1

Human Rights in Danish Development Aid 1975-2010

Kristine Midtgaard

Introduction
Human rights, democracy and good governance have played a central role in the policies of donors
in development cooperation since the late 1980s and in particular in the 1990s. Whereas economic
conditionality already formed part of the development approach of major international financial
institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank of
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD or World Bank) in the 1980s, political conditionality in
development cooperation only arrived in the 1990s.
1

This chapter will show that the international tendency in the 1990s to impose political
conditionality may be traced back to the 1970s when human rights were discussed in connection
with development in both the IBRD and in the European Community (EC) such as in the
negotiations leading to the renewal of the Lom Convention with the African, Caribbean and
Pacific (ACP) countries.
2
The discussions of human rights and aid in the IBRD followed closely
upon the legislation introduced by the Carter administration and passed by the US Congress in
October 1977 that made respect for human rights a prerequisite for American aid through the
international financial institutions.
3
The so-called like-minded states, i.e. Canada, the United
Kingdom (UK), the Netherlands, Sweden, Norway and Denmark adopted policies in the mid to late
1980s which made aid conditional upon respect for human rights.
4

Denmark was the last of the like-minded states to join when parliament in May 1987 voted to
make human rights part of Danish development aid.
5
Existing research has already identified
Denmark as a late-comer in this respect.
6
However, the topic of human rights in Danish
development aid has not been the subject of an in-depth historical study on its own. It has been dealt


2
with by development researchers in legal studies in particular, and by political scientists who have
focused on the implementation of human rights in development aid in the form of democratization
from the 1990s onwards.
7

Central to this chapter is to analyze Denmarks policy on human rights in development aid
from the mid-1970s until 2010. The following key questions are posed: what was the nature of
integration of human rights into Danish development aid? Were Danish policy makers equally
concerned with civil rights, political rights and socio-economic rights? How did Danish decision-
makers conceive of aid as a lever of human rights? What was the Danish perception of
conditionality? And finally, why was Denmark a relative laggard among the like-minded states?
The chapter consists of two main parts and may be seen as a hybrid between a chronological
and an institutional approach. The first part deals with the Cold War period. This part analyses
Denmarks policy on human rights in development aid in four international institutions: the United
Nations (UN), the World Bank, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD)'s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and the European Community (EC). It also
includes a short analysis of the 1987 parliamentary decision to integrate human rights principles in
the development policy and the subsequent development aid strategy paper published by the Danish
aid agency, Danida, in January 1988. The first part of the chapter is primarily based on material in
the archive of the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. For the second and shorter part of the
chapter, archival materials are still classified and thus not available for researchers. Consequently,
in this section I mainly discuss human rights strategies. The analysis of the development aid
strategies of the last two decades will be followed by a section on the status of human rights in
Danish development aid and the status of development aid in Denmarks foreign policy which is
seen as an interdependent relationship with a central explanatory value.



3
Human Rights, Democracy and Approaches to Linking Human Rights to Development Aid
As human rights are a minefield of competing, conflicting and overlapping concerns, we need an
initial classification of the issues. Firstly, human rights are commonly defined in terms of three
categories (or generations) of rights: political-civil rights, socio-economic rights and the right to
development. The two first categories are commonly understood as individual rights. The right to
development was promoted by Third World countries as a collective right.
8
The chapter focuses on
the categories of rights that Danish decisions-makers considered central when shaping the policy on
human rights and development aid.
Secondly, it is useful to distinguish between human rights on the one hand and democracy as
one aspect or part of the political rights category on the other hand. In donor policy guidelines after
1990 human rights, democracy and good governance are often treated as one package. Furthermore,
the concepts are both controversial and hard to define and hence rarely operationalized.
9
While
liberal democracy and human rights (in particular the first generation of rights) appear clearly
related, Danish decision-makers, particularly (as we will see) during the Cold War, explicitly sought
to focus considerations of human rights in aid policy on democratization as one particular aspect of
human rights. They did not, however, clarify the conceptual content of democracy and human
rights.
Hence, for analytical purposes it is necessary to retain a distinction between human rights and
democracy. The Indian-American journalist and author, Fareed Zakaria, makes a number of
propositions that are most useful. His starting point is that democratically elected regimes around
the world increasingly ignore the constitutional limits of their power and deprive their citizens of
basic rights and freedoms. This has not been sufficiently recognized due to a focus on elections
rather than post-election processes. According to Zakaria, this perspective stems from the fact that
in the West democracy has been understood as liberal democracy, i.e. a political system marked by


4
free and fair elections, the rule of law, a separation of powers and the protection of basic liberties of
speech, assembly, religion, and property. However, Zakaria finds that the

latter bundle of freedoms - which may be termed constitutional liberalism - is
theoretically different and historically distinct from democracy. As the political scientist
Phillippe Schmitter has pointed out, "liberalism, either as a conception of political
liberty, or as a doctrine about economic policy, may have coincided with the rise of
democracy". Today the two strands of liberal democracy, interwoven in the Western
political fabric, are coming apart in the rest of the world. Democracy is flourishing;
constitutional liberalism is not.
10


Even if Zakaria's distinction between liberal constitutionalism and democracy is not identical with
the distinction between human rights and democracy in this chapter, it does serve to illustrate how
the two inter-connected concepts may be separated. In this chapter I will also keep an analytical
distinction between human rights and democracy.
The third classification issue concerns the approach applied by Denmark as a donor to the
integration of human rights in development aid. Development aid literature distinguishes between
three basic ways in which a donor can influence a recipient country's policy and behaviour: 1)
pressure, 2) support and 3) persuasion. Conditionality is one instrument of pressure. Conditionality
means that aid is made conditional on the potential recipient accepting a number of requirements.
11

Since political conditionality was not formally introduced until the late 1980s I will use a crude but
useful definition of the approach to human rights in development aid in the analysis of Danish Cold
War policies. The literature distinguishes between two basic approaches. The first is a so-called
negative approach where respect for human rights is made a prerequisite for aid. The second is a


5
so-called positive approach in which aid is continued, or even initiated, despite breaches of human
rights because aid is seen as a way to improve standards of human rights through dialogue,
cooperation and improved economic and social conditions.
12
The United States on the one hand and
Western Europe and Canada on the other have by and large been seen as representatives of
respectively the negative and positive approach.
13
Still, as the chapter will show, there were
clear differences within the West European camp.

The International and National Contexts
After 1945, international human rights law expanded to encompass new areas. Major steps included
the UN Universal Declaration on Human Rights of 1948, the European Convention on Human
Rights in 1950 and the two UN covenants on political-civil rights and economic-social rights, which
were finalized and opened for ratification by 1966. The two covenants finally became legally
binding in 1976 when ratified by a sufficient number of states. At that time the ongoing Helsinki
process placed human rights even more firmly on the international political agenda. These processes
served to undermine the constraints against foreign interventions in cases of human rights
violations. The sovereignty of the state was no longer to be considered a shield for those states
engaged in the violation of individual rights.
14

The promotion and codification of human rights was profoundly affected by the Cold War.
East and West argued in favour of the primacy of socio-economic rights and political-civil rights
respectively. At the same time, human rights came to involve a North-South dimension: first, during
the decolonization process from the 1950s human rights rhetoric formed part of the struggle for
independence by Afro-Asian countries against the colonial countries.
15
Second and most
controversial, the Third World promoted the right to development as a collective human right


6
hereby giving priority to states over individuals. Thus, the issue of human rights caused tensions not
merely between East and West but also between North and South.
Development aid was launched by the United States and the United Nations in 1949. Aid was
seen as both a foreign policy instrument for the West in its efforts to prevent Soviet expansion, and
as a means to promote economic growth and development as a goal in itself. Aid was above all
transferred bilaterally from donor to recipient, but also multilaterally as international organizations,
the UN and its affiliates in particular, expanded their activities. The organizations at the final count
also depended on individual states to fund their operations. Thus the multilateral organizations were
also subject to the vagaries of East-West and North-South conflicts.
16

Human rights were introduced as a basic principle already in the American Foreign
Assistance Act of 1963. In 1977 a law was passed that made American support for loans in
international financial institutions conditional on the projects meeting certain basic human rights
standards and catering to basic human needs. The principle of basic human needs referred to the
International Labour Organization (ILO)s adoption of the Basic Human Needs strategy in 1976,
setting the minimum standards with regard to food, housing, clothes, drinking water, sanitary
conditions, public transportation and healthcare, education and cultural facilities.
17

