[G.R. NO.

173479 : July 12, 2007]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JUAN CABBAB, JR., Accused-Appellant.
Before the Court on automatic review is the decision
1
dated February 22, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-
H.C. No. 00968 which affirmed, with modification, an earlier decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bangued, Abra,
Branch 2, in Criminal Case No. 687, finding appellant Juan Cabbab, Jr., guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Robbery with Homicide and Attempted Murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Pursuant to our pronouncement in People v. Mateo
2
which modified the provisions of the Rules of Court insofar as they
provide for direct appeals from the RTC to this Court in cases where the penalty imposed by the trial court is death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, this case was earlier
3
referred to the CA, whereat it was docketed as CA-G.R. CR-
H.C. No. 01978, for appropriate action and disposition.
The Case
In the court of origin, appellant Juan Cabbab, Jr., along with his cousin-in-law Segundino Calpito, was charged with the
crimes of Double Murder and Attempted Murder with Robbery in an Information
4
alleging, as follows:
That on or about April 22, 1988, in Sitio Kayawkaw, Barangay Kimmalasag, Municipality of San Isidro, Province of Abra,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with the intent to kill, treachery
and evident premeditation, while armed with a firearm (not-recover), conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and shot from ambush WINNER AGBULOS
and EDDIE QUINDASAN, consequently inflicting thereby multiple gunshot wounds on the different parts of their bodies,
killing Winner Agbulos on the spot and causing the death of Eddie Quindasan shortly thereafter, then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill, shot William Belmes, said accused having commenced the execution of Murder
by overt acts but were unable to perform all the acts of execution, which would have produced the crime of Murder as a
consequence thereof, due to alertness of victim William Belmes to roll and poor marksmanship of the accused thus
prevented his death, then and there willfully and unlawfully and feloniously, with the intent of gain, take, steal and carry
away the money of Winner Agbulos in the amount of Twelve Thousand Pesos (P12,000.00), Philippine currency..
ALL CONTRARY TO LAW with the aggravating circumstance of: (1) uninhabited place.
On arraignment, appellant Juan Cabbab, Jr. and accused Segundino Calpito separately entered their pleas of "Not Guilty" to
the crimes charged. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued, in the course of which the prosecution presented the oral
testimonies of M/Sgt. Godofredo Tubadeza, a police investigator at Camp Villamor, Bangued, Abra; PO William Belmes, a
member of the Integrated National Police at the Villaviciosa Police Station; Vidal Agbulos, father of the victim Winner
Agbulos; Dra. Leona Garcia-Beroa, medico-legal officer who conducted an autopsy on the body of Winner Agbulos; and
Dr. Godofreco Gasa, a physician at the Abra Provincial Hospital.
For its part, the defense presented the appellant himself; accused Segundino Calpito; and George de Lara, a Forensic
Chemist of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
The Evidence
The People's version of the incident is succinctly summarized by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in its Appellee's
Brief,
5
to wit:
In the morning of 22 April 1988, father and son Vidal Agbulos and Winner Agbulos, together with Eddie Quindasan, Felipe
Abad and Police Officer (PO) William Belmes, went to Barangay Kimmalasag, San Isidro, Abra to attend a "fiesta"
celebration. Upon arrival in the area, they found out that the fiesta celebration was already over, thus, they decided to go
home in Villaviciosa, Abra. Since it was already lunchtime, the group took their lunch at Sitio Turod, located in the same
area of Barangay Kimmalasag. After taking their lunch and on their way home, they were met by accused-appellant Juan
Cabbab, Jr. and Segundino Calpito who invited them to play "pepito," a local version of the game of "russian poker."
Only Winner Agbulos and Eddie Quindasan played "pepito" with the group of accused-appellant. Winner Agbulos played the
dealer/banker in the game while accused-appellant and Segundino Calpito acted as players therein. Around 3:00 o'clock
p.m., PO William Belmes told Winner Agbulos and Eddie Quindasan that they should be going home after three (3) more
deals. About 3:30 p.m., Winner Agbulos's group wrapped-up the game and were set for home together with his group.
Winner Agbulos won the game.
While walking on their way home from Sitio Turod, PO William Belmes, who was behind Winner Agbulos and Eddie
Quindasan picking-up guava fruits from a tree, saw accused-appellant, accused Segundino Calpito and a companion running
up a hill. Suddenly, he heard gunshots and saw Winner Agbulos and Eddie Quindasan, who were then walking ahead of the
group, hit by the gunfire.
By instant, PO William Belmes dove into a canal to save himself from the continuous gunfire of accused-appellant. PO
William Belmes ran towards Vidal Agbulos and Felipe Abad, who were walking behind the group, and informed the two that
Winner Agbulos and Eddie Quindasan were ambushed by accused-appellant and Segundino Calpito. The three (3) proceeded
to the crime scene where they saw the dead body of Winner Agbulos together with Eddie Quindasan whom they mistook for
dead. The three sought help from the police authorities of Pilar, Abra and returned to the scene of the crime where they
found Eddie Quindasan who was still alive and who narrated that it was Juan Cabbab, Jr. and Segundino Calpito who
ambused them and took the money, estimated at P12,000.00, of Winner Agbulos which he won in the card game. Eddie
Quindasan was brought to the Abra Provincial Hospital but died the following day.
Postmortem examination of Winner Agbulos showed that the cause of his death was "cardio respiratory arrest secondary to
hemorrhage due to multiple gunshot wounds." On the other hand, Eddie Quindasan's cause of death was "cardio respiratory
arrest secondary to hypovolemic shock due to multiple gunshot wounds."
For the defense, appellant himself took the witness stand claiming that in the morning of April 22, 1988, he went to Palao,
Baddek, Bangued, Abra to visit his friends Romeo, Demetrio and Restituto, all surnamed Borreta. He stayed there almost the
entire day and left only at around 5:00 p.m. He arrived home in Kimmalasag, San Isidro, Abra at around 5:30 p.m. He
declared that his co-accused Calpito was not with him that day. He likewise averred that he did not know prosecution
witnesses PO William Belmes and Vidal Agbulos nor did he know of any motive for them to testify against him.
Appellant's co-accused Calpito denied having committed the crimes charged. He testified that at around 8:30 a.m. of April
22, 1988, he went fishing at Kimmalasag, San Isidro, Abra until 4:00 a.m. of the following day.
George de Lara, Forensic Chemist of the NBI, testified that he conducted an examination on the paraffin cast taken from
appellant to determine the presence of gunpowder residue or nitrates on appellant's hands. The results of the said
examination showed that appellant was negative of nitrates. He opined that certain factors may affect the result of the test
such as perspiration, wind velocity, humidity or the type of gun used. He also theorized that a paraffin test would yield a
negative result if fertilizers or cosmetics are applied to the hands before the cast is taken.
The Trial Court's Decision
In a decision
6
dated August 26, 1997, the trial court acquitted Segundino Calpito but found appellant Juan Cabbab, Jr. guilty
of two crimes, i.e. (1) robbery with double homicide and (2) attempted murder. Dispositively, the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the court finds accused Juan Cabbab, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of double murder with robbery or
better put, robbery with double homicide and attempted murder as defined in Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code in relation
to Art. 294 of the same Code or robbery with double homicide defined and penalized under Art. 248 in relation to Art. 6 of
the Same Code with aggravating circumstance of uninhabited place with no mitigating circumstances and sentences him
with the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each of the killing of Winner Agbulos and for robbing the said victim after killing
him and for the killing of Eddie Quindasan. The court likewise finds the accused Juan Cabbab, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the attempted murder defined and penalized in Art. 48 in relation to Art. 6 of the Revised Penal Code. These
offenses attended by the aggravating circumstance of uninhabited place with no mitigating circumstances and sentence him
to suffer an indeterminate penalty of FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of arresto mayor as minimum to FOUR (4) YEARS
and TWO (2) MONTHS of prision correccional as maximum.
He is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of the victims P50,000.00 for each of them plus P20,000.00 also for each of them as
actual expenses and finally, the amount of P100,000.00 also for each of them as moral and exemplary damages and to pay
the costs of this suit.
Accused Segundino Calpito is acquitted for insufficiency of evidence.
SO ORDERED.
The records of the case were then transmitted to this Court on automatic review. As stated at the onset hereof, the Court, in
its Resolution
7
of January 17, 2006 and pursuant to its ruling in People v. Mateo,
8
referred the case and its records to the CA
for appropriate action and disposition, whereat it was docketed as CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00968.
In a decision dated February 22, 2006, the CA modified the trial court's decision and found appellant guilty of the special
complex crime of Robbery with Homicide and imposed upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The CA also affirmed
appellant's conviction, as well as the penalty imposed, for the separate crime of attempted murder.
From the CA, the case was then elevated to this Court for automatic review. In its Resolution
9
of September 20, 2006, the
Court resolved to require the parties to submit their respective supplemental briefs.
In a Manifestation dated November 16, 2006, the OSG, in behalf of appellee People, informed the Court that it is no longer
filing a supplemental brief and was merely adopting its appellee's brief before the CA as its supplemental brief.
Appellant, on the other hand, filed on December 18, 2006 his supplemental brief on the lone assigned error, that:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN REJECTING THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI INTERPOSED BY THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE VERSION IS MORE CREDIBLE AND SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE.
Insisting that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, appellant pleads for acquittal. He avers that
the witnesses for the prosecution failed to positively identify him as the perpetrator of the crime as they did not actually see
him shoot the victims. Appellant also relies on the results of the paraffin test showing that he was negative of gunpowder
nitrates.
The appeal must fail.
Appellant's contention that the witnesses for the prosecution failed to identify him as the perpetrator of the crime is belied
by the testimony of PO William Belmes, who was with the victims when the incident happened. We quote from the
transcripts of the stenographic notes:
William Belmes on Re-direct Examination
FISCAL FLORES:
Q. Mr. Witness, when you gave your statement on April 30, 1988, exactly eight (8) days after the incident when the incident
wherein you were investigated upon still very very fresh in your mind (sic). Now, in your statement which you gave to the
investigator, Pat. Tubadeza, you stated that you saw the persons shot at Winner Agbulos and Eddie Quindasan and after the
two (2) had fell down then you also likewise saw them shot at you at the time you were rolling to the ground. Do you affirm
and confirm this statement of yours which you subscribed before Fiscal Ricarte Valera?cralaw library
ATTY. YANURIA:
Your Honor, it is misleading, we object, in so far as the shooting of Eddie Quindasan and Winner Agbulos was not seen. He
only saw the persons who were firing at him namely: Juan Cabbab and Segundino Calpito.
COURT:
In his testimony before the court he testified before the court that he saw Juan Cabbab and Segundino Calpito shot at Eddie
Quindasan and Winner Agbulos. Reform the question.
FISCAL FLORES:
Q. However, you saw these two (2) accused, Juan Cabbab and Segundino Calpito shoot at you?cralaw li brary
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Will you tell the court if how far were these two (2) accused when they were firing at you?cralaw library
A. Eight (8) meters, sir.
Q. And therefore what time is it when they were firing at you?cralaw library
A. If I m not mistaken it was 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon.
10

William Belmes on cross-examination
ATTY. YANURIA:
Q. In other words, it was you being shot out by Segundino Calpito and Juan Cabbab but you did not see them shoot at
Winner Agbulos and Eddie Quindasan?cralaw li brary
A. I saw Juan Cabbab and Segundino fire at Winner Agbulos and Eddie Quindasan (the witness using the word "banat") and
when they already fell down, they continued firing attempt and in my case I rolled and they also fired at me.
11

The above testimony adequately showed that Belmes was able to look at and see appellant at the time he perpetrated the
crime. To our mind, Belmes could not have made a mistake with respect to appellant's identity, what with the fact that just
a few hours before the incident, it was even appellant himself who invited Belmes and his group to play poker. For sure,
Belmes had a face-to-face encounter with appellant before the assault and thus would be able to unmistakably recognize
him especially because at the time of the attack, Belmes was just eight (8) meters away from appellant and conditions of
visibility were very good at the time of the incident as it was only around 4:00 in the afternoon. Jurisprudence recognizes
that it is the most natural reaction of victims of violence to strive to see the appearance of the perpetrators of the crime and
to observe the manner in which the crime was committed.
12

Belmes' testimony was corroborated by that of Vidal Agbulos who was also with the group when the robbery and shooting
took place. Again, we quote from the transcripts of stenographic notes:
Vidal Agbulos on direct examination
FISCAL FLORES:
Q. What did you do next when Felipe Abad informed you again that your son was already killed and Eddie Quindasan was
injured?cralaw library
A. Even if he told me about that I just went ahead.
Q. What happened next when he told you that?cralaw library
A. When I went ahead I saw Juan Cabbab took the wallet from my son.
COURT:
Q. At that time, Winner Agbulos was already prostrate on the ground?cralaw library
A. Yes, sir, my son was lying on the ground facing down.
13

Clearly, then, Vidal Agbulos positively identified appellant as the person who robbed his son, Winner, of his winnings. Just
like Belmes, Agbulos could also not have been mistaken as to appellant's identity considering that it was appellant who
personally approached Agbulos' group and invited them to play poker just a few hours prior to the commission of the crime.
Further, Agbulos testified that he was familiar with appellant as he would often see him in a cockpit in San Isidro, Abra.
To be sure, the trial court which had the unique opportunity to observe at first hand the demeanor of witnesses Belmes and
Agbulos and asses whether they are telling the truth or not, gave full faith and credence to their testimonies. Finding no
facts and circumstances of weight and substance that would otherwise warrant a different conclusion, the Court accords the
highest respect to the trial court's evaluation of the credibility of these witnesses.
Appellant likewise capitalizes on the results of the paraffin test showing that both his hands yielded no trace of gunpowder
residue. Unfortunately for appellant, the results of the paraffin test would not exculpate him. The negative findings of said
test do not conclusively show that a person did not discharge a firearm at the time the crime was committed. This Court has
observed that it is quite possible for a person to discharge a firearm and yet exhibit no trace of nitrates: when, e.g., the
assailant fired the weapon while wearing gloves or where the assailant thoroughly washes his hands thereafter.
14
As George
de Lara of the NBI stated in his testimony before the trial court, if a person applies cosmetics on his hands before the cast is
taken, gunpowder residue would not be found in that person's hands. He also testified that certain factors could contribute
to the negative result of a paraffin test such as perspiration, humidity or the type of firearm used. In fine, a finding that the
paraffin test on the person of the appellant yielded negative results is not conclusive evidence to show that he indeed had
not fired a gun.
Too, appellant has not shown any evidence of improper motive on the part of prosecution witnesses Belmes and Agbulos
that would have driven them to falsely testify against him. In fact, appellant himself declared that he did not know of any
reason why Belmes and Agbulos would implicate him in the crime. Where there is nothing to show that the witnesses for the
prosecution were actuated by improper motive, their positive and categorical declarations on the witness stand under the
solemnity of an oath deserve full faith and credence.
15

Interjected as a defense is alibi, appellant claiming that he went to Palao, Baddek, Bangued, Abra to visit his friends in the
morning of April 22, 1988 and returned home only at around 5:30 p.m. For alibi to prosper, however, the hornbook rule
requires a showing that the accused was at another place at the time of the perpetration of the offense and that it was
physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.
16
Where there is even the least
chance for the accused to be present at the crime scene, the defense of alibi will not hold water.
17

Here, the evidence shows that Palao, Baddek, Bangued, Abra where appellant allegedly visited his friends was only 30
minutes drive from Barangay Kimmalasag, San Isidro, Abra where the crime was committed. In short, appellant failed to
establish by clear and convincing evidence the physical impossibility of his presence at the scene of the crime on the date
and time of its commission.
The weakness of appellant's alibi is heavily underscored by the fact that appellant was positively identified by witnesses
Belmes and Agbulos who were with the victims at the time of the incident. For sure, appellant's positive identification as the
perpetrator of the crime renders his defense of alibi unworthy of credit.
18

The crime committed by appellant was correctly characterized by the appellate court as Robbery with Homicide under Article
294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) which reads:
Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons - Penalties.' Any person guilty of robbery with the use of
violence against any person shall suffer:
1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall
have been committed, or when the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation or arson.
To warrant conviction for the crime of Robbery with Homicide, the prosecution is burdened to prove the confluence of the
following elements:
(1) the taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against persons;
(2) the property taken belongs to another;
(3) the taking is characterized by intent to gain or animo lucrandi; andcralawl ibrary
(4) by reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof, homicide is committed.
19

In Robbery with Homicide, so long as the intention of the felon is to rob, the killing may occur before, during or after the
robbery. It is immaterial that death would supervene by mere accident, or that the victim of homicide is other than the
victim of robbery, or that two or more persons are killed. Once a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of the
robbery, the felony committed is the special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide.
20

Here, the prosecution adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt that appellant, having lost to Winner Agbulos in the game of
poker, intended to divest Agbulos of his winnings amounting to P20,000.00. In pursuit of his plan to rob Agbulos of his
winnings, appellant shot and killed him as well as his companion, Eddie Quindasan.
The prescribed penalty for Robbery with Homicide under Article 294 of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 7659 (Death
Penalty Law), is reclusion perpetua to death. In the application of a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, like that
for Robbery with Homicide, Article 63 of the RPC provides that "when in the commission of the deed there is present only
one aggravating circumstance, the greater penalty shall be applied." In this case, the aggravating circumstance of treachery
attended the commission of the crime, as appellant's attack on the victims who were then unsuspectingly walking on their
way home was sudden and done without any provocation, thus giving them no real chance to defend themselves.
However, considering that the crime was committed in 1988 or prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 7659,
21
the trial court and
the CA correctly imposed upon appellant the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua.chanrobles virtual law l ibrary
The Court feels, however, that the two courts below erred in convicting appellant of the separate crime of attempted murder
for the shooting of PO William Belmes. Attempted homicide or attempted murder committed during or on the occasion of the
robbery, as in this case, is absorbed in the crime of Robbery with Homicide which is a special complex crime that remains
fundamentally the same regardless of the number of homicides or injuries committed in connection with the robbery.
22

We now come to the award of damages.
Conformably with existing jurisprudence, the heirs of Winner Agbulos and Eddie Quindasan are each entitled to civil
indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00,
23
to moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00,
24
and to exemplary damages in
the sum of P25,000.00.
25

With respect to actual damages, Winner's father, Vidal Agbulos, testified that he spent a total of P50,000.00 as burial
expenses but he failed to present receipts therefor. In People v. Abrazaldo,
26
we laid down the doctrine that where the
amount of actual damages for funeral expenses cannot be determined because of the absence of receipts to prove them,
temperate damages may be awarded in the amount of P25,000.00. Thus, in lieu of actual damages, temperate damages in
the amount of P25,000.00 must be awarded to the heirs of Winner because although the exact amount was not proved with
certainty, it was reasonable to expect that they incurred expenses for the coffin and burial of the victim. We, however,
cannot grant the same to the heirs of Eddie Quindasan for their failure to testify on the matter. Finally, appellant is obliged
to return to the heirs of Winner Agbulos the amount of P20,000.00 he had taken from Winner.
WHEREFORE, the decision dated February 22, 2006 of the CA in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00968 is hereby AFFIRMED with the
following MODIFICATIONS:
1. Appellant Juan Cabbab, Jr. is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Robbery with Homicide and sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
2. Appellant is hereby ordered to return to the heirs of Winner Agbulos the amount of P20,000.00 representing the amount
stolen from him. He is likewise ordered to indemnify the heirs of Winner Agbulos the following: (a) P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity; (b) P50,000.00 as moral damages, (c) P25,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (c) P25,000.00 as temperate
damages.
3. Appellant is further ordered to pay the heirs of Eddie Quindasan P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, another P50,000.00 as
moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
4. For reasons herein stated, appellant is ACQUITTED of the separate crime of attempted murder against the person of PO
William Belmes.










[G.R. No. 140756. April 4, 2003.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JUAN GONZALES ESCOTE, JR.

Robbery with homicide is classified as a crime against property. Nevertheless, treachery is a generic aggravating
circumstance in said crime if the victim of homicide is killed treacherously. The Supreme Court of Spain so ruled. So does
the Court rule in this case, as it had done for decades.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Before the Court on automatic review is the Decision 1 of Branch 11 of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan in Criminal Case
No. 443-M-97 convicting accused-appellants Juan Gonzales Escote, Jr. and Victor Acuyan of the complex crime of robbery
with homicide, meting on each of them the supreme penalty of death, and ordering them to pay the heirs of the victim,
SPO1 Jose C. Manio, Jr., the total amount of P300,000.00 by way of actual and moral damages and to pay to Five Star Bus,
Inc., the amount of P6,000.00 by way of actual damages.
The Facts

The antecedent facts as established by the prosecution are as follows:chanrob1es vi rtual 1aw library

On September 28, 1996 at past midnight, Rodolfo Cacatian, the regular driver of Five Star Passenger Bus bearing Plate No.
ABS-793, drove the bus from its terminal at Pasay City to its destination in Bolinao, Pangasinan. Also on board was Romulo
Digap, the regular conductor of the bus, as well as some passengers. At Camachile, Balintawak, six passengers boarded the
bus, including Victor Acuyan and Juan Gonzales Escote, Jr. who were wearing maong pants, rubber shoes, hats and jackets.
2 Juan seated himself on the third seat near the aisle, in the middle row of the passengers seats, while Victor stood by the
door in the mid-portion of the bus beside Romulo. Another passenger, SPO1 Jose C. Manio, Jr., a resident of Angeles City,
was seated at the rear portion of the bus on his way home to Angeles City. Tucked on his waist was his service gun bearing
Serial Number 769806. Every now and then, Rodolfo looked at the side view mirror as well as the rear view and center
mirrors installed atop the drivers seat to monitor any incoming and overtaking vehicles and to observe the passengers of
the bus.

The lights of the bus were on even as some of the passengers slept. When the bus was travelling along the highway in
Plaridel, Bulacan, Juan and Victor suddenly stood up, whipped out their handguns and announced a holdup. Petrified,
Rodolfo glanced at the center mirror towards the passengers seat and saw Juan and Victor armed with handguns. Juan fired
his gun upward to awaken and scare off the passengers. Victor followed suit and fired his gun upward. Juan and Victor then
accosted the passengers and divested them of their money and valuables. Juan divested Romulo of the fares he had
collected from the passengers. The felons then went to the place Manio, Jr. was seated and demanded that he show them
his identification card and wallet. Manio, Jr. brought out his identification card bearing No. 00898. 3 Juan and Victor took the
identification card of the police officer as well as his service gun and told him: "Pasensya ka na Pare, papatayin ka namin,
baril mo rin and papatay sa iyo." The police officer pleaded for mercy: "Pare maawa ka sa akin. May pamilya ako." However,
Victor and Juan ignored the plea of the police officer and shot him on the mouth, right ear, chest and right side of his body.
Manio, Jr. sustained six entrance wounds. He fell to the floor of the bus. Victor and Juan then moved towards the driver
Rodolfo, seated themselves beside him and ordered the latter to maintain the speed of the bus. Rodolfo heard one of the
felons saying: "Ganyan lang ang pumatay ng tao. Parang pumapatay ng manok." The other said: "Ayos na naman tayo pare.
Malaki-laki ito." Victor and Juan further told Rodolfo that after they (Victor and Juan) shall have alighted from the bus, he
(Rodolfo) should continue driving the bus and not report the incident along the way. The robbers assured Rodolfo that if the
latter will follow their instructions, he will not be harmed. Victor and Juan ordered Rodolfo to stop the bus along the
overpass in Mexico, Pampanga where they alighted from the bus. The robbery was over in 25 minutes.

When the bus reached Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga, Rodolfo and Romulo forthwith reported the incident to the police
authorities. The cadaver of SPO1 Manio, Jr. was brought to the funeral parlor where Dr. Alejandro D. Tolentino, the
Municipal Health Officer of Mabalacat, Pampanga, performed an autopsy on the cadaver of the police officer. The doctor
prepared and signed an autopsy report detailing the wounds sustained by the police officer and the cause of his death:jgc:chanrobles.com. ph

"Body still flaccid (not in rigor mortis) bathed with his own blood. There were 6 entrance wounds and 6 exit wounds. All the
entrance were located on his right side. An entrance (0.5 cm x 0.5 cm.) located infront of the right ear exited at the left side
just below the ear lobe. Another entrance through the mouth exited at the back of the head fracturing the occiput with an
opening of (1.5 cm x 2 cm). Blood CSF and brain tissues came out. Another fatal bullet entered at the upper right cornea of
the sternum, entered the chest cavity pierced the heart and left lung and exited at the left axillary line. Severe hemorrhage
in the chest cavity came from the heart and left lung. The other 3 bullets entered the right side and exited on the same side.
One entrance at the top of the right shoulder exited at the medial side of the right arm. The other entered above the right
breast and exited at the right lateral abdominal wall travelling below muscles and subcutaneous tissues without entering the
cavities. Lastly another bullet entered above the right iliac crest travelled superficially and exited above the right inguinal
line.

Cause of Death:chanrob1es vi rtual 1aw library

Shock, massive internal and external hemorrhage, complete brain destruction and injury to the heart and left lung caused
by multiple gunshot wounds." 4

Rodolfo and Romulo proceeded to the police station of Plaridel, Bulacan where they reported the robbery and gave their
respective sworn statements. 5 SPO1 Manio, Jr. was survived by his wife Rosario Manio and their four young children.
Rosario spent P20,000.00 for the coffin and P10,000.00 for the burial lot of the slain police officer. 6 Manio, Jr. was 38 years
old when he died and had a gross salary of P8,085.00 a month. 7

Barely a month thereafter, or on October 25, 1996, at about midnight, SPO3 Romeo Meneses, the team leader of Alert Team
No. 1 of Tarlac Police Station, and PO3 Florante S. Ferrer were at the police checkpoint along the national highway in Tarlac,
Tarlac. At the time, the Bambang-Concepcion bridge was closed to traffic and the police officers were tasked to divert traffic
to the Sta. Rosa road. Momentarily, a white colored taxi cab without any plate number on its front fender came to view.
Meneses stopped the cab and asked the driver, who turned out to be the accused Juan Gonzales Escote, Jr., for his
identification card. Juan told Meneses that he was a policeman and handed over to Meneses the identification card of SPO1
Manio, Jr. and the money which Juan and Victor took from Manio, Jr. during the heist on September 28, 1996. 8 Meneses
became suspicious when he noted that the identification card had already expired on March 16, 1995. He asked Juan if the
latter had a new pay slip. Juan could not produce any. He finally confessed to Meneses that he was not a policeman.
Meneses brought Juan to the police station. When police officers frisked Juan for any deadly weapon, they found five live
bullets of a 9 millimeter firearm in his pocket. The police officers confiscated the ammunition. In the course of the
investigation, Juan admitted to the police investigators that he and Victor, alias Victor Arroyo, staged the robbery on board
Five Star Bus and are responsible for the death of SPO1 Manio, Jr. in Plaridel, Bulacan. Meneses and Ferrer executed their
joint affidavit of arrest of Juan. 9 Juan was subsequently turned over to the Plaridel Police Station where Romulo identified
him through the latters picture as one of those who robbed the passengers of the Five Star Bus with Plate No. ABS-793 and
killed SPO1 Manio, Jr. on September 28, 1996. In the course of their investigation, the Plaridel Police Station Investigators
learned that Victor was a native of Laoang, Northern Samar. 10 On April 4, 1997, an Information charging Juan Gonzales
Escote, Jr. and Victor Acuyan with robbery with homicide was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan. The Information
reads:chanrob1es vi rtual 1aw library

That on or about the 28th day of September 1996, in the municipality of Plaridel, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually
helping each other, armed with firearms, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent of (sic) gain and
by means of force, violence and intimidation, take, rob and carry away with one (1) necklace and cash in [the]
undetermine[d] amount of one SPO1 Jose C. Manio, Jr., to the damage and prejudice of the said owner in the said
undetermine[d] amount; that simultaneously or on the occassion (sic) of said robbery, said accused by means of violence
and intimidation and in furtherance of their conspiracy attack, assault and shoot with the service firearm of the said SPO1
Jose C. Manio, Jr., thereby inflicting serious physical injuries which resulted (sic) the death of the said SPO1 Jose C. Manio,
Jr.

Contrary to law. 11

On the strength of a warrant of arrest, the police officers arrested Victor in Laoang, Northern Samar and had him
incarcerated in the Bulacan Provincial Jail. Assisted by Atty. Ramiro Osorio, their counsel de parte, Juan and Victor were duly
arraigned and entered their plea of not guilty to the charge. Trial thereafter ensued. After the prosecution had rested its
case on August 26, 1998, Juan escaped from the provincial jail. 12 The trial court issued a bench warrant on September 22,
1998 for the arrest of said Accused-Appellant. 13 In the meantime, Victor adduced his evidence.

Victor denied the charge and interposed the defense of alibi. He testified that in 1996, he worked as a tire man in the
vulcanizing shop located in Banga I, Plaridel, Bulacan owned by Tony Boy Negro. On one occasion, Ilarde Victorino, a
customer of Tony Boy Negro, ordered Victor to sell a tire. Victor sold the tire but did not turn over the proceeds of the sale
to Ilarde. The latter hated Victor for his misdeed. The shop was later demolished and after two months of employment,
Victor returned to Barangay Muwal-Buwal, Laoang, Northern Samar. On September 26, 1996, at 9:30 p.m., Victor was at
the town fiesta in Laoang. Victor and his friends, Joseph Iringco and Rickey Lorcio were having a drinking spree in the house
of Barangay Captain Ike Baluya. At 11:30 p.m., the three left the house of the barangay captain and attended the public
dance at the town auditorium. Victor and his friends left the auditorium at 5:30 a.m. of September 27, 1996. Victor likewise
testified that he never met Juan until his arrest and detention at the Bulacan Provincial Jail. One of the inmates in said
provincial jail was Ilarde Victorino. Victor learned that Ilarde implicated him for the robbery of the Five Star Bus and the
killing of SPO1 Manio, Jr. to hit back at him for his failure to turn over to Ilarde the proceeds of the sale of the latters tire.

