DETERMINATE NEGATION IN SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS: A

RESPONSE TO ROSENS PARADOX AND KUHNS PARADIGM SHIFTS

_______________
A Thesis
Presented to the
Faculty of
San Diego State University
_______________
In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts
in
Philosophy
_______________
by
Nader M. Ktait
Summer 2011


iii
Copyright 2011
by
Nader M. Ktait
All Rights Reserved



iv
DEDICATION
My thesis is dedicated to my great uncle, Hussein. The small city of Acre knew him as Abu
Alli, a wise and charismatic man who put family first but never hesitated to lend his hand to
all who could have used it. May he rest in peace.


v
ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS
Determinate Negation in Scientific Revolutions: A Response to
Rosens Paradox and Kuhns Paradigm Shifts
by
Nader M. Ktait
Master of Arts in Philosophy
San Diego State University, 2011

Determinate negation is a significant principle of Hegels dialectic. It is believed that
all developments of human knowledge undergo the claims under this principle, in that the
recognition of an internal contradiction in a communitys beliefs leads to a resolution of that
contradiction. The resolution is then followed by a positive, unique and necessary result.
My thesis examines determinate negation in relation to scientific revolutions. I argue against
Michael Rosen criticisms against determinate negation applicability to science and compare
the effects of my argument to Thomas Kuhns perspective on why Kuhn believes normal
science is incapable of critically appraising the state of its development toward truth. The
responses to Rosen and Kuhn also bring up an interesting question as the whether scientific
revolutions could lead to moments of regression and whether a regression is also gives us
reason to deny that there actually determinate negations at work in scientific revolutions. In
addition, we consider how the question about regressions becomes quite relevant to
Stanfords anti-realist argument, the problem of unconceived alternatives. We examine and
discuss Stanfords argument as well as a possible response, which Hegel might provide to
this anti-realist argument.



vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
ABSTRACT ...............................................................................................................................v
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .................................................................................................... vii
CHAPTER
1 INTRODUCTION .........................................................................................................1
2 ON HEGELS DIALECTICS ........................................................................................4
The Doctrine of Essence ..........................................................................................4
The Role of Mediation .............................................................................................8
The Absolute Truth of the System ...........................................................................9
3 THE POST FESTUM PARADOX ..............................................................................14
Contradiction and Negation in Dialectics ..............................................................15
Truth and Rationality in Science ............................................................................18
4 A RESPONSE TO ROSEN USING HEGELS SCIENCE OF LOGIC .....................22
Arguments Against the Dialectic ...........................................................................22
First Kind: Contradictions in Dialectics ................................................................23
Second Kind: The Truth is the Whole .................................................................26
5 THOMAS KUHN IN PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE .................................................34
Normal Science, Anomalies and Paradigm Shifts .................................................34
Phlogiston Theory and the Chemical Revolution ..................................................39
6 TRUE KNOWLEDGE AND THE RATIONAL THEORY CHOICE ........................41
Kuhn on Common Standards .................................................................................42
The Determinate Negation Made in a Scientific Revolution .................................45
7 THE SCIENTIFIC REALISM IN HEGELS EPISTEMOLOGY ..............................48
Arguments Against Scientific Realism ..................................................................50
The Problem of Unconceived Alternatives ............................................................56
8 IN CONCLUSION.......................................................................................................60
REFERENCES ........................................................................................................................62



vii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I am very happy with the way my thesis turned out and I owe a lot of credit to my
advisors, especially to Tom Weston. My thesis deals with a challenging subject and I thank
Tom for dedicating a great deal of his time to helping me learn Hegels philosophy and issues
in the philosophy of science. Tom played an essential role in the development of my thesis.
His enthusiasm and guidance managed to make my thesis journey an enjoyable one. I also
want to thank Professor Darrel Moellendorf, who in addition to helping me with my thesis
has also made me a better philosopher. I also appreciate Professor Emanuele Saccarellis
contribution to my thesis, for the time he spent reading my drafts and helping me organize
my thesis.
In addition, I extend my gratitude to the entire Department of Philosophy at San
Diego State University. This department is filled with an inspiring faculty and respected
professors, especially professors like Steve Barbone. Steve has not only been excellent
graduate advisor for me, he was also a great teacher and friend. Like so many of the
professors I was fortunate to cross paths with, I believe that Steve is a great asset to the
Department of Philosophy.
And of course, I would like to thank my family. I am grateful to have such a great
older sister, younger brother and younger sister who constantly support and encourage me to
pursue my goals. I am also very fortunate to have such great parents. I give credit for my
strong work ethic and ambitious mentality to the positive influence that my parents have had
on my life.


1
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The question on whether scientific knowledge is true knowledge is a philosophical
question. Science does not ask such a question because this is not the kind of question that
science considers a scientific question. The scientific community assumes that what it knows
(so far) is the truth and whenever a scientist finds herself questioning that assumption she
may also find herself engaged in a practice that is no longer called science. Science does not
practice philosophy, science is too busy building its knowledge of reality, using what it
knows to unravel certain mysteries of the world that it believes it can unravel based on the
knowledge that it currently has. It is up to philosophy, then, to deal with the difficult
question on whether science is indeed finding truth. To see philosophy in this light is to
agree with Hegel on what he believes philosophy really does. According to Hegel,
philosophy is a speculative science that is different than what we understand to be the normal
sciences, like biology, chemistry or physics, because philosophy engages itself in a reflective
activity. In The Encyclopaedia Logic, Hegel writes, speculative science does not leave the
empirical content of the other sciences aside, but recognizes and uses it, and in the same way
recognizes and employs what is universal in these sciences.
1
Thus, when philosophy uses
the other sciences as the content of its reflective activity philosophy becomes the philosophy
of science.
Hegels philosophy is a system called the dialectic. Like all his other philosophies,
Hegels philosophy of science is built off the laws and principles defined under his dialectical
system. The dialectic calls the developments of human knowledge dialectical developments.
For instance, when the scientific community experiences a revolution the community also
experiences the consequences of making, what Hegel calls a determinate negation. The
dialectic believes that changes are caused by internal contradictions and a revolution is a type

1
G.W.F Hegel, The Encyclopaedia Logic, trans. T.F. Garaets, W.A. Suchtin, and H.S. Harris (Indiana:
Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1991), 33.


2
of this internal contradiction. A determinate negation, then, is the positive, unique and
necessary result of the internal contradiction. Scientific revolutions are not the only kinds of
revolutions that undergo determinate negations. In fact, scientific revolutions are not usually
a topic discussed in Hegel, but in my thesis I am primarily concerned with Hegels
philosophy of science.
The topic for my thesis was initiated through a reading of Michael Rosens Hegels
Dialectic and Its Criticism. In his book, Rosen argues that Hegels philosophy is
incompatible with the way that science accumulates its knowledge. I found that Rosens
interpretation of the dialectic was blemished and as result, his criticisms equally defective.
And so, in my thesis I provide a defense of Hegels determinate negation against, what Rosen
calls, the post festum paradox by considering reasons and examples from scientific history
that support Hegels principle, determinate negation. In addition, because Rosen references
Thomas Kuhns work, dealing with this issue about sciences progress finding truth, as a
basis to deny Hegels perspective of truth, I discuss the implications of determinate negation
in facing Kuhns philosophy.
The topic for my thesis is derived through a series of discussions that are presented in
the following seven chapters. In chapter two, we discuss some important sections from the
Science of Logic where Hegel explains aspects of his dialectical framework, including the
contradictory relationships that lead to a determinate negation. In chapter three, I discuss
Rosens post festum paradox and why it creates a problem for Hegels dialectic, and in
chapter four, I present a response to the post festum paradox and explain why my response
also initiates a further discussion on whether determinate negations are actually made in
scientific developments. Chapter six is about Kuhns philosophy regarding scientific
revolutions and what he calls paradigm shifts. In chapter seven, we then address the
differences between Hegels perspective on scientific developments and Kuhns perspective,
as well the possible ways that Hegel might respond to Kuhns perspective. Based on this
possible response, I will argue that Hegels perspective on scientific developments is more
compatible with the way science works because a lot of Hegels ideas are compatible with
scientific realism. And finally, in order to further support the compatibility between Hegel
and scientific realism, I consider how Hegel might respond to the two common anti-realist


3
arguments and also a significant anti-realist argument, called the problem of unconceived
alternatives.


4
CHAPTER 2
ON HEGELS DIALECTICS
The dialectic is a philosophy about the nature and causes of change. The dialectic
also functions as a system, used for analyzing and understanding the historical development
of human knowledge as a dialectical process. Hegel used the dialectic as a system, providing
him with a way to make sense of how contradictions can lead to developments. The dialectic
theory is based on the idea that all changes are a result of contradiction. Changes, in the form
of developments, such as the developments in scientific knowledge, come from the
resolutions of contradictions, a process that is referred to as the principle of determinate
negation. Determinate negation is the principle that governs the movement in Hegels
dialectic. The principle defines the outcome of a dialectical movement and assesses what the
result of the movement consists of. In dialectics, when a contradiction emerges it is resolved
through a form of mediation. Determinate negation is the principle that explains that what
results from a contradiction is only one possible and unique result; a result in which one
regards as a development from contradiction.
THE DOCTRINE OF ESSENCE
In Science of Logic, there are four kinds of relationships Hegel discusses that are
helpful and important to understanding how a dialectical contradiction arises and necessitates
change. The four relationships are identity, difference, opposition and then contradiction.
By discussing these four relationships, we will be able to get a better sense of why Hegel
believed that a contradiction emerges from the series of outcomes in determining the three
other relationships.
The first relationship is identity. When trying to determine the identity of a particular
subject matter (a concept or entity), Hegel believed the determination of the identity of an
entity requires us to consider other kinds of relationships as well.
2
The relationship a

2
For the sake of simplicity, we are discussing how Hegels dialectical relationships apply to entities but



5
particular entity has with itself does not allow us to determine its unique and individual
identity, especially since the identity of an entity does not only depend on what constitutes
this particular but also depends on what does not constitute this entity. In other words, the
actual identity of an entity is always accompanied by difference and the difference is
established through analyzing the entitys relationships with other entities. Hegel provided
an example of why other relationships need to be looked at when determining an identity:
If anyone opens his mouth and promises to state what God is, namely God is
God, expectation is cheated, for what was expected was a different determination;
and if this statement is absolute truth, such absolute verbiage is very lightly
esteemed; nothing will be held to be more boring and tedious than conversation
which merely reiterates the same thing, or than such talk which yet is supposed to
be truth.
3

The determination of an identity is not possible unless the entity relies on something other
than itself; this means that the determination of an entity is also a determination of a
difference. The determination of an entity, the one that provides us with a clear
identification of what the entity is, becomes a determination that is also accompanied by
difference.
4
According to Hegel, the determination of a difference allows us to separate the
identity of one entity from the identity of others.
5
Thus, an entitys identity requires
difference as well.
The process of identity through difference may encounter one of two other essential
forms of relationships, opposition and contradiction. Any two entities are bound to share
some of the same characteristics and properties with one another but this does not necessarily
mean that they contradict one another. As I mentioned, what matters is the sense in which
the two entities are different, and by sense I mean a category or a condition. For instance,
if we set up different categories or conditions to assess the relationship between a baseball
and football we are able to make sense of how these two objects are similar and also

the subject matter concerns both entities and concepts.
3
G.W.F Hegel, Science of Logic, trans. A.V. Miller (Amberst: Humanity Books, 1969), 415.
4
I mentioned the word (clearly) and it may be helpful to elaborate on my usage of this term. What
provides us with a clear understanding is a uniqueness that sets apart the identity of one entity from the rest.
Often times, a particular identity of one entity can also function as a category. If the identity of a thing is
entity, then this identity is a category because all things that share this identity are entities. As I will discuss
later, to be independent is to have an identity that also establishes a difference.
5
Hegel, Science of Logic, 414.


6
different. A baseball and football share certain characteristics and properties that allow us to
associate the identities of both objects under common categories (like how each object is a
ball and is also affiliated with a sport). But there is at least one category that the objects do
not share with one another, and this unique category is what provides us with a clear
understanding of what each objects identity really is (the type of ball that the object is, for
instance).
Hegel says that two of the most basic examples of how relationships contain
oppositions, that allow each side to be different and capable of coexisting with the other side,
are the relationships between above and below and right and left.
6
What each example
shows us is that in each pair one side is directly identified by its relationship to its opposite
side. For example, even though right is the opposite of left we cannot understand what a
right side is without also understanding what a left side is. These two sides, right and left,
are related by their differences and this difference allows us to treat two opposites in a unity.
To properly understand below we must also understand its opposite, above. Notice in
these two examples how right or below does not interfere with the left or above but actually
helps us understand those opposites. The ability to provide a non-interfering identification of
opposites is essential to forming a unity among entities and it is also essential to
understanding a contradictory relationship, an issue that we shall discuss momentarily.
To be able to treat identities as a unity is especially important in Hegels dialectics.
Oppositions allow for unity because two things that are in opposition are also unified by their
ability to provide identities of their opposites because of their difference in relationship. The
relationship between right and left is also a relationship that allows us to provide a distinction
between one and the other. A distinction allows us to treat two different entities as entities
with independent and unique identities; each entity has its own distinct identity, in one
respect (below and above are each their own identity) and, in another respect, each sides
identity depends on the identity of the other side (we cannot identify what is above if we
cannot identify what is below us).

6
The most trivial examples of above and below, right and left, father and son, and so on ad infinitum, all
contain opposition in each term. That is above, which is not below; above is specifically just this, not to be
below, and only is, in so far as there is a below and conversely, each determination implies its opposite
(Hegel, Science of Logic, 441).


7
Interfering entities turns the relationship between these two entities into a
contradictory relationship, rather than an opposition. The relationship between entities that
contradicts one another is caused by an instance where two entities are unable to establish an
identity that separates them into two independent entities that are capable of coexisting in
unity.
7
An entity is in unity with other entities if the entity has an identity that is
independent and also dependent on the identities of other entities. Hegel believes that
independent entities are related through difference, but when there is no unique characteristic
that sets the identities of two entities apart then the identities interfere with each other. When
such interference occurs, there exists a relationship that is in contradiction. Hegel writes,
Opposites, therefore, contain contradiction in so far as they are, in the same
respect, negatively related to one another or sublate each other and are indifferent
to one another.
8

In this context, indifference to something means not being determined by it.
A relationship that is a contradiction is not a relationship that can form a stable unity
(one that is not negative and allows for coexistence among different entities), and we will
soon discuss what it means to form a unity. In a negative unity, entities are unified because
they interfere with each other and entities that are unified in such a way have an unstable
relationship towards each other. They continue to conflict with each other and their
relationship has an instability that gradually intensifies. Two entities in a negative unity are
in contradiction, and Hegel believes that contradictory relationship require a change, or a
resolution.
It is important to distinguish the opposition from a contradiction because what causes
changes and/or developments to occur, according to Hegel is a difference that requires a
movement. And only a contradictory relationship creates this sort of a movement.