The integration of human rights into the development agenda occurred in response to large-
scale human rights violations in developing countries. At the same time, much integration served as
a means to kill two birds with one stone, making progress on human rights on the one hand, and
strengthening the position of the West more generally on the other. The demand of the developing
countries for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) had put the West on the defensive,
particularly within the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The
West, the US in particular, eagerly grasped the opportunity to regain the initiative. It allowed the


7
West to place counter-demands on the Third World, in an attempt to regain the initiative on the
playing field of international development.
18

After the Cold War and with the ongoing transition towards democracy in the former Soviet
Union and the Eastern European countries, human rights, democracy and good governance became
central elements in international relations and the foreign policies of states. International military
interventions in the 1990s took place with reference to human rights and developing countries were
assisted in establishing democratic and legal systems. After 2003, the war against Saddam Hussein
was arguably fought with the aim to promote democracy and human rights.
The Danish domestic context concerning human rights in development aid is characterized by
at least two main features. Firstly, the development aid consensus among the majority of the Danish
political parties which implied that Denmark should give aid to developing countries broke down
with a change of government in 2001 from a Social Democratic to a Liberal-Conservative one.
19

The new government was supported by the Danish Peoples Party which may be characterized as a
center party with regards to socio-economic issues and a right-wing party with regards to
development aid, asylum and refugee policy. Secondly, when discussing the domestic context we
need to include the rather odd political constellation in Denmark from 1982-8 when an alternative
majority of Centre and Left Wing opposition parties shaped Danish foreign and security policies.
The bourgeois government found itself unable to counter this majority, which, in particular, forced
the Danish government to make reservations from major NATO decisions.
20
As we shall see,
however, the issue of human rights in development aid was also affected by this rather special
parliamentary situation.

Denmark, Human Rights and International Institutions during the Cold War


8
The basic Danish approach to aid in international institutions was based on the view that the
institutions and their programmes should deal with development issues exclusively from a
professional and technical point of view. Denmarks development policy was to be distinguished
from other political issues and not used to promote any other goals than those aimed at the
programme in question.
21
From the outset, Denmark appeared reluctant to adapt the negative
approach to human rights in development aid. The following sections will look at the degree to
which non-politicization as the point of departure for Denmarks development policy in the
international institutions policy was pursued in practice.

Denmark in the UN
Denmarks policy in the UN was very much in line with the stance mentioned above. As
emphasized in documents of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it was Denmarks policy in the UN to
avoid politicization of development aid. Rather than relying on political arguments in development
negotiations, Denmark would emphasize criteria of efficiency, i.e. whether aid actually reached the
intended recipients, namely the neediest people in the poorest countries.
22
One should not, however,
necessarily accept the official distinction between political and non-political issues. It may be
argued that the attempt to avoid politicization is also political. However, the point is that Denmark
was very concerned with keeping development debates focused on development rather than the
political nature of the recipient regimes.
Denmarks resistance to the politicization of development aid in the UN is illustrated by its
opposition to an Italian proposal for a joint EC statement on the human rights situation in Chile.
Whereas Italy, several other EC members and the US were in favour of putting pressure on
violating regimes, including suspending development aid, Denmarks approach was of the
positive kind. The Italian proposal contained a passage saying that we of course agree that


9
foreign assistance can and should be used as an instrument to bear pressure for re-orientation of
repressive policies. Denmark did not agree with this.
23

When discussing United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Denmark only raised
questions of efficiency. In 1984 the Conservative-Liberal government attempted to avoid an East-
West confrontation in the UNDP Steering Committee over the country programme to
Afghanistan.
24
Considering Denmarks NATO membership, we might have expected Denmark to
join in Western criticism of the human rights violations of an Afghan regime that was a puppet of
the Soviet Union. But Denmark did not.
However, the scepticism towards politicization of aid did not mean that Denmark in the UN
did not criticize states for violating human rights. Such criticism was, however, only brought out in
other UN bodies relevant to issues of human rights and not in debates on development issues.
One reason why Denmark opposed the negative approach to human rights in aid is that the
Social Democratic governments in the 1970s and the Conservative-Liberal government after 1982
believed that the main goal of Danish development policy was to reduce poverty. Further, they
believed that poverty reduction was truly a way to support human rights, namely economic and
social rights. As expressed by Henning Kjeldgaard in the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
ambassador to Tanzania, Zimbabwe and Kenya from 1983-96, the shaping of Denmarks
development policy aims first of all at improving conditions for the poorest people in the poorest
developing countries. At the same time, Denmark recognizes that the concept of human rights in its
expanded meaning includes political-civil as well as economic, social and cultural rights.
25

Denmark adhered to a broad concept of human rights. Since it included economic and social rights
it may be argued that Denmark believed that aid distribution in itself would strengthen human
rights. Seemingly, Denmark equated economic and social development with economic and social
rights.


10
Even so, the broader Danish understanding of human rights did not include the Declaration on
the Right to Development promoted by Third World countries and adopted by the UN General
Assembly in 1986. Denmark and the other Nordic countries did agree on the existence of a close
relationship between social, economic and cultural rights and development, but opposed the
declaration for a number of reasons: firstly, because of the emphasis of the declaration on collective
rights instead of individual rights; secondly, because the declaration assumed a certain degree of
economic development and the existence of the NIEO as preconditions for respecting and
promoting human rights in the developing countries; and thirdly, because it emphasized economic
and social rights at the expense of political-civil rights.
26
However, apart from taking a stand on the
Declaration of the Rights to Development, Denmark managed to avoid politicization of
development aid in the UN.

Denmark's Policy with Respect to the World Bank
The World Bank did not officially adopt the ILO's Basic Human Needs Strategy. However, due to
the American law of 1977 mentioned earlier, it was clearly affected by it.
27
In the World Bank
Denmark did not promote a development policy based on professional and technical considerations
as strongly as it did in the UN. The main Nordic priorities in the World Bank were poverty
reduction and gradually during the 1980s also structural adjustment lending, environmental
protection and women in development.
28
In a number of instances, in cases of gross violations,
Denmark, together with the other Nordic countries, voted against loans.
29
In 1974 Denmark and the
other Nordic countries agreed with the US in opposing loans to Chile. It did the same in 1978-80
with regard to another loan to Chile and loans to Argentina, Paraguay and Equatorial Guinea.
30
In
1982, Denmark proposed that the Nordic countries oppose all loans to Guatemala. Sweden agreed,
but Norway and Finland preferred to take a stand on a case to case basis.
31



11
Even if human rights considerations contributed to shaping Denmarks development policy in
the international financial institutions in the cases of gross violations, Denmark remained generally
sceptical of the negative approach to human rights in aid. According to a ministerial note,
Denmark, before 1978, had taken human rights into account only indirectly and only concerning
loans to Chile in the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). By
indirectly the ministerial note referred to the fact that Denmark's proposed rejection of loans to
Chile was not officially motivated by a concern about human rights; it mentioned instead the poor
economic performance of the Chilean government. The reasons were, firstly, that the World Bank
statute only allowed for economic evaluation of projects. Secondly, the Foreign Ministry feared that
an introduction of human rights into World Bank decision-making might lead to a damaging
politicization of the international financial institutions. The Nordic countries agreed to refer
political issues to the UN, not to the World Bank, and in the UN, importantly, to institutions dealing
with political matters, not development issues. The UK and Belgium, in comparison, officially
opposed loans to Chile because of the human rights violations committed by the Pinochet regime.
However, due to the Banks statute they would not vote against loans, only abstain.
32
The UK and
Belgium were not among the states that directly opposed loans, but did criticize the Chilean regime.
Denmark was among the countries seeking to keep Chile from getting loans, but not among the
states criticizing the human rights performance of the Chilean regime.
In January 1978, the Nordic Committee of Development Officials
33
discussed the issue of
human rights in the international financial institutions. The discussion was initiated by the Danish
delegation for three reasons: firstly, due to the new American law of 1977 that introduced basic
human rights as a conditional for loans in international institutions; secondly, because of the shock
generated among the Nordic citizens by human-rights violations in developing countries; and
thirdly, as a consequence of the fear that Scandinavian aid to these countries might lead to a


12
negative public perception of development aid. Denmark, with explicit reference to public opinion,
argued for a careful rapprochement to the US position and preferably a common Nordic position.
34

Clearly, a consideration of public opinion was at play here.
The Swedish public also took a growing interest in human rights. Sweden was positive
towards the new American policy as it had led to the release of political prisoners in Haiti. At the
same time, Sweden would prefer to oppose projects only if these met neither demands of human
rights nor basic human needs. The US, in comparison, would oppose projects if these failed to meet
just one of these demands. Furthermore, Sweden argued for taking human rights into account only
in special cases, such as in Chile where the regime clearly had no intention of improving either
human rights or the conditions of the poorest part of the Chilean population. The difficult balance to
strike, according to the Swedish government, was to ensure American interest in development aid
on the one hand, and constructive work in the financial institutions on the other. In its bilateral aid
arrangements, Sweden would continue aid despite violations of human rights, but at the same time
criticize recipient countries in donor-recipient negotiations.
35

According to the Norwegian representative,

Norway was not convinced that it was fortunate to use economic arguments against loans. The
public would probably feel doubtful if the real reason was not expressed, and it would also be
difficult to influence the countries in question in the preferred direction if we did not refer to
the issue of human rights.
36


Seemingly, Norway took both domestic public opinion and the improvement of human rights
standards in recipient countries into account in deciding which arguments to use in the international
financial institutions.