On January 14, 1999, Juan was rearrested in Daet, Camarines Norte. 14 However, he no longer adduced any evidence in his
behalf.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

The Verdict of the Trial Court

On March 11, 1999, the trial court rendered its Decision judgment finding Juan and Victor guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime charged, meted on each of them the penalty of death and ordered them to pay P300,000.00 as actual and moral
damages to the heirs of the victim and to pay the Five Star Bus Company the amount of P6,000.00 as actual damages. The
decretal portion of the decision reads:chanrob1es vi rtual 1aw library

WHEREFORE, this Court finds both accused, Juan Gonzales Escote, Jr. and Victor Acuyan GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of Robbery with Homicide as penalized under Art. 294 of the Revised Penal Code as amended and hereby sentences both to
suffer the supreme penalty of Death and to indemnify the heirs of the late SPO1 Jose C. Manio, Jr., the amount of
P300,000.00 as actual and moral damages and to pay the Five Star Bus P6,000.00 as actual damage.

SO ORDERED. 15

Assignment of Errors

Juan and Victor assail the Decision of the trial court and contend that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw l ibrary
I


THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RODOLFO CACATIAN AND ROMULO DIGAP, DRIVER AND CONDUCTOR OF THE
FIVE STAR BUS, RESPECTIVELY, WERE ABLE TO POSITIVELY IDENTIFY THE TWO (2) MEN WHO HELD-UP THEIR BUS AND
KILLED ONE PASSENGER THEREOF AT AROUND 3:00 OCLOCK IN THE EARLY MORNING OF SEPTEMBER 28, 1996.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE TWO (2) ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF
ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE. 16


The Courts Verdict

Anent the first assignment of error, Juan and Victor contend that the trial court committed a reversible error in relying on
the testimony of Rodolfo, the bus conductor, for convicting them of the crime charged. They aver that although their counsel
was able to initially cross-examine Rodolfo, the former failed to continue with and terminate his cross-examination of the
said witness through no fault of his as the witness failed to appear in subsequent proceedings. They assert that even if the
testimonies of Rodolfo and Romulo were to be considered, the two witnesses were so petrified during the robbery that they
were not able to look at the felons and hence could not positively identify accused-appellants as the perpetrators of the
crime. They argue that the police investigators never conducted a police line-up for the identification of the authors of the
crime.

The contentions of Juan and Victor are not meritorious. There is no factual and legal basis for their claim that they were
illegally deprived of their constitutional and statutory right to fully cross-examine Rodolfo. The Court agrees that the right to
cross-examine is a constitutional right anchored on due process. 17 It is a statutory right found in Section 1(f), Rule 115 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides that the accused has the right to confront and cross-examine the
witnesses against him at the trial. However, the right has always been understood as requiring not necessarily an actual
cross-examination but merely an opportunity to exercise the right to cross-examine if desired. 18 What is proscribed by
statutory norm and jurisprudential precept is the absence of the opportunity to cross-examine. 19 The right is a personal
one and may be waived expressly or impliedly. There is an implied waiver when the party was given the opportunity to
confront and cross-examine an opposing witness but failed to take advantage of it for reasons attributable to himself alone.
20 If by his actuations, the accused lost his opportunity to cross-examine wholly or in part the witnesses against him, his
right to cross-examine is impliedly waived. 21 The testimony given on direct examination of the witness will be received or
allowed to remain in the record. 22

In this case, the original records show that after several resettings, the initial trial for the presentation by the prosecution of
its evidence-in-chief was set on November 18, 1997 and December 5, 1997, both at 9:00 a.m. 23 Rodolfo testified on direct
examination on November 18, 1997. The counsel of Juan and Victor forthwith commenced his cross-examination of the
witness but because of the manifestation of said counsel that he cannot finish his cross-examination, the court ordered the
continuation thereof to December 5, 1997. 24 On December 5, 1997, Rodolfo did not appear before the court for the
continuation of his cross-examination but Rosemarie Manio, the widow of the victim did. The prosecution presented her as
witness. Her testimony was terminated. The court ordered the continuation of the trial for the cross-examination of Rodolfo
on January 20, 1998 at 8:30 a.m. 25 During the trial on January 20, 1998, Rodolfo was present but accused-appellants
counsel was absent. The court issued an order declaring that for failure of said counsel to appear before the court for his
cross-examination of Rodolfo, Victor and Juan waived their right to continue with the cross-examination of said witness. 26
During the trial set for February 3, 1998, the counsel of Juan and Victor appeared but did not move for a reconsideration of
the courts order dated January 20, 1998 and for the recall of Rodolfo Cacatian for further cross-examination. It behooved
counsel for Juan and Victor to file said motion and pray that the trial court order the recall of Rodolfo on the witness stand.
Juan and Victor cannot just fold their arms and supinely wait for the prosecution or for the trial court to initiate the recall of
said witness. Indeed, the Court held in Fulgado v. Court of Appeals, et al:chanrob1es virtual 1aw l ibrary

The task of recalling a witness for cross examination is, in law, imposed on the party who wishes to exercise said right. This
is so because the right, being personal and waivable, the intention to utilize it must be expressed. Silence or failure to assert
it on time amounts to a renunciation thereof. Thus, it should be the counsel for the opposing party who should move to
cross-examine plaintiffs witnesses. It is absurd for the plaintiff himself to ask the court to schedule the cross-examination of
his own witnesses because it is not his obligation to ensure that his deponents are cross-examined. Having presented his
witnesses, the burden shifts to his opponent who must now make the appropriate move. Indeed, the rule of placing the
burden of the case on plaintiffs shoulders can be construed to extremes as what happened in the instant proceedings. 27

The trial was reset to March 31, April 17 and 24, 1998, all at 8:30 a.m. because of the non-availability of the other
witnesses of the prosecution. 28 On March 31, 1998, the prosecution presented Dr. Alejandro Tolentino, PO2 Rene de la
Cruz and Romulo Digap. During the trial on April 17, 1998, the counsel of Juan and Victor failed to appear. The trial was
reset to June 3, 19 and 26, 1998. 29 The trial scheduled on June 3, 1998 was cancelled due to the absence of the counsel of
Juan and Victor. The court issued an order appointing Atty. Roberto Ramirez as counsel for Accused-Appellants. 30

During the trial on August 26, 1998, Atty. Ramirez appeared in behalf of Juan and Victor. The prosecution rested its case
after the presentation of SPO2 Romeo Meneses and formally offered its documentary evidence. The next trial was set on
September 23, 1998 at 8:30 a.m. 31 On November 11, 1998, Juan and Victor commenced the presentation of their evidence
with the testimony of Victor. 32 They rested their case on January 27, 1999 without any evidence adduced by Juan.

Juan and Victor did not even file any motion to reopen the case before the trial court rendered its decision to allow them to
cross-examine Rodolfo. They remained mute after judgment was rendered against them by the trial court. Neither did they
file any petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals for the nullification of the Order of the trial court dated January 20,
1998 declaring that they had waived their right to cross-examine Rodolfo. It was only on appeal to this Court that Juan and
Victor averred for the first time that they were deprived of their right to cross-examine Rodolfo. It is now too late in the day
for Juan and Victor to do so. The doctrine of estoppel states that if one maintains silence when in conscience he ought to
speak, equity will debar him from speaking when in conscience he ought to remain silent. He who remains silent when he
ought to speak cannot be heard to speak when he should be silent. 33

The contention of accused-appellants Juan and Victor that Rodolfo and Romulo failed to identify them as the perpetrators of
the crime charged is disbelieved by the trial court, thus:chanrob1es vi rtual 1aw library

As can be gathered from the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution, on September 28, 1996, the accused boarded
at around 3:00 a.m. a Five Star Bus driven by Rodolfo Cacatian, bound to Pangasinan, in Camachile, Balintawak, Quezon
City. Twenty (20) minutes or so later, when the bus reached the vicinity of Nabuag, Plaridel, Bulacan, along the North
Expressway, the accused with guns in hand suddenly stood up and announced a hold-up. Simultaneously with the
announcement of a hold-up, Escote fired his gun upwards. Acuyan, meanwhile, took the gun of a man seated at the back.
Both then went on to take the money and valuables of the passengers, including the bus conductors collections in the
amount of P6,000.00. Thereafter, the duo approached the man at the back telling him in the vernacular "Pasensiya ka na
pare, papatayin ka namin. Baril mo rin ang papatay sa iyo." They pointed their guns at him and fired several shots oblivious
of the plea for mercy of their victim. After the shooting, the latter collapsed on the floor. The two (2) then went back at the
front portion of the bus behind the drivers seat and were overheard by the bus driver, Cacatian, talking how easy it was to
kill a man. The robbery and the killing were over in 25 minutes. Upon reaching the Mexico overpass of the Expressway in
Pampanga, the two (2) got off the bus. The driver drove the bus to the Mabalacat Police Station and reported the incident.
During the investigation conducted by the police, it was found out that the slain passenger was a policeman, SPO1 Jose C.
Manio, Jr. of the Caloocan City Police Department.

The above version came from Rodolfo Cacatian and Romulo Digap, bus driver and conductor, respectively, of the ill-fated
Five Star Bus. 34

The Court agrees with the trial court. It may be true that Romulo was frightened when Juan and Victor suddenly announced
a holdup and fired their guns upward, but it does not follow that he and Rodolfo failed to have a good look at Juan and Victor
during the entire time the robbery was taking place. The Court has held in a catena of cases that it is the most natural
reaction of victims of violence to strive to see the appearance of the perpetrators of the crime and to observe the manner in
which the crime was committed. 35 Rodolfo and Romulo had a good look at both Juan and Victor before, during and after
they staged the robbery and before they alighted from the bus. The evidence on record shows that when Juan and Victor
boarded the bus and while the said vehicle was on its way to its destination, Romulo stationed himself by the door of the bus
located in the mid-section of the vehicle. The lights inside the bus were on. Juan seated himself in the middle row of the
passengers seat near the center aisle while Victor stood near the door of the bus about a meter or so from Romulo. 36
Romulo, Juan and Victor were near each other. Moreover, Juan divested Romulo of his collection of the fares from the
passengers. 37 Romulo thus had a face-to-face encounter with Juan. After shooting SPO1 Manio, Jr. at the rear portion of
the bus, Juan and Victor passed by where Romulo was standing and gave their instructions to him. Considering all the facts
and circumstances, there is no iota of doubt that Romulo saw and recognized Juan and Victor before, during and after the
heist. 38 Rodolfo looked many times on the rear, side and center view mirrors to observe the center and rear portions of the
bus before and during the robbery. Rodolfo thus saw Juan and Victor stage the robbery and kill SPO1 Manio, Jr. with
impunity:chanrob1es vi rtual 1aw library

When Rodolfo gave his sworn statement to the police investigators in Plaridel, Bulacan after the robbery, he described the
felons. When asked by the police investigators if he could identify the robbers if he see them again, Rodolfo declared that he
would be able to identify them:chanrob1es virtual 1aw l ibrary

May we know from the accused if his name is Juan Escote Gonzales because he just said Juan Escote. In the Information, it
is one Juan Gonzales, Jr., so, we can change, Your Honor. 42

Moreover, when he was accosted by SPO3 Romeo Meneses on October 25, 1997 in Tarlac, Tarlac, Juan was in possession of
the identification card 43 of the slain police officer. Juan failed to explain to the trial court how and under what
circumstances he came into possession of said identification card. Juan must necessarily be considered the author of the
robbery and the killing of SPO1 Manio, Jr. In People v. Mantung, 44 we held:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

. . . [T]he recovery of part of the loot from Mantung or the time of his arrest gave rise to a legal presumption of his guilt. As
this Court has held, [I]n the absence of an explanation of how one has come into possession of stolen effects belonging to a
person wounded and treacherously killed, he must necessarily be considered the author of the aggression and death of the
said person and of the robbery committed on him.

While police investigators did not place Juan and Victor in a police line-up for proper identification by Rodolfo and Romulo, it
cannot thereby be concluded that absent such line-up, their identification by Romulo and Rodolfo as the authors of the
robbery with homicide was unreliable. There is no law or police regulation requiring a police line-up for proper identification
in every case. Even if there was no police line-up, there could still be proper and reliable identification as long as such
identification was not suggested or instigated to the witness by the police. 45 In this case, there is no evidence that the
police officers had supplied or even suggested to Rodolfo and Romulo the identities of Juan and Victor as the perpetrators of
the robbery and the killing of SPO1 Manio, Jr.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

The Felony Committed by Juan and Victor

The Court finds that the trial court committed no error in convicting Juan and Victor of robbery with homicide. Article 294,
paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 7659, reads:chanrob1es vi rtual 1aw library

Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons. Penalties. Any person guilty of robbery with the use
of violence against or intimidation of any person shall suffer:chanrob1es vi rtual 1aw library

1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall
have been committed, or when the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation or arson.

To warrant the conviction of Juan and Victor for the said charge, the prosecution was burdened to prove the confluence of
the following essential elements:chanrob1es vi rtual 1aw library

. . . (a) the taking of personal property with the use of violence or intimidation against a person; (b) the property thus taken
belongs to another; (c) the taking is characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi and (d) on the occasion of the
robbery or by reason thereof, the crime of homicide, which is therein used in a generic sense, was committed. . . . 46

The intent to rob must precede the taking of human life. 47 In robbery with homicide, so long as the intention of the felons
was to rob, the killing may occur before, during or after the robbery. In People v. Barut, 48 the Court held that:chanrob1es vi rtual 1aw library

In the controlling Spanish version of article 294, it is provided that there is robbery with homicide "cuando con motivo o con
ocasin del robo resultare homicidio." "Basta que entre aquel este exista una relacin, meramente ocasional. No se requiere
que el homicidio se cometa como medio de ejecucin del robo, ni que el culpable tenga intencin de matar, el delito existe
segn constanta jurisprudencia, aun cuando no concurra animo homicida. Incluso si la muerte sobreviniere por mero
accidente, siempre que el homicidio se produzca con motivo con ocasin del robo, siendo indiferente que la muerte sea
anterior, coetanea o posterior a ste" (2 Cuello Calon, Derecho Penal, 1975 14th Ed. P. 872).

Even if the victim of robbery is other than the victim of the homicide committed on the occasion of or by reason of the
robbery, nevertheless, there is only one single and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide. All the crimes committed on
the occasion or by reason of the robbery are merged and integrated into a single and indivisible felony of robbery with
homicide. This was the ruling of the Supreme Court of Spain on September 9, 1886, et sequitur cited by this Court in People
v. Mangulabnan, Et. Al. 49

We see, therefore, that in order to determine the existence of the crime of robbery with homicide it is enough that a
homicide would result by reason or on the occasion of the robbery (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of November 26,
1892, and January 7, 1878, quoted in 2 Hidalgos Penal Code, p. 267 and 259260, respectively). This High Tribunal
speaking of the accessory character of the circumstances leading to the homicide, has also held that it is immaterial that the
death would supervene by mere accident (Decision of September 9, 1886; October 22, 1907; April 30, 1910 and July 14,
1917), provided that the homicide be produced by reason or on occasion of the robbery, inasmuch as it is only the result
obtained, without reference or distinction as to the circumstances, causes, modes or persons intervening in the commission
of the crime, that has to be taken into consideration (Decision of January 12, 1889 see Cuello Calons Codigo Penal, p.
501502).

Case law has it that whenever homicide has been committed by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery, all those who
took part as principals in the robbery will also be held guilty as principals of robbery with homicide although they did not
take part in the homicide, unless it appears that they endeavored to prevent the homicide. 50

In this case, the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that Juan and Victor conspired and confabulated together in
robbing the passengers of the Five Star Bus of their money and valuables and Romulo of his collections of the fares of the
passengers and in killing SPO1 Manio, Jr. with impunity on the occasion of the robbery. Hence, both Juan and Victor are
guilty as principals by direct participation of the felony of robbery with homicide under paragraph 1, Article 294 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659, punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.chanrob1es vi rtua1 1aw 1ibrary

The Proper Penalty

The trial court imposed the supreme penalty of death on Juan and Victor for robbery with homicide, defined in Article 294,
paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, punishable with reclusion perpetua. Under Article 63, paragraph 1 of the Revised
Penal Code, the felons should be meted the supreme penalty of death when the crime is committed with an aggravating
circumstance attendant in the commission of the crime absent any mitigating circumstance. The trial court did not specify in
the decretal portion of its decision the aggravating circumstances attendant in the commission of the crime mandating the
imposition of the death penalty. However, it is evident from the findings of facts contained in the body of the decision of the
trial court that it imposed the death penalty on Juan and Victor on its finding that they shot SPO1 Manio, Jr. treacherously
on the occasion of or by reason of the robbery:chanrob1es vi rtual 1aw li brary

The two (2) accused are incomparable in their ruthlessness and base regard for human life. After stripping the passengers of
their money and valuables, including the firearm of the victim, they came to decide to execute the latter seemingly because
he was a police officer. They lost no time pouncing him at the rear section of the bus, aimed their firearms at him and, in a
derisive and humiliating tone, told him, before pulling the trigger, that they were rather sorry but they are going to kill him
with his own gun; and thereafter, they simultaneously fired point blank at the hapless policeman who was practically on his
knees begging for his life. Afterwhich, they calmly positioned themselves at the front boasting for all to hear, that killing a
man is like killing a chicken ("Parang pumapatay ng manok"). Escote, in particular, is a class by himself in callousness. . . ..
51

The Court agrees with the trial court that treachery was attendant in the commission of the crime. There is treachery when
the following essential elements are present, viz: (a) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend
himself; and (b) the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods or forms of attack
employed by him. 52 The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor on the unsuspecting
victim, depriving the latter of any chance to defend himself and thereby ensuring its commission without risk of himself.
Treachery may also be appreciated even if the victim was warned of the danger to his life where he was defenseless and
unable to flee at the time of the infliction of the coup de grace. 53 In the case at bar, the victim suffered six wounds, one on
the mouth, another on the right ear, one on the shoulder, another on the right breast, one on the upper right cornea of the
sternum and one above the right iliac crest. Juan and Victor were armed with handguns. They first disarmed SPO1 Manio, Jr.
and then shot him even as he pleaded for dear life. When the victim was shot, he was defenseless. He was shot at close
range, thus insuring his death. The victim was on his way to rejoin his family after a hard days work. Instead, he was
mercilessly shot to death, leaving his family in grief for his untimely demise. The killing is a grim example of the utter
inhumanity of man to his fellowmen.

The issues that now come to fore are (1) whether or not treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance in robbery with
homicide; and if in the affirmative, (b) whether treachery may be appreciated against Juan and Victor. On the first issue, we
rule in the affirmative. This Court has ruled over the years 54 that treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance in the
felony of robbery with homicide, a special complex crime (un delito especial complejo) and at the same time a single and
indivisible offense (uno solo indivisible). 55 However, this Court in two cases has held that robbery with homicide is a crime
against property and hence treachery which is appreciated only to crimes against persons should not be appreciated as a
generic aggravating circumstance. 56 It held in another case that treachery is not appreciated in robbery with rape precisely
because robbery with rape is a crime against property. 57 These rulings of the Court find support in case law that in robbery
with homicide or robbery with rape, homicide or rape are merely incidents of the robbery, with robbery being the main
purpose and object of the criminal. 58 Indeed, in People v. Cando, 59 two distinguished members of this Court advocated a
review of the doctrine that treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance in robbery with homicide. They opined that
treachery is applicable only to crimes against persons. After all, in People v. Bariquit, 60 this Court in a per curiam decision
promulgated in year 2000 declared that treachery is applicable only to crimes against persons. However, this Court held in
People v. Cando that treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance in robbery with homicide, citing its prior rulings that in
robbery with homicide, treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance when the victim of homicide is killed with treachery.
This Court opted not to apply its ruling earlier that year in People v. Bariquit.

Legal Luminaries in criminal law and eminent commentators of the Revised Penal Code are not in full accord either. Chief
Justice Ramon C. Aquino (Retired) says that treachery is appreciated only in crimes against persons as defined in Title 10,
Book Two of the Code. 61 Chief Justice Luis B. Reyes (Retired) also is of the opinion that treachery is applicable only to
crimes against persons. 62 However, Justice Florenz D. Regalado (Retired) is of a different view. 63 He says that treachery
cannot be considered in robbery but can be appreciated insofar as the killing is concerned, citing the decisions of this Court
in People v. Balagtas 64 for the purpose of determining the penalty to be meted on the felon when the victim of homicide is
killed with treachery.

It must be recalled that by Royal Order of December 17, 1886 the 1850 Penal Code in force in Spain, as amended by the
Codigo Penal Reformado de 1870 was applied in the Philippines. The Penal Code of 1887 in the Philippines was amended by
Act 3815, now known as the Revised Penal Code, which was enacted and published in Spanish. In construing the Old Penal
Code and the Revised Penal Code, this Court had accorded respect and persuasive, if not conclusive effect to the decisions of
the Supreme Court of Spain interpreting and construing the 1850 Penal Code of Spain, as amended by Codigo Penal
Reformado de 1870. 65

Article 14, paragraph 16 of the Revised Penal Code reads:chanrob1es vi rtual 1aw li brary

ART. 14. Aggravating circumstances. The following are aggravating circumstances:chanrob1es virtual 1aw l ibrary

16. That the act be committed with treachery (alevosia). There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes
against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure
its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.

The law was taken from Chapter IV, Article 10, paragraph 2 of the 1860 Penal Code and the Codigo Penal Reformado de
1870 of Spain which reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw li brary

Art. 10 . . . 2. Ejecutar el hecho con alevosia. Hay alevosia cuando el culpable comete cualquiera de los delitos contra las
personas empleando medios, modos o for mas en la ejecucion que tiendan directa y especialmente a asegurarla sin riesgo
para su persona, que proceda de la defensa que pudiera hacer el ofendido. . . .

Article 14, paragraph 16 of the Revised Penal Code is a reproduction of the 1850 Penal Code of Spain and the Codigo Penal
Reformado de 1870 with a slight difference. In the latter law, the words "las personas" (the persons) are used, whereas in
Article 14, paragraph 6, of the Revised Penal Code, the words "the person" are used.

Going by the letter of the law, treachery is applicable only to crimes against persons as enumerated in Title Eight, Chapters
One and Two, Book II of the Revised Penal Code. However, the Supreme Court of Spain has consistently applied treachery
to robbery with homicide, classified as a crime against property. Citing decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, Cuello
Calon, a noted commentator of the Spanish Penal Code says that despite the strict and express reference of the penal code
to treachery being applicable to persons, treachery also applies to other crimes such as robbery with homicide: 66

Aun cuando el Codigo solo se refiere a los delitos contra las personas, cabe estimarla en los que no perteneciendo a este
titulo se determinan por muerte o lesiones, como, en el robo con homicidio, y en el homicidio del Jefe del Estado que es un
delito contra la seguridad interior del Estado, y no obstante la referencia estricta del texto legal a los delitos contra las
personas no es la alevosia aplicable a la mayoria de ellos, no lo es en el homicidio, pues como su concurrencia lo cualifica lo
transforma en delito distinto, en asesinato, ni en el homicidio consentido (art. 409), ni en la ria tumultuaria (art. 408) ni en
el infanticidio (art. 410). . . . . 67

Viada also says that treachery is appreciated in crimes against persons (delitos contra personas) and also in robbery with
homicide (robo con homicidio). 68

"Contra las personas. Luego la circunstancia de alevosia solo puede apreciarse en los delitos provistos desde el art. 417 al
447, y en algun otro, como el de robo con homicidio, atentario, a la vez que contra la propriedad, contra la persona."cralaw virtua1aw l ibrary

Thus, treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance to robbery with homicide although said crime is classified as a crime
against property and a single and indivisible crime. Treachery is not a qualifying circumstance because as ruled by the
Supreme Court of Spain in its decision dated September 11, 1878, the word "homicide" is used in its broadest and most
generic sense. 69

Article 62, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code provides that in diminishing or increasing the penalty for a crime,
aggravating circumstances shall be taken into account. However, aggravating circumstances which in themselves constitute
a crime specially punishable by law or which are included by the law in defining a crime and prescribing a penalty therefor
shall not be taken into account for the purpose of increasing the penalty. 70 Under paragraph 2 of the law, the same rule
shall apply with respect to any aggravating circumstances inherent in the crime to such a degree that it must of necessity
accompany the commission thereof.

1. Aggravating circumstances which in themselves constitute a crime specially punishable by law or which are included by
the law in defining a crime and prescribing the penalty therefor shall not be taken into account for the purpose of increasing
the penalty.
2. The same rule shall apply with respect to any aggravating circumstances inherent in the crime to such a degree that it
must be of necessity accompany the commission thereof.

Treachery is not an element of robbery with homicide. Neither does it constitute a crime specially punishable by law nor is it
included by the law in defining the crime of robbery with homicide and prescribing the penalty therefor. Treachery is likewise
not inherent in the crime of robbery with homicide. Hence, treachery should be considered as a generic aggravating
circumstance in robbery with homicide for the imposition of the proper penalty for the crime.
In its Sentencia dated March 14, 1877, the Supreme Court of Spain declared that treachery is a generic aggravating
circumstance not only in crimes against persons but also in robbery with homicide. The high court of Spain applied Article 79
of the Spanish Penal Code (Article 62 of the Revised Penal Code) and ruled that since treachery is not a constitutive element
of the crime of robbery with homicide nor is it inherent in said crime, without which it cannot be committed, treachery is an
aggravating circumstance to said crime. The high court of Spain was not impervious of the fact that robbery with homicide is
classified as a crime against property. Indeed, it specifically declared that the classification of robbery with homicide as a
crime against property is irrelevant and inconsequential in the application of treachery. It further declared that it would be
futile to argue that in crimes against property such as robbery with homicide, treachery would have no application. This is
so, the high tribunal ruled, because when robbery is coupled with crimes committed against persons, the crime is not only
an assault (ataca) on the property of the victims but also of the victims themselves (ofende):chanrob1es vi rtual 1aw library

In fine, in the application of treachery as a generic aggravating circumstance to robbery with homicide, the law looks at the
constituent crime of homicide which is a crime against persons and not at the constituent crime of robbery which is a crime
against property. Treachery is applied to the constituent crime of "homicide" and not to the constituent crime of "robbery" of
the special complex crime of robbery with homicide.

The crime of robbery with homicide does not lose its classification as a crime against property or as a special complex and
single and indivisible crime simply because treachery is appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance. Treachery
merely increases the penalty for the crime conformably with Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code absent any generic
mitigating circumstance.

In its Sentencia, dated July 9, 1877, the high tribunal of Spain also ruled that when the victim of robbery is killed with
treachery, the said circumstance should be appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance in robbery with homicide:chanrob1es vi rtual 1aw li brary

In sum then, treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance in robbery with homicide when the victim of homicide is killed
by treachery.

On the second issue, we also rule in the affirmative. Article 62, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code which was taken from
Article 80 of the Codigo Penal Reformado de 1870, 73 provides that circumstances which consist in the material execution of
the act, or in the means employed to accomplish it, shall serve to aggravate or mitigate the liability of those persons only
who had knowledge of them at the time of the execution of the act or their cooperation therein. The circumstances attending
the commission of a crime either relate to the persons participating in the crime or into its manner of execution or to the
means employed. The latter has a direct bearing upon the criminal liability of all the accused who have knowledge thereof at
the time of the commission of the crime or of their cooperation thereon. 74 Accordingly, the Spanish Supreme Court held in
its Sentencia dated December 17, 1875 that where two or more persons perpetrate the crime of robbery with homicide, the
generic aggravating circumstance of treachery shall be appreciated against all of the felons who had knowledge of the
manner of the killing of victims of homicide, with the ratiocination that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw li brary

Be that as it may, treachery cannot be appreciated against Juan and Victor in the case at bar because the same was not
alleged in the Information as mandated by Section 8, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedures which reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Sec. 8. Designation of the offense. The complaint or information shall state the designation of the offense given by the
statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there
is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it.

Although at the time the crime was committed, generic aggravating circumstance need not be alleged in the Information,
however, the general rule had been applied retroactively because if it is more favorable to the accused. 76 Even if treachery
is proven but it is not alleged in the information, treachery cannot aggravate the penalty for the crime.

There being no modifying circumstances in the commission of the felony of robbery with homicide, Juan and Victor should
each be meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua conformably with Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code.chanrob1es vi rtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Civil Liability of Juan and Victor

The trial court awarded the total amount of P300,000.00 to the heirs of SPO1 Manio, Jr. The court did not specify whether
the said amounts included civil indemnity for the death of the victim, moral damages and the lost earnings of the victim as a
police officer of the PNP. The Court shall thus modify the awards granted by the trial court.

Since the penalty imposed on Juan and Victor is reclusion perpetua, the heirs of the victim are entitled to civil indemnity in
the amount of P50,000.00. The heirs are also entitled to moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00, Rosemarie Manio
having testified on the factual basis thereof. 77 Considering that treachery aggravated the crime, the heirs are also entitled
to exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00. This Court held in People v. Catubig 78 that the retroactive application
of Section 8, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should not impair the right of the heirs to exemplary
damages which had already accrued when the crime was committed prior to the effectivity of the said rule. Juan and Victor
are also jointly and severally liable to the said heirs in the total amount of P30,000.00 as actual damages, the prosecution
having adduced evidence receipts for said amounts. The heirs are not entitled to expenses allegedly incurred by them during
the wake as such expenses are not supported by receipts. 79 However, in lieu thereof, the heirs are entitled to temperate
damages in the amount of P20,000.00. 80 The service firearm of the victim was turned over to the Evidence Custodian of
the Caloocan City Police Station per order of the trial court on October 22, 1997. 81 The prosecution failed to adduce
documentary evidence to prove the claim of Five Star Bus, Inc. in the amount of P6,000.00. Hence, the award should be
deleted. However, in lieu of actual damages, the bus company is entitled to temperate damages in the amount of P3,000.00.
82

The heirs are likewise entitled to damages for the lost earnings of the victim. The evidence on record shows that SPO1
Manio, Jr. was born on August 25, 1958. He was killed on September 28, 1996 at the age of 38. He had a gross monthly
salary as a member of the Philippine National Police of P8,065.00 or a gross annual salary of P96,780.00. Hence, the heirs
are entitled to the amount of P1,354,920.00 by way of lost earnings of the victim computed, thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw l ibrary

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellants Juan Gonzales Escote, Jr. and Victor Acuyan are hereby found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the felony of robbery with homicide defined in Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code and,
there being no modifying circumstances in the commission of the felony, hereby metes on each of them the penalty of
RECLUSION PERPETUA. Said accused-appellants are hereby ordered to pay jointly and severally the heirs of the victim SPO1
Jose C. Manio, Jr. the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P1,349,920.00 for lost
earnings, P30,000.00 as actual damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages. The award of P6,000.00 to the Five Star
Bus, Inc. is deleted. However, the said corporation is awarded the amount of P3,000.00 as temperate damages.chanrob1es vi rtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.




