Crim Pro - Rule 126 Cases

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Criminal Procedure Rule 126: Searches and Seizures

BACHE & CO. vs RUI Z

Search and Seizure Personal Examination of the Judge
On 24 Feb 1970, Commissioner Vera of Internal Revenue, wrote a letter addressed to J
Ruiz requesting the issuance of a search warrant against petitioners for violation of Sec
46(a) of the NIRC, in relation to all other pertinent provisions thereof, particularly Sects
53, 72, 73, 208 and 209, and authorizing Revenue Examiner de Leon make and file the
application for search warrant which was attached to the letter. The next day, de Leon and
his witnesses went to CFI Rizal to obtain the search warrant. At that time J Ruiz was
hearing a certain case; so, by means of a note, he instructed his Deputy Clerk of Court to
take the depositions of De Leon and Logronio. After the session had adjourned, J Ruiz was
informed that the depositions had already been taken. The stenographer read to him her
stenographic notes; and thereafter, J Ruiz asked respondent Logronio to take the oath and
warned him that if his deposition was found to be false and without legal basis, he could be
charged for perjury. J Ruiz signed de Leons application for search warrant and Logronios
deposition. The search was subsequently conducted.

ISSUE: Whether or not there had been a valid search warrant.

HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Bache on three grounds.
1. J Ruiz failed to personally examine the complainant and his witness.
Personal examination by the judge of the complainant and his witnesses is necessary to
enable him to determine the existence or non-existence of a probable cause.
2. The search warrant was issued for more than one specific offense.
The search warrant in question was issued for at least four distinct offenses under the Tax
Code. As ruled in Stonehill Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in
connection with the disputed search warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend
Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court that a search warrant shall not issue
but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense. Not satisfied with this
qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that no search warrant shall
issue for more than one specific offense.
3. The search warrant does not particularly describe the things to be seized.
The documents, papers and effects sought to be seized are described in the Search Warrant
Unregistered and private books of accounts (ledgers, journals, columnars, receipts and
disbursements books, customers ledgers); receipts for payments received; certificates of
stocks and securities; contracts, promissory notes and deeds of sale; telex and coded
messages; business communications, accounting and business records; checks and check
stubs; records of bank deposits and withdrawals; and records of foreign remittances,
covering the years 1966 to 1970.
The description does not meet the requirement in Art III, Sec. 1, of the Constitution, and of
Sec. 3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, that the warrant should particularly
describe the things to be seized.
A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the
description therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow or when the
description expresses a conclusion of fact not of law by which the warrant officer may be
guided in making the search and seizure or when the things described are limited to those
which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued.

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EN BANC
G.R. No. 71410 November 25, 1986
JOSEFINO S. ROAN, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE ROMULO T. GONZALES,
PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MARINDUQUE, BRANCH
XXXVIII; THE PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF MARINDUQUE; THE PROVINCIAL
COMMANDER, PC-INP MARINDUQUE, Respondents.chanrobles virtual law library
CRUZ, J :
Once again we are asked to annul a search warrant on the ground that it violates the
Constitution. As we can do no less if we are to be true to the mandate of the fundamental
law, we do annul.chanrobles virtual law ry
One of the most precious rights of the citizen in a free society is the right to be left alone in
the privacy of his own house. That right has ancient roots, dating back through the mists of
history to the mighty English kings in their fortresses of power. Even then, the lowly
subject had his own castle where he was monarch of all he surveyed. This was his humble
cottage from which he could bar his sovereign lord and all the forces of the
Crown.chanrobles virtual law library
That right has endured through the ages albeit only in a few libertarian regimes. Their
number, regrettably, continues to dwindle against the onslaughts of authoritarianism. We
are among the fortunate few, able again to enjoy this right after the ordeal of the past
despotism. We must cherish and protect it all the more now because it is like a prodigal son
returning.chanrobles virtual law library
That right is guaranteed in the following provisions of Article IV of the 1973 Constitution:
SEC. 3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall
not be violated, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized
by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.chanrobles virtual law library
SEC. 4. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shag be inviolable except
upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety and order require
otherwise.chanrobles virtual law library
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Invoking these provisions, the petitioner claims he was the victim of an illegal search and
seizure conducted by the military authorities. The articles seized from him are sought to be
used as evidence in his prosecution for illegal possession of firearms. He asks that their
admission be temporarily restrained (which we have)
1
and thereafter permanently
enjoined.chanrobles virtual law library
The challenged search warrant was issued by the respondent judge on May 10, 1984.
2
The
petitioner's house was searched two days later but none of the articles listed in the warrant
was discovered.
3
However, the officers conducting the search found in the premises one
Colt Magnum revolver and eighteen live bullets which they confiscated. They are now the
bases of the charge against the petitioner.
4

To be valid, a search warrant must be supported by probable cause to be determined by the
judge or some other authorized officer after examining the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce. No less important, there must be a specific description of the place to be
searched and the things to be seized, to prevent arbitrary and indiscriminate use of the
warrant.
5

Probable cause was described by Justice Escolin in Burgos v. Chief of Staff
6
as referring to
"such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with
the offense are in the place sought to be searched." As held in a long line of decisions, the
probable cause must refer to only one specific offense.
7

The inclusion of the requirement for the "examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce" was a refinement proposed by Delegate
Vicente J. Francisco in the1934 Constitutional Convention. His purpose was the
strengthening of the guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizures. Although the
condition did not appear in the corresponding provision of the federa Constitution of the
United States which served as our model it was then already embodied in the Code of
Criminal Procedure. Nevertheless, Delegate Jose P. Laurel, Chairman of the Committee on
the Bill of Rights of that body, readily accepted the proposal and it was thereafter,
following a brief debate, approved by the Convention.
8

Implementing this requirement, the Rules of Court provided in what was then Rule 126:
SEC. 4. Examination of the applicant. - The municipal or city judge must, before issuing
the warrant, personally examine on oath or affirmation the complainant and any witnesses
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he may produce and take their depositions in writing, and attach them to the record, in
addition to any affidavits presented to him.
The petitioner claims that no depositions were taken by the respondent judge in accordance
with the above rule, but this is not entirely true. As a matter of fact, depositions were taken
of the complainant's two witnesses in addition to the affidavit executed by them.
9
It is
correct to say, however, that the complainant himself was not subjected to a similar
interrogation.chanrobles virtual law library
Commenting on this matter, the respondent judge declared:
The truth is that when PC Capt. Mauro P. Quinosa personally filed his application for a
search warrant on May 10, 1984, he appeared before me in the company of his two (2)
witnesses, Esmael Morada and Jesus Tohilida, both of whom likewise presented to me their
respective affidavits taken by Pat. Josue V. Lining, a police investigator assigned to the
PC-INP command at Camp Col. Maximo Abad. As the application was not yet subscribed
and sworn to, I proceeded to examine Captain Quillosa on the contents thereof to ascertain,
among others, if he knew and understood the same. Afterwards, he subscribed and swore to
the same before me.
10

By his own account, an he did was question Captain Quillosa on the contents of his
affidavit only "to ascertain, among others, if he knew and understood the same," and only
because "the application was not yet subscribed and swom to." The suggestion is that he
would not have asked any questions at all if the affidavit had already been completed when
it was submitted to him. In any case, he did not ask his own searching questions. He
limited himself to the contents of the affidavit. He did not take the applicant's deposition in
writing and attach them to the record, together with the affidavit presented to
him.chanrobles virtual law library
As this Court held in Mata v. Bayona:
11

Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining
Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he niay
produce and attach them to the record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that
the Judge may be able to properly determine the existence or non-existence of the probable
cause, to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it wifl be found later that his
declarations are false.chanrobles virtual law library
We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality by the failure of the
Judge to conform with the essential requisites of taking the depositions in writing and
attaching them to the record, rendering the search warrant invalid.
The respondent judge also declared that he "saw no need to have applicant Quillosa's
deposition taken considering that he was applying for a search warrant on the basis of the
information provided by the aforenamed witnesses whose depositions as aforementioned
had already been taken by the undersigned."
12