7
The word (coexistence) is used a lot here and I want to make a point about that. I am not sure if Hegel
ever used this word but I thought it was appropriate here because I wanted to illustrate why it is that a
contradiction requires a change and why an opposition does not. Entities can coexist when they know their
identity opposes another identity, as an opposite, but to be an opposite does not mean that an entity interferes
with another entitys state of existence. We find this identity crisis in Hegels section of his Phenomenology
titled, Lordship and Bondage, where two self-conscious individuals struggle to establish identities of their
own.
8
Hegel, Science of Logic, 441.


8
For as against contradiction, identity is merely the determination of the simple
immediate, of dead being; but contradiction is the root of all movement and
vitality; it is only in so far as something has a contradiction within it that it moves,
has an urge and activity.
9

The key difference between an opposition and a contradiction is that a contradiction causes
movement, a change. An opposition does not require a change because opposition is a stable
relationship. On the other hand, a contradiction requires change because contradiction is
relationship that is less stable than opposition. Two entities in opposition can form a stable
unity, where each one coexists within a whole. Contradiction, however, requires change and
this change or movement is what Hegel continually refers to as the process of resolving a
contradiction.
THE ROLE OF MEDIATION
A contradiction is resolved by mediation. The focus of my thesis is Hegels
epistemology (particularly Hegels view on scientific knowledge) and so it may be helpful to
consider Hegels perspective on the development of other kinds of knowledge, like political
knowledge. In this section of chapter two, I believe that a comparison of how mediation
works in political revolutions may be helpful in understanding how mediation is involved in
scientific revolutions.
10
But first, we will discuss what happens when a contradiction is
resolved by mediation.
The contradictions in politics or economics are the contradictions that can lead to
political revolutions. These revolutions are referred to as internal contradictions because
they often take place among a community of people with different and conflicting interests.
As we have already discussed, it is not necessarily a difference that causes a contradiction
because sometimes differences are just oppositions and oppositions do not require a
movement towards resolution. But when interests in a community begin to conflict and
interfere with each other and gradually attain a level of intensity, Hegel believes this level of
intensity can be driven towards a resolution.

9
Hegel, Science of Logic, 439.
10
As we will later see (in chapters five and six especially) political, economical and even scientific
knowledge undergo dialectical develops that tend to overlap with each other. Some philosophers, like Kuhn,
have made it a point in discussing the influence that politics sometimes has in the causes of scientific
revolutions.


9
Mediation is the process in which takes the two entities that are in a contradiction and
resolves their negative unity in such a way so that the two entities no longer interfere with
each other. The mediation of contradiction requires the introduction of another side, a third
side. This third side could be introduced in order to address the differences between the two
contradictory sides as well as the relationship between the two. Thus, the resolution of a
contradiction requires us to develop a form of mediation, which establishes a new
relationship between two contradictory sides. A third side represents the relationship
between the two contradictory sides and this third side functions to mediate the contradiction
so that the two sides are no longer in contradiction.
In Hegels political philosophy, the state plays the role of this third side, when it
attempts resolve internal contradictions that arise among its citizens.
11
Hegel recognized
that the internal conflicts arise at times, for instance, when the economic interests of different
classes in a particular community reach a level of intensity that calls for a political
revolution. A reason why such an internal contradiction results in a revolution is because the
political institution (existing at the time of the political revolution) may not have been able to
properly handle the internal conflict arising among its own citizens. But Hegel is optimistic
and believes that human beings learn from their past mistakes, so the newer political
institution should be able handle conflicts that the older institution was not able to handle.
Thus, the ability to handle further conflicts in a more effective manner is a sign of progress,
while the reoccurrence of revolutions indicates regression.
THE ABSOLUTE TRUTH OF THE SYSTEM
Hegels dialectic is a system that results from the successive resolution of
contradictions. In the Science of Logic, Hegel discussed the principles and conditions of the
dialectic in a very general way, but because the discussion of the dialectic is general, it
allowed Hegel (or so he thought) to apply the dialectic to every aspect of life and determine

11
Hegel writes, But it is the universal (State, government, right) that is the substantial middle term within
which the individuals and their satisfaction have and preserve their full reality, mediation, and subsistence.
Precisely because the mediation con-cludes each of these determinations with the other extreme, each of them
con-cludes itself with itself in this way or produces itself; and this production is its self-preservation.It is only
through the nature of this con-cluding, or through this triad of syllogisms with the same terms, that a whole is
truly understood in its [organization] (Hegel, The Encyclopaedia Logic, 277).


10
how things change and develop through a dialectical process. For instance, by using the
dialectical method Hegels philosophy attempted to provide an account of how true
knowledge emerges. According to Hegel, political and even scientific knowledge undergo
changes and developments that can be described as a process that is dialectical.
The dialectic is also a process directed toward a goal, which is to determine a
comprehensive truth, called absolute truth.
12
The way dialectics provides an account of the
developments and progress made in attaining truth is based on determinate negation. A
negation is a transition to a new entity or process that results from the resolution of a
contradiction. To say that is determinate means that it is the unique possible result of this
resolution.
13
But another important aspect of the result of a determinate negation is that the
result contains both sides of the contradiction. In the Science of Logic, Hegel writes, the
result essentially contains that from which it results; which strictly speaking is a tautology,
for otherwise it would be an immediacy, not a result.
14
The incorporation of both sides in
the result is a significant aspect in the dialectic because Hegel claims the incorporation is
what makes the result a positive result.
15

A determinate negation explains how developments are caused by contradictions.
The dialectics could then be summed-up as a philosophy about how things develop based on
the principle Hegel called determinate negation. The purpose of the principle is to provide a
framework and as well as an explanation for how true knowledge emerges in human history.
For our purposes, we are concerned with Hegels perspective on scientific knowledge. But
where exactly does Hegel mention anything about scientific knowledge that could justify my
interpretation and defense of Hegel? In his work, the second book of his Encyclopaedia,
Hegel writes,

12
Hegel writes, Finally Idea is absolute truth, truth in and for itself" (Hegel, Science of Logic, 760).
13
In his Phenomenology, Hegel described how the result is conceived as it is in truth, namely, as a
determinate negation, a new form has thereby immediately arisen, and in the negation the transition is made
through which the progress through the complete series of forms comes about of itself (G.W.F Hegel,
Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A.V. Miller (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), 51.)
14
Hegel, Science of Logic, 54.
15
Hegel writes, It is of the greatest importance to perceive and to bear in mind this nature of the reflective
determinations we have just considered, namely, that their truth consists only in their relation to one another,
that therefore each in its very Notion contains the other; without this knowledge, not a single step can really be
taken in philosophy (Hegel, Science of Logic, 438).


11
Philosophy in general has, as philosophy, other categories than those of the
ordinary consciousness: all education reduces to the distinction of categories. All
revolutions, in the sciences no less than in world history, originate solely from the
fact that Spirit, in order to understand and comprehend itself with a view to
possessing itself, has changed its categories, comprehending itself more truly,
more deeply, more intimately, and more in unity with itself.
16

This passage indicates that Hegel believed his dialectical system is applicable to all
revolutions, even scientific revolutions.
Contradictions cause movement and they also drive the development of scientific
knowledge. In making the claim that scientific revolutions undergo determinate negations,
we are claim that when the scientific community realizes an internal contradiction in their
beliefs they resolve this contradiction and the resolution leads to a positive and unique result.
The Copernican revolution provides a great example of a scientific revolution undergoing the
effects of a determinate negation.
Copernicuss heliocentric model of the universe did not completely replace Ptolemys
astronomical theory. At the time when Copernicuss theory was introduced, there had been
no consensus on a single theory of planetary motion. Both theories, Copernicuss and
Ptolemys were up for debate. Copernicuss theory, however, was able to provide more
explanations about planetary motion that Ptolemys theory could not. For example,
astronomers who thought the Earth was the center of the universe (as Ptolemys theory
claimed) also thought Mars was a planet that had a retrogressive motion. These same
astronomers noticed the motion of Mars appeared to be linear, a constant relocation where
the planet would only constantly relocate its position between the east and west side of the
sky. However, Copernicuss theory provided an alternative explanation of this planets
motion. Copernicus claimed that Mars was moving in a circular motion and so was the
Earth. When the Earth and Mars orbited around Sun faster Marss orbit because the distance
that Mars needed to cover to complete a single orbit around the sun was much smaller than
the distance that the Earth needed to cover. Therefore, the reason why it looked like there
was a retrogression in Marss motion is because the Earths distance form the Sun is greater

16
G.W.F Hegel, Hegels Philosophy of Nature: Part Two of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical
Sciences (1830), trans. A.V. Miller (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 11.


12
than the distance between Mars and the Sun, and so when the astronomers observe the
motion of Mars from Earth it would appear that the planets motion was retrogressive.
Although Copernicuss heliocentric model provided more explanations than
Ptolemys model, the heliocentric model was not enough to convince the scientific
community to abandon their theoretical basis of an Earth centered universe that came from
the ideas of Aristotle and Ptolemy, and accept a heliocentric model of the universe. But the
reason why Copernicuss theory did not immediately replace Ptolemys was because both
theories were supported by the same set of data, and because both theories were supported by
the same data it was difficult to prove which theory was more accurate.
17
In other words,
neither theory was able to actually explain what was going on in the universe; they only
offered plausible accounts.
Nonetheless, the scientific revolution that led to this conflict between Ptolemys
theory and Copernicuss theory was also the most significant scientific revolution. The
reason why this first scientific revolution was significant is because, although Copernicus
was not able to establish a paradigm-theory of planetary motion that would help unite and
even establish a consensus on a model of the universe, the introduction of Copernicuss
theory would provide other theorists alternative models and ideas to work with (besides
Ptolemys) with when attempting to find a more accurate theory.
The eventual acceptance of heliocentric model of the universe came out as a result of
the work that came after Copernicus. Copernicuss rejection was followed by Tycho Brahes
attempt to transform Copernicuss model into Tychonic model, or one that was Earth
centered. Brahe maintained the assumption that the Earth was motionless, while the Sun and
Moon orbited the Earth. However, Brahe proposed the idea that the other planets then
orbited the Sun. Brahes attempt to improve Copernicuss theory, however, was prevailed by
the work of his own student, Kepler. Kepler made improvements to Copernicuss theory by
introducing new data and his theory of elliptical motion. The theory of elliptical motion

17
The old belief that the Earth is motionless and the Sun and other planets revolved around the Earth was
a belief that appeared to make more sense to the scientific community than Copernicuss theory. Although it
seemed obvious that the position of the Sun changed, it was not obvious that Earth was moving; if the Earth
were moving then it would seem its change in location, in relation to the stars, should be observable. But given
that distance of the stars from the Earth is an incredibly large distance and telescopes were not going to around
for a few hundred years, there was no observable evidence to support heliocentric model.


13
became an important reason why the heliocentric model of the universe persuaded the other
astronomers that an Earth centered model was less accurate than a heliocentric model. Thus,
the heliocentric model seemed to be the only viable alternative.
The transition from an Earth centered model to a heliocentric model of the universes
appears to be a scientific revolution that is an example of a determinate negation. The main
reason why it may illustrate a determinate negation is because of the process that led to the
adoption of the heliocentric model. The conflict that arose between those who supported
Ptolemys theory and those who supported Copernicus theory was a stage of scientific
development that resembled a contradiction; two astronomical theories agreed with the same
data but provided completely different explanations. But this conflict (or contradiction) also
became a necessary one because it would lead Brahe and then Kepler to determine a theory
that was more accurate, than the older theories. Kepler developed his theory of elliptical
motion by using the aspects of what both of the older theories could explain while also
considering the aspects that both theories could not explain. In a sense, Hegel might claim
that the result of Keplers work was mediated by Brahes attempt to transform Copernican to
his own. But Hegels idea that result of a revolution incorporates the older ideas appears to
be right, at least in this particular example.
18


18
The acceptance of Copernicuss theory after Keplers elliptical motion theory was not the only reason
why the Copernican revolution was a necessary stage of scientific development, that also provides an example
of a determinate negation. There were also other developments in science that supported to outcome of the
Copernican Revolution and Keplers contribution. Keplers theory would later be used by Newton to determine
his work regarding the gravitational motion of the universe.


14
CHAPTER 3
THE POST FESTUM PARADOX
In the last chapter, we discussed some of the important aspects of Hegels dialectical
system. In this chapter, we discuss a criticism of the dialectics that is called the post festum
paradox. By analyzing the issues with Hegels dialectics raised by the post festum paradox, I
will show how these issues initiate a further analysis of Hegels dialectic. I will argue that
the post festum paradox seems only to arise when a philosopher is unwilling to accept
Hegels way of thinking and a further analysis of how the dialectic functions within scientific
knowledge is necessary to overcome the criticisms and issues raised by the post festum
paradox.
In Hegels Dialectic and its Criticism, Rosen provides a critical analysis of Hegelian
dialectics. Rosens critical analysis pays special attention to certain issues he found with
Hegels dialectic, especially the principle of determinate negation. A determinate negation is
a unique stage in dialectical movement, a process in which a unique development arises from
a contradiction. According to Rosen, Hegel established certain conditions about the dialectic
that prevent a philosopher from being able to legitimately critique the dialectic and to decide
whether or not the dialectic can be viewed as a rational or even a true system. By
conducting his own analysis of Hegels work, Rosen realized when a philosopher interpreted
Hegels work like Rosen did, this philosopher would inevitably encounter a set of significant
issues with the dialectic.
These particular criticisms of Rosens are directed at determinate negation, the
principle that directs the dialectical movement described in the Science of Logic. Many of
Rosens disagreements with this principle are based on the following passage from Hegels
Science of Logic:
All that is necessary to achieve scientific progressand it is essential to strive to
gain this quite simple insight [] that what is self-contradictory does not resolve
itself into a nullity, into abstract nothingness, but essentially only into the
negation of its particular content, in other words, that such a negation is not all
and every negation but the negation of a specific subject matter which resolves
itself, and consequently is a specific negation, and therefore the result essentially


15
contains that from which it results; which strictly speaking is a tautology, for
otherwise it would be an immediacy, not a result.
19

The passage describes the principle, determinate negation, and Rosen finds some problems
with this description. In the next section, we will first discuss the problems that Rosen thinks
the dialectic encounters when Hegel uses concepts like negation and contradiction, in his
description of determinate negation. Secondly, we will discuss why Rosen believes that
Hegels claim, the truth is the whole, prevents any philosopher from providing a critical
appraisal of the dialectic.
CONTRADICTION AND NEGATION IN DIALECTICS
In developing his own interpretation of the dialectic, Rosen attempted to focus on the
meaning of significant concepts Hegel used in describing his dialectic. By examining
dialectical concepts, Rosen believes that showing how Hegel understands them would be
important. Rosen thought it would be important because if we could the understand the
meanings like Hegel did then we have already established a bit of a common ground and the
establishment of a common ground is necessary for ones ability to rationally criticize a
philosophical enterprise. Hegels dialectic makes special use of certain concepts that are not
familiar to the common understanding of the definition of contradiction and negations. But
for Rosen, whenever Hegel uses a concept in an ambiguous way it creates a difficulty for the
interpreter. Rosen writes,
In interpreting we are concerned with the points of concepts, and this means
knowing not just the way in which, actually, the author does use the concept to
organize his text, but also, normatively, the way in which it should, ideally,
govern all texts in which it might be used. In this way knowing the point of a
concept leads us towards knowledge of meaning, knowledge of its semantic
power.
20

