INFORMATION MANIPULATION THEORY

STEVEN A. McCORNACK
One way of thinking about how deceptive messages are generated is in terms of how
the information that interactants possess is manipulated within the messages that they
produce. Information Manipulation Theory suggests that deceptive messages function
deceptively because they covertly violate the principles that govern conversational
exchanges. Given that conversational interactants possess assumptions regarding the
quantity, quality, manner, and relevance of information that should be presented, it is
possible for speakers to exploit any or all of these assumptions by manipulating the
information that they possess so as to mislead listeners. By examining various message
examples, it is demonstrated that IMT helps to reconcile previous disagreement about
the properties of deceptive messages.
R
esearchers studying deception recently have begun to argue that deceptive-
ness is a message property that reflects a kind of functional adaptation to the
demands of complex communication situations (McCornack, 1988; Metts &
Chronis, 1986). Individuals frequently are confronted with situations in which
they must reconcile the competing goals of conveying information that their
conversational partners are entitled to have and minimizing the damage that
conveying that information might cause (Bowers, Elliot, & Desmond, 1977;
Metts & Chronis, 1986; Turner, Edgley, & Olmstead, 1975). One strategy for
reconciling these goals is to present altered information. Thus, one way to
describe deceptive messages is in terms ofthe ways that sensitive information is
manipulated and controlled (Turner et al., 1975).
Despite recognition that deceptive messages involve the manipulation of
sensitive information, most deception researchers have paid little attention to
the content of these messages (Bavelas, Black, Chovil, & Mullett, 1990). As a
result, many researchers share an overly simplistic conceptualization of decep-
tive message design. For example, though it has been demonstrated that
message deceptiveness often arises from extremely subtle shading of the infor-
mation that is presented (McCornack, 1988), communication researchers con-
tinue to code deceptive messages into global categories of "deception types."
The primitive view of deceptive messages shared by many researchers stems
from two sources. First, researchers of deception are interested primarily in
topics other than message design, such as the nonverbal cues associated with
deception and the variables that influence accuracy in detecting deception. In
conducting experiments, researchers often instruct subjects to either "tell the
truth" or "lie" (e.g., BuUer, Strzyzewski, & Comstock, 1991; Greene, O'Hair,
Cody, & Yen, 1985; McCornack & Levine, 1990; Toris & DePaulo, 1985). The
repeated usage of this type of method has engendered belief in a false distinc-
tion: that messages produced within actual interaction are either "truthful" or
"distorted" (see Bavelas et al., 1990, for further discussion of this problem).
Second, those researchers interested in deceptive messages often use recall
methods to generate message examples.' Subjects typically are instructed to
Steven A. McCornack is an assistant professor and 1991/1992 Lilly Endowment Teaching f
Department of Communication at Michigan State University. The author is indebted to Dr.
O'Keefe, without whom this project would not have been possible.
COMMUNICATION MONOGRAPHS, Volume 59, March 1992
Fellow in the
Barbara J.
2 COMMUNICATION MONOGRAPHS
"think of a situation in which you were not truthful with a partner, and describe
what was said" (e.g., Metts, 1989). Given this procedure, it is not particularly
surprising that the messages generated are the most salient and clear-cut
examples of deception, examples that can be coded easily into categories such as
"falsification" and "omission." However, there has been a notable failure on the
part of deception researchers to examine the deceptive messages that individu-
als produce when faced with difficult situations (McCornack, 1988).
The goal of this essay is to examine the difFerent ways that information can be
manipulated in the production of deceptive messages. In doing so, a theory for
describing the range of variation observable in deceptive message design will be
presented and discussed. It will be argued that deceptive messages are unique
from other forms of discourse in that they involve deviations from what can be
considered rational and cooperative conversational behavior. When presented
within ongoing conversations, deceptive messages mislead listeners through
covertly violating the principles that underly and guide conversational under-
standing (Bowers et al., 1977). Because assumptions about the quantity, quality,
manner, and relevance of information that is disclosed serve as guidelines for
the effective and efficient use of language in conversation (Grice, 1989), decep-
tiveness can arise from varying the amount of information that is disclosed, the
distortion of information, the use of conventionally ambiguous phrases, and/or
varying the relevance ofthe information that is presented.
Deceptive Message Types
Researchers interested in deceptive message design traditionally have taken
one of two approaches in conceptualizing such messages: thinking of deceptive
messages as distinct "strategies" or "types," or thinking of deceptive messages as
message forms resulting from the manipulation of information in difFerent
ways. Most communication researchers interested in deception have opted for
the former approach (e.g., Aune, Metts, & Ebesu, 1990; Metts, 1989; Tolhuizen,
1990).^ For example, Metts (1989) explored "the form and function of deception
in close relationships" (p. 159). She had subjects respond to items regarding a
particular close relationship, and then "describe in as much detail as possible a
situation in which you were not completely truthful with the person you have
been thinking about" (1989, p. 164). Based upon her data, Metts (1989)
specified three difFerent basic "lie types": Falsification (asserting information
contradictory to the true information or explicitly denying the validity of the
true inFormation), distortion (manipulation oF the true inFormation through
exaggeration, minimization, and equivocation, such that a listener would not
know all relevant aspects oF the truth or would logically misinterpret the
inFormation provided), and omission (withholding all references to the relevant
inFormation). A category labelled "escape" was used as a default category For
uncodable responses (see Metts, 1989, p. 165).