In other words, the applicant was asking for the issuance of the search warrant on the basis
of mere hearsay and not of information personally known to him, as required by settled
jurisprudence."
13
The rationale of the requirement, of course, is to provide a ground for a
prosecution for perjury in case the applicant's declarations are found to be false. His
application, standing alone, was insufficient to justify the issuance of the warrant sought. It
was therefore necessary for the witnesses themselves, by their own personal information, to
establish the apphcant's claims.
14

Even assuming then that it would have sufficed to take the depositions only of the
witnesses and not of the applicant himself, there is still the question of the sufficiency of
their depositions.chanrobles virtual law library
It is axiomatic that the examination must be probing and exhaustive, not merely routinary
or pro-forma, if the claimed probable cause is to be established. The examining magistrate
must not simply rehash the contents of the affidavit but must make his own inquiry on the
intent and justification of the application.
15

A study of the depositions taken from witnesses Esmael Morada and Jesus Tohilida, who
both claimed to be "intelligence informers," shows that they were in the main a mere
restatement of their allegations in their affidavits, except that they were made in the form
of answers to the questions put to them by the respondent judge. Significantly, the
meaningful remark made by Tohilida that they were suspicious of the petitioner because he
was a follower of the opposition candidate in the forthcoming election (a "Lecarista")
16
did
not excite the respondent judge's own suspicions. This should have put him on guard as to
the motivations of the witnesses and alerted him to possible misrepresentations from
them.chanrobles virtual law library
The respondent judge almost unquestioningly received the witnesses' statement that they
saw eight men deliver arms to the petitioner in his house on May 2, 1984.
17
This was
supposedly done overtly, and Tohilida said he saw everything through an open window of
the house while he was near the gate.
18
He could even positively say that six of the
weapons were.45 caliber pistols and two were.38 caliber revolvers.
19

One may well wonder why it did not occur to the respondent judge to ask how the witness
could be so certain even as to the caliber of the guns, or how far he was from the window,
or whether it was on the first floor or a second floor, or why his presence was not noticed at
all, or if the acts related were really done openly, in the full view of the witnesses,
Page 4 of 96 |

considering that these acts were against the law. These would have been judicious
questions but they were injudiciously omitted. Instead, the declarations of the witnesses
were readily accepted and the search warrant sought was issued forthwith.chanrobles
virtual law library
The above-discussed defects have rendered the search warrant invalid. Nonetheless, the
Solicitor General argues that whatever defect there was, was waived when the petitioner
voluntarily submitted to the search and manifested his conformity in writing.
20

We do not agree. What we see here is pressure exerted by the military authorities, who
practically coerced the petitioner to sign the supposed waiver as a guaranty against a
possible challenge later to the validity of the search they were conducting. Confronted with
the armed presence of the military and the presumptive authority of a judicial writ, the
petitioner had no choice but to submit. This was not, as we held in a previous case,
21
the
manifestation merely of our traditional Filipino hospitality and respect for authority. Given
the repressive atmosphere of the Marcos regime, there was here, as we see it, an
intimidation that the petitioner could not resist.chanrobles virtual law library
The respondents also argue that the Colt Magnum pistol and the eighteen have bullets
seized from the petitioner were illegal per se and therefore could have been taken by the
military authorities even without a warrant. Possession of the said articles, it is urged, was
violative of P.D. 1866 and considered malum prohibitum. Hence, the Wegal articles could
be taken even without a warrant.chanrobles virtual law library
Prohibited articles may be seized but only as long as the search is valid. In this case, it was
not because: 1) there was no valid search warrant; and 2) absent such a warrant, the right
thereto was not validly waived by the petitioner. In short, the military officers who entered
the petitioner's premises had no right to be there and therefore had no right either to seize
the pistol and bullets.chanrobles virtual law library
It does not follow that because an offense is malum prohibitum, the subject thereof is
necessarily illegal per se. Motive is immaterial in mala prohibita,but the subjects of this
kind of offense may not be summarily seized simply because they are prohibited. A search
warrant is still necessary. If the rule were otherwise, then the military authorities could
have just entered the premises and looked for the guns reportedly kept by the petitioner
without bothering to first secure a search warrant. The fact that they did bother to do so
indicates that they themselves recognized the necessity of such a warrant for the seizure of
the weapons the petitioner was suspected of possessing.chanrobles virtual law library
It is true that there are certain instances when a search may be validly made without
warrant and articles may be taken validly as a result of that search. For example, a
warrantless search may be made incidental to a lawful arrest,
22
as when the person being
arrested is frished for weapons he may otherwise be able to use against the arresting
officer. Motor cars may be inspected at borders to prevent smuggling of aliens and
contraband
23
and even in the interior upon a showing of probable cause.
24
Vessels and
aircraft are also traditionally removed from the operation of the rule because of their
mobility and their relative ease in fleeing the state's jurisdiction.
25
The individual may
knowingly agree to be searched or waive objections to an illegal search.
26
And it has also
been held that prohibited articles may be taken without warrant if they are open to eye and
hand and the peace officer comes upon them inadvertently.
27

Clearly, though, the instant case does not come under any of the accepted exceptions. The
respondents cannot even claim that they stumbled upon the pistol and bullets for the fact is
that these things were deliberately sought and were not in plain view when they were
taken. Hence, the rule having been violated and no exception being applicable, the
conclusion is that the petitioner's pistol and bullets were confiscated illegally and therefore
are protected by the exclusionary principle.
Stonehill v. Diokno established this rule which was later expressly affirmed in the 1973
Constitution. While conceding that there may be occasions when the criminal might be
allowed to go free because "the constable has blundered," Chief Justice Concepcion
observed that the exclusionary rule was nonetheless "the only practical means of enforcing
the constitutional injunction" against abuse. The decision cited Judge Learned Hand's
justification that "only in case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials,
know that it cannot profit by their wrong, will the wrong be repressed. "
The pistol and bullets cannot, of course, be used as evidence against the petitioner in the
criminal action against him for illegal possession of firearms. Pending resolution of that
case, however, the said articles must remain in custodia legis.
Finally, it is true that the petitioner should have, before coming to this Court, filed a motion
for the quashal of the search warrant by the respondent judge in accordance with the
normal procedure. But as we said and did in Burgos, "this procedural flaw notwithstanding,
we take cognizance of this petition in view of the seriousness and urgency of the
constitutional issues raised.
28

WHEREFORE, Search Warrant No. 1-84 issued by the respondent judge on May 10, 1984,
is hereby declared null and void and accordingly set aside. Our restraining order of August
6,1985, is made permanent. No costs.chanrobles virtual law library
SO ORDERED.
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Teehankee, C.J., Feria, Yap, Fernan, Melencio-Herrera, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr and
Paras, JJ., concur.