Rosens perspective on this issue is that although we may not be able to understand the
definition of some concept as it was used in every passage in which the particular concept
arises, we should still be able to understand what the point of the concept is. According to
Rosen, the point of the concept should not only be clear for Hegelians but also to all other

19
Hegel, Science of Logic, 54.
20
Michael Rosen, Hegels Dialectic and Its Criticism, (New York: Cambridge, 1982), 19.


16
philosophical perspectives, even non-dialectical ones. Understanding the point of a concept
is one of the conditions for being able to evaluate (or provide a critical appraisal of) Hegels
dialectic. However, Rosen believes that, even in dialectics, the point of a concept like
contradiction should agree with commonly the understood definition of a contradiction,
which Rosen thinks is the definition of contradiction in formal logic.
If we refer back to the passage above, about Hegels view on scientific progress, this
passage specifically explains the function of the principle, determinate negation, where the
resolution of a contradiction leads to a unique and positive result. According to Hegel, if a
theory demonstrates that it contains internal contradictions then the aspects that caused the
contradiction in that theory are in need of being negated. For the most part, Rosen seems to
agree with on this point, but he disagrees with Hegels view that a negation does more than
deny the causes of the contradiction. Rosen says the point of the negation is to wipe the
board and nothing else. Rosen believes that realizing the existence of a contradiction leads
one to recognize the need to start over rather than progressing.
Hegel usage of concepts like contradiction and negation seem rather unconventional
and ambiguous, according to Rosen; and perhaps, as Rosen suggests, the concepts also seem
ambiguous to any philosopher standing outside of this mental framework that the dialectic
uses.
21
A philosopher standing outside the dialectic (and evaluating the claims) might not be
willing to accept how contradiction and negation are used in Hegels dialectic, because the
philosophers acceptance requires an understanding that eludes anyone who has not tried to
adopt Hegels method of thinking. If we look at the way contradiction and negation function
in the principle of determinate negation, says Rosen, Hegel uses the concept in a way that is
contrary to how we would normally understand what the point of a contradiction or
negation really is. Rosen writes,
To think of negation as all negation would be to think of it as a procedure which
is in no way adapted to its objects. The act of negation would then be like the

21
Rosen, the dialectical movement contains features which the philosopher standing outside it would feel
no compulsion to grant. We could understand the idea of standing outside as someone who tries to evaluate
the dialectic from a perspective that is contrary to Hegels. In other words, someone who stands outside the
dialectic is someone who has a non-dialectical perspective (Rosen, 21).


17
wiping clean of a blackboard; whatever is inscribed on the mental slate is
wiped off, no matter what its intrinsic character, by one and the same action.
22

But Rosen thinks the point of negation in the dialectic is different than a clean wipe of the
blackboard. Rosen says that Hegels understanding of negation involves two separate claims
that are supposed to be conjoined to one concept. For Hegel, there are two claims: claim (i)
states that negation is not all negation but the negation of a determinate matter which
dissolves, and claim (ii) states: that from which it results is essentially contained in the
result. Hegel thought the point of a negation in determinate negation includes both claims
in such a way that they both are conjoined; that (ii) always follow (i) is a trivial point (a
tautology).
Hegel has, indeed, claimed that it is actually a tautology that to negate is to
produce a negated something, not nothing. Yet very little examination shows the
doctrine of determinate negation to be in fact anything but a tautology, in the
sense of being trivially true.
23

Rosen argues these two claims are different and not conjoined in any logical sense and it is
not common sense to assume claim (i) necessarily (or at all) includes claim (ii) in any form
of negation. But this issue that Rosen has with the point of a contradiction and negation in
Hegels dialectic leads to another issue that a philosopher would encounter when attempting
to provide a critical appraisal of the dialectic. The issue arises from Hegels claim, the truth
is the whole and we will now turn our focus to this issue.
Rosens interpretation of the dialectic suggests that Hegels claim, the truth is the
whole, implies that the truth is only given to us when the dialectic is whole and the dialectic
is only whole when it has completed itself. It follows that the system is not true when it is
incomplete because only when it is complete can be defined and determined as truth. The
reason why it is not possible to rationally criticize Hegels dialectic, says Rosen, is because
Hegel made it impossible for any philosopher to establish the basis at which the system could
be rationally appraised. Rosen says that determining the rationality (or the truth) of Hegels
system is possible only when the dialectic has attained the status of becoming whole, or
complete. But Rosen says neither Hegel nor any human being actually lived or will ever live

22
Rosen, 32.
23
Rosen, 31.


18
in a time period that attains the point in which the system becomes whole and actually
reaches its ultimate goal, absolute truth (a concept that Rosen thinks means the state of
human knowledge that is true and complete).
24

How do these two conditions (the misuse of concepts and the claim, the truth is the
whole) relate to each other? According to Rosen, the idea that determinate negations lead to
a positive and unique result as a tautology is Hegels understanding of what a contradiction
does in the dialectic. Rosen disagrees with Hegels understanding of contradiction for two
reasons. First, the definition of a dialectical contradiction is not consistent with the definition
of contradiction that is commonly understood in formal logic. Secondly, since formal logics
definition of contradiction does not include the claim that developments arise out of
contradictions, Hegels determinate negation requires further justification. In particular,
Rosen believes that if Hegel includes scientific knowledge as an example of dialectical
developments in human knowledge capable of reaching a state of completion then there are
further reasons to doubt that determinate negations are even possible.
TRUTH AND RATIONALITY IN SCIENCE
The requirement of waiting for the dialectic to complete itself creates what Rosen
refers to as the post festum paradox (which literally mean, after the event). The post festum
paradox recognizes the inability to effectively critique the Hegelian system of dialectics until
the reflective movement of consciousness reaches its last stage (as absolute truth).
Knowing when the final point is or even giving a rough estimate of when it might be seems
rather impossible and even unrealistic. Rosen writes,
to criticize Hegel is to claim that the system does not attain validly its point of
completion. But to criticize from any point other than the point of completion
violates a crucial presupposition of the system itself, namely, that only someone
who has really attained its final point can perceive the rationality of its
attainment.
25


24
Rosen writes, one obvious interpretation [] as we attain this point of completion, we are not in a
position fully to comprehend (and hence to justify or criticize) the method by which it was reached (Rosen,
23). Nonetheless, Rosens understanding of what the end of the dialectic amounts to and the meaning of Hegels
absolute truth is a crucial misunderstanding on Rosens part that will soon be discussed.
25
Rosen, 23-24.


19
If we would like to provide a critical appraisal of the dialectic then it looks like Hegel puts us
in a very inconvenient position to do so. According to Rosen, Hegel put us in a position
where we cannot critique and rationally criticize the dialectical system until the dialectic is
all done resolving its contradictions. It seems that Hegel thought he was going to be around
to witness the final determinate negation occur and the arrival at absolute truth, at least
according to Rosens point of view.
26
But the final determinate negation could not have
already occurred because scientific knowledge is not yet complete and so it would appear,
Rosen claims, that not even Hegel could have been able to perceive the rationality of [own
his dialectical systems] attainment. The reason why we could deny that the dialectic has
attained this point of completion seems obvious to Rosen. When Hegel says we are at the
end of the dialectic he appears to be referring to human knowledge, which should include
scientific knowledge. Scientific knowledge, however, could not have been complete in
Hegels time because it is not even complete now.
27

From Rosens point of view, it seems that we are only able to rationally claim that
determinate negations are made in history if we know what the final determinate negation
and absolute truth look like. One might ask whether it is possible to assess the validity of
determinate negation before the attainment of absolute truth, and this question will become
especially important in the later chapters on common standards (see chapter six). However,
Rosen is convinced determinate negations are not made in scientific revolutions. He even
claims that a dialectical account of what happens when contradictions arise in science is not a
realistic account. Furthermore, Rosen believes that a dialectical account especially

26
It is important to mention that Hegel does not actually rely on this argument, so we would not be able to
find areas of his texts where he might respond to Rosens criticism (on the condition in which we must wait till
the end of the dialectic). Hegel was not interested in developing a complete un-falsifiable system. The
falsification of a theory is a discussion that Karl Popper was well known for. If Rosens perspective were a
Popperian one then it would seem that a system capable of falsification is an important feature in refutation of
the theorys validity. Rosen writes, It is worth reiterating that that an objection to this claim that there exist
logical means for generating new content in the course of the process of refutation is at the heart of Sir Karl
Poppers attack on Hegels dialectic. Refutation, Popper claims, consists in confronting a theory with a
logically incompatible observation (Rosen, 39).
27
In this way we have the paradox: to criticize Hegel is to claim that the system does not attain validly its
point of completion. But to criticize from any point other than the point of completion violates a crucial
presupposition of the system itself, namely, that only someone who has really attained its final point can
perceive the rationality of its attainment. I shall call this the post festum paradox (Rosen, 23-24).


20
unrealistic when we consider the current debates in the philosophy of science regarding the
issue of true knowledge. Rosen writes,
this claim that theories do have such progressive aspirations and that there are
common standards between theories according to which they can be judged is
exactly what the skeptical trend in modern philosophy of science, pioneered by
writers such as Kuhn and Feyerbend, denies.
28

Theories in science, according to Rosen, do not necessary develop when they undergo a
contradiction. In the cases where a theory does make a change due to the emergence of an
internal contradiction, it is not necessarily the case that this change is really a development.
If anything, Rosen believes that his metaphor of blackboard getting wiped clean is a more
realistic and appropriate way of viewing the effects of a contradiction, especially a
contradiction that arises in scientific revolutions. Rosen even claims, Common sense would
say more accurately, surely that the person who has done no more than reject a theory as
false has ended up back where he started.
29
Thus, according to Rosen, every contradiction
in the history of is not necessarily some moment that precedes a development but rather a
step back, perhaps even a moment where a blackboard is wiped clean.
If Hegels dialectical system is built on a method of reasoning that is dialectical then
Rosen should have made a better effort at understanding what a dialectical perspective
entails. Instead, it would seem that Rosen did not attempt to understand the dialectic as
Hegel understood it at all.
30
If this is true then Rosens criticisms need to be evaluated,
because the semantical approach that Rosen uses does not seem to be a proper method to
provide to critical appraisal of Hegel.
31
Thus, in evaluating Rosens criticism of the
dialectic, I believe that we should reconsider two questions that Rosen thought he had

28
Rosen, 33.
29
Rosen, 39.
30
To properly analyze and criticize the dialectical way of thinking, Hegel says one must first try to adopt
those new ways of thinking. One might argue that Rosen also never tried to apply the new ways of thinking
that came with Hegels dialectic. But this implies that Rosen criticized the dialectic without even trying to apply
it in Hegels way, a way that could illustrate how Hegel envisioned the dialectics to function as a rational
system of understanding developments, especially of scientific knowledge (Hegel, Science of Logic, 26 -27).
31
The semantical approach is a description of Rosens approach that Devries provided in his review of
Rosens book. For Rosen, a proper interpretation of the dialectic focuses on the meaning of concepts and by
showing how the concept under investigation organizes the discourse in the text (Willem A. Devries,
Hegels Dialectic And Its Criticism, a review of Hegels Dialectic And Its Criticism by Michael Rosen (The
Philosophical Review, J uly 1984), 450-451).


21
provided answers for. First, in what ways can we make sense of the usage of dialectical
contradictions that would be compatible with the definition of a contradiction in formal
logic? And secondly, can the claim, regarding the positive development of theories that
result from prior-contradiction, be justified when looking at examples from history where the
developments in knowledge, such as scientific knowledge, seemed to have experienced a
series of determinate negations?


22
CHAPTER 4
A RESPONSE TO ROSEN USING HEGELS
SCIENCE OF LOGIC
In chapter two there was a discussion of some of the fundamental principles and laws
that define Hegels dialectic. I emphasized that the dialectic functions as a system, capable
of being applied to many different subjects. For our purposes, we are concerned with how
the dialectic serves as a legitimate system for understanding changes and developments in the
history of human knowledge. If this system could in fact provide a legitimate account of the
changes and developments as they occur throughout history of human knowledge then the
dialectic should allow us to understand how these developments in knowledge are results of a
series of contradictions.
ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE DIALECTIC
As we saw in chapter three, Rosen denies that Hegels dialectic is capable of
providing a rational account for the development of human knowledge. We also discussed
Rosens criticisms that fell under the post festum paradox, but the paradox is only part of
Rosens criticisms.
32
Although all of Rosens arguments appear to be intertwined and related
to each other, I am going to break them up into two kinds and address each kind of argument
independently. We will refer to the criticisms, about the point of a contradiction, as the first
kind and the criticisms regarding the claim, the truth is the whole, as the second kind. In this
chapter, I argue that referring to particular sections of Hegels Science of Logic can refute
both kinds of arguments.

32
The post festum paradox raises the issue that I discussed in the previous chapter about whether any
philosopher is able to rationally criticize Hegels dialectic until the dialectical process has completed itself (see
chapter three).


23
FIRST KIND: CONTRADICTIONS IN DIALECTICS
According to Rosens interpretation, what makes the dialectic an immanent critique is
that it leads to a positive result.
33
The problem Rosen has with this claim is that by
conventional understandings, a contradiction does not lead to a positive result. Rosen
explains that a contradiction in determinate negation is not the same as a common conception
of a contradiction. Rosen thinks Hegel understands the point of contradiction much
differently than the point of a contradiction in formal logic. The type of negation that
Rosen initially questioned plays has a unique role in determinate negation. As we discussed
in the previous chapter, Rosen seems to believe that negating is an action, which completely
erases and/or brings the subject back to a blank slate.
Rosen argues that there is only one point of a contradiction; the point of a
contradiction should be the same as the point of a contradiction in formal logic, to wipe the
board clean. Hegel appears to provide another form of contradiction, a dialectical
contradiction. The dialectical contradiction is a form of contradiction that Rosen is
concerned with in the first kind of criticism. But what reasons permit Hegel to develop a
different definition of contradiction? Michael Wolff discussed this question in his article,
Hegels Doctrine of Contradiction.
According to Wolff, perspectives like Rosens that make a distinction between the
contradiction of formal logic and the dialectical contradiction are critical of Hegels
dialectical contradiction because such perspectives treat these two contradictions as if they
were homonyms; Hegel uses the same word, contradiction, as in formal logic but the
meaning of this word is not the same in both usages (dialectical contradiction and formal
logic contradiction).
34
Wolff thinks that critics, like Rosen, who interpret Hegels
contradiction as homonymic will consider that the formal logic definition of contradiction is
lost when Hegel introduces the dialectical contradiction called objective contradiction.
35


33
The fact of leading to a positive result is also an issue that relates to scientific developments in human
knowledge, a topic that we will discuss in greater detail in the later chapters (Rosen, 31).
34
As we will discuss, Wolff argues that Hegel is actually using he same contradiction that formal logic is
using, but the relationship between Hegels use and formal logic is not homonymic.
35
Michael Wolff, Hegels Doctrine of Contradiction, The Owl of Minerva 31, no. 3 (Fall 1999): 5.


