The Issue:

The crisis in Ukraine is driven by

the ineffectiveness of the state,
a high level of corruption, and
economic ineffciency, as well
as by Russias aggression. A
combination of the geopolitical
appetites of Russia, the
shortcomings of the EUs foreign
and security policy, and the lack
of democracy and economic
effciency in Ukraine produced
disastrous consequences for the
country and regional security.
The upcoming elections will thus
be critical for both Ukraine and
the EU.
Policy Recommendations:
After the elections, the new
government in Ukraine has
to implement economic and
democratic reforms as well as
enhanced security arrangements
in order to strengthen Ukraines
sovereignty. The country needs
to make strategic changes in
its foreign and security policy,
while also stabilizing the east
of the country. In the long
term, provided that there is
successful confict settlement
in eastern Ukraine, NATO
membership would be the best
way to safeguard security in the
country.
Will Elections Make Ukraine Stronger?
by Mykola Kapitonenko
1744 R Street NW
Washington, DC 20009
T 1 202 683 2650
F 1 202 265 1662
E info@gmfus.org
Europe Program
Policy Brief
October 2014
Vol. 1, No. 2
Introduction
Te situation in Ukraine has hardly
improved since Petro Poroshenko
became president in May, three
months afer his predecessor, Viktor
Yanukovych, fed the country. Ukraine
is still fghting disintegration as Russia
continues its hybrid war on its terri-
tory. Exploiting Ukraines weaknesses,
Russia gains momentum and chal-
lenges all key areas of its neighbors
security. It is annexing parts of the
country, supporting separatists in
the East, waging trade wars, and
attempting to limit its freedom in
foreign policy.
Te economy is in a dire situation,
which is made worse by the high costs
of the war. Meanwhile, the recon-
struction of the countrys political
system and processes has just started.
Te security and economic circum-
stances make this a daunting task,
complicated further by the deep frag-
mentation of the Ukrainian political
landscape. Against this background,
the next government will have to
tackle profound strategic choices as
to Ukraines situation between Russia
and the West.
Military Efforts to Stabilize the
Country
To Poroshenkos credit, however,
Ukraine has made serious eforts to
respond to the Russian attack and
prevent disintegration. Yet the current
situation leaves little room for opti-
mism. With about 1,000 of its soldiers
killed
1
and about 1 million of its
civilians displaced,
2
the price of the
confict continues to rise for Ukraine.
Following a third military draf in
August, the number of Ukrainian
troops deployed in the East rose
to about 35,000. Separatist forces,
combining local rebels and Russian
military personnel, number around
15-20,000 and, as of August, were
located mainly in big cities and small
towns in the densely populated,
industrialized regions of Donetsk and
Lugansk oblasts (counties). An ofen-
sive by the Ukrainian military over
the summer resulted in it regaining a
number of towns, including Slovyansk
and Kramatorsk, the initial bases of
separatists. However, a strategic stale-
mate was reached once the Ukrainian
forces surrounded large urban centers.
1 Memory Book, http://memorybook.org.ua/index1.htm
2 Reuters, http://www.reuters.com/arti-
cle/2014/09/02/us-ukraine-security-displaced-idUSK-
BN0GX0Y020140902
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Europe Program
Large-scale military operations became impossible as they
posed too high a risk for civilians, and a blockade would
have been inefcient as the Ukrainian-Russian border in
Lugansk oblast was under control of rebels who continued
to get direct and full support from Russia. Using gaps in the
border, Russia supplied the rebels with weapons, including
tanks and artillery systems and volunteers. As a result,
the number of rebel troops has remained at the same
level, while Russia intensifed and upgraded its operations.
Consequently, Ukrainian forces found it increasingly dif-
cult to continue the ofensive. And, while they encircled
Donetsk and Lugansk, the incursion of Russian troops in
the small border town of Novoazovsk on August 27 opened
a new front and the confict escalated once again.
