Philosophy 454 Second Paper

Aristotle and the Nature of Decision-Making

According to Aristotle, prohairesis is distinct from appetite, spirit, wish and
belief. Prohairesis must be distinct from appetite and spirit, Aristotle argues, because
appetite and spirit are possessed by animals but animals do not possess prohairesis;
furthermore, the same is true with regards to appetite for incontinent individuals (EN
III.2.1111b10-15). Both animals and the incontinent possess appetites which drive them
towards the pleasurable things which are the object of appetites, such as food and drink,
but animals do not have the capacity for the rational apparatus which prohairesis requires
and the incontinent do not exercise such a power; hence, because one can exist without
the other, they cannot be identical. The same holds true for spirit and prohairesis;
Aristotle believes that actions that result from spirit can still be voluntary actions (EN
III.2.1111a20-27), but nevertheless, an action that flows from spirit seems to have only
the bare minimum of free agency that is required for being a voluntary action; it is done
on the spur of a moment, without any real thought or deliberation behind and hence lacks
the thoughtfulness that prohairesis requires and so ...actions caused by spirit seem least
of all to accord with decision (EN III.2.1111b15-20).
Nor can prohairesis be wish because prohairesis concerns itself with those things
which we ourselves have power over, a direct ability to change, whereas wishes can
concern impossible objects, such as a desire for immortality, or objects that we have no
say in, such as a desire that a certain athlete win an event (EN III.2.1111b20-26). Finally,
it seems to be the case that a wish is that which sets an aim for us to work towards (when
its possible for us to achieve it) such as health, whereas prohairesis concerns discerning


the means toward that aim, e.g. avoiding pizza (EN III.2.1111b26-31). Finally, it is clear
that prohairesis is not belief. Beliefs concern everything, including the same objects of
wishes that do not concern prohairesis, e.g. things that we have no power over.
Furthermore, beliefs are judged as being true or false, whereas acts of prohairesis are
judged as being good or bad (EN III.2.1111b30-35). Nor can prohairesis be any
particular kind of belief either since, according to Aristotle, prohairesis determines our
character whereas our beliefs do not and prohairesis concerns performing actions,
whereas beliefs do not (i.e. we can believe performing a certain action would be good but
that belief is not like the actual decision to perform this action) (EN III.2.1112a1-5).
Aristotle ultimately comes to the conclusion that prohairesis involves
deliberation. According to Aristotle, deliberation does not involve eternal things such as
the nature of the universe; nor things like droughts or floods; nor the results of fortune;
nor even human affairs which are not connected to the society of the person in question
(EN III.3.1112a22-33). From these exclusions, it is clear that Aristotle understands
deliberation as that process by which a decision is reached with regards to a subject
which the person or group of people in question have power over and are in some way
trying themselves to affect. Hence, deliberation differs from inquiry because inquiry
concerns asking and answering questions that are designed to expand our theoretical
knowledge of realms which do not concern practical actions, e.g. the nature of the
universe and so on. However, we do deliberate about the sciences which concern
practical affairs, such as medicine and navigation: There is no deliberation about the
sciences that are exact and self-sufficient...[r]ather, we deliberate about what results
through our agency, but in different ways on different occasions... (EN III.3.1112b1-5).


Finally, Aristotle notes that we do not deliberate about ends but rather about
means. I believe that what Aristotle means by this is that, because deliberation focuses
upon arriving at a decision with regards toward carrying out some action, it is essentially
purposive in nature and therefore must presuppose a purpose or end of some kind that
determines what the deliberation in question is about. It does not make sense to have a
deliberation to arrive at a decision for action when there is no specific action in mind; if
the deliberation were to be totally open-ended, then it would not involve any practical
affair but would rather be a general philosophical pursuit and hence it would really be an
enquiry. But of course, it is still possible to deliberate about something like what career
should I pursue? It just needs to be the case that the deliberation has the proper end set in
place beforehand, such as the desire to earn as much money as possible. The following
deliberation would then be about the means most effective for fulfilling this desire.
Aristotle then tells us that what we deliberate about is the same as our decision
[prohairesis] except that by the time we decide to do it, it is definite (EN
III.3.1113a3-5). What Aristotle seems to be saying here is that a prohairesis simply is
what a deliberation results in after that deliberation has succeeded in arriving at a definite
conclusion; i.e. a single product that determines how the agent will now act contra all
other possible actions that the agent could have chosen instead. For this reason, I believe
decision is probably the best translation for this term since, in English, we use this word
to indicate a plan for moving forward that has been arrived at through careful thought.
Irwin notes that some translators translate prohairesis as choice instead, but I agree with
Irwin that this is a poor translation since the term choice is broader than the term
decision and so can be used to refer to plans for action that have no careful thought


