In the present case, however, respondents' predecessor-in-interest, Bernardino
Taeza, had already obtained a transfer certificate of title in his name over the
property in question. Since the person supposedly transferring ownership was not
authorized to do so, the property had evidently been acquired by mistake. In Vda.
de Esconde v. Court of Appeals,
[18]
the Court affirmed the trial court's ruling that
the applicable provision of law in such cases is Article 1456 of the Civil Code
which states that [i]f property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person
obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the
benefit of the person from whom the property comes.

A constructive trust having been constituted by law between respondents as
trustees and petitioner as beneficiary of the subject property, may respondents
acquire ownership over the said property? Unlike in express trusts and resulting
implied trusts where a trustee cannot acquire by prescription any property entrusted
to him unless he repudiates the trust, in constructive implied trusts, the trustee
may acquire the property through prescription even if he does not repudiate
the relationship. It is then incumbent upon the beneficiary to bring an action for
reconveyance before prescription bars the same.

An action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust
must perforce prescribe in ten years and not otherwise. It is now well-settled
that an action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust prescribes
in ten years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the property.

It has also been ruled that the ten-year prescriptive period begins to run
from the date of registration of the deed or the date of the issuance of the
certificate of title over the property.