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2014 46: 199 originally published online 22 January Administration & Society
Karen Baehler, Aviva Chengcheng Liu and David H. Rosenbloom
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Examples From the United States and the People's Republic of
Mission-Extrinsic Public Values as an Extension of Regime Values:

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Administration & Society
2014, Vol. 46(2) 199 219
The Author(s) 2014
DOI: 10.1177/0095399713515873
aas.sagepub.com
Article
Mission-Extrinsic Public
Values as an Extension of
Regime Values: Examples
From the United States
and the Peoples Republic
of China
Karen Baehler
1
, Aviva Chengcheng Liu
1
,
and David H. Rosenbloom
1
Abstract
The academic fields of public administration and public management are
diverging. Public management focuses primarily on the orthodox values of
efficiency, cost-effectiveness, and value for money. It views accountability
from the perspective of obtaining results (outcomes) defined in terms
of core mission objectives and the operations that are ancillary to their
achievement, such as deploying financial, human, and other resources
cost-effectively. Public administration is also interested in all of the above.
However, it retains the fields broad interest in regime values and other
public values. This analysis seeks to provide a clearer conception of mission-
extrinsic public values and their centrality to public administration in the
United States and the Peoples Republic of China.
Keywords
mission-extrinsic public values, regime values, China
1
American University, Washington, DC, USA
Corresponding Author:
David H. Rosenbloom, Department of Public Administration and Policy, School of Public
Affairs, American University, 4400 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20016-8070,
USA.
Email: rbloom@american.edu
515873AASXXX10.1177/0095399713515873Administration & SocietyBaehler et al.
research-article2014
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200 Administration & Society 46(2)
Introduction
The academic fields of public administration and public management are
diverging. Public management focuses primarily on the orthodox values of
efficiency, cost-effectiveness, favorable benefitcost ratios, and performance
measurement. It is also concerned with the tools of public management and
the key elements of contemporary collaborative governance, including out-
sourcing, designing contracts, managing and monitoring contractors, and
steering within the framework of networks. It views accountability from the
perspectives of obtaining results (outcomes) and creating value for money.
Results are overwhelmingly defined in terms of core mission objectives and
the operations that are ancillary to their achievement, such as deploying
financial, human, and other resources cost-effectively. Public administration
is also interested in all of the above. However, it retains the fields broader
interest in regime values and other public values that are often extrinsic to the
core missions of administrative agencies and programs.
Regime values embody normative preferences, beliefs, passions, and views
of government and society that are associated with a political communitys
founding and historical development (Rohr, 1978). Extrinsic public values are
generally less fundamental and more transitory. They are often embodied in
law and typically promote (a) broad political system attributes for good gov-
ernment and (b) specific macro-policy objectives. As Van Ryzin (2011) and
Wichowsky and Moynihan (2008) observe, such attributes and policies are
often related to trust in government and citizenship outcomes that are of
critical importance to vibrant democracy. These outcomes include social capi-
tal, efficacy, political participation, and civic engagement.
The desirability of specific public values is inherently contestable and
some contend that they are an impediment to cost-effective public manage-
ment. There is a long-standing debate over whether mission-extrinsic public
values can or should be created by the public administration community of
academics, practitioners, and pracademics. In this article, we seek to provide
a clearer conception of mission-extrinsic public values and their centrality to
public administration in the United States and the Peoples Republic of
China.
Regime Values and the Problem of Mission-
Extrinsic Public Values
John A. Rohr called attention to the importance of regime values in public
administration. Initially focusing on the United States, he explained that
regime values are the values of that political entity that was brought into
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Baehler et al. 201
being by the ratification of the Constitution that created the present American
republic (Rohr, 1978, p. 59). Distinguished from other political and moral
values, they encompass beliefs, passions, and principles that have been held
for several generations by the overwhelming majority of the American peo-
ple (Rohr, 1978, p. 65). The public administrators task is to ask, How can
I promote the values of the regime? in my daily work and exercise of official
discretion (Rohr, 1978, p. 61). This requires being well versed in the writ-
ings and speeches of outstanding political leaders, major Supreme Court
opinions, scholarly interpretations of American history, literary works of all
kinds, religious tracts and sermons, and even the rhetoric of standard Fourth
of July oratory (Rohr, 1978, p. 66). Rohrs emphasis was on promoting
within the bureaucracy a community of moral discourse centered on funda-
mental constitutional values, and it would
be no embarrassment if two bureaucrats choose interpretations of American
values that are mutually exclusive. The purpose of regime values is not to make
all bureaucrats march in lock-step. What is important is that they accept the
moral obligation to put themselves in touch with the values of the American
people through the values of the American regime. (Rohr, 1978, p. 74)
Regime values are deeply ingrained in the political community and basic
to its identity. Their promotion is in some respects public administrators
highest mission. Although there are trade-offs among regime values, such as
liberty or privacy and security, they trump other public values. In these
respects, they can be distinguished from mission-extrinsic public values,
which are more transitory and often associated with specific governmental
and policy issues or problems.