13
Domestic public opinion played a central role in the formation of Denmarks policy. When
Norway at a Nordic World Bank meeting in November 1982 suggested that the Nordic countries
should remove certain countries from a blacklist, Denmarks representative referred to the domestic
political context for the human rights reservations and mentioned that a precondition for a positive
Danish public opinion of the World Bank and the IDB was that the government took a critical stand
on certain recipient countries.
37
At the meeting, Denmark also commented on the apparent fact that
the US applied a project-by-project approach rather than a country-by-country approach.
38
This
approach allowed loans to states even if they violated human rights. Denmark found the approach
inappropriate.
39

In 1986 Denmark and Sweden still voted against loans to Chile. Norway made its decision on
a case by case basis according to whether the project in question would support the regime. Finland
only took economic considerations into account.
40
In 1986, however, Denmark softened its position
on loans to Guatemala and applied, together with Norway and Finland, the more pragmatic
approach of deciding on a case by case basis. A further softening had been discussed, but was
opposed by Denmark.
41
Denmark continued to maintain a blacklist of human rights offenders,
which happened to include only states that the Danish public opinion took an active political
interest in.
42
A ministerial note emphasized that the Nordic reactions in the international financial
institutions against violations of human rights had a symbolic rather than an actual effect. They
never managed to prevent the adoption of a loan. However, Denmarks reactions in the World Bank
had a certain domestic effect in terms of ensuring public support for Danish development aid.
43

Both the careful and pragmatic change of policy in the case of Guatemala, the maintenance of the
blacklist and the ministerial note clearly suggest that Denmark's policy on human rights in
development aid in the mid-1980s was shaped by reference to public opinion in particular.



14
Denmark in the DAC
In 1977 the DAC officially adopted the ILOs Basic Human Needs Strategy. The Statement on
Development Cooperation for Economic Growth and Meeting Basic Human Needs emphasized that
the ambition to meet basic human needs was not intended to replace economic growth, but should
rather be seen as an important component in generating economic growth. The Basic Human Needs
strategy was not to be understood as charity, but as a productivity-oriented and self-generating
growth strategy.
44

The Basic Human Needs strategy was in line with the key principle of poverty reduction in
Danish development policy. However, Denmarks perception of the Basic Human Needs strategy
was also marked by skepticism. The reason had more to do with words than with content. Danida
noticed that while DAC used the term basic human needs, the ILO conference had probably more
correctly termed the strategy basic needs, which would reduce the risk of conflating it with the
human rights agenda. Danida preferred the term basic needs, and would in its own writings on the
matter deliberately use the term basic needs instead of basic human needs. In this way, a
conflation between basic human needs and basic human rights could be avoided and Denmark
could maintain pure social and economic criteria for the allocation of development aid.
45
The Head
of Danida explained in the DAC how too strong a focus on human rights easily might lead to an
unfortunate public debate.
46
Seemingly, public opinion played a central role in Danish policy.
Firstly, the Danish decision makers were eager to avoid a public debate on human rights and aid.
Secondly, to the degree that a critical public opinion existed, Denmark took a critical stand on
different regimes.
In June 1988, after the parliamentary decision to include human rights considerations in
development policy, Denmark initiated the adoption on the DAC agenda of human rights as a
principle in development aid. The Danish representative also emphasized that Denmark in the future


15
would place increased emphasis on human rights in its development programmes.
47
In December
1988 at a DAC High Level meeting, Denmark was the only DAC member mentioning the question
of human rights in aid.
48
However, Denmark focused its concern in particular on one aspect of
human rights, namely that of democratization. At the DAC meeting in June 1988, Denmark stressed
the need for democracy, human rights and public participation as the basis for sustainable economic
and social growth and for peace which was also emphasized at times. Later in the same Danish
intervention, only democracy and political participation were mentioned.
49

Denmark seemed to emphasize, to a greater extent than earlier, civil and political rights with
democracy as an aspect of political rights. Judging from the meeting of the Nordic Chiefs of
Development Aid in May 1988 the democratic focus was a deliberate choice inspired by Sweden to
frame the development discourse in a way that allowed Denmark to take human rights into account
in its development policy without risking having to suspend aid. At the meeting, the Danish
representative explained how human rights were sometimes part of an ideological struggle in the
domestic development debate. The Swedish representative agreed. He stressed the difficulty in
defining human rights and preferred for that reason to concentrate the debate on the process of
democratization. The Nordic chiefs acknowledged the difficulty in defining strict criteria for
human rights in development aid and a need for Nordic coordination. It would cause problems for
the planning as well as for the implementation of aid efforts if human rights were used as an
argument to end development cooperation with certain countries. Aid should be suspended only in
the case of very serious violations. Human rights should be promoted through a positive rather
than a negative approach, by means of dialogue rather than pressure.
50


Denmark in the EC


16
In the EC, human rights and development aid were on the agenda in a number of institutions and
bodies: the European Development Fund (EDF) (in the negotiations to revise the Lom convention),
in the Committee of Non-Associated Developing Countries and in the Council of Ministers
negotiations of the EC special development aid programmes.
51
The Lom Convention was adopted
in Lom, the capital of Togo, in 1975 between the EC and 46 African, Caribbean and Pacific
countries (ACP). It coincided with the fourth EDF programme, and aimed to include some of the
Commonwealth countries after the accession of the UK to the EC. The ACP countries gained
privileged access (with important exceptions) to the common market and the EC countries were also
to contribute to the industrialization of the ACP countries by investments in existing industries and
by the introduction of new ones. As an additional protocol, the EC established the so-called Stabex
programme (the acronym for a European Commission compensatory finance scheme to stabilize
export earnings of the ACP countries) in order to counteract future falling export prices.
Furthermore, programmes for technical and financial aid were established. The convention
recognized a number of principles for EC cooperation with the ACP countries establishing a formal
equality between the EU and the recipients.
52

The Lom convention was a trade and aid agreement. It posed no demands on the ACP
countries. Lom in fact applied a number of NIEO proposals within a limited geographic area. The
convention was re-negotiated every five years until 1990, when Lom IV was concluded for a
duration of ten years with a midterm evaluation in 1995. In 1990, an elaborate article on human
rights were for the first time introduced in the Convention's text as an area of cooperation between
the EC and the ACP countries although, as we will see below, the issue had been on the agenda
during the previous negotiations and within EC internal discussions.
53

Denmarks preference for non-political aid was easily accommodated in the EDF and the
Committee of Non-Associated Developing Countries where decisions required unanimity.
54



17
Already during the first revision negotiations in 1978-9, the UK proposed including demands of
human rights in Lom II. The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) opposed the proposal.
55