Te shooting down in July of fight MH17 by a surface-
to-air missile, reportedly fred by the separatists,
3
and the
recent escalation in fghting near the important coastal
city of Mariupol indicate Russias resolve to counter any
success Ukraine might have in fghting the separatists. Tat
has meant additional political pressure on the Ukrainian
government ahead of the coming parliamentary elections,
and efectively making the confict on Ukraines territory
a part of its political landscape for the foreseeable future.
A military deadlock, similar to the ones in the frozen
conficts in Moldova and Georgia, seems to ft Russias
plans perfectly. Tis situation will require the Ukrainian
government to undertake additional political steps and
negotiations toward the eastern oblasts, including some
form of power sharing.
Along with military eforts, steps have been taken to
stabilize Ukraine politically. Poroshenko dissolved the
Parliament at the end of August and early parliamentary
elections were scheduled for October 26. Elected in 2012
under the heavy infuence of the Yanukovych regime, the
current parliament proved unable to introduce reforms or
to react efectively to current external threats. For example,
in January a considerable number of members voted for
the authoritarian laws that prompted a new surge in the
Maidan protests.
3 Peter Baker, Michael Gordon, Mark Mazzetti. U.S. Sees Evidence of Russian
Links to Jets Downing, The New York Times, July 18, 2014, http://www.nytimes.
com/2014/07/19/world/europe/malaysia-airlines-plane-ukraine.html; Preliminary
Report, Crash Involving Malaysia Airlines Boeing 777-200 Flight MH17, The Hague, Sep-
tember 2014, http://www.onderzoeksraad.nl/uploads/phase-docs/701/b3923acad-
0ceprem-rapport-mh-17-en-interactief.pdf
In 2011, Yanukovych introduced a mixed electoral system,
in which half the members of parliament are elected on
a frst-past-the-post basis in districts, and the other half
on national party lists.
4
Tis resulted in a large increase
in the number of seats won by his Party of Regions in the
following years elections. While it only won 30 percent
of the votes on national lists, massive support from local
administrations and abuse of administrative resources led
to the Party of Regions winning almost half of the seats
elected in districts. Moreover, many members elected on
other party lists focked to the Party of Regions when the
parliament was formed.
Tis electoral system remains in place, and there are fears
of a repetition of the 2012 scenario, with the will of voters
again being perverted. More generally, the political system
remains fragile and corrupted, and considerable eforts
should be taken to achieve more transparency, account-
ability, and democracy.
Corruption is almost as big a problem as lack of secu-
rity. Initiatives such as a Committee on Lustration or an
Anticorruption Bureau, launched immediately afer the
Maidan, seem obsolete and have produced no practical
results. In April, the Parliament approved an anti-corrup-
tion law that addresses the lack of control over ofcials
in central and local government bodies, as well as over
policemen and judges. Te new anti-corruption body that
the law created is charged with tracing ofcials incomes
going back to 2010, and identifying past and new acts
of corruption. As practice suggests, though, law alone is
not enough to eradicate corruption; this takes political
resolve. Te next Parliament and government, backed by
electoral legitimacy, should be able to address corruption
vigorously, as part of a general strategy of strengthening
the state through democratization, power-sharing, and
4 Lack of unity within the opposition at the time made it easier for Yanukovych to get
the law passed. In Parliament 62 deputies (out of 156) from Batkyvschina and 36 (out
of 72) from Our Ukraine, two major opposition parties at that time, voted against chang-
ing the system.
Corruption is almost as big a
problem as lack of security.
3
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Europe Program
enhancement of mutual trust by building cooperation and
interdependence networks among societal groups, incorpo-
rating minorities, etc. Dismantling the authoritarian system
erected by Yanukovych is a key prerequisite, while efective
oversight by civil society will be more important than ever.
Faced with the real threat of disintegration and national
collapse, Ukrainian politicians will hopefully fnally mature
and work to bolster civil society.