Mission-extrinsic public values are problematic in contemporary public
management because they are not typically central or ancillary to the achieve-
ment of public agencies core missions. In Koppells (2003) terms, these val-
ues are not mission-related (pp. 72-75). Rather they resemble non-mission
preferences. Mission-related activities can be defined as operations that
strike at the center of an organizations function and relate to the utiliza-
tion of an organizations core technology or competence (Koppell, 2003,
p. 73). By contrast, non-mission preferences address the manner in which an
agency pursues its policy objectives. They are often procedural in charac-
ter and distinguished by their broadness (Koppell, 2003, p. 73).
Building on Koppell (2003), non-mission preferences can be either inte-
gral or extrinsic to achieving core mission objectives. They are integral
when they produce better core mission results, whether directly or indirectly.
For example, President Obamas Executive Order 13514 (2009) develops a
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202 Administration & Society 46(2)
strategic planTo create a clean energy economy asserting that the fed-
eral Government must lead by example. It presents an overarching perfor-
mance plan and scorecard for all federal agencies. The order embodies the
public value of environmental sustainability and commits the federal gov-
ernment as a whole toward its achievement. For the majority of agencies
other than the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Department of
Energy, Department of Interior, and some units of the Department of
Agriculture, environmental sustainability is not a core mission objective.
Yet, pursuing it can be indirectly beneficial to them by reducing costs. For
example, the Department of the Treasurys core mission has little to do with
promoting environmental sustainability, which is not within its area of
administrative and technological expertise. Nevertheless, the Treasury noted
that implementation of the order would be administratively beneficial:
Using this scorecard as a benchmark, Treasury will identify and track the
best opportunities to reduce pollution, improve efficiency, and cut costs.
1
Consequently, as a class of public values, those that are extrinsic to par-
ticular agencies are potentially neutral in the sense that they do not necessar-
ily interfere with the achievement of core missions and may tangentially
improve them. Specifically, extrinsic public values (a) do not support achiev-
ing the central purposes, core activities, and raison dtre of agencies and
programs, (b) are unrelated to an agencys specialized competencies and
technologies, (c) promote preferences that are extraneous to organizational
missions and may even impede them, (d) are imposed across all agencies in
one-size-fits-all fashion that is not strategically tailored to individual mis-
sions, and (e) are not necessarily supported by agency leaders and personnel.
A clear example is the performance target of population control in China.
Population control is a fundamental public value, written into the post-Mao
Constitution. However, implementing population control frequently inter-
feres with the routine management of local governments because it sharply
raises the tensions between street-level bureaucrats and (rural) families who
eagerly want more (male) offspring. When this national public value turns
into a strict performance target with veto power
2
(Chan & Gao, 2009), it
makes local bureaucrats feel powerless: No matter how successfully local
officials have accomplished their mission-based targets, they run the risk of
being removed from leadership positions for failing to fulfill non-mission
based targets (Gao, 2009, p. 57s).
Not all preferences rise to the level of public values. Those that do are
generally associated with political system attributes or macro-policy objec-
tives. They enjoy legitimacy by virtue of their authoritative allocation by
lawful governmental action and/or their broad and widely accepted base in
professional, social, economic, or political practice. They are found
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Baehler et al. 203
in constitutions, public laws, executive orders, judicial decisions, and other
official proclamations and regulations that control administrative behavior.
For example, freedom of information relates to the political system attribute
of transparency, which promotes accountability and an informed citizenry. It
is a mission-extrinsic public value for the overwhelming number of agencies.
The United States and China have transparency regulations intended to pro-
mote accountability and open government (The State Council of the Peoples
Republic of China, 2007; The Freedom of Information Act [FOIA], 1966). A
bright line does not always separate mission-extrinsic public values from
other values, including regime values, or non-mission-related preferences.
It is important to draw a distinction between what is extrinsic on one hand
and what is ancillary, that is, overhead, staff as opposed to line, and mission
supporting activity such as human resources management, budgeting, and
information technology, on the other. Administrative operations designed to
contribute to an agencys ability to implement its core mission are integral,
rather than extraneous. However, distinguishing between the two may some-
times be difficult or impossible. Nevertheless, the distinction holds up rea-
sonably well overall and is central to the different foci of public management
and public administration.
U.S. Mission-Extrinsic Public Values
It would be difficult to generate a comprehensive list of mission-extrinsic
public values in U.S. federal administration. However, in addition to FOIA,
the following are illustrative.
