Hegel Science of Logic

21 - 41 The speculative is the most important aspect of dialectic.

21 - 45 Logic was defined as the science of pure thought the science that has pure nowledge for its
principle and is a unit! which is not a"stract "ut living and concrete# so that the opposition of
consciousness "etween a "eing su"$ectivel! e%isting for itself# and another "ut o"$ectivel! e%isting such
"eing# has "een overcome in it# and "eing is nown to "e in itself a pure concept and the pure concept
to "e true "eing.
The su"$ect and o"$ect are distinct# "ut do not e%ist for themselves for this reason their unit! is not
a"stract# dead and inert# "ut concrete.
The earl! determinations of the concept &earl! as in along the pathwa! to truth'# "! which these
determinations e%isted for themselves# are now in their truth# that is# in their unit!# reduced to forms.
21 4(f The o"$ective logic taes the place of ontolog! &a species of metaph!sics'. The o"$ective logic
is genuinel! critical )a criti*ue that considers +determinations of thought,# not according to the
a"stract form of the a priori as contrasted with the a posteriori +there"! maing use of the world
uncriticall!,# "ut in themselves according to their particular content.-
21 55 The idea has a determination that has "ecome truth it has interiori.ed the su"$ect matter that
would otherwise have stood over against certaint! as something e%ternal it is its su"$ect-matter# and is
nowingl! aware that it is. /t is also not opposed to o"$ectivit! &which# if opposed# would reduce
o"$ectivit! to a nullit!' )/t has e%ternali.ed this su"$ectivit! and is at one with its e%ternali.ation-
21 50 1ould !ou rather that we presuppose nothing2 /t is the same as presupposing "eing. &The
opposite of nothing is not something# it is "eing'
21 53f 1hat are we to mae of the sa!ing that science is a circle of circles2 That a"solute truth must
"e a result# and developed from a "eginning that is onl! proved &"ew4hren' by the result to "e the
"eginning of the result2 5rogression in philosoph! is a retreat into the ground# the inner truth.
6t the end of its development# a"solute truth freely e%ternali.es itself and taes its result as a principle
of a reversed development.
57 1ith what must a science "egin2 5ure "eing is the unit! into which pure nowledge returns.
(4f. 8aco"i# despite himself# must thin "ecoming in his attempt to polemici.e against the alleged
nullit! of 9antian pure "eing &the simple immediate of the in-itself'.
(0 :ecause "eing is posited as immediate# the nothing onl! "reas out in it immediatel!.
To a"stract from ever!thing is tae what the! all have in common "eing. :ut ever!thing also has
nothing in common. 6nd so nothing is a"stracted; it is ineffa"le.
73 <%istence is the simple oneness of "eing and nothing. /t has the form of an immediate# "ecause it
has su"lated its "ecoming.
1=> ?Something@ is the first negation of negation it is simple self-reference. /t su"lates its
distinguishedness "etween determinac! and *ualit!. /t is the existing distinction "etween realit! and
negation. Thus# something is the mediation of itself with itself for it is a negative determination# and
it determines itself negativel! from this determination. The mediation is posited.
/t is mediation of itself with itself. The mediation with itself is what ?something@ is in itself.
1=4 Something simpl! is it has no concrete sides. /t $ust is something there must "e an other to its
simple position.
?nothing@ is determined as the negative of something an other.
Something is an alteration "etween itself in itself and its other a transition.
1=0 Aow# let@s loo at this other. 1e could sa!# "! an e%ternal reflection# that something and other are
"asicall! the same# since ever! other is a something. :ut# then again# the other with reference to a
something is also for itself other apart from the something. /f the other is taen a"stractl!# it is that
which-e%ists-outside-itself# the other within. 5h!sical nature &is this not a pleonasm2 Ao it is space#
time# matter'.
The other which is for itself is the other within.
1=7 The Thing-in-itself is the result of a"straction from all "eing-for-other# which is an integral
moment of what something is. The thing-in-itself designates a thing without an! determination &"eing-
for-other'# and thus a nothing.