A Fragmented Political Landscape
Ukraine lacks well-established political parties organized
along ideological lines. Before each election, new forma-
tions and parties mushroom that are in fact only diferent
combinations of the same politicians. Te party system is
in a constant process of reshufing and rebranding, with
parties emerging out of nowhere and disappearing afer
the next elections. Tey are ofen named afer certain
politicians and can be efectively transferred from one to
another. As a result, they are anything but a reliable tool for
translating societys desires into political decisions. A high
level of corruption and low level of input from civil society
make political parties instruments for various fnancial
groups and oligarchs.
Te Petro Poroshenko Bloc, which is leading in the polls
and is expected to score over 30 percent of votes, is no
more than a motley assembly of politicians who, most
likely temporarily, back the presidents program. It has been
recently created on the basis of Solidarnist, a party Porosh-
enko created in 2001. It has reached an agreement with the
Udar party, headed by Vitaliy Klitchko, over joint participa-
tion in the elections. Klitchko, currently the mayor of Kyiv,
heads the joint list, which is evenly divided between the
two parties. UDAR is strongly pro-European and generally
backs the presidents program.
Te heavyweight Batkivshchyna party, headed by former
Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, is expected to lose
support compared to the 2012 elections, when it was the
main opposition to Yanukovychs Party of Regions. In an
attempt to boost its appeal, it has placed Nadiya Savchenko,
the Ukrainian air force pilot currently detained in Russia,
at the head of its list, with Tymoshenko second. Batkivsh-
chyna has recently lost a number of prominent members,
most notably Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk and
Chairman of Parliament Olexander Turchynov. Tey are
instead running under the Peoples Front party, formerly
Yatsenyuks Front of Changes, which had joined Batkivsh-
chyna in 2013. Batkivshchyna and the Peoples Front Party
are pro-European and on the moderate lef. Before the split
Batkivshchyna was polling at about 14-15 percent of votes,
but its support will now be shared with Yatsenyuks new
political outft.
Several parties, including previously major ones, will
struggle to clear the 5 percent electoral threshold for
gaining representation in Parliament. Among them are
the far-right Svoboda and the far-lef and Communist
parties. Fearing falling under the threshold, the Party of
Regions recently withdrew from the race, afer it stood at 6
percent approval in opinion polls. Among the new parties,
two stand the best chance of making it into Parliament:
Civil Position, headed by the former minister of defense,
Anatoliy Hrytsenko; and the Radical Party, led by Oleh
Lyashko. Te former places anti-corruption and defense
at the top of its agenda and polls at about 9-10 percent,
while the latter is a populist outft that could end up an
unexpected runner-up in the elections, with polling scores
around 13 percent.
Maidan will bring some new people to the Parliament, but
they are unlikely to have a decisive voice in it. As Maidan
is not a political party, some of its members are running
on the lists of various parties, mainly the Poroshenko
Bloc and Peoples Front. Prominent journalists, like Serhiy
Leschenko and Mustafa Nayem, will likely be elected, as
well as several battalion commanders and social activ-
ists. Political parties have featured Maidan activists very
prominently in their campaigns, yet it remains to be seen
how they will carry the Maidan spirit into the new Parlia-
The party system is in a constant
process of reshuffing and
rebranding, with parties emerging
out of nowhere and disappearing
after the next elections.
4
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Europe Program
ment. Judging by the party lists, the share of members of
parliament from Maidan is unlikely to be above 10 percent.
If politics continues to operate in the traditional way afer
the elections, there will be no way for them to infuence
major decision-making by the parties management and by
the key oligarchs behind them. Tere are several political
parties running for the Parliament that have a much greater
number of activists, such as Samopomich, led by the mayor
of Lviv, Andriy Sadovy, but they are unlikely to clear the
threshold.
An absence of political reforms afer the elections will
lead to the reoccurrence of old problems. Without judicial
reforms and more transparent electoral procedures, the
system will remain corrupt and inefective. And a simple
return to a political compromise similar to the one of
2004, when the Orange Revolution resulted in a shif to a
parliamentary republic without any success in overcoming
corruption and the infuence of oligarchs, would lead to a
repetition of the confict over power between the president
and the government, as experienced during Yuschenkos
presidency.