There are two problems inherent within most type/strategy approaches that
limit both the validity and generalizability oFthe constructed taxonomies. First,
messages involving Fundamentally difFerent types oF inFormation manipulation
are conceptualized as similar and treated methodologically as identical. For
example, Metts (1989) coded messages presenting distorted inFormation, mes-
sages presenting truthFul but irrelevant inFormation, and messages presenting
INFORMATION MANIPULATION THEORY 3
equivocal inFormation all as "distortion," despite the Fact that they each involve
distinctly difFerent types oF inFormation manipulation (Bavelas et al., 1990;
Turner et al., 1975). Second, message examples are generated through the use
oF recall methods. By having subjects recall "instances in which they were
untruthFul" (e.g., Metts, 1989), one guarantees a sample oF messages that
involve the most salient examples oFdeception, but are not necessarily indicative
oF how people deceive within actual conversations.' McCornack (1988) has
demonstrated that when individuals are asked to produce messages in response
to difficult relational contexts (rather than recall them), the deceptive messages
that are produced are uncodable using a "deception types" coding system. Metts
recognized this limitation in her discussion, noting that her results "can be
explained, in part, as an artiFact oFthe stimulus question" (1989, p. 172).
Multi-Dimensional Approaches to Deceptive Message Design
An alternative to the type/strategy approach is to conceptualize deceptive
messages as a potentially infinite class oF specific message Forms resulting From
the manipulation oFinFormation in particular, characteristic ways. For example,
Ekman (1985) has argued that
There are two primary ways to lie: to conceal and to falsify. In concealing, the liar withholds
some information without actually saying anything untrue. In falsifying, an additional step is
taken. Not only does the liar withhold true information, but he [sic] presents false information
as if it were true. Often it is necessary to combine concealing and falsifying to pull off the deceit, but
sometimes a liar can get away just with concealment. (1985, p. 28, emphasis added)
Implicit within this commonly-cited definition oF lying is the assumption that
individuals can "play" with the inFormation they disclose in at least two difFerent
ways: they can adjust the amount oFinFormation that is disclosed, and they can
choose to disclose False inFormation. By noting the possibility oF various
"combinations," Ekman presumes that both the amount and veracity oFinForma-
tion disclosed can be adjusted to produce specific deceptive message Forms.
The idea that message deceptiveness arises From the manipulation oFinForma-
tion was first empirically documented by Turner et al. (1975). Similar to Ekman
(1985), Turner et al. (1975) argued that inFormation can be manipulated along
two primary dimensions: concealment and distortion. They tested their two-
dimensional hypothesis by having subjects record a significant conversation
with a relational partner. Subjects then reviewed and evaluated their verbal
expressions For attempts at inFormation control.
Turner et al. (1975) Found that the messages generated could be described in
terms oF how they varied along the two proposed dimensions."* However, they
also discovered a third way in which inFormation could be varied: relevance. As
they noted, a distinct class oFinFormation control acts within the conversations
that they examined were "diversionary responses," acts that maximized inForma-
tion control not simply by concealing or distorting, but by diverting the
conversation away From the information that the actor desired to withhold.^
Thus, while these acts did not involve the presentation oFany distorted inForma-
tion, they Functioned in a decidedly deceptive Fashion (Turner et al., 1975).
While Turner et al. (1975) were the first to recognize three difFerent ways
inFormation could be manipulated in the production oFdeceptive messages, the
work oF Bavelas et al. (1990) examining equivocation has demonstrated that the
4 COMMUNICATION MONOGRAPHS
manner in which inFormation is presented can also be exploited to produce
deceptive messages. Bavelas et al. argued that there are
. . . two distinct coordinates on which messages can vary: truthfulness and equivocality. What
is said can range from true to false; how it is said can range . . . from clear to equivocal. (1990,
p. 177, emphasis in the original)
Bavelas et al. (1990, p. 261) defined "message equivocality" in terms oFFour
sub-components: clarity oFthe inFormation presented, claiming ownership over
the inFormation presented, recognition oF the listener within the message, and
relevance oFthe message to the preceding discourse.^ Based upon findings From
a series oFstudies, they concluded that "the solution . . . is to recognize explicitly
the multidimensional nature oF intuitive conceptions oF deception and begin a
systematic identification oF the various dimensions being invoked" (1990, p.
175).
Summary
Researchers have noted that individuals produce deceptive messages by
manipulating inFormation in one (or any combination) oF Four primary ways:
manipulating the amount oFinFormation that is disclosed, distorting the inForma-
tion that is disclosed, presenting the inFormation in an equivocal Fashion, and/or
presenting inFormation that is irrelevant to the preceding discourse. While each
oF these Forms oF inFormation manipulation has been recognized by difFerent
researchers as influencing the deceptiveness oF messages, no attempt has been
made to develop a theory that consolidates these difFerent Forms oFinFormation
manipulation into a workable Framework For describing deceptive messages. In
Fact, no theory oF any kind has been introduced as a basis For examining
inFormation manipulation, or the difFerent observable Forms oF deceptive mes-
sages. The goal oFthe remainder oFthis essay is to present just such a theory.
CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURE
In a series oF lectures delivered at Harvard in 1967, Paul Grice presented a
theory oF language usage that has come to be known as his theory oF conversa-
tional implicature.' Grice noted that
Our talk exchanges do not normally consist of a succession of disconnected remarks, and
would not be rational if they did. They are characteristically, to some degree at least,
cooperative efforts; and each participant recognizes in them, to some extent, a common
purpose or set of purposes, or at least a mutually accepted direction. This purpose or
direction may be fixed from the start (e.g., by an initial proposal of a question for discussion),
or it may evolve during the exchange. . . . But at each stage, some possible conversational
moves would be excluded as conversationally unsuitable. (1989, p. 26, emphasis in the
original)
Grice argued that participants within any interaction are expected to Follow a
general principle, namely
Make your contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted
purpose or direction ofthe talk exchange in which you are engaged. One might label this the
Cooperative Principle. (1989, p. 26)
INFORMATION MANIPULATION THEORY 5
Grice also specified "Four categories under one or another oF which will Fall
certain more specific maxims and submaxims, the Following oF which will, in
general, yield results in accordance with the Cooperative Principle" (1989, p.