Political System Attributes (Examples)
Statutes.
Administrative Procedure Act (1946); public and stakeholder participation
in rulemaking, transparency, fairness in administrative adjudication,
and accountability and adherence to the rule of law through judicial
review of agency actions.
Federal Advisory Committee Act (1972); stakeholder representation and
participation in agency decision making.
Privacy Act (1974); protection of individual personal privacy.
Government in the Sunshine Act (1976); open decision making by multi-
headed agencies.
Negotiated Rulemaking Act (1990), direct stakeholder participation in
writing substantive (legislative) administrative rules.
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204 Administration & Society 46(2)
Openness Promotes Effectiveness in our National Government (OPEN
Government Act, 2007); improved transparency under FOIA.
Executive orders (subject to subsequent revocation and amendment).
12866 (1993); general rulemaking guidelines and obtaining the views of
state, local, and tribal governments.
13132 (1999); vibrant federalism.
13576 (2011); efficient, effective, accountable government.
13579 (2011); periodic review of regulations by independent regulatory
agencies.
13610 (2012); identifying and reducing regulatory burdens.
Judicial decisions.
Cinderella Career and Finishing Schools, Inc. v. Federal Trade
Commission (1970); promotes principled and neutral decision making
in federal agency adjudication.
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe (1971); promotes the rule of
law in agency discretionary actions.
Harlow v. Fitzgerald (1982); public administrators liability for constitu-
tional torts.
Macro-Policy Objectives (Examples)
Statutes.
National Environmental Policy Act (1970), environmental protection and
sustainability.
Regulatory Flexibility Act (1980), Small Business Regulatory Enforcement
Fairness Act (1996); assessing negative impacts of agency rulemaking
on small entities.
Paperwork Reduction Acts (1980; 1995); reduction of the burdens associ-
ated with agencies collection information from private entities.
Assessment of Regulations and Policies on Families Act (1998); consider-
ation of the impact of agency actions on family structure.
Executive orders (subject to subsequent revocation and amendment).
12606 (1987); impact of agency proposed rules and actions on family
structure.
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Baehler et al. 205
12873 (1993); evaluation of environmental aspects of goods and services
purchased.
12898 (1994); environmental justice.
13101 (1998); recycling and reducing waste.
13148 (2000); environmental management systems (e.g., to reduce
pollution).
13423 (2007); environmental sustainability in purchasing goods and
services.
13524 (2009); acquisition of environmentally friendly products (e.g.,
energy efficient; recycled).
Judicial decisions.
Cleveland Board of Education v. La Fleur (1974); reproductive rights.
National Archives and Records Administration v. Favish (2004); protec-
tion of personal privacy under FOIA.
Chinese Mission-Extrinsic Public Values
Chinese mission-extrinsic public values offer an interesting comparison because
they are embedded in the fragmented authoritarian polity of the party-state
regime (Lieberthal, 2004). Below the very peak that establishes the nations
principal strategies and ideology, policy objectives, and performance targets,
administrative units operate on a polycentric and hierarchical basis. Compared
with U.S. agency-based performance management, the distinctive feature of the
Chinese approach is the broad use of mission-extrinsic public values across
agencies and levels of government, particularly with respect to major macro-
policy objectives. In Chinas civil law system, the Constitution sets up the fun-
damental mission-extrinsic public values of the regime. The Constitution of the
Peoples Republic of China (1982, as amended in 1988, 1993, 1999, and 2004)
widely sets forth the states political system attributes, macro-policy objectives,
and government administrative principles as follows:
Political System Attributes (Examples)
Chapter 1: General principles.
Article 2. All power of the state belongs to the people.
Articles 6 and 12. The basis of the socialist economic system is socialist
public ownership of the means of production. Socialist public property
is inviolable.
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206 Administration & Society 46(2)
Articles 11 and 13. The state protects the lawful rights and interests of the
non-public sectors of the economy. Citizens lawful private property is
inviolable.
Article 15. The state practices socialist market economy.
Article 24. The state strengthens the building of a socialist society with an
advanced culture and ideology by promoting education in high ideals,
ethics, general knowledge, discipline and the legal system . . .
Chapter 2: The fundamental rights and duties of citizens.
Article 33. All citizens are equal before the law. The state respects and
preserves human rights.
Articles 42 and 43. Citizens have the right as well as the duty to work.
Working people have the right to rest.
Article 46. Citizens have the duty as well as the right to receive
education.
Article 48. Women enjoy equal rights with men in all spheres of life . . .
The state protects the rights and interests of women, applies the prin-
ciples of equal pay for equal work, and trains and selects cadres from
among women.