The Logic does 9ant one "etter rather than wondering what is in the thing-in-itself# the Logic e%poses
what something is in its concept.
11( Binitude is the most o"stinate categor! of the understanding the understanding that imposes
negativit! upon all its determinations# and can onl! operate "! sticing to its negative one-sidedness.
The non-"eing of what is understood does not perish# it endures# it is a"solute. To the understanding#
finitude is eternal. ):ut that the finite is a"solute is certainl! not a standpoint that an! philosoph! or
outloo# or the understanding# would want to endorse.- /n fact# it is a contradictor! endorsement#
"ecause the finite cannot "e the imperisha"le it is $ust finite# after all.
Coes Heidegger want to endorse finitude2
117 The in-itself of something as its determination# when it taes its cue from negating the restriction of
something# is the ought. The in-itselfness of the something transcends the limit alread! an inasmuch
as the determination of something has a limit for its side# something transcends itself.

<nc!clopedia
Sec 3D The principle of e%perience contains the infinitel! important determination that# for a content to
"e accepted and held to "e true# man must himself be activel! involved with it, more precisel!# that he
must find an! such content to "e at one and in unit! with the certainty of his own self.
Sec 7D The relation "etween speculative science to the other sciences is that the speculative taes over
the o"$ects from a science# emplo!s what is universal# and adds to it other categories.
Sec 14D The science of the a"solute is essentiall! a system# since what is concretely true is so onl! in its
inward self-unfolding and in taing and holding itself together in unit!# ie# as totality.
Sec. 13 Thining must find out for itself what thining is in truth# and onl! as that result can it "e
certain that it has taen true thining for its o"$ect. :! its necessar! manner of operating in $ust this
wa!# it is a circle that returns to its "eginning. 1e must arrive at the Eoncept of science@s concept# so
that thining ma! arrive at its return into itself and find contentment.
Sec. 24 To sa! that there is understanding# or reason# in the world is e%actl! what is contained in the
e%pression ?o"$ective thought@
ad. 2 Truth is ?agreement of a content with itself.@ To sa! that "eing and nothing are in their truth
"ecoming is to sa! that each is the other# and that content &the vanishing distinctness' can onl! agree
with itself in "ecoming.
6dditionD / is the same thing as thining# or rather# / is thining as what thins. 6nd so on a"out the /.
Sec. >1D The form of a sentence# or more precisel!# a $udgment is in an! case unsuita"le to e%press that
which is concrete and speculative and the true is concrete. 6 $udgment is one-sided on a count of its
form &This su"$ect is that predicate' and to that e%tent false. The o"$ect# in this case# is not allowed to
freel! determine itself from out of itself "ut taen as something read!-made to which predicates are
affi%ed.
Sec. 2(D Food infinit!# "ad infinit! &)!onder and ever !onder-' and infinite thought &as well as finite
thought'. The idealit! of thining is at home in its going "e!ond limited thought determinations
infinite nowing nows to loo "e!ond the finite# for it taes its own nowing as the o"$ect of
nowledge.
Sec >1D Cogmatism is the assumption that given two opposite assertions# one must "e true while the
other is false. Cogmatism engages the world through an eitherGor schema &non-speculative'.
Sec. 4(D The antinom! occurs in all o"$ects of all inds.
Sec. (1D What ever!thing finite is# is its own su"lation. 6 self-su"lation. /t must show its own
restrictedness as what it is which re*uires a dialectical immanent transcending. There is a thing
what is the thing2 /t must su"late its simplicit!.
Sec (2D 5hilosoph! deals e%clusivel! with concrete thoughts. 1hat is concrete2 5ositivel!
determinate# first of all. Truth is not a"stract nothingness "ut instead the negation of definite
determinations creats a result a result that is not an immediate nothing. Truth is not a simple formal
unit!# "ut a unit! of distinct determinations. 6 record of these determinations# affirmed in speculative
sentences# maes up ordinar! logic.