24
So why is it that Hegel thinks he needs to introduce the objective contradiction?
Wolff explains that Hegel is attempting to provide a definition of contradiction that is not just
limited to the definition given in formal logic. In formal logic, contradictions usually pertain
to errors in sentences, statements, claims, assessments, or any other linguistic
constructions.
36
In the Science of Logic, Hegel devotes his section, the Doctrine of
Contradiction to building a conception of contradiction that all other forms of contradictions
can be derived from. Hegels goal in writing this section was to build a conception of
contradiction that goes deeper than formal logic because, as Wolff explains, Hegel proceeds
from the by-no-means-misguided conviction that a formal contradiction, insofar as it is
merely formal, cannot be a genuine contradiction.
37

Wolff goes on to explain that a contradiction is only genuine when it is the form of
contradiction that the reflective activity of philosophy uses. Philosophys reflective activity
is intended to be objective and since Hegel believes that philosophy uses the dialectic in its
reflective activity, the genuine (or objective) contradiction must be the dialectical
contradiction. Wolff refers to the following passage from Hegels Science of Logic to
explain the role of this dialectical contradiction:
everything is inherently contradictory, and in the sense that this law in contrast to
the others expresses rather the truth and the essential nature of things. The
contradiction which makes its appearance in opposition, is only the developed
nothing that is contained in identity and that appears in the expression that the law
of identity says nothing.
38

Hegels objective contradiction appears to be a relation and this should not be surprise
because we have already discussed how Hegel believes contradiction is one of the four
essential relationships in the Doctrine of Essence (see chapter two). What makes this
contradiction objective is because this contradiction belongs to the things themselves.
39


36
Wolff, 1.
37
Hegel is attempting to take on the same task that Kant did. Wolff writes, it was Kant (in his concern
for a concept of contradiction not merely regarding logical form, but one suited to a transcendental logic) who
called attention to these counterparts. Kant coined for them the term analytic oppositions and accounted for
the concept of contradiction in terms of them: contradictions are, according to Kant, negations of analytic
judgments (Wolff, 4).
38
Hegel, Science of Logic, 439.
39
Wolff, 4.


25
Thus, contradiction is a concept that is paronymic, according to Wolff, because there are
variety of contradictions, which are not all completely the same in any expression but are
similar enough to all be considered contradictions. The expression of a contradiction that is
paronymic is an expression of a particular variation of contradictions.
Wolff provides us with a possible way to avoid Rosens criticisms on how Hegels
uses concepts like contradiction and negation in the principle of determinate negation.
Although we may wonder: is Wolffs account of paronymic contradictions even necessary in
avoiding Rosens criticisms raised by the post festum paradox? Whether or not Hegel
thought he was using contradiction in a different way may or not be determined solely by
Wolffs work. But based on the relevance that Wolffs work has to particular passages he
noted from the Science of Logic, it does appear that Wolff is at least partly right. In addition,
I believe that Wolff did make an important point about Hegels use of contradiction in the
dialectics that I think is relevant to how I will defend determinate negation. Wolff said that
contradiction, as Hegel uses it, makes more sense of how concepts are used in science (a
subject that we will discuss in greater detail in chapter six).
By considering Wolffs work, I wanted to demonstrate that there is a way to make
sense of how Hegel is referring to the same contradiction as formal logic. Wolff was able to
make sense of it because he attempted to adopt a dialectical perspective, something that
Rosen did not do. Wolff overcomes the issue that Rosens semantical approach raises,
regarding the proper definition of contradiction. Now that we have an answer to one
question we can proceed to answer the question as to whether determinate negations can be
applicable in scientific revolutions.
40
I believe this question is also the main question (raised
of Rosens interpretation) that we should be concerned with is whether Hegel is right in
claiming that the developments arise necessarily from contradictions as a tautology and also
whether these developments are in fact moving toward truth. Rosen argues that history
shows that the development of scientific knowledge do not necessarily support Hegels

40
This was the first question that was raised earlier (in chapter three) and initiated by Rosens critique.
The question states: in what ways can we make sense of the usage of dialectical contradictions that would be
compatible with the definition of a contradiction in formal logic? And the second question was: can the claim,
regarding the positive development of theories that result from prior-contradiction, be justified when looking at
examples from human history where the developments of knowledge, such as scientific knowledge, seemed to
have experienced a series of determinate negations?


26
determinate negation, especially the claim that it yields a positive result. Nonetheless, in
making this argument Rosen also initiates a further investigation of whether we should
believe that history does in fact rule out determinate negation.
41

SECOND KIND: THE TRUTH IS THE WHOLE
The second kind of criticisms is about the post festum paradox. The paradox
illustrates a philosophers inability to rationally criticize Hegels dialectic until the dialectic
has a reached a state of completion; because to rationally criticize, in a sense, is to determine
whether the law of determinate negation is true and thus, truth becomes the basis of a rational
critique. Truth only emerges when the dialectical system is complete, which means the basis
of a rational critique is unavailable until the dialectic is complete. However, knowing exactly
when the dialectic is complete requires one to have a clear idea of what the end of the
dialectic looks like (or what absolute truth looks like) since Hegel supposes that the whole of
the system establishes the truth of the system. Since we do not have a clear conception of
truth, it seems unclear whether we would be able to recognize truth, even if the truth hit us
straight in the face. Thus according to Rosen, since we are unable to determine this point of
completion we are unable to determine the point at which we could rationally criticize the
dialectic. In other words, the basis of a rational critique is unavailable and trying to
determine when the basis will be available may be impossible.
So what the does Hegel mean by the claim, the truth is the whole? Let us discuss
what Rosen thinks it is first and then I will provide what I believe to be a more accurate
account of Hegels claim. Rosen thinks Hegel is referring to human knowledge because only
when human knowledge is complete does it become true knowledge. To examine Rosens
interpretation of Hegel a little further, I derived a couple possible interpretations from
Rosens interpretation of Hegel. In looking at each of these derived interpretations, I will
argue that both of them provide good reasons why we should not take Rosens account of
Hegel seriously.

41
I mentioned that Rosen is critical of Hegels claim that the determinate negation process is a bit of a
tautology. A tautology means that developments that arise out of a contradiction are particular results. This a
reference to the same passage from the Science of Logic (see chapter three) where Hegel describes the particular
development as the result [that] essentially contains that from which it results; which strictly speaking is a
tautology, for otherwise it would be an immediacy, not a result (Hegel, Science of Logic, 54).


27
Consider two interpretations that can be derived from Rosens interpretation of
Hegels claim, the truth is the whole. In the first interpretation, Rosen assumes Hegel
believed the dialectical system had completed itself because Hegel thinks all of human
knowledge had reached the level of becoming true, because all of human knowledge
becomes true only when human knowledge is complete. The second interpretation considers
an account of Hegel that considers the claim, truth is the whole, as a prediction about what
will happen to human knowledge in the near future, meaning the end of human knowledge
was not complete or whole yet but the end is not too far away. The only difference between
these two interpretations is matter of time; the first interprets truth as being achieved while
the second interprets as going to be achieved.
42

Assuming either of these derived interpretations accurately portray Rosens point of
view, these interpretations should at least demonstrate some serious issues Rosen had with
Hegels dialectic. The first interpretation thinks human knowledge is complete while the
second interpretation thinks human knowledge is near completion. Both interpretations treat
the completion of the dialectic as if it meant the same thing as the completion of human
knowledge and this bothered Rosen, because Rosen is led to believe that Hegel has an
understanding of truth as if it were a concept that was unchanging, stagnant, and even
attainable by human beings in a given time period.
43

Now we turn to what I believe is more accurate interpretation of the claim, the truth is
the whole. As we mentioned above, both of the interpretations derived from Rosens were
based on a view of the claim, the truth is the whole, as if Hegel was talking about the

42
Let us put this in the context of science. Complete knowledge in science is the point in time where all
discoveries are made and science is capable of providing explanations for any given phenomena. One might
ask: is complete scientific knowledge what truth really entails? Perhaps, or perhaps not. But the difficulty in
being able to determine a clear definition of truth is exactly why Rosen thinks there is an issue with Hegels
claim, the truth is the whole. As a skeptic, Rosen (like Kuhn, as we will soon discuss) seems to believe that
coming up with a clear definition of truth is not even possible.
43
Though our main focus is scientific knowledge, if we are talking about all of human knowledge then
these first two interpretations are especially troubling. Consider political knowledge, for instance. If Hegel
thought that human beings were close to deriving or had already derived the best possible political institution
then how can we explain the two world wars, especially the second one? Given these unfortunate events, for
Hegel to claim that political knowledge was complete or near completion in his time would also require him to
claim that knowledge had also uncompleted itself. But of course, we do not know if Hegel would have made
such a claim.


28
development of all human knowledge.
44
However, I do not think that Hegel was referring to
the whole of human knowledge when he made this claim. Actually, I believe that Hegel was
referring to whole of the dialectical method, the one philosophy uses for its reflective
activity. Thus, I argue that what is true and whole is the dialectical method of philosophy,
not the whole of human knowledge. Looking at particular passages found in the Science of
Logic and a look at Tom Rockmores interpretation of Hegels epistemology as a circular
epistemology will help support this argument.
The distinction between knowledge that is whole and the whole philosophical method
is an important issue to discuss. DeVries noted that Rosen applies the dialectic in so many
ways that it sometimes becomes rather difficult to assess which type of whole Rosen thinks
Hegel is referring to. This discussion then regarding Hegels claim, the truth is the whole, is
not only important to responding to Rosen but also to further understanding Hegel. For the
remainder of this chapter, I will discuss how Hegels claim is actually a reference to his
circular epistemology that is found in his Science of Logic. The discussion of Hegels
circular epistemology will support my argument against Rosens interpretation of Hegel: that
a more plausible interpretation of Hegels claim, the truth is the whole, is that we are already
at the end the dialectical movement because the whole is the dialectical method and not the
whole containing all of human knowledge.
The interpretation that I am advocating is the one that Rockmore discusses in his
book, Hegels Circular Epistemology. Rosen was unable to make sense of how the dialectic
could have completed itself and that Hegel was justified in believing that we are at the end of
the dialectic. On the other hand, Rockmores interpretation of Hegel as a circular
epistemology is able to make sense of Hegels belief that we are at the end of the dialectic.
To explain Hegels thought in his circular epistemology, Rockmore emphasized the
distinction between how philosophy operates in distinction to how other non-philosophic
disciplines work.
45
Rockmore writes,

44
In the Science of Logic, Hegel writes, Absolute Idea is all truth. (Hegel, Science of Logic, 824). Hegel
then he goes on to write, Content of the Absolute Idea is all truth and that Method is the universal form of
the absolute Idea. (Ibid., 825).
45
Tom Rockmore, Hegels Circular Epistemology, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), 91.


29
Since philosophy cannot justify itself through its deduction from its initial
principle, its beginning, which itself is not justified, it must be the case that the
result of the theory justifies the beginning. In other words, the beginning of a
theory cannot already contain in merely implicit form the proof which follows
from it. On the contrary, it is the result which justifies the entire process,
including its onset. In a word, philosophy, which must justify itself in part and in
whole, can carry out this process only through a return to itself in the form of a
circle.
46

We are emphasizing the kind of activity that philosophy engages in because we want to show
that Rosen seems to misunderstand Hegels method of how philosophy of science arrives at
truth. And yet, Hegel describes the dialectic by claiming [its] method as a circle of
circles.
47
What makes this method circular is the pattern of the method that is taken to
establish the truth of a particular subject. Hegel believes that arriving at the essence of a
subject is a result of the dialectical development of the subject. To establish an essence, then,
one must go through a dialectical process and arrive at the end. Hegel writes, Truth of the
method is in the course of the process and in the conclusion.
48
Thus, we begin with a
question about what the essence of a subject is but only arrive at an answer at the every end
of a series of determinate negations.
49

Hegels argument against Kants understanding of infinity is a useful example of how
Hegel employs his circular epistemology. In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant attempted to
show the limitations of human reasoning by showing that the concept of infinity could not be
proven through human reason alone. Kant attempted to argue that defining infinity as
something that is endless will inevitably lead one to committing a contradiction.
50
Kant
writes,
For if one assumes that the world has no beginning in time, then up to every given
point in time an eternity has elapsed, and hence an infinite series of states of
things in the world, each following another, has passed away. But now the

46
Rockmore, Hegels Circular Epistemology, 90.
47
Hegel, Science of Logic, 842.
48
Hegel, Science of Logic, 842.
49
Hegel writes, By means of one of its moments, method expands into a system (Hegel, Science of
Logic, 838).
50
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, eds. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (New York: Cambridge,
1988), 472-474.


30
infinity of a series consists precisely in the fact that it can never be completed
through a successive synthesis.
51

Kant says that if we imagine infinity as something that represents an endless line, then the
line could have no beginning and also no end to it, because as long as the line is endless there
is no way that we could find at which the line starts and the line ends. If we do claim that
this infinite or endless line does have a beginning and/or end we commit a contradiction.
Hegel would agree with Kant that human reason could not justify the concept of the true
infinity, especially if reasoning was only limited to non-dialectical philosophy. Non-
dialectical philosophy can, however, demonstrate why the infinity that Kant was trying to
deal with is actually the spurious infinity. According to Hegel, there was a real and true
conception of infinity but reasoning that is non-dialectical cannot determine this type of
infinity without encountering a contradiction.
52
Hegel writes, the image of true infinity,
bent back into itself, becomes the circle, the line which has reached itself, which is closed
and wholly present, without a beginning and end.
53

Hegels attempt to overcome Kants antinomy, regarding infinity, demonstrates how
Hegel believed we arrive at truth when we reach the end of the dialectical development of
what we are trying to find the truth of. Hegel writes, Truth of the method is in the course of
the process and in the conclusion.
54
One arrives at a conception of the true infinity by first
building off the contradiction that Kant demonstrated and making a negation of Kants proof
to arrive at true conception of infinity. In other words, to arrive at true conception of infinity
we make a determinate negation; we negate both sides of the contradiction (that infinity is
endless and complete) and then we construct a conception of infinity that is capable of

51
Kant, 470.
52
In a footnote from the Science of Logic, Hegel writes, The philosophizing which is most widespread
among us does not go beyond the Kantian results, that Reason cannot acquire knowledge of any true content or
subject matter and in regard to absolute truth must be directed to faith. But philosophizing, so that the
preceding exposition from which that result issued and which is a philosophical cognition, is cut away
beforehand. The Kantian philosophy thus serves as a cushion for intellectual indolence which soothes itself
with the conviction that everything is already proved and settled. Consequently for genuine knowledge, for a
specific content of thought which is not to be found in such barren and arid complacency, one must turn to that
preceding exposition (Hegel, Science of Logic, 61-62).
53
Hegel, Science of Logic, 149.
54
Hegel, Science of Logic, 838.