Macro-Policy Objectives (Examples)
Chapter 1: General principles.
Article 14. The state continuously raises labor productivity and improves
economic results . . .
Articles 19 and 20. The state undertakes the development of socialist edu-
cation, works to raise the scientific and cultural level of the whole
nation, and promotes the development of the natural and social
sciences.
Article 21. The state develops medical and health services.
Article 22. The state promotes the development of art and literature, the
press, radio, and television broadcasting . . . and other cultural
undertakings.
Article 23. The state trains specialized personnel in all fields who serve
socialism, expands the ranks of intellectuals, and creates conditions to
give full scope to their role in socialist modernization.
Article 25. The state promotes family planning so that population growth
may fit the plans for economic and social development.
Article 26. The state protects and improves the environment in which peo-
ple live and the ecological environment.
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Baehler et al. 207
Administrative Principles (Examples)
Chapter 1: General principles.
Article 3. State organs apply the principle of democratic centralism.
Article 27. All state organs carry out the principle of simple and efficient
administration, the system of responsibility, and the system of training
functionaries and appraising performance constantly to improve the
quality of work and efficiency and combat bureaucratism. All state
organs and functionaries must rely on the support of the people, keep in
close touch with them, heed their opinions and suggestions, accept
their supervision, and do their best to serve them.
Chapter 3: The structure of the state.
Article 86. The Premier assumes overall responsibility for the work of the
State Council. The ministers assume overall responsibility for the work
of the ministries and commissions. The organization of the State
Council is prescribed by law.
Article 105. Governors, mayors, and heads of counties, districts, town-
ships, and towns assume overall responsibility for local peoples gov-
ernments at various levels.
Taken together, these and other mission-extrinsic public values enable
government to leverage agencies organizational resources in the pursuit of
objectives that are extraneous to the main purposes for which such adminis-
trative units were created and empowered.
3
They enable government to use
public administration as a tool not just for attaining core mission results, but
also for contributing to the achievement of a variety of political system and
macro-policy goals. They determine what substantial components of national,
state, and local administrative systems and their personnel do. They contrib-
ute a great deal to the definition of what public administration is.
Can the Public Administration Community Create
Mission-Extrinsic Public Values?
In the United States and China, the mission-extrinsic public values identified
were imposed on public administration by political authorities. However,
they are established, the desirability of mission-extrinsic public values in
administration is inherently contestable. Professor Steven Kelman, a leader
of the public management movement, opposes tacking them onto agency
operations. He maintains that, when we try to do everything, we accomplish
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208 Administration & Society 46(2)
nothing.
4
Other scholars take a less global stance in arguing against forcing
specific values on administration. For example, there has been a lively debate
on the desirability of using costbenefit analysis in regulatory administration
(Shapiro, 2010). An even broader debate involves the question of whether
these values can be imposed by the public administration community of
scholars, practitioners, and pracademics (see Lynn, 2009; Moynihan, 2009,
for some of the parameters of the debate).
This question was hotly discussed during the advent of the new public
administration in the United States in the late 1960s and 1970s. The new
public administration called on public administrators to use their positions to
promote social equity, now accepted by many as the third pillar of public
administration, along with economy and efficiency (Frederickson, 2010).
Although ill defined, promoting social equity generally means using public
administration as a vehicle for improving the circumstances of politically and
economically disadvantaged groups (Rosenbloom, 2005; Svara & Brunet,
2005). Victor Thompson vehemently attacked the effort to impose this value
on public administrative practice, calling it theft of the popular sovereignty
(Thompson, 1975, p. 66).
Thompsons vitriolic, wide-ranging critique of the new public administra-
tion may have detracted from his central point. He raised a legitimate two-
pronged question that remains unresolved. First, is public administration a
profession like law or medicine that can impose values and ethical standards
on its practitioners? Unlike law, medicine, and other professions, no license
or membership in specific associations is required to practice public admin-
istration. Its value system may be more flexible than those of other profes-
sions. Members of the public administration community may view a
commitment to public service as incorporating a host of values that do not
necessarily find their way into official governmental pronouncements or reg-
ulations. For instance, the American Society for Public Administration
(ASPA) Code of Ethics (2012) includes encouraging others, throughout
their careers, to participate in professional activities and associations. Today,
public service motivation
5
stands alongside social equity as a non-mission
preference that many view as an aspect of professionalism.
Second, if public administration is a profession, it is a profession of gov-
ernment (Chapman, 1959). As such, can private entities create its values or
must they be established through governmental action and/or long-standing
accepted practice? For public administrators in the United States and China
believing that something is in the public interest is not license to pursue it.