[G.R. No. 118334. February 20, 2001.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LARRY CONSEJERO y PASCUA and ROMMEL MALAPIT

This is an appeal from the February 2, 1994 Decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 6, in Criminal
Case No. VI-619, convicting accused-appellant Larry Consejero y Pascua of the crime of robbery with homicide.chanrob1es vi rtua1 1aw 1i brary

The information against accused-appellant alleges:chanrob1es virtual 1aw l ibrary

That on or about May 25, 1989, in the municipality of Lal-lo, province of Cagayab (sic), and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused LARRY CONSAJERO (sic) and ROMMEL MALAPIT, armed with an M-14, conspiring together
and helping one another, with evident premeditation, with intent to gain, and by use of violence against and intimidation of
persons, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away against the will of the owner,
Jaime Israel, one motor engine, Briggs and Straton, worth THREE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED EIGHTY SIX (P3,786.00)
PESOS, Philippine Currency; and that on the same occasion (sic) of the Robbery, and in furtherance of their criminal design,
the said accused, LARRY CONSAJERO (sic) and ROMMEL MALAPIT, armed with an M-14 and a deadly weapon, conspiring
together and helping one another with intent to kill and with treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and stabbed one DESTO CASTILLO and one DIONISIO USIGAN inflicting upon them several
injuries in the different parts of their bodies which caused their death.

That the crime was committed in an inhabited place.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 2

Upon arraignment on April 30, 1991, 3 accused-appellant Larry Consejero entered a plea of not guilty. His co-accused,
Rommel Malapit was not arraigned, being still at large. At the trial, the prosecution presented the following witnesses: Jaime
Israel, Melchor Pulido, Romana Castillo, Zenaida Usigan and Dr. Cesar R. Real.

The facts are as follows:chanrob1es vi rtual 1aw library

In the morning of May 26, 1989, two dead bodies were discovered not far from the river bank of Barangay Jurisdiccion, Lal-
lo, Cagayan. Found Lying on the ground, face down, drenched in his own blood with hands tied at the back, was the lifeless
body of Modesto Castillo. Twenty meters away lay the dead body of Dionisio Usigan, who sustained thirty-one stab and hack
wounds on the different parts of his body. 4

According to prosecution witness Jaime Israel, the victims were last seen alive in the afternoon of May 25, 1989, when the
two went out to fish at the Cagayan River using his motorized banca with Briggs and Straton engine. 5

Another prosecution witness, Melchor Pulido, 6 a resident of Maxingal, Lal-lo, Cagayan, testified that in the afternoon of May
25, 1989, his neighbor, Accused-appellant Larry Consejero, a CAFGU member, invited him to gather fish caught in the
Cagayan River. Melchor Pulido agreed, and, together with accused-appellant, who was then carrying an M-14 armalite rifle,
he rode a banca towards Barangay Jurisdiccion, Lal-lo, Cagayan. That was between the hours of 8:00 oclock and 9:00
oclock in the evening of May 25, 1989. With them was accused Rommel Malapit, who was also armed with an M-14 armalite
rifle.

After emptying the contents of the fishnets, they noticed at a distance a motorized banca carrying two persons. They
paddled towards the motorized banca. When they got nearer, Accused-appellant asked the two persons in the boat, "Were
you not the ones who usually demand quota from Barangay Captain Bacuyan?" The two replied, "No." Then, Accused-
appellant asked the two if there was a nearby store. They answered in the affirmative, whereupon accused-appellant told
them to accompany him and his companions to the said store. The two bancas then proceeded to the river bank. Upon
reaching the bank, however, Accused-appellant said that only one should accompany them. Thus, one of them, who turned
out to be Dionisio Usigan, went with accused-appellant Larry Consejero and accused Rommel Malapit towards the northeast
direction. Left behind were Melchor Pulido and Modesto Castillo. After ten (10) minutes, Accused-appellant and accused
Rommel Malapit returned holding an armalite rifle and a ten-inch bolo, respectively. Dionisio Usigan was not with them
anymore.

Upon orders of accused-appellant, Rommel Malapit tied the hands of Modesto Castillo at his back using a portion of a fishnet
and, thereafter, they brought him to the same northeast direction where Usigan was taken. Again, only Larry Consejero and
Rommel Malapit came back; Modesto Castillo was no longer with them.

Accused-appellant then detached the engine of the motorized banca ridden by Usigan and Castillo, while Melchor Pulido was
told to stand as look-out. After they loaded the engine in their banca, the three of them headed home. On the way, the two
accused told Melchor Pulido that the persons they met were already dead. Accused-appellant threatened to kill Melchor
Pulido and his family if Pulido reveals what he knew. After they alighted from the banca, Pulido went straight home while
accused-appellant and Rommel Malapit brought the engine of the motorized banca to a cogonal area.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

The following morning, May 26, 1989, the lifeless body of Modesto Castillo and Dionisio Usigan were found not far from the
river bank of Barangay Jurisdiccion, Lal-lo, Cagayan. The motorized banca ridden by the two deceased was nowhere to be
found. 7

The postmortem examination of the two deceased, conducted at around 12:00 noon of May 26, 1989 by Dr. Cesar R. Real,
Municipal Health Officer of Lal-lo, Cagayan, disclosed that Modesto Castillo and Dionisio Usigan died approximately between
7:00 oclock p.m. to 12:00 oclock midnight of May 25, 1989. Modesto Castillo sustained eight (8) incised and stab wounds;
while Dionisio Usigan sustained a total of thirty-one (31) hack, stab, and incised wounds on the different parts of his body. 8

Melchor Pulido explained that he executed a sworn statement only on September 12, 1990, because he was afraid that
accused-appellant would make good his threat to kill him and his family if he would reveal what he knew. In fact, they had
to move to the house of his parents-in-law in order to avoid accused-appellant, who happened to be their neighbor. It was
only when accused-appellant was no longer a member of the CAFGU that he gathered enough courage to report to the
authorities. 9

The defense relied mainly on denial and alibi. Accused-appellant testified that he became a CAFGU member sometime before
May 25, 1989, and was accordingly issued an M-14 armalite rifle. He recounted that in the afternoon of May 25, 1989, on his
own initiative, he went to the Office of SPO3 Rogelio Constantino, PNP, Lal-lo, Police Station to ask permission to go to the
then 117th Philippine Constabulary Company at Barangay Punta, Aparri, Cagayan, to report the presence of some New
Peoples Army members along the other side of the Cagayan River at Sitio Sianig, Barangay Fabrica, Lal-lo, Cagayan.
Accused-appellant left his M-14 armalite rifle with one Rey Conseja, another CAFGU member, before going to Aparri,
Cagayan. He arrived there at around 3:00 oclock in the afternoon of May 25, 1989, and immediately reported to SPO3
Edgardo Daniel. 10

Accused-appellant further testified that on his way to get a ride home, he met two police officers in the person of SPO1
Porfirio Divina and SPO3 Amante Gorospe, who invited him to have a drinking spree inside the headquarters of the PNP of
Aparri. They later transferred to the house of SPO1 Porfirio Divina where they resumed drinking. Accused-appellant spent
the night in said house. The following morning, May 26, 1989, at around 6:00 oclock, he left the house of SPO1 Divina, rode
a passenger jeepney and went straight home. 11 Accused-appellant claimed that he ceased to be a member of the CAFGU
and surrendered his M-14 armalite rifle on March 16, 1990. From then on, he stayed most of the time in Aparri, Cagayan,
for fear of the NPAs who were allegedly after him. 12

The version of accused-appellant was corroborated by the testimony of SPO1 Porfirio Divina, SPO3 Edgardo Daniel, SPO3
Rogelio Constantino and Patrolman Virgilio Camacam.

On February 2, 1994, the trial court rendered the judgment of conviction under review. The dispositive portion thereof
reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court, in the interest of justice, after trial on the merits of this case, finds LARRY
CONSEJERO y Pascua, one of the two (2) accused herein, Rommel Malapit, the other of the two (2) accused herein, being
still at-large, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt, as principal, of the crime of Robbery With Homicide, as defined and
penalized under Article 293 and 294, No. 1 of the Revised Penal Code, and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of
RECLUSION PERPETUA and to indemnify the Heirs of DIONISIO USIGAN, one of the two (2) deceased victims herein, in the
amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00), Philippine Currency, as well as the Heirs of MODESTO OR DESTO
CASTILLO, the other of the two (2) deceased victims herein, in the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00),
Philippine Currency, and to pay the costs of suit.

The bail bond set for the provisional liberty of Larry Consejero, one of the two accused herein, is hereby cancelled and,
immediately after the promulgation of this Decision, the Officer-in-Charge of the Provincial Jail of Cagayan at Aparri,
Cagayan or his duly authorized representative, is hereby ordered to immediately transmit his person for confinement at the
Provincial Jail of Cagayan at Tuguegarao, Cagayan, and, immediately thereafter, the Provincial Warden of Cagayan at
Tuguegarao, Cagayan shall transmit his person to the National Penitentiary at Muntinlupa, Rizal.

SO ORDERED. 13

Hence, Accused-appellant is before this Court, contending that:chanrob1es vi rtual 1aw library
I
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING THE EVENTS TESTIFIED TO BY MELCHOR PULIDO AS CONSTITUTING
FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES FROM WHICH GUILT COULD BE INFERRED; AND, IN CONSIDERING SAID FACTS AND
CIRCUMSTANCES TO HAVE BEEN CORROBORATED BY OTHER PROSECUTION EVIDENCE;

II
ASSUMING THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT THE FIRST ERROR, IT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO
THE TESTIMONY OF MELCHOR PULIDO AS SAID TESTIMONY IS FILLED WITH IMPROBABILITIES; AND, HE REVEALED TO
THE AUTHORITIES HIS KNOWLEDGE OF THE ALLEGED CRIME ONLY AFTER MORE THAN A YEAR AND THREE MONTHS FROM
THE TIME OF THE ALLEGED COMMISSION OF THE CRIME.

III
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REJECTING ACCUSED-APPELLANTS DEFENSE OF ALIBI. 14

The appeal is without merit.chanrob1es vi rtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Like a tapestry made up of strands which create a pattern when interwoven, the circumstances proved should constitute an
unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion, that the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. In
other words, the circumstances or a combination thereof, should point to overt acts of the appellant that would logically
usher to the conclusion and no other that he is guilty of the crime charged. 15 Thus, Rule 133, Section 4 of the Rules of
Court, provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw l ibrary

SECTION 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:chanrob1es vi rtual 1aw library

a) There is more than one circumstance;
b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

In the case at bar, the evidence presented by the prosecution established the following circumstances pointing to the fact
that accused- appellant was the author of the killing of the two deceased and the unlawful taking of the engine of the
motorized banca:chanrob1es vi rtual 1aw library

1) In the afternoon of May 25, 1989, the two deceased went out fishing at the Cagayan River using Jaime Israels motorized
banca with Briggs and Straton engine.

2) Between the hours of 8:00 and 9:00 oclock in the evening of May 25, 1989, prosecution witness Melchor Pulido together
with accused-appellant and accused Rommel Malapit, who were both armed with M-14 armalite rifles, also went fishing at
the Cagayan River, particularly in Barangay Jurisdiccion, Lal-lo, Cagayan.

3) When the three were emptying the fish nets, they noticed a motorized banca carrying two persons who turned out to be
the two deceased. Accused-appellant asked the two persons on board the motorized banca if they were the ones exacting
quota from Barangay Captain Bacuyan, to which they replied, "No."cralaw vi rtua1aw l ibrary

4) Accused-appellant requested the two deceased to accompany them to a nearby store. When they reached the river bank
the two accused took along with them Dionisio Usigan and proceeded towards the northeast direction; while Modesto Castillo
was left on the river bank.

5) After ten minutes, Accused-appellant, who was holding his armalite rifle, and Rommel Malapit, who was clasping a 10-
inch bolo in his hand, went back, but the deceased Dionisio Usigan was no longer with them.

6) Accused-appellant ordered Rommel Malapit to tie the hands of Modesto Castillo, which he obeyed using a portion of a
fishnet. Thereafter, the two accused brought Modesto Castillo towards the same northeast direction. That was the last time
Castillo was seen alive.

7) The two accused detached the engine of the motorized banca and loaded it in their own banca while Melchor Pulido was
asked by accused-appellant to stand as look-out.

8) On their way home, the two accused told Melchor Pulido that the two persons they met were already dead. Accused-
appellant also threatened to kill Melchor Pulido and his family if Melchor would reveal what he knew.

9) When they alighted from the banca, Melchor Pulido saw the two accused bring the engine to a cogonal area.

10) In the morning of May 26, 1989, the dead body of Modesto Castillo, which sustained several stab wounds and whose
hands were tied at his back with a portion of a fishnet, was discovered not far from the river bank of Barangay Jurisdiccion,
Lal-lo, Cagayan. Twenty meters away was located the dead body of Dionisio Usigan with 31 stab wounds. The motorized
banca of Jaime Israel was no longer recovered.

11) The result of the postmortem examination of the two deceased shows that the approximate time of death was between
7:00 oclock p.m. to 12:00 midnight of May 25, 1989.

From the foregoing, it can be gleaned unerringly that an unbroken chain of circumstances proven by the prosecution clearly
shows the guilt of Accused-Appellant. Unequivocally established is the fact that the two deceased were last seen alive in the
company of accused-appellant Larry Consejero and accused Rommel Malapit. A combination of their concerted and
complementary acts vividly manifest a common criminal intent to kill the victims and to take the engine of the motorized
banca. Thus, their hostile approach towards the two deceased in inquiring if they were the ones exacting quota from the
barangay captain, their treacherous and intimidating scheme in cajoling the two deceased to moor their banca, their
strategic taking of the two deceased one after the other and the violent act of tying the hands of Modesto Castillo, not to
mention the ten-inch bolo clasped in the hands of Rommel Malapit, all taken together with the circumstances that the dead
bodies of the two deceased were found the next morning in the same place where they were last seen alive, usher to the
inevitable conclusion of accused-appellants liability for the death of the two deceased. Likewise, the fact that the motorized
banca and the engine thereof were no longer found at the river bank where they were last seen, points the liability for the
loss of the engine to accused-appellant who was seen to have loaded said engine in their banca on the night of May 25,
1989.

Similarly, in People v. Bionat, 16 the Court, based on circumstantial evidence, meted a judgment of conviction on accused-
appellant who, armed with a gun and together with others, tied the victim and took him away from his house. The victim
was last seen alive under such circumstances and found dead the following day with stab wounds.

In the case at bar, the gamut of evidence upon which the trial court based its judgment of conviction is anchored mainly on
the testimony of prosecution witness Melchor Pulido. Expectedly, attack on his credibility is proffered by the Accused-
Appellant. The constant rule in our jurisdiction, however, is that the Court will accord great respect to the factual conclusions
drawn by the trial court, particularly on the matter of credibility of witnesses since the trial judge had the opportunity
which is denied to appellate courts to observe the behavior and demeanor of witnesses while testifying. The trial judge is
thus able to form at first hand a judgment as to whether particular witnesses are telling the truth or not. 17chanrob1es vi rtua1 law library

Thus, the observation made by the trial court on the demeanor of Marcelo Pulido while testifying, comes to the fore, to wit
This Court, after observing the demeanor of . . . Melchor Pulido . . . has come to the belief that the same was marked with
spontaneity, clarity and candor, all of which were perceptible in the emphasis, gesture and inflection of their voices,
frankness of their countenances, simplicity of their languages and total absence of artificiality in their whole manner. It has
also come to the belief that, in conformity with day-to-day common knowledge, observation and experience of ordinary
man, both . . . [his] person[s] and . . . [his] testimonies can undoubtedly pass the test of solidly and firmly set touchstones
of credibility, for the reason that, aside from demonstrating characters of truthfulness, both in . . . [his] person[s] and in . . .
[his] testimonies, . . . Melchor Pulido . . . [has] not been positively, clearly and convincingly proven by the defense beyond
reasonable doubt, or in any manner whatsoever, to have been or to be nursing any bias or prejudice against the cause of
the defense, particularly against that of each of the two accused herein, Larry Consejero and Rommel Malapit, who is still at-
large, and, more particularly, against the former, and/or to have uttered prior or subsequent statements, which are
inconsistent with . . . [his] testimonies in open court during the trial on the merits of this case, and/or to have failed to
perceive the facts testified to by . . . [him]. Indeed, the credibility of . . . [his] person[s] and that of . . . [his] testimonies . .
. [has] been greatly enhanced, inasmuch as the same . . . [has] neither been competently impeached nor sufficiently
rebutted, in any manner whatsoever, by the defense! 18

As the trial court gave full faith and credit to the testimony of Melchor Pulido which this Court, after a careful scrutiny
thereof, found to be credible and worthy of belief, the affirmance of the decision under review is in order.

The delay of almost sixteen months before Melchor Pulido executed a sworn statement does not in any way diminish the
value of his testimony. As adequately explained by him, the threat on his life and that of his familys cowed him to silence. It
was only when accused-appellant was no longer a CAFGU member, and hence, no longer armed, that he gained the courage
to reveal what he knew. Verily, delay or vacillation in reporting a crime does not negate the credibility of a witness,
especially when the delay is satisfactorily explained. 19
The alleged improbabilities pointed out by accused-appellant are too inconsequential to merit attention. As correctly argued
by the Solicitor General, they refer merely to trivial matters which do not alter the substance of Melchor Pulidos testimony
positively identifying accused-appellant as one of the culprits. Moreover, Accused-appellant cannot successfully make an
issue on the two deceaseds alleged improbable obedience to the orders of accused-appellant as well as their failure to put
up resistance. The same is true with respect to the failure of Melchor Pulido to help the two deceased. Suffice it to say,
Melchor Pulido as well as the two deceased were understandably afraid to antagonize the accused-appellant who was then a
CAFGU member and armed with an M-14 armalite rifle. Besides, no standard form of behavior may be expected of Melchor
Pulido and the victims. Persons do not necessarily react uniformly to a given situation, given that what may be natural to
one may be strange to another. 20

Anent the defense of alibi theorized by accused-appellant, the Court is of the opinion, and so holds, that the same cannot
prevail over the positive identification of accused-appellant by Melchor Pulido as one of the culprits. According to accused-
appellant, he was in Aparri, Cagayan at around 3:00 oclock in the afternoon of May 25, 1989, until the following morning.
As testified, however, by Jaime Israel, he in fact met accused-appellant at around 4:30 in the afternoon of May 25, 1989, on
his way home from the Bureau of Posts of Lal-lo, Cagayan. 21 What is more, Accused-appellant failed to prove the physical
impossibility of his presence at the scene of the crime at the time of the commission thereof. Settled is the rule that for alibi
to prosper it is not enough to prove that the accused was somewhere else when the crime was committed, but he must also
demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.

The trial court found that the geographical distance between Barangay Minanga, Aparri, Cagayan, and Barangay Jurisdiccion,
Lal-lo, Cagayan is only twenty (20) kilometers, more or less, which could be reached by traveling along the national highway
by a motor vehicle for twenty-five (25) to thirty (30) minutes more or less, or by motorized banca for one and a half (1 1/2)
hours. 23 Thus, even assuming that accused-appellant was indeed in Aparri, Cagayan, at around 3:00 oclock in the
afternoon of May 25, 1989, the probability of his traveling back to Lal-lo, Cagayan, and his presence at the locus criminis at
the time of the commission of the crime, is not at all precluded. Hence, his defense of alibi must fail.

The crime committed by accused-appellant, however, could not be "robbery with homicide." The elements of said crime are
as follows: a) the taking of personal property with the use of violence or intimidation against a person; b) the property thus
taken belongs to another; c) the taking is characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi; and d) on the occasion of the
robbery or by reason thereof, the crime of homicide, which is therein used in a generic sense, was committed. 24

In People v. Amania, 25 the Court had occasion to rule that in robbery with homicide, the killing must have been directly
connected with the robbery. It is necessary that there must have been an intent on the part of the offenders to commit
robbery from the outset and, on occasion or by reason thereof a killing takes place. The original design must have been
robbery, and the homicide, even if it precedes or is subsequent to the robbery, must have a direct relation to, or must be
perpetrated with a view to consummate the robbery. The taking of the property should not be merely an afterthought which
arose subsequent to the killing.

In the present case, it does not appear that the primary purpose of accused-appellant in accosting the two deceased was to
rob the engine of the motorized banca. From all indications, Accused-appellant, a CAFGU member, was primarily interested
in taking the life of the two deceased whom he suspected of exacting quota from the Barangay captain, and the taking of
the subject engine was merely an afterthought that arouse subsequent to the killing of the victims.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Clearly therefore, the criminal acts of accused-appellant constitute not a complex crime of robbery with homicide, but three
separate offenses: two crimes for the killing of the two deceased, and one for the taking of the Briggs and Straton engine of
Jaime Israel.

With respect to Dionisio Usigan, the crime committed is homicide because the qualifying circumstance of treachery alleged in
the information cannot affect the liability of Accused-Appellant. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the
crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to
insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. 26 Considering
that no evidence on record showed that accused-appellant consciously and purposely adopted means and methods that
would make sure that the killing of Dionisio Usigan would not cause any risk to himself, the crime committed is only
homicide.

In the case of Modesto Castillo, the taking of his life was undoubtedly attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
In tying Modesto Castillos hand at his back, Accused-appellant obviously adopted a method that would insure the absence
of any risk to himself which might arise from the defense that may possibly be put up by Modesto Castillo. Hence, the crime
committed by accused-appellant is murder.

In taking the Briggs and Straton engine of the motorized banca, the crime perpetrated was theft. In People v. Basao, 27 the
Court ruled that where the taking of the personal property was merely an afterthought and was done after the culprit has
successfully carried out his primary criminal intent to kill the victim, and hence, the use of violence or force is no longer
necessary, the crime committed is theft. Conformably, since the taking of the engine in the present case was merely an
afterthought, and was perpetrated after accused-appellant had already accomplished his original criminal purpose of killing
the two deceased, the felony committed is theft.

Then too, the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation in the unlawful taking of the engine cannot be considered
here. Though alleged in the information, the prosecution failed to substantiate the attendance of the elements 28 thereof in
the unlawful taking of the engine.

The penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal. There being neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances, the
appropriate penalty is reclusion temporal in its medium period. 29 Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, Accused-
appellant is entitled to an indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to
fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

At the time accused-appellant perpetrated the crime of murder, the same was punishable by reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to death. Since there was neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance attendant in its commission, the
proper penalty is reclusion perpetua. 30

As shown by the receipt presented by Jaime Israel, he purchased the Briggs and Straton engine for P3,786.00. 31 Under
Article 309, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code, theft is punishable by prision correccional in its minimum and medium
periods if the value of the property stolen is more than P200.00 but does not exceed P6,000.00. Absent aggravating and
mitigating circumstances in the unlawful taking of the engine, the penalty for theft must be imposed in its medium period.
32 With the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the proper penalty, as reparation for the unrecovered Briggs
and Straton engine, is four (4) months and twenty-one (21) days of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year, eight (8)
months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional, as maximum.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 86, in Criminal Case No. VI-619, is SET
ASIDE and another one is rendered,. finding accused-appellant Larry Consejero y Pascua, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the following crimes

1) Murder, for the killing of Modesto Castillo, for which he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua;

2) Homicide, for the death of Dionisio Usigan, for which he is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal, as maximum.

3) Theft, for the unlawful taking of the Briggs and Straton engine of the motorized banca owned by Jaime Israel, for which
he is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of four (4) months and twenty-one (21) days of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional, as maximum.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Accused-appellant is further ordered to indemnify the heirs of Modesto Castillo and Dionisio Usigan the amount of Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) each as indemnity ex delicto.


[G.R. No. 120548. October 26, 2001.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOSELITO ESCARDA

On appeal is the decision dated September 21, 1994, of the Regional Trial Court of Cadiz City, Branch 60, in Criminal Case
No. 586-S, finding accused Joselito Escarda and Jose Villacastin Jr., guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of the Anti-
Cattle Rustling Law. In its decision, the trial court decreed:chanrob1es virtual 1aw l ibrary

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing circumstances, this Court finds both accused JOSELITO ESCARDA and JOSE
VILLACASTIN, JR., guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of "Viol. of P.D. 533" (Anti-Cattle Rustling Law), and there
being the presence of three generic aggravating circumstances of [r]ecidivism, nighttime and unlawful entry, with no
mitigating circumstances to offset the same, as such, the accused are each sentenced to suffer, considering the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the imprisonment of EIGHTEEN (18) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (I) DAY as the
minimum to RECLUSION PERPETUA as the maximum, together with all the accessory penalties imposed by law and to
indemnify the offended party, Joel Barrieses, in the amount of P5,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.chanrob1es vi rtua1 1aw 1ibrary

The accused being detained, are hereby entitled to the full credit of their preventive imprisonment as provided for under
R.A. 6127. Costs against both accused. SO ORDERED.

In an information dated April 18, 1988, Provincial Fiscal Othello Villanueva charged accused with violation of Presidential
Decree No. 533, otherwise known as Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974, as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw l ibrary

The undersigned Provincial Fiscal accuses JOSELITO ESCARDA, JOSE VILLACASTIN, JR., HERNANI ALEGRE (at-large) and
RODOLFO CAEDO (at-large) of the crime of Violation of Presidential Decree No. 533, (Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974),
committed as follows:chanrob1es vi rtual 1aw library

That on or about the 29th day of July, 1987, in the Municipality of Sagay, Province of Negros Occidental, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the first two (2) above-named accused, in company of their two (2) other co-
accused, namely: Hernani Alegre and Rodolfo Caedo, who are both still-at-large, conspiring, confederating and mutually
help[ing] one another, with intent of gain, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away
two (2) female carabaos, valued in the total amount of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00), Philippine Currency, belonging
to JOEL BARIESES, without the consent of the latter, to the damage and prejudice of the said owner in the aforestated
amount.chanrob1es virtua1 law l ibrary

CONTRARY TO LAW. 2

Upon arraignment, Accused Escarda and Villacastin, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial on the
merits ensued.

The facts as presented by the prosecution and summarized by the trial court are as follows:chanrob1es vi rtual 1aw library

[Dionesio Himaya] testified that on July 29, 1987 at about 2:00 oclock in the morning in [Hacienda] Ricky, Jose Villacastin,
Jr. and his group passed by his house. [He] was still awake at that time because he was watching over his cornfield and
while doing so, he saw the two accused remove the cyclone wire which was used as the corral for the two (2) carabaos of
Rosalina Plaza. He was able to see Jose Villacastin, Jr. cut the cyclone wire because he was just four (4) arms length away
from them and after Jose Villacastin cut the wire, they swept it aside and untied the two (2) carabaos. After untying the
carabaos, they rode on it and proceeded to the canefields. [He] saw two (2) persons riding on the carabao whom he
identified as Jose Villacastin, Jr. together with Joselito Escarda. He awakened Rosalina Plaza who thereafter went to Joel
Barrieses, owner of the carabaos, to inform the latter that his carabaos were stolen.

[Rosalina Plaza] testified that on July 29, 1987 at about 2:00 oclock in the morning, in the residence of Joel Barrieses,
Dionesio Himaya called her and informed her that the carabaos were stolen and when asked who stole the carabaos,
Dionesio Himaya only mentioned Jose Villacastin, Jr. Before the incident of July 29, 1987, she already knew the person of
Jose Villacastin, Jr., because the latter always passed by their house. After she was informed of the stealing of the carabaos,
she went to the corral to check whether the carabaos were there but discovered that the beasts were no longer there and
the cyclone wire was destroyed. She informed Joel Barrieses, that Jose Villacastin, Jr., stole the carabaos and she went to
the 334th PC Company and reported the incident. 3

In their defense, Escarda and Villacastin denied the charges. Escarda claimed that he was sleeping in the house of Gilda
Labrador during the incident while Villacastin declared that he too was sleeping in his house at that time. 4 The defense
version of the incident was summarized by the trial court as follows:chanrob1es vi rtual 1aw library

. . . Joselito Escarda testified that he did not know his co-accused in this case, specifically, Jose Villacastin, Hernani Alegre
and Rodolfo Cahedo. Neither did he know of somebody by the name of Dionesio Himaya although he knew somebody by the
name of Gilda Labrador. In the early morning of July 29, 1987, he was working as cane cutter and hauler in the hacienda of
Javelosa located in Barrio Malubon, Sagay, Negros Occidental which is fifteen (15) kilometers away from the house of his
mother where he was residing. On July 29, 1987, he started working at 8:00 oclock in the morning and ended at 11:00.
After he finished working in the field, he went to the house of his mother where he ate lunch and rested until 3:00 oclock in
the afternoon. In the evening of July 29, 1987, he slept at the house of Gilda Labrador starting at 7:00 oclock in the
evening and woke up at 6:00 oclock in the morning of July 30, 1987. Sometime on August 29, 1987, he left alone for the
dance hall located at Hda. Ricky to attend a dance held there because there was a fiesta at that time. While he was at the
dance hall, he was arrested by the PC elements and brought to the 334th PC Company where he was maltreated. He was
asked whether or not he stole the carabaos at Hda. Ricky but he denied the commission of the crime and again, he was
maltreated. He suffered injuries when they maltreated him so he made a confession before them but did not sign the same.
His injuries were not treated by a physician because the PC would not let him go out of the jail, so, his injuries healed while
he was in jail. He did not know the names of the PC who maltreated him and forced him to admit the loss of the carabaos at
Hda. Ricky because the maltreatment happened in the evening. Furthermore, he did not know the complainant in this case,
i.e. Joel Barrieses.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
[Jose Villacastin, Jr. testified] that on or before July 29, 1987, he did not know the accused Joselito Escarda, Hernani Alegre
and Rodolfo Caedo because in the early morning of July 29, 1987, at more or less 2:00 oclock to 3:00 oclock, he had not
gone with Joselito Escarda, Hernani Alegre and Rodolfo Caedo because he was sleeping in his house which is located in
Sitio Candiis. He started sleeping at 8:00 oclock in the evening of July 28, 1987 and woke up the next day, July 29, 1987 at
7:00 in the morning. On August 29, 1987 at 10:00 oclock in the evening, he was attending a dance at Hda. Ricky and while
watching the dance, he was arrested and brought to the 334th PC Headquarters in Tan-ao, Sagay, Negros Occidental. When
they arrived at the PC Headquarters, they were investigated about the stealing of the carabaos and the PC elements wanted
them to admit it. He denied what they were accusing him of because he has not committed the crime. He does not know of
anybody by the name of Joel Barrieses. When he denied the commission of the crime, he was maltreated and was forced to
admit it and to make a confession. They were detained for about a month at the 334th PC Headquarters and they were
transferred to the Municipal Jail of Sagay, Negros Occidental and there was no lawyer present during his refusal to admit the
stealing of the carabaos. 5

The trial court found the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses credible, while it disbelieved the defense of denial and alibi
of accused Escarda and Villacastin. They were found guilty as charged. However, the charge against accused Rodolfo Caedo
was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. Earlier, the charge against co-accused Hernani Alegre was dismissed on motion
by the prosecution, for lack of evidence.