31
incorporating both sides of that contradiction while overcoming the contradiction. Hegel
believed that the result of this determinate negation was a conception of infinity as a circle.
The method of circularity provides us with how Hegel thinks we arrive at true
through a dialectical process. But explaining this circular method does not necessarily show
how Hegel is justified in believing that we are at the end of the dialectic, especially, as Rosen
might point out, if the end of the dialectic is supposed to be complete human knowledge. So
what gives Hegels belief a justification and out of Rosens paradox? The answer to the
question is actually quite simple. Rosens interpretation of Hegel that led to the post festum
paradox makes a mistake of treating the content and method of philosophy as if they were the
same thing. In this sense, Rosen misunderstands the dialectical method because he interprets
the complete development of the dialectic as if it were a linear development, comparable to
Kants conception of infinity (where the end of the line is indeterminate). But the dialectical
method should not be confused with the development of human knowledge. If the content of
philosophic reflection were scientific knowledge, it is not the case that scientific knowledge
needs to be whole. What is the whole, however, is the method that philosophy reflective
activity uses. Thus, the whole that Hegel is referring to in his claim, the truth is the whole, is
not the whole of human knowledge it is the dialectical system.
We can find several areas that support my claim that the whole is the dialectical
system and not the whole of human knowledge. For instance, in the Science of Logic, Hegel
refers to the System as a totality and that the Method winds itself into a totality.
55
The
system and method that Hegel is referring to is the one that belongs to philosophy, the
dialectic. In the first part of his Encyclopaedia, Hegel described how the development of
philosophic thought is essentially a system, since what is concretely true is so only in its
inward self-unfolding and in taking and holding itself together in unity, i.e., as totality.
56

The whole is the whole of the dialectical system that philosophy uses to talk about those
other sciences; this because philosophy has no content by itself. Hegel writes,
Philosophy lacks the advantage, which the other sciences enjoy, of being able to
presuppose its ob-jects as given immediately by representation. And with regard

55
Hegel, Science of Logic, 840-841.
56
Hegel, The Encyclopaedia Logic, 38-39.


32
to its beginning and advance, it cannot presuppose the method of cognition as one
that is already accepted.
57

Although philosophy uses these types of knowledge (from these other non-philosophical
sciences) as the content of its reflective activity, philosophy does not conduct is practice in
the same way that the other sciences do, which means philosophy does not expand on their
knowledge, it only helps to make better sense of all that knowledge. And on that same note,
just because Hegel assumes the method is complete, this does not indicate that Hegel thought
every application of the method (in its reflection of knowledge, like science) is also
complete.
Rockmores interpretation of Hegels also seems to be a more acceptable account of
Hegels philosophy because it is able to overcome the post festum paradox without providing
an interpretation of Hegel that steers too far away from what Hegel actually wrote.
Rockmores interpretation also emphasized an important view expressed by Hegel that Rosen
did not take seriously. The circular epistemology interpretation of Hegel also rules out a
view of truth, where the content of what defines truth remains and is incapable of constant
improvements.
58

To be able to decide whether determinate negations are made in science requires us to
overcome Rosens post festum paradox, because the existence of this paradox prevents us
from being able to decide if there are actual determinate negations made throughout the
development of scientific knowledge. However, the basis of Rosens criticism is his own
misinterpretation of the claim, the truth is the whole. Rosens inaccurate interpretation of
determinate negation also led him to an incorrect interpretation of Hegels epistemology.
Therefore, it seems clear that based on Rosens work and what we have discussed so far in
this thesis we have yet to determine a good understanding of Hegels epistemology,

57
Hegel, Science of Logic, 24.
58
Hegel is not offering a static view of theory as completed. He understands the justification of claims to
know as a dynamic process taking place through the development of the theory. According to Hegel, a given
theory is not justified initially, but only justified progressively through its results. What we have, then, is a
form of circularity that is not an epistemological error but the only acceptable approach to knowledge (Tom
Rockmore, On Hegels Epistemology and Contemporary Philosophy, (New J ersey: Humanities Press
International Inc., 1996), 29).


33
We have already seen how Hegel applies this dialectical method in political
knowledge (the state functions to mediate the internal contradictions among its citizens), but
how are these series of determinate negations demonstrated in the development of scientific
knowledge? I believe that a social constructivist interpretation of Hegels Phenomenology of
Spirit has a place in Hegel epistemology, especially in the sense that what is considered to be
true knowledge depends on communal standards and these standards are subject to change.
So, if Hegels view appears social constructivist in his Phenomenology (as I believe it does)
then let us see how his social constructivism compares with a modern social constructivists
perspective (especially like Kuhns) regarding the issue of developments of scientific
knowledge and whether there are implications of determinate negations at work throughout
history.
59



59
The reason why I think Hegel provides us with a social constructivist view is partly based on my
agreement with Pinkards interpretation of Hegels Phenomenology. Though Pinkard presents us with a non-
metaphysical account of Hegels work, I am not concerned with the debate as to whether a non-metaphysical
account is a proper account of Hegel. I only assume a social constructivist account of Hegels Phenomenology
to address the topic of my thesis. But for a good interpretation of how Hegels Phenomenology presents a social
constructivist view of knowledge, see: Terry Pinkard, Hegels Phenomenology: The Sociality of Reason,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).


34
CHAPTER 5
THOMAS KUHN IN PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
Before we could set up a legitimate defense of Hegels dialectics, particularly in the
sense that there are actual determinate negations made in scientific revolutions, it is first
necessary that we discuss what exactly scientific revolutions are and what causes them. To
recall, Rosen thought that the condition that contradictions lead to a positive result seems to
be incompatible with the modern perspectives, such as Kuhns, regarding the issue of truth in
philosophy of science.
60
We are required then to investigate Kuhns perspective as a social
constructivist but before we could do this we must first set the basis of our discussion.
Therefore, in this chapter we will discuss what Kuhn thinks scientific revolutions are we and
what exactly causes a scientific community to experience a revolution.
NORMAL SCIENCE, ANOMALIES AND PARADIGM SHIFTS
In the Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Kuhn explains the scientific community
experiences a revolution when it undergoes a paradigm shift. The notion of a paradigm is
especially important for Kuhn because the scientific community has a particular
methodology of research that is unlike any other discipline. Kuhn calls this method of
research normal science. Kuhn believes that there is a great difference between what we may
call a particular discipline a science and what should be referred to as normal science. An
important feature of the normal science, according to Kuhn, is that its development depends
on the establishment of paradigms. Kuhn defines paradigms as:
It is, in the first place, a fundamental scientific achievement and one which
includes both a theory and some exemplary applications to the results of
experiment and observation. More importantly, it is an open-ended achievement,
one which leaves all sorts of research to be done. And, finally, it is an accepted

60
See the quote mentioned in chapter three, where Rosen argued, this claim that theories do have such
progressive aspirations and that there are common standards between theories according to which they can be
judged is exactly what the skeptical trend in modern philosophy of science, pioneered by writers such as Kuhn
and Feyerbend, denies (Rosen, 22).


35
achievement in the sense that it is received by a group whose members no longer
try to rival it or to create alternatives for it.
61

Before a paradigm is established, there was no such thing as a normal science; there was only
a science, an intellectual discipline that operated in a very similar fashion to other disciplines
like philosophy, history or even literature. Normal science is different because it instructs its
practitioners to follow an accepted set ideals as well as a particular methodology.
Philosophy, on the other hand, encourages its practitioners to examine various methodologies
and ideals.
Kuhn believed that the practice of normal science is unique in that it operates and
develops in a way that is much more different than fields such philosophy, history or
literature.
62
In philosophy, for instance, there are different beliefs on selected topics such as
religion, ethics, or metaphysics. Within the philosophy of religion, there is a debate
concerning the issue of the problem of evil. And even within this issue, there are a great
amount of different positions. The problem of evil is an issue that deals with the existence of
God, in the face of obvious evils that are present in human reality. To deal with this issue,
J udeo-Christian theorists have come up with various arguments to accommodate these evils
while preserving definition of God, as being a divine entity who is also omni-benevolent,
omniscient, and omnipotent. There are the determinists, the non-determinists, as wells as the
compatibilists and non-compatibilists. Each one of these groups attempt to provide an
explanation that deals with the problem of evil through some discussion dealing with free
will and determinism. But then there are also the atheists and agonistics, who find the
presence of evil in the world as a great reason to support their positions.
63


61
Thomas Kuhn, The Function of Dogma in Scientific Research, in Scientific Knowledge: Basic Issues
in the Philosophy of Science, ed. J anet K. Kourany (California: Wadsworth Publishing, 1998), 307. And to
note, the definition of paradigm can be a bit ambiguous. Interestingly, Kuhn even mentions how he had been
accused of using different definitions to what he refers to as paradigms. Nevertheless, because of this
possible ambiguity, Kuhn writes in the postscript that the way paradigm should be understood is by thinking of
it as being a disciplinary matrix. We will discuss the features of this definition later on in this paper (Thomas
Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 3
rd
ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 182).
62
Perhaps I should note that Kuhns normal science is not his definition that should be confused with how
philosophy of science conducts its particular kind of research. The discussion of normal science is about
science as a practice or discipline that is independent of philosophical discourse. We will discuss what Kuhn
believes the role of philosophy is in the later chapters.
63
I am referring to Petriks discussion in the problem of evil that explains the complexity of this subject in
philosophy. Petrik explains, the logical problem of evil is not quite so frail as it might first appear. Petrik



36
A good example of how paradigms influence practice in normal science is the
development of the paradigm theory for electricity by Benjamin Franklin. Before the
paradigm, there were different schools of thought that argued with one another in
determining the true nature of electricity. Since there was no consensus on what a proper
explanation of electricity was, people sided with whatever theory they liked best. Otherwise,
there were no logical reasons for why one theory of electricity should disprove any
competing theory. The pre-paradigm era (as Kuhn calls it) had established different
schools of thought on the matter and what related these different schools was the way in
which they conducted their research.
64
Kuhn writes,
All their numerous concepts of electricity had something in commonthey were
partially derived from one or another version of the mechanico-corpuscular
philosophy that guided all scientific research of the day. In addition, all were
components of real scientific theories, of theories that had been drawn in part
form experiment and observation and that partially determined the choice and
interpretation of additional problems undertaken in research.
65

Most of these earlier scientists (such as Du Fay, Nollett, Watson, Gray and even Franklin)
based their theories on a variety of observations and kinds of experiments, but they never
relied on one single paradigm. That is, until Franklin founded that paradigm. Franklin was
the first to discover the essential nature of electricity.
66
After Franklin made this
discovery, the method of research in this area (electricity) had completely changed and taken
on a new form. Thus, Kuhn believes examples like the one of Franklin demonstrate how the

also explains that although it is called the logical problem of evil, the debate seems to be more about story
telling and whether the theist is able to provide a story [which] internally coherent and does not violate any
principle that is necessarily true, the theist will have met the threshold needed to rebut the logical version of the
problem in its strictest form (J ames Petrik, Evil Beyond Belief, (New York: M.E. Sharp, 2000), 8).
64
According to Kuhn, the benefit of this, not having a paradigm, allows the intellectual field to accumulate
a broader scheme of information than in the practice of a normal science and this is because philosophy sees
every philosophy to be important. Students in philosophy are encouraged to be able to see both sides of an
argument and also understand the reasoning behind some of the oldest and outdated theories, especially of Plato
and Aristotle.
65
Kuhn goes on to write: Yet though all the experiments were electrical and though most of the
experimenters read each others works, their theories had no more than a family resemblance (Kuhn, The
Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 13-14).
66
Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 306.


37
establishment a single paradigm establishes the way in which practitioners conduct their
research in normal science.
67

Kuhn explains that further research after the establishment of a paradigm would the
be directed at finding more precise, accurate and thorough ways to not only support the
paradigm but to also find ways of articulating and clarifying what the paradigm can explain
and why an explanation drawn from this paradigm is correct; and this type of project
becomes especially important for the normal science when a particular paradigm is not easy
to understand.
68
By being able to articulate the paradigm in a better way, researchers in
normal science would have less trouble and spend less time trying to learn how to apply
paradigm to reality. These scientists, Kuhn explains, would have more time to conduct
further research and make more contributions to the knowledge of normal science.
According to Kuhn, after the paradigm is established, the further development on
paradigm finding take on the look of puzzle solving, where further research under a currently
held paradigm appears to concern itself with problems that resemble puzzles. What makes
these problems look like puzzles is that they are problems that are similar to the problem that
the paradigm had already solved. To progress in the quickest manner, normal science
focuses on only similar problems, or ones that can be figured out by using the same kind of
problem solving techniques as the ones provided by the paradigm. Problems that require
other techniques, that are not yet available for the researcher in normal science, are problems
that normal science could not quickly benefit from. The puzzle-solving aspect of the normal
science may limit the scope of the scientists work but thats the point in using paradigms.
69


67
Kuhn writes, The end of inter-school debate ended the constant reiteration of fundamentals; confidence
that they were on the right track encouraged electricians to undertake more precise, esoteric, and consuming
sorts of work (Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 306).
68
The task of articulation was actually a really important job for many scientists. Some scientists would
build their careers just on their ability of explaining a theory better than it was explained before. For example,
Bryson, in his book, A Short History of Nearly Everything, explains that if it were not for John Playfair, the
work of J ames Hutton might have never been appreciated and recognized. Huttons work would set the
paradigm to resolve the longstanding geology debate between Neptunists and Plutonists (Bill Bryson, A Short
History of Nearly Everything, (New York: Broadway Books, 2003), 64-66).
69
This is an important distinction that Kuhn makes (between puzzle solvers and problem solvers). Normal
science may be able to solve more and more puzzles but it is not really the case that scientists actually solve
more problems, since the problems are sometimes outside the scheme set my the paradigm. This also implies
that the paradigm also constitute which problems the community should focus on and which ones to ignore.