Guerilla government can promote the public interest, but its legitimacy is
dubious at best (OLeary, 2006). The pursuit of social equity may violate the
U.S. Constitutions equal protection clause (Adarand Constructors v. Pea,
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Baehler et al. 209
1995). In China, the acceptance of an ethical administration is rooted in its
bureaucratic history and the modern civil service system. The Civil Servant
Law of 2005 makes it explicit that all civil servants have the obligation to
lead as examples in social morals, work ethics, and public service. Within this
framework, the civil service system is primarily guided by the political direc-
tion and principles written in the Constitutions of the State and the Communist
Party.
Not being able to resolve these issues definitively, the public administra-
tion community can fall back on the claim of a legitimate role in advocating
for mission-extrinsic public values. But the limits are unclear. U.S. constitu-
tional law places greater restrictions on the freedom of speech of public
employees than on that of ordinary citizens and legal residents (Garcetti v.
Ceballos, 2006; Rosenbloom, OLeary, & Chanin, 2010, pp. 196-200). Civil
servants in China have the legal obligation to keep the secrets of the state
and the secrets related to his/her work (The National Peoples Congress of
the Peoples Republic of China, 2005). The conundrum is that while the saf-
est approach to defining and advocating mission-extrinsic public values is to
promote those enjoying some form of official recognition, it is also one that
is resistant to change.
How the Public Administration Community Shapes
Mission-Extrinsic Public Values: Transparency and
Environmental Justice as Illustrations
In the absence of definitive research in either the United States or China,
logic and experience suggest that public administrators may exert different
types of influence on mission-extrinsic public values depending on which of
the two types identified earlier is being examined. With respect to political
system attributes, we might expect rational agency heads to expend less polit-
ical capital trying to influence these more diffuse, process-focused policies
compared with substantive policies affecting their core business. An excep-
tion might occur when an agency stands to benefit specifically from one or
more political system attributes. For example, the New York State Department
of Environmental Conservation, which uses citizen participation special-
ists, could benefit from diffuse efforts by the state government to increase
citizen participation generally. Putting this exception aside, it seems reason-
able to hypothesize that public administrators will have less impact on the
creation of political-system-shaping public values than they do, on average,
for other types of policies. This is congruent with Rohrs analysis in the sense
that public administrators are expected to conform to and promote extant
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210 Administration & Society 46(2)
regime values (many of which concern political system attributes), not
attempt to create new ones.
Conforming to regime values encounters serious obstacles when public
administrators see hierarchically imposed values as threats to business as
usual. Yet even in a centralized polity such as China that features top-down
policy-making processes, public administrators often become advocates for
political system attributes. For example, when initially adopted as a modern
attribute of good governance and imposed by the State Councils regulations
in 2007, transparency was not only mission-extrinsic with respect to most
agencies but extremely unwelcomed by bureaucrats insider-only tradition of
doing business. The China Food and Drug Administration (CFDA) was no
exception in keeping matters secret. In fact, in May 2007,
6
the former director
of CFDA, Zheng Xiaoyu, was sentenced to death for corruption during his
8-year reign. Zheng personally approved unsafe medicines after taking bribes
from pharmaceutical companies, which led to tens of deaths. These matters
went unreported prior to the Beijing Courts sentence.
Chinese public administrators have gradually realized that transparency
not only guards the publics right to know, but also protects them from collid-
ing with unconstrained power and easy money. Facing widespread food and
drug safety crises, the then President Hu Jintao signed the Food Safety Law
of 2009, explicitly requiring the establishment of a national food safety infor-
mation system. CFDAs core mission today includes establishing unified
food safety information disclosure systems nation-wide and releasing major
food safety information.
7
Serving as a pilot to many other Chinese govern-
ment agencies, CFDA has created its own Weibothe Chinese version of
Twitterto post agency information as well as to interact directly with the
public, including more than 2 million followers. CFDA now takes charge of
releasing all information related to food and drug safety, which is listed by
the State Council as one of the nine government priorities of information
disclosure (General Office of State Council, 2013). The political system attri-
bute of transparency is no longer an extrinsic public value that is imposed
from the top or advocated exclusively outside the government. For agencies
like CFDA, information disclosure is increasingly integral to their perfor-
mance and credibility. Future case study research should focus on explaining
how and why these transformations occurred.
With respect to the other category of mission-extrinsic public values
macro-policy objectiveslogic suggests an even larger role for administra-
tive influence. On the demand side, creating macro-policies that take priorities
from one agencys portfolio and extend them across the whole of government
surely requires expert advice from administrators in the donor agency at
least. On the supply side, administrators in the donor agency will have strong
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Baehler et al. 211
incentives to shape and promote the process. Case studies are needed to test
these suppositions empirically.