Nevertheless, during the negotiations between the EC and the ACP countries in July 1978, the EC
emphasized the importance of human rights. However, the ACP countries refused to include
stipulations of human rights in a trade and aid agreement. Until November 1978, the issue was off
the agenda for discussion with the ACP due to internal EC disagreements. The UK, the Netherlands
and the European Commission supported a text mentioning the UN Declaration of Human Rights in
its preamble and including an operative text on the relationship between human rights and the
reduction of development aid. France and Denmark were willing to agree to the reference to the UN
declaration, but not to the operative text on potential reductions of aid in the case of human rights
violations. Denmark, supported by France, suggested instead a text including a passage on the
relationship between aid and the effort of the recipient state to mobilize its own resources. The
suggestion should, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs remarked, be seen in the context where violating
regimes seldom accommodated basic human needs.
56
Denmark's focus was on the social conditions
rather than on the human rights standard in the developing countries and seemingly Denmark had
accepted the usage of the term basic human needs even if it was not, as we have seen, the preferred
term.
In February 1979 the Danish minister responsible for development aid in a speech to the
Council and the Commission warned against letting the question of human rights come between the
Community and the ACP countries. Denmark agreed with the ACP that human rights demands did
not belong in a voluntary treaty on trade and aid and that it would be better to pay attention to the
level of social and economic development in the different ACP countries when deciding the
magnitude and aim of aid. The EC ought to follow the same economic and social criteria as the
World Bank and questions of human rights should be referred to negotiations in the UN i.e. to


18
political institutions, not development bodies.
57
The speech may be seen as an attempt to separate
the politically controversial issue of human rights from that of development aid.
The document agreed upon in the Lom negotiations in 1978-79 included a general reference
to the UN declaration in the preamble. However, during the signing ceremony the EC presidency
emphasized the importance of respecting human rights. Subsequently, on 20 November 1979 a
decision was adopted in the Council that in cases of gross and systematic violations of human rights
in an ACP country that had signed the Lom II, the EC could take suitable measures.
58
The
decision gave the EC the option of suspending aid to ACP countries if agreement on such a measure
could be reached in the Council. Still, conditionality was far from an established principle in EC
development aid.
During the re-negotiation of the Lom in 1984, human rights were again a controversial topic.
In particular the Netherlands and the UK, this time joined by Belgium, France and Ireland, argued
in favour of including a concern about human rights. The Netherlands was most determined arguing
for a provision allowing for the suspension of aid in case of gross and systematic violations. The
FRG and Denmark remained reluctant. The ACP countries at this point argued that respect for
human rights had to be seen in tandem with the rights to development. Additionally, they would
only accept a reference to human rights in the convention if the EC agreed to discuss economic
sanctions against South Africa.
59

Although the human rights camp had gained more members, the EC remained internally
divided. The result of the revision negotiations was a compromise between the EC and the ACP.
The Lom III referred in its preamble to the UN Declaration on Human Rights and to the
contracting parties mutual respect for human rights. It included a reference to human dignity in
art. 4., and a common EC-ACP statement concerning art. 4. on economic, social and cultural rights.
Finally, it included a condemnation of apartheid.
60
Human rights were mentioned. However, the


19
Lom III represented only modest changes from its predecessors and was characterized by dialogue,
negotiation and mutuality. This is evident in particular when comparing Lom III to Lom IV from
1990 when human rights became included as an essential area of cooperation (Lom IV, art. 5).
61

During the 1980s, Denmark and the FRG would not use EC development aid for political ends in
developing countries. The principle of unanimity in the EC Council of Ministers guaranteed that
this Danish position was upheld.
Denmarks policy concerning the ECs special aid programmes to South America differed
from its Lom policy. In 1982, the EC adopted the Central America Initiative, including
extraordinary financial aid to Costa Rica, Honduras, The Dominican Republic and Nicaragua.
During aid negotiations, the Danish Social Democratic foreign minister opposed aid to El Salvador,
Guatemala and Haiti, referring directly to breeches of human rights.
62

Following the military coup in Bolivia in July 1980, the EC decided to suspend its relations
with Bolivia and put negotiations with the South American free trade area, the Andean Community,
on hold until the situation in Bolivia was improved and the other Andean countries had normalized
their relations with Bolivia. The US also suspended its relations with Bolivia. Denmark adhered to
the joint EC decision, and instructed its embassy in La Paz not to assume official contacts with the
new regime. However, Denmark did accept necessary technical contacts with regard to
development aid.
63

In 1981, a counter coup in Bolivia took place. The new president promised to return to
democratic conditions within a period of three years. A report from the UN Human Rights
Commission bore evidence of significant improvements of human rights.
64
In the fall of 1981, the
US decided to reestablish normal relations with Bolivia. The Andean countries followed suit during
fall and winter 1981/2. In the spring of 1982, Denmark and the Netherlands agreed as the last EC
countries to resume EC-Andean relations. In May 1982, the Social Democratic government of


20
Denmark approved a DKK 46m financial guarantee to Bolivia. In September 1982, the remaining
EC countries had all normalized their relations with Bolivia and the newly elected Conservative-
Liberal government in Denmark soon did so too.
65

In 1985 Denmark did not raise the issue of human rights when the EC negotiated its
development aid to Central America, possibly because human rights had already been taken into
account. The Liberal foreign minister explained to the Danish Parliaments Market Committee that
the limited aid to Central America was shaped by political motives rather than by pure poverty
criteria. The opposition apparently did not question this arrangement, which was in line with the
former Social Democratic foreign ministers opposition to aid certain Latin American countries a
few years before.
66
Besides certain South American states, Turkey was rejected as recipient of EC
development aid with reference to the lack of democracy and human rights in Turkey.
67

To sum up, development aid ought not to be politicized by raising demands of human rights.
This policy was maintained in UN development bodies, in the DAC and in the EC with regard to
the revision of the Lom Convention until 1990, whereas in the World Bank human rights
considerations led to Danish rejections of loans in cases of gross violations, e.g. in the case of
Chile. Denmark sought to separate development policy from human rights policy by way of
referring human rights issues to the political bodies of the UN rather than to development bodies.
Latin American countries stand out, in particular when compared to the ACP countries, both in the
World Bank and the EC, as countries to which Denmark most often rejected loans or suspended aid.
Taking this into account, the explanation for the nuances in the policy in the different institutions
may be explained less by the differences in scope, power and membership of the various
institutions, but more by the recipient countries in question.

The Parliamentary Decision in 1987 and the Development Aid Strategy of 1988


21
Before turning to the analysis of human rights in Danish development aid after the Cold War, it is
necessary to provide some background to the parliamentary decision in 1987 to integrate human
rights in Danish development aid. It is a part of the domestic context which shaped Danish
development aid and the inclusion of human rights.
The main principle in Danish development aid in the 1970s was poverty reduction. In addition
a number of so-called cross-cutting principles were added to Danish aid in the 1970s and 1980s.
Concern for women was introduced in the mid-1970s. Protection of the environment was adopted as
a central principle in the parliamentary decision following the discussion of the Brundtland report of
1987 on sustainable development. At the same time, human rights were included as Parliament
adopted a proposition by the Social Democrats and Radical Liberals on broadening the scope of
Danish development aid policy.
68

The debate took place during the years in which the Danish Centre-Right government was
forced to take formal exceptions to NATO decisions by an alternative Centre-Left foreign policy
majority. The Socialist Peoples Party (Socialistisk Folkeparti, SPP) had first presented a proposal
calling for the government to increase aid to Nicaragua and give direct economic support to the
ANC and Swapo in South Africa and South West Africa. Compared to the SPP proposal, the
proposal by the Social Democrats and the Radical Liberals was more moderate and supported by
the government.
Following the parliamentary decision, Danida included human rights in the renewed
development strategy Strategic Planning from 1988. However, the publication Strategic Planning
leaves the impression that human rights enjoyed a less central position than women and
environmental protection. Human rights are mentioned as the last principle to be taken into account,
and in the presentation of the role of development aid in foreign policy they are mentioned only in
brackets: the aim of Danish development aid is to promote social, humanitarian (including human


22
rights) and political ideals, which have been and ought to continue to be the basis for this part of
Denmarks foreign policy.
69
In the presentation of the more specific role of development aid,
human rights are not mentioned, whereas women and environment are: development aid should
promote Danish views on development including lasting improvement of the economic and social
conditions in the developing countries, including poverty reduction, a sustainable development
including environmental sustainability and integration of women in the development process.
70

Furthermore, in strategies for countries as well as sectors, human rights are mentioned last, if at
all.
71

In short, during the Cold War, Denmark remained reluctant to include demands of human
rights into its foreign aid policy. A positive approach to human rights in aid was preferred and an
emphasis on social improvement rather than political rights - was first maintained. From the mid
and late 1980s Denmark also embarked on the road of political conditionality, though only
reluctantly and with a deliberate and limited focus on one aspect of political rights, namely that of
democratization. Human rights did not formally become a principle in Danish aid policy until
1987/8. However, in the official aid strategy (Strategic Planning), human rights still appeared as a
principle of lesser importance.

