NAZI Monetary Policy

"Our main enemy as always is international finance."--A.Hitler

In 1932 unemplyment in Germany was 30%,in America it was 24.9%.
In 1933 FDR and Hitler both instituted socialism and massive works programs.
FDR,embedded with international central bankers kept debt based money.
Germany reformed monetary policy and issued fair money without debt to bankers.
Germany was under terrible economic sanctions,had no natural resources left,and
no gold reserves.
America had enormous resources,free trade and even confiscated citizens personal
gold.
By 1938,Germany's unemployment rate was 2% and America's was still 19.8%.
The international bankers, because of NAZI monetary policy that brought prosperi
ty to the people had decided to utterly destroy and forever slander this good co
untry.

When Hitler came to power, Germany was hopelessly broke. The Treaty of Versaille
s had imposed crushing reparations on the German people, demanding that Germans
repay every nations costs of the war. These costs totaled three times the value o
f all the property in Germany. Private currency speculators caused the German ma
rk to plummet, precipitating one of the worst runaway inflations in modern times
. A wheelbarrow full of 100 billion-mark banknotes could not buy a loaf of bread
. The national treasury was empty. Countless homes and farms were lost to specul
ators and to private (Jewish controlled) banks. Germans lived in hovels. They we
re starving.On top of this came a global depression. Germany had no choice but t
o succumb to debt slavery under international (mainly Jewish) bankers until 1933
, when the National Socialists came to power. At that point the German governmen
t thwarted the international banking cartels by issuing its own money. World Jew
ry responded by declaring a global boycott against Germany. Hitler began a natio
nal credit program by devising a plan of public works that included flood contro
l, repair of public buildings and private residences, and construction of new ro
ads, bridges, canals, and port facilities. All these were paid for with money th
at no longer came from the private international bankers. The projected cost of
these various programs was fixed at one billion units of the national currency.
To pay for this, the German government (not the international bankers) issued bi
lls of exchange, called Labor Treasury Certificates. In this way the National So
cialists put millions of people to work, and paid them with Treasury Certificate
s. Under the National Socialists, Germanys money wasn't backed by gold (which was
owned by the international bankers). It was essentially a receipt for labor and
materials delivered to the government. Hitler said, "For every mark issued, we
required the equivalent of a mark's worth of work done, or goods produced." The
government paid workers in Certificates. Workers spent those Certificates on oth
er goods and services, thus creating more jobs for more people. In this way the
German people climbed out of the crushing debt imposed on them by the internatio
nal bankers. Within two years, the unemployment problem had been solved, and Ger
many was back on its feet. It had a solid, stable currency, with no debt, and no
inflation, at a time when millions of people in the United States and other Wes
tern countries (controlled by international bankers) were still out of work. Wit
hin five years, Germany went from the poorest nation in Europe to the richest. G
ermany even managed to restore foreign trade, despite the international bankers d
enial of foreign credit to Germany, and despite the global boycott by Jewish-own
ed industries. Germany succeeded in this by exchanging equipment and commodities
directly with other countries, using a barter system that cut the bankers out o
f the picture. Germany flourished, since barter eliminates national debt and tra
de deficits. (Venezuela does the same thing today when it trades oil for commodi
ties, plus medical help, and so on. Hence the bankers are trying to squeeze Vene
zuela.) Germany's economic freedom was short-lived; but it left several monument
s, including the famous Autobahn, the world's first extensive superhighway. Hjal
mar Schacht, who was temporarily head of the German central bank, summed it up t
hus An American banker had commented, "Dr. Schacht, you should come to America. W
e've lots of money and that's real banking." Schacht replied, "You should come t
o Berlin. We don't have money. That's real banking." This economic freedom made
Hitler extremely popular with the German people. Germany was rescued from Englis
h economic theory, which says that all currency must be borrowed against the gol
d owned by a private and secretive banking cartel -- such as the Federal Reserve
, or the Central Bank of Europe -- rather than issued by the government for the
benefit of the people. Canadian researcher Dr. Henry Makow (who is Jewish himsel
f) says the main reason why the bankers arranged for a world war against Germany
was that Hitler sidestepped the bankers by creating his own money, thereby free
ing the German people. Worse, this freedom and prosperity threatened to spread t
o other nations. Hitler had to be stopped! "We were not foolish enough to try to
make a currency coverage of gold of which we had none, but for every mark that
was issued we required the equivalent of a mark's worth of work done or goods pr
oduced. . . .we laugh at the time our national financiers held the view that the
value of a currency is regulated by the gold and securities lying in the vaults
of a state bank." -Adolf Hitler, 1937 (CC Veith, Citadels of Chaos, Meador, 19
49.)