behind them, such as a choice that has been made at random (Irwin, pg. 322).
From all of the foregoing, it is clear that Aristotle considers prohairesis to be a
subset of the internal principles from which an agent makes an action that comes from his
own self rather than being forced upon him by an outside cause and is thus, along with
appetite and spirit, one of the sources of voluntary actions. I believe that Aristotle tells us
that prohairesis is most proper to virtue because virtue necessarily concerns itself with
voluntary actions; involuntary actions, after all, Aristotle tells us, receive pardon or even
pity, rather than praise or blame and hence are not moral in nature (EN III.1.1109b30-35).
And of these sources for voluntary action, prohairesis is the one that is most proper to
virtue because it is prohairesis that is unique to humans. It is prohairesis that involves the
exercise of the rationality that is necessary for us to fulfill our functions as beings which
use reason in acting towards our emotions; such rationality is neither found in nor comes
from spirit or appetite. Furthermore, prohairesis distinguishes character better than
actions do because it is always possible that even someone who has an unvirtuous
character can, for whatever reason, carry out the same action that he would have if he had
been acting from reason and the virtues and that a virtuous person can make a decision he
would not normally. Focusing upon prohairesis allows us to avoid these false positives
and negatives because someone who arrives at the right action through prohairesis and
deliberation has made the conscious decision to settle upon that action rather than hitting
upon the right action merely through dumb luck or perverse irony.
I believe that Aristotle's account of prohairesis is largely common-sensical. I
believe that in particular, Aristotle is right that deliberation cannot be about ends
themselves but rather must be about the means by which these ends can best be promoted


and I believe that our current political society aptly demonstrates this point. We cannot
have a common deliberation for the sake of bettering our society if we cannot even agree
that such a goal is worth pursuing. Hence, for example, it could be argued that in our
modern political culture, money from special interests that do not care about the general
welfare has so clogged our political apparatus that it is impossible to make any progress
on any of the fronts that we need to because there is no longer even a consensus that such
progress would be a good thing. Having a rational deliberation about what action to
pursue for a common social goal presupposes that we even have such a goal in mind to
begin with. Aristotle realized this and probably thought that such a goal could be easy
enough to discern from our own common circumstances and nature and that rational
deliberation could fill in the rest. Alas, in a corrupt or pluralistic society, it is doubtful to
what degree this can really be the case.
However, there is one aspect of Aristotles account which I do not find so
plausible. Aristotle says that prohairesis is not belief and to back up this claim, he argues
that it is our decisions which determine our character, not our beliefs (EN III.2.1112a1-5).
I agree that prohairesis is not belief, but it seems to me that Aristotle is discounting the
importance of belief and misunderstanding the relationship between prohairesis and
belief. If one has repulsive beliefs such as a racist attitude, it seems to me that this in and
of itself would be enough to discount a persons character, even if he still arrives at
virtuous decisions. However, more importantly, it seems to be impossible that a person
even could arrive at virtuous decisions unless he has the morally proper beliefs to
motivate such decisions. Aristotle, however, gives no discussion of this in his account
and even suggests that it is often the case that those who have the right beliefs do a poorer


job of making decisions (EN III.2.1112a9-14). Hence, his account of decision-making
seems quite flat in at least one respect. Instead, he seems to push the issue under the rug
because it is not the object of his present inquiry. But any complete account of decisions
must take into account belief-formation and how decisions are made according to these
beliefs as well.




















Citation

Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics. Trans. Terence Irwin. Cambridge: Hackett Publishing
Company, Inc. 1999. Print