Human Rights in Development Aid in the 1990s
In 1994 Danida presented a new development strategy emphasizing human rights.
72
Human rights
were to be promoted through democratization, electoral supervision and a strengthened judiciary in
recipient countries. Danidas annual reports confirm that the agency held on to this approach.
73

Thus, the identification of human rights with democracy - initiated as we have seen during the Cold
War as a way to avoid discussions on human rights - continued.


23
Danish policies during the 1990s were modified with explicit reference to concern for
democratic principles and human rights.
74
Direct aid to human rights and democracy increased from
below DKK 12m in 1988 to 300m in 1994. During the period 1988-93 aid was altered due to
political conditions in recipient countries in seventeen instances.
75
These two features bear evidence
of a combination of the positive and the negative approach. The previous skepticism towards the
negative approach seems, however, to have continued. Aid was frequently just scaled down, not
terminated. For instance, the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989 led to an immediate stop of
Danish aid to China, but relations were normalized again in 1992. In a couple of sensitive cases,
Danish aid was redirected through NGOs instead of disbursed directly through the Foreign
Ministry. A project in Malawi in 1991 was adopted despite the fact that Malawi had a despotic
regime and one of the worst human rights regimes in Africa. Eventually, the project was suspended
when a disturbing report on the human rights situation reached the Danish press.
76

It seems reasonable to conclude that along with the many reductions of aid due to political
circumstances in the recipient countries, there was still a reluctance to place demands on recipient
states and to practice political conditionality, as opposed to the dominant international trend.
Denmark remained true to its predilection for carrots over sticks. Further, public opinion continued
to play a central role in the sense that aid was terminated not necessarily when human rights were
violated, but when evidence for this reached the Danish press.

Human Rights and Development Aid after 2001
In November 2001 the Social Democratic government was replaced by a Liberal-Conservative one.
Nevertheless, the Partnership 2000 development aid strategy adopted by the previous government
was continued. The government supplemented the Partnership programme with a series of annual
priority plans that reiterated human rights, democratization and good governance as central


24
principles of Danish aid and signalled that aid would be conditional upon the recipients meeting
strict demands.
77

At a press conference in January 2002, the Minister of Foreign Affairs explained the aid
reductions that had taken place: systematic and continued violations of human rights and
democratic rules will no longer be tolerated. For this reason development cooperation with Eritrea,
Malawi and Zimbabwe will end.
78
In Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Uganda and Vietnam reductions
were due to worries. The UNDP worked too inefficiently at country level and for this reason was
reduced with DKK 50m.
79

In 2003, the government adopted the so-called Arabic Initiative to increase cooperation with
actors in Arab states supporting modernization and democracy. The purpose was to counter
radicalization and religious fundamentalism.
80
In 2003, Danida also presented the Action Plan to
Fight against Corruption and the priority plan from 2004 emphasized a need for an increased
effort on human rights, democratization and good governance.
81

According to the priority plan of 2006-10, the amount of aid directed towards human rights
and democracy was increased from DKK 150m in 2005 to 200m in 2006 out of a total aid budget in
2005 of 10.7bn and 10.89bn in 2006. In 2010 the figure would be increased further to DKK 215m
out of a total budget of 10.87bn. In addition 30m were set aside to combat terrorism and extreme
religious fundamentalism.
82
These budgets signal a more pronounced as well as a broader emphasis
on political rights, now including anti-terrorism and anti-extremism. The concern for human rights
in Danish development aid became closely linked to Denmarks international human rights policy
in general, which was elaborated and intensified after 2009 notably with regard to the fight against
torture, the death penalty and the rights of indigenous peoples in accordance with international
trends.
83
The close connection between human rights in aid on the one hand, and Denmark's human


25
rights policy in general on the other hand, represents a novelty compared to the previous deliberate
attempt to separate the two.
In 2007 good governance and human rights became the first of three main focus areas in
Danish development aid the other two were women and HIV/aids.
84
In 2008 an additional nine
programmes on good governance, democracy and human rights were launched.
85
Human
development was understood according to the Danish Foreign Ministry 'not only as social and
economic welfare, but also the respect of the rights of the individual and democratic
participation were integrate parts of human development.
86

In February 2010 the Danish Prime Minister (Liberal) reorganized his government and
appointed a new Minister for Development. The new minister, as the former one, was from the
Liberal Party, but with a very pronounced liberal profile. He proceeded to transform the ministry
into one of Liberty, as he expressed it, which would fight terrorism, promote gender equality,
democracy and civil liberties. Focus would be on the reconstruction of Afghanistan.
87
Promotion of
liberty, human rights and democracy became the first among five goals of Danish aid according to
the aid strategy of 2010.
88
This signalled a strong focus on civil-political rights and on a connection
between aid, human rights and countering terrorism. Aid was terminated in the case of gross
violations of democratic rule or its complete abolition: the military coup in Niger was condemned
and a water sector programme was postponed.
89

At the same time it should be noticed that the Liberal-Conservative government did not
always apply the negative approach. Shortly after his appointment, the new minister for
development visited Zimbabwe. He explained that he would meet only with the moderate
government leader, Morgan Tsvangirai, and not with president Mugabe. Further, he emphasized
that Danish aid was to people, not to states: Denmark gives aid to the people in Zimbabwe, not to
Mugabe. We have to accept the risk that a small amount of Danish aid may fall in the wrong


26
hands.
90
Even if political rights in recipient countries were reinforced and even if the government
embraced the negative approach much more positively than its predecessor, the case of Zimbabwe
indicates that the government had to realize the general dilemma of who receives aid and that
political conditionality or the negative approach was not always seen as the proper way to
promote democracy and human rights.

The Status of Aid in Danish Foreign Policy and Human Rights in Danish Development Aid
1975-2010 an Interdependent Relationship
The chapter has shown that public opinion played an important role in Danish policy on human
rights in development aid. However, the impact of national public opinion needs to be understood in
the context of the status of development aid in Danish foreign policy which, as this section will
show, was decisive for the status of human rights in Danish development aid.
Until 2001 a broad national consensus generally supported development aid as a significant
element in Danish foreign policy. Only the Left Socialists, the Progress Party and later the Danish
Peoples Party did not belong to this consensus.
Even though development aid played a lesser role in Denmarks foreign policy than did core
pillars such as NATO and the EC, aid was nevertheless a key feature of Denmarks foreign policy
profile and a tool for Danish political parties and changing governments in their efforts to
accommodate or balance various domestic and international interests. Thus, it makes sense that
Danish decision-makers within the development aid consensus avoided fundamental debates on
development aid. If respect for human rights were made a requirement for recipients of aid,
Denmark risked having to suspend or discontinue aid to many countries. Three sets of adverse
consequences could potentially occur, and Danish policy-makers surely must have been aware of
them. Firstly, Denmarks small state foreign policy platform would be eroded as both altruistic and


27
commercial consensus would suffer. So would security interests that were part and parcel of aid
efforts. Secondly, aid projects and programmes would most likely suffer as they under the threat of
closure would be forced to adopt more short term perspectives. Thirdly, the aid agency and its
affiliates would suffer. As aid became subject to the vagaries of human rights concerns,
employment opportunities would both shrink and be less predictable. Both domestic and foreign
policy concerns worked against making human rights enforcement mandatory.
The argument is further based on the assumption that the aid budgets are indicative of the
status of development aid in Danish foreign policy. The 1990s was characterized by an increase in
Danish aid. The ambition was to reach one per cent of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 1992.
During the period 1989-1994 Denmarks development aid increased by 50 per cent, from DKK
6.65bn in 1989 to 9.04bn in 1994.
91
This development occurred first under a Conservative-Liberal-
Social Liberal government and was also affected by a wish to direct aid to Eastern Europe.
However, it gained further momentum under the Social Democratic led government from 1993. In
1995, Denmark, with an aid percentage of 0.97, took the lead among donors well in front of Sweden
with 0.89 per cent, Norway with 0.87 per cent and the Netherlands with 0.80 per cent. Denmark
thus gained first place in the premier league of contributors to development aid and was well aware
of its international image as a front runner.
In 1995 Danida apologized for an under-consumption of DKK 405m. The administration was
criticized for having too much money to be able to spend it in a reasonable way. In January 1997,
therefore, the minister of development was pleased to be able to announce that in 1996 the ministry
had been able to spend the whole of the appropriation and the surplus from 1995.
92
Spending
became an end in itself. The aid spending impulse and the preservation of Denmarks image as a
front runner therefore contribute to explaining both the positive carrot-rather-than-stick approach
to conditionality as well as the reluctance to attach demands of human rights to Danish aid.