Hitler began with the economic doctrines against "interest slavery" of Gottfried
Feder,a founding member of NSDAP, and his manifesto on breaking the shackles of
interest ("Brechung der Zinsknechtschaft").Hitler started working with Bankers
and Industrialists, the German General Staff, and he moved towards capitalism.

More than any other country, Nazi Germany then set out
on a serious stimulus program. The government built up the military,
expanded the autobahn, put up stadiums for the 1936 Berlin Olympics and
built monuments to the Nazi Party across Munich and Berlin.

Germany escaped the Great Depression
faster than other countries. Corporate profits boomed, and unemployment
sank (and not because of slave labor, which didnt become widespread
until later). Harold James, an economic historian, says that the young liberal e
conomists studying under John Maynard Keynes in the 1930s began to concede that
Hitler had solved unemployment.

"Hitler had found a cure against unemployment
before Keynes was finished explaining it (Garvy, 1975),

From an article by Henry C K Liu in a series about failed states:
( "http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Global_Economy/GE24Dj01.html ) The Nazis came to
power in Germany in 1933, at
a time when its economy was in total collapse, with ruinous war-reparation oblig
ations and zero prospects for foreign investment or credit. Yet through an indep
endent monetary policy of sovereign credit and a full-employment public-works pr
ogram, the Third Reich was able to turn a bankrupt Germany, stripped of overseas
colonies it could exploit, into the strongest economy in Europe within four yea
rs, even before armament spending began. In fact, German economic recovery prece
ded and later enabled German rearmament, in contrast to the US economy, where co
nstitutional roadblocks placed by the US Supreme Court on the New Deal delayed e
conomic recovery until US entry to World War II put the US market economy on a w
ar footing. While this observation is not an endorsement for Nazi philosophy, th
e effectiveness of German economic policy in this period, some of which had been
started during the last phase of the Weimar Republic, is undeniable....

From the very outset of his rule, Hitler, whose main short-term goal was the eco
nomic revival of Germany with the help of German nationalist bankers and industr
ialists, won popular support of the nation. Hitler adopted an aggressive full-em
ployment campaign. Between January 1933 and July 1935 the number of employed Ger
mans rose by a half, from 11.7 million to 16.9 million. More than 5 million new
jobs paying living wages were created. Unemployment was banished from the German
economy and the entire nation was productively engaged in reconstruction. Infla
tion was brought under control by wage freeze and price control. Besides this, t
aking into account the lessons learned during 1914-18, Hitler aimed at creating
an economy that would be independent from foreign capital and supply, and be wel
l protected from another blockade and economic war. For Germans, all of the abov
e was proof that Hitler was the one who had not only brought Germany out of econ
omic depression but would take it directly to prosperity with new pride. German
popular trust in the Fuehrer rose dramatically.

In four short years, Hitler's Germany was able to turn a Germany ravaged by defe
at in war and left in a state national malaise by the liberal policies of the We
imar Republic, with a bankrupt economy weighted down by heavy foreign war debt a
nd the total unavailability of new foreign capital, into the strongest economy a
nd military power in Europe. How did Germany do it? The centerpiece was Germany'
s Work Creation Program of 1933-36, which preceded its rearmament program. Neo-l
iberal economists everywhere seven decades later have yet to acknowledge that em
ployment is all that counts and living wages are the key to national prosperity.
Any economic policy that does not lead to full employment is self-deceivingly c
ounterproductive, and any policy that permits international wage arbitrage is tr
easonous. German economic policies between 1930 and 1932 were brutally deflation
ary, which showed total indifference to high unemployment, and in 1933 Hitler wa
s elected chancellor out of the socio-economic chaos.

The financing of Nazi economic-recovery programs drew upon sovereign credit crea
tion techniques already experimented prior to Hitler's appointment as chancellor
. What changed after 1933 was the government's willingness to create massive sho
rt-term sovereign credit and the its firm commitment to retire in full the debt
created by that credit. Short-term sovereign credit was important to change the
general climate of distrust on government credit. The quick rollover of short-te
rm government notes created popular trust within months in German sovereign cred
it domestically.