Insisting on their innocence, Escarda and Villacastin filed their notice of appeal. In their assignment of error, they alleged
that the trial court erred in convicting them of the crime charged. 6

On November 27, 1995, we required the trial court to order the commitment of Escarda and Villacastin to the Bureau of
Corrections or the nearest national penal institution. However, Executive Judge Renato Munez requested that their
commitment to the Bureau of Corrections be deferred until the termination of the other criminal case 7 against them
pending before the said trial court. Further, Captain Eduardo Legaspi, Acting Provincial Warden of Negros Occidental, also
requested to hold in abeyance the commitment of Escarda and Villacastin in view of their pending criminal cases before the
Regional Trial Court of Cadiz City. 8 Accordingly, we granted the aforesaid request for deferment. 9 On August 12, 1998,
they were eventually committed to the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City. 10

On October 12, 1998, Escarda sought the approval of this Court to withdraw his appeal. 11 We required the Director of the
New Bilibid Prison to confirm the voluntariness of said withdrawal. 12 In his certification dated July 15, 1999, Atty. Roberto
Sangalang, who personally examined Escarda, attested that Escarda executed his urgent motion to withdraw appeal on his
own free will and fully understood the consequences of the same. On August 9, 1 999, we granted Escardas motion to
withdraw appeal. 13

Accordingly, we are now concerned only with the appeal of the remaining appellant, Jose Villacastin, Jr. In his brief, he
assigns only one error:chanrob1es virtual 1aw l ibrary

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED OF THE CRIME CHARGED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

Appellant contends that the element of "taking away of carabaos by any means, method or scheme without the consent of
the owner" was not proven by the prosecution. He also alleges that his identity was not established beyond reasonable
doubt, thus, he should be acquitted. He adds that the prosecution failed to prove ownership of the stolen carabaos by
presenting the certificate of ownership, 14 as required by the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law.chanrob1es vi rtua1 1aw 1i brary

Cattle rustling is the taking away by any means, method or scheme, without the consent of the owner or raiser of cow,
carabao, horse, mule, ass, or other domesticated member of the bovine family, whether or not for profit or gain, or whether
committed with or without violence against or intimidation of any person or force upon things. Cattle rustling includes the
killing of large cattle, or taking its meat or hide without the consent of the owner or raiser. 15

In this case, the overt act which gives rise to the crime of cattle rustling is the taking away of the carabaos by the accused
without the consent of the caretaker. Dionisio Himaya testified that he saw appellant cut the cyclone wire used as corral for
the carabaos. Afterwards, appellant untied the two carabaos. Then, appellant rode on one carabao while co-accused Escarda
rode on the other and immediately proceeded to the canefield. 16 The taking was confirmed by Rosalina Plaza, the caretaker
of the carabaos, who declared that after she was informed by Himaya about the incident, she went right away to the corral
and discovered that indeed the two carabaos were missing.

Appellants assertion that his identity was not positively established deserves no serious consideration. Prosecution witness
Dionisio Himaya identified appellant and Escarda as the rustlers. In his testimony, Himaya said he was awake at that time as
he was watching over his cornfield nearby, and there was enough illumination from the moon. 17 He was just four arms
length away. He saw appellant and Escarda unleash the two carabaos. He stated that appellant rode on one carabao while
Escarda rode on the other, and both immediately went away. He said he easily recognized appellant as he knew him long
before the incident. According to the witness, appellant was the nephew of his wife and used to visit them before. During the
trial, the witness positively identified appellant as the same person who stole the carabaos. Appellants contention
concerning lack of proper identification is, in our view, baseless and unmeritorious.chanrob1es vi rtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Similarly, appellants assertion, that the prosecution should have first presented the certificate of ownership of the stolen
carabaos to warrant his conviction, is untenable. It is to be noted that the gravamen in the crime of cattle-rustling is the
"taking" or "killing" of large cattle or "taking" its meat or hide without the consent of the owner. The "owner" includes the
herdsman, caretaker, employee or tenant of any firm or entity engaged in the raising of large cattle or other persons in
lawful possession of such large cattle. In this case Rosalina Plaza, the caretaker of the carabaos, did not consent to the
taking away of the carabaos. She immediately informed Joel Barrieses, the owner, that the carabaos were stolen and
reported the incident to the police. Note that the ownership was never put in issue during the trial in the lower court and is
now raised belatedly. It is settled that, generally, questions not raised in the trial court will not be considered on appeal. 18

Appellants alibi must likewise fail. He insists that he was sleeping in his house at the time the crime occurred. He slept at
8:00 P.M., July 28, 1987 and woke up the next day, July 29, 1987 at 7:00 A.M. As the trial court noted, it is difficult to
believe appellants claim that he slept for eleven hours straight just like Escarda. Besides, the rule is settled that alibi cannot
prosper unless it is proven that during the commission of the crime, the accused was in another place and that it was
physically impossible for him to be at the place where the crime was committed. 19 In this case, appellant failed to
demonstrate satisfactorily that it was physically impossible for him to be in the crime scene at the time of the incident.
Admittedly, the scene of the crime was only a fifteen-minute walk from appellants house.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

We note that the trial court appreciated the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, unlawful entry and recidivism, without
any mitigating circumstance. The prosecution, however, failed to specify these circumstances in the charge filed before the
trial court, as now required expressly by the Code of Criminal Procedure effective December 1, 2000 but applicable
retroactively for being procedural and pro reo. 20

Moreover, we find that the trial court also erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of recidivism. A recidivist is
one who, at the time of his trial for one crime, shall have been previously convicted by final judgment of another crime
embraced in the same title of the Code. In its decision, the trial court merely mentioned that appellant was convicted for
cattle rustling under Criminal Case No. 627-S on February 8, 1993, at the time when the case at bar was being tried. It did
not state that said conviction was already final. Even the records did not show that appellant admitted his previous
conviction. As we had held before, there can be no recidivism without final judgment. 21 The best evidence of a prior
conviction is a certified copy of the original judgment of conviction, and such evidence is always admissible and conclusive
unless the accused himself denies his identity with the person convicted at the former trial. 22chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

P.D. 533 does not supersede the crime of qualified theft of large cattle under Articles 309 23 and 310 24 under the Revised
Penal Code. It merely modified the penalties provided for qualified theft of large cattle under Article 310 by imposing stiffer
penalties thereon under special circumstances. 25 Under Section 8 26 of P.D. 533, any person convicted of cattle rustling
shall, irrespective of the value of the large cattle involved, be punished by prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion
temporal in its medium period if the offense is committed without violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon
things. If the offense is committed with violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things, the penalty of
reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed.

In the instant case, the offense was committed with force upon things as the perpetrators had to cut through the cyclone
wire fence to gain entrance into the corral and take away the two carabaos therefrom. Accordingly, the penalty to be
imposed shall be reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
the penalty imposable on appellant is only prision mayor in its maximum period as minimum, to reclusion temporal in its
medium period as maximum. Thus, it is proper to impose on appellant only the indefinite prison term of ten (10) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum; to fourteen (14) years, ten (10) months and twenty-one (21) days of reclusion
temporal as maximum.chanrob1es vi rtua1 1aw 1ibrary

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated September 21, 1994, of the Regional Trial Court of Cadiz City, Branch 60, in
Criminal Case No. 586-S, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant Jose Villacastin, Jr., is declared guilty of violating the
Anti-Cattle Rustling Law (P.D. 533) and sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor as minimum; to fourteen (14) years, ten (10) months and twenty-one (21) days of reclusion temporal as
maximum; and to indemnify offended party Joel Barrieses the amount of P5,000, and to pay the costs.

















[G.R. NO. 139857 : September 15, 2006]
LEONILA BATULANON, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
This petition assails the October 30, 1998 Decision
1
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 15221, affirming with
modification the April 15, 1993 Decision
2
of the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City, Branch 22 in Criminal Case Nos.
3453, 3625, 3626 and 3627, convicting Leonila Batulanon of estafa through falsification of commercial documents, and the
July 29, 1999 Resolution
3
denying the motion for reconsideration.
Complainant Polomolok Credit Cooperative Incorporated (PCCI) employed Batulanon as its Cashier/Manager from May 1980
up to December 22, 1982. She was in charge of receiving deposits from and releasing loans to the member of the
cooperative.
During an audit conducted in December 1982, certain irregularities concerning the release of loans were discovered.
4

Thereafter, four informations for estafa thru falsification of commercial documents were filed against Batulanon, to wit:
Criminal Case No. 3625
That on or about the 2nd day of June, 1982 at Poblacion Municipality of Polomolok, Province of South Cotabato, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court said accused being then the manager-cashier of Polomolok Credit
Cooperative, Inc., (PCCI), entrusted with the duty of managing the aff[a]irs of the cooperative, receiving payments to, and
collections of, the same, and paying out loans to members, taking advantage of her position and with intent to prejudice and
defraud the cooperative, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a commercial document, namely:
Cash/Check Voucher No. 30-A of PCCI in the name of Erlinda Omadlao by then and there making an entry therein that the
said Erlinda Omadlao was granted a loan of P4,160, Philippine Currency, and by signing on the appropriate line thereon the
signature of Erlinda Omadlao showing that she received the loan, thus making it appear that the said Erlinda Omadlao was
granted a loan and received the amount of P4,160 when in truth and in fact the said person was never granted a loan, never
received the same, and never signed the cash/check voucher issued in her name, and in furtherance of her criminal intent
and fraudulent design to defraud PCCI said accused did then and there release to herself the same and received the loan of
P4,160 and thereafter misappropriate and convert to her own use and benefit the said amount, and despite demands,
refused and still refuses to restitute the same, to the damage and prejudice of PCCI, in the aforementioned amount of
P4,160, Philippine Currency.
5

Criminal Case No. 3626
That on or about the 24th day of September, 1982 at Poblacion, Municipality of Polomolok, Province of South Cotabato,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, said accused being then the manager-cashier of Polomolok
Credit Cooperative, Inc. (PCCI), entrusted with the duty of managing the affairs of the cooperative, receiving payments to,
and collections of, the same, and paying out loans to members taking advantage of her position and with intent to prejudice
and defraud the cooperative, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a commercial document, namely:
Cash/Check Voucher No. 237 A of PCCI in the name of Gonafreda Oracion by then and there making an entry therein that
the said Gonafreda Oracion was granted a loan of P4,000.00 and by signals on the appropriate line thereon the signature of
Gonafreda Oracion showing that she received the loan, thus making it appear that the said Gonafreda Oracion was granted a
loan, received the loan of P4,000.00 when in truth and in fact said person was never granted a loan, never received the
same, and never signed the Cash/Check voucher issued in her name, and in furtherance of her criminal intent and
fraudulent design to defraud PCCI said accused did then and there release to herself the same and received the amount of
P4,000.00 and thereafter misappropriate and convert to her own use and benefit the said amount, and despite demands,
refused and still refuses to restitute the same, to the damage and prejudice of PCCI, in the aforementioned amount of
P4,000, Philippine Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
6

Criminal Case No. 3453
That on or about the 10th day of October 1982 at Poblacion, Municipality of Polomolok, Province of South Cotabato,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the said accused being then the manager-cashier of
Polomolok Credit Cooperative, Inc., (PCCI), entrusted with the duty of managing the affairs of the cooperative, receiving
payments to, and collection of the same and paying out loans to members, taking advantage of her position and with intent
to prejudice and defraud the cooperative, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a commercial
document, namely: an Individual Deposits and Loan Ledger of one Ferlyn Arroyo with the PCCI by then and there entering
on the appropriate column of the ledger the entry that the said Ferlyn Arroyo had a fixed deposit of P1,000.00 with the PCCI
and was granted a loan in the amount of P3,500.00, thus making it appear that the said person made a fixed deposit on the
aforesaid date with, and was granted a loan by the PCCI when in truth and in fact Ferlyn Arroyo never made such a deposit
and was never granted loan and after the document was so falsified in the manner set forth, said accused did then and there
again falsify the Cash/Check Voucher of the PCCI in the name of Ferlyn Arroyo by signing therein the signature of Ferlyn
Arroyo, thus making it appear that the said Ferlyn Arroyo received the loan of P3,500, Philippine Currency, when in truth
and in fact said Ferlyn Arroyo never received the loan, and in furtherance of her criminal intent and fraudulent design to
defraud PCCI said accused did then and there release to herself the same, and received the amount of P3,500, and
thereafter, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate and convert to her own personal use and
benefit the said amount, and despite demands, refused and still refuses to restitute the same, to the damage and prejudice
of the PCCI in the aforementioned amount of P3,500, Philippine Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
7

Criminal Case No. 3627
That on or about the 7th day of December, 1982 at Poblacion, Municipality of Polomolok, Province of South Cotabato,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the said accused being then the manager-cashier of
Polomolok Credit Cooperative, Inc., (PCCI) entrusted with the duty of managing the affairs of the cooperative, receiving
payments to, and collection of, the same and paying out loans to members, taking advantage of her position and with intent
to prejudice and defraud the cooperative, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a commercial
document, namely: an Individual Deposits and Loan Ledger of one Dennis Batulanon with the PCCI by then and there
entering on the appropriate column of the ledger the entry that the said Dennis Batulanon had a fixed deposit of P2,000.00
with the PCCI and was granted a loan in the amount of P5,000.00 thus making it appear that the said person made fixed
deposit on the aforesaid date with, and was granted a loan by the PCCI when in truth and in fact Dennis Batulanon never
made such a deposit and was never granted loan and offer the document was so falsified in the manner set forth, said
accused did then and there again falsify the Cash/Check Voucher No. 374 A of PCCI in the name of Dennis Batulanon by
signing therein the signature of Dennis Batulanon, thus making it appear that the said Dennis Batulanon received the loan of
P5,000.00 when in truth and in fact said Dennis Batulanon never received the loan and in furtherance of her criminal intent
and fraudulent design to defraud PCCI said accused did then and there release to herself the same and receive the loan of
P5,000, and thereafter, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate and convert to her own
personal use and benefit the said amount, and [despite] demands, refused and still refuses to restitute the same to the
damage and prejudice of the PCCI in the aforementioned amount of P5,000, Philippine Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
8

The cases were raffled to Branch 22 of the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City and docketed as Criminal Case Nos.
3453, 3625, 3626 and 3627.
Batulanon pleaded not guilty to the charges, afterwhich a joint trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution presented Maria Theresa Medallo, Benedicto Gopio, Jr., and Bonifacio Jayoma as witnesses.
Medallo, the posting clerk whose job was to assist Batulanon in the preparation of cash vouchers
9
testified that on certain
dates in 1982, Batulanon released four Cash Vouchers representing varying amounts to four different individuals as follows:
On June 2, 1982, Cash Voucher No. 30A
10
for P4,160.00 was released to Erlinda Omadlao; on September 24, 1982, Cash
Voucher No. 237A
11
for P4,000.00 was released to Gonafreda
12
Oracion; P3, 500.00 thru Cash Voucher No. 276A
13
was
released to Ferlyn Arroyo on October 16, 1982 and on December 7, 1982, P5,000.00 was released to Dennis Batulanon thru
Cash Voucher No. 374A.
14

Medallo testified that Omadlao, Oracion, and Dennis Batulanon were not eligible to apply for loan because they were not
bona fide members of the cooperative.
15
Ferlyn Arroyo on the other hand, was a member of the cooperative but there was
no proof that she applied for a loan with PCCI in 1982. She subsequently withdrew her membership in 1983.
16
Medallo stated
that pursuant to the cooperative's by-laws, only bona fide members who must have a fixed deposit are eligible for loans.
17

Medallo categorically stated that she saw Batulanon sign the names of Oracion and Arroyo in their respective cash vouchers
and made it appear in the records that they were payees and recipients of the amount stated therein.
18
As to the signature
of Omadlao in Cash Voucher No. 30A, she declared that the same was actually the handwriting of appellant.
19

Gopio, Jr. was a member of PCCI since 1975 and a member of its board of directors since 1979. He corroborated Medallo's
testimony that Omadlao, Arroyo, Oracion and Dennis Batulanon are not members of PCCI. He stated that Oracion is
Batulanon's sister-in-law while Dennis Batulanon is her son who was only 3 years old in 1982. He averred that membership
in the cooperative is not open to minors.
20

Jayoma was the Vice-Chairman of the PCCI Board of Directors in 1980 before becoming its Chairman in 1982 until 1983. He
testified that the loans made to Oracion, Omadlao, Arroyo and Dennis Batulanon did not pass through the cooperative's
Credit Committee and PCCI's Board of Directors for screening purposes. He claimed that Oracion's signature on Cash
Voucher No. 237A is Batulanon's handwriting.
21
Jayoma also testified that among the four loans taken, only that in Arroyo's
name was settled.
22

The defense presented two witnesses, namely, Maria Theresa Medallo who was presented as a hostile witness and
Batulanon.
Medallo was subpoenaed by the trial court on behalf of the defense and was asked to bring with her the PCCI General
Journal for the year 1982. After certifying that the said document reflected all the financial transactions of the cooperative
for that year, she was asked to identify the entries in the Journal with respect to the vouchers in question. Medallo was able
to identify only Cash Voucher No. 237A in the name of Gonafreda Oracion. She failed to identify the other vouchers because
the Journal had missing pages and she was not the one who prepared the entries.
23

Batulanon denied all the charges against her. She claimed that she did not sign the vouchers in the names of Omadlao,
Oracion and Arroyo; that the same were signed by the loan applicants in her presence at the PCCI office after she personally
released the money to them;
24
that the three were members of the cooperative as shown by their individual deposits and the
ledger; that the board of directors passed a resolution in August 1982 authorizing her to certify to the correctness of the
entries in the vouchers; that it has become an accepted practice in the cooperative for her to release loans and dispense
with the approval of Gopio Jr., in case of his absence;
25
that she signed the loan application and voucher of her son Dennis
Batulanon because he was a minor but she clarified that she asked Gopio, Jr., to add his signature on the documents to
avoid suspicion of irregularity;
26
that contrary to the testimony of Gopio, Jr., minors are eligible for membership in the
cooperative provided they are children of regular members.
Batulanon admitted that she took out a loan in her son's name because she is no longer qualified for another loan as she still
has to pay off an existing loan; that she had started paying off her son's loan but the cooperative refused to accept her
payments after the cases were filed in court.
27
She also declared that one automatically becomes a member when he
deposits money with the cooperative.
28
When she was Cashier/Manager of PCCI from 1980 to 1982, the cooperative did not
have by-laws yet.
29

On rebuttal, Jayoma belied that PCCI had no by-laws from 1980-1982, because the cooperative had been registered since
1967.
30

On April 15, 1993, the trial court rendered a Decision convicting Batulanon as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding the accused Leonila Batulanon guilty beyond reasonable doubt in all the above-
entitled case, she is sentenced in each of the four cases to 4 months of ARRESTO MAYOR to 1 year and 2 months of
PRISION CORRECTIONAL, to indemnify the PCCI in the total sum of P16,660.00 with legal interest from the institution of the
complaints until fully paid, plus costs.
SO ORDERED.
31

The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court, thus:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is MODIFIED. Appellant LEONILA BATULANON is found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of Falsification of Private Documents under Par. 2, Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code; and is hereby sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor maximum, AS MINIMUM, to four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional medium, AS MAXIMUM; to pay a fine of five thousand (P5,000.00) pesos; and to indemnify
the Polomolok Cooperative Credit, Inc. the sum of thirteen thousand one hundred sixty (P13,160.00), plus legal interests
from the filing of the complaints until fully paid, plus costs.
SO ORDERED.
32

The motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this petition.
Batulanon argues that in any falsification case, the best witness is the person whose signature was allegedly forged, thus the
prosecution should have presented Erlinda Omadlao, Gonafreda Oracion and Ferlyn Arroyo instead of relying on the
testimony of an unreliable and biased witness such as Medallo.
33
She avers that the crime of falsification of private document
requires as an element prejudice to a third person. She insists that PCCI has not been prejudiced by these loan transactions
because these loans are accounts receivable by the cooperative.
34

The petition lacks merit.
Although the offense charged in the information is estafa through falsification of commercial document, appellant could be
convicted of falsification of private document under the well-settled rule that it is the allegations in the information that
determines the nature of the offense and not the technical name given in the preamble of the information. In Andaya v.
People,
35
we held:
From a legal point of view, and in a very real sense, it is of no concern to the accused what is the technical name of the
crime of which he stands charged. It in no way aids him in a defense on the merits. x x x That to which his attention should
be directed, and in which he, above all things else, should be most interested, are the facts alleged. The real question is not
did he commit a crime given in the law some technical and specific name, but did he perform the acts alleged in the body of
the information in the manner therein set forth. x x x The real and important question to him is, "Did you perform the acts
alleged in the manner alleged?" not, "Did you commit a crime named murder?" If he performed the acts alleged, in the
manner stated, the law determines what the name of the crime is and fixes the penalty therefor. x x x If the accused
performed the acts alleged in the manner alleged, then he ought to be punished and punished adequately, whatever may be
the name of the crime which those acts constitute.
The elements of falsification of private document under Article 172, paragraph 2
36
of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) that
the offender committed any of the acts of falsification, except those in paragraph 7, Article 171; (2) that the falsification was
committed in any private document; and (3) that the falsification caused damage to a third party or at least the falsification
was committed with intent to cause such damage.
37

In Criminal Case Nos. 3625, 3626, and 3453, Batulanon's act
38
of falsification falls under paragraph 2 of Article 171, i.e.,
causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate. This is
because by signing the name of Omadlao, Oracion, and Arroyo in Cash Voucher Nos. 30A, 237A, and 267A, respectively, as
payee of the amounts appearing in the corresponding cash vouchers, Batulanon made it appear that they obtained a loan
and received its proceeds when they did not in fact secure said loan nor receive the amounts reflected in the cash vouchers.
The prosecution established that Batulanon caused the preparation of the Cash Vouchers in the name of Omadlao and
Oracion knowing that they are not PCCI members and not qualified for a loan from the cooperative. In the case of Arroyo,
Batulanon was aware that while the former is a member, she did not apply for a loan with the cooperative.
Medallo categorically declared that she saw Batulanon forge the signatures of Oracion and Arroyo in the vouchers and made
it appear that the amounts stated therein were actually received by these persons. As to the signature of Arroyo, Medallo's
credible testimony and her familiarity with the handwriting of Batulanon proved that it was indeed the latter who signed the
name of Arroyo. Contrary to Batulanon's contention, the prosecution is not duty-bound to present the persons whose
signatures were forged as Medallo's eyewitness account of the incident was sufficient. Moreover, under Section 22, Rule 132
of the Rules of Court, the handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of
such person because he has seen the person write, or has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has
acted or been charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person.
Her insistence that Medallo is a biased witness is without basis. There is no evidence showing that Medallo was prompted by
any ill motive.
The claim that Batulanon's letter to the cooperative asking for a compromise was not an admission of guilt is untenable.
Section 27, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that in criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses or criminal
negligence or those allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of compromise by the accused may be received in evidence
as an implied admission of guilt.
There is no merit in Batulanon's assertion that PCCI has not been prejudiced because the loan transactions are reflected in
its books as accounts receivable. It has been established that PCCI only grants loans to its bona fide members with no
subsisting loan. These alleged borrowers are not members of PCCI and neither are they eligible for a loan. Of the four
accounts, only that in Ferlyn Arroyo's name was settled because her mother, Erlinda, agreed to settle the loan to avoid legal
prosecution with the understanding however, that she will be reimbursed once the money is collected from Batulanon.
39

The Court of Appeals
40
correctly ruled that the subject vouchers are private documents and not commercial documents
because they are not documents used by merchants or businessmen to promote or facilitate trade or credit transactions
41

nor are they defined and regulated by the Code of Commerce or other commercial law.
42
Rather, they are private
documents, which have been defined as deeds or instruments executed by a private person without the intervention of a
public notary or of other person legally authorized, by which some disposition or agreement is proved, evidenced or set
forth.
43

In all criminal prosecutions, the burden of proof is on the prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt. It has the duty to prove each and every element of the crime charged in the information to warrant a finding of guilt
for the said crime or for any other crime necessarily included therein.
44
The prosecution in this case was able to discharge its
burden completely.
As there is no complex crime of estafa through falsification of private document,
45
it is important to ascertain whether the
offender is to be charged with falsification of a private document or with estafa. If the falsification of a private document is
committed as a means to commit estafa, the proper crime to be charged is falsification. If the estafa can be committed
without the necessity of falsifying a document, the proper crime to be charged is estafa. Thus, in People v. Reyes,
46
the
accused made it appear in the time book of the Calamba Sugar Estate that a laborer, Ciriaco Sario, worked 21 days during
the month of July, 1929, when in reality he had worked only 11 days, and then charged the offended party, the Calamba
Sugar Estate, the wages of the laborer for 21 days. The accused misappropriated the wages during which the laborer did not
work for which he was convicted of falsification of private document.
In U.S. v. Infante,
47
the accused changed the description of the pawned article on the face of the pawn ticket and made it
appear that the article is of greatly superior value, and thereafter pawned the falsified ticket in another pawnshop for an
amount largely in excess of the true value of the article pawned. He was found guilty of falsification of a private document.
In U.S. v. Chan Tiao,
48
the accused presented a document of guaranty purportedly signed by Ortigas Hermanos for the
payment of P2,055.00 as the value of 150 sacks of sugar, and by means of said falsified documents, succeeded in obtaining
the sacks of sugar, was held guilty of falsification of a private document.
In view of the foregoing, we find that the Court of Appeals correctly held Batulanon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Falsification of Private Documents in Criminal Case Nos. 3625, 3626 and 3453.
Article 172 punishes the crime of Falsification of a Private Document with the penalty of prision correccional in its medium
and maximum periods with a duration of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. There being no
aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the penalty should be imposed in its medium period, which is three (3) years, six
(6) months and twenty-one (21) days to four (4) years, nine (9) months and ten (10) days. Taking into consideration the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, Batulanon is entitled to an indeterminate penalty the minimum of which must be within the
range of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period, or four (4) months and one (1)
day to two (2) years and four (4) months.
49
Thus, in Criminal Case Nos. 3625, 3626 and 3453, the Court of Appeals correctly
imposed the penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as maximum, which is within the range of the allowed imposable penalty.
Since Batulanon's conviction was for 3 counts of falsification of private documents, she shall suffer the aforementioned
penalties for each count of the offense charged. She is also ordered to indemnify PCCI the amount of P11,660.00
representing the aggregate amount of the 3 loans without deducting the amount of P3,500.00 paid by Ferlyn Arroyo's
mother as the same was settled with the understanding that PCCI will reimburse the former once the money is recovered.
The amount shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the filing of the complaints on November 28, 1994 until
the finality of this judgment. From the time the decision becomes final and executory, the interest rate shall be 12% per
annum until its satisfaction.
However, in Criminal Case No. 3627, the crime committed by Batulanon is estafa and not falsification. Under Article 171 of
the Revised Penal Code, the acts that may constitute falsification are the following:
1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature, or rubric;
2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate;
3. Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding statements other than those in fact made by them;
4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
5. Altering true dates;
6. Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its meaning;
7. Issuing in an authenticated form a document purporting to be a copy of an original document when no such original
exists, or including in such copy a statement contrary to, or different from, that of the genuine original; or;
8. Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance thereof in a protocol, registry, or official book.
In Criminal Case No. 3627, the trial court convicted petitioner Batulanon for falsifying Dennis Batulanon's signature in the
cash voucher based on the Information charging her of signing the name of her 3 year old son, Dennis. The records,
however, reveal that in Cash Voucher No. 374A, petitioner Batulanon did not falsify the signature of Dennis. What she did
was to sign: "by: lbatulanon" to indicate that she received the proceeds of the loan in behalf of Dennis. Said act does not fall
under any of the modes of falsification under Article 171 because there in nothing untruthful about the fact that she used
the name of Dennis and that as representative of the latter, obtained the proceeds of the loan from PCCI. The essence of
falsification is the act of making untruthful or false statements, which is not attendant in this case. As to whether, such
representation involves fraud which caused damage to PCCI is a different matter which will make her liable for estafa, but
not for falsification. Hence, it was an error for the courts below to hold that petitioner Batulanon is also guilty of falsification
of private document with respect to Criminal Case No. 3627 involving the cash voucher of Dennis.
50

The elements of estafa through conversion or misappropriation under Art. 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code are:
(1) that money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return, the same;
(2) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender or denial on his part of such
receipt;
(3) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another;
(4) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender. (Note: The 4th element is not necessary when there
is evidence of misappropriation of the goods by the defendant)
51