26). The maxim oF Quantity relates to expectations regarding the amount oF
inFormation that should be provided within a message. In ordinary conversa-
tions, it is assumed that conversational contributions will be as informative as is
required (and not more inFormative), given the demands oFthe situation.^ The
maxim oF Quality relates to expectations regarding the veracity oF inFormation
that is presented. Participants are expected not to present inFormation that they
know to be False, nor make claims For which they lack adequate evidence. The
maxim oF Relation suggests that participants will make their contributions
relevant, given the constraints established by the preceding discourse. As a final
maxim, Grice argued For Manner, which he viewed "as relating not (like the
previous categories) to what is said, but rather, to how what is said is to be said"
(1989, p. 27, emphasis in the original). This includes the expectation that
participants will avoid obscurity and ambiguity, and will present inFormation in
a brieFand orderly Fashion.
As Levinson has pointed out (1983), there is an immediate objection to Grice's
theory as a model oFconversation. While this view oFindividuals always speaking
inFormatively, truthFuUy, relevantly, and clearly may describe a "philosopher's
paradise" (Levinson, 1983), conversational interactants do not consistently
adhere to these maxims. But, Grice did not envision these maxims as guidelines
to which interactants strictly adhere; rather, in most ordinary conversations
interactants orient in a general Fashion to these maxims, such that "when talk
does not proceed according to their specifications, hearers assume that, con-
trary to appearances, the principles are nevertheless being adhered to at some
deeper level" (Levinson, 1983, p. 102).
This belieF in cooperativeness allows people to make sense oF conversational
acts that blatantly violate maxims (e.g., sarcasm). Because individuals assume
adherence to the Cooperative Principle (CP) despite surFace deviations From the
maxims, they are able to understand such statements as meaning something,
namely something difFerent From their surFace meaning. Such blatant and overt
violations of maxims Grice labelled "flouts" (see Grice, 1989, pp. 30-31, For a
detailed discussion oFthe inFerential process associated with flouting).
INFORMATION MANIPULATION THEORY
In contrast to the collaborative and cooperative efFort involved between
speaker and hearer in producing and understanding flouts, Grice noted that
speakers may also "quietly and unostentatiously violate a maxim" (1989, p. 30).
In these cases, the violation is not so blatant as to be obvious to the recipient, and
is not readily advertised as a violation by additional supportive behaviors (e.g..
Facial expression, vocal intonation). It is the principal claim oF InFormation
Manipulation Theory that messages that are commonly thought of as deceptive derive
from covert violations of the conversational maxims. Because the speaker purpose-
Fully violates one (or more) oF the maxims, s/he deviates From what can be
considered rational and cooperative behavior (i.e., behavior that adheres to the
CP). Because the violation is not made apparent to the listener, the listener is
6 COMMUNICATION MONOGRAPHS
misled by her/his assumption that the speaker is adhering to the CP and its
maxims.^
The production and presentation oF messages that are deceptive can be
considered a phenomenon in which speakers exploit the belieF on the part oF
listeners that they (i.e., speakers) are adhering to the principles governing
cooperative exchanges. Deceptive messages are "deceptive" in that, while they
constitute deviations From the principles underlying conversational understand-
ing, they remain covert deviations.'" Listeners are misled by their belieF that
speakers are Functioning in a cooperative Fashion (i.e., actually adhering to the
maxims).
InFormation Manipulation Theory can account For the various Forms oF
deceptive messages noted by previous researchers (i.e., Bavelas, 1989; Ekman,
1985; Metts, 1989; Turner et al., 1975). Individuals possess Four types oF
expectations regarding the transmission oFinFormation: expectations about the
quantity oF relevant inFormation that is transmitted, expectations about the
quality oFthe inFormation transmitted, expectations about the manner in which
inFormation is presented, and expectations about the relevance oF conversa-
tional contributions. When speaking, an individual can covertly violate any or all
oFthese expectations in transForming the inFormation that s/he possesses so as to
deceive a listener. Put difFerently, there are at least Four dimensions along which
inFormation can be varied in the production oF deceptive messages: manipula-
tions oi Quantity (as noted by Ekman, 1985; Metts, 1989; Turner et al., 1975),
manipulations of Quality (as noted by Ekman, 1985; Metts, 1989; Turner et al.,
1975), manipulations of Relation (as noted by Turner et al., 1975), and manipu-
lations ofManner^^ (as noted by Bavelas et al., 1990).
The argument that verbal deception stems From violations oF the CP is not
entirely new. Bowers et al. (1977) argued that within many contexts, interact-
ants exploit implicatures by producing "devious" messages: "messages designed
by the respondent to mislead the demander without making the respondent
subject to the negative sanctions attached to lying" (1977, p. 238). As they noted,
interactants are oFten placed within communicative contexts in which the
relevant response is either a "yes" or a "no." Communicators Frequently
respond to such situations "by saying something other than (or in addition to)
the only semantically-adequate response" (1977, p. 236). Because oFthe CP (and
implicatures that are generated From it), individuals
. . . habitually process pragmatically responses that do not fulfill demands semantically
because we assume good faith in the respondent. . . . Therefore, we muddle through our
symbolic lives seldom saying exactly what we mean but being adequately understood anyway.
(Bowers et al., 1977, p. 238)
Bowers et al. (1977) also described a difFerent type of situation: one in which
individuals perceive that telling the complete truth or lying would both be costly
to them. It is this type oFsituation that gives rise to devious messages. As Bowers
etal. (1977) described, "the devious respondent exploits the demander's inclina-
tion to deduce an answer From a hypothesized state oF afFairs which makes the
actual response relevant to meeting the demand made" (p. 238).