The Electoral Campaign
Security Challenges
Te electoral campaign has inevitably focused on security
issues. Joining NATO, further integration with the EU, and
how to deal with Russia have replaced traditional economic
worries. Polls show a dramatic shif in how Ukrainians
perceive their countrys security challenges. Lack of atten-
tion to foreign policy and an inertial approach, which
could be boiled down to being friends with everyone,
has been replaced by a distinct division of opinions on an
issue that is gaining utmost importance. Tere has been
an increase in support for NATO membership, from 34
percent in May to 41 percent in June (with 40 percent still
opposing it).
5
A poll by GfKUkraine in September revealed
that 52 percent of Ukrainians would support NATO
membership.
6
By comparison, 49.7 percent were against
NATO membership in 2008, while 31.2 percent supported
the idea.
7
Among possible security strategies for their
country, 34 percent of Ukrainians prefer NATO member-
ship, while 28 percent support the continuation of a non-
alignment policy, and 13 percent are in favor of an alliance
with Russia (as of June 2014). At the same time, 43 percent
say the country should reacquire nuclear weapons, while 37
percent think it should not.
Te European future of Ukraine has been at the heart of
the demands of Maidan, which, it must be remembered,
started afer Yanukovych halted preparations for signing
an Association Agreement with the EU. As the crisis has
unfolded, the debate over the Europeanness of Ukraine
has broadened to include not only the countrys foreign
policy options, but also a reformation of life within it.
Facing direct foreign aggression, Ukrainians are reconsid-
ering how to enhance national security, especially through
seeking membership of NATO and the EU, institutions
capable of providing direct and fast solutions to its security
threats. But while both options are increasingly popular,
many experts are skeptical about how probable of short-
term solutions they really are and suggest other options, as
discussed further below.
Coping with Economic Fragility
Te Ukrainian economy remains extremely fragile at a time
when any successful solution to the current security crisis
requires signifcant economic strength. Ukraine has been
among the countries most heavily afected by the global
fnancial and economic crisis since 2008. Its outdated
5 Democracy Initiatives Polls on Security Issues, http://www.dif.org.ua/ua/polls/2014_
polls/stavlen-bezpeki-.htm
6 More Than Half of Possible Voters Support Ukraines Joning NATO, September 29,
2014, http://www.gfk.com/ua/news-and-events/press-room/press-releases/pages/
politics-290914.aspx
7 Does Ukraine Need Nuclear Weapons? Polls by the Gorshenin Institute, http://www.
unian.ua/society/97468-chi-potribna-ukrajini-yaderna-zbroya-opituvannya.html
An absence of political reforms
after the elections will lead to the
reoccurrence of old problems.
Without judicial reforms and more
transparent electoral procedures,
the system will remain corrupt
and ineffective.
5
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Europe Program
industrial sector, which consumes twice as much energy
per unit of production than the European average, is
unable to generate income per capita at satisfactory levels.
Te post-Yanukovych government initiated a program of
reforms, but the economy has further deteriorated over the
past months. With the annexation of the Crimea by Russia,
Ukraine has lost about 3 percent of its GDP and hundreds
of billions of dollars in property in the peninsula.
8
Since
the outbreak of war, industrial production has fallen by
28.5 percent in the Donetsk oblast and by 56 percent in the
Lugansk oblast. In the frst seven months of 2014, Ukrai-
nian industry overall lost about 5.8 percent of output,
9

while infation exceeded 12 percent
10
and the currency
lost half of its value. Access to the Russian market, which
accounts for more than one-third of exports, is increas-
ingly problematic, while compensation through access to
European markets will take time.
At the same time, Ukraines military budget exceeded
4 percent of the GDP in July, which means the country
is rapidly turning into a militarized economy. Te anti-
terrorist operation in the East, as well as military modern-
ization, is demanding considerable economic efort. Under
these circumstances, economic assistance from the Western
countries, the EU, and international fnancial organizations
is gaining importance.