Thus in the case of U.S. v. Sevilla,
52
the Court convicted the appellant of estafa by misappropriation. The latter, a treasurer
of the Manila Rail Road Company, took the sum of P8,330.00 out of the funds of the company and used it for personal
purposes. He replaced said cash with his personal check of the same amount drawn on the Philippine National Bank (PNB),
with instruction to his cashier not to deposit the same in the current account of the Manila Rail Road Company until the end
of the month. When an audit was conducted, the check of appellant was discovered to have been carried in the accounts as
part of the cash on hand. An inquiry with the PNB disclosed that he had only P125.66 in his account, although in the
afternoon of the same day, he deposited in his account with the PNB sufficient sum to cover the check. In handing down a
judgment of conviction, the Court explained that:
Fraudulent intent in committing the conversion or diversion is very evidently not a necessary element of the form of estafa
here discussed; the breach of confidence involved in the conversion or diversion of trust funds takes the place of fraudulent
intent and is in itself sufficient. The reason for this is obvious: Grave as the offense is, comparatively few men
misappropriate trust funds with the intention of defrauding the owner; in most cases the offender hopes to be able to
restore the funds before the defalcation is discovered. x x x
Applying the legal principles here stated to the facts of the case, we find all of the necessary elements of estafa x x x. That
the money for which the appellant's checks were substituted was received by him for safe-keeping or administration, or
both, can hardly be disputed. He was the responsible financial officer of the corporation and as such had immediate control
of the current funds for the purposes of safe-keeping and was charged with the custody of the same. That he, in the
exercise of such control and custody, was aided by subordinates cannot alter the case nor can the fact that one of the
subordinates, the cashier, was a bonded employee who, if he had acted on his own responsibility, might also have
misappropriated the same funds and thus have become guilty of estafa.
Neither can there be any doubt that, in taking money for his personal use, from the funds entrusted to him for safekeeping
and substituting his personal checks therefor with instructions that the checks were to be retained by the cashier for a
certain period, the appellant misappropriated and diverted the funds for that period. The checks did not constitute cash and
as long as they were retained by the appellant or remained under his personal control they were of no value to the
corporation; he might as well have kept them in his pocket as to deliver them to his subordinate with instructions to retain
them.
But it is argued in the present case that it was not the intention of the accused to permanently misappropriate the funds to
himself. As we have already stated, such intention rarely exists in cases of this nature and, as we have seen, it is not a
necessary element of the crime. Though authorities have been cited who, at first sight, appear to hold that misappropriation
of trust funds for short periods does not always amount to estafa, we are not disposed to extend this interpretation of the
law to cases where officers of corporations convert corporate funds to their own use, especially where, as in this case, the
corporation is of a quasi-public character. The statute is clear and makes no distinction between permanent
misappropriations and temporary ones. We can see no reason in the present case why it should not be applied in its literal
sense.
The third element of the crime with which the appellant is charged is injury to another. The appellant's counsel argues that
the only injury in this case is the loss of interest suffered by the Railroad Company during the period the funds were
withheld by the appellant. It is, however, well settled by former adjudications of this court that the disturbance in property
rights caused by the misappropriation, though only temporary, is in itself sufficient to constitute injury within the meaning of
paragraph 5, supra. (U.S. v. Goyenechea, 8 Phil., 117 U.S. v. Malong, 36 Phil., 821.)
53

In the instant case, there is no doubt that as Cashier/Manager, Batulanon holds the money for administration and in trust
for PCCI. Knowing that she is no longer qualified to obtain a loan, she fraudulently used the name of her son who is likewise
disqualified to secure a loan from PCCI. Her misappropriation of the amount she obtained from the loan is also not disputed
as she even admitted receiving the same for personal use. Although the amount received by Batulanon is reflected in the
records as part of the receivables of PCCI, damage was still caused to the latter because the sum misappropriated by her
could have been loaned by PCCI to qualified members, or used in other productive undertakings. At any rate, the
disturbance in property rights caused by Batulaono's misappropriation is in itself sufficient to constitute injury within the
meaning of Article 315.
Considering that the amount misappropriated by Batulanon was P5,000.00, the applicable provision is paragraph (3) of
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, which imposes the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period, where the amount defrauded is over P200.00 but does not exceed P6,000.00. There
being no modifying circumstances, the penalty shall be imposed in its medium period. With the application of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, Batulaon is entitled to an indeterminate penalty of three (3) months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision correccional, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
(1) In Criminal Case Nos. 3625, 3626 and 3453, Leonila Batulanon is found GUILTY of three counts of falsification of private
documents and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two
(2) months of prision correccional, as maximum, for each count, and to indemnify complainant Polomolok Credit Cooperative
Incorporated the amount of P11,660.00 with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from November 28, 1994 until finality of
this judgment. The interest rate of 12% per annum shall be imposed from finality of this judgment until its satisfaction;
andcralawlibrary
(2) In Criminal Case No. 3627, Leonila Batulanon is found GUILTY of estafa and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of three
(3) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision correccional, as maximum. She is
likewise ordered to indemnify Polomolok Credit Cooperative Incorporated the sum of P5,000.00 with interest at the rate of
6% per annum from November 28, 1994 until finality of this judgment. The interest rate of 12% per annum shall be
imposed from finality of this judgment until its satisfaction.













[G.R. NO. 156248 : August 28, 2007]
MARISSA CENIZA-MANANTAN, Petitioner, v. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari
1
under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, petitioner Marissa Ceniza-Manantan
prays for the reversal of the Decision,
2
dated 29 August 2001, and Resolution,
3
dated 26 November 2002, of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 23676, affirming with modification the Decision,
4
dated 30 July 1999, of the Quezon City Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 78, in Criminal Case No. Q-97-72787, finding petitioner guilty of the crime of Estafa as defined
and penalized under paragraph 1(b), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.
On 1 August 1997, petitioner Marissa Ceniza-Manantan (Manantan) and her sister-in-law, Regina Manantan-Vizconde
(Vizconde), were indicted in an Information
5
for estafa under paragraph 1(b), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code allegedly
committed as follows:
That on or about the period comprised from July 15, 1994 to September 3, 1994, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said
accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping each other, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously defraud one ALBERTO CARILLA, in the following manner to wit: the said accused, pursuant to their
conspiracy, received in trust from said complainant several pieces of jewelry worth P1,079,000.00, Philippine Currency, for
the purpose of selling the same on commission basis under the express obligation on the part of the said accused of turning
over the proceeds of the sale to said Alberto Carilla, if sold, or of returning the same if unsold to said complainant, but the
said accused, once in possession of the said items, far from complying with their obligations as aforesaid, with intent to
defraud, unfaithfulness and grave abuse of confidence, failed and refused and still fails and refuses to fulfill their aforesaid
obligation despite repeated demands made upon them to do so, and instead misapplied, misappropriated and converted the
same or the value thereof, to their own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of said Alberto Carilla, in the
aforesaid amount of P1,079,000.00, Philippine Currency.
On 2 December 1998, Manantan was arrested whereas Vizconde remained at large. When arraigned on 5 March 1999,
Manantan pleaded "Not Guilty" to the charge.
6
Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The facts, according to the prosecution, are summarized in the Comment dated 4 July 2003 of the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), to wit:
Herein private complainant, Alberto Carilla, is a jeweler whose office is located at Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City. Sisters-
in-law Regina Manantan-Vizconde and Marissa Ceniza-Manantan entered into an agreement with Carilla that they would act
as the latter's agent in selling the pieces of jewelry worth P1,079,000.00. They received the jewelry in trust with the
obligation to sell them within two (2) weeks and remit the proceeds to private complainant within another two (2) weeks or
to return them within the same period if they were unable to sell. The sisters-in-law would earn any amount that they would
add to the selling price.
After the lapse of the above-mentioned period, accused sisters-in-law failed to remit the purchase price or return the pieces
of jewelry. As such, Carilla made verbal demands for their return or the proceeds of the sale. After several verbal demands,
the sisters-in-law issued several checks. Regina Manantan-Vizconde issued thirteen (13) postdated checks, while Marissa
Ceniza-Manantan issued four (4) postdated checks.
Upon maturity of the checks, Carilla deposited the checks to his bank account. But to his dismay, the checks were
dishonored for the reason that the account from which the checks were drawn had been closed. The checks that were still to
fall due were stamped on their face "account closed."
Carilla thus sought the help of a lawyer who made out a written demand upon the accused through their counsel. But
despite this, the two accused still refused to pay. Hence, Carilla was constrained to file a criminal complaint.
7

Manantan denied the foregoing accusations. In her Counter-Affidavit with Motion to Dismiss dated July 1996,
8
Manantan
alleged that Carilla's filing of estafa case against her was a mere harassment suit as Carilla desperately tried but failed to
recover from her the jewelries allegedly entrusted to her and to Vizconde; that Vizconde borrowed several checks from her
after Vizconde ran out of her own checks; that Vizconde told her that the borrowed checks will only be shown to the former's
customers or other persons from whom she received jewelries so as to convince them that she had collections; and that
Vizconde promised to return the checks. During her direct examination before the RTC,
9
Manantan denied that she had any
business transaction with Carilla. Manantan also disclaimed any knowledge as to how the four dishonored checks in her
name came into the possession of Carilla.
On 30 July 1999, the RTC rendered a Decision convicting Manantan of estafa under paragraph 1(b), Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code. Thus:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds accused MARISSA CENIZA-MANANTAN, GUILTY of the crime of Estafa, defined and penalized
under par.1 (b) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, and is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of, there being no
mitigating and aggravating circumstances, and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, TWELVE (12) YEARS, and one (1)
DAY, as minimum, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, and EIGHT (8) MONTHS, as maximum, of Reclusion Temporal in its minimum
period.
Further, the award of civil liability is appropriate as the preponderance of evidence sanctioned by the Rules has been
satisfied, the accused Marissa Ceniza-Manantan is ordered to pay P1,079,000.00 as actual damages.
10

Aggrieved, Manantan filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. On 29 August 2001, the appellate court promulgated its
Decision affirming with modification the assailed RTC Decision. The modification pertains to Manantan's period of
imprisonment as provided under the Indeterminate Sentence Law. The decretal portion of the appellate court's decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant appeal is DENIED and the assailed decision of the court a quo in Criminal
Case No. Q-97-72787 is hereby AFFIRMED with modification that accused is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of Four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional as minimum to Twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal
as maximum.
11

Manantan filed a motion for reconsideration but this was denied for lack of merit by the appellate court in its Resolution
dated 26 November 2002.
Hence, Manantan filed the instant Petition. In our Resolution dated 10 March 2003,
12
we denied the Petition due to
Manantan's (a) failure to state the material dates showing when the notice of the assailed decision and resolution were
received and when the motion for reconsideration was filed thereby violating Sections 4(b) and 5 of Rule 45, in relation to
Sec. 5(d) of Rule 56; and (b) failure to indicate in the Petition the counsel's roll number as required in Bar Matter 1132.
Manantan filed a Motion for Reconsideration which we subsequently granted in our Resolution dated 7 May 2003.
13
The
petition was then reinstated.
Manantan proffered the following issues
14
for our consideration:
I.
CONTRARY TO THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT, WHICH FINDINGS THE COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMED, THE
PROSECUTION FAILED TO PROVE THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, CONSIDERING INTER ALIA
THAT NOT ALL THE ELEMENTS CONSTITUTING THE OFFENSE CHARGED, SPECIFICALLY CONSPIRACY AND THE ALLEGED
CONTRACTUAL RELATION (i.e., THE RECEIPT IN TRUST BY PETITIONER OF CERTAIN PIECES OF JEWELRY FROM PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT), WERE ESTABLISHED.
II.
MORE IMPORTANTLY, THE COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER IN THE TRIAL COURT MISERABLY FAILED AND/OR REFUSED TO
DISCHARGE HIS BOUNDEN DUTY TO HIS CLIENT. STATED DIFFERENTLY, SAID COUNSEL'S INCOMPETENCE WAS SO GREAT
AND SO EXECRABLE THAT, IN THE INTEREST OF SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE, AT LEAST A NEW TRIAL SHOULD BE ORDERED BY
THIS HONORABLE COURT IF ONLY TO AFFORD PETITIONER THE CONSTITUTIONALLY MANDATED OPPORTUNITY TO DEFEND
HERSELF WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF AN EFFECTIVE AND VIGILANT COUNSEL OF HER OWN CHOICE. THE AFORESAID
FAILURE AND/OR REFUSAL OF HER COUNSEL WERE A VIRTUAL GIVEAWAY TO THE PROSECUTION TO SEND HER TO THE
GALLOWS. THE CONSEQUENCE WAS A MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE.
Anent the first issue, Manantan alleged that the RTC conducted only one hearing where the prosecution presented only one
witness, which was Carilla himself, and thereafter rested its case; that the said lone hearing was abbreviated at the expense
of the rights and liberty of Manantan; that the direct testimony of Carilla, upon which the RTC based its conviction of
Manantan, consisted only of five double-spaced pages as shown in the transcript of stenographic notes (TSN); and that
Manantan's guilt cannot be proven on the basis of the few questions propounded by the private prosecutor on Carilla and
Manantan.
15

EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION
The prosecution presented the lone court testimony of Carilla as its testimonial evidence. Carilla testified that Manantan and
Vizconde agreed to be his agents in selling jewelries; that Manantan and Vizconde received from him in trust jewelries with
the obligation to sell them within two weeks from receipt thereof, and to remit the proceeds to him within two weeks after
the sale or to return the jewelries in case they were not sold; that Manantan and Vizconde would earn from any amount that
they would add to the original sale price of the jewelries fixed by him; that after the expiration of the stipulated period,
Manantan and Vizconde failed to remit to him the proceeds of the sale of the jewelries or return the unsold jewelries
themselves; that he made several verbal demands on Manantan and Vizconde to remit the proceeds of the sale of the
jewelries or return the unsold jewelries; that Manantan and Vizconde issued to him postdated checks as supposed payment
of the sales proceeds of the jewelries; that these checks were dishonored by reason of "Account Closed"; that Manantan and
Vizconde failed to make good the value of the dishonored checks despite his repeated demands for them to do so; and that
by reason of the foregoing, he instituted the instant case against Manantan and Vizconde.
The prosecution also offered documentary evidence to buttress Carilla's court testimony. It introduced Carilla's Complaint-
Affidavit dated 11 March 1996 which recounts how Manantan and Vizconde had swindled Carilla of the jewelries.
16
This
Complaint-Affidavit was admitted as part of Carilla's direct testimony.
17
It also submitted the dishonored checks issued by
Manantan
18
to prove that the jewelries were still unpaid for, and the demand-letters
19
sent by Carilla to Manantan, to
substantiate the latter's persistent failure to comply therewith.
EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENSE
On the other hand, the defense presented Manantan as its sole witness. No documentary evidence was utilized.
20

Manantan conjured denials and alibi in support of her contentions. Manantan denied having any transaction with Carilla. She
claims that she lent the dishonored checks to Vizconde as the latter was running out of checks; that she had no idea as to
how the dishonored checks came into the possession of Carilla; and that Carilla had an ill motive to accuse her of a crime
since Carilla failed to recover from her the alleged entrusted jewelries.
The threshold issue is, whose evidence is credible?cralaw library
It is axiomatic that truth is established not by the number of witnesses but by the quality of their testimonies.
21
In the
determination of the sufficiency of evidence, what matters is not the number of witnesses but their credibility and the nature
and quality of their testimonies.
22
The testimony of a lone witness, if found positive and credible by the trial court, is
sufficient to support a conviction especially when the testimony bears the earmarks of truth and sincerity. While the number
of witnesses may be considered a factor in the appreciation of evidence, proof beyond reasonable doubt is not necessarily
with the greatest number.
23

Witnesses are to be weighed, not numbered; hence, it is not at all uncommon to reach a conclusion of guilt on the basis of
the testimony of a single witness. Conviction of the accused may still be had on the basis of the positive and credible
testimony of a single witness.
24

Verily, the prosecution presented only one witness, who was Carilla himself as the complainant. However, we find the
latter's testimony consistent with his Complaint-Affidavit dated 11 March 1996, which was positive and categorical. The RTC
and the Court of Appeals both found Carilla's testimony credible and truthful.
25

More telling are the documentary evidences consisting of various checks issued by Manantan which later bounced and the
demand letters of Carilla addressed to Manantan. Although the admissibility of these checks was objected to by Manantan
during the trial, the RTC, nevertheless, admitted them as part of the testimony of Carilla.
The rule is that the findings of fact of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of
the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings are accorded high respect if not conclusive
effect.
26
This is more true if such findings were affirmed by the appellate court. When the trial court's findings have been
affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are generally binding upon this Court.
27

In stark contrast, the evidence for the defense consists mainly of denials. Manantan denied having transacted with Carilla.
Beyond her bare denials, however, she has not presented any plausible proof to successfully rebut the evidence for the
prosecution.
It is jurisprudentially settled that as between bare denials and positive testimony on affirmative matters, the latter is
accorded greater evidentiary weight.
28

The next question now crops up - were the elements of estafa for which Manantan is charged proven beyond reasonable
doubt?cralaw library
Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, provides:
ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be
punished by:
1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:
(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods or any other personal property received
by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make
delivery of, or to return the same, even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying
having received such money, goods, or other property.
The elements
29
of estafa in the above provision are as follows:
a) That money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration
or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same;
b) That there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender or denial on his part of such
receipt; and
c) That such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another.
The essence of estafa under this paragraph is the appropriation or conversion of money or property received, to the
prejudice of the owner thereof. It takes place when a person actually appropriates the property of another for his own
benefit, use and enjoyment.
30
In a prosecution for estafa, demand is not necessary where there is evidence of
misappropriation or conversion; and failure to account, upon demand for funds or property held in trust, is circumstantial
evidence of misappropriation.
31

All of the foregoing enumerated elements of estafa under paragraph 1(b), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, are duly
established herein.
First, Manantan received in trust the jewelries from Carilla for the purpose of selling them within two weeks from receipt
thereof; and to remit the proceeds to Carilla within two weeks after the sale or to return the jewelries in case they were not
sold. It was also agreed that Manantan will earn from any amount that she would add to the original sale price of the
jewelries fixed by Carilla. This, in effect, created a fiduciary relationship between Carilla and Manantan.
The absence of a written document showing receipt of jewelries or other property in trust does not necessarily mean that no
such contract exists between the parties. Contracts can be made verbally for as long as there is a meeting of the minds of
the parties thereto.
32
Carilla positively and categorically testified on the transaction that transpired between him and
Manantan.
Second, there is misappropriation or conversion by Manantan of the jewelries or the proceeds of the sale thereof, as well as
a denial on her part of receipt of the jewelries.
The words "misappropriate" and "convert" as used in the said provision of law connote an act of using or disposing of
another's property as if it were one's own or of devoting it to a purpose or use different from that agreed upon.
Misappropriation or conversion may be proved by the prosecution by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence.
33

In an agency for the sale of jewelries, as in the present case, it is the agent's duty to return the jewelry upon demand of the
owner and failure to do so is evidence of conversion of the property by the agent. In other words, the demand for the return
of the thing delivered in trust and the failure of the accused to account for it are circumstantial evidence of misappropriation.
However, this presumption is rebuttable. If the accused is able to satisfactorily explain his failure to produce the thing
delivered in trust or to account for the money, he may not be held liable for estafa.
34

Manantan misappropriated Carilla's properties, which she held in trust, by failing to remit the sale price of the jewelries or
return the same to Carilla upon the expiration of the stipulated period, despite repeated demands by the latter. Manantan
issued checks to Carilla as supposed payment of the sales proceeds of the jewelries but these checks were dishonored.
Carilla hired a lawyer and sent a demand-letter to Manantan but the latter still failed to turn over the jewelries or the sale
prices thereof.
35

As already heretofore pointed out, failure to account upon demand for the return of the thing delivered in trust raises a
presumption of misappropriation. Manantan's bare denials are not sufficient to overcome such presumption.
Estafa may also be committed by denying untruthfully that the thing was received.
36
Manantan denied having received
jewelries from Carilla. However, as we have already determined, such denial is unsubstantiated and therefore cannot prevail
over the categorical declarations of Carilla that the jewelries were turned over in trust to Manantan. Hence, Manantan's
denial of the receipt of jewelries also constitutes estafa.chanrobles vi rtual law library
Finally, Manantan's failure or refusal to account for or return the jewelries to Carilla had evidently prejudiced the rights and
interests of the latter. Not only did Carilla fail to recover his investment, but he also lost the opportunity to realize profits
from the sales of the jewelries. Carilla further incurred expenses in hiring a lawyer and in litigating the present case.
37

Apropos the second assignment of error, Manantan seeks a new trial because her former counsel, Atty. Donato A. Mallabo
(Atty. Mallabo) of the Public Attorneys Office (PAO), was incompetent and had failed to discharge his duty as her defense
counsel resulting in a denial of due process to her. She claims that Atty. Mallabo asked Carilla only a few questions during
the latter's cross-examination and did not conduct a re-cross examination; that after the prosecution had rested its case, the
RTC Presiding Judge inquired from Atty. Mallabo if he would file a motion to dismiss on demurrer to evidence, which was
already a hint of the weakness of the prosecution's evidence, but Atty. Mallabo ignored the question and presented, instead,
Manantan as sole witness for the defense; and after a few perfunctory questions to Manantan, already rested the case for
the defense.
38

Settled is the rule that mistake and negligence of a counsel bind his client. The basis is the tenet that an act performed by a
counsel within the scope of his general or implied authority is regarded as an act of his client. Consequently, the mistake or
negligence of a counsel may result in the rendition of an unfavorable judgment against his client.
39

A contrary view would be inimical to the greater interest of dispensing justice. For all that a losing party will do is to invoke
the mistake or negligence of his counsel as a ground for reversing or setting aside a judgment adverse to him, thereby
putting no end to litigation.
40
To allow this obnoxious practice would be to put a premium on the willful and intentional
commission of errors by accused persons and their counsel, with a view to securing new trials in the event of conviction.
41

Mistakes of attorneys as to the competency of a witness; the sufficiency, relevancy or irrelevancy of certain evidence, the
proper defense, or the burden of proof; and failure to introduce certain evidence, to summon witness and to argue the case
are not proper grounds for a new trial.
42
Error of the defense counsel in the conduct of the trial is neither an error of law nor
an irregularity upon which a motion for new trial may be presented.
43

Concededly, the foregoing rule admits of exceptions. Hence, in cases where (1) the counsel's mistake is so great and serious
that the client is prejudiced and denied his day in court, or (2) the counsel is guilty of gross negligence resulting in the
client's deprivation of liberty or property without due process of law, the client is not bound by his counsel's mistakes, and a
new trial may be conducted.
44

Tested against these guidelines, we find that Manantan's case falls within the general rule rather than the exceptions.
It is true that Atty. Mallabo asked only few questions during the cross-examination of Carilla. Quoted hereunder is Atty.
Mallabo's cross-examination of Carilla:
It appears from the foregoing that Atty. Mallabo's questions were aimed at proving that Carilla was not the owner of the
subject jewelries. It can be reasonably deduced from the questions that Atty. Mallabo's strategy in securing petitioner's
acquittal was to display the absence of the element of prejudice or damage on the part of Carilla. Notably, however, the
questions were confined to the issue of the ownership of jewelries.
Despite the preceding, Atty. Mallabo cross-examined Carilla and conducted a direct examination of Manantan. Atty. Mallabo
also interposed several objections during the re-direct examination of Carilla and challenged the admissibility of the
dishonored checks as evidence for the prosecution.
46
Atty. Mallabo even moved for the dismissal of the charge against
Manantan.
47

Admittedly, Atty. Mallabo committed mistakes and shortcomings in conducting examinations on Carilla and Manantan and in
assessing the proper and sufficient evidence for the defense. Nonetheless, such cannot be considered as recklessness or
gross negligence on his part, because there was neither a total abandonment nor a disregard of Manantan's cause or a
showing of conscious indifference to or disregard of consequences.
48
If at all, the mistakes and omissions of Atty. Mallabo
may only be considered as simple negligence or a slight want of care that circumstances reasonably impose.
As regards the prison term of Manantan, a perusal of the pertinent provision of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code is in
order:
ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be
punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the
fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty
provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but
the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory
penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision
mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
The penalty prescribed by Article 315 is composed of two, not three, periods, in which case, Article 65 of the same Code
requires the division of the time included in the penalty into three equal portions of time included in the penalty imposed
forming one period of each of the three portions.
49
Applying the latter provisions, the maximum, medium and minimum
periods of the penalty given are:
Maximum - 6 years, 8 months, 21 days to 8 years
Medium - 5 years, 5 months, 11 days, to 6 years, 8 months, 20 days
Minimum - 4 years, 2 months, 1 day to 5 years, 5 months, 10 days
In the present case, since the amount involved is P1,079,000.00, which exceeds P22,000.00, the penalty imposable should
be the maximum period of 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years of prision mayor. Article 315 further states that a
period of one year shall be added to the penalty for every additional P10,000.00 defrauded in excess of P22,000.00, but in
no case shall the total penalty which may be imposed exceed 20 years. The amount swindled from Carilla greatly exceeds
the amount of P22,000.00 which, when translated to the additional penalty of one year for every P10,000.00 defrauded,
goes beyond 20 years. Under the law, the maximum penalty to be imposed in the present case should be 20 years of
reclusion temporal.
50

We now apply the Indeterminate Sentence Law in computing the proper penalty. Since the penalty prescribed by law for the
estafa charge against Manantan is prision correcional maximum to prision mayor minimum, the penalty next lower would
then be prision correccional in its minimum to medium periods. Thus, the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence
should be anywhere from 6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months, while the maximum term of the indeterminate
sentence should be 20 years.
51