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EN BANC
G.R. No. 81510 March 14, 1990
HORTENCIA SALAZAR, Petitioner, vs. HON. TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, in his
capacity as Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration,
and FERDIE MARQUEZ, Respondents.
Gutierrez & Alo Law Offices for petitioner.
SARMIENTO, J .:
This concerns the validity of the power of the Secretary of Labor to issue warrants of arrest
and seizure under Article 38 of the Labor Code, prohibiting illegal
recruitment.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The facts are as follows:
xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library
1. On October 21, 1987, Rosalie Tesoro of 177 Tupaz Street, Leveriza, Pasay City, in a
sworn statement filed with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA
for brevity) charged petitioner Hortencia Salazar,viz:
04. T: Ano ba ang dahilan at ikaw ngayon ay narito at
nagbibigay ng salaysay.
S: Upang ireklamo sa dahilan ang aking PECC Card ay
ayaw ibigay sa akin ng dati kong manager. - Horty
Salazar - 615 R.O. Santos, Mandaluyong, Mla.
05. T: Kailan at saan naganap and ginawang panloloko sa
iyo ng tao/mga taong inireklamo mo?chanrobles virtual law library
S. Sa bahay ni Horty Salazar.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
06. T: Paano naman naganap ang pangyayari?chanrobles virtual law library
S. Pagkagaling ko sa Japan ipinatawag niya ako. Kinuha
ang PECC Card ko at sinabing hahanapan ako ng
booking sa Japan. Mag 9 month's na ako sa Phils. ay
hindi pa niya ako napa-alis. So lumipat ako ng ibang
company pero ayaw niyang ibigay and PECC Card
ko.
2. On November 3, 1987, public respondent Atty. Ferdinand Marquez to whom said
complaint was assigned, sent to the petitioner the following telegram:
YOU ARE HEREBY DIRECTED TO APPEAR BEFORE FERDIE MARQUEZ POEA
ANTI ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT UNIT 6TH FLR. POEA BLDG. EDSA COR.
ORTIGAS AVE. MANDALUYONG MM ON NOVEMBER 6, 1987 AT 10 AM RE
CASE FILED AGAINST YOU. FAIL NOT UNDER PENALTY OF LAW.
4. On the same day, having ascertained that the petitioner had no license to operate a
recruitment agency, public respondent Administrator Tomas D. Achacoso issued his
challenged CLOSURE AND SEIZURE ORDER NO. 1205 which reads:
HORTY SALAZAR
No. 615 R.O. Santos St.
Mandaluyong, Metro Manilachanrobles virtual law library
Pursuant to the powers vested in me under Presidential Decree No. 1920 and Executive
Order No. 1022, I hereby order the CLOSURE of your recruitment agency being operated
at No. 615 R.O. Santos St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila and the seizure of the documents
and paraphernalia being used or intended to be used as the means of committing illegal
recruitment, it having verified that you have -
(1) No valid license or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment to recruit
and deploy workers for overseas employment;chanrobles virtual law library
(2) Committed/are committing acts prohibited under Article 34 of the New Labor Code in
relation to Article 38 of the same code.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
This ORDER is without prejudice to your criminal prosecution under existing
laws.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Done in the City of Manila, this 3th day of November, 1987.
5. On January 26, 1988 POEA Director on Licensing and Regulation Atty. Estelita B.
Espiritu issued an office order designating respondents Atty. Marquez, Atty. Jovencio
Page 7 of 96 |

Abara and Atty. Ernesto Vistro as members of a team tasked to implement Closure and
Seizure Order No. 1205. Doing so, the group assisted by Mandaluyong policemen and
mediamen Lito Castillo of the People's Journal and Ernie Baluyot of News Today
proceeded to the residence of the petitioner at 615 R.O. Santos St., Mandaluyong, Metro
Manila. There it was found that petitioner was operating Hannalie Dance Studio. Before
entering the place, the team served said Closure and Seizure order on a certain Mrs. Flora
Salazar who voluntarily allowed them entry into the premises. Mrs. Flora Salazar informed
the team that Hannalie Dance Studio was accredited with Moreman Development (Phil.).
However, when required to show credentials, she was unable to produce any. Inside the
studio, the team chanced upon twelve talent performers - practicing a dance number and
saw about twenty more waiting outside, The team confiscated assorted costumes which
were duly receipted for by Mrs. Asuncion Maguelan and witnessed by Mrs. Flora
Salazar.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
6. On January 28, 1988, petitioner filed with POEA the following letter:chanrobles virtual
law library
Gentlemen:chanrobles virtual law library
On behalf of Ms. Horty Salazar of 615 R.O. Santos, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, we
respectfully request that the personal properties seized at her residence last January 26,
1988 be immediately returned on the ground that said seizure was contrary to law and
against the will of the owner thereof. Among our reasons are the following:
1. Our client has not been given any prior notice or hearing, hence the Closure and Seizure
Order No. 1205 dated November 3, 1987 violates "due process of law" guaranteed under
Sec. 1, Art. III, of the Philippine Constitution.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
2. Your acts also violate Sec. 2, Art. III of the Philippine Constitution which guarantees
right of the people "to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose."chanrobles
virtual law library
3. The premises invaded by your Mr. Ferdi Marquez and five (5) others (including 2
policemen) are the private residence of the Salazar family, and the entry, search as well as
the seizure of the personal properties belonging to our client were without her consent and
were done with unreasonable force and intimidation, together with grave abuse of the color
of authority, and constitute robbery and violation of domicile under Arts. 293 and 128 of
the Revised Penal Code.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Unless said personal properties worth around TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) in
all (and which were already due for shipment to Japan) are returned within twenty-four
(24) hours from your receipt hereof, we shall feel free to take all legal action, civil and
criminal, to protect our client's interests.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
We trust that you will give due attention to these important matters.
7. On February 2, 1988, before POEA could answer the letter, petitioner filed the instant
petition; on even date, POEA filed a criminal complaint against her with the Pasig
Provincial Fiscal, docketed as IS-88-836.
1
chanrobles virtual law library
On February 2, 1988, the petitioner filed this suit for prohibition. Although the acts sought
to be barred are already fait accompli, thereby making prohibition too late, we consider the
petition as one for certiorari in view of the grave public interest
involved.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The Court finds that a lone issue confronts it: May the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (or the Secretary of Labor) validly issue warrants of search and seizure (or
arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor Code? It is also an issue squarely raised by the
petitioner for the Court's resolution.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
Under the new Constitution, which states:
. . . no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
2
it is only a judge who may issue warrants of search and arrest.
3
In one case, it was declared
that mayors may not exercise this power:
But it must be emphasized here and now that what has just been described is the state of
the law as it was in September, 1985. The law has since been altered. No longer does the
mayor have at this time the power to conduct preliminary investigations, much less issue
orders of arrest. Section 143 of the Local Government Code, conferring this power on the
mayor has been abrogated, rendered functus officio by the 1987 Constitution which took
effect on February 2, 1987, the date of its ratification by the Filipino people. Section 2,
Page 8 of 96 |

Article III of the 1987 Constitution pertinently provides that "no search warrant or warrant
of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or things to be
seized." The constitutional proscription has thereby been manifested that thenceforth, the
function of determining probable cause and issuing, on the basis thereof, warrants of arrest
or search warrants, may be validly exercised only by judges, this being evidenced by the
elimination in the present Constitution of the phrase, "such other responsible officer as may
be authorized by law" found in the counterpart provision of said 1973 Constitution, who,
aside from judges, might conduct preliminary investigations and issue warrants of arrest or
search warrants.
4
Neither may it be done by a mere prosecuting body:
We agree that the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force exercises, or was meant to
exercise, prosecutorial powers, and on that ground, it cannot be said to be a neutral and
detached "judge" to determine the existence of probable cause for purposes of arrest or
search. Unlike a magistrate, a prosecutor is naturally interested in the success of his case.
Although his office "is to see that justice is done and not necessarily to secure the
conviction of the person accused," he stands, invariably, as the accused's adversary and his
accuser. To permit him to issue search warrants and indeed, warrants of arrest, is to make
him both judge and jury in his own right, when he is neither. That makes, to our mind and
to that extent, Presidential Decree No. 1936 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 2002,
unconstitutional.
5
Section 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, as now written, was entered as an
amendment by Presidential Decrees Nos. 1920 and 2018 of the late President Ferdinand
Marcos, to Presidential Decree No. 1693, in the exercise of his legislative powers under
Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution. Under the latter, the then Minister of Labor
merely exercised recommendatory powers:
(c) The Minister of Labor or his duly authorized representative shall have the power to
recommend the arrest and detention of any person engaged in illegal
recruitment.
6
On May 1, 1984, Mr. Marcos promulgated Presidential Decree No. 1920, with the avowed
purpose of giving more teeth to the campaign against illegal recruitment. The Decree gave
the Minister of Labor arrest and closure powers:
(b) The Minister of Labor and Employment shall have the power to cause the arrest and
detention of such non-licensee or non-holder of authority if after proper investigation it is
determined that his activities constitute a danger to national security and public order or
will lead to further exploitation of job-seekers. The Minister shall order the closure of
companies, establishment and entities found to be engaged in the recruitment of workers
for overseas employment, without having been licensed or authorized to do so.
7
chanrobles
virtual law library
On January 26, 1986, he, Mr. Marcos, promulgated Presidential Decree No. 2018, giving
the Labor Minister search and seizure powers as well:
(c) The Minister of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representatives shall
have the power to cause the arrest and detention of such non-licensee or non-holder of
authority if after investigation it is determined that his activities constitute a danger to
national security and public order or will lead to further exploitation of job-seekers. The
Minister shall order the search of the office or premises and seizure of documents,
paraphernalia, properties and other implements used in illegal recruitment activities and the
closure of companies, establishment and entities found to be engaged in the recruitment of
workers for overseas employment, without having been licensed or authorized to do
so.
8
The above has now been etched as Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor
Code.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The decrees in question, it is well to note, stand as the dying vestiges of authoritarian rule
in its twilight moments.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or
arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial process. To that extent,
we declare Article 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no force
and effect.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The Solicitor General's reliance on the case ofMorano v. Vivo
9
is not well-
taken. Vivo involved a deportation case, governed by Section 69 of the defunct Revised
Administrative Code and by Section 37 of the Immigration Law. We have ruled that in
deportation cases, an arrest (of an undesirable alien) ordered by the President or his duly
authorized representatives, in order to carry out a final decision of deportation is valid.
10
It
is valid, however, because of the recognized supremacy of the Executive in matters
involving foreign affairs. We have held:
11