28
After 2001, the previous emphasis on democracy was maintained, but expanded with a
broader aim of combating terrorism and religious extremism. Moreover, human rights compliance
or non-compliance as a consideration in aid policy was in line with important new Danish foreign
policy goals such as combating international terrorism and religious extremism.
This increased focus on human rights in the shape of political-civil rights occurred along with
severe aid reductions. The volume of Denmarks development aid was reduced from DKK 12.8bn
to 11.9bn between 2001 and 2002. The previous policy of donating one per cent of BNP was
modified to 0.8 per cent. Funding to NGOs was reduced by ten per cent.
93
Seemingly, the image of
Denmark as a front runner in development aid was less important in the foreign policy after 2001.
Rather, the government from 2001 gave priority to international activism in the shape of alliance
policy and solidarity with the United States, including participation in the US coalition against Iraq
2003-8. This new priority went hand in hand with an increased focus on human rights in
development aid. Hence, it seems fair to argue that a reduced status of development aid in Danish
foreign policy made room for an increased status of human rights in Danish development aid.

Conclusion
The starting point of Denmarks development policy in international institutions was to focus
predominantly on economic and social progress. Development aid ought not to be politicized by
emphasizing demands for human rights. A positive approach to human rights in aid was favoured
over a negative one. This policy was pursued in the UN development bodies. In the DAC and in
the EC negotiations of the revision of the Lom Convention, Denmark also opposed political
conditionality until the 1990s. In the World Bank, however, Denmark rejected loans in cases of
gross violation of human rights, e.g. in the case of Chile. Except from the cases of gross violation
in the World Bank, Denmark sought to separate development policy from human rights policy by


29
referring human rights issues to political bodies of the UN (importantly not to UN development
bodies).
The skepticism of the negative approach should be seen in relation with the fact that Danish
decision-makers perceived social and economic prosperity as a way to promote human rights, i.e.
decision-makers initially emphasized economic and social rights and hence saw development aid as
a lever for human rights. In the late 1980s, Denmark was among the countries discussing human
rights, including political rights, in development aid in the DAC, but deliberately sought to focus
the human rights agenda in aid purely on democratization. With the emphasis on democracy,
political rights became more pronounced than before, but at the same time, the focus on democracy
was a deliberate way to shape the human rights agenda in a rather circumscribed way.
Human rights were formally integrated into Danish development policy in 1987 following a
domestic debate in which human rights were still discussed in the light of the Cold War. Human
rights were therefore given a rather modest status in the new formal development strategy from
1988 in which they were most often mentioned as the last consideration.
The reluctance towards the negative approach changed somewhat in the 1990s which saw
several changes in Danish aid due to political developments and human rights violations. Denmark
now came closer to following the international trend of prioritizing political conditionality.
Nevertheless, the fact that aid cooperation was often resumed indicates that the positive approach
to human rights in aid was to a large degree maintained and skepticism towards political
conditionality continued to exist. It was not until after 2001 that political rights and liberties came to
play a more pronounced role in Danish development policy and the previous skepticism of the
negative approach disappeared. Danish aid to Zimbabwe in 2010, however, indicates that the
negative approach was pragmatically applied and that the government continued to face the
problem that aid to people risked falling into the hands of oppressing regimes.


30
Public opinion and the status of development aid in Danish foreign policy are important
factors in explaining the status of human rights in Danish development aid. During the Cold War
and in the 1990s the development aid budget was indeed significant in the relative term by
international standards, and aid enjoyed an important role in Danish foreign policy as a platform for
Danish international agency. As a major international donor, Denmark could preserve an image as a
front-runner and pursue an active international policy in the field of development. This aspect helps
to explain why decision-makers were reluctant towards the negative approach and political
conditionality and to risk a fundamental debate on Danish development aid.
After 2001, the balance in Danish foreign policy activism changed from emphasizing soft
power to hard power. Danish development aid was reduced and appeared to be less important in
Denmarks foreign policy. This went hand in hand with a more pronounced emphasis on a broader
set of political rights, including an ambition to combat terrorism and religious extremism, and a
much less sceptical perception of the negative approach. Thus, the reduced status of development
aid in Danish foreign policy made room from the political rights and the political conditionality
point of view - for an increased role of human rights in Danish development aid.

I would like to thank Christilla Roederer-Rynning, Dept. of Political Science, U. of Southern Denmark, two
anonymous reviewers and the editors of the book for very valuable comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
1
H. Selbervik, Aid as a tool for promotion of human rights and democracy: What can Norway do? (Oslo 1997), pp. 5-
6, p. 15.
2
K. Arts, Integrating Human Rights into Development Cooperation: The Case of the Lom Convention (The Hague
2000).
3
K. Cmiel, The Emergence of Human Rights Politics in the United States, pp. 1231-50 in: Journal of American
History, vol. 86, no. 3, 1999, pp. 1233-6.
4
J. Donnelly, International Human Rights. Dilemmas in World Politics, 2 (Boulder CO 1998), pp. 107-10; L. R. Rehof,
Udviklingsbistand og menneskerettigheder. En oversigt over forskellige donorlandes og organisationers synspunkter
(Copenhagen 1987).
5
Parliamentary Records (PR) 1986-97, vol. VIII, 21 May, 1987, clm. 12238; L. A. Rehof, Udviklingsbistand og
menneskerettigheder. En oversight over forskellige donorlandes og organisationers synspunkter (Copenhagen 1987).


31

Norway's policy on human rights and development has been analyzed by O. Stokke, 'Aid and Political Conditionality:
The Case of Norway', in: O. Stokke (ed.), Aid and Political Conditionality (London 1995), pp. 162-200; Selbervik, Aid
as a tool; H. Selbervik, The role of the bilateral donor. A case study of Norwegian-Tanzanian aid relationship (Oslo:
The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1999); H. Selbervik, Power of the purse? Norway as a donor in the
conditionality epoch 1980-2000, unpublished Ph.D. thesis (University of Bergen 2003). A. E. Ruud with K. A.
Kjerland, Norsk utviklingshjelps historie, vol. 2: 1975-1989: Vekst, velvilje og utfordringer (Bergen 2003), pp. 252-9.
6
Rehof, Udviklingsbistand og menneskerettigheder; K. Midtgaard, Menneskerettigheder og dansk udviklingsbistand i
1970erne og 1980erne, in: Den Jyske Historiker, 120, 2008, pp. 93-110; K. Midtgaard, 'Menneskerettigheder og
Demokrati i dansk udviklingsbistand i internationale institutioner i 1970erne og 1980erne', in: T. W. Friis and K.
Midtgaard (eds.), Diktatur og demokrati (Odense 2010), pp. 215-36. (These two articles partly represent earlier versions
in Danish of the article at hand). T. B. Olesen, Stabilitet og turbulens: Udviklingspolitikken 1975-1989, pp. 258-389
in: C. Due-Nielsen, O. Feldbk and N. Petersen, Idealer og realiteter. Dansk udviklingspolitisk historie 1945-2005
(Copenhagen 2008), pp. 284-5; Chr. F. Bach, Foregangslandet under forandring 1989-2005, in: Carsten Due-Nielsen,
O. Feldbk and N. Petersen, Idealer og realiteter. Dansk udviklingspolitiks historie 1945-2005 (Copenhagen 2008), pp.
472-81.
7
H. L. Madsen and L. Haghfelt, Menneskerettigheder i U-landene og i Dansk U-landspolitik (Copenhagen 1989); O.
Therkildsen, (ed.), Dansk bistand en blandet landhandel, (Copenhagen 1994); K. Tomasevski, Human Rights in
International Development Cooperation: Between Politics and Policy, working paper no. 69 in Development Research
Series (Aalborg: Research Center on Development and International Relations (DIR) 1999); H.-O. Sano, Development
and Human Rights: The Necessary, but Partial Integration of Human Rights and Development, in: Human Rights
Quarterly 22, 2000, pp. 734-52; E. Neumayer, Do Human Rights Matter in Bilateral Aid Allocation? A Quantitative
Analysis of 21 Donor Countries, in: Social Science Quaterly, vol. 84, no. 3, Sept. 2003, pp. 650-66; K. D. K Hede,
Menneskerettigheder, demokratisering og good governance i dansk udviklingspolitik, (Copenhagen 2006).
8
See eg. Donnelly, International Human Rights, pp. 22-6, L. Haghfelt, Den internationale menneskeret og dansk u-
landsbistand, In: H. L. Madsen and L. Hagfelt, Menneskerettigheder i U-landene og i Dansk U-landspolitik,
(Copenhagen 1989), p. 163. For a scheme of human rights see Selbervik, Aid as a tool, p. 9.
9
Selbervik, Aid as a tool, p. 8.
10
F. Zakaria, 'The Rise of Illiberal Democracy', in: Foreign Affairs, Nov./Dec. 1997, pp. 22-23.
11
Selbervik, Aid as a tool, pp. 15-28.
12
Haghfelt and Madsen, Menneskerettigheder i U-landene, preface. Because the terms positive and negative are also
more normative expressions, they will be placed in inverted commas (positive and negative) when used to describe
the approach to human rights in aid applied by Denmark.
13
K. Sikkink, The Power of Principled Ideas: Human Rights Policies in the United States and Western Europe, pp.
139-72 in: Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane (red.), Ideas and Foreign Policy. Beliefs, Institutions, and Political
Change (Ithaca and London 1993), pp. 139-41; Donnelly, International Human Rights, pp. 108-11.
14
For the evolution of international human rights see S.-L. Hoffmann (ed.), Human Rights in the Twentieth Century
(New York 2011); S. Moyn, The Last Utopia (Harvard University 2010); S. C. Neff, A Short History of International
Law, in: M. D. Evans (ed.), International Law (Oxford 2003), pp. 31-58; A. B. W. Simpson, Human Rights and the