Thus, the Court of Appeals was correct in imposing a prison term of 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional as
minimum to 20 years of reclusion temporal as maximum.
We also sustain the indemnification of actual damages in favor of Carilla in the sum of P1,079,000.00 made by the RTC and
affirmed by the Court of Appeals as this is supported by the records
52
of the instant case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated 29 August 2001 and Resolution dated 26 November 2002 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 23676 are hereby AFFIRMED in toto. No costs.
[G.R. NO. 168217 : June 27, 2006]
JOY LEE RECUERDO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Joint Decision
1
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No.
25983, affirming with modification the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan in Criminal Cases Nos.
2750-M-94, 2751-M-94 and 2807-M-94 for estafa.
As synthesized by the appellate court, the antecedents are as follows:
In September 1994, three separate Criminal Informations charging Joy Lee Recuerdo of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph
2(d) of the Revised Penal Code involving 18 worthless bank checks were simultaneously filed by the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Bulacan, the accusatory portions of which read, thus:
A. Six (6) Unitrust Checks
Crim. Case No. 2750-M-94
"That sometime in the second week of December, 1993, in the municipality of Meycauayan, province of Bulacan, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused Joy Lee Recuerdo, with intent to gain and by means of
deceit, false pretenses and fraudulent manifestations, and pretending to have sufficient funds with the Unitrust, Makati
Commercial Center Branch, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously prepare, draw, make and issue the
following postdated checks, to wit:
Check No Date Amount
014355 April 5, 1994 P22,000.00
014356 May 5, 1994 22,000.00
014357 June 5, 1994 22,000.00
014358 July 5, 1994 22,000.00
014359 August 5, 1994 22,000.00
014360 September 5, 1994 22,000.00
with the total amount of P132,000.00 drawn against the said bank, and deliver the said checks to the complaining witness
Yolanda G. Floro as payment for pieces of jewelry she obtained from the said complainant, knowing fully well at the time the
checks were issued that her representations were false for she had no sufficient funds in the said bank, so much that upon
presentment of the said checks with the said bank for encashment, the same were dishonored and refused payment for
having been drawn against an "Account Closed", and inspite of repeated demands to deposit with the said bank the amount
of P132,000.00, the said accused failed and refused to do so, to the damage and prejudice of the said Yolanda G. Floro in
the said amount of P132,000.00.
Contrary to law."
B. Six (6) PCI Bank Checks
Crim. Case No. 2807-M-94
"That sometime in the second week of December 1993, in the municipality of Meycauayan, province of Bulacan, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused Joy Lee Recuerdo, with intent of gain and by means of
deceit, false pretenses and fraudulent manifestations, and pretending to have sufficient funds with the PCI Bank, Makati-De
La Rosa Branch, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously prepare, draw, make and issue the following
postdated checks, to wit:
Check No. Date Amount
053051982A March 28, 1994 P13,000.00
053051983A April 28, 1994 13,000.00
053051984A May 28, 1994 13,000.00
053051985A June 28, 1994 13,000.00
053051986A July 28, 1994 13,000.00
053051987A August 28, 1994 13,000.00
with the total amount of P78,000.00 drawn against the said bank, and deliver the said checks to the complaining witness
Yolanda G. Floro as payment for pieces of jewelry she obtained from the said complainant, knowing fully well at the time the
checks were issued that her representations were false for she had no sufficient funds in the said bank, so much that upon
presentment of the said checks with the said bank for encashment, the same were dishonored and refused payment for
having been drawn against an "Account Closed", and inspite of repeated demands to deposit with the said bank the amount
of P78,000.00, the said accused failed and refused to do so, to the damage and prejudice of the said Yolanda G. Floro in the
said amount of P78,000.00.
Contrary to law.
C. Six (6) Prudential Bank Checks
Criminal Case No. 2751-M-94
That on or about the 7th day of February, 1994, in the municipality of Meycauayan, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused Joy Lee Recuerdo, with intent of gain and by means of
deceit, false pretenses and fraudulent manifestations, and pretending to have sufficient funds with the Prudential Bank,
Legaspi Village Branch, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously prepare, draw, make and issue the following
postdated checks, to wit:
Check No. Date Amount
0011783 March 13, 1994 P100,000.00
0011784 April 13, 1994 100,000.00
0011785 May 13, 1994 100,000.00
0011786 June 13, 1994 100,000.00
0011787 July 13, 1994 100,000.00
0011788 August 13, 1994 100,000.00
with the total amount of P600,000.00 drawn against the said bank, and deliver the said checks to the complainant witness
Yolanda G. Floro as payment for pieces of jewelry she obtained from the said complainant, knowing fully well at the time the
checks were issued that her representations were false for she had no sufficient funds in the said bank, so much that upon
presentment of the said checks with the said bank for encashment, the same were dishonored and refused payment for
having been drawn against an "Account Closed", and inspite of repeated demands to deposit with the said bank the amount
of P600,000.00, the said accused failed and refused to do so, to the damage and prejudice of the said Yolanda G. Floro in
the said amount of P600,000.00
Contrary to law."
Evidence adduced by the Prosecution tend to establish that herein private respondent Yolanda G. Floro is engaged in the
business of buying and selling of jewelry since 1985. She regularly conducts business at her residence located at No. 51
Interior, Poblacion, Meycauayan, Bulacan. Sometimes, though, it was Floro who would personally visit her customers to
show and offer them the pieces of jewelry. Herein accused-appellant/petitioner Joy Lee Recuerdo, on the other hand, a
dentist by profession, who was introduced to Floro by the latter's cousin Aimee Aoro in the first week of December 1993,
became her customer. Sometime in the second week of December 1993, at around 7:30 in the evening, Recuerdo went to
the house of Floro in Meycauayan, Bulacan and purchased from her two pieces of jewelry, to wit: a 2.19 carat diamond
round stone in white gold setting worth P220,000.00 pesos, and one piece of loose 1.55 karat marquez diamond with a
value of P130,000.00 pesos.
For the 2.19 carat diamond stone, accused issued and delivered to the complainant then and there ten post-dated checks
each in the amount of P22,000.00 drawn against Unitrust Development Bank, Makati Commercial Center Branch. Only six
(6) postdated checks, to wit: Checks Nos. 014356, 014357, 014358, 014359 and 014360 are subject of Criminal Case No.
2750-M-94. For the 1.55 carat marquez loose diamond, accused issued and delivered to complainant then and there ten
(10) postdated checks, each in the amount of P13,000.00 drawn against PCI Bank, Makati, Dela Rosa Branch. Six of those
checks are subject of Criminal Case No. 2807-M-94, to wit: Checks Nos. 053051983A, 053051984A, 053051985A,
053051986A and 053051987A, subject matter of Crim. Case No. 2751-M-94.
In yet another transaction that transpired in the early evening of February 7, 1994, Recuerdo once again proceeded at
Floro's house in Meycauayan, Bulacan and bought another set of jewelry, this time a pair of diamond earrings worth
P768,000.00 pesos. She was given seven (7) postdated checks one for P168,000.00 as downpayment and another six (6)
postdated checks drawn against Prudential Bank, Legaspi Village, Makati Branch, each for P100,000.00 representing the
balance in the aggregate amount of P600,000.00 pesos (Checks Nos. 100783, 01184, 01185, 011786, 011787 and 011788,
Record, Criminal Case No. 2750-M-94, pp. 138-150) subject matter of Crim. Case No. 2751-M-94.
Floro deposited the aforementioned checks at Liberty Savings & Loan Association, Meyc[a]uayan, Bulacan. Upon
presentment for encashment by said depositary bank with the different drawee banks on their respective maturity dates, the
six (6) Prudential Bank checks were all dishonored for having been drawn against closed accounts. With her pieces of
jewelry still unpaid, Floro, through counsel, made formal demands requiring Requerdo to pay the amounts represented by
the dishonored checks (Record, supra, pp. 123, 138, and 151). Floro's efforts to obtain payment, though, only proved futile
as Requerdo continuously refused to pay the value of the purchased pieces of jewelry.
Upon her arraignment on March 1, 1995 in Criminal Case No. 2807-M-94, and on April 4, 1995 in Criminal Case Nos. 2750-
M-94 and 2751-M-94, Recuerdo, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty. (Record, Criminal Case No. 2807-M-94,
p. 40; Criminal Case No. 2750-M-94, p. 58). Considering the identity of the parties concerned, and the nature of the
transactions from which the charges of Estafa trace its roots, the three criminal cases were consolidated. Joint trial then
ensured. Recuerdo, on separate dates, posted three Personal Bail Bonds to obtain provisional liberty (Record, Criminal Case
No. 2750-M-94, p. 21; 2807-M-94, p. 27; 2751-M-94, p. 17).
By way of defense, Recuerdo posited the theory that the trial court of Malolos, Bulacan is devoid of jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the criminal cases against her, insisting that all the essential elements of the crime of Estafa involving the bad
checks occurred at the City of Makati, in that, all her business transactions with Floro, to wit; the purchase of the pieces of
jewelry and the subsequent issuance of and delivery of the subject bank checks in payment thereof which eventually
bounced, all took place and were executed at her Dental Clinic located at the Medical Towers at Suite 306, Herrera corner
Ormaza Streets Legaspi Village Makati City. Furthermore, Recuerdo argued that her act of issuing the dishonored checks
does not constitute the offense of Estafa considering that the subject checks were not issued and delivered to Floro
simultaneous to the purchase of the pieces of jewelry, but only several days thereafter, when she had already thoroughly
examined the jewelry and is fully satisfied of its fine quality (TSN, Joy Lee Recuerdo, January 16, 1996, pp. 3-18).
2

On July 28, 1997, the trial court rendered a Joint Decision convicting petitioner Joy Lee Recuerdo of two counts of estafa
under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused JOY LEE RECUERDO GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of estafa,
defined and penalized under Article 315, par. 2[b] (sic) of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences her as follows:
1. In Criminal Case Nos. 2750-M-94 and 2807-M-94, to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from six
(6) years and one (1) day of prison correccional as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day reclusion temporal as
maximum and to pay Yolanda Floro by way of civil indemnity the amount of P210,000.00 pesos plus interest from the filing
of the information until fully paid; andcralawlibrary
2. In Criminal Case No. 2751-M-94, to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) minimum to
twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum and to pay Yolanda Floro by way of civil indemnity the
amount of P600,000.00 pesos plus interest from the filing of the information until fully paid.
In both cases, accused shall pay the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.
3

Petitioner appealed the decision to the CA on the following assignment of errors:
I.
The Regional Trial Court erred in finding that the Municipal Trial Court, Meycauayan, Bulacan, Branch I did not pass upon the
merits of the criminal cases filed against the petitioner by confining and limiting itself merely to the dispositive portion of the
Joint Decision dated 28 January 1998 rendered by the latter court, instead of reading the Joint Decision as a whole to get its
true meaning and intent.
II.
The Regional Trial Court erred in affirming the judgment of conviction rendered by the Municipal Trial Court, Meycauayan,
Bulacan, Branch II which is in derogation of the petitioner's right against double jeopardy considering that the latter was
previously acquitted of the same criminal cases by the Municipal Trial Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, Branch I.
III.
The Regional Trial Court erred in finding that all proceedings in the court a quo have been made in the presence and with
the authority of the public prosecutor, in the face of the undisputed fact that the appeal initiated by the private respondent
is fatally defective because it was filed without the concurrence, permission and authority of the public prosecutor, in this
case, the provincial prosecutor of Bulacan.
4

Petitioner averred that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the offenses charged because the crimes were committed in
Makati City and not in Malolos, Bulacan where the Informations were filed. The prosecution failed to prove the essential
element of deceit because she drew and delivered the postdated checks to the private complainant after the jewelries had
been delivered. Moreover, she was denied the right to due process.
On August 23, 2004, the CA rendered judgment affirming with modification the decision of the RTC as to the penalty meted
on the appellant. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration insisting that based on the evidence on record, out of the 17
subject checks, nine were honored by the drawee banks. Moreover, she made partial payments of the amounts of the
subject checks while the case was pending in the CA. Contrary to the finding of the trial court and the appellate courts that
she acted with deceit when she drew and delivered the checks in payment of the pieces of jewelry she purchased from the
private complainant, she in fact acted in good faith; hence, should be acquitted based on the decision of this Court in People
v. Ojeda.
5
The CA denied the motion on May 20, 2005.
Petitioner filed the instant petition contending that:
THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED THE CASE CONVICTING THE PETITIONER IN A WAY PROBABLY NOT IN ACCORD
WITH '
A. THE BENEFICENT RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT ENUNCIATED IN PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. CORA ABELLA
OJEDA (G.R. NOS. 104238-58, JUNE 3, 2004) WHERE IT HELD THAT A DEBTOR'S OFFER TO ARRANGE A PAYMENT SCHEME
WITH HIS CREDITOR AND PAYMENT OF THE OBLIGATION INDICATE GOOD FAITH THAT SUCCESSFULLY REBUTS THE
PRESUMPTION OF DECEIT.
B. WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT ENUNCIATED IN BORROMEO V. COURT OF APPEALS,
PEOPLE V. CLORES, ET AL., PEOPLE V. BAUTISTA AND PEOPLE V. BENITO GO BIONG, JR. DIRECTING THAT IN CRIMINAL
CASES, ALL CIRCUMSTANCES AGAINST GUILT AND IN FAVOR OF INNOCENCE MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.
C. THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE
WHICH HOLDS THAT WHEN FACED WITH TWO PROBABILITIES, ONE CONSISTENT WITH GUILT AND THE OTHER WITH
INNOCENCE, THE SCALES OF JUSTICE SHOULD TILT IN FAVOR OF INNOCENCE.
D. THE APPLICABLE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT WHICH DIRECTS THAT IN ESTAFA CASES, IT IS OF PRIMORDIAL
SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THE EXACT DATE OF THE TRANSACTION AND THE EXACT DATE OF THE
ISSUANCE OF THE CHECKS.
6

Petitioner avers that she acted in good faith and exerted her utmost efforts to confer with the private complainant to settle
her obligations. She points out that she made monthly cash payments to lessen her civil liability and later on, for
convenience, deposited the monthly payments at the private complainant's bank account with the Bank of the Philippine
Islands. She continued to make payments even during the pendency of the case in the CA, and continues to make deposits
to private complainant's bank account.
Petitioner asserts that her efforts to settle her civil obligations to the private complainant indicate that she has no intention
of duping the latter, as well as the absence of deceit on her part. That she failed to comply with her obligations by failing to
make good the checks as they fell due does not suggest deceit, but at best only financial hardship in fulfilling her civil
obligations. Thus, there is no factual and legal basis to convict her of estafa. Petitioner insists that criminal intent in
embezzlement is not based on technical mistakes as to the legal effect of a transaction honestly entered into, and there can
be no embezzlement if the mind of the person doing the act is innocent or if there is no wrongful purpose.
Petitioner further avers that she should be benefited by the Court's ruling in People v. Ojeda,
7
considering that the facts
therein are parallel if not almost identical to this case, the only difference being that, in the Ojeda case, the accused-
appellant was able to fully settle her civil obligations. Petitioner points out that she is still paying her obligations to the
private complainant and further argues that:
[i]n Criminal Case No. 2750-M-94, the petitioner issued ten (10) postdated Unitrust Development Bank checks to the private
complainant for the purchase of a 2.19 carat diamond stone in white gold setting. Out of the ten (10) checks, four checks
were duly funded when presented for acceptance and payment. In Criminal Case No. 2807-M-94, the petitioner issued ten
(10) post-dated PCI Bank checks to the private complaint for the purchase of a 1.55 carat marquez loose diamond. The first
four (4) checks were duly funded when presented for acceptance and payment. In Criminal Case No. 2751-M-94, the
petitioner issued seven (7) post-dated Prudential Bank checks to the private complainant for the purchase of a pair of
diamond earrings. The amount covered by the first check was paid and settled. The rest bounced.
The petitioner respectfully submits that the act of the petitioner - - - OF DULY FUNDING SOME OF THE POST-DATED
CHECKS WHICH SHE ISSUED, SPECIFICALLY THOSE WHICH BECAME DUE FIRST OR EARLIER - is and should be considered
in law as, a CIRCUMSTANCE INDICATING GOOD FAITH AND ABSENCE OF DECEIT.
8

For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General asserts:
In the case of Ojeda, the prosecution failed to prove deceit. Ojeda never assured Chua the checks were funded. Chua knew
that the checks were issued to guarantee future payments. Furthermore, Ojeda did not only make arrangements for
payment but she fully paid the entire amount of the dishonored checks.
In the instant case, the elements of deceit and damage were established by convincing evidence. Petitioner Recuerdo issued
the subject bank checks as payment for the pieces of jewelry simultaneous to the transactions, that is, on the very same
occasion when the pieces of jewelry were bought. The issuance of the check by Recuerdo was the principal inducement to
private complainant to part with the subject jewelries (CA Decision, pp. 12-13). In addition, petitioner only promised to
replace the dishonored checks but she did not settle her obligations with private complainant. Assuming that there was an
offer to settle her obligations, this will not overturn the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals as to the presence
of deceit.
The guilt of petitioner was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
The crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code has the following basic elements:
Postdating or issuance of a check in payment of an obligation contracted simultaneously at the time the check was issued;
The postdating or issuance was done when the offender had no funds in the bank, or that his funds deposited therein were
not sufficient to cover the amount of the check; andcralawl ibrary
Damage to the payee thereof (Justice Luis B. Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Thirteenth Edition 1993, Book Two, p. 693;
People v. Panganiban, 335 SCRA 354).
The existence of the foregoing elements of the crime was concretely established by the prosecution through convincing
evidence, warranting petitioner's conviction of the offense of Estafa.
The trial court found private complainant Floro's testimony that petitioner issued the subject checks as payment for the
purchase of pieces of jewelry simultaneous to their transactions to be categorical and credible. There was sufficient evidence
established by the prosecution that the checks were issued by the accused to the complainant in exchange of the pieces of
jewelry given to her on two separate occasions.
The issue of deceit raised by petitioner is a factual issue and must be proved by evidence. The finding of the trial court and
the Court of Appeals that the issuance of petitioner was tainted with fraud or deceit is a factual finding that binds this
Honorable Court (Jose R. Guevarra v. The Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 100894, prom. January 26, 1993).
9

In reply, petitioner avers that she is a dentist/orthodontist with a fairly established practice at the Medical Towers, Ibarra
St., Legaspi Village, Makati City. She did not move out of her office because she had no intention to renege on her
obligations to the private complainant.
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
Estafa through false pretense or fraudulent act under Paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by Republic Act No. 4885, is committed as follows:
By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank, or his
funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check. The failure of the drawer of the check to
deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within three (3) days from receipt of notice from the bank and/or the
payee or holder that said check has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds shall be prima facie evidence of deceit
constituting false pretense or fraudulent act.
The essential elements of the felony are: (1) a check is postdated or issued in payment of an obligation contracted at the
time it is issued; (2) lack or insufficiency of funds to cover the check; and (3) damage to the payee thereof.
10
It is criminal
fraud or deceit in the issuance of a check which is made punishable under the Revised Penal Code, and not the non-payment
of a debt.
11
Deceit is the false representation of a matter of fact whether by words or conduct by false or misleading
allegations or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed which deceives or is intended to deceive another so
that he shall act upon it to his legal injury.
12
Concealment which the law denotes as fraudulent implies a purpose or design to
hide facts which the other party ought to have.
13
The postdating or issuing of a check in payment of an obligation when the
offender had no funds in the bank or his funds deposited therein are not sufficient to cover the amount of the check is a
false pretense or a fraudulent act.
14

There is no false pretense or fraudulent act if a postdated check is issued in payment of a pre-existing obligation.
15
As the
Court emphasized in Timbal v. Court of Appeals:
16

x x x In order to constitute Estafa under the statutory provisions, the act of postdating or of issuing a check in payment of
an obligation must be the efficient cause of the defraudation; accordingly, it should be either prior to or simultaneous with
the act of fraud. In fine, the offender must be able to obtain money or property from the offended party by reason of the
issuance, whether postdated or not, of the check. It must be shown that the person to whom the check is delivered would
not have parted with his money or property were it not for the issuance of the check by the other party.
Estafa is a felony committed by dolo (with malice). For one to be criminally liable for estafa under paragraph (2)(d) of Article
315 of the Revised Penal Code, malice and specific intent to defraud are required.
General criminal intent is an element of all crimes but malice is properly applied only to deliberate acts done on purpose and
with design. Evil intent must unite with an unlawful act for there to be a felony. A deliberate and unlawful act gives rise to a
presumption of malice by intent. On the other hand, specific intent is a definite and actual purpose to accomplish some
particular thing.
The general criminal intent is presumed from the criminal act and in the absence of any general intent is relied upon as a
defense, such absence must be proved by the accused. Generally, a specific intent is not presumed. Its existence, as a
matter of fact, must be proved by the State just as any other essential element. This may be shown, however, by the nature
of the act, the circumstances under which it was committed, the means employed and the motive of the accused.
17

The law provides that, in estafa, prima facie evidence of deceit is established upon proof that the drawer of the check failed
to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within three (3) days from receipt of the notice of dishonor for lack or
insufficiency of funds. A prima facie evidence need not be rebutted by a preponderance of evidence, nor by evidence of
greater weight. The evidence of the accused which equalizes the weight of the People's evidence or puts the case in
equipoise is sufficient. As a result, the People will have to go forward with the proof. Should it happen that, at the trial the
weight of evidence is equally balanced or at equilibrium and the presumption operates against the People who has the
burden of proof, it cannot prevail.
18

There can be no estafa if the accused acted in good faith because good faith negates malice and deceit.
19
Good faith is an
intangible and abstract quality with no technical meaning or statutory definition, and it encompasses, among other things,
an honest belief, the absence of malice and the absence of design to defraud or to seek an unconscionable advantage. An
individual's personal good faith is a concept of his own mind, therefore, may not conclusively be determined by his
protestations alone. It implies honesty of intention and freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the
holder upon inquiry. The essence of good faith lies in an honest belief in the validity of one's right, ignorance of a superior
claim, and absence of intention to overreach another.
20
In People v. Gulion,
21
the Court held that:
Good faith is a defense to a charge of Estafa by postdating a check. This may be manifested by the accused's offering to
make arrangements with his creditor as to the manner of payment or, as in the present case, averring that his placing his
signature on the questioned checks was purely a result of his gullibility and inadvertence, with the unfortunate result that he
himself became a victim of the trickery and manipulations of accused-at-large.
22

In the present case, the prosecution adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the petitioner of the crime
charged. The trial court gave credence and probative weight to the evidence of the People and disbelieved that proferred by
the petitioner.
Petitioner's insistence of her good faith and her reliance on the ruling of this Court in the Ojeda case were raised as a mere
afterthought in a last ditch effort to secure her acquittal, as these arguments were invoked only in her motion for
reconsideration of the CA decision. In Pascual v. Ramos,
23
this Court held that if an issue is raised only in the motion for
reconsideration of the appellate court's decision, it is as if it was never raised in that court at all.
Petitioner's defense of good faith is even belied by the evidence of the prosecution and her own evidence. When the
postdated checks issued by petitioner were dishonored by the drawee banks and the private complainant made demands for
her to pay the amounts of the checks, she intransigently refused to pay; she insisted that she issued and delivered the
postdated checks to the private complainant after the subject pieces of jewelry had been delivered to her. Petitioner never
offered to pay the amounts of the checks after she was informed by the private complainant that they had been dishonored
by the drawee banks, the private complainant thus charged her with estafa before the RTC. It was only during the period of
January 4, 2005 to June 27, 2005, after the CA promulgated its decision affirming the decision of the trial court, that
petitioner made several payments to the private complainant. While petitioner appended the deposit slips
24
to her motion for
reconsideration in the CA and her petition in this Court, there is no showing as to which checks they were made in payment
for. In fine, it was the spectre of a long prison term which jolted petitioner into making remittances to the private
complainant, after the CA affirmed the decision of the trial court and increased the penalty meted on her, and not because
she had acted in good faith in her transactions with the private complainant. To reiterate, petitioner rejected the demands of
the private complainant to pay the amounts of the dishonored checks.
While it is true that nine of the 17 postdated checks petitioner issued and delivered to the private complainant were honored
by the drawee banks, such a circumstance is not a justification for her acquittal of the charges relative to the dishonored
checks. The reimbursement or restitution to the offended party of the sums swindled by the petitioner does not extinguish
the criminal liability of the latter. It only extinguishes pro tanto the civil liability.
25
Moreover, estafa is a public offense which
must be prosecuted and punished by the State on its own motion even though complete reparation had been made for the
loss or damage suffered by the offended party.
26
The consent of the private complainant to petitioner's payment of her civil
liability pendente lite does not entitle the latter to an acquittal. Subsequent payments does not obliterate the criminal
liability already incurred.
27
Criminal liability for estafa is not affected by a compromise between petitioner and the private
complainant on the former's civil liability.
28

Petitioner cannot find solace in the Court's ruling in the Ojeda case. The CA correctly refuted the submission of the petitioner
in its decision, thus:
This Court is in full agreement with the position advanced by the Office of the Solicitor General that on account of the glaring
dissimilarities between the factual backdrop of the case of Ojeda, on one hand, and the material facts obtaining in the case
at bench, on the other, the doctrine in the former case may not be applied to benefit accused-appellant. Indeed, even
accused-appellant herself was quick to admit that the facts of her case are not entirely on all fours with those that obtained
in the case of Ojeda. At the outset, emphasis must be made of the fact that the acquittal of the accused in the Ojeda case
was brought about by a combination of reasons not obtaining in the present case. First, the Supreme Court ruled out the
existence of deceit and intent to defraud in the case of Ojeda in view of the fact that the accused therein performed
extraordinary efforts to gradually pay and settle her monetary obligations with the private complainant, and this convinced
the High Court that the acts of the accused were not tainted with malice, bad faith and criminal intent. Verily, the accused in
the Ojeda case not only made determined and honest arrangements to pay the private complainant, but was likewise able to
actually satisfy with completeness the sums she owed the latter, and this was evidenced by an affidavit of desistance where
the private complainant categorically declared that the accused already paid in full her monetary obligations. The facts in the
instant case, however, are totally different. Contrary to the contention of accused-appellant, she never made a determined
and earnest effort to arrange and settle with Floro with the end in view of paying her monetary obligations. In truth,
accused-appellant simply promised to pay Floro the value of the dishonored checks that were issued in payment for the
pieces of jewelry. However, that was all there was to it, and lamentably said promise turned out to be an empty one as
accused-appellant never made good her commitment to pay for the value of the dishonored checks. Accused-appellant
never arranged a payment scheme with Floro, and as the facts of the case would disclose she never made any gradual
payment to Floro as shown by the fact that the value of the dishonored checks remained unpaid, in direct contrast with the
facts of the Ojeda case where the accused was able to pay in full. Suffice it to say that accused-appellant failed to perform
any concrete act to show that she had the intention of paying Floro for the value of the purchased pieces of jewelry, in order
to somehow rebut the fact duly established by the prosecution that deceit attended her business dealings with Floro. It must
be reiterated that We have found that accused-appellant issued the subject bank checks as payment for the pieces of
jewelry simultaneous with her transactions with Floro, and that was, on the very same occasion when the pieces of jewelry
were purchased, first, on the second week of December 1993, and subsequently, on February 7, 1994. It being clear that
the subject bank checks were issued simultaneous with said transactions, it likewise became evident that deceit attended
accused-appellants' dealings with Floro for the same only goes to show that the bum checks were issued to Floro in order to
induce her to part with the pieces of jewelry in favor of accused-appellant.
In addition to the foregoing, the High Court likewise found in the Ojeda case that the prosecution miserably failed to adduce
evidence to establish that the indispensable element of notice of dishonor was sent to and was received by the accused
therein. In the case at bench, however, it is undisputed that after the dishonor of the subject bank checks Floro, through
counsel, made repeated formal demands requiring accused-appellant to pay for the value of the bum checks, perforce the
notice of dishonor which is required to properly prosecute and eventually convict an accused of the crime of Estafa under
Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code has been sufficiently met.
29

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are
AFFIRMED. No costs.





[G.R. NO. 142641 : July 17, 2006]
PACIFICO B. ARCEO, JR., Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the April 28, 1999 decision
1
and March 27, 2000 resolution
2
of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 19601 affirming the trial court's judgment finding petitioner Pacifico B. Arceo, Jr. liable for
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 22, otherwise known as the "Bouncing Checks Law."
The facts of the case as found by the trial court and adopted by the Court of Appeals follow.
On March 14, 1991, [petitioner], obtained a loan from private complainant Josefino Cenizal [] in the amount of P100,000.00.
Several weeks thereafter, [petitioner] obtained an additional loan of P50,000.00 from [Cenizal]. [Petitioner] then issued in
favor of Cenizal, Bank of the Philippine Islands [(BPI)] Check No. 163255, postdated August 4, 1991, for P150,000.00, at
Cenizal's house located at 70 Panay Avenue, Quezon City. When August 4, 1991 came, [Cenizal] did not deposit the check
immediately because [petitioner] promised [] that he would replace the check with cash. Such promise was made verbally
seven (7) times. When his patience ran out, [Cenizal] brought the check to the bank for encashment. The head office of the
Bank of the Philippine Islands through a letter dated December 5, 1991, informed [Cenizal] that the check bounced because
of insufficient funds.
Thereafter, [Cenizal] went to the house of [petitioner] to inform him of the dishonor of the check but [Cenizal] found out
that [petitioner] had left the place. So, [Cenizal] referred the matter to a lawyer who wrote a letter giving [petitioner] three
days from receipt thereof to pay the amount of the check. [Petitioner] still failed to make good the amount of the check. As
a consequence, [Cenizal] executed on January 20, 1992 before the office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City his affidavit
and submitted documents in support of his complaint for [e]stafa and [v]iolation of [BP 22] against [petitioner]. After due
investigation, this case for [v]iolation of [BP 22] was filed against [petitioner] on March 27, 1992. The check in question and
the return slip were however lost by [Cenizal] as a result of a fire that occurred near his residence on September 16, 1992.
[Cenizal] executed an Affidavit of Loss regarding the loss of the check in question and the return slip.
3

After trial, petitioner was found guilty as charged. Aggrieved, he appealed to the Court of Appeals. However, on April 28,
1999, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision in toto. Petitioner sought reconsideration but it was denied.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner claims that the trial and appellate courts erred in convicting him despite the failure of the prosecution to present
the dishonored check during the trial. He also contends that he should not be held liable for the dishonor of the check
because it was presented beyond the 90-day period provided under the law. Petitioner further questions his conviction since
the notice requirement was not complied with and he was given only three days to pay, not five banking days as required by
law. Finally, petitioner asserts that he had already paid his obligation to Cenizal.
Petitioner's contentions have no merit.
Significance of the 90-day Period
For Presentment of the Check
Petitioner asserts that there was no violation of BP 22 because the check was presented to the drawee bank only on
December 5, 1991 or 120 days from the date thereof (August 4, 1991). He argues that this was beyond the 90-day period
provided under the law in connection with the presentment of the check. We disagree.
Section 1 of BP 22 provides:
SECTION 1. Checks without sufficient funds Any person who makes or draws and issues any check to apply on account or for
value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment
of such check in full upon its presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of
funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered
the bank to stop payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more than one (1) year or
by a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the check which fine shall in no case exceed Two Hundred
Thousand Pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who, having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank when he
makes or draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the
check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by
the drawee bank.
Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the person or persons who actually signed the check in
behalf of such drawer shall be liable under this Act.
In Wong v. Court of Appeals,
4
the Court ruled that the 90-day period provided in the law is not an element of the offense.
Neither does it discharge petitioner from his duty to maintain sufficient funds in the account within a reasonable time from
the date indicated in the check. According to current banking practice, the reasonable period within which to present a check
to the drawee bank is six months. Thereafter, the check becomes stale and the drawer is discharged from liability thereon to
the extent of the loss caused by the delay.
Thus, Cenizal's presentment of the check to the drawee bank 120 days (four months) after its issue was still within the
allowable period. Petitioner was freed neither from the obligation to keep sufficient funds in his account nor from liability
resulting from the dishonor of the check.
Applicability of the
Best Evidence Rule
Petitioner's insistence on the presentation of the check in evidence as a condition sine qua non for conviction under BP 22 is
wrong. Petitioner anchors his argument on Rule 130, Section 3, of the Rules of Court, otherwise known as the best evidence
rule. However, the rule applies only where the content of the document is the subject of the inquiry. Where the issue is the
execution or existence of the document or the circumstances surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not
apply and testimonial evidence is admissible.
5

The gravamen of the offense is the act of drawing and issuing a worthless check.
6
Hence, the subject of the inquiry is the
fact of issuance or execution of the check, not its content.
Here, the due execution and existence of the check were sufficiently established. Cenizal testified that he presented the
originals of the check, the return slip and other pertinent documents before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City
when he executed his complaint-affidavit during the preliminary investigation. The City Prosecutor found a prima facie case
against petitioner for violation of BP 22 and filed the corresponding information based on the documents. Although the check
and the return slip were among the documents lost by Cenizal in a fire that occurred near his residence on September 16,
1992, he was nevertheless able to adequately establish the due execution, existence and loss of the check and the return
slip in an affidavit of loss as well as in his testimony during the trial of the case.
Moreover, petitioner himself admited that he issued the check. He never denied that the check was presented for payment
to the drawee bank and was dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds.
Presence of the Elements of the Offense
Based on the allegations in the information,
7
petitioner was charged for violating the first paragraph of BP 22. The elements
of the offense are:
1. the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply to account or for value;
2. knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; andcralawl ibrary
3. subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or dishonor of the check for the
same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.
8

All these elements are present in this case.
Both the trial and appellate courts found that petitioner issued BPI check no. 163255 postdated August 4, 1991 in the
amount of P150,000 in consideration of a loan which he obtained from Cenizal. When the check was deposited, it was
dishonored by the drawee bank for having been drawn against insufficient funds. There was sufficient evidence on record
that petitioner knew of the insufficiency of his funds in the drawee bank at the time of the issuance of the check. In fact, this
was why, on maturity date, he requested the payee not to encash it with the promise that he would replace it with cash. He
made this request and assurance seven times but repeatedly failed to make good on his promises despite the repeated
accommodation granted him by the payee, Cenizal.
Notice of Dishonor to Petitioner And Payment of the Obligation
The trial court found that, contrary to petitioner's claim, Cenizal's counsel had informed petitioner in writing of the check's
dishonor and demanded payment of the value of the check. Despite receipt of the notice of dishonor and demand for
payment, petitioner still failed to pay the amount of the check.
Petitioner cannot claim that he was deprived of the period of five banking days from receipt of notice of dishonor within
which to pay the amount of the check.
9
While petitioner may have been given only three days to pay the value of the check,
the trial court found that the amount due thereon remained unpaid even after five banking days from his receipt of the
notice of dishonor. This negated his claim that he had already paid Cenizal and should therefore be relieved of any liability.
Moreover, petitioner's claim of payment was nothing more than a mere allegation. He presented no proof to support it. If
indeed there was payment, petitioner should have redeemed or taken the check back in the ordinary course of business.
10

Instead, the check remained in the possession of the payee who demanded the satisfaction of petitioner's obligation when
the check became due as well as when the check was dishonored by the drawee bank.
These findings (due notice to petitioner and nonpayment of the obligation) were confirmed by the appellate court. This Court
has no reason to rule otherwise. Well-settled is the rule that the factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the
appellate court, are not to be disturbed.
11

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The April 28, 1999 decision and March 27, 2000 resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 19601 are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
[G.R. No. 129764. March 12, 2002.]
GEOFFREY F. GRIFFITH, Petitioner, v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, RTC JUDGE EDWIN A. VILLASOR

Assailed in this petition is the decision 1 dated March 14, 1997 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 19621, affirming
the Regional Trial Courts decision 2 finding petitioner Geoffrey F. Griffith guilty on two counts for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 (the Bouncing Checks Law), and sentencing him to suffer imprisonment for a period of six months on
each count, to be served consecutively. Also assailed is the Court of Appeals resolution 3 dated July 8, 1997 denying
petitioners motion for reconsideration.