The State has the inherent power to deport undesirable aliens (Chuoco Tiaco vs. Forbes,
228 U.S. 549, 57 L. Ed. 960, 40 Phil. 1122, 1125). That power may be exercised by the
Page 9 of 96 |

Chief Executive "when he deems such action necessary for the peace and domestic
tranquility of the nation." Justice Johnson's opinion is that when the Chief Executive finds
that there are aliens whose continued presence in the country is injurious to the public
interest, "he may, even in the absence of express law, deport them". (Forbes vs. Chuoco
Tiaco and Crossfield, 16 Phil. 534, 568, 569; In re McCulloch Dick, 38 Phil.
41).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The right of a country to expel or deport aliens because their continued presence is
detrimental to public welfare is absolute and unqualified (Tiu Chun Hai and Go Tam vs.
Commissioner of Immigration and the Director of NBI, 104 Phil. 949, 956).
12
chanrobles
virtual law library
The power of the President to order the arrest of aliens for deportation is, obviously,
exceptional. It (the power to order arrests) can not be made to extend to other cases, like
the one at bar. Under the Constitution, it is the sole domain of the
courts.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Moreover, the search and seizure order in question, assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that it
was validly issued, is clearly in the nature of a general warrant:
Pursuant to the powers vested in me under Presidential Decree No. 1920 and Executive
Order No. 1022, I hereby order the CLOSURE of your recruitment agency being operated
at No. 615 R.O. Santos St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila and the seizure of the documents
and paraphernalia being used or intended to be used as the means of committing illegal
recruitment, it having verified that you have -
(1) No valid license or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment to recruit
and deploy workers for overseas employment;chanrobles virtual law library
(2) Committed/are committing acts prohibited under Article 34 of the New Labor Code in
relation to Article 38 of the same code.
This ORDER is without prejudice to your criminal prosecution under existing
laws.
13
We have held that a warrant must identify clearly the things to be seized, otherwise, it is
null and void, thus:
Another factor which makes the search warrants under consideration constitutionally
objectionable is that they are in the nature of general warrants. The search warrants
describe the articles sought to be seized in this wise:
1) All printing equipment, paraphernalia, paper, ink, photo equipment, typewriters,
cabinets, tables, communications/ recording equipment, tape recorders, dictaphone and the
like used and/or connected in the printing of the "WE FORUM" newspaper and any and all
documents/communications, letters and facsimile of prints related to the "WE FORUM"
newspaper.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
2) Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and other publications to promote the
objectives and purposes of the subversive organizations known as Movement for Free
Philippines, Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6 Movement; andchanrobles virtual law
library
3) Motor vehicles used in the distribution/circulation of the "WE FORUM" and other
subversive materials and propaganda, more particularly, chanrobles virtual law library
1) Toyota-Corolla, colored yellow with Plate No. NKA 892;chanrobles virtual law library
2) DATSUN, pick-up colored white with Plate No. NKV 969;chanrobles virtual law library
3) A delivery truck with Plate No. NBS 542;chanrobles virtual law library
4) TOYOTA-TAMARAW, colored white with Plate No. PBP 665; andchanrobles virtual
law library
5) TOYOTA Hi-Lux, pick-up truck with Plate No. NGV 472 with marking "Bagong
Silang."
In Stanford v. State of Texas, the search warrant which authorized the search for "books,
records, pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists, memoranda, pictures, recordings and other written
instruments concerning the Communist Parties of Texas, and the operations of the
Community Party in Texas," was declared void by the U.S. Supreme Court for being too
general. In like manner, directions to "seize any evidence in connection with the violation
of SDC 13-3703 or otherwise" have been held too general, and that portion of a search
warrant which authorized the seizure of any "paraphernalia which could be used to violate
Sec. 54-197 of the Connecticut General Statutes (the statute dealing with the crime of
conspiracy)" was held to be a general warrant, and therefore invalid. The description of the
articles sought to be seized under the search warrants in question cannot be characterized
differently.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Page 10 of 96 |

In the Stanford case, the U.S. Supreme court calls to mind a notable chapter in English
history; the era of disaccord between the Tudor Government and the English Press, when
"Officers of the Crown were given roving commissions to search where they pleased in
order to suppress and destroy the literature of dissent both Catholic and Puritan." Reference
herein to such historical episode would not be relevant for it is not the policy of our
government to suppress any newspaper or publication that speaks with "the voice of non-
conformity" but poses no clear and imminent danger to state security.
14
chanrobles virtual
law library
For the guidance of the bench and the bar, we reaffirm the following principles:
1. Under Article III, Section 2, of the l987 Constitution, it is only judges, and no other, who
may issue warrants of arrest and search:chanrobles virtual law library
2. The exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and undesirable aliens, whom the
President or the Commissioner of Immigration may order arrested, following a final order
of deportation, for the purpose of deportation.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code is
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and null and void. The respondents are ORDERED to
return all materials seized as a result of the implementation of Search and Seizure Order
No. 1205.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
No costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano,
Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Cortes, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Page 11 of 96 |

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 89103. July 14, 1995.]

LEON TAMBASEN, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, 2ND
ASSISTANT PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR GLORIA LASTIMOSA MARCOS and
HON. CICERO U. QUERUBIN in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Negros Occidental, Branch 44, Bacolod City,Respondents.

Rodolfo V . Gumban and Jose J . Diaz for Petitioner.

Solicitor General for public Respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; SEARCH WARRANTS; ISSUANCE
THEREOF FOR MORE THAN ONE SPECIFIC OFFENSE PROHIBITED. On its
face, the search warrant violates Section 3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, which
prohibits the issuance of a search warrant for more than one specific offense. The caption
of Search Warrant No. 365 reflects the violation of two special laws: P.D. No. 1866 for
illegal possession of firearms, ammunition and explosives; and R.A. No. 1700, the Anti-
Subversion Law. Search Warrant No. 365 was therefore a "scatter-shot warrant" and totally
null and void.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; SEIZURE OF ARTICLES NOT DESCRIBED THEREIN VIOLATIVE
OF SECTION 2, ARTICLE III OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION. By their seizure of
articles not described in the search warrant, the police acted beyond the parameters of their
authority under the search warrant. Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution requires
that a search warrant should particularly describe the things to be seized. "The evident
purpose and intent of the requirement is to limit the things to be seized to those, and only
those, particularly described in the search warrant to leave the officers of the law with
no discretion regarding what articles they should seize, to the end that unreasonable
searches and seizures may not be made and that abuses may not be committed." The same
constitutional provision is also aimed at preventing violations of security in person and
property and unlawful invasions of the sanctity of the home, and giving remedy against
such usurpations when attempted.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; EVIDENCE OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF RIGHT AGAINST
UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURE INADMISSIBLE. Section 3(2) of
Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that evidence obtained in violation of the right
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.