Hitler told German industrialists in May 1933 that economic recovery required ac
tion by both the state and the private sector. The government's role was limited
to encouraging private-sector investment, mainly through tax incentives. He exp
ressed willingness to provide substantial public funding only for highway projec
ts, not for industry. Investment was unlikely if consumers had no money to spend
or were afraid because of job insecurity to spend money to buy products produce
d, and Hitler understood that workers needed decent income to become healthy con
sumers. Thus full employment was the kick-start point of the economic cycle. To
combat traditional German fear of the social consequences of appearing better of
f than their neighbors, Nazi propaganda would psychologically stimulate the econ
omy by developing a lust for life among consumers.

Hitler stressed on May 31, 1933, that the Reich budget must be balanced. A balan
ced budget meant reducing expenditures on social programs, because Hitler intend
ed to reduce business taxes to promote needed private investment. To avoid reduc
ing social programs, a large work program without deficit spending had to be fin
anced outside of the Reich budget. Hitler resorted to "pre-financing" (Vorfinanz
ierung) by means of "work-creation bills" (Arbeitsbeschaffungswechseln), a class
ic response of using monetary measures to deal with a fiscal dilemma.

Under the scheme of "pre-financing" with work-creation bills, the Reich Finance
Ministry distributed these WCBs (three months, renewable up to five years) to pa
rticipating credit institutions and public agencies. Contractors and suppliers w
ho required cash to participate in work-creation projects drew bills against the
agency ordering the work or the appropriate credit institutions. These credit i
nstitutions then accepted (assumed liability for payment of) the bills, which, n
ow treated as commercial paper, could rediscount the bills at the Reichsbank (ce
ntral bank). The entire process of drawing, accepting and discounting WCBs provi
ded the cash necessary to pay the contractors and suppliers. The experience of s
uccessful rollover every three months quickly established credit worthiness. The
Reich Treasury undertook to redeem these bills, one-fifth of the total every ye
ar, between 1934 and 1938, as the economy and tax receipts recovered. As securit
y for the bills, the Reich Treasury deposited with the credit institutions a cor
responding amount of tax vouchers (Steuergutscheine) or other securities. As the
Treasury redeemed WCBs, the tax vouchers were to be returned to the Treasury. H
itler increased the money supply in the German economy by creating special money
for employment....

Nazi economic experts understood that sovereign credit creation for purposes of
job creation posed no inflationary threat and that it would be a far more respon
sible policy than the conservative approach of tax increases and welfare cuts to
balance government budgets. The idiotic policy of monetary restraint and social
-spending reduction to balance government budgets in order to pay foreign debts
is still being advocated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in debtor nati
ons around the world - except for the United States, the world's largest debtor
nation, which uses dollar hegemony as an escape hatch or, more to the point, esc
ape hedge. Redeeming WCBs did burden the 1934-39 Reich budget, but the decline i
n Reich expenditure for welfare support and other tax subsidies as a result of f
ull employment recovery more than offset the redemption payments. The surplus wa
s then used to reduce public debt and taxes further....

n 1933, Hitler sought to reassure Germany's business leadership that Nazi rule w
as consistent with the preservation of the free-market system, because he needed
the support of the industrialists. He could buy that support by keeping wages d
own during the recovery, but any rigorous effort to curb prices and profits woul
d alienate the business community and slow down economic recovery. Instead, Hitl
er sought to restore profitability to German business through reduced unit cost
achieved by increasing output and sales volume, rather than through a general in
crease in prices (Mengenkonjunktur, niche Preiskonjunktur - output boom, not pri
ce boom). Adoption of "performance wage" (Leistungslohn - payment on a price-rat
e basis) increased labor productivity, thereby driving costs down and profit up.
Some upward price movements were permitted to adjust price relationships betwee
n agricultural and manufactured products and between goods with elastic and inel
astic demands, also to prevent price wars and below-cost dumping. These principl
es of "output boom, not price boom" and "performance wage" could also work in co
mbating inflation today in many economies generally and China specifically.

Hitler saved the German farmers from their heavy debt burden through relief prog
rams and through subsidized farm prices. The stable farm income came at the expe
nses of the middlemen institutions, but Hitler sustained popular support by the
provision of living income to consumers. Had Nazi Germany been a member of the W
orld Trade Organization (WTO), this option would have been foreclosed to it. Hit
ler sought price stability only in sectors critical to the national economy and
to the ultimate goal of rearmament. Germany had no overall price policy until th
e 1936 Four Year Plan, which concentrated economic authority in the hands of Her
mann Goering for war production and put an end to regulated free-market policies
.