38
By establishing paradigms, the scientist can work within what has already been proven (or
thinks it has proven).
So if problems that are unlike the paradigm are usually ignored by normal science,
what exactly causes a paradigm shift? The theories that the scientist relies on (the ones
called paradigms) provide the scientist with a particular outcome or an explanation for why a
particular event produces a single result. If the scientist decides to demonstrate and try to
prove to herself how the paradigm can account for the phenomenon then she will conduct a
particular experiment, based on the knowledge provided by the paradigm. In most cases (as
the paradigm would predict and what it expects) if she conducts the experiment properly
meaning she has followed the exact instructionsthen she would be able to witness the
success of this paradigm. But depending on the scope of the paradigm, as in what it attempts
to explain and how it attempts to explain, there are times in history where scientists have
found an unexpected result, or an anomaly. The result is unexpected because what the
paradigm was supposed to be capable of explaining only proved to be unexplainable by the
paradigm. There are times when this unexpected result, this anomaly, is actually not what it
seems; the scientist might have done something wrong. However, if the scientist did not do
anything wrong, because she did in fact follow the instructions perfectly but still attains some
variation in her results, then she had encountered an actual anomaly.
According to Kuhn, when the scientific community encounters anomalies, the
community is also likely encounter a crisis. The crisis is the result of the anomaly and
communitys recognition of the significance in the anomaly. The utility of a paradigm is its
ability to provide explanations for a phenomenon and also make predictions on the likely
outcomes of a similar phenomenon. But when the paradigm fails to provide an explanation
or the phenomena produces a result that is contrary to the result predicted by the paradigm,
then the scientific community must determine whether the paradigm is still correct and
should still function as a paradigm. If a community thinks that this anomaly is significant
then they may have to re-analyze their data and even question whether they could afford to
ignore the existence of the anomaly. Perhaps, the anomaly may not be that big of a deal.
Thus, when the anomaly continues to arise Kuhn believes the community necessarily


39
undergoes a crisis.
70
A scientific revolution comes about as a result of the unanimous
recognition of a crisis. When there is a need to reconcile the existence of an anomaly,
because of the way it conflicts with the explanations under the currently held paradigm, the
community experiences an internal contradiction, or a civil conflict, between the members
who believe the paradigm can still accommodate the anomaly and those believe a paradigm
shift is necessary.
PHLOGISTON THEORY AND THE CHEMICAL
REVOLUTION
A popular example of the effects of the paradigm shift described by Kuhn is an
example from the Chemical Revolution. In the 1770s, the scientific community once
considered phlogiston theory a paradigm. This theory was once accepted as the paradigm
theory for its ability to explain the causes and effects of combustion. Phlogiston theory
explained that all objects contain an element called phlogiston. When an object undergoes
combustion the object is said to have released its phlogiston and as a consequence the object
loses some of its weight. The prediction that phlogiston theory made was that objects would
lose weight in combustion and the explanation for this phenomenon was that objects lost
weight because those objects no longer contain phlogistons following combustion.
Since paradigms provide explanations and predictions for a phenomenon present in
nature, the verification of the paradigms explanation is dependent on the observable
consequence of the phenomena. In phlogiston theory, objects such as wood could be proven
to lose weight after combustion because a scientist can easily observe the loss of weight by
weighing the object before and after combustion. Nonetheless, the effects of combustion on
a particular object, such as a metal, could not be explained by phlogiston theory. Lavoisier
found that such objects actually gained weight after combustion and thus, the observable
consequences of this case of combustion did not verify the previous paradigm that was
phlogiston theory. The observable consequences in the combustion of metal actually
contradicted the explanations and predictions drawn from phlogiston theory.

70
For instance, sometimes what makes the existence of an anomaly significant is whether the anomaly
continues to arise every time a researcher conducts a particular experiment. If an anomaly only arises once or
very few times then scientific community might find that there is no reason to take this anomaly seriously and
would rather just ignore it.


40
Although Lavoisiers findings eventually led to the discovery of oxygen, a better
explanation on the effects combustion, Lavoisier findings were by no means accepted with
open arms by the community. The existence of oxygen explained how metal objects gained
weight following combustion by proposing the possibility that these metal objects absorbed
oxygen from the air during combustion and thereby gained excess weight. The community
began to experience its own internal contradiction, with the emergence of growing support
for explanations containing oxygen; there were those who continued to support phlogiston
theory and those who were willing to look for an alternative theory. Lavoisier was obviously
associated with the latter but J oseph Priestly was one of the scientists who were unwilling to
replace the paradigm. Despite the observational evidence that Lavoisier founded, Priestly
continued to defend phlogiston theory, taking his loyalty to his grave.


41
CHAPTER 6
TRUE KNOWLEDGE AND THE RATIONAL
THEORY CHOICE
After the discussion of Kuhns account of normal science and scientific revolutions,
we are now in a position to conduct an analysis of how Hegels dialectic could explain what
goes on in scientific revolutions. Hegel and Kuhn have different views on what constitutes
true knowledge in science. In this chapter, we will compare and contrast their views on true
knowledge. We will discuss how their different positions depend a lot on whether a social
constructivist like Hegel or Kuhn acknowledges the existence of common standards that
define what is a rational choice for a theory or true knowledge. What distinguishes Hegel
and Kuhn on this matter is whether they believe that common standards on what constitutes a
rational theory choice are actually reliable for the development of true scientific knowledge.
The issue then, of what sets these two philosophers views of science apart, is not whether
they acknowledge the existence of common standards but whether common standards are
objective measures of approach to true knowledge.
For Hegel, the continuous accumulation of true knowledge in science demonstrates
that determinate negations are made in sciences historical development. Examples that
demonstrate there are determinate negations being made, also demonstrate the existence and
reliability of those common standards. Common standards that scientific community has are
used to determine which theories are the most rational choices for a new paradigm. If a new
paradigm is established, as a result of scientific revolution, then common standards were
used when scientific community decided on that paradigm. Likewise, the common standards
that led to the establishment of the new paradigm are also the common standards that involve
a determinate negation.
A determinate negation in scientific development is when the community recognizes
an internal contradiction, probably inherent within an existing paradigm, and the very
resolution of the contradiction leads to a necessary, positive and unique result. Hegel would
believe that when the history of science follows this pattern of development, described by the


42
principle of determinate negation, this also indicates the reliability of the common standards.
The uniqueness of a theory (or new paradigm), for instance, indicates that the new theory is
different than the old theory, the one the scientific community had before the scientific
revolution. But what makes this new theory reliable, based on its uniqueness, is that the
theory deals with some of the same issues that the old theory dealt with, in addition to being
able to deal with issues that the older theory could not deal with. If common standards are
able to provide this type of uniqueness towards the acceptance of a new theory, then it would
appear that the common standards are reliable. On the other hand, Kuhn disagrees because
he finds that common standards are not entirely reliable, and we will now discuss some of his
reasons.
KUHN ON COMMON STANDARDS
One reason that these common standards are unreliable is because these common
standards are not entirely objective but are greatly influenced by social factors. Throughout
his work, Kuhn attempted to show how social factors (such class and political interests)
greatly influence the scientists research and acceptance of a theory. Because of these social
factors, Kuhn rules out the possibility that science operates through objective means and that
a choice between competing theories is never based on purely objective standards.
Kuhn believes that the revolutions in science are quite similar to the revolutions in
politics, and it is not necessarily the case that every political revolution is considered a
rational transition. Kuhn writes,
scientific revolutions are inaugurated by a growing sense, again often restricted to
a narrow subdivision of the scientific community, that an existing paradigm has
ceased to function adequately in the exploration of an aspect of nature to which
that paradigm itself had previously led the way. In both political and scientific
development the sense of malfunction that can lead to crisis is prerequisite to
revolution.
71

We find that in political revolutions cases where a particular community is no longer able to
handle the hostile environment of its inhabitants and there grows a need for a resolution for
the communitys internal contradiction. If the interests of the working-class conflict with the
capitalists then those opposing interests must be resolved in a way that allows both sides to

71
Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 92.


43
coexist. However, there are cases where both sides are not preserved at the end of political
revolution. At times, the more powerful or dominant side simply overcomes and wipes out
the other side. It was not until phlogiston theory looked completely unreasonable as a theory
choice, in comparison to what oxygen could explain, that phlogiston theory lost all of its
former support. Theories that become paradigms after scientific revolutions also share this
characteristic, where the acceptance is primarily based on the dominance of one side.
J ust as we saw in the phlogiston theory example, Kuhn argues that revolutions tend to
split up a community into different sides (or camps). In politics, one side of the conflict
supports the old beliefs and the other side supports the new set of beliefs and this is also the
case in scientific revolutions. People who still believed in phlogiston theory after Lavoisier
disproved it when through desperate measures in trying to preserve the theory, some even
began to develop concepts that could overcome Lavoisiers experimental results. For
instance, supporters of phlogiston theory tried to save the theory in way that appeared more
like a desperate tactic, claiming that phlogiston was negative weight. Of course, this tactic
only seemed to make phlogiston theory even less credible.
In the previous chapter, we had already started to touch on another aspect of Kuhns
reasoning for why these common standards are not entirely rational and this has a lot to do
with what Kuhn refers to as the logic of discovery. The idea that there is no logic to
discovery refers back to the ideas presented in the last chapter, on how exactly new
paradigms are not intentionally discovered but are rather accidental outcomes of scientific
research gone wrong. Kuhn writes,
Discovery commences with the awareness of anomaly, i.e., with the recognition
that nature has somehow violated the paradigm-induced expectations that govern
normal science. It then continues with a more or less extended exploration of the
area of anomaly. And it closes only when the paradigm theory has been adjusted
so that the anomalous has become the expected.
72

Kuhn believes it is not the case that a community is constantly looking for ways to disprove
their current paradigm. If anything, the community only encounters an anomaly by accident.
Thus, when a researcher discovers an anomaly he only does so by accident. Under the
normal science, researchers should not be looking for anomalies but only solving puzzles so

72
Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 52-53.


44
the fact the researcher discovers an anomaly indicates the anomaly was discovered by
accident. This sort of discovery, which would lead to paradigm shift, is by no means entirely
rational at all. Thus, we must conclude, as Kuhn says, that the process of a paradigm shift is
not entirely rational.
73

Kuhn believes that there also may be cases where a community might have equally
good reasons for choosing either one of two theories competing theories and when there is no
way to determine which choice is more rational, the choice between two theories cannot
itself be a rational choice.
74
Sometimes, according to Kuhn, the acceptance of one theory
leads to risk of losing some valuable information that may have been provided by the
competing theory. For instance, Kuhn writes, the phlogiston theory, unlike its rival, could
account for the metals being much more alike than the ores from which they were formed.
One theory thus matched experience better in one area, the other in another.
75

Kuhn also argues the inconsistency in common standards is also demonstrated in how
definitions of particular scientific concepts continue to undergo significant changes. In one
notable paradigm shift the concept of mass underwent some significant changes in its
definition when the community decided to accept some of the principles of Einsteins physics
at the abandonment of some of Newtonian physics. For Kuhn, the different usages of terms
in paradigm shifts, in the example of the different definitions for mass in Newtonian and
Einsteins physics, indicates another reason why paradigm shifts can be not be fully rational.
Kuhn believes that when scientists do not use scientific concepts in the same way, this
creates, what he calls the incommensurability of paradigms (or standards), which leads
advocates of paradigms to talk past each other.
76


73
Kuhn has also compared to the effects of a paradigm shift to religious conversion. His analogy to
religious conversion is an attempt to show that the acceptance of a new paradigm is not fully rational and
unexpected sometimes, like the way an individual changes his religion, and in that sense both religious
conversion and paradigm shifts are not entirely rational.
74
In discussing the significance of a crisis, Kuhn writes, individuals commit themselves to some concrete
proposal for the reconstruction of society in a new institutional framework. At that point the society is divided
into competing camps or parties, one seeking to defend the old institutional constellation, the others seeking to
institute some new one. And, once that polarization has occurred, political recourse fails (Kuhn, The Structure
of Scientific Revolutions, 93).
75
Thomas Kuhn, Objectivity, Value J udgment, and Theory Choice, in Scientific Knowledge: Basic
Issues in the Philosophy of Science, ed. J anet A. Kourany (California: Wadsworth Publishing, 1998), 214.
76
The point about talking past each other is actually a subject that Kuhn discusses in greater detail in this



45
If the knowledge in pre-paradigm eras (as Kuhn would call them) relied on a different
set of empirical data and then perhaps even their form of reasoning become different from us
to understanding. This would then mean that the new theories in science that try to expand
on the older theoretical terms (like Newtons mass) would be introducing concepts using our
form of reasoning that is incompatible with the form of reasoning behind Newtons mass.
Newtons physics, for instance, uses terms like mass, force and gravity in a way that relies on
his laws of motion and also the definitions of any other terms under his physics. This makes
his physics its own system of logic, where every aspect is logically related in the sense of that
all the terms and laws are categorized under the same taxonomy. If we attempted to
introduce a new principle about mass, as Einstein did, then we may introduce system of logic
that is contrary to the system of logic behind the definition of Newtons mass. As Kuhn had
repeatedly stated in his book, different traditions with competing paradigms talk to each other
at cross-purposes.
As we discussed earlier, Kuhn believes that common standards are not entirely
rational because they are inconsistent and constantly undergo reformations. When a
paradigm shift occurs, the common standards also change and in that sense, the common
standards in which a paradigm assessed are found within the paradigm. These changes just
go to show that the standards are different for every paradigm and at times, the standards
conflict. Choosing between paradigms then is like religious conversion then because the
choice between one religion over another can not be decision based on one set of standards in
which judge both religions indifferently. Each religion has a different set of standards and
choosing between one over the other is not a rational decision because favoring one set of
standards makes it a biased decision.
THE DETERMINATE NEGATION MADE IN A SCIENTIFIC
REVOLUTION
Hegel would interpret the consequences of a scientific revolution and paradigm shifts,
as necessary and positive moments of the dialectic. Every scientific revolution includes a

more recent book, especially in this chapter called Rationality and Theory Choice (Thomas Kuhn, The Road
Since Structure, eds. J ames Conant and John Haugeland (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 209-
215).


46
determinate negation, where the result of the scientific revolution leads to a necessary and
unique result, in the form of a new paradigm. Kuhn may question whether choices between
theories are considered rational especially in hindsight, where we begin to notice all the
issues that Kuhn brought up (such as the influence of social factors and absence of common
cross-paradigm standards). However, Hegel may not question these transitions in paradigms.
Because every determinate negation leads to a necessary result, if the result is not a paradigm
that is actually better than the old paradigm then this too will lead to another determinate
negation. Realization of an internal contradiction in beliefs seems to work to the benefit of
science. Rosen argued that every negation in a contradiction should be perceived as wiping
the board clean, but this makes no sense in Hegels dialectic. If the scientific community
realizes that it made a mistake and did not correctly determine a true theory, this mistake
only functioned as a necessary movement that would eventually lead to a development.
The contradiction that leads to a determinate negation is the conflict that arises when
the anomaly provides results that conflict with the results that were proposed by the existing
paradigm. The anomaly that arises in the scientific community then helps the community
make a further discovery through the recognition of an internal contradiction; the
contradiction necessary leads to a positive result. And yet, through the recognition of this
contradiction the scientific community was able to develop its knowledge by determining an
even better and more truthful paradigm.
What reasons do we have regarding Kuhns perspective of science that supports
Rosens belief that determinate negations do not actually happen in the development of
scientific knowledge? Rosens criticisms of determinate negation are strongly related to his
particular position on two issues. These issues are what set the perspective of Hegel and
Kuhn apart from each other: First, whether common standards exist, especially during
scientific revolutions and secondly, whether Hegel and/or Kuhn believe in some concept of
truth.
Regarding the first issue, as we have already discussed, Hegel thinks that there are in
fact common standards. Kuhn believes common standards are unreliable because the
common standards that the scientific community employs undergo constant changes.
Changes, in Kuhns opinion, indicate that these common cross-paradigm standards do not
exist. These changes in common standards, however from Hegels perspective, are not the


47
reason to deny the existence of them. Instead, Hegel may argue that these changes do not
indicate inconsistencies but rather improvements. In other words, common standards evolve
as scientific knowledge develops.
77

The existence of reliable commons standards is strongly related to how Hegel
believes that there are determinate negations are being made and how every determinate
negation is a necessary moment for scientific developments. On the other hand, Kuhn does
not believe that there is a determinate negation in theory choice. The second issue is about
the belief in the existence of such concepts depends on common standards to determine what
is the best to resolve a scientific resolution. Hegel believes that common standards in which
establish the meaning of truth, rationality, and approximate truth do exist. But Kuhn believes
there are no real and objectively reliable common standards. Rosen would tell us that Kuhn
would disagree that there is determinate negation made in a scientific revolution. Because
Hegel has a concept of truth, Hegels account of scientific knowledge is not skeptical like
Kuhns account. In this respect, Hegels account is more like scientific realism.