D E C I S I O N

QUIASON, J .:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court to set aside the order dated July 20, 1989 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
44, Bacolod City in Civil Case No. 5331, which nullified with order earlier issued by the
Municipal Trial Circuit Court (MTCC) of the City of Bacolod. The MTCC Order directed
the return to petitioner of the amount of P14,000.00 which had been seized by the
police.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
I

On August 31, 1988, P/ Sgt. Flumar Natuel applied for the issuance of a search warrant
from the MTCC, alleging that he received information that petitioner had in his possession
at his house at the North Capitol Road, Bacolod City, "M-16 Armalite Rifles (Mags &
Ammos), Hand Grenades, .45 Cal. Pistols (Mags & Ammos), Dynamite Sticks and
Subversive Documents," which articles were "used or intended to be used" for illegal
purposes (Rollo, p. 14). On the same day, the application was granted by the MTCC with
the issuance of Search Warrant No. 365, which allowed the seizure of the items specified in
the application (Roll, p. 15).

At around 6:30 P.M. of September 9, 1988, a police team searched the house of petitioner
and seized the following articles:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"(1) Two (2) envelops containing cash in the total amount of P14,000.00 (one envelope
P10,000.00 and another P4,000.00);

(2) one (1) AR 280 handset w/antenae (sic) SN-00485;

(3) one (1) YAESU FM Transceiver FT 23R w/ Antenae (sic);

(4) one (1) ALINCO ELH 230D Base;

(5) one (1) DC Regulator Supply 150 V. 13.8 V 12 AMP VAC;

Page 12 of 96 |

(6) one (1) brown Academy Notebook & Assorted papers; and

(7) Four (4) handsets battery pack" (Rollo, p. 16).

On September 19, 1988, the MTCC acting on petitioners urgent motion for the return of the
seized articles, issued an order directing Sgt. Natuel to make a return of the search warrant.
The following day, Sgt. Natuel submitted a report to the court. Not considering the report
as a "return in contemplation of law," petitioner filed another motion praying that Sgt.
Natuel be required to submit a complete and verified inventory of the seized articles.
Thereafter, Sgt. Natuel manifested that although he was the applicant for the issuance of
the search warrant, he was not present when it was served.cralawnad

On October 7, 1988, petitioner filed before the MTCC a motion praying that the search and
seizure be declared illegal and that the seized articles be returned to him. In his answer to
the motion, Lt. Col. Nicolas Torres, the station commander of the Bacolod City Police, said
that the amount of P14,000.00 had been earmarked for the payment of the allowance of the
Armed City Partisan (ACP) and other "known NPA personalities" operating in the City of
Bacolod.

On December 23, 1988, the MTCC issued an order directing Lt. Col. Torres to return the
money seized to petitioner. The court opined that in the implementation of the search
warrant, any seizure should be limited to the specific items covered thereby. It said that the
money could not be considered as "subversive documents" ; it was neither stolen nor the
effects of gambling.

Three months later, the Solicitor General filed before the RTC Branch 44, Bacolod City a
petition forcertiorari seeking the annulment of the order of the MTCC (Civil Case No.
5331). The petition alleged that assuming that the seizure of the money had been invalid,
petitioner was not entitled to its return citing the rulings in Alih v. Castro, 151 SCRA 279
(1987) and Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687 (1986). In those cases, the Court held that
pending the determination of the legality of the seizure of the articles, they should remain
in custodia legis. The petition also averred that a criminal complaint for "any of the crimes
against public order as provided under Chapter I, Title III of the Revised Penal Code" had
been filed with the City Fiscal (BC I.S. No. 88-1239) and therefore, should the money be
found as having been earmarked for subversive activities, it should be confiscated pursuant
to Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

On July 20, 1989 RTC, Branch 44 issued an order granting the petition for certiorari and
directing the clerk of court to return to the MTCC the money pending the resolution of the
preliminary investigation being conducted by the city prosecutor on the criminal complaint.
In said order, the RTC held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The Court observed that private respondent Leon Tambasen never questioned the validity
of the search warrant issued by respondent Judge Demosthenes L. Magallanes. A perusal of
private respondents Motion to Declare Search and Seizure Illegal and to Return Seized
Properties dated October 7, 1988 shows that respondent Tambasen questions not the
validity of the search warrant issued by respondent Judge Demosthenes Magallanes, but
rather, the execution or implementation of the said warrant principally on the ground that
the articles seized are not allegedly mentioned in the search warrant. However, the question
thus raised involves matters determinative of the admissibility in evidence and the legality
of the articles seized. These matters, it is submitted, go beyond the immediate and limited
jurisdiction of the respondent Judge to inquire into the validity of the search warrant he
issued. These issues which relate exclusively or principally with the intrinsic and
substantive merits of the case or cases which are being prepared against respondent
Tambasen, and insofar as Tambasen is concerned involve matters of defense which should
be properly raised at the criminal action or actions that may be filed against respondent
Leon Tambasen (see DOH v. Sy Chi Siong Co., Inc. Et. Al., G.R. No. 85289, Feb. 20,
1989). They cannot be addressed to the respondent Judge because the respondent Judge has
no jurisdiction over the said issue. It is clear therefore that respondent Judge has
transcended the boundaries of his limited jurisdiction and had in effect encroached upon
the jurisdiction of the appropriate trial court or courts that will try the criminal case or
cases against respondent Leon Tambasen, in issuing the assailed order dated December 23,
1988. Ostensibly, the assailed order, if not corrected, will unduly deprived the prosecution
of its right to present the evidence in question and consequently will improperly oust the
trial court, which will try the criminal case or cases against private respondent Leon
Tambasen of its original and exclusive jurisdiction to rule on the admissibility and legality
of the said evidence. This order of respondent court is tantamount to a denial of due
process. It may be considered as a grave abuse of discretion reviewable
by certiorari (Esparagoza v. Tan, 94 Phil. 749)" (Rollo , pp. 47-48).

Consequently, petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition praying for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order commanding the city prosecutor to cease and
desist from continuing with the preliminary investigation in BC I.S. No. 88-1239 and the
RTC from taking any step with respect to Civil Case No. 5331. He also prayed that Search
Warrant No. 365 and the seizure of his personal effects be declared illegal and that the
Order of July 20, 1989 be reversed and annulled.

Petitioner contended that the search warrant covered three offenses:" (1) illegal possession
of armalite rifle and .45 cal. pistol; (2) illegal possession of hand grenade and dynamite
sticks; and (3) illegal possession of subversive documents" (Rollo, pp. 3-4) in violation of
Section 3 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court. He assailed the legality of the seizure
of the articles which were not mentioned in the search warrant. Moreover, since a
complaint against him was filed only after his house had been searched, petitioner claimed
that the police were "on a fishing expedition."cralaw virtua1aw library

During the pendency of the instant petition, a series of events related to the questioned
Page 13 of 96 |

search and seizure transpired. At around 10:30 P.M. of March 1, 1990, Petitioner, who was
then on board a passenger vehicle, was arrested by intelligence operatives in Barangay
Mandalagan, Bacolod City and forthwith detained. On the strength of sworn statements of
two rebel returnees, the police filed a complaint for subversion against petitioner with the
Office of the City Prosecutor. The following day, the City Prosecutor filed an information
for violation of the Anti-Subversion Law against petitioner with RTC, Branch 42, Bacolod
City (Criminal Case No. 8517). An order for the arrest of petitioner was issued on March 2,
1990.

On March 6, 1990, petitioner filed a motion to quash the information in Criminal Case No.
8517.

On March 15, 1990, RTC, Branch 42 granted petitioners motion to quash and recalled the
warrant of arrest. The court also directed the City Prosecutor to resolve BC-I.S. Case No.
88-1239.