While Bowers et al. (1977) pointed to the Fact that deception can stem From
exploitation oF the CP, they Failed to discuss the particular ways in which
inFormation could be transFormed in order to enact deceptive messages (i.e..
INFORMATION MANIPULATION THEORY 7
exploitation oF the specific maxims). They chose instead to explore the issue oF
how one could potentially detect such messages (see Bowers et al., 1977, pp.
239-241). As they concluded, "we have shown the explorer how to get to various
points but not what he or she will find there" (1977, p. 241).
USING IMT TO EXAMINE DECEPTIVE MESSAGE DESIGN
In order to explore just how inFormation can be manipulated within decep-
tive messages, a set oFdeception-provoking situations was created. From this set,
three difFerent situations were selected. Respondents generated messages in
response to these situations. These messages subsequently were used as the basis
For both the current analysis and the empirical test oF IMT reported in the
companion to this essay.
Situation Generation
Undergraduate communication students {N = 36) were solicited on a volun-
tary basis at a large midwestern university. Respondents were told that the goal
oFthe project was to examine difFerent situations in which deception occurs, and
were asked to think oF a recent situation in which they had verbally deceived a
dating partner. Respondents were then asked to write a detailed description oF
the situation, including a description oFthe relationship, the setting, and details
regarding what was said between the interactants. Upon completing this task,
respondents were thanked For their participation and were assured that their
responses would remain confidential.
OFthe 36 descriptions collected, 15 were sufficiently detailed to be used as
stimulus materials. These situation descriptions were then edited to preserve
confidentiality. In addition, descriptions were re-worded such that they could
be used as "hypothetical" descriptions oFpresent situations, rather than descrip-
tions oF past situations. All other inFormation in the responses was leFt intact,
with the exception oFthe deceptive responses oFthe individuals. In place oFthe
original names used by the respondents in their descriptions, gender-neutral
fictitious names were added.
Situation Evaluation
A sample oF 113 respondents was solicited From undergraduate communica-
tion classes at the same university. Respondents participated during regularly
scheduled class time. Respondents were asked to read each oFthe 15 hypotheti-
cal situations previously generated. After reading each situation, respondents
answered two questions. The first asked them to describe how much they agreed
with the statement, "I would be likely to produce a message in this situation that
somehow distorts or withholds relevant inFormation." Respondents rated their
agreement on Four 7-interval semantic difFerential scales: likely/unlikely, proba-
ble/improbable, possible/impossible, and true/False. The second question asked
respondents how much they agreed with the statement, "It would be difficult in
this situation to be completely truthFul to my partner." Respondents once again
rated their agreement using the Four semantic difFerential scales.
Scores For the eight semantic difFerential items were then tested as a single
index oF "lie potential," using confirmatory Factor analysis. The data were
consistent with a unidimensional structure For lie potential across all 15 situa-
COMMUNICATION MONOGRAPHS
TABLE 1
DECEPTION PROVOKING SITUATIONS
Committed Chris
You have known Chris for over two years, and have been dating for over a year. Because ofthe
length ofthe relationship, you feel very close to her/him. Recently, however, your feelings have begun
to change. Chris is extremely jealous, and the two of you have recently been arguing about almost any-
thing. Chris is in the phase where s/he wants to have a serious committed relationship, but now you feel
like you want to date others. Recently you have been dating someone else, unbeknownst to Chris. This
other relationship has been a lot of fun, and has recently become more intense, both sexually and emo-
tionally.
One night when you and Chris are out, Chris is acting really cold. Suddenly, s/he looks at you and
says, "Lately you've been acting really distant. Is there anything wrong?"
Intrudingjo
Jo is a friend that youVe known since last year. Both of you lived in the same apartment complex.
You got to be very close friends last year. Jo wanted the two of you to date, but you thought that the two
of you lived too close together, and you really didn't feel like dating her/him anyway. Last Thursday
night you and Jo go out and things are really fun. You find yourself attracted to Jo, and you decide that
you would like to start dating Jo as more than just a friend. You tell Jo that you would like to start going
out. You already have another date planned for that Friday night, with someone whom you're also very
interested in. You decide not to tell Jo about it until you are certain just what her/his intentions are as
far as your relationship is concerned.
On Friday night, your date is supposed to arrive at seven p.m. At five minutes to seven, the doorbell
rings. Rushing to the door, you open it to find Jo standing there with a bottle of wine and a huge smile.
Jo says, "I thought you might like some company!"
Upstate Terry
You have been dating Terry for nearly three years. You feel very close and intimate toward her/him.
Because Terry goes to a different school upstate, the two of you have agreed to date other people. Nev-
ertheless, Terry is very jealous and possessive. You see Terry only occasionally, however, you call each
other every Sunday, and talk for an hour. On Friday one of your friends invites you to a party on Satur-
day night, but the party is "couples only," and so in order to go you need a date. There is no way possi-
ble that Terry could come down for the weekend. You decide to ask someone from your Comm class
whom you've been attracted to so that you can go to the party. The two of you go to the party, and end
up having a great time.
On Sunday afternoon, your doorbell rings, and it is Terry. Terry walks in and says, "I decided to
come down and surprise you. I tried calling you all last night, but you weren't around. What were you
doing?"
tions. Respondents' scores on these eight items were summed to create an index
of "lie potential" For each respondent that could potentially range From 8 (low)
to 56 (high). The 15 situations were then rank-ordered in terms oF their mean
potential For eliciting deception. To ensure variation in message Form, three
difFerent situations were selected From the middle oFthe order.'^ These situa-
tions are described in Table 1.