77
The evolution of common standards is a subject that Hegel has in common with scientific realism, a
topic we discuss more in the next chapter.


48
CHAPTER 7
THE SCIENTIFIC REALISM IN HEGELS
EPISTEMOLOGY
What reasons do we have to claim that Hegels view of scientific knowledge is
compatible with the development of science? One answer to our question was given at the
end of the last chapter: Hegels belief that common standards used to determine what theory
is rational do exist is what makes his perspective similar to scientific realism. Of course,
there are some differences between Hegel and scientific realism regarding their views of
common standards, and so as we note the similarities we shall also acknowledge their
differences. After considering some answers to the question, our next task is to discuss some
of the common anti-realists arguments and then conclude the chapter with a discussion of the
problem of unconceived alternatives.
Scientific realism believes that science uses common standards to determine which
theories are more approximately true. Hegel, on the other hand, believes that common
standards are employed when science makes a determinate negation. The similarity between
both views is that the common standards are used to determine what the most rational choice
of a theory is. When science gives up on a paradigm in favor of a new paradigm it is because
the new paradigm overcomes the problems that older paradigm had. The new paradigm
appears to the scientific community as sign of progress and step towards truth, a view that
Hegel shares with realism. In that sense, Hegel believes that a determinate negation appears
to be a type of abduction, an inference to the best explanation, but I do not think that this is
always the case.
The rational theory choice is what Hegel refers to as determinate negation and what
scientific realism calls the theory that is approximately true. The different ways of referring
to the rational theory choice are significant. Hegel and scientific realism may agree that the
outcome of scientific revolutions yields a positive result, one that brings the scientific
community, but Hegel may not be willing to claim that every result is approximately true.
Hegel leaves some room for mistakes; sometimes the mistakes are quite significant. J ust like


49
in his political theory, revolutions do not always lead to progress through one determinate
negation. There may be times when a community needs to undergo several determinate
negations (and/or revolutions) before reaching a better or an ideal state. In the case of
science, Hegel might make a similar claim. Scientific revolutions may not always lead to a
better theory, or one that is a greater approximation of truth. Regressions are possible
outcomes for Hegel, but he does not think that stages of regression are reasons to become
skeptical of scientific development. These stages of regression may actually be necessary
stages for the scientific communitys progression. On the other hand, Hegel and scientific
realism agree that there are common standards; whether scientific realism is committed
determinate negation becomes another issue.
Hegel also shares another point of view with scientific realism, about how the
definition of concepts in science can change. Hegel would not agree with Kuhn that scientific
concepts could not change. For instance, the two uses of mass (Newtons and then Einstein)
are not completely different for the same reasons that the contradiction in formal logic is not
completely different than the contradiction in dialectics. As we discussed in chapter four,
contradiction is a concept that is paronymic and the same could be said about the concept of
mass. The contradiction of formal logic and dialectical contradiction are not different
concepts, as Wolff explained, the two usages of contradiction are related paronymically and
are thus the same. The definition of a contradiction used in formal logic, however, falls short
and is unable to explain fully explain what a contradiction is. But Hegel believed that the
dialectical contradiction is genuine and can provide a definition of contradiction that all other
usages, like in formal logic, are built off of. Likewise, the scientific concepts, like mass,
have similar relationship. Wolff explains how changes in concepts are an important feature
in scientific development:
Science and philosophy are for the most part fairly innovative in this respect. As
is well known, words such as warmth, mass, force, weight, or water
words that are also used outside of physics and chemistry and are older than these
sciencesgain through physics and chemistry entirely new meanings that,
nevertheless, have content in common with pre-scientific usage and as such relate
paronymically to them.
78


78
Paronymic shifts in meaning are an important and widespread aid in all scientific and philosophical
artificial languages Because of the limited scope and precision of expressions in natural language, paronyms



50
Though Einstein provided different principles about mass, it is not the case that Einstein had
created a concept of mass that was homonymic in relation to Newtons. Hilary Putnam
claimed that definitions of concepts can change but these changes are still linked to the
original definition of the concept. The two concepts (old version and the new one) are linked
because both concepts are referring to the same thing. Though definition of the thing might
change, it only changes because we happen to understand that thing a little better than we did
before.
79
On that note, one might argue that Newtons definition of mass and Einsteins
mass are related in the same way that Hegels contradiction and the contradiction of formal
logic are related; each pair of concepts is related as paronyms of each other.
Now that we have provided some reasons to associate Hegels position with scientific
realism, let us now turn to the common arguments against scientific realism. These
arguments are from anti-realist positions and as anti-realists, these arguments are primarily
directed at the notion that theories in science are approximately true. Common standards are
supposed to help the scientific community in determining which one of two competing
theories is more approximately true. But whether such standards exist is not only an issue
that Kuhn addresses but is an issue that has been readdressed by other anti-realist
philosophers of science as well. There are two anti-realist arguments against the idea that
theories are approximately true. The first argument is the argument of pessimistic induction
and the second is the underdetermination of theory by the evidence.
ARGUMENTS AGAINST SCIENTIFIC REALISM
The argument of pessimistic induction denies that theories are approximately true
because the theory that we may consider approximately true at one point in time may not be
regarded as approximately true in another point in time. We often find examples where older
theories were once thought to be true but only to be overturned later on. The scientific

prove to be useful for representing linguistically newly discovered scientific domains (Wolff, 7).
79
In his discussion of Ben Franklins experiment that produced the term and understanding of electricity,
Putnam discusses the consequences of this discovery: I could now use the term electricity myself. Let us
call this eventmy acquiring the ability to use the term electricity in this wayan introducing event. It is
clear that each of my later uses will be casually connected to this introducing event, as long as those uses
exemplify the ability I acquired in that introducing event (Hilary Putnam, Explanation and Reference, in The
Philosophy of Science, eds. Richard Boyd, Philip Gasper, and J .D. Trout (Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1993),
174).


51
community thought phlogiston theory was an example of an approximately true theory and
then realized that phlogiston theory was not actually true because explanations and
predictions provided by theory did not agree with the data (the actual consequences that were
observed in combustion). The scientific communitys mistake in thinking that phlogiston
theory was approximately true may indicate that the anti-realists are right about pessimistic
induction. However, pessimistic induction is an argument that is not taken seriously by
scientific realists. Stanford claims, the very simplicity that makes this challenge so striking
also invites a natural reply to it.
80

Stanford refers to the type of reasoning used in pessimistic induction as enumerative
induction, a form of reasoning that is defective. Enumerative induction is a fallacious form
of reasoning because someone who uses enumerative induction attempts to make a
generalization from particular cases. But enumerative induction does not consider the
possibility that there are exceptions, certain circumstances and conditions may need to be
accounted for when such generalizations are made. For example, a drug addict refuses to
give up his destructive lifestyle based on the fact that despite how bad heroin is for him he
still wakes up the following morning. The drug addict then argues that since he wakes up
every morning and is not dead yet, he will continue to wake up every morning and thus, the
heroin should have no effect on his longevity. But what the drug addict does not realize is
that the human body can only take so much abuse. After long-term use of the drug, the
addict will soon realize that his body is not functioning the way that it was when he first took
the drug. Thus, in this example we can see that the drug addiction makes an enumerative
induction that is likely to face some serious issues, especially when attempting to make a
prediction about the future state of his existence based on the particular cases of the past few
days of his life.
Pessimistic induction does not seem to be much of an effective argument against
scientific realism because it overlooks the important differences between general and
particular cases. In science, the general cases where theories have enjoyed a certain degree
of success in making predictions and providing explanations are not the same as those

80
P. Kyle Stanford, Exceeding Our Grasp: Science, History, and the Problem of Unconceived
Alternatives, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 10.


52
particular cases that did not share the same level of success.
81
But another point that
scientific realism makes is that there is important difference between how science currently
operates and how science operated when it was in its premature state. Stanford writes,
it is common to find scientific realists objecting that the pessimistic induction
seeks to generalize unfairly from theories found in the immature periods of
various sciences and/or those not matching the performance of one or more
contemporary theories in some particular respect.
82

We could also find a similar reply in Hegel. The system that Hegel lays for us is intended to
show that the determinations of the present are based on the determinations of the past. The
determination negations of the present cannot be same as the determination negations made
in the past. The fact that the determinations of the present are different indicates the
development of the dialectic. In his political philosophy, for instance, the state that mediates
the internal contradiction (that begins to arise among its citizens) begins to mediate a
different kind of contradiction than it did before. Actually there are stages of political history
where the contradictions are so intense that the state unable to mediate them and as a result,
the revolution occurs. The contradiction that intensifies to the state of a revolution is can be
referred to as an antagonistic contradiction. But given the maturity of the Prussian state (or
so Hegel thought), it would be able to mediate any further contradictions from reaching this
level of intensity. In that sense, the contradictions of Hegels time are non-antagonistic.
83

The underdetermination of a theory by the evidence states that there can be no way to
rationally determine whether a single theory is more logical than a competing theory,
especially when both theories are supported the same empirical evidence.
84
In van

81
Stanford writes, The lingering whiff of ad-hoc-ery or special pleading cannot dispel the fact that
changed circumstance, conditions, or characteristics sometimes really do make a difference to the legitimacy of
projecting an inductive generalization into the future (Stanford, 11). On a further note, Kuhn might be helpful
in making the distinction between the immature and mature states of science. Kuhn explains the normal science
operates in accordance to paradigms but before a paradigm is established there was no normal science (see
chapter five).
82
Stanford, 10.
83
The distinction between Antagonistic and Non-antagonistic discussed here came from Westons article
(Thomas Weston, The Concept of Non-Antagonistic Contradiction in Soviet Philosophy, Science & Society
72, no. 4 (Oct. 2008): 427-454). Westons paper discusses some reasons why this distinction is untenable.
Westons argument will not be addressed in this work though, because for Hegel the distinction does actually
exist, at least in his political philosophy.
84
Van Fraassen writes, Theories T and T are empirically equivalent exactly if neither is empirically
stronger than the other. In that case, as an easy corollary, each is empirically adequate if and only if the other



53
Fraassens version of underdetermination of a theory by the evidence, scientific researchers
develop models or special apparatuses that make sense of unobservables. Atoms, for
instance, are unobservable and within the atom, scientists have claimed there are electrons
that orbit the neutron (center of the atom), which are also unobservable). Since the existence
of electrons cannot have been justified according to van Fraassen, he argues that we only
know what our models tell us and in that sense, we do not have actual knowledge about the
way nature works, we only have knowledge of our models. It could be the case, says van
Fraassen, that our models are incorrect but they still provide us with some useful predictions.
Furthermore, van Fraassen says that we could develop an infinite number of models under
one theory and each one of those models could provide us with the same observable results
that the theory predicts.
85
The question then arises for scientific realists: if there are two
competing models that provide the same observable results, how do we determine which
model is correct?
For van Fraassen, the use of models is to illustrate tools that science uses to help
prove the claims of a theory. An explanation could be a tool, especially when our
explanations are derived from the apparatus that is used to determine the existence of an
unobservable. For instance, an electron is connected to an atom and the distance between the
electron and nucleus is proportional to an amount of potential energy. Where the electron is
relative to the nucleus determines its state of potential energy. Scientists can measure this
state of energy because when the electron unbinds it releases an amount of energy and this
release in energy emits a photon. This photon that is emitted can be measured using different
sorts of spectroscopic measurement apparatuses. The amount of energy that the
spectroscopic apparatus detects provides one of the many reasons why scientists believe in an
unobservable like an electron. Thus, when a scientist claims that an electron exists, his
explanation might be dependent on what his apparatus detects.
Consider an explanation that does not come from an apparatus. At times, the
molecules involved in a chemical reaction release an amount of energy (in photons) that does

is (B. van Fraassen, To Save the Phenomena, in The Philosophy of Science, eds. Richard Boyd, Philip
Gasper, and J .D. Trout (Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1991), 192).
85
B. van Fraassen, The Pragmatics of Explanation, in The Philosophy of Science, eds. Richard Boyd,
Philip Gasper, and J .D. Trout (Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1991), 317-327.


54
not require the use of apparatuses to detect. Sometimes the human eye can even see the
photon that is emitted in a chemical reaction. So let us assume that there are two different
explanations for the emission of light (that can be seen by the human eye). The first
explanation is the one that is derived from theory behind the spectroscopic apparatus,
including the knowledge of electron behavior. The other, competing explanation, suggests
that the emission of light has no nothing to do with electron behavior, it is rather a result of a
divine intervention; whenever molecule A collides with molecule B, God decides to spark a
light. Though the second explanation may be justified based on the observable consequences
(whenever A and B collide they produce light) this explanation provides very little utility to
the scientific community. The explanation that has to do with God sparking a light every
time this particular reaction happens raises more questions (such as, why does God spark a
light for this reaction and not other ones?) The first explanation that is derived from electron
theory and spectroscopic measurements is more applicable to other reactions and is more
useful to the scientific community.
The example that I provided above about the two competing explanations for a the
single phenomenon (emission of light) shows us that although we could create another model
of explanation under the same theoretical observable consequences, the alternative models
are only competitive when the explanations are as useful as the one that scientific community
already accepts. And so, van Fraassen suggests that one could create various models under
the same theory by taking any theory that has valid premises and replace those premises with
theoretical terms. As long as the consequences of the theory are the same then theory
remains valid. However, just because it logically valid does not mean that it is actually
useful in its application to the physical world.
86

Determining a Hegelian response on the issue of underdetermination of a theory by
the evidence is not difficult because I think Hegel would agree with the scientific realists
reply, for the most part. Scientist realism would argue that it is not the case that we could
come up with an infinite amount of useful explanations under a single model. There should
be other considerations made in determining what is useful, rather than solely relying on the

86
Richard Boyd, Observations, Explanatory Power, and Simplicity: Toward a Non-Humean Account, in
The Philosophy of Science, eds. Richard Boyd, Philip Gasper, and J .D. Trout (Massachusetts: The MIT Press,
1991), 373-377.