On March 20, 1990, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Gloria Lastimosa Marcos manifested
before RTC, Branch 42 that petitioner had been "dropped" from BC-I.S. No. 88-1239.
However, the City Prosecutor had, by then, filed a motion for the reconsideration of said
Resolution of March 15, 1990. The motion was denied.

Under this factual matrix, this Court is confronted with the question of whether RTC,
Branch 44 gravely abused its discretion in directing that the money seized from petitioners
house, specifically the amount of P14,000.00, be retained and kept in custodia legis.

On its face, the search warrant violated Section 3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court,
which prohibits the issuance of a search warrant for more than one specified offense. The
caption of Search Warrant No. 365 reflects the violation of two special laws: P.D. No. 1866
for illegal possession of firearms, ammunition and explosives; and R.A. No. 1700, the
Anti-Subversion Law. Search Warrant No. 365 was therefore a "scatter-shot warrant" and
totally null and void (People v. Court of Appeals, 216 SCRA 101 [1992]).

Moreover, by their seizure of articles not described in the search warrant, the police acted
beyond the parameters of their authority under the search warrant. Section 2, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution requires that a search warrant should particularly describe the things
to be seized. "The evident purpose and intent of the requirement is no limit the things to be
seized to those, and only those, particularly described in the search warrant to leave the
officers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles they should seize, to the end
that unreasonable searches and seizures may not be made and that abuses may not be
committed" (Corro v. Lising, 137 SCRA 541, 547 [1985]); Bache & Co. [Phil.], Inc. v.
Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 [1971]; Uy Kheytin v. Villareal, 42 Phil. 886 [1920]). The same
such usurpations when attempted (People v. Damaso, 212 SCRA 547 [1992] citing Alvero
v. Dizon, 76 Phil. 637, 646 [1946]).cralawnad

Clearly then, the money which was not indicated in the search warrant, had been illegally
seized from petitioner. The fact that the members of the police team were doing their task
of pursuing subversive is not a valid excuse for the illegal seizure. The presumption juris
tantum of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot by itself prevail against the
constitutionally protected rights of an individual (People v. Cruz, 231 SCRA 759 [1994];
People v. Veloso, 48 Phil. 169, 176 [1925]). Although public welfare is the foundation of
the power to search and seize, such power must be exercised and the law enforced without
transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens (People v. Damaso, supra, citing
Rodriguez v. Evangelista , 65 Phil. 230, 235 [1937]). As the Court aptly puts it in
Bagalihog v. Fernadez, 198 SCRA 614 (1991)," [z]eal in the pursuit of criminals cannot
ennoble the use of arbitrary methods that the Constitution itself abhors."cralaw virtua1aw
library

For the retention of the money seized by the police officers, approval of the court which
issued the search warrant is necessary (People v. Gesmundo, 219 SCRA 743 [1993]). In
like manner, only the court which issued the search warrant may order their release
(Templo v. Dela Cruz, 60 SCRA 295 [1974]; Pagkalinawan v. Gomez, 21 SCRA 1275
[1967]).

Section 3(2) of Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that evidence obtained in
violation of the right against unreasonable searches and seizured shall be inadmissible for
any purpose in any proceeding.

The information in Criminal Case No. 8517, with petitioner as the sole accused, was
ordered quashed by the trial court and the prosecutions motion for the reconsideration of
the quashal order had been denied. Even in BC I.S. Case No. 88-1239, which was being
investigated by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Marcos, petitioner was dropped as
a Respondent. Hence, there appears to be no criminal prosecution which can justify the
retention of the seized articles in custodia legis.

A subsequent legal development added another reason for the return to him of all the seized
articles: R.A. No. 1700, the Anti-Subversion Law, was repealed by R.A. No. 7636 and,
therefore, the crimes defined in the repealed law no longer exist.chanrobles.com.ph :
virtual law library

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the People of the Philippines is ORDERED
to RETURN the money seized to petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Page 14 of 96 |

Padilla, Davide, Jr. and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

Bellosillo, J., is on leave.

Page 15 of 96 |

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 142295. May 31, 2001]
VICENTE DEL ROSARIO y NICOLAS, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PARDO, J .:
Petitioner Vicente del Rosario y Nicolas appeals via certiorari from a decision of the
Court of Appeals
[1]
affirming with modification the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Bulacan, Branch 20, Malolos, and finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation
of P. D. No. 1866, as amended by Republic Act No. 8294 (illegal possession of firearms),
sentencing him to four (4) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days of prision
correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as maximum, and to pay a fine of P30,000.00.
On June 17, 1996, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Eufracio S. Marquez of Bulacan
filed with the Regional Trial Court, Bulacan, Malolos an Information charging petitioner
Vicente del Rosario y Nicolas with violation of P. D. No. 1866, as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of June 1996, in the municipality of Norzagaray, Province
of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his
possession under his custody and control, the following, to wit:
a) One (1) pc. Pistol Cal. 45 SN:70G23792 (w/o license)
b) One (1) pc. Revolver Cal. 22 SN:48673 (w/o license)
c) Twenty Seven (27) rds live ammos. For cal. .45
d) Five (5) pcs. Magazines for cal. .45
e) Eight (8) rds live ammunitions for cal. 22
f) Five (5) pcs. Magazines short for cal. 5.56 (M16)
g) Twenty (20) rds live ammunitions for cal 5.56
without first having obtained a proper license therefor.
Contrary to law.
[2]

On June 25, 1996, the trial court arraigned the petitioner. He pleaded not
guilty.
[3]
Trial ensued.
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
Sometime in May 1996, the police received a report that accused-appellant Vicente del
Rosario was in possession of certain firearms without the necessary licenses. Acting upon
the report, P/Sr. Insp. Jerito Adique of the PNP Criminal Investigation Group at Camp
Olivas, Pampanga inquired from the PNP Firearms and Explosive Division whether or not
the report was true. On May 10, 1996, P/Sr. Insp. Edwin C. Roque of the PNP Firearms
and Explosives Division issued a certification (Exhibit L) stating that per records in his
office, the appellant is not a licensed/registered firearm holder of any kind and
caliber. Armed with the said certification, P/Sr. Insp. Adique applied for a search warrant
to enable his team to search the house of appellant.
On June 13, 1996, a search warrant (Exhibit A) was issued by Judge Gil Fernandez, Sr. of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 217, authorizing the search of the
residence of appellant at Barangay Tigbe, Norzagaray, Bulacan.
[4]
On June 15, 1996, at
about 7:00 oclock in the morning, a team led by P/Sr. Insp. Adique went to Norzagaray to
serve the warrant. Before proceeding to the residence of the appellant, the police officers
requested Barangay Chairman Rogelio de Silva and Barangay Councilman Aurelio
Panteleon to accompany them in the implementation of the warrant. Upon arrival at the
house of appellant, the police officers introduced themselves to the wife of appellant. When
the appellant came out, P/Sr. Insp. Adique informed him that they had a search warrant and
that they were authorized to search his house. After appellant gave his permission, the
police officers conducted a search of the house. The search yielded the following items:
(a) a caliber .45 pistol with Serial No. 703792 with five magazines of caliber .45 (Exhibits
B and H) found at the masters bedroom; (b) five magazines of 5.56 M-16 rifle and two
radios (Exhibits C to C-4) found in the room of appellants daughter; and (c) a caliber .22
revolver with Serial No. 48673 (Exhibit F) containing 8 pieces of live ammunition (Exhibit
M) found in the kitchen of the house. When asked about his license to possess the firearms,
the appellant failed to produce any. This prompted the police officers to seize the subject
firearms.
Page 16 of 96 |