The mean lie potentials For upstate Terry (M = 40.19, SD = 13.19) and
committed Chris (M = 41.54, SD = 11.75) were not significantly difFerent,
<(111)= 1.17, m. Neither was the mean For intruding Jo (M = 39.23,5D = 13.61)
significantly difFerent From upstate Terry, t{lll) = .89, ns, nor that oFcommitted
Chris From intrudingjo, <(111) = 1.60, ns.
Message Generation
Undergraduates (A^ = 295) were solicited on a voluntary basis From communi-
cation classes at a large midwestern university. Respondents were asked to
complete a questionnaire during regularly scheduled class time during which
they produced a message in response to one oFthe three potentially lie-eliciting
situations previously described. Respondents were assured oF confidentiality
INFORMATION MANIPULATION THEORY 9
and were asked to write what they would actually say iFthey were Faced with that
situation. Respondents were not told that these situations were potentially
lie-provoking. Ninety-seven respondents were assigned to "committed Chris,"
101 respondents completed "intrudingjo," and 97 respondents received "up-
state Terry." The examples that Follow were all derived From this response pool.
Message Examples
According to IMT, one possibility For dealing with the competing demands oF
situations such as "committed Chris," "intruding Jo," and "upstate Terry" is
simply to disclose all oFthe sensitive inFormation, in a Fashion that complies with
Grice's maxims. Similar to messages produced by individuals possessing an
expressive message design logic (O'KeeFe, 1988), such messages involve a
one-to-one relationship between the sensitive inFormation that is possessed and
the inFormation presented within the message. For example:
(#1) "Chris, I haven't really been honest with you. I don't feel the same about you or our
relationship any longer. I know I was wrong in waiting this long to tell you. I have been
seeing someone else. It started out as a fun thing but has recently gotten more intense.
And yes, if you're wondering what I mean by "more intense," I mean more intense
physically and emotionally. I'm sorry ifi am hurting you by telling you this, but there's
really no easy way to do this."
(#2) "Jo, I'm afraid this may hurt your feelings. I probably should've told you this before.
I'm expecting other company here any minute. I have a date witb this other guy that
I'm interested in also. I feel like I was keeping it from you, but I didn't really mean to.
It was just tbat I was afraid I'd lose your interest if I told you, and I don't want to lose
your company."
(#3) "Terry, I was out last night at a party. Since I figured you couldn't make it and we
decided to date other people, I asked this chick from my Comm class wbo I like if she'd
go. We had a really good time. If you feel like we need to talk through dating otber
people again tben let's do it."
Each oF these messages displays a clear and direct representation oFthe sensitive
inFormation that is possessed, without any attempt to manipulate inFormation to
mislead the listener.
Quantity Violations
A second option For dealing with the disclosure oF sensitive inFormation is to
alter it in terms oFthe amount oFsensitive inFormation that is presented. In cases
oF"pure" manipulation oF Quantity, messages are truthFul, relevant, and clear,
but involve the disclosure oFnone or only some oFthe sensitive inFormation that
is possessed. For example:
(#4) "Jo, thanks for stopping by! That was really sweet and thoughtful of you. I really want
to see you, but not tonight. Sorry!"
This response involves no notable distortion or Fabrication. In addition, it is a
completely relevant response (i.e., it is a direct reFusal oFJo's implicit bid to
spend the evening together). How the inFormation within this utterance could
be expressed more clearly is difficult to imagine. Yet, in contrast to the first three
examples, this response discloses none oFthe sensitive inFormation possessed by
the individual, thus it violates the maxim oFQuantity.
Manipulations oF Quantity are not limited to complete omission. Individuals
10 COMMUNICATION MONOGRAPHS
also produce messages that involve varying degrees oF inFormativeness. For
example:
(#5) "Terry, I went out to a party. It was a lot of fun."
(#6) "Terry, I went to a party one of my friends was baving."
(#7) "Terry, I went to a party one of my friends was having. It was a blast."
When compared with the inFormation that is possessed, these three messages
do not involve the presentation oF Fabricated or distorted inFormation and thus
are "truthFul." They constitute relevant and clear responses, given the expecta-
tions For disclosure established by Terry's preceding utterance oF "What were
you doing?" They also disclose some ofthe "sensitive" information, namely that
a party was attended and (in two of the three cases) Fun was had. Yet, these
messages are deceptive because they Fail to disclose the critical piece oF the
contextually-relevant sensitive inFormation: that the party was attended with a
date. IF hypothetical Terry received any oF these messages, and assumed (as
many relational partners would) that all relevant inFormation was being dis-
closed, Terry would be deceived.
An individual can disclose almost all oF the relevant inFormation within a
situation, yet selectively edit out a critical piece oF inFormation so as to mislead
her/his partner. For example,
(#8) "Yes, Chris, tbere is something wrong. Recently I feel as if we are growing furtber and
further apart. All we ever seem to do is fight! And your jealousy is really getting on my
case. I know tbat you are interested in a serious thing right now, but I am just not
ready. In fact, I think we should both see otber people."
In this message, the respondent discloses nearly all the sensitive information
possessed, including her/his desire to date others. Similar to messages five, six,
and seven, this message is inFormative, honest, clear, and relevant. Given the
expectations For disclosure established by Chris's preceding utterance, hypothet-
ical Chris likely would perceive this message as having complied with the maxim
oF Quantity (i.e., as having disclosed all relevant inFormation). Yet, the critical
piece oF incriminating inFormation (i.e., that s/he has already begun seeing
others, and is currently involved in another romantic entanglement) has been
edited out. Similar to messages five, six, and seven, the deceptiveness oF this
message arises From the manipulation oF Quantity that occurs within it, the
particular Facet oFthe sensitive inFormation that it Fails to disclose.'^
Quality Violations
Messages involving manipulations oF Quality are perhaps the most prototypi-
cal "deceptive messages," in terms oFhow theorists and laypersons traditionally
have thought oF deception. These messages involve distorted versions oF the
sensitive inFormation, or the presentation oFcompletely Fabricated inFormation.