Te Energy Challenge
Energy remains a key short- and mid-term problem.
Ukraine has been heavily dependent on supplies of Russian
natural gas, bought at a high price (about $485 per thou-
sand cubic meters). Eforts to escape Russias infuence will
only be successful if it addresses its energy dependence.
Current projects include reverse natural gas supplies from
Europe, development of liquefed natural gas terminals,
and securing alternative sources of energy, including
domestic ones. For energy security to be achieved, such
projects need to be complemented by the modernization
of Ukrainian industry to make it more energy efcient. But
while Ukraine needs sound and strategic energy projects,
it also has to survive the coming winter with signifcantly
lower supplies of gas from Russia and absent other sources
8 Ministry of Energy of Ukraine: Kiev Lost Billions of Dollars in the Crimea, http://ria.ru/
world/20140530/1010058684.html
9 Decline in Industrial Production in Ukraine Accelerated, http://www.bbc.co.uk/ukrai-
nian/rolling_news_russian/2014/08/140818_ru_n_indystry_statistics.shtml
10 Infation Index in Ukraine, http://index.minfn.com.ua/index/inf/?2014
to supplement it. Te short-time goal must be to lower
consumption, entailing energy-saving technologies in
industry and shifing to electricity in house-heating.
Ukraines Strategic Choices Ahead
Since security issues have risen up the agenda, the ques-
tion of Ukraines foreign policy strategy choice is becoming
a key one. Most of the options available to the country
imply not only alliance building, but also deep reforms in
national security, defense, and economy. Tus, the foreign
policy debate is becoming part of a broader political one
and an important element of electoral campaigning.
Te key area, where all possible solutions to the crisis will
be tested, remains security. Te Ukrainian crisis requires
short-term measures aimed at de-escalating the confict
and long-term security arrangements. Te latter currently
boil down to the four models outline below.
Preserving Non-Bloc Status
Neutral or non-bloc status, as a specifc form of non-
alignment, has always been one of the key foreign policy
options for Ukraine. Russian pressure and the desire of
Ukrainian leaders to minimize the political costs that
a serious security option such as joining NATO would
have entailed have maintained the countrys non-aligned
status. Te non-aligned status works well if security can
be provided by other means, such as legal, normative, or
The key area, where all possible
solutions to the crisis will be
tested, remains security. The
Ukrainian crisis requires short-
term measures aimed at de-
escalating the confict and long-
term security arrangements.
6
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Europe Program
organizational ones, and it is efective in an international
environment in which countries compete to make absolute
gains rather than relative ones and where the chances of
military aggression are low. Tis does not apply to Ukraine,
since it has been invaded by Russia. Non-alignment and/
or neutrality produces the highest level of risk for Ukraine
in mid- and long-term. Even if non-aligned status could be
maintained in exchange for signifcant concessions from
Russia (with return of Crimea as the fundamental one),
it would still be a risky choice as long as Russia maintains
its policy of bullying and aggression. Such an option is
supported by a diminishing minority of the population
(28 percent for non-bloc status compared to 34 percent
for NATO membership),
11
and only by two political
parties, the Communists and former Party of Regions,
neither of which are likely to make it into the next Parlia-
ment. Formally introduced in 2010 in the Law on Basics
of Internal and Foreign Policy of Ukraine, the non-bloc
status is still in place. On August 28, 2014, the National
Security and Defense Council recommended abandoning
non-alignment. It took almost a month for Poroshenko to
issue an order for the government, dated September 24,
to prepare a draf law that would end Ukraines non-bloc
status and create legal ground for possible NATO member-
ship. Tis draf has been introduced into the Parliament,
but has not been voted on so far.