Sec (>D 1h! does Hegel "egin with the untrue &immediate "eing'# and not with the true &the
speculative and positivel! rational' straight awa!2 The answer to this is that the truth has to prove
&"ew4hren' itself precisel! to "e the truth# and here# within the logical sphere# the proof consists in the
concept demonstrating itself to "e mediated through and with itself and there"! also as what is trul!
immediate.
Sec ((D :eing and nothing are the opposite in its complete immediacy. 6ll other opposites are
mediated "! some determination or other that would contain a relation "etween the two opposites.
There is a determination that :eing and Aothing have which is that the! are "oth the same. /f the
a"solute is "eing# then it is also nothing "ut nothing immediatel! vanishes into "eing# and so "eing H
nothing must "e# in some wa!# distinguished insofar as the! are the same.
4 6s the unit! of "eing and nothing# "ecoming is the true e%pression of the result of "eing
and nothing. /t is not onl! the unit! of "eing and nothing # "ut the unrest in itself . . . it is within itself
against itself on account of the difference of "eing and nothing contained in it.
Sec 72D That tran*uil "eing-at-rest# at peace# is in truth unrest# and going "e!ond its "oundar!. To "e
determinate is to have a negation as the other to what something is in itself.
Sec 75 Something comes together onl! with itself in its transition into something other# and this
relation to itself in its transition and in the other is the true infinit!.
Sec 70 <ver! true philosoph! is idealism# and the fundamental concept of philosoph! is the true
infinite.
Sec 1=> /ntensive magnitudes and e%tensive magnitudes are two moments of the same degree-character
to things.
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Being is a false start to the Logic &22'. Science trul! "egins with becoming. /t seems that the
culmination of science would "e a pure affirmation of "eing# and we are going to proveGvalidate this
principle "! watching it concretel! develop into itself "ut# though the Logic in fact commences with
"eing# this lead-off consideration is onl! a matter of e%ternal structure# which trul! departs from
becoming. Aothing and "eing are "oth arrived at through each other# and are contained within
"ecoming.
:eing H Aothing set the tone for all that follows the nature of their unification# a tenuous# restless
and vanishingl! tena"le tension casts a mood# or a principle# upon Hegel@s wor. There is a moment of
negation and affirmation in all of realit!. 6 thing alwa!s is in opposition this unit! of opposites is the
re*uirement for concreteness.
5ure thought# although ver"all! e*uated with "eing# is proven to "e in truth becoming. 9ant looed
toward the conditions for the possi"ilit! of a pre$udicial form of e%perience &identical "eing'# without
sta!ing true to the actuality of that ver! e%perience. /n actualit!# there is activit!# and those concepts
which remained !oed to a pre$udice &vi.# "eing G nothing' are proven to "e in actualit! "ecoming.
Coes ?"eing@ still hold swa!# in a su"terranean fashion# "! remaining the o"$ect of desire for our
scientific s!stem-"uilding2 That is# onl! the dashed eagerness to understand "eing gives wa! to
meditative confirmation that becoming onl! could "e the true principle. 1ould "ecoming "e located if
it weren@t for the pre$udicial preference for "eing2
Hegel@s translator goesD )1e are concerned here e%clusivel! with the consciousness of these
"eginnings# namel! that the! are nothing "ut these empt! a"stractions and that each of them is as empt!
as the other. The drive to find in "eing or in "oth a fi%ed meaning is the ver! necessity that e%pands
+weiterfKhrt, "eing and nothing and gives them a true# ie concrete meaning- &Sec. (3'
The a"stract immediate# "eing# perhaps a clue or *uestion latent at the "eginning of all consciousness
and the originar! thinking it over produces the truly immediate. The true has to prove itself
&"ewahren' precisel! to "e the truth# and here #within the logical sphere# the proof consists in the
concept demonstrating itself to "e mediated through and with itself and there"! also as what is trul!
immediate &sec (> ad.'.