55
consideration of whether an explanation is supported by experimental data. Richard Boyd
explains that there are also non-experimental measures, such as the common standards that
determine what a true theory entails. If a particular explanation does not expand our
scientific but makes accurate predications, says Boyd, then the explanation is practically
useless the scientific community. What good is an explanation about a particular subject if
that explanation does not help us derive explanations about similar subjects?
87

Hegel believes that determinate negations lead to developments because the result of
a contradiction is mediated by dialectical system. In other words, the result is derived from
within the system and explanations used methods that the scientific are available. New
explanations should expand on those methods. For instance, Boyd writes,
Theoretical understanding of unobservable causal factors enjoys a dialectical
relationship with the development and improvement of methods for improving
theoretical understanding itself. In particular, judgments of projectability require
knowledge of unobservable factors.
88

Furthermore, because Hegel believes that a determinate negation is a kind of abduction, it
would seem that the underdetermination of a theory by the evidence is an argument that may
be responded to using the same sort of reasoning scientific realist employ. Abduction is an
inference to the best explanation, but a competing theory, which provides very little utility to
further understanding the natural world, is not going to be best explanation. Thus, any new
and competing explanation that does not expand the scientific communitys method of
understanding reality is not determinate negation.
While the current philosophers who defend scientific realism can provide sufficient
responses to the problems pessimistic induction and the underdetermination of theories by
the evidence, Stanford believes that scientific realists are unable to respond to the problem of
unconceived alternatives. Stanford thinks the unconceived alternatives as the most serious
issue for scientific realism. If Stanford is right and we acknowledge the similarities between
scientific realism and determinate negation then the problem of unconceived alternatives

87
Boyd writes, Both judgments of projectability and assessments of experimental evidence for claims
about observables thus depend on non-experimental criteria of the sort that I am discussing. They play a crucial
epistemic role in scientific methodology, and thus, like the practice of subjecting theories to observational tests,
they contribute to the epistemic reliability that characterizes scientific objectivity (Boyd, 351).
88
Boyd, 365.


56
should also be a serious issue for determinate negation. Thus, we should determine if the
problem of unconceived alternatives really is a problem for determinate negation or if Hegel
can provide a response to overcome the anti-realist argument.
THE PROBLEM OF UNCONCEIVED ALTERNATIVES
History shows, according to Stanford, that when a scientist has made a theory choice
and establishes a paradigm (which would be later refuted), Stanford says that scientist failed
to consider alternatives to the theory chosen. In the long run, argues Stanford, the history of
science demonstrates how alternatives to the theory chosen are actually better than the theory
that was chosen. Therefore, since the scientific community did not conceive of alternatives
to the theory that they choose, it is unreasonable to claim that theories are approximately true
or even that negation of the old view is determinate.
Stanford uses a series of examples of how the scientific community fails to consider
alternatives to their theory choice. One example comes from the early stages of
biochemistry, where scientific theorists tried to make sense of the issue of inheritance.
August Weismann made some useful contributions to biochemistry, including his theory of
germinal specificity. Weismann proposed there is an internal ordered hierarchy structure in a
microorganism that plays a regulative and significant role in cell division. Each part (of the
internal order of the cell) serves a particular function and works as a network of functions
that together constitute its whole microorganism. According to Weismann, when a
microorganism goes through cell division it is a one way process, in which the particular
parent embryonic cells (gametes) divide to form singular cells and other, somatic, cells. The
somatic cells have no influence on the embryonic cell of a new generation. Although
biochemistry today does not use Weismanns exact terms, some of Weismanns ideas were
still accepted. However, there was one thing that Weismann was unable to do. Weismann
was unable to provide a legitimate account of how the chromatin in daughter cells and
somatic cells, produced in cell division, could be identical copies of each other. The reason
why he was unable to provide an account of this is because Weismann didnt believe that one
could provide a legitimate.
Weismann said that you can not divide the cell in half and make two exact duplicates
when the internal structure of both cells are manipulated forms of the parent cell. The


57
divided cells operate differently because their internal structure is not the same as its whole
(or when it was not divided). In its whole, Weismann believed that the internal structure of
the microorganisms has facilitative role to its smaller parts. The hierarchy has an overall
purpose of controlling the precise quality and quantity that make up portions of hereditary
material that is being divided and passed. It seemed to Weismann that when a cell divides,
its internal structure is manipulated and so Weismann thought that different cells must
contain different hereditary material. Thus, the cell division does not produce two exact
copies of the same cell. It produces two manipulated versions.
Stanford uses Weismanns inheritance theory as an example of how a scientist fails to
conceive of alternative explanations. Stanford says that Weismann was unable to conceive
this particular alternative to his theory because Weismann thought there was no alternative.
Stanford writes,
it is because [Weismann] can conceive of no alternative mechanism of
ontogenetic differentiation and/or cellular control that Weismann is forced to
insist that the germ-plasm must disintegrate into its constituent elements in the
course of its development. And because he judges it impossible that the
organisms germ-plasm could be re-formed once disintegrated in this way, this in
turn leads him to insist that complete copies of the organisms entire germ-plasm
must be reserved for and passed along to its reproductive cells from the very
beginning of its ontogeny.
89

But what Weismann failed to consider was that the internal make up of the hereditary
material not only consisted of parts that regulate and facilitate division but the internal
structure itself also bears the necessary material to generate a duplicate of itself. Stanford
claims that Weismann failed to acknowledge that the hereditary material not only generates
but produces materials needed for the production process in cell division.
90

According to Stanford, the Weismann example shows that historical records indicate
a pattern in scientific development (if that is what we could call it), where history shows that
there continues to be unconceived alternatives to chosen paradigms and these alternatives are
actually equally well-confirmed (in relation to those chosen paradigms). Stanford concludes
that it is incorrect to view accepted theories as being approximately true. Since scientific

89
Stanford, 121.
90
Stanford, 126.


58
realists believe that accepted theories are approximately true, the belief that theories are
approximately true is rooted in the scientific realists account of knowledge that is unable to
respond to the problem of unconceived alternatives. Stanford believes that instead of
viewing new theories as being more approximately true, we should view the scientific
discipline as a discipline, which accumulates new theories that are useful conceptual tools
used in accomplishing scientists practical goals.
Stanford says there are unexplored alternative that are actually better in ways, which
means that the choice made between competing theories is not always a development
towards truth but a regression. Since Stanford denies that developments are made in every
theory choice it would also appear that Stanford denies that science makes determinate
negations. In other words, Stanford might claim that we are not actually making a movement
towards a better explanation, as a result of a scientific revolution. Stanford implies that
making a theory choice is more like Kuhn saying we are taking a leap of faith, especially in
the way Kierkegaard had understood it.
91

As we noted earlier, from Hegels point of view the regression may be necessary
stage towards a progression. The choices that are made that lead to a regression are what the
future state of science uses as a learning basis, so that eventually science is able to prevent a
similar regression from reoccurring. Thus, Hegel would argue that the problem of
unconceived alternatives does not rule out the necessity of each stage in scientific
development. Even at a particular stage of the development, when the scientific community
did not conceive of every alternative to the theory chosen, this stage still appears to be a
necessary one, for Hegel. Perhaps there are times, during a scientific revolution, when a
wrong theory is chosen and the scientific community will later realize it made a mistake and
corrects the mistake. The old and incorrect theory that was previously chosen may
eventually become the reason that the scientific community is lead to discover a better
theory.

91
Kierkegaards The Knight of Faith and the Knight of Infinite Resignation discusses an interesting
understanding of faith as a choice made on non-rational grounds, where some evidence points against the
decision to make the choice but we make the choice anyway (Soren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling (1843),
in A Kierkegaard Anthology, ed. Robert Bretall, (New J ersey: Princeton University Press, 1946), 118-134.


59
It is interesting that Stanford calls his argument the problem of unconceived
alternatives because based on his reasoning it seems that Stanford thinks that it was possible
for the scientific community to conceive of all the alternatives to the theory chosen. But it is
one thing the say that the alternative theories were unconceived and yet another thing to say
that the alternatives were inconceivable. Stanford appears to advocate the former while
overlooking reasons in support for the latter. If the alternatives were conceivable then the
scientific community would have probably considered those alternative theories, but the fact
that they were unconceivable indicates that it was possible for the scientific community to
consider these other alternatives. It may not have been possible for early scientists to
conceive of the possibilities when these possibilities are only available to the scientific
community in a more advanced period. Perhaps old scientists thought in a way that
prevented them from considering these alternatives. We cannot overlook the idea that new
theories come with new ways of thinking and even possibilities, and these new ways of
thinking and possibilities are ones that we might not have thought of without the existence of
those theories.
Nevertheless, we find many examples in which philosophers come up with theories
we find ridiculous today. It was Aristotle that denied the existence of atoms because he did
not think the idea made any sense. Today the scientific community considers the existence
of atoms as a fact. But Aristotles inability to make sense of atomism was due to the limited
knowledge he had on the issue. Aristotles knowledge was not based on any scientific
research or special apparatuses, his knowledge came from the theories of his predecessors,
which based their knowledge on information that was even more limited in content than the
information Aristotle had. Likewise, scientists, like Weismann, could only rely on what they
knew and what other scientists of their time also knew. The information available to them
allowed them to come with the theories that they did. As the scientific communitys
knowledge expanded, scientists were able to rule out older and outdated forms of reasoning
in favor of new ones and even conceive of the alternatives that were now conceivable.


60
CHAPTER 8
IN CONCLUSION
One might argue: had Rosen actually looked more into what Hegel meant by it
through reading those sections in Science of Logic (see chapter four) Rosen might have
understood this claim and not worried about the post festum paradox. But Rosen also helped
initiate a further discussion of Hegel that goes beyond the scope of Rosens analysis and
brought us to a interesting research into how Hegels work can be applicable and appreciated
in other unvisited areas, like scientific knowledge. Though some critics have argued that the
transitions Hegel makes in the Phenomenology and other works (pertaining to his political
views) are considered questionable, I have attempted to turn the focus elsewhere and present
an argument about how the transitions in science from a Hegelian account are not
questionable.
Determinate negation was the basis of my exposition and my defense of Hegels
dialectic against Rosens criticism about how the dialectic has no place in the philosophy of
science (see chapter three and four). Determinate negation is the principle that states that
what results from a contradiction is a unique and positive result, and the result of a scientific
revolution is the development of a new and better paradigm. To establish this view of
determinate negation, I associated Hegels view of knowledge from the Phenomenology with
social constructivism, because a social constructivist account of knowledge seemed to fit
Hegels view of how theories are discovered and how human beings use common standards
to determine when and how those theories are true. The problem of unconceived alternatives
presents an interesting obstacle because it calls into question the idea that science is
constantly developing. Stanford believed that the unconceived alternatives set science back
in its movement towards Hegels absolute truth but if anything Stanford only shows us that
the Hegelian view of scientific development is even more justified.
My thesis provides a defense of determinate negation but it does not prove it. There
are some areas that may require further research. For instance, I mentioned at the end of
chapter four that I believed Hegels Phenomenology could be interpreted as a social


61
constructivist view of knowledge. Rather than defending this claim, I made it an assumption.
At the same time, I acknowledge that this claim requires more research before really taken
seriously and at the same time, I think that further research into this idea would make a
comparison between Kuhn and Hegel even more interesting.
I became interested in this topic, of defending determinate negation, when studying
Hegel and trying to look for ways to show how the dialectic is inapplicable to particular
areas. After considering scientific revolutions and setting aside questions about whether
Hegels ideology gets in the way of my type of analysis, it seemed that the principle alone,
determinate negation that is, was worth further consideration.






62
REFERENCES
Boyd, Richard. Observations, Explanatory Power, and Simplicity: Toward a Non-Humean
Account. In The Philosophy of Science, edited by Richard Boyd, Philip Gasper, and
J .D. Trout, 349-377. Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1991.
Bryson, Bill. A Short History of Nearly Everything. New York: Broadway Books, 2003.
DeVries, Willem A. Hegels Dialectic And Its Criticism. Review of Hegels Dialectic
And Its Criticism, by Michael Rosen. The Philosophical Review, J uly 1984: 450-454.
Hegel, G. W. F. Phenomenology of Spirit. Translated by A.V. Miller. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1977.
Hegel, G. W. F. Science of Logic. Translated by A.V. Miller. Amberst: Humanity Books,
1969.
Hegel, G. W. F. The Encyclopaedia Logic. Translated by T.F. Garaets, W.A. Suchtin, and
H.S. Harris. Indiana: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1991.
Hegel, G. W. F. Hegels Philosophy of Nature: Part Two of the Encyclopaedia of the
Philosophical Science (1830). Translated by A.V. Miller. New York: Oxford
University Press, 2004.
Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason. Edited by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood. New
York: Cambridge, 1998.
Kierkegaard, Soren. Fear and Trembling (1843) In A Kierkegaard Anthology, edited by
Robert Bretall, 116-134. New J ersey: Princeton University Press, 1946.
Kuhn, Thomas S. Objectivity, Value J udgment, and Theory Choice. In Scientific
Knowledge: Basic Issues in the Philosophy of Science, edited by J anet A. Kourany,
212-224. California: Wadsworth Publishing, 1998.
Kuhn, Thomas S. The Function of Dogma in Scientific Research. In Scientific Knowledge:
Basic Issues in the Philosophy of Science, edited by J anet A. Kourany, 301-315.
California: Wadsworth Publishing, 1998.
Kuhn, Thomas S. The Road Since Structure. edited by J ames Conant and J ohn Haugeland.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000.
Kuhn, Thomas S. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. 3
rd
ed. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1996.
Petrik, J ames. Evil Beyond Belief. New York: M. E. Sharp, 2000.
Pinkard, Terry. Hegels Phenomenology: The Sociality of Reason. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1994.


63
Putnam, Hilary. Explanation and Reference. In The Philosophy of Science, edited by
Richard Boyd, Philip Gasper, and J .D. Trout, 171-185. Massachusetts: The MIT
Press, 1991.
Rockmore, Tom. On Hegels Epistemology and Contemporary Philosophy. New J ersey:
Humanities Press International Inc., 1996.
Rockmore, Tom. Hegels Circular Epistemology. Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1986
Rosen, Michael. Hegels Dialectic and Its Criticism. New York: Cambridge, 1982.
Stanford, P. Kyle. Exceeding Our Grasp: Science, History, and the Problem of Unconceived
Alternatives. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.
Van Fraassen, B. To Save the Phenomena. In The Philosophy of Science, edited by Richard
Boyd, Philip Gasper, and J . D. Trout, 187-194. Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1991.
Van Fraassen, B. The Pragmatics of Explanation. In The Philosophy of Science, edited by
Richard Boyd, Philip Gasper, and J . D. Trout, 317-327. Massachusetts: The MIT
Press, 1991.
Weston, Thomas. The Concept of Non-Antagonistic Contradiction in Soviet Philosophy.
Science & Society 72, no. 4 (Oct. 2008): 427-454.
Wolff, Michael. Hegels Doctrine of Contradiction. The Owl of Minerva 31, no. 3 (Fall
1999): 1-22.