A quick glance at one potential case studyenvironmental justice
reveals that the Presidents Council on Environmental Quality, U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights, and Congressional Black Caucus were the
first federal agencies to embrace the issue in the 1970s, while EPA came
late to the cause. Within EPA, environmental justice moved from being
virtually invisible in the 1970s and 1980s
8
to warranting establishment of
its own program office in 1992. Elevation to full status as a mission-extrin-
sic public value and macro-policy objective occurred just 2 years later
when President Clintons Executive Order 12898 (1994) on Federal
Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and
Low-Income Populations extended the goal to all federal departments.
Today, EPA has become a passionate advocate for environmental justice.
Administrator Lisa Jackson officially selected Expanding the Conversation
on Environmentalism and Working for Environmental Justice as one of
EPAs Seven Priorities for the Future in 2010.
9
This vignette raises important questions about the role of public adminis-
tration in generating and shaping mission-extrinsic public values: Did the
Presidents Council on Environmental Quality, the U.S. Commission on Civil
Rights, and the Congressional Black Caucus view environmental justice as a
cross-agency, macro-policy objective from the beginning? What caused the
EPAs position to shift from reluctance to advocacy? How did EPAs role
change after the executive order created environmental justice obligations for
all departments? Did the stature of the EPA under Administrator William K.
Reillys widely respected leadership contribute to environmental justices
elevation as a macro-policy objective? These types of questions merit inves-
tigation for macro-policies generally.
Speaking Truth to Power as the Normative
Standard: The Case of Social Equity
If the question for the public administrator remains how to improve laws
and policies to promote the public good
10
without exceeding ones authority,
the answer lies in Principle 5 of ASPAs 2013 Code of Ethics: Fully inform
and advise: Provide accurate, honest, comprehensive, and timely information
and advice to elected and appointed officials and governing board members,
and to staff members in your organization.
11
It has long been recognized that
public administrators exert considerable influence over policy making even
when they are not aggressively promoting a position (Heclo, 1977; Kaufman,
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212 Administration & Society 46(2)
2001). They do this by highlighting certain problems and conditions over
others and educating policymakers to view policy problems through particu-
lar conceptual lenses. As Weber contended, hierarchical authorities are often
dependent on subordinates expertise (Weber, 1958, chap. 8).
It is not surprising, therefore, that administrators technical and program-
matic knowledge and expertise appears to be the main source of their stand-
ing in the policy-making process (Kaufman, 2001). Nor is it surprising that
the exercise of knowledge and expertise defines the boundaries of public
administrations legitimate role in shaping mission-extrinsic public values.
By meeting elected and appointed officials demands for information and
advice fairly and disinterestedly, public administrators equip the policymak-
ers with what they need to improve laws and policies. In doing so, adminis-
trators contribute to the evolution and creation of mission-extrinsic public
values while conforming to regime values.
Properly understood, the role of public administrator requires thorough
knowledge of the law, deep expertise about programs, and high levels of
political nous, including deep appreciation for what it means to speak truth
to power (Wildavsky, 1987) while simultaneously implementing policies
that one personally may oppose. Of course, some policiesthose that are
illegal or clearly immoralshould not be implemented, in which case the
employee faces difficult choices about whether to protest within or outside
the agency, and when circumstances demand, to utilize the moral resource
of resigning (Dobel, 1999, p 248).
When truth calls for social change, speaking truth to power requires solid
evidence that status quo conditions are unacceptable and a firm foundation in
regime values to define what counts as unacceptable. With respect to social-
equity issues, for example, the embrace of environmental justice as a macro-
policy objective required the steady accumulation of data showing
disproportionate exposure to environmental harms in minority and low-
income communities, combined with appeals to the fundamental value of
equal protection under the law.
12
This was also the case with racial desegre-
gation in public schools as mandated by Brown v. Board of Education (1954),
which relied heavily on scientific evidence debunking long-held myths about
innate differences between races as well as social science evidence demon-
strating the adverse psychological effects of segregation on African American
children.
It is worth noting that both of these breakthroughs in social equitythe
embrace of environmental justice and the defeat of the separate-but-equal
doctrinefocused on remedying and preventing specific types of identifiable
harm to readily identifiable individuals and communities rather than entrench-
ing in law a preferred philosophical definition of distributive justice more
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Baehler et al. 213
generally. In contrast, Svara and Brunet (2005) promote the use of John
Rawls second principle of justice as fairness, sometimes referred to as the
difference principle or maximin criterion,
13
as a guide for public administra-
tors seeking to reduce inequality.
14
They do not explain, however, what might
give Rawlsian theory this preeminent standing. Rawls was a brilliant, path-
breaking philosopher, but neither the U.S. Constitution nor the regime values
that underpin it endorse anything like his difference principle.