32

End of Empire: Britain and the Genesis of the European Convention (Oxford and New York 2001); H. J. Steiner and P.
Alston (ed.), International Human Rights in Context. Law, Politics, Morals, 2
nd
ed. (Oxford 2000), part C; P. G. Lauren,
The Evolution of Human Rights. Visions Seen (Philadelphia PA 1998), ch. 6-8 esp. pp. 242-58. For the historiography of
international human rights see, R. Afshari, On Historiography of Human Rights: Reflections on Paul Gordon Laurens
The Evolution of International Human Rights: Visions Seen, Human Rights Quarterly, vol. 29, 2007, pp. 1-67; K.
Cmiel, The Recent History of Human Rights, in: The American Historical Review, vol. 109, 2004, pp. 117-36.
15
J. Eckel, 'Human Rights and Decolonization: New Perspectives and Open Questions', Humanity, fall 2010, pp. 111-
35.
16
For international institutions and international aid programmes see e.g. D. Kapur, J. P. Lewis and R. Webb, The
World Bank. Its first half century (Brookings Institution 1997); C. Caufield, Masters of Illusion: the World Bank and the
poverty of nations (London 1997); A. L. S. Staples, The birth of development: how the World Bank, Food and
Agriculture Organization, and World Health Organization have changed the world, 1945-65 (Ohio 2005); C. N
Murphy, The United Nations development programme: a better way? (Cambridge 2006). For an interpretation of
development aid during the Cold War arguing for a moral impulse in aid see D. H. Lumsdaine, Moral vision in
international politics: the foreign aid regime, 1949-89 (Princeton NJ 1993). For an analysis of development policies of
the US, Japan and various European states see C. Lancaster, Foreign Aid: diplomacy, development, domestic politics,
Chicago, Ill. (Chicago IL 2007), and Contemporary European History, vol. 12, no. 4, 2003. K. Midtgaard, Smstat,
magt og sikkerhed. Danmark og FN 1949-65 (Odense 2005), pp. 58-63.
17
T. B. Olesen, Stabilitet og turbulens: Udviklingspolitikken 1975-89, in: C. Due-Nielsen, O. Feldbk and N.
Petersen, Idealer og realiteter. Dansk udviklingspolitiks historie 1945-2005 (Copenhagen 2008), pp. 265-8.
18
Olesen, Stabilitet og turbulens, pp. 265-8.
19
Ibid, 2008, p. 289.
20
N. Petersen, Dansk udenrigspolitiks historie, vol. 6: Europisk og globalt engagement, 1973-2003 (Copenhagen
2004), pp. 292-359.
21
Archive of the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (DMFA), 104 A 1 b. Box 2. Note. 19 Feb. 1985. Denmarks
position on questions of human rights in international development cooperation. (The title of boxes and documents are
translated from Danish to English by author in order for the reader to see what documents the article draws on).
22
DMFA. 104 A 1 b. Box 2. Note. 19 Feb. 1985. Denmarks position on questions of human rights in international
development cooperation.
23
DMFA. 104 A 1 b. Box 1. 17 Nov. 1978. Dan Mission New York. ECOSOC's report. The human rights situation in
Chile.
24
DMFA. 104 A 1 b. Box 2. Note. 19 Feb. 1985. Denmarks position on questions of human rights in international
development cooperation.
25
DMFA. 104 A 1 b. Box 2. Note to P.I.-ER. The Council of Europes Parliamentary Assembly. 22 March, 1983.
Henning Kjeldgaard.
26
DMFA. 104 A 1 b. Box 3. 4 Dec. 1986. Explanation of vote on behalf on Denmark, Iceland, Sweden and Finland by
Ambassador Reijo Korhonen, Permanent Representative of Finland. See also 104 A 31. Box 16. Confidential. Summary
of Nordic Foreign Ministers meeting in Oslo, 17-18 Oct., 1985.


33

27
S. Kaur-Pedersen, Spiren til dansk udviklingspolitik 1945-62, pp. 24-115, in: C. Due-Nielsen, O. Feldbk og N.
Petersen, Idealer og realiteter. Dansk udviklingspolitisk historie 1945-2005 (Copenhagen 2008), pp. 58-9; Olesen,
Stabilitet og turbulens, pp. 295-302.
28
H. H. Vik, 'Small, not weak? Nordic strategies to influence the World Bank in the 1980s', pp. 333-63 in: H. Pharo and
M.P. Fraser (eds.), The Aid Rush, Aid regimes in Northern Europe during the Cold War, vol. 1 (Oslo 2008), pp. 345-58.
Norway's policy in the World Bank during the 1960s and 1970s has been analyzed in B. T. Rosendahl, Bank og bistand
prinsipper og realpolitik, unpublished MA thesis (University of Oslo 1998). I have not been able to consult this MA
thesis.
29
DMFA. 104 A 1 b. Box 2. Note. 19 Feb. 1985. Denmarks position on questions of human rights in international
development cooperation.
30
DMFA 104 A 1 b. Box 1. Note. Human rights policy. Minister Lise stergaard, November/December 1978; Olesen,
Stabilitet og turbulens, p. 285.
31
DMFA. 104A 1 b. Box 2. Note. Request by Guatemala for Danish support for World Bank loan. 3. Nov. 1983.
DMFA. 104 A1b. Box 2. Note. 19 Feb. 1985. Denmarks position on questions of human rights in international
development cooperation.
32
DMFA. 104 A 31. Box 4. Note. Human Rights in the international financial institutions. 2 Jan. 1978. (The quote
above is translated by author).
33
Nordisk Embedsmandskomit.
34
DMFA. 104 A 31. Box 4. Note. Informal meeting in the Nordic Officials Committee. Stockholm, 9-10 Jan. 1978.
Discussions on human rights in international financial institutions.
35
DMFA. 104 A 31. Box 4. Note. Informal meeting in the Nordic Officials Committee. Stockholm, 9-10 Jan. 1978.
Discussions on human rights in international financial institutions.
36
DMFA. 104 A 31. Box 4. Note. Informal meeting in the Nordic Officials Committee. Stockholm, 9-10 Jan. 1978.
Discussions on human rights in international financial institutions.
37
Translation by author. Quote in original: MR-reservationernas inrikespolitiska bakgrund och nmnde att en
frutsttning fr att kunna ha en positiv instlling til Vrldsbanken och IDB i Danmark var, att regeringen frhll sig
kritisk til vissa mottagarlnder. DMFA. 104. A1 b. Box 2. Summary of Nordic World Bank Meeting in Helsingfors 9-
10 Nov. 1982.
38
DMFA. 104. A1 b. Box 2. Summary of Nordic World Bank Meeting in Helsingfors 9-10 Nov. 1982.
39
DMFA. 104. A1 b. Box 2. Summary of Nordic World Bank Meeting in Helsingfors 9-10 Nov. 1982.
40
DMFA. 104 A1 b. Box 3. 12 Aug., 1986. Preparation note [Beredskabsnotits]. Nordic Chiefs of Development
meeting: Multilateral development banks.
41
DMFA. 104 A1 b. Box 3. 12 Aug., 1986. Preparation note [Beredskabsnotits]. Nordic Chiefs of Development
meeting: Multilateral development banks.
42
DMFA. 104 A1 b. Box 3. 12 Aug., 1986. Preparation note [Beredskabsnotits]. Nordic Chiefs of Development
meeting: Multilateral development banks.
43
DMFA. 104 A1b. Box 2. Note. 19 Feb. 1985. Denmarks position on questions of human rights in international
development cooperation.