For example:
(#9) "No, Chris, tbere isn't anything wrong. I'm just stressing about exams."
(#10) "Jo, Hi! How are you? Jo, it's really nice of you to come over tonight, but I really don't
feel very well and I'm staying in tonight by myself. I really need a nigbt on my own to
tbink about some of my problems. I will give you a call tomorrow."
(#11) "Terry, I went out to the bars with my friends. We bad a few drinks and tben went back
to one of their apartments to watch a movie."
Each oF these messages would be described by previous researchers as "lies"
INFORMATION MANIPULATION THEORY 11
or "Falsifications." Although their most noteworthy Feature is that all oF the
inFormation that is disclosed is complete Fabrication, they also involve violations
oF Quantity that contribute to their status as deceptive. These messages are not
deceptive simply because they disclose False inFormation, but because they also
Fail to disclose any oFthe relevant truthFul inFormation.'''
Individuals can manipulate Quantity and Quality independently in the mes-
sages that they produce. For example:
(#12) "Terry, I went to a party witb a bunch of friends. I really bad a good time. It was a lot of
fun."
In this example, the individual discloses some of the sensitive inFormation that
s/he possesses, but attenuates it by providing additional False inFormation along
with it, namely that the party was attended with "a bunch oF Friends" (as
opposed to "a date").'* This type oF combination (i.e., moderate violations oF
both Quantity and Quality) gives rise to the type oF message described by
previous researchers as "halF-truths" (e.g., Metts & Chronis, 1986).
Individuals can also disclose most or even all oFthe sensitive inFormation that
is possessed, but alter its meaning by including additional False inFormation. For
example:
(#13) "Chris, yeah, tbere is sometbing wrong. We bave been fighting all tbe time! Your
jealousy is getting way out of band. You're pressing me to commit, and I just don't
tbink I'm ready yet. I've been feeling recently like I want to date otber people. Don't
think that I would ever do something like that without telling you, because I wouldn't! It's just my
feelings toward you have begun to change."
(#14) "Well, Terry, on Friday a friend of mine invited me to a party for Saturday night. I
really wanted to go, but unfortunately we had to have a date. I would have asked you,
but you couldn't make it down, so I asked tbis guy wbo I used to like from my Comm
class to go with me. We went to tbe party together and everything, but he was really kind
of boring, and it turned out to be a drag. Please don't feel threatened by this."
(#15) "Jo, Wow! Tbanks for stopping by! I'd really love to spend some time witb you, but I
already bave a date with someone else for tonight. It's this guy that I used to like, but
recently he's been getting on my nerves, and so I am just kind of going out with him out of a sense
of obligation. I hope you understand. You're not mad, are you?"
Upon examining message examples 9 through 15, it becomes apparent that
manipulations oFQuantity and Quality can occur in an independent Fashion. An
individual may disclose none, some, or even all oFthe sensitive inFormation that
is possessed, and yet alter the way in which it will be interpreted by including
Fabricated inFormation.
Messages 12-15 would be treated as identical by previous researchers, and
would be coded as the same "type": "distortion." Yet, these messages involve
very difFerent combinations oF information (and very difFerent degrees oF a
Quantity violation). From this analysis, we can begin to see that by placing
messages into global categories (rather than construing them as existing at the
intersection oF multiple dimensions), we necessarily lose inFormation relevant to
the subtle message Features that potentially influence deceptiveness.'^
Relation Violations
Another linguistic option is For speakers to manipulate the inFormation that
they possess in terms oFits relevance. By Failing to respond in a relevant Fashion
(given the constraints established by the partner's previous utterance), an
12 COMMUNICATION MONOGRAPHS
individual can divert the course of the conversation away From potential
disclosure oF"dangerous" inFormation. For example:
(#16) "Ob my gosh, Chris! You asking me that just reminded me of something! My professor
in Comm today was talking about relationships and infidelity, and it was tbe most
depressing lecture I bave ever heard! Have you taken that relationships class?"
(#17) "Terry! Wow! I can't believe you're here! I wisb I had known you were coming, then I
could've planned sometbing for us to do tbis afternoon. By the way, it's great to see
you! How was your trip down?"
(#18) "Terry! Wby didn't you tell me you were coming!? I mean, I know tbat you get
paranoid some times, but driving all tbe way down here just to check up on me is a bit
ridiculous, don't you tbink? How would you Uke it if I paid a sneak visit to you and
acted like a bitcb by surprising you and asking you wbat you had been doing?"
The most noteworthy characteristic oFeach oF these responses is that they Fail
to answer (directly or indirectly) the question that has been asked. Instead, they
each initiate new topics in order to divert the direction oFthe conversation away
From its projected course. Thus, they are each "irrelevant" in terms oF the
conditional relevance that is established by the preceding act (ScheglofF, 1972).
In addition, example 18 utilizes a "best deFense is a good ofFense" approach.
This is a clever Form oF Relation violation, in that it precludes the possibility oF
Further probing (on the part oF the partner) by casting up such probing as
situationally inappropriate (i.e., a "questioning oFtrustworthiness").
Although each oF these messages is truthFul and clear, they Fail to disclose any
oF the sensitive inFormation that is possessed by the interactants. In Fact, it is
difficult to conceive oF a way that someone could disclose any oF the sensitive
inFormation, yet produce a message that is irrelevant (in terms oFthe constraints
established by the preceding discourse). This is because the "relevance" oF a
message depends upon whether the contextually relevant inFormation is dis-
closed. Thus, while violations oF Quantity may or may not be relevant (see
previous examples), violations oF Relation appear to stem From extreme viola-
tions oF Quantity."