Do current efforts to promote greater economic equality as a mission-
extrinsic public value meet the criteria of solid evidence and a firm connec-
tion to regime values? With respect to evidence, a quick review reveals a
rapidly accumulating body of research showing inequalitys deleterious
effects on important social indicators. For example, math and literacy scores
of 15-year-olds are lower in countries with higher levels of income inequality
(measured by the ratio of income received by the top 20% to the bottom 20%)
and in American states with higher levels of income inequality (measured by
the Gini coefficient; Wilkinson & Pickett, 2010). The same pattern holds for
mortality, infant deaths, AIDS, obesity, teen-age births, mental illness, illegal
drug use, homicide, conflict between children, numbers of incarcerated pris-
oners, and social immobility. Rates of all of these problems are greater in
states and countries with greater income inequality (Subramanian & Kawachi,
2004; Wilkinson & Pickett, 2010, 2006). This body of evidence might be suf-
ficient to warrant creation of a new macro-policy objective to alleviate
income inequalitywere it not for the fact that inequalitys harms and equal-
itys benefits appear to cut across population groups and social gradients. In
other words, increasing levels of income inequality appear to aggravate social
problems for the rich and the poor, and this striking fact makes it difficult to
individualize the harms of inequality and argue for discriminatory impacts
needing social-equity remedies. Although the empirically based insight that
inequality hurts everyone may support a utilitarian or greater-happiness
argument for adopting the macro-policy objective of reducing material
inequality, utilitarian principles of distribution have no more standing within
U.S. regime values than Rawlsian principles do. In this case, the availability
of strong evidence is not sufficient to create a mission-extrinsic public value
if normative justification rooted in regime values is missing.
It could be argued that any new mission-extrinsic public value aimed at
limiting income inequality belongs under the heading of political system
attributes rather than social-equity macro-policies. Nobel Laureate Joseph
Stiglitz (2012) has argued forcefully that growing social and economic
inequality threatens the quality of democracy in the United States and erodes
the rule of law. The problems associated with income inequality in China are
also perceived as problematic for governance. Stiglitzs arguments share
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214 Administration & Society 46(2)
some features with the growing literature on how inequality increases social
distance between people, which erodes trust and reduces peoples willingness
to cooperate toward solving problems (Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005; Uslaner,
2002; Wilkinson & Pickett, 2010). Should further research continue to con-
firm these relationships and generate strong evidence that inequality weakens
capacity for self-government, pressure may mount for government to take
action across departments to curtail the growth of inequality in the name of
democratic citizenship and fundamental political system attributes rather
than theories of distributive justice. Public administrators may play a role in
the creation of such a new mission-extrinsic public value by helping bring the
aforementioned evidence to light, vetting it, encouraging informed discus-
sion about its implications for democracy, and inventing options for statutory
or executive action.
In the end, perhaps Rawls observations on the process of working out
public values are more relevant to public administrators than his substantive
principles of just distribution. According to his method of reflective equilib-
rium, we can work out conflicts between our opinions on particular issues
and our broader values and principles through a reflexive, back-and-forth
process in which we test intuition against theory and theory against intuition
and modify either or both to achieve greater coherence (Rawls, 1971).
Reflective equilibrium is not a bad description of how good debates proceed.
In different language, Rohr called for a related discourse within the public
administration community on regime values. Public administrators contrib-
ute to the process through their information and advice, based on their exper-
tise in management, law, and politicsRohr would add, regime valuesbut
not their personal normative preferences.
Conclusion: Putting Core Mission Performance in
Its Place
Core mission results are neither everything nor the only thing in public
administration. They are clearly trumped by regime values, as Rohr explained.
In Jordan v. Gardner (1993), a U.S. federal court of appeals judge contended
that Single-minded inspector Javert is a monster, even though he focused
only on his duty and
a bland American civil servant can be as much of a beast as a ferocious
concentration camp guard if he does not think about what his actions are doing
. . . Half the cruelties of human history have been inflicted by conscientious
servants of the state. The mildest of bureaucrats can be a brute if he does not
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Baehler et al. 215
raise his eyes from his task and consider the human being on whom he is having
an impact. (pp. 1123, 1544)
Political system attributes and macro-policy objectives served by mission-
extrinsic public values such as transparency, environmental sustainability,
and environmental justice are of undeniably great importance because they
require precisely this raising of ones eyes from the task to consider its ripple
effects.
The narrowly focused public administration Orthodoxy of the 1930s col-
lapsed because it refused to recognize that political concerns are embedded in
administrative theory and practice (see Appleby, 1949; Waldo, 1948). Thirty
years ago, Rosenbloom took the now widely accepted position that public
administration includes at least three perspectives embedded in the U.S. sep-
aration of executive, legislative, and judicial powers: management, politics,
and law (Rosenbloom, 1983).