Finlandization
Te option of Finlandization of Ukrainian foreign and
security policy has surfaced as a result of the crisis. For
Russia, this would be the second-best possible outcome
afer Ukrainian non-alignment, and it is a very prob-
able scenario in the face of Russian pressure. Te concept
derives from the post-World War II experience of Finland,
which opted to adapt its foreign policy by taking into
account the interests of the Soviet Union. As a result,
Finland stayed out of NATO and accepted annexation of
parts of its territory. In return, it did not have to join the
Warsaw Pact and was able to develop close ties with Euro-
pean structures, eventually joining the EU.
Finlandization in Ukraine has been, in fact, carried out
from the moment the country announced European inte-
gration as a priority in 2010 while remaining a non-aligned
state. However, Russian active resistance to the Association
11 Democracy Initiatives Polls on Security Issues, http://www.dif.org.ua/ua/
polls/2014_polls/stavlen-bezpeki-.htm
Agreement between Ukraine and the EU indicates that
the concept is now understood diferently in the Kremlin.
Russia sees Finlandization not only as the non-alignment
of Ukraine with NATO, but also as it having the right to
veto any signifcant Ukrainian foreign policy move. Tis
updated version of Finlandization is unacceptable to
Ukraine, as it keeps it dependent on a country that is now
its aggressor. A sofer version allowing total freedom of
action outside NATO could be a compromise, based on
two preliminary conditions. First, restoring Ukraines terri-
torial integrity, and second, additional multilateral security
guarantees. Most pro-Western political parties, including
Batkyvschina and Solidarnist, used to support this strategy
(along with having a rhetoric of European integration), but
the crisis made them shif to demanding NATO member-
ship. Finlandization is seen as a possible compromise
solution to the current crisis, and as such is still referred
to by some politicians. It should be added that positions of
political parties over security issues are ofen inconsistent
and unstable, subject to shifs and fexibility.
Bilateral Alliances with Strategic Partners
A countrys security can be enhanced by improving bilat-
eral relations with strategic partners, in particular against
a specifc enemy and under certain structural conditions.
Ukraine made such a decision in the 1990s when post-
Soviet quasi-integration projects among former Soviet
republics proved to be inefective. Lack of common stra-
tegic vision was a main obstacle then, and it most likely
remains one today. For example, Ukraines participation
in the Commonwealth of Independent States, the GUAM
Organization for Democracy and Economic Development,
or the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Coopera-
Russia sees Finlandization not
only as the non-alignment of
Ukraine with NATO, but also as
it having the right to veto any
signifcant Ukrainian foreign policy
move.
7
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tion did not bring about the expected results in strength-
ening the countrys security. While bilateral arrangements
are quite problematic for ensuring Ukraines security,
especially in what is now a dramatically changed strategic
environment, they must surely be applied and strengthened
as an additional path to security. Examples of existing bilat-
eral strategic alliances should be kept in mind. Te likes of
Israel, South Korea, Saudi Arabia, or Pakistan have all bet
on alliances with the United States in the face of a high risk
of regional instability and/or because they were confronted
by a powerful neighboring adversary. Tese states are
among worlds leaders in military spending, which seems
to be a crucial component of this security approach. Poro-
shenko has bet on a special partnership with the United
States and tried to get the status of prioritized U.S. partner
outside NATO for Ukraine. However, so far this seems
unlikely to be achieved.
Joining NATO
More than at any other moment in Ukraines history,
joining NATO meets its vital security interests. Taking
part in the worlds most efective collective security orga-
nization would help minimize hard and sof challenges.
NATO membership would certainly be the best possible
security enhancer for Ukraine, and it has increasing
support among the population and the political class. As
the experience of the former socialist states in Central and
Eastern Europe shows, there is hardly a better way for a
country like Ukraine to meet its numerous regional chal-
lenges. However, Ukraine is much more vulnerable than
these countries to Russian manipulation, especially with
regard to contested territories and frozen conficts. U.S.
President Barack Obama has said NATO keeps the door
open
12
to Ukraine, and the Alliance has said that it would
respect any Ukraines decision to try to join it.
13
Nonethe-
less, much preparatory work should be done by Ukraine
and NATO if this strategy is to become viable.