Manner Violations
A Fourth way that inFormation can be manipulated to deceive others is in
terms oF the manner in which it is presented. For example:
(#19) "Whaaa??! Uh, Jo, I really appreciate tbe surprise and would like to spend some time
with you, but I have plans for tonight. May I call you tomorrow so we can set
something up?"
This particular message example is not uninFormative, distorted, or irrele-
vant. Rather, it discloses some oFthe inFormation that is possessed, but does so in
an ambiguous Fashion. The inFormation possessed (i.e., "I have a date") is
transFormed into "I have plans," the result being polite ambiguity. This type oF
message is not a "lie": according to the inFormation possessed, the individual
does indeed "have plans." The issue is one oF clarity oF expression, as noted by
Bavelas etal. (1990).
Similar to the relationship between Quality and Quantity, manipulations oF
Manner can occur independent From manipulations oF Quantity. For example:
(#20) "Gee, Jo, I'm sorry, I'm really busy. Maybe tomorrow!"
(#21) "Sorry Jo, I have a previous engagement."
(#22) "I'm sorry Jo, I'm going out."
INFORMATION MANIPULATION THEORY 13
Each oF these messages involves manipulating clarity oF expression to conceal
the Fact that one actually has a date. At the same time, these messages also vary in
terms oFtheir inFormativeness. While the nature oFthe specific action to be taken
remains ambiguous, a general course oF action is described when an individual
specifies "going out," or the existence oFa "previous engagement." This stands
in stark contrast to "I'm busy," in which the course oFaction to be taken remains
completely veiled.
As Brown and Levinson (1978) have noted, indirect expressions such as polite
equivocation are oFten used in order to protect the Face oF other interactants.
Yet, ambiguity is also exploited to deceive others (McCornack, 1988). While
manipulating the clarity oFinFormation is distinctly difFerent From manipulating
inFormation in other ways (Bavelas et al., 1990), the messages presented as
examples 19, 20, 21, and 22 would either be coded as "distortion" or "uncodable"
by previous deception researchers.
CONCLUSIONS
In this essay, InFormation Manipulation Theory has been presented as a way
oF reconciling disagreement about the properties oF deceptive messages. IMT
argues that one way oF thinking about how deceptive messages become
"deceptive" is in terms oF how the inFormation that interactants possess is
manipulated within the messages that they produce. Given that conversational
interactants possess expectations regarding inFormation quantity, quality, man-
ner, and relevance, it is possible For speakers to violate any or all oF these
expectations in attempting to deceive listeners. Thus, verbal deception can be
characterized as a particular sub-class oF uncooperative acts, a sub-class of acts in
which the principles guiding cooperative exchanges are covertly violated.
A second goal of this essay was to demonstrate (in a preliminary Fashion) the
utility oF IMT For describing the types oF messages that are produced within
contexts in which competing demands are present. From the messages dis-
cussed (as well as the patterns observed by several previous researchers), it is
apparent that inFormation can be manipulated along a number oF difFerent
dimensions in attempting to mislead interactional partners, and that individuals
choose to exploit this range oF options in dealing with difficult communication
situations.
As a system For describing deceptive messages, IMT is not meant as the basis
For generating "a taxonomy oF deception types," but as a descriptive tool For
addressing particular messages. Any message can be coded in terms oF how it
varies along Four difFerent dimensions, all oF which may influence its deceptive-
ness. Thus, any particular message can be assigned a position within Four-
dimensional space (i.e., at some particular intersection oF quantity/quality/
relevance/manner). Although only relatively "pure" Forms oF manipulation
were addressed in this paper, there are a multitude oF possible combinations oF
manipulations that can potentially occur.'^
Three additional issues merit discussion, the first being the relative compe-
tence oF the message examples presented. Although examples one, two, and
three can be described as technically "cooperative" (in terms oFhow they adhere
to the maxims), one would be hard pressed to assess these as competent ways oF
dealing with the particular contexts in question. How competent is it to tell Jo
(given Jo's immediately preceding utterance) that "I have a date, and it's with
14 COMMUNICATION MONOGRAPHS
someone else I am very interested in"? Such a disclosure, given the lack oF a
specific request For such inFormation on the part oFJo, would be distinctly
incompetent, in that it would threaten both Jo's Face and the likelihood oF
preserving any Future relationship with Jo. As O'KeeFe and McCornack (1987)
have demonstrated, messages that dump all available salient mental contents
regardless oF contextual constraints are Frequently rated as less competent and
less successFul at maintaining Face.
Second, upon Further examination oFthe relationship between conversational
principles and deceptiveness, one finds that individuals can produce messages
that adhere to all oF Grice's maxims, hut present them in such a Fashion that the
listener is misled. For example, an individual could respond to Terry by saying,
"Oh, I had a great time, I went to this party with this guy From my Comm class
who I really like" in such a Fashion that it sounds sarcastic (i.e., like a flout). In
cases such as this, speakers would not be exploiting the assumption of adherence
to the maxims, but exploiting the assumption of cooperation underlying the
collaboration between speakers and hearers in producing and deducing flouts.'^
Should hypothetical Terry later confront the issue, the speaker could always
claim that s/he was being completely truthful (and, in Fact, s/he would have
adhered to all oF Grice's maxims), yet s/he would have produced a Fundamen-
tally deceptive message. This possibility suggests a realm oF deceptive messages
beyond the immediate conceptual scope oF IMT: messages that mislead not
through the manipulation oFinFormation, but through the generation oFdecep-
tive implicatures.^"
Finally, one untested assumption underlying this essay is that manipulations
oF inFormation in the difFerent ways discussed result in "deceptive" messages.