15
This framework has found extensive use out-
side the United States, suggesting that all governments have these functions;
however, they may be configured, and all three are involved in public admin-
istration (Rosenbloom, 2013). As Professor Beryl Radin contends in
Challenging the Performance Movement (2006), with its heavy emphasis on
performance, public management can only occupy a limited theoretical and
practical space within public administration if it fails to acknowledge the
complex goals of public action and, instead focuse[s] only on efficiency out-
comes (Radin, 2006, p. ix).
As a field, public administration has paid more attention to regime values
than mission-extrinsic public values. The purpose of this article has been to
provide a clearer conceptualization of mission-extrinsic public values, iden-
tify some of their sources, and clarify legitimate roles and efficacious means
by which the public administration community can contribute to their cre-
ation. Certainly, this article is not the last word on mission-extrinsic public
values. As the arguments presented here are augmented by reconceptualiza-
tion and empirical research, one basic claim surely will stand, that is, that
failure to incorporate these values into contemporary performance-oriented
public management risks impeding their achievement, adversely affecting
the quality and character of government and administration, undercutting the
attainment of macro-policy objectives, and narrowing the role public admin-
istration plays in public life.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research,
authorship, and/or publication of this article.
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216 Administration & Society 46(2)
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publi-
cation of this article.
Notes
1. U.S. Treasury Department Releases Scorecard on Sustainability Goals (June 15, 2012).
http://www.treasury.gov/about/organizational-structure/offices/Documents/Treasury%
20Releases%20Scorecard%20on%20Energy%20and%20Sustainability%20
Goals%20(2011).pdf.
2. Veto power means that if the target is not met, the officials performance is inad-
equate regardless of successfully meeting other targets or other achievements.
3. General mission-extrinsic public values may constitute a core mission for some
agencies. For instance, the executive orders on the environment are mission
based for the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).
4. Remarks at the Conference on Public Management in the Coming Decade: China
and the World, Fudan University, Shanghai, Peoples Republic of China (PRC),
July 16, 2011.
5. The literature on public service motivation does not conclusively link such moti-
vation to performance or establish whether successful performance generates
public service motivation. See Petrovsky (2009).
6. http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2007-05/29/content_6168200.htm
7. http://www.sfda.gov.cn/WS01/CL0003/
8. In 1971, EPAs first administrator, William D. Ruckelshaus, indicated that he
saw no connection between the agencys regulatory role and non-discrimination
aims (U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 2003, p. 1).
9. http://www2.epa.gov/aboutepa/seven-priorities-epas-future.
10. http://www.aspanet.org/public/ASPA/Resources/Code_of_Ethics/ASPA/
Resources/Code%20of%20Ethics1.aspx?hkey=acd40318-a945-4ffc-ba7b-
18e037b1a858, Principle 2.
11. http://www.aspanet.org/public/ASPA/Resources/Code_of_Ethics/ASPA/
Resources/Code%20of%20Ethics1.aspx?hkey=acd40318-a945-4ffc-ba7b-
18e037b1a858, Principle 5.
12. For a review of the literature underpinning the case for environmental justice,
see U.S. Commission on Civil Rights (2003). For a critique of that literature, see
Bowen (2002).
13. According to Rawls second principle, institutions should be arranged so that
social and economic inequalities increase the absolute standard of living for the
worst-off members of the society.
14. In doing so, they follow the founding of the New Public Administration move-
ment, which claimed Rawlsian social equity as its core ethical principle
(Cooper, 2004, p. 397). For the original arguments, see Public Administration
Reviews symposium on Social Equity and Public Administration, volume 34,
number 1, January-February, 1974.
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Baehler et al. 217
15. The fourth edition of Rosenblooms text (now going into eighth edition with
Robert Kravchuk and Richard Clerkin), Public Administration: Understanding
Management, Politics, and Law in the Public Sector (1998), which is based on
this framework, was listed as the fifth most influential book in the field published
from 1990 to 2010. See Kasdan (2012).
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Author Biographies
Karen Baehler is scholar in residence at American University's School of Public
Affairs, Washington DC. Her research interests include the philosophical foundations
of social policy and frameworks for policy analysis.
Aviva Chengcheng Liu is a PhD student in public administration and public policy
at American University, who specializes in comparative public administration, public
sector reforms, and health care systems.
David H. Rosenbloom is distinguished Professor of Public Administration in the
School of Public Affairs at American University in Washington D.C. He specializes
in public administrative theory and public administration and democratic constitu-
tionalism. He was a classmate of John Rohrs at the University of Chicago in the
mid-1960s.
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