SPO2 Marion Montezon, one of the searching officers, prepared three separate inventories
of the seized items (Exhibits H, M and N). The inventories were signed by P/Sr. Insp.
Adique, the appellant and the barangay officials who witnessed the search. Thereafter
SPO2 Montezon prepared a certification of orderly search (Exhibit I) which was signed by
the appellant and the barangay officials attesting to the orderly conduct of the search.
For his defense, appellant contends that he had a license for the caliber .45 pistol
recovered in his bedroom and that the other items seized during the search including the
caliber .22 revolver, were merely planted by the police officers. Appellant likewise assails
the manner in which the search was carried out, claiming that the police officers just
barged into his house without asking permission. Furthermore, he claimed that the
barangay officials arrived only after the police already had finished the search.
After trial and on July 2, 1998, the trial court rendered a judgment of conviction, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused VICENTE DEL
ROSARIO y NICOLAS guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of P. D. No. 1866 as
charged under the Information dated June 17, 1996.
Conformably with the provisions of said law, as amended by Republic Act No. 8294, and
pursuant to the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Court hereby sentences
the accused to suffer imprisonment of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to six
(6) years of prision correctional, as maximum, and to pay a fine of Fifteen Thousand Pesos
(P15,000.00).
[5]

On July 20, 1998, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, assailing the decision
for being contrary to facts and the law.
[6]

On July 9, 1999, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision affirming with
modification the decision of the trial court as set out in the opening paragraph of this
decision.
[7]

On August 10, 1999, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for
reconsideration and/or new trial.
[8]
He contended that the certification issued by the Chief,
Firearms and Explosives Division, Philippine National Police stating that the person named
therein had not been issued a firearm license referred to a certain Vicente Vic del Rosario
of barangay Bigte, Norzagaray, Bulacan, not to him. He comes from barangay Tigbe,
Norzagaray, Bulacan, and that he has a valid firearm license.
On February 22, 2000, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration for
lack of merit.
[9]

Hence, this appeal.
[10]

Petitioner submits that the search conducted at his residence was illegal as the search
warrant was issued in violation of the Constitution
[11]
and consequently, the evidence
seized was inadmissible. He also submits that he had a license for the .45 caliber firearm
and ammunition seized in his bedroom. The other firearm, a .22 caliber revolver seized in
a drawer at the kitchen of his house, a magazine for 5.56 mm. cal. Armalite rifle, and two
2-way radios found in his daughters bedroom, were either planted by the police or illegally
seized, as they were not mentioned in the search warrant.
We find the petition impressed with merit.
We define the issues as follows:
First: whether petitioner had a license for the .45 caliber Colt pistol and ammunition
seized in his bedroom; and
Second: whether the .22 caliber revolver seized in a drawer at the kitchen of his
house, a magazine for 5.56 mm. cal. Armalite rifle and two 2-way radios found in his
daughters bedroom, were planted by the police or were illegally seized.
We shall resolve the issues in seriatim.
First: The .45 cal. Colt pistol in question was duly licensed.
Normally, we do not review the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial
courts.
[12]
However, this case comes within the exceptions.
[13]
The findings of fact by the
Court of Appeals will not be disturbed by the Court unless these findings are not supported
by evidence.
[14]
In this case, the findings of the lower courts even directly contradict the
evidence. Hence, we review the evidence. The trial court held that the copy of the license
presented was blurred, and that in any event, the court could rely on the certification dated
May 10, 1996, of P/Sr. Inspector Edwin C. Roque, Chief, Records Branch, Firearms and
Explosives Division, Philippine National Police stating that Vicente Vic del Rosario of
Barangay Bigte, Norzagaray, Bulacan is not a licensed/registered firearm holder of any
kind and caliber.
[15]
As against this, petitioner submitted that he was not the person referred
to in the said certification because he is Vicente del Rosario y Nicolas from
Barangay Tigbe, Norzagaray, Bulacan. The Court takes judicial notice of the existence of
both barangay Tigbe and barangay Bigte, in Norzagaray, Bulacan.
[16]
In fact, the trial court
erred grievously in not taking judicial notice of the barangays within its territorial
jurisdiction, believing the prosecutions submission that there was only barangay Tigbe,
and that barangay Bigte in the certification was a typographical error.
[17]
Petitioner
presented to the head of the raiding team, Police Senior Inspector Jerito A. Adique, Chief,
Operations Branch, PNP Criminal Investigation Command, a valid firearm license. The
court is duty bound to examine the evidence assiduously to determine the guilt or
innocence of the accused. It is true that the court may rely on the certification of the Chief,
Firearms and Explosives Division, PNP on the absence of a firearm license.
[18]
However,
Page 17 of 96 |

such certification referred to another individual and thus, cannot prevail over a valid
firearm license duly issued to petitioner. In this case, petitioner presented the printed
computerized copy of License No. RCL 1614021915 issued to him on July 13, 1993,
expiring in January 1995, by the Chief, Firearms and Explosives Division, PNP under the
signature of Reynaldo V. Velasco, Sr. Supt. (GSC) PNP, Chief, FEO.
[19]
On the dorsal
side of the printed computerized license, there is stamped the words Validity of
computerized license is extended until renewed license is printed dated January 17, 1995,
signed by Police Chief Inspector Franklin S. Alfabeto, Chief, Licence Branch,
FEO.
[20]
Coupled with this indefinite extension, petitioner paid the license fees for the
extension of the license for the next two-year period.
[21]

Consequently, we find that petitioner was the holder of a valid firearm license for the
.45 caliber Colt pistol seized in the bedroom of his house on June 15, 1996.
[22]
As required,
petitioner presented the license to the head of the raiding team, Police Senior Inspector
Jerito A. Adique of the Criminal Investigation Division Group, PNP.
[23]
As a senior police
officer, Senior Inspector Adique could easily determine the genuineness and authenticity of
the computerized printed license presented. He must know the computerized license
printed form. The stamp is clearly visible. He could decipher the words and the signature
of the authorized signing official of the Firearms and Explosives Division, PNP. He
belonged to the same national police organization.
Nevertheless, Senior Insp. Adique rejected the license presented because, according
to him, it was expired. However, assuming that the license presented was expired during
the period January 1995 to January 1997, still, possession of the firearm in question, a .45
caliber Colt pistol with serial No. 70G23792, during that period was not illegal. The
firearm was kept at home, not carried outside residence. On June 15, 1996, at the time of
the seizure of the firearm in question, possession of firearm with an expired license was
not considered unlawful,provided that the license had not been cancelled or
revoked. Republic Act No. 8294, providing that possession of a firearm with an expired
license was unlawful took effect only on July 7, 1997.
[24]
It could not be given retroactive
effect.
[25]

According to firearm licensing regulations, the renewal of a firearm license was
automatically applied for upon payment of the license fees for the renewal period. The
expired license was not cancelled or revoked. It served as temporary authority to possess
the firearm until the renewed license was issued. Meantime, the applicant may keep the
gun at home pending renewal of the firearm license and issuance of a printed computerized
license. He was not obliged to surrender the weapon. Printed at the dorsal side of the
computerized license is a notice reading:
IMPORTANT
1. This firearm license is valid for two (2) years. Exhibit this license whenever
demanded by proper authority.
2. Surrender your firearm/s to the nearest PNP Unit upon revocation or
termination of this license. Under any of the following instances, your
license shall be revoked for which reason your firearm/s is/are subject to
confiscation and its/their forfeiture in favor of the government.
a. Failure to notify the Chief of PNP in writing of your change of address,
and/or qualification.
b. Failure to renew this license by paying annual license, fees, within six (6)
months from your birth month. Renewal of your license can be made
within your birth month or month preceding your birth month. Late renewal
shall be penalized with 50% surcharge for the first month (from the first day
to the last day of this month) followed by an additional 25% surcharge for all
of the succeeding five (5) months compounded monthly.
c. Loss of firearm/s through negligence.
d. Carrying of firearm/s outside of residence without appropriate permit and/or
carrying firearm/s in prohibited places.
e. Conviction by competent court for a crime involving moral turpitude or for
any offense where the penalty carries an imprisonment of more than six (6)
months or fine of at least P1,000.00.
f. Dismissal for cause from the service.
g. Failure to sign license, or sign ID picture or affix right thumbmark.
3. Unauthorized loan of firearm/s to another person is punishable by permanent
disqualification and forfeiture of the firearm in favor of the government.
4. If termination is due to death, your next of kin should surrender your
firearm/s to the nearest PNP Unit. For those within Metro Manila, surrender
should be made with FEO, Camp Crame.
5. When firearms become permanently unserviceable, they should be deposited
with the nearest PNP Unit and ownership should be relinquished in writing
so that firearms may be disposed of in accordance with law.
6. Application for the purchase of ammunition should be made in case of a
resident of Metro Manila direct to the Chief, FEO and for residents of a
Province to secure recommendation letter to the nearest PNP Provincial
Page 18 of 96 |