34

44
DAC in Dates. The History of OECDs Development Assistance Committee, p. 18, available at
<www.oecd.org/dataoecd/3/38/1896808.pdf> (accessed 13 Jul. 2010).
45
Olesen, Stabilitet og turbulens, pp. 284-5; DMFA. 104 S 6. Box 25. Note. D.2. The consequences of the basic needs
strategy for Denmarks bilateral development aid. 7 Mar. 1978. (Quotes translated by author).
46
DMFA. 104 S 6. Box 9. Summary concerning examination of Denmark in DAC, 15 Dec. 1978.
47
DMFA. 106 S 6. Box 46. Statement by Mr. Henrik Whlk, Under-Secretaty of State, Danish Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. DAC Joint Review Meeting, 20-21 Jun. 1988. Agenda Item 3: Review of Aid in the Nineties.
48
DMFA. 106 S 6. Box 46. Contribution to the Danida overview. DAC High Level meeting, 5-6 Dec. 1988. 8 Dec.
1988.
49
DMFA. 106 S 6. Box. 46. Statement by Mr. Henrik Whlk, Under-Secretaty of State, Danish Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. DAC Joint Review Meeting, 20-21 Jun. 1988. Agenda Item 3: Review of Aid in the Nineties.
50
DMFA. 104 A 12. Box 9. Summary of Nordic meeting between Heads of Development Agencies. 24-25 Jun., 1988.
(Quote translated by author).
51
DMFA. 104 A 1 b. Box. 2. Note. Denmarks position on the question of human rights in the multilateral financial
institutions. 22 Oct. 1984.
52
Arts, Integrating Human Rights into Development Cooperation: the Case of the Lom Convention (The Hague 2000).
53
Olesen, Stabilitet og turbulens, pp. 277-8; M. Lister, The European Community and the Developing World. The
Role of the Lom Convention, (Aldershot 1988); Arts, Integrating Human Rights, p. 333.
54
DMFA. 104 A 1 b. Box. 2. Note. Denmarks position on the question of human rights in the multilateral financial
institutions. 22 Oct. 1984.
55
DMFA. 104 A 1 b. Box 1. Note. Human rights in the EC development aid policy, in particular the Lom Convention.
8 Mar. 1978.
56
DMFA. 104 A 1 b. Box 1. Note. Human rights in the new Lom Convention. 17 Nov. 1978.
57
DMFA. 104 A 1 b. Box 1. Speech by Minister without Portefolio, Lise stergaard, at the Council conference with
Commissioner Cheysson. 12 Feb. 1979.
58
(trffe egnede foranstaltninger, my translation, km). DMFA. 104 A 1 b. Box 2. Note. 19 Feb. 1985. Denmarks
position on questions of human rights in international development cooperation.
59
DMFA. 104 A1b. Box 2. Note. 19 Feb. 1985. Denmarks position on questions of human rights in international
development cooperation.
60
DMFA. 104 A1b. Box 2. Note. 19 Feb. 1985. Denmarks position on questions of human rights in international
development cooperation.
61
Arts, Integrating Human Rights, p. 333.
62
DMFA. 104 A 1 b. Box 2. Note. 19 Feb. 1985. Denmarks position on questions of human rights in international
development cooperation. Ibid. Note. Denmarks position on the question of human rights in the multilateral financial
institutions. 22 Oct. 1984. For an analysis of Denmarks development aid to South America, see J. Pedersen, Danmark
og Latinamerika. Udviklingsbistand mellem solidaritetsarbejde og international politik, in: Den Jyske Historiker, no.
129, 2008, pp. 36-55.
63
DMFA. 104 A 1 b. Box 2. Note. Denmarks relation with Bolivia. 21 Sept. 1982.


35

64
(betydelige forbedringer, my translation, km). DMFA. 104 A 1 b. Box 2. Note. Denmarks relation with Bolivia. 21
Sep. 1982.
65
DMFA. 104 A 1 b. Box 2. Note. Denmarks relation with Bolivia. 21 Sep. 1982.
66
DMFA. 104 A 1 b. Box 2. Note. 19 Feb. 1985. Denmarks position on questions of human rights in international
development cooperation. The Market Committee (today the European Committee) was a parliamentary committee
with which the Danish government should consult in EC matter and which negotiated the mandate to the Danish
government prior to meetings in the EC Council of Ministers. See T. Knudsen, Fra folkestyre til markedsdemokrati.
Dansk demokratihistorie efter 1973 (Copenhagen 2007), pp. 177-80.
67
DMFA. 104 A 1 b. Box 2. Note. 19 Feb. 1985. Denmarks position on questions of human rights in international
development cooperation.
68
PR, 21 May, 1987, clm. 12200-12222.
69
Danida, Strategisk planlgning, vol. 10 (Copenhagen 1988), p. 95. (Translation by author).
70
Ibid. My translation, km.
71
Danida, Strategisk planlgning, vol. 1 (Copenhagen 1988), p. 31, 35, 40, 44 and pp. 48-59.
72
Danida, En verden i udvikling strategi for dansk udviklingsbistand frem mod r 2000 (Copenhagen 1994).
73
E.g. Danida, Danidas rsberetning (Copenhagen 1996), pp. 17-9.
74
Danida, En verden i udvikling, p. 74.
75
Bach, Foregangslandet under forandring 1989-2005, pp. 473-4.
76
Bach, Foregangslandet under forandring 1989-2005, pp. 475-7.
77
Ibid., p. 417.
78
Ibid., p. 418. (Translation by author).
79
Ibid., p. 418. (Translation by author).
80
Ibid., p. 481.
81
Danida, En verden i udvikling. (Translation by author).
82
Danida, Globalisering, 2006-2010 (Copenhagen 2005).
83
Det internationale menneskerettighedsarbejde. Strategi for regeringens tilgang. 2009. See
http://um.dk/da/~/media/UM/Danish-site/Documents/Politik-og-diplomati/Fred-sikkerhed-og-
retsorden/Dansk%20Menneskerettighedspolitik/1MRstrategi.ashx (accessed 8 August 2012).
84
Danida, Vilje til udvikling (Copenhagen 2006), p. 3.
85
Danida, 2007, p. 10.
86
(Translation by author). The webpage quoted from does unfortunately no longer exist.
<www.um.dk/da/menu/udviklingspolitik/temaerIBistanden/Godregeringsfoerel,> (accessed 28 April 2009). A similar
understanding of development can be found in Danida, Frihed fra fattigdom frihed til forandring. Strategi for
Danmarks udviklingssamarbejde. 2010. See http://um.dk/da/~/media/UM/Danish-site/Documents/Politik-og-
diplomati/Fred-sikkerhed-og-
retsorden/Dansk%20Menneskerettighedspolitik/StrategiforDanmarksudviklingssamarbejde.ashx (Accessed 8 August
2012).


36

87
Hans Davidsen-Nielsen, 'Sren Pind lgger hrdt ud med Mugabes diktaturstat', in: Politiken 24 Feb. 2010.
http://politiken.dk/politik/ECE909369/soeren-pind-laegger-haardt-ud-med-mugabes-diktaturstat/ (accessed 24 Feb.
2010).
88
Danida, Freedom from Poverty. Freedom to Change, 2010, p. 15.
http://www.netpublikationer.dk/um/10529/pdf/freedom_poverty_freedom_change.pdf( accessed 8 August 2012).
89
'Kup in Niger bekymrer Danmark', in: Jyllands-Posten 19 Feb. 2010. http://jyllands-
posten.dk/international/article4332185.ece (accessed 8 August 2012).
90
Radio Broadcast, P1 Morgen, 3 Mar. 2010. (Translation by author).
91
Bach, Foregangslandet under forandring 1989-2005, p. 395. Statistisk rbog 1994, 1995.
92
Bach, Foregangslandet under forandring 1989-2005, p. 395, 410.
93
Ibid., p. 416-8. Statistisk rbog 2002.

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