Business managers generally make investment and employment decisions based on th
eir judgment of the prospect for new orders. The difference between German econo
mic recovery under Hitler and US economic stagnation under Roosevelt in the 1930
s was the degree of uncertainty for new orders for goods. Hitler made it clear t
hat after 1936, a major rearmament program would make heavy demand on German dur
able-goods and capital-goods industries without the need to export. With that as
surance, German industry could plan expansion with confidence. Roosevelt was una
ble to provide such "confidence" to industry and had to rely on anemic market fo
rces until after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii."--Henry C K Liu


"And it proved sound. It worked. In less than ten years Germany became easily th
e most powerful state in Europe. It worked so magically and magnificently that i
t sounded the death knell of the entire (Zionist) Jewish money system. World Jew
ry knew that they had to destroy Hitler's system, by whatever means might prove
necessary, or their own [system of usury] would necessarily die. And if it die
d, with it must die their dream and their hope of making themselves masters of t
he world. The primary issue over which World War II was fought was to determine
which money system was to survive. At bottom it was not a war between Germany an
d the so-called allies. Primarily it was war to the death between Germany and t
he International Money Power." --William Gayley Simpson, 'Which Way Western Man'
(p.642)

again:Under the National Socialists, Germanys money wasnt backed by gold (which wa
s owned by the international bankers). It was essentially a receipt for labor an
d materials delivered to the government.Economist Henry C K Liu writes of German
ys remarkable transformation:The Nazis came to power in 1933 when the German econo
my was in total collapse, with ruinous war-reparation obligations and zero prosp
ects for foreign investment or credit. Through an independent monetary policy of
sovereign credit and a full-employment public-works program, the Third Reich wa
s able to turn a bankrupt Germany, stripped of overseas colonies, into the stron
gest economy in Europe within four years, even before armament spending began. (H
enry C. K. Liu, Nazism and the German Economic Miracle, Asia Times (May 24, 2005).
In Billions for the Bankers, Debts for the People (1984), Sheldon Emry commented
:Germany issued debt-free and interest-free money from 1935 on, which accounts fo
r Germanys startling rise from the depression to a world power in five years. The
German government financed its entire operations from 1935 to 1945 without gold
, and without debt. It took the entire Capitalist and Communist world to destroy
the German revolution, and bring Europe back under the heel of the Bankers.These
facts do not appear in any textbooks today, since Jews own most publishing comp
anies. What does appear is the disastrous runaway inflation suffered in 1923 by
the Weimar Republic, which governed Germany from 1919 to 1933. Todays textbooks u
se this inflation to twist truth into its opposite. They cite the radical devalu
ation of the German mark as an example of what goes wrong when governments print
their own money, rather than borrow it from private cartels.

"For the great mass of Germans, wages and working conditions improved steadily.
From 1932 to 1938 gross real weekly earnings increased by 21 percent. After taki
ng into account tax and insurance deductions and adjustments to the cost of livi
ng, the increase in real weekly earnings during this period was 14 percent. At t
he same time, rents remained stable, and there was a relative decline in the cos
ts of heating and light. Prices actually declined for some consumer goods, such
as electrical appliances, clocks and watches, as well as for some foods. "Consum
er prices rose at an average annual rate of just 1.2 percent between 1933 and 19
39," notes British historian Niall Ferguson. "This meant that Germans workers we
re better off in real as well as nominal terms: between 1933 and 1938, weekly ne
t earnings (after tax) rose by 22 percent, while the cost of living rose by just
seven percent." Even after the outbreak of war in September 1939, workers income
continued to rise. By 1943 average hourly earnings of German workers had risen
by 25 percent, and weekly earnings by 41 percent." -- R. Grunberger, The Twelve-
Year Reich (1971), p. 187; David Schoenbaum, Hitlers Social Revolution (Norton,19
80 [softcover]), p. 100; Niall Ferguson, The War of the World (New York: Penguin
, 2006), p. 247. Sources cited: A. Ritschl, Deutschlands Krise und Konjunktur (B
erlin, 2002); G. Bry, Wages in Germany, 1871-1945 (Princeton, 1960).