Although it seems intuitive that the manipulation oF sensitive inFormation gives
rise to messages that are deceptive, whether or not these messages are perceived
as deceptive remains an empirical question in need oF testing.
By thinking oF verbal deception as something that can be accomplished by
manipulating inFormation in various ways, we can begin to isolate the particular
Features oF messages that potentially influence deceptiveness. This is difficult
when one relegates messages to broad categories oF "deception types." In the
companion to this essay, the relationship between specific message Features,
message deceptiveness, and message competence is empirically investigated.
However, such testing stands as merely a beginning toward developing a Full
understanding oFnot just the properties that make certain messages "deceptive,"
but the contextual, individual, and linguistic antecedents oFsuch messages.
ENDNOTES
'A notable exception to this is the work of Camden, Motley, and Wilson (1984). They had respondents
record, over a two-week period, interactions in which they told what they believed was a "white lie."
However, Camden et al. (1984) chose to classify deceptive acts in terms ofthe social motivations for the
acts, rather than the particular ways in which sensitive information was handled within messages.
^Extreme examples of this approach are those studies that have ignored altogether the actual features
of deceptive messages, and instead used factor analysis to generate "taxonomies of deceptive acts" based
upon the difFerent dictionary terms related to deception (e.g., Buller, 1986; Hopper & Bell, 1984).
'Recall methods are particularly useful if one's goal is to determine the type of deception scripts that
individuals possess.
Using these two dimensions as a conceptual foundation. Turner et al. (1975) generated a more
discriminating taxonomy of specific message types. They specified seven different forms of information
INFORMATION MANIPULATION THEORY 15
control: lies, exaggerations (types I and II), half-truths (types I and II), secrets, and diversionary
responses (see Turner et al., 1975, for details).
^The fact that deceptive messages may involve diversion, not distortion, also was recognized by
Camden et al. (1984) in their study of white lies. In their taxonomy of motivations for lies, they noted that
many lies are designed with the goal being to control the conversation, either by redirecting it or by
withholding critical sensitive information (see Camden etal., 1984, p. 313).
^Although Bavelas et al. (1990) argued that message relevance is an issue of "clarity," their notion of
relevance is virtually identical to that noted by Turner et al. (1975) in their discussion of "diversionary
responses."
Although some may argue that Grice's arguments do not constitute "a theory," his arguments
regarding conversational implicature are consistently characterized by philosophers and sociolinguists as
"Grice's Theory of Conversational Implicature" (see, for example, Levinson, 1983, p. 100).
'Grice's intent is not to suggest that individuals are expected to disclose every piece of information that
they possess within every situation. Rather, the constraint upon disclosure is one of "disclose what is
perceived to be situationally relevant." Because what constitutes "situationally relevant information to
disclose" is subjectively determined, the possibility for both misunderstanding and exploitation is
generated.
'Grice noted tbat when covert violations occur, speakers will "in some cases . . . be liable to mislead"
(1989, p. 30). He failed to discuss this issue further.
'"Obviously there will be interactions in which one cannot covertly violate a maxim. One of the
implications of IMT is that particular contextual features (such as the partner's immediately preceding
utterance) establish constraints upon what is relevant and rational behavior, and thus establish
parameters upon how information can be manipulated and still remain a covert manipulation. For
example, if one demands of one's partner, "Did you or did you not sleep with the babysitter?!," one's
partner cannot respond by saying, "Have I told you how much I love you recently?" and expect to have
this blatant violation of Relation go unnoticed.
"Although Bavelas et al.'s (1990) notion of "message clarity" fits best under the heading of "Manner,"
their sub-components of clarity involve message features related to other maxims. As noted previously,
Bavelas et al. (1990) described relevance as an issue of "clarity," while Grice would label this as an issue of
"Relation." "To what extent the message is addressed to the other person in the situation" (Bavelas et al.,
1990, p. 261) is also an issue Grice would most likely categorize as one of "Relation," while "to what extent
this message is the speaker's own opinion" (p. 261) appears to be wholly unrelated to the maxims
proposed by Grice.
''If the situations selected were too high in "lie-potential," all respondents would simply "lie" (i.e.,
manipulate Quality), whereas if the situations were too benign, respondents would simply produce
truthful messages. Thus, three situations were selected from the middle ofthe order to ensure adequate
variation in message design.
"This type of message is commonly labelled a "white lie" by laypersons (see Gamden et al., 1984, for
details on "white lies").
'* Ekman (1985) recognized this when he argued that "in concealing, the liar withholds some
information. . . . In falsifying, an additional step is taken" (1985, p. 28, emphasis added).
''The claim that this message involves "the presentation of some fabricated information" assumes that
one draws the implicature that "bunch of friends" is logically tied to "went." If one draws the implicature
that "bunch of friends" is actually tied to "party," one finds that this message becomes a pure violation of
quantity (i.e., equivalent to "I went to a party" -I- "I partied with a bunch of friends"). This stands as
further evidence of the striking and subtle relationship between implicatures that are drawn within
conversations and deceptiveness.
'^The author would like to thank judee Burgoon for her suggestions regarding this point.
"Turner et al. noted this fact when they argued that "diversionary responses" stem from complete
concealment (1975, p. 77).
'"Claiming that "there are a multitude of possible combinations" is probably a drastic understatement.
Preliminary evidence (McCornack, 1988) suggests that the vast majority of deceptive messages involve
subtle and complex combinations, not "pure" forms.
''The author is indebted to Kelly A. Morrison for her contributions to this argument.
Bowers et al. (1977) noted the possibility of deceptive implicatures in their discussion of "devious"
messages. However, they were more interested in the detection of such messages than in the particular
features of these messages.
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