The facts are as follows:chanrob1es vi rtual 1aw library

In 1985, Phelps Dodge Philippines, Inc. leased its lot and factory building to Lincoln Gerard, Inc. for a term of two years at a
monthly rental of P75,000. When Lincoln Gerard, Inc., incurred rental arrearages, Geoffrey F. Griffith, in his capacity as
president of Lincoln Gerard, Inc., issued the following checks:chanrob1es vi rtual 1aw li brary

Far East Bank and Trust Co. Check No. 06B-C-075065, dated April 15, 1986 for P100,000.00, payable to Phelps Dodge Phils.
Inc.; and

Far East Bank and Trust Co. Check No. 06B-C-075066, dated May 1, 1986 for P115,442.65, payable to Phelps Dodge Phils.
Inc. 4

The voucher for these checks contained the following instruction:chanrob1es vi rtual 1aw library

These checks are not to be presented without prior approval from this Corporation to be given not later than May 30, 1986.

Also written on the face of the voucher was the following note:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

However, if written approval of Lincoln Gerard, Inc. is not given before May 30, 1986, Phelps Dodge, Phils. shall present the
cheques for payment. This is final and irrevocable. 5

On May 29, 1986, Griffith wrote Phelps Dodge not to present the said checks for payment on May 30, 1986 because they
could not be funded due to a four-week labor strike that had earlier paralyzed the business operations of Lincoln Gerard. 6

Previously, in a letter dated May 20, 1986, Phelps Dodge, through its treasurer Ricardo R. Manarang, advised Lincoln Gerard
that it was transferring the contents of the Lincoln Gerard warehouse in the leased premises since a new tenant was moving
in. Phelps Dodge told Lincoln Gerard that its properties would be placed "in our compound and under our custody." 7

On June 2, 1986, 8 when no further communication was received from Lincoln Gerard, Phelps Dodge presented the two
checks for payment but these were dishonored by the bank for having been drawn against insufficient funds. Three days
later, Phelps Dodge sent a demand letter to Lincoln Gerard, apprising Griffith of the dishonor of the checks and asking him
to fund them within the time prescribed by law. 9 Lincoln Gerard still failed to fund the checks but Griffith sent a letter to
Phelps Dodge, explaining Lincolns inability to fund said checks due to the strike. 10 Subsequently, on June 19, 1986, Phelps
Dodge notified Lincoln Gerard that its properties would be foreclosed. Phelps Dodge went ahead with the foreclosure and
auction sale on June 20, 1986, 11 despite Lincoln Gerards protest. 12

On May 10, 1988, two informations for violation of B.P. 22 docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 73260 and 73261 were filed
against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court. The motion for reconsideration filed by Griffith was dismissed, and so were
his petition for review filed before the Department of Justice and later on his motion to quash filed before the RTC. Griffith
then filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals that was likewise denied.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Meanwhile, on November 6, 1987, Lincoln Gerard lodged a complaint for damages docketed as Civil Case No. 55276 before
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 69, against Phelps Dodge and the notary public who conducted the auction sale. 13
On July 19, 1991, the trial court ruled that the foreclosure and auction sale were invalid, but applied the proceeds thereof to
Lincoln Gerards arrearages. It also ordered Phelps Dodge to return to Lincoln Gerard the P1,072,586.88 as excess. 14 The
court stated:chanrob1es vi rtual 1aw library

The evidence shows that defendant corporation had already received the amount of P254,600 as a result of the invalid
auction sale. The latter amount should be applied to the rental in arrears owed by the plaintiff corporation to the defendant
corporation (P301,953.12). Thus, the plaintiff corporation still owes the defendant corporation the amount of P47,953.12 as
rental arrears. In order to get the true and real damages that defendant corporation should pay the plaintiff corporation, the
balance of the rental arrears should be deducted from the amount of P1,120,540.00, the total value of the items belonging
to the plaintiff corporation and sold by the defendant corporation at a public auction. The net result is P1,072,586.88. 15

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision, and this became final and executory. 16

On August 25, 1994, the criminal cases against Griffith pending before the RTC were remanded to the Metropolitan Trial
Court (MeTC), in view of Republic Act No. 7691 that expanded the jurisdiction of the MeTC.

On July 25, 1995, the MeTC, in Criminal Cases Nos. 41678 and 41679, found Griffith guilty on both counts for violation of
B.P. 22, 17 and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment for six months on each count, to be served consecutively. Thus:chanrob1es vi rtual 1aw library

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this court finds the accused GEOFFREY F. GRIFFITH, GUILTY OF VIOLATION of Section 1
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law on two counts.

The accused is therefore hereby sentence (sic) to suffer imprisonment for a period of SIX (6) MONTHS in Criminal Case No.
41678 and another SIX (6) MONTHS in Criminal Case No. 41679, both of which shall be served consecutively.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Considering that the civil aspect of these cases has already been decided by the Regional Trial Court Branch 69, Pasig,
regardless of its finality, of which this court has no record, this Court shall not resolve the same because they are either
"Res Judicata" or "Pendente Litis" .

SO ORDERED. 18

On appeal, the RTC affirmed in toto the lower courts decision.

Petitioner then appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals. In a consolidated decision dated March 14, 1997, the
appellate court ruled:chanrob1es vi rtual 1aw library

WHEREFORE, absent any prima facie merit in it, the Petition for Review under consideration is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE.
Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED. 19

Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of said decision but this was denied by the appellate court in a resolution dated July
8, 1997. 20 Hence, this petition seeking reversal of the CA decision and resolution on the criminal cases, anchored on the
following grounds:chanrob1es virtual 1aw l ibrary

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED 14 MARCH 1997 AND ITS RESOLUTION DATED 8 JULY 1997 ARE CONTRARY
TO THE RULING IN MAGNO V. COURT OF APPEALS, WHERE THIS HONORABLE COURT LAID DOWN THE DOCTRINE THAT A
CONVICTION UNDER B.P. 22 CANNOT BE BASED ON AN INVERSE APPLICATION OF THE ELEMENT OF KNOWLEDGE.chanrob1es vi rtua1 1aw 1i brary

II. THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED 14 MARCH 1997 AND ITS RESOLUTION DATED 8 JULY 1997 RESULT IN AN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL APPLICATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF B.P. 22.

III. THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED 14 MARCH 1997 AND ITS RESOLUTION DATED 8 JULY 1997 STATING THAT
PAYMENT THROUGH NOTARIAL FORECLOSURE BEFORE THE FILING OF THE CRIMINAL INFORMATIONS UNDER B.P. 22 DOES
NOT ABATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY, ARE ERRONEOUS AND RESULT IN THE INIQUITOUS INTERPRETATION OF THE LAW.

IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED 14 MARCH 1997 AND ITS RESOLUTION DATED 8 JULY 1997 ARE
INCONSISTENT WITH ITS OWN FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS IN A RELATED CASE (CA-G.R. NO. 20980) INVOLVING THE
SAME PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT AND THE SAME TRANSACTION SUBJECT OF THIS CASE.

V. THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED 14 MARCH 1997 AND ITS RESOLUTION DATED 8 JULY 1997 WHICH RELIED
ON THE RULING IN THE CASE OF LIM V. COURT OF APPEALS ON VENUE TO JUSTIFY ITS FINDING THAT PETITIONER HAS
COMMITTED TWO COUNTS OF VIOLATION OF B.P. 22, ARE CONTRARY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE. 21

Petitioner points out that he communicated to Phelps Dodge through a note on the voucher attached to the checks, the fact
that said checks were unfunded at the time of their issuance. Petitioner contends that this good faith on his part negates any
intent to put worthless checks in circulation, which is what B.P. 22 seeks to penalize. Moreover, as regards the second check
that was postdated, petitioner contends that there could not be any violation of B.P. 22 with said check since the element of
knowledge of insufficiency of funds is absent. Petitioner could not have known at the time of its issuance that the postdated
check would be dishonored when presented for payment later on.chanrob1es vi rtual law library

Petitioner argues that his conviction in this case would be violative of the constitutional proscription against imprisonment
for failure to pay a debt, since petitioner would be punished not for knowingly issuing an unfunded check but for failing to
pay an obligation when it fell due.

Petitioner also asserts that the payment made by Lincoln Gerard through the proceeds of the notarial foreclosure and
auction sale extinguished his criminal liability.

On the other hand, private respondent contends that all the elements that comprise violation of B.P. 22 are present in this
case. Moreover, the payment in this case was made beyond the five-day period, counted from notice of dishonor, provided
by the law and thus did not extinguish petitioners criminal liability.

For the State, the Solicitor General contends that Lincoln Gerard assured Phelps Dodge, through the note on the voucher
attached to the checks, that said checks would be covered with sufficient funds by May 30, 1996, which assurance was "final
and irrevocable," .22 The OSG also argues that B.P. 22 does not distinguish between a check that is postdated and one that
is not, for as long as the drawer issued the checks with knowledge of his insufficient funds and the check is dishonored upon
presentment.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

There is no unconstitutional punishment for failure to pay a debt in this case, since according to the OSG, what B.P. 22
penalizes is the act of making and issuing a worthless check that is dishonored upon presentation for payment, not the
failure to pay a debt. 23

The OSG asserts that the supposed payment that resulted from Phelps Dodges notarial foreclosure of Lincoln Gerards
properties could not bar prosecution under B.P. 22, since damage or prejudice to the payee is immaterial. Moreover, said
payment was made only after the violation of the law had already been committed. It was made beyond the five-day period,
from notice of dishonor of the checks, provided under B.P. 22.

The principal issue in this case is whether petitioner Geoffrey F. Griffith, president of Lincoln Gerard, Inc., has been
erroneously convicted and sentenced for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law (Batas Pambansa Blg. 22). His conviction on
two counts and sentence of six months imprisonment for each count by the respondent MTC Judge Manuel Villamayor was
upheld by respondent RTC Judge Edwin Villasor and affirmed by the respondent Court of Appeals. But private respondent
appears to have collected more than the value of the two checks in question before the filing in the trial court of the case for
violation of B.P. 22. Hence, petitioner insists he has been wrongfully convicted and sentenced. To resolve this issue, we
must determine whether the alleged payment of the amount of the checks two years prior to the filing of the information for
violation of B.P. 22 justifies his acquittal.

Whether there is an unconstitutional application of the provisions of B.P. 22 in this case, however, does not appear to us an
appropriate issue for consideration now. A purported constitutional issue raised by petitioner may only be resolved if
essential to the decision of a case and controversy. But here we find that this case can be resolved on other grounds. Well to
remember, courts do not pass upon constitutional questions that are not the very lis mota of a case. 24

In the present case, the checks were conditionally issued for arrearages on rental payments incurred by Lincoln Gerard, Inc.
The checks were signed by petitioner, the president of Lincoln Gerard. It was a condition written on the voucher for each
check that the check was not to be presented for payment without clearance from Lincoln Gerard, to be given at a specific
date. However, Lincoln Gerard was unable to give such clearance owing to a labor strike that paralyzed its business and
resulted to the companys inability to fund its checks. Still, Phelps Dodge deposited the checks, per a note on the voucher
attached thereto that if written approval was not received from Lincoln Gerard before May 30, 1986, the checks would be
presented for payment. "This is final and irrevocable", according to the note that was written actually by an officer of Phelps
Dodge, not by petitioner. The checks were dishonored and Phelps Dodge filed criminal cases for violation of B.P. 22 against
petitioner. But this filing took place only after Phelps Dodge had collected the amount of the checks, with more than one
million pesos to spare, through notarial foreclosure and auction sale of Lincoln Gerards properties earlier impounded by
Phelps Dodge.

In our view, considering the circumstances of the case, the instant petition is meritorious.

The Bouncing Checks Law "was devised to safeguard the interest of the banking system and the legitimate public checking
account user." 25 It was not designed to favor or encourage those who seek to enrich themselves through manipulation and
circumvention of the purpose of the law. 26 Noteworthy, in Administrative Circular No. 12-2000, this Court has expressed a
policy preference for fine as penalty in cases of B.P. 22 violations rather than imprisonment to "best serve the ends of
criminal justice."cralaw virtua1aw l ibrary

Moreover, while the philosophy underlying our penal system leans toward the classical school that imposes penalties for
retribution, 27 such retribution should be aimed at "actual and potential wrongdoers." 28 Note that in the two criminal cases
filed by Phelps Dodge against petitioner, the checks issued were corporate checks that Lincoln Gerard allegedly failed to fund
for a valid reason duly communicated to the payee. Further, it bears repeating that Phelps Dodge, through a notarial
foreclosure and auction that were later on judicially declared invalid, sold Lincoln Gerards property for cash amounting to
P1,120,540 29 to satisfy Phelps Dodge claim for unpaid rentals. Said property was already in Phelps Dodges custody earlier,
purportedly because a new tenant was moving into the leased premises. The obligation of Lincoln Gerard to Phelps Dodge
for said rentals was only P301,953.12. 30 Thus, by resorting to the remedy of foreclosure and auction sale, Phelps Dodge
was able to collect the face value of the two checks, totalling P215,442.65. In fact, it impounded items owned by Lincoln
Gerard valued far in excess of the debt or the checks. This was the situation when, almost two years after the auction sale,
petitioner was charged with two counts of violation of B.P. 22. By that time, the civil obligation of Lincoln Gerard, Inc. to
Phelps Dodge Phils. Inc. was no longer subsisting, though respondent Court of Appeals calls the payment thereof as
involuntary. 31 That the money value of the two checks signed by petitioner was already collected, however, could not be
ignored in appreciating the antecedents of the two criminal charges against petitioner. Because of the invalid foreclosure and
sale, Phelps Dodge was ordered to pay or return P1,072,586.88 to Lincoln Gerard, per decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig, Branch 69, which became final after it was affirmed by the appellate court. We cannot, under these circumstances,
see how petitioners conviction and sentence could be upheld without running afoul of basic principles of fairness and justice.
For Phelps Dodge has, in our view, already exacted its proverbial pound of flesh through foreclosure and auction sale as its
chosen remedy.

That is why we find quite instructive the reasoning of the Court of Appeals earlier rendered in deciding the petition for
Certiorari and Injunction, Griffith v. Judge Milagros Caguioa, CA-G.R. SP No. 20980, in connection with the petitioners
motion to quash the charges herein before they were tried on the merits. 32

Said Justice C. Francisco with the concurrence of Justices Reynato S. Puno and Asaali S. Isnani:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . We are persuaded that the defense has good and solid defenses against both charges in Criminal Cases Nos. 73260-61.
We can even say that the decision rendered in Branch 69 in Civil Case No. 55276, well-written as it is, had put up a
formidable obstacle to any conviction in the criminal cases with the findings therein made that the sale by public auction of
the properties of Lincoln was illegal and had no justification under the facts; that also the proceeds realized in the said sale
should be deducted from the account of Lincoln with Phelps, so that only P47,953.12 may only be the rentals in arrears
which Lincoln should pay, computed at P301,953.12 less P254,600.00; that out of what had happened in the case as the
trial court had resolved in its decision, Phelps is duty bound to pay Lincoln in damages P1,072,586.88 from which had been
deducted the amount of P47,953.12 representing the balance of the rental in arrearages; and that consequently, there is
absolutely no consideration remaining in support of the two (2) subject checks." 33

Petitioners efforts to quash in the Court of Appeals the charges against him was frustrated on procedural grounds because,
according to Justice Francisco, appeal and not certiorari was the proper remedy. 34 In a petition for certiorari, only issues of
jurisdiction including grave abuse of discretion are considered, but an appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for
review.

While we agree with the private respondent that the gravamen of violation of B.P. 22 is the issuance of worthless checks
that are dishonored upon their presentment for payment, we should not apply penal laws mechanically. 35 We must find if
the application of the law is consistent with the purpose of and reason for the law. Ratione cessat lex, et cessat lex. (When
the reason for the law ceases, the law ceases.) It is not the letter alone but the spirit of the law also that gives it life. This is
especially so in this case where a debtors criminalization would not serve the ends of justice but in fact subvert it. The
creditor having collected already more than a sufficient amount to cover the value of the checks for payment of rentals, via
auction sale, we find that holding the debtors president to answer for a criminal offense under B.P. 22 two years after said
collection, is no longer tenable nor justified by law or equitable considerations.

In sum, considering that the money value of the two checks issued by petitioner has already been effectively paid two years
before the informations against him were filed, we find merit in this petition. We hold that petitioner herein could not be
validly and justly convicted or sentenced for violation of B.P. 22. Whether the number of checks issued determines the
number of violations of B.P. 22, or whether there should be a distinction between postdated and other kinds of checks need
no longer detain us for being immaterial now to the determination of the issue of guilt or innocence of petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 19621 dated March 14,
1997, and its resolution dated July 8, 1997, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Geoffrey F. Griffith is ACQUITTED of
the charges of violation of B.P. 22 in Criminal Cases Nos. 41678 and 41679.

People vs Malngan
The Case
For revi ew is the Decisi on1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. CR HC No. 01139
promul gat ed on 2 Sept ember 2005, affi rming wit h modi fi cat ion the Judgment 2 of the Regional
Tri al Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 41, in Criminal Case No. 01 -188424 promul gated on 13
Oct ober 2003, finding appell ant Edna Malngan y Mayo (Edna) gui lt y beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Arson with Multi ple Homi cide or Arson result ing to t he deat h of six (6) peopl e,
and sent encing her t o suffer t he penalt y of deat h.

The Facts
As summarized3 by the Court of Appeals, the antecedent facts are as follows:
From the personal account of Remigio Bernardo, the Barangay Chairman in the area, as well as
the personal account of the pedicab driver named Rolando Gruta, it was at around 4:45 a.m. on January
2, 2001 when Remigio Bernardo and his tanods saw the accused-appellant EDNA, one hired as a
housemaid by Roberto Separa, Sr., with her head turning in different directions, hurriedly leaving the
house of her employer at No. 172 Moderna Street, Balut, Tondo, Manila. She was seen to have
boarded a pedicab which was driven by a person later identified as Rolando Gruta. She was heard by
the pedicab driver to have instructed that she be brought to Nipa Street, but upon her arrival there, she
changed her mind and asked that she be brought instead to Balasan Street where she finally alighted,
after paying for her fare.

Thirty minutes later, at around 5:15 a.m. Barangay Chairman Bernardos group later discovered
that a fire gutted the house of the employer of the housemaid. Barangay Chairman Bernardo and his
tanods responded to the fire upon hearing shouts from the residents and thereafter, firemen from the
Fire District 1-NCR arrived at the fire scene to contain the fire.

When Barangay Chairman Bernardo returned to the Barangay Hall, he received a report from
pedicab driver Rolando Gruta, who was also a tanod, that shortly before the occurrence of the fire, he
saw a woman (the housemaid) coming out of the house at No. 172 Moderna Street, Balut, Tondo,
Manila and he received a call from his wife telling him of a woman (the same housemaid) who was
acting strangely and suspiciously on Balasan Street. Barangay Chairman Bernardo, Rolando Gruta and
the other tanods proceeded to Balasan Street and found the woman who was later identified as the
accused-appellant. After Rolando Gruta positively identified the woman as the same person who left
No. 172 Moderna Street, Balut, Tondo, Manila, Barangay Chairman Bernardo and his tanods







apprehended her and brought her to the Barangay Hall for investigation. At the Barangay Hall,
Mercedita Mendoza, neighbor of Roberto Separa, Sr. and whose house was also burned, identified the
woman as accused-appellant EDNA who was the housemaid of Roberto Separa, Sr. Upon inspection, a
disposable lighter was found inside accused-appellant EDNAs bag. Thereafter, accused-appellant
EDNA confessed to Barangay Chairman Bernardo in the presence of multitudes of angry residents
outside the Barangay Hall that she set her employers house on fire because she had not been paid her
salary for about a year and that she wanted to go home to her province but her employer told her to just
ride a broomstick in going home.

Accused-appellant EDNA was then turned over to arson investigators headed by S[F]O4
Danilo Talusan, who brought her to the San Lazaro Fire Station in Sta. Cruz, Manila where she was
further investigated and then detained.

When Mercedita Mendoza went to the San Lazaro Fire Station to give her sworn statement, she
had the opportunity to ask accused-appellant EDNA at the latters detention cell why she did the
burning of her employers house and accused-appellant EDNA replied that she set the house on fire
because when she asked permission to go home to her province, the wife of her employer Roberto
Separa, Sr., named Virginia Separa (sic) shouted at her: Sige umuwi ka, pagdating mo maputi ka na.
Sumakay ka sa walis, pagdating mo maputi ka na (TSN, January 22, 2002, p.6) (Go ahead, when
you arrive your color would be fair already. Ride a broomstick, when you arrive your color would be
fair already.) And when Mercedita Mendoza asked accused-appellant EDNA how she burned the
house, accused-appellant EDNA told her: Naglukot ako ng maraming diyaryo, sinindihan ko ng
disposable lighter at hinagis ko sa ibabaw ng lamesa sa loob ng bahay (TSN, January 22, 2002, p. 7.)
(I crumpled newspapers, lighted them with a disposable lighter and threw them on top of the table
inside the house.)

When interviewed by Carmelita Valdez, a reporter of ABS-CBN Network, accused-appellant
EDNA while under detention (sic) was heard by SFO4 (sic) Danilo Talusan as having admitted the
crime and even narrated the manner how she accomplished it. SFO4 (sic) Danilo Talusan was able to
hear the same confession, this time at his home, while watching the television program True Crime
hosted by Gus Abelgas also of ABS-CBN Network.

The fire resulted in [the] destruction of the house of Roberto Separa, Sr. and other adjoining
houses and the death of Roberto Separa, Sr. and Virginia Separa together with their four (4) children,
namely: Michael, Daphne, Priscilla and Roberto, Jr.
On 9 January 2001, an Information4 was filed before the RTC of Manila, Branch 41, charging accused-
appellant with the crime of Arson with Multiple Homicide. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 01-188424.
The accusatory portion of said Information provides:
That on or about January 2, 2001, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, with
intent to cause damage, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and deliberately set fire
upon the two-storey residential house of ROBERTO SEPARA and family mostly made of wooden
materials located at No. 172 Moderna St., Balut, Tondo, this city, by lighting crumpled newspaper with
the use of disposable lighter inside said house knowing the same to be an inhabited house and situated
in a thickly populated place and as a consequence thereof a conflagration ensued and the said building,



together with some seven (7) adjoining residential houses, were razed by fire; that by reason and on the
occasion of the said fire, the following, namely,

1. Roberto Separa, Sr., 45 years of age
2. Virginia Separa y Mendoza, 40 years of age
3. Michael Separa, 24 years of age
4. Daphne Separa, 18 years of age
5. Priscilla Separa, 14 years of age
6. Roberto Separa, Jr., 11 years of age sustained burn injuries which were the
direct cause of their death immediately thereafter.5
When arraigned, accused-appellant with assistance of counsel de oficio, pleaded6 Not Guilty to the crime
charged. Thereafter, trial ensued.7
The prosecution presented five (5) witnesses, namely, SPO48 Danilo Talusan, Rolando Gruta, Remigio
Bernardo, Mercedita Mendoza and Rodolfo Movilla to establish its charge that accused-appellant Edna committed the
crime of arson with multiple homicide.

SPO4 Danilo Talusan, arson investigator, testified that he was one of those who responded to the fire that
occurred on 2 January 2001 and which started at No. 172 Moderna St., Balut, Tondo, Manila. He stated that the fire
killed Roberto Separa, Sr. and all the other members of his family, namely his wife, Virginia, and his children,
Michael, Daphne, Priscilla and Roberto, Jr.; the fire also destroyed their abode as well as six neighboring houses. He
likewise testified that he twice heard accused-appellant once while the latter was being interviewed by Carmelita
Valdez, a reporter of ABS-CBN, and the other time when it was shown on channel 2 on television during the airing of
the television program entitled True Crime hosted by Gus Abelgas confess to having committed the crime
charged, to wit:

Lastl y, t he prosecuti on present ed Rodol fo Movi lla, owner of the house situat ed beside t hat
of t he Separa famil y. He t esti fi ed that his house was also gutt ed by the fire that ki lled the Separa
famil y and t hat he t ri ed to hel p said vi cti ms but to no avail.

The prosecuti on present ed other documentary evi dence9 and t hereafter rest ed its case.












When it came time for the defense to present excul patory evidence, inst ead of doing so,
accused-appell ant fi led a Moti on to Admit Demurrer t o Evi dence10 and the corresponding
Demurrer to Evidence11 with t he former expressl y st ating that said Demurrer to Evi dence was
bei ng fil ed x x x wi thout express l eave of court x x x. 12

In her Demurrer to Evi dence, accused-appellant asserts that the prosecutions evi dence was
insuffi ci ent to prove her guilt beyond reasonabl e doubt for the foll owi ng reasons: 13 (a) that she i s
charged wit h crime not defined and penalized by l aw; (b) that ci rcumst anti al evidence was
insuffi ci ent to prove her guilt beyond reasonabl e doubt ; and (c) that the t est i moni es given by the
witnesses of the prosecution were hearsay, thus, inadmissibl e i n evidence against her.

The prosecution fi led its Comment/Opposi tion to accused-appell ant s Demurrer to
Evi dence.

On 13 October 2003, acting on the Demurrer to Evidence, the RTC promulgated its Judgment14 wherein it
proceeded to resolve the subject case based on the evidence of the prosecution. The RTC considered accused-
appellant to have waived her right to present evidence, having filed the Demurrer to Evidence without leave of court.

In finding accused-appellant Edna guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Arson with Multiple
Homicide, the RTC ruled that:

The first argument of the accused that she is charged with an act not defined and penalized by
law is without merit. x x x the caption which charges the accused with the crime of Arson with
Multiple Homicide is merely descriptive of the charge of Arson that resulted to Multiple Homicide.
The fact is that the accused is charged with Arson which resulted to Multiple Homicide (death of
victims) and that charge is embodied and stated in the body of the information. What is controlling is
the allegation in the body of the Information and not the title or caption thereof. x x x.

The second and third arguments will be discussed joi ntl y as they are
interrel at ed wit h each other. x x x.












[W]hile there is no direct evidence t hat points to the accused i n the act of burning t he
house or act ual l y starting the subject fi re, the foll owi ng ci rcumstances that show t hat
the accused int enti onall y caused or was responsibl e for the subject fire have been
dul y established:

1. that immedi at el y before t he burning of t he house, t he accused hurri edl y
and with head t urni ng in di fferent di rections (palinga -linga) went out of the said
house and rode a pedicab apparentl y not knowi ng where to go x x x;

2. that immedi at el y aft er the fi re, upon a report that t here was a woman in
Bal asan St. who appears confused and apprehensi ve (bali sa), the Barangay Chai rman
and his t anods went there, found the accused and apprehended her and brought her to
the barangay hall as shown by the t estimony of Barangay Chai rman Remi gi o
Bernardo; and

3. that when she was apprehended and investi gat ed by the barangay
official s and when her bag was opened, the same cont ai ned a disposabl e li ght er as
likewise shown by the t esti mony of t he Barangay Chai rman.

[T]he timi ng of her hurri ed departure and nervous demeanor immediat el y before t he
fire when she l eft t he house and rode a pedi cab and her same demeanor, physi cal and
ment al condit ion when found and apprehended at the same pl ace where she ali ght ed
from t he pedi cab and t he di scovery of t he li ght er in her bag thereaft er when
investi gat ed indi sput abl y show her guilt as charged.

If t here is any doubt of her gui lt that remains wit h the circumstanti al evidence
against her, the same is removed or obl iterat ed with the confessi ons/ admissi ons of
the commi ssion of the offense and t he manner thereof that she made to the
prosecut ion witnesses Barangay Chai rman Remi gio Bernardo, Merced it a Mendoza
and to the medi a, respectivel y.

[H]er confessi ons/ admissions are positive acknowledgment of guil t of t he crime and
appear to have been voluntari l y and int elli gentl y gi ven. These
confessi ons/ admissi ons, especiall y the one given t o her nei ghbor Mercedit a Mendoza
and the medi a, al bei t uncounselled and made whil e she was al ready under the cust ody
of aut horiti es, it is beli eved, are not viol ative of her ri ght under the Consti tution.

The decretal part of the RTCs Judgment reads:

WHEREFORE, t he Demurrer to Evidence is hereby deni ed and judgment is
hereby rendered fi nding the accused EDNA MALNGAN Y MAYO guilt y beyond
reasonabl e doubt of the crime of Arson with Multiple Homi cide or Arson resul ting t o
the death of six (6) peopl e and sent encing her to suffer the mandatory penalt y of
death, and orderi ng her t o pay the hei rs of the vi ctims Roberto Separa, Sr. and
Virgini a Separa and chil dren Mi chael, Daphne, Pri sci lla and Roberto, Jr. , the amount
of Fi ft y Thousand (P50, 000. 00) Pesos for each vi ctim and the amount of One
Hundred Thousand (P100, 000. 00) Pesos as temperat e damages for thei r burned house
or a tot al of Four Hundred Thousand (P400, 000. 00) Pesos and to Rodolfo Movill a t he
amount of One Hundred [Thousand] (P100, 000. 00) Pesos.