1e "egin with one-sided "eing that# although a"solutel! mediated# must "e taen as immediate "ecause
if it was taen to "e alread! mediated it would "e alread! carried further than itself which is not the
nature of a "eginning. Ceterminate things have the character of an other with respect to a first.
L! trou"le lies in whether the a"stract idea of "eing is a clue Hegel could not "egin without# and in
that respect# ?"ecoming@ is derivative. Mes it seems so. :eing is the "eginning# not nothing. Aothing
gets nowhere. 1ith :eing as the "eginning# there is the lingering commitment to hold on to "eing as it
passes over into nothing "ecoming is the return to being# not to nothing# for "ecoming unfolds into
existence.
1hat is ?necessit!@ if it issues from a drive2 This would "e a necessit! that is spontaneous# and
therefore it would appear from out of its inner ground as# to e%ternal o"servation# contingent.
The "eginning shows the necessit! of determinateness. ):ecoming is the first concrete thought- &<
(52' &cf Sec (2D 5hilosoph! deals e%clusivel! with concrete thoughts. 1hat is concrete2 5ositivel!
determinate# first of all. Truth is not a"stract nothingness "ut instead the negation of definite
determinations creats a result a result that is not an immediate nothing. Truth is not a simple formal
unit!# "ut a unit! of distinct determinations. 6 record of these determinations# affirmed in speculative
sentences# maes up ordinar! logic.' The understanding can onl! hold for true what are a"stract
identities in their separatedness the speculative &or even the m!stical' is the concrete unit! of these
determinations that# to the understanding# appear as incomprehensi"le oppositions.
A: The speculative is nothing other than the rational insofar as it is thought.
The difference is one "etween a world in itself &pure "eing identical onl! to itself' and one that is in
and for itself# so that it is identical to what it is not not-identical to. /f "eing remains in itself# it is onl!
e*ual to itself# with nothing e%terior wait there@s nothing# too# then. 6s "ecoming# it is for itself.
:ecoming# as a principle of the true &not "ad' infinit!# is coming to "e in and for itself# which# since ?in-
itself@ it would "e pure "eing# it comes to "e with itself through its other# ie# in and for itself.
/ would lie to argue that $ust as in the case of the ?true infinite@ where both the finite and the infinite
are "lunted e*uall! in turn through their unit!# the phrase ?the actual is rational and the rational actual@
holds $ust as much of a speculative character# where"! each term is su"lated through the other# and their
difference is determinately negated for both. The "ad reading of this phrase would interpret it as )the
real is rational# and the rational is rational- instead# / propose# there is an actual logic that is logically
actual. 6 concrete# living rationalit! not the a"stract rationalit! that remains in serfdom through its
thralldom to a"stract :eing.
1hat is a determination2 Bor starters# we could sa! that it re*uires "oth one and another. 6n entit! is
determined by another. Lediation# after all# means to have gone from a first to a second and to emerge
from something differentiated. 6 "eginning is indeterminate "ecause we# as of !et# have no other. The
"eginning is not the mediated a"sence of determinac!# "ut the ver! first immediate indeterminac!.
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7G12
There is formal logic# transcendental# and s!stematic.
Bormal must presuppose what is separate from and ?a"out.@ /t must provide for itself laws which
condition the logic itself# of which it cannot prove "! its own rules. Transcendental logic can@t ground
itself# "ecause it taes its cue from its givens# of which it tries to find the conditions for the possi"ilit!
thereof.
The "eginning onl! reall! occurs in chapter 2 if !ou press determinate "eing with respect to its
origins# !ou end up "ac in the indeterminate "eginning.
:eing# in terms of its determinac!# is coe%tensive with nothing.
Aegation is the lac of the position.
Neason has criteria intrinsic to itself its limits fall within the parameters of reason itself. There aren@t
an! restrictions that are e%trinsic to realit! of these# there is nothing to "e said.
Ontolog! is not fundamentall! positive through and through there is negativit! in "eing.