Command who will thereafter endorse same to CHIEF, FEO for issuance of
the permit. License must be presented before an authority to purchase ammo
could be obtained.
[26]

Indeed, as heretofore stated, petitioner duly paid the license fees for the automatic
renewal of the firearm license for the next two years upon expiration of the license in
January 1995, as evidenced by official receipt No. 7615186, dated January 17,
1995.
[27]
The license would be renewed, as it was, because petitioner still possessed the
required qualifications. Meantime, the validity of the license was extended until the
renewed computerized license was printed. In fact, a renewed license was issued on
January 17, 1997, for the succeeding two-year period.
[28]

Aside from the clearly valid and subsisting license issued to petitioner, on January 25,
1995, the Chief, Philippine National Police issued to him a permit to carry firearm outside
residence valid until January 25, 1996, for the firearm in question.
[29]
The Chief, Philippine
National Police would not issue a permit to carry firearm outside residence unless
petitioner had a valid and subsisting firearm license. Although the permit to carry firearm
outside residence was valid for only one year, and expired on January 25, 1996, such
permit is proof that the regular firearm license was renewed and subsisting within the two-
year term up to January 1997. A Permit to Carry Firearm Outside Residence presupposes
that the party to whom it is issued is duly licensed to possess the firearm in
question.
[30]
Unquestionably, on January 17, 1997, the Chief, Firearms and Explosives
Division, PNP renewed petitioners license for the .45 cal. Colt pistol in question.
[31]

Clearly then, petitioner had a valid firearm license during the interregnum between
January 17, 1995, to the issuance of his renewed license on January 17, 1997.
Finally, there is no rhyme or reason why the Court of Appeals and the trial court did
not accept with alacrity the certification dated June 25, 1996, of P/Sr. Inspector Edwin C.
Roque,
[32]
Chief, Records Branch, Firearms and Explosives Division, PNP that Vicente N.
del Rosario of Barangay Tigbe, Norzagaray, Bulacan is a licensed/registered holder of
Pistol, Colt caliber .45 with serial number 70G23792, covered by computerized license
issued dated June 15, 1995, with an expiry date January 1997.
[33]
Reinforcing the
aforementioned certification, petitioner submitted another certification dated August 27,
1999, stating that Vicente N. del Rosario of Barangay Tigbe, Norzagaray, Bulacan, was
issued firearm license No. RL-C1614021915, for caliber .45 Pistol with Serial Number
70G23792, for the years covering the period from July 13, 1993 to January 1995, and the
extension appearing at the back thereof for the years 1995 to 1997.
[34]
Had the lower courts
given full probative value to these official issuances, petitioner would have been correctly
acquitted, thus sparing this Court of valuable time and effort.
In crimes involving illegal possession of firearm, the prosecution has the burden of
proving the elements thereof, viz.: (a) the existence of the subject firearm and (b) the fact
that the accused who owned or possessed it does not have the license or permit to possess
the same.
[35]
The essence of the crime of illegal possession is the possession, whether actual
or constructive, of the subject firearm, without which there can be no conviction for illegal
possession. After possession is established by the prosecution, it would only be a matter of
course to determine whether the accused has a license to possess the
firearm.
[36]
Possession of any firearm becomes unlawful only if the necessary permit or
license therefor is not first obtained. The absence of license and legal authority constitutes
an essential ingredient of the offense of illegal possession of firearm and every ingredient
or essential element of an offense must be shown by the prosecution by proof beyond
reasonable doubt. Stated otherwise, the negative fact of lack or absence of license
constitutes an essential ingredient of the offense which the prosecution has the duty not
only to allege but also to prove beyond reasonable doubt.
[37]
To convict an accused for
illegal possession of firearms and explosives under P. D. 1866, as amended, two (2)
essential elements must be indubitably established, viz.: (a) the existence of the
subject firearm or explosive which may be proved by the presentation of the subject
firearm or explosive or by the testimony of witnesses who saw accused in possession of the
same, and (b) the negative fact that the accused had no license or permit to own or possess
the firearm or explosive which fact may be established by the testimony or certification of
a representative of the PNP Firearms and Explosives Unit that the accused has no license or
permit to possess the subject firearm or explosive. x x x We stress that the essence of the
crime penalized under P. D. 1866 is primarily the accuseds lack of license or permit to
carry or possess the firearm, ammunition or explosive as possession by itself is not
prohibited by law.
[38]
Illegal possession of firearm is a crime punished by special law,
a malum prohibitum, and no malice or intent to commit a crime need be proved.
[39]
To
support a conviction, however, there must be possession coupled with intent to possess
(animus possidendi) the firearm.
[40]

In upholding the prosecution and giving credence to the testimony of police officer
Jerito A. Adigue, the trial court relied on the presumption of regularity in the performance
of official duties by the police officers.
[41]
This is a flagrant error because his testimony is
directly contradictory to the official records of the Firearms and Explosives Division, PNP,
which must prevail. Morever, the presumption of regularity can not prevail over the
Constitutional presumption of innocence.
[42]
Right from the start, P/Sr. Insp. Jerito A.
Adigue was aware that petitioner possessed a valid license for the caliber .45 Colt pistol in
question. Despite this fact, P/Sr. Insp. Adigue proceeded to detain petitioner and charged
him with illegal possession of firearms. We quote pertinent portions of the testimony of
petitioner:
Q: What else did Adigue tell you after showing to him the license of your cal. .45
pistol and the alleged cal. .22 found in a drawer in your kitchen?
A: He told me that since my firearm is licensed, he will return my firearm, give him
ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) and for me to tell who among the people in our
barangay have unlicensed firearm, sir.
Q: How did he say about the ten thousand pesos?
Page 19 of 96 |

A: He said palit kalabaw na lang tayo sir.
Q: And what did you answer him?
A: I told him my firearm is licensed and I do not have money, if I have, I will not give
him, sir, because he was just trying to squeeze something from me.
Q: How about the unlicensed firearms in your barangay which he asked from you?
A: I said I do not know any unlicensed firearm in our barangay, sir.
Q: About the .22 cal. pistol, what was your answer to him?
A: I told him that it was not mine, they planted it, sir.
Q: What did he say next?
A: He said that it is your word against mine, the Court will believe me because I am
a police officer, sir.
Q: What was your comment to what he said?
A: I said my firearm is licensed and we have Courts of law who do not conform with
officials like you and then he laughed and laughed, sir.
[43]

The trial court was obviously misguided when it held that it is a matter of judicial
notice that a caliber .45 firearm can not be licensed to a private individual.
[44]
This ruling
has no basis either in law or in jurisprudence.
[45]

Second issue. The seizure of items not mentioned in the search warrant was illegal.
With respect to the .22 caliber revolver with Serial No. 48673, that the police raiding
team found in a drawer at the kitchen of petitioners house, suffice it to say that the firearm
was not mentioned in the search warrant applied for and issued for the search of
petitioners house. Section 2, Article III of the Constitution lays down the general rule that
a search and seizure must be carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant,
absent which such search and seizure becomes unreasonable within the meaning of said
constitutional provision.
[46]
Supporting jurisprudence thus outlined the following
requisites for a search warrants validity, the absence of even one will cause its downright
nullification: (1) it must be issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be
determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person; (3) in the
determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the
complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and (4) the warrant issued must
particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be
seized.
[47]
Seizure is limited to those items particularly described in a valid search warrant.
Searching officers are without discretion regarding what articles they shall
seize.
[48]
Evidence seized on the occasion of such an unreasonable search and seizure is
tainted and excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In the language of
the fundamental law, it shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any
proceeding.
[49]