Due to the deat h penalt y imposed by t he RTC, the case was directl y el evat ed to t his Court
for automati c revi ew. Conformabl y wit h our deci sion i n Peopl e v. Efren Mateo y Garcia, 15
however, we referred the case and i ts records to t he CA for appropri at e action and dispos i tion.

On 2 Sept ember 2005, the Court of Appeals affi rmed wit h modifi cation the deci si on of t he
RTC, t he fall o of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assail ed Oct ober 13, 2003 Judgment
of the Regi onal Tri al Court of Manila, Branch 41, fi ndi ng accused-appellant Edna
Malngan y Mayo guilt y beyond reasonable doubt of Arson with mult ipl e homi cide
and sent enci ng her to suffer the DEATH PENALTY is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION in that she i s further ordered to pay P50, 000. 00 as moral damages
and anot her P50, 000. 00 as exempl ary damages for each of the vi cti ms who peri shed
in the fire, to be paid to t hei r hei rs. She is ordered to pay Rodol fo Movill a, one
whose house was also burned, t he sum of P50, 000. 00 as exemplary damage.

Pursuant to Section 13 (a), Rul e 124 of the 2000 Rul es of Criminal Procedure
as amended by A. M. No. 00-5-03-SC dat ed Sept ember 28, 2004, whi ch became
effective on October 15, 2004, the Court of Appeals, aft er rendering judgment ,
hereby refrains from maki ng an ent ry of judgment and fort hwith certi fi es t he case
and elevat es the ent i re record of thi s case to t he Supreme Court for revi ew. 16

It i s t he cont ent ion of accused-appell ant that t he evidence present ed by the prosecuti on is
not sufficient to est abli sh her guilt beyond reasonabl e doubt as t he perpet rator of the crime
charged. In support of sai d excul pat ory propositi on, she assi gns the following errors 17:

I.

THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION IS SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT THE ACCUSED; and

II.

THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING AND GIVING CREDENCE TO
THE HEARSAY EVIDENCE AND UNCOUNSELLED ADMISSIONS ALLEGEDLY
GIVEN BY THE ACCUSED TO THE WITNESSES BARANGAY CHAIRMAN
REMIGIO BERNARDO, MERCEDITA MENDOZA AND THE MEDIA.


THERE IS NO COMPLEX CRIME OF ARSON WI TH (MULTI PLE) HOMI CI DE.








The Inf ormation in this case erroneousl y charged accused-appell ant with a compl ex cri me,
i. e. , Arson wi th Mul tiple Homi ci de. Presentl y, t here are two (2) laws that govern the crime of
arson where death results t herefrom Articl e 320 of t he Revi sed Penal Code (RPC), as amended
by Republ ic Act (RA) No. 7659, 18 and Sect ion 5 of Presidenti al Decree (PD) No. 161319, quot ed
hereunder, to wit:

Revised Penal Code:

ART. 320. Destruct i ve Arson. x x x x
If as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts penalized under thi s
Arti cle, death result s, the mandat ory penalt y of death shall be imposed. [Emphasis
suppl ied. ]

Presidential Decree No. 1613:

SEC. 5. Where Deat h Results from Arson. If by reason of or on the occasion
of the arson deat h results, t he penal t y of reclusion perpetua to death shall be
imposed. [Emphasis suppl ied. ]

Art. 320 of the RPC, as amended, wit h respect t o dest ructive arson, and t he provisions of PD No.
1613 respecting ot her cases of arson provi de onl y one penalt y for the commi ssion of arson,
whet her consi dered dest ructi ve or otherwise, where death results t heref rom. The raison d' tre is
that arson i s itsel f t he end and deat h is si mpl y t he consequence. 20

Whether the cri me of arson will absorb the result ant death or will have t o be a separate
cri me altoget her, the joint discussi on21 of the late Mr. Chi ef Justice Ramon C. Aqui no and Mme.
Justice Carolina C. Gri o-Aquino, on t he subj ect of the crimes of arson and murder/homicide, i s
hi ghl y instructive:

Groizard says that when fi re is used wit h the i nt ent to kill a parti cul ar person
who may be in a house and that obj ecti ve is at tai ned by burni ng the house, the cri me
is murder onl y. When the Penal Code declares that killi ng commi tted by means of
fire is murder, it int ends that fi re should be purposel y adopt ed as a means to that end.
There can be no murder without a desi gn to t ake li fe. 22 In other words, i f the mai n











obj ect of t he offender i s to kil l by means of fi re, the offense is murder. But if the
main obj ecti ve is the burni ng of the buil ding, the resulting homicide may be absorbed
by the crime of arson. 23

If the house was set on fire after t he vi ct ims therei n were kill ed, fi re woul d not be a
qualifyi ng ci rcumst ance. The accused would be li able for t he separate offenses of
murder or homi ci de, as t he case may be, and arson. 24

Accordi ngl y, i n cases where bot h burni ng and death occur, in order t o det ermine what
cri me/ crimes was/ were perpetrat ed whether arson, murder or arson and homici de/murder, it is
de ri gueur to ascert ain t he mai n obj ecti ve of the mal efactor: (a) if the main objective i s the
burning of the building or edi fi ce, but death results by reason or on the occasion of arson, t he
cri me i s simpl y arson, and t he resul ting homi cide is absorbed; (b) i f, on the other hand, the main
obj ecti ve is to kill a parti cul ar person who may be in a building or edifi ce, when fi re is resort ed
to as the means to accompli sh such goal the crime committed is murder onl y; lastl y, (c) if the
obj ecti ve is, likewi se, to kill a parti cular person, and in fact t he offender has al ready done so, but
fire i s resort ed to as a means t o cover up the ki lling, then there are two separate and disti nct
cri mes commit ted homi ci de/ murder and arson.

Where then does t his case fall under?

From a reading of t he body of t he Information:

That on or about January 2, 2001, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, with
intent to cause damage, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and deliberately set fire
upon the two-storey residential house of ROBERTO SEPARA and family mostly made of wooden
materials located at No. 172 Moderna St., Balut, Tondo, this city, by lighting crumpled newspaper with
the use of disposable lighter inside said house knowing the same to be an inhabited house and situated
in a thickly populated place and as a consequence thereof a conflagration ensued and the said building,
together with some seven (7) adjoining residential houses, were razed by fire; that by reason and on
the occasion of the said fire, the following, namely,

1. Roberto Separa, Sr., 45 years of age
2. Virginia Separa y Mendoza, 40 years of age
3. Michael Separa, 24 years of age
4. Daphne Separa, 18 years of age
5. Priscilla Separa, 14 years of age
6. Roberto Separa, Jr., 11 years of age

sustained burn injuries which were the direct cause of their death immediately thereafter.25 [Emphasis
supplied.]








accused-appell ant is bei ng charged with t he crime of arson. It it is clear from the foregoing that
her intent was merel y to dest roy her employers house through the use of fi re.

We now go to t he issues raised. Under the fi rst assi gnment of error, i n asserting the
insuffi ci ency of the prosecutions evidence to est abl ish her guil t beyond reasonabl e doubt ,
accused-appell ant argues that the prosecution was onl y abl e to adduce circumst antial evi dence
hardl y enough to prove her gui lt beyond reasonabl e doubt . She rati oci nates that the following
circumst ances:

1. That immedi at el y before t he burning of t he house , the accused hurri edl y
and wit h head t urni ng in di fferent di rections (pali nga-l inga) went out of t he
said house and rode a pedi cab apparentl y not knowi ng where to go for she fi rst
request ed to be brought to Ni pa St. but upon reaching t here request ed again to
be brought t o Bal asan St . as shown by the testimony of prosecut ion wit ness
Rolando Grut a;

2. That i mmedi at el y aft er the fire, upon a report that there was a woman in
Bal asan St. who appears confused and apprehensi ve ( bali sa), the Barangay
Chai rman and his tanods went there, found the accused and apprehended her
and brought her to the barangay hal l as shown by the test imony of Barangay
Chai rman Remi gio Bernardo; and

3. That when she was apprehended and investi gated by t he barangay offi ci als a nd
when her bag was opened, the same contained a disposabl e l ight er as likewise
shown by t he t estimony of t he Barangay Chai rman. 26

fal l short of proving that she had any i nvolvement in setting her employers house on fi re, much
less show guilt beyond reasonabl e doubt, given that it is a fact t hat housemai ds are the fi rst
persons in the house to wake up earl y to perform routi ne chores for thei r employers, 27 one of
whi ch is preparing and cooki ng the morning meal for t he members of the household; and
necessit y requi res her to go out earl y to l ook for open stores or even nearby marketpl aces t o buy
things that wi ll complet e the earl y meal for the day. 28 She then concludes t hat it was normal for
her to have been seen going out of her employers house i n a hurry a t that time of the day and t o
look at all di recti ons to insure t hat the house is secure and t hat t here are no other persons in the
vici nit y. 29










We are far from persuaded.

True, by t he nature of their jobs, housemaids are required t o st art t he day earl y ; however,
contrary to sai d assert ion, the act uat ions and the demeanor of accused -appellant on that fat eful
earl y morning as observed firsthand by Rolando Gruta, one of the wi tnesses of t he prosecuti on,
beli e her cl aim of normalcy, t o wit:

We quot e wit h approval the pronouncement of the RTC in discrediting accused -appell ant s
aforementi oned rational e:

[O]bviousl y it is never normal, common or ordinary to l eave the house in such a
disturbed, nervous and agit at ed manner, demeanor and condit ion. The timing of her
hurri ed depart ure and nervous demeanor immedi at el y before the fi re when she l eft
the house and rode a pedi cab and her same demeanor, physi cal and mental condi tion
when found and apprehended at the same place where she al ight ed from the pedi cab
and t he di scovery of the li ghter i n her bag t hereaft er when i nvesti gat ed i ndi sput abl y
show her guilt as charged. 30

All the wit nesses are in accord that accused-appell ant s agitat ed appearance was out of the
ordi nary. Remarkabl y, she has never deni ed this obs ervation.

We give great weight to the findings of the RTC and so accord credence to the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses as it had the opportunity to observe them directly. The credibility given by trial courts to prosecution
witnesses is an important aspect of evidence which appellate courts can rely on because of its unique opportunity to
observe them, particularly their demeanor, conduct, and attitude, during the direct and cross-examination by counsels.
Here, Remigio Bernardo, Rolando Gruta and Mercedita Mendoza are disinterested witnesses and there is not an iota
of evidence in the records to indicate that they are suborned witnesses. The records of the RTC even show that
Remigio Bernardo, the Barangay Chairman, kept accused-appellant from being mauled by the angry crowd outside of
the barangay hall:

Pros. Rebagay:
Now, who were present when the accused are (sic) tel ling you this?

A: Iyon nga i yong mga tanod ko, mamamayan doon nakapali gid, si yempre may
sunog nagkakagul o, gusto nga si yang kunin ng mga mamamayan para saktan
hindi ko mai bigay papatayi n si ya gawa ng may namatay eh anim na tao and
namatay, kaya i yong mga tao kinokont rol siya madi disgrasya siya dahi l pin -
point ed po siya, Your Honor, iyong dami na iyon libo iyong nakapaligid doo n
sa barangay hall napakahirap awatin. Gusting-gust o si yang kunin ng mga
taong-bayan, nagali t dahi l ang daming bahay hong nasunog. 31

Accused-appellant has not shown any compelling reason why the witnesses presented would openly, publicly and
deliberately lie or concoct a story, to send an innocent person to jail all the while knowing that the real malefactor
remains at large. Such proposition defies logic. And where the defense failed to show any evil or improper motive





on the part of the prosecution witnesses, the presumption is that their testimonies are true and thus entitled to full faith
and credence.32

While t he prosecution wit nesses di d not see accused-appell ant actuall y st arti ng t he fi re that
burned several houses and killed t he Separa famil y, her gui lt may st ill be established t hrough
circumst anti al evi dence provi ded that: (1) there is more than one ci rcumst ance; (2) the facts from
whi ch the inferences are derived are proven; and, (3) the combination of all t he circumst ances is
such as t o produce convi ction beyond reasonabl e doubt. 33

Circumst antial evidence is that evi dence whi ch proves a fact or seri es of facts from whi ch
the facts i n issue may be established by inference. 34 It is founded on experi ence and observed
facts and coincidences est abli shing a connecti on bet ween t he known and proven facts and the
facts sought t o be proved. 35 In order t o bring about a convi ction, the circumst antial evidence
present ed must constitut e an unbroken chai n, which leads to one fai r and reasonabl e conclusion
point i ng to t he accused, to the exclusion of others, as the guil t y person. 36

In t his case, the interlocking t esti moni es of the prosecut i on witnesses, t aken together,
exempli fy a case where convict ion can be uphel d on the basi s of circumstanti al evidence. Fi rs t,
prosecut ion witness Rolando Grut a, t he driver of the pedi cab that accused -appell ant rode on,
testi fi ed t hat he knew for a fact t hat she worked as a housemaid of the vict ims, and that he
positi vel y identi fi ed her as the person hurriedl y l eavi ng the house of the vi ctims on 2 Januar y
2001 at 4:45 a. m. , and acti ng in a nervous manner. That while riding on t he pedicab, accused -
appell ant was unsure of her int ended desti nat ion. Upon reachi ng the place where he ori gi nal l y
picked up accused-appellant onl y a few minut es after droppi ng her off, Rol ando Grut a saw the
Separas house being gutted by a bl azing fire. Second, Remi gio Bernardo t esti fi ed that he and hi s
tanods, i ncl uding Rolando Gruta, were t he ones who pi cked up accused -appell ant Edna at Balasan
Street (where Rol ando Grut a dropped her off) aft er receivi ng a call that t here was a woman act ing
strangel y at said st reet and who appeared to have nowhere t o go. Thi rd, SPO4 Danilo Talusan
overheard accused-appellant admit to Carmelit a Valdez, a report er of Chan nel 2 (ABS-CBN) that
said accused-appel lant st arted the fi re, plus t he fact t hat he was abl e see the tel ecast of Gus
Abel gas show where accused-appell ant, whil e bei ng i nt erviewed, confessed to the cri me as well .
The foregoing t esti moni es j uxtaposed with t he t estimony of Mercedit a Mendoza validati ng t he
fact that accused-appell ant confessed t o having st arted the fi re whi ch kill ed the Separa famil y as











wel l as burned seven houses including that of t he vi ctims, convincingl y form an unbroken chain,
whi ch l eads to the unassai lable concl usion pinpointi ng accused-appell ant as the person behind t he
cri me of simpl e arson.

In her second assi gned error, accused-appell ant questions the admissi bilit y of her
uncounselled extrajudici al confessi on given to prosecuti on wi t nesses, namel y Remigio Bernardo,
Mercedita Mendoza, and t o the medi a. Accused-appell ant Edna cont ends that bei ng uncounselled
extrajudi ci al confession, her admissi ons t o having committ ed the crime charged should have been
excluded in evidence against her f or being violat ive of Arti cle III, Section 12(1) of the
Constit ution.

Part icularl y, she t akes exception to t he t estimony of prosecut ion witnesses Remi gio Bernardo and
Mercedita Mendoza for bei ng hearsay and in t he nature of an uncounsell ed admissi on.

With the above vital pieces of evi dence excluded, accused-appellant is of the position that
the remai ning proof of her all eged guil t, consisti ng in t he main of circumst ant ial evidence, is
inadequate to establi sh her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

We partl y disagree.

Arti cl e III, Sect ion 12 of the Constituti on in part provides:

(1) Any person under invest i gation for the commissi on of an offense shall
have t he ri ght t o be informed of his ri ght to remain sil ent and to have compet ent and
independent counsel preferabl y of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
servi ces of counsel, he must be provided with one. These ri ghts cannot be wai ved
except i n wri ting and in t he presence of counsel.

(3) Any confession or admi ssion obt ai ned in viol ati on of thi s Sect ion or
Section 17 hereof shall be inadmi ssible i n evidence.

We have held that t he abovequot ed provi sion appl ies to the st age of custodi al investi gation
when the investi gation is no longer a general inqui ry into an unsol ved crime but start s to focus
on a parti cul ar person as a suspect . 37 Said constit utional guarant ee has also been extended t o
situations in which an indivi dual has not been formal l y arrest ed but has merel y been invi ted for
questioning. 38

To be admissibl e i n evi dence agai nst an accused, the extrajudici al confessions made must
satisfy the fol lowing requi rements:

(1) it must be volunt ary;
(2) it must be made with the assist ance of competent and independent counsel;
(3) it must be express; and





(4) it must be i n writi ng. 39

Arguabl y, t he barangay t anods, i ncluding t he Barangay Chai rman, in this parti cul ar
inst ance, may be deemed as l aw enforcement offi cer for purposes of appl yi ng Articl e III, Secti on
12(1) and (3), of the Constitution. When accused-appell ant was brought to the barangay hall in
the morni ng of 2 January 2001, she was already a suspect , actuall y t he onl y one, in the fire that
dest royed several houses as well as kil led the whol e famil y of Robert o Separa, Sr. She was,
therefore, al ready under custodi al invest i gati on and t he ri ghts guarant eed by Article III, Secti on
12(1), of t he Const itution shoul d have al ready been observed or appli ed to her. Accused -
appell ants confessi on to Barangay Chairman Remi gio Bernardo was made in response to the
int errogation made by the l att er admitt edl y conduct ed without fi rst i nforming accused-
appell ant of her ri ghts under the Constitution or done in the presence of counsel. For this reason,
the confession of accused-appell ant, gi ven t o Barangay Chai rman Remi gi o Bernardo, as well as
the li ghter found by the l att er in her bag are i nadmissibl e i n evidence against her as such were
obt ained i n viol ation of her const ituti onal ri ghts.

Be that as it may, the inadmissi bilit y of accused-appel lants confession t o Barangay
Chai rman Remi gio Bernardo and t he l ight er as evidence do not automati call y l ead t o her
acquitt al . It should well be recall ed that the constitutional safeguards during custodial
investi gati ons do not appl y t o those not elicit ed through quest ioning by the poli ce or t hei r agent s
but gi ven in an ordi nary manner whereby the accused verbal l y admits to having commi tted the
offense as what happened in the case at bar when accused -appell ant admitt ed to Mercedit a
Mendoza, one of the nei ghbors of Robert o Separa, Sr. , to having st art ed the fi re i n the Separas
house. The t estimony of Mercedi ta Mendoza recounti ng said admi ssion is, unfortunatel y for
accused-appell ant, admissi ble in evi dence agai nst her and is not covered by the aforesaid
constitut ional guarantee. Arti cl e III of the Constitution, or the Bill of Ri ghts, sol el y governs t he
rel ati onship between the individual on one hand and the St ate (and i ts agent s) on the ot her; it
does not concern it sel f wit h the rel ati on between a private individual and another private
indivi dual as both accused-appell ant and prosecution witness Mercedit a Mendoza undoubt edl y
are. 40 Here, there is no evidence on record to show that sai d witness was acting under poli ce
aut horit y, so appropri at el y, accused-appell ant s uncounsell ed extraj udi ci al confession t o sai d
witness was properl y admitt ed by t he RTC.

Accused-appellant likewise assails the admission of the testimony of SPO4 Danilo Talusan. Contending that [w]hen
SPO4 Danilo Talusan testified in court, his story is more of events, which are not within his personal knowledge but
based from accounts of witnesses who derived information allegedly from the accused or some other persons x x x.
In other words, she objects to the testimony for being merely hearsay. With this imputation of inadmissibility, we
agree with what the Court of Appeals had to say:

Although this testimony of SFO4 Danilo Talusan is hearsay because he was not present when Gus
Abelgas interviewed accused-appellant EDNA, it may nevertheless be admitted in evidence as an
independently relevant statement to establish not the truth but the tenor of the statement or the fact that
the statement was made [People v. Mallari, G.R. No. 103547, July 20, 1999, 310 SCRA 621 citing





People v. Cusi, Jr., G.R. No. L-20986, August 14, 1965, 14 SCRA 944.]. In People vs. Velasquez, G.R.
Nos. 132635 & 143872-75, February 21, 2001, 352 SCRA 455, the Supreme Court ruled that:

Under the doctrine of independently relevant statements, regardless of their truth or
falsity, the fact that such statements have been made is relevant. The hearsay rule does
not apply, and the statements are admissible as evidence. Evidence as to the making of
such statement is not secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a
fact in issue or be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact.41


As regards the confession given by accused-appell ant t o the medi a, we need not discuss i t
further for the report ers were never presented to testi fy i n court.

As a final attempt at exculpation, accused-appell ant asserts t hat since t he ident iti es of the
burned bodi es were never concl usi vel y established, she cannot be responsibl e for t hei r deaths.

Such assert ion is bereft of merit.

In the crime of arson, the identi ties of the victims are immaterial in that i ntent to kill them
parti cul arl y is not one of the el ement s of the crime. As we have cl arified earlier, the killi ng of a
person is absorbed in the charge of arson, si mpl e or dest ructive. The prosecut ion need onl y
prove, that the burning was int enti onal and that what was intentionall y burned is an inhabited
house or dwell ing. Again, in the case of Peopl e v. Soriano, 42 we expl ained that:

Although int ent may be an ingredi ent of t he crime of Arson, it may be i nferred
from t he acts of t he accused. There is a presumption that one i ntends the natural
consequences of his act; and when it is shown that one has deliberatel y set fi re t o a
buildi ng, the prosecution i s not bound t o produce further evidence of his wrongful
intent. 43

The ult imat e query now i s whi ch kind of arson is accused -appell ant guil t y of?

As previously discussed, there are two (2) categories of the crime of arson: 1) destructive arson, under Art. 320 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659; and 2) simple arson, under Presidential Decree No.
1613. Said classification is based on the kind, character and location of the property burned, regardless of the value
of the damage caused,44 to wit:










Arti cl e 320 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659, cont empl at es
the mal ici ous burni ng of structures, both public and private, hotels, buildings,
edifices, trains, vessels, ai rcraft, factori es and other mil itary, government or
commercial establ ishments by any person or group of persons . [45] The
cl assi fi cation of this t ype of crime is known as Destructive Arson, which is
punishabl e by reclusion perpetua to deat h. The reason for t he law is sel f -evi dent: to
effectivel y discourage and det er the commission of t his dast ardl y crime, to prevent
the dest ruction of properti es and protect the lives of innocent peopl e. Exposure to a
brewi ng conflagrati on l eaves onl y dest ruction and despai r in it s wake; hence, the
Stat e mandat es great er ret ribution to authors of thi s hei nous crime. The excepti onall y
severe punishment i mposed for this crime t akes into consideration the extreme
danger to human lives exposed by the mal icious burning of t hese structures; the
danger to propert y resulting from the conflagration; the fact that it is normall y
diffi cult to adopt precautions agai nst it s commissi on, and the difficult y in
pinpointi ng t he perpetrat ors; and, t he great er impact on the soc i al, economi c,
securit y and politi cal fabri c of t he nation. [Emphasi s suppli ed. ]

If as a consequence of t he commi ssion of any of the act s penalized under Art .
320, death should result, the mandat ory penalt y of death shall be imposed.

On t he ot her hand, PD 1613 which repeal ed Arts. 321 to 326-B of The Revised
Penal Code remai ns t he governi ng l aw for Simpl e Arson. This decree contempl at es
the mal ici ous burni ng of publi c and private struct ures, regardl ess of size, not
incl uded i n Art . 320, as amended by RA 7659, and cl assifi ed as other cases of arson.

These i ncl ude houses, dwell ings, government buildings, farms, mil ls,
plantations, rai lways, bus stati ons, ai rports, wharves and other industrial
establishments. [46] Although t he purpose of the law on Simpl e Arson is t o prevent
the hi gh inci dence of fi res and ot her crimes i nvolving dest ruct ion, prot ect the
nati onal economy and preserve t he soci al , economi c and politi cal st abi lit y of the
nati on, PD 1613 t empers t he penalt y to be met ed to offenders. This separat e
cl assi fi cation of Simple Arson recognizes the need t o l essen the severit y of
punishment commensurat e t o the act or acts committ ed, depending on the parti cul ar
facts and ci rcumstances of each case. [Emphasis suppli ed. ]

To emphasize:

The nature of Destructive Arson is distinguished from Simple Arson by the degree of perversity or
viciousness of the criminal offender. The acts committed under Art. 320 of the Revised Penal Code (as
amended) constituting Destructive Arson are characterized as heinous crimes for being grievous,
odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness,
viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms
of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society.47 On the other hand, acts committed






under PD 1613 constituting Simple Arson are crimes with a lesser degree of perversity and viciousness
that the law punishes with a lesser penalty. In other words, Simple Arson contemplates crimes with
less significant social, economic, political and national security implications than Destructive Arson.
However, acts falling under Simple Arson may nevertheless be converted into Destructive Arson
depending on the qualifying circumstances present. [Emphasis supplied.]48

Prescinding from the above clarification vis--vis the description of the crime as stated in the accusatory portion of the
Information, it is quite evident that accused-appellant was charged with the crime of Simple Arson for having
deliberately set fire upon the two-storey residential houseof ROBERTO SEPARA and family x x x knowing the same
to be an inhabited house and situated in a thickly populated place and as a consequence thereof a conflagration
ensued and the said building, together with some seven (7) adjoining residential houses, were razed by fire.
[Emphasis supplied.]

The facts of the case at bar is somewhat similar to the facts of the case of People v. Soriano.49 The accused in the
latter case caused the burning of a particular house. Unfortunately, the blaze spread and gutted down five (5)
neighboring houses. The RTC therein found the accused guilty of destructive arson under paragraph 150 of Art. 320
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. This Court, through Mr. Justice Bellosillo,
however, declared that:

x x x [T]he applicable provision of law should be Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613, which imposes a penalty
of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua for other cases of arson as the properties burned by
accused-appellant are specifically described as houses, contemplating inhabited houses or dwellings
under the aforesaid law. The descriptions as alleged in the second Amended Information particularly
refer to the structures as houses rather than as buildings or edifices. The applicable law should
therefore be Sec. 3, Par. 2, of PD 1613, and not Art. 320, par. 1 of the Penal Code. In case of ambiguity
in construction of penal laws, it is well-settled that such laws shall be construed strictly against the
government, and liberally in favor of the accused.

The elements of arson under Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613 are: (a) there is intentional burning; and (b)
what is intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling. Incidentally, these elements concur in
the case at bar.51

As stat ed in the body of the Information, accused-appell ant was charged wit h havi ng
intentional l y burned the two-storey residential house of Robert Separa. Sai d confl agration
likewise spread and dest royed seven (7) adj oining houses. Consequentl y, i f proved, as it was










proved, at the t ri al, she may be convi ct ed, and sentenced accordingl y, of the crime of simple
arson. Such is the case notwit hst anding the error i n the desi gnation of the offense i n the
information, the information remains effective i nsofar as it st ates the facts constituting t he crime
all eged therein. 52 What i s cont rolling i s not the ti tle of t he complai nt, nor t he desi gnat ion of
the offense charged or t he particul ar law or part thereof all egedl y viol at e, x x x, but the
descripti on of the cri me charged and t he part icular facts t herei n recit ed. 53

There i s, t hus, a need to modi fy the penalt y imposed by the RTC as Sec. 5 of PD No. 1613
categoricall y provides that t he penalt y to be imposed for simpl e arson is:

SEC. 5. Where Death Result s from Arson. - If by reason of or on the occasi on
of arson death result s, the penalt y of recl usion perpetua to death shall be imposed.
[Emphasis suppli ed. ]

Accordi ngl y, t here being no aggravating circumst ance all eged in t he Informati on, t he
imposabl e penalt y on accused-appell ant is reclusion perpet ua.

Apropos the civi l li abiliti es of accused-appellant, current j uri sprudence54 di ct at e that the
civil indemnit y due from accused-appell ant is P50, 000. 00 for the deat h of each of the vi ctims. 55
However, the monetary awards for moral and exempl ary damages given by the Court of Appeals,
both in t he amount of P50, 000. 00, due t he hei rs of the victims, have t o be del et ed for l ack of
mat eri al basis. Simil arl y, the Court of Appeals award of exemplary damages t o Rodolfo Movill a
in the amount of P50, 000. 00 for the destructi on of his house, also has to be del eted, but i n this
inst ance for being improper. Moral damages cannot be award by this Court in the absence of
proof of ment al or physi cal sufferi ng on the part of the heirs of t he vi ctims. 56 Concerning the
award of exempl ary damages, the reason for the delet ion being that no aggravati ng ci rcumst ance
had been al l eged and proved by the prosecuti on i n t he case at bar. 57

To summarize, accused-appell ant s alt ernative pl ea that she be acquitt ed of the crime must
be rej ect ed. With t he evidence on record, we find no cogent reason t o dist urb the findings of t he













RTC and t he Court of Appeals. It is indubitable t hat accused-appell ant is the author of the cri me
of simple arson. All the ci rcumstanti al evidence present ed before the RTC, vi ewed in its ent iret y,
is as convincing as direct evi dence and, as such, negat es accuse d-appell ant s innocence, and when
considered concurrentl y wit h her admission given t o Mercedit a Mendoza, the formers guilt
beyond reasonable doubt i s twi ce as evident . Hence, her convicti on i s effecti vel y justi fied. More
so, as it is propitious to not e that i n stark contrast to the factual circumst ances present ed by the
prosecut ion, accused-appell ant neit her mustered a deni al nor an alibi except for the proposi tion
that her gui lt had not been est ablished beyond reasonabl e doubt.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, t he Deci sion of the Court of Appeal s dat ed 2 Sept ember 2005, in CA
G. R. CR HC No. 01139, is hereby AFFIRMED insofar as the convi ction of accused -appell ant
EDNA MALNGAN Y MAYO is concerned. The sent ence t o be imposed and the amount of
damages to be awarded, however, are MODIFIED. In accordance with Sec. 5 of Presidential
Decree No. 1613, accused-appell ant is hereby sent enced t o RECLUSION PERPETUA. Accused-
appell ant is hereby ordered to pay t he hei rs of each of the vict ims P50, 000. 00 as ci vil indemnit y.