Before acquiring enough freedom of maneuver to choose
any of these security models, Ukraine will have to settle the
ongoing confict in the east of the country. On September
5, a preliminary agreement was signed in Minsk estab-
12 Obama hints at NATO membership for Ukraine, urges military support, September 3,
2014, http://rt.com/news/184845-ukraine-obama-nato-membership/
13 NATO Says It Would Respect Any Ukraine Decision to Try to Join Alliance, The Wall
Street Journal, August 29, 2014, http://online.wsj.com/articles/nato-says-it-would-
respect-any-ukraine-decision-to-try-to-join-alliance-1409324690
lishing a ceasefre and opening a window for a political
solution.
14
However, neither of the parties seems satisfed
with the compromise, which is thus seen by many as only
a temporary agreement. If Russia aims at either creating
a land corridor to the Crimea for itself or at freezing
the confict in the Eastern Ukraine, its intervention in the
country is far from over. Poroshenko, for his part, will have
to come up with initiatives and huge resources to restore
normal life in the eastern oblasts. Tat will require complex
strategies of post-confict management and efective
mechanisms of power-sharing.
Dealing with the current situation will require the
incoming government to address various issues at various
levels at the same time. Te utmost goal remains to
strengthen the state. Tis would require completing three
interconnected tasks.
First, a solution to the current crisis in the east must
be found. An efective resolution to the confict may
require a long process, and it also should be addressed
as part of the broader task of making the state more
efective. Democratization, power-sharing, and
increasing economic competitiveness are still the best
options for dealing with these issues.
Second, Ukraine has to undergo deep structural trans-
formations that address the political system, economic
efciency, and the legal and court systems. Strength-
ening the state is of critical importance, and most of
this task is for Ukrainians to undertake themselves. No
foreign aid will heal a corrupt and inefective state, but
sound politics will.
14 Protocol on the results of consultations of the Trilateral Contact Group, signed in
Minsk, September 5, 2014, http://www.osce.org/home/123257
NATO membership would certainly
be the best possible security
enhancer for Ukraine, and it has
increasing support among the
population and the political class.
8
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Europe Program
Te views expressed in GMF publications and commentary are the
views of the author alone.
About the Author
Mykola Kapitonenko, Ph.D. is the Executive Director of the Center
for International Studies, based in Kyiv, Ukraine.
About the Europe Program
Te Europe Program aims to enhance understanding of the challeng-
es facing the European Union and the potential implications for the
transatlantic relationship. Analysis, research, and policy recommen-
dations are designed to understand the dichotomy of disintegration
and deepening of the EU and to help improve the political, economic,
fnancial, and social stability of the EU and its member states. In 2014,
the Europe Program focuses on integration and disintegration in the
EU, the deepening of the euro area, the changing role of Germany in
Europe and the world, as well as challenges in the EUs neighborhood.
About GMF
Te German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) strengthens
transatlantic cooperation on regional, national, and global challenges
and opportunities in the spirit of the Marshall Plan. GMF does this by
supporting individuals and institutions working in the transatlantic
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maintains a strong presence on both sides of the Atlantic. In addition
to its headquarters in Washington, DC, GMF has ofces in Berlin,
Paris, Brussels, Belgrade, Ankara, Bucharest, and Warsaw. GMF also
has smaller representations in Bratislava, Turin, and Stockholm.
Finally, Ukraine has to defne its place and strategy
within the European security system. Tis implies
implementation of the Association Agreement with
the EU, developing a new framework for relations with
Russia, and enhancing its partnership with NATO.
During this process, the West needs to remain close to
Ukraine, and assist it through the many crises it faces.
Increasing pressure on Russia to raise cost of its aggression
and providing Ukraine with fnancial assistance during and
afer reforms are where Western help will be most needed.
A weak Ukraine is a security challenge for Europe. Te EU
and the United States have understood, mostly, that success
of Ukraine is also the success of Europe, and that the failure
of Ukraine is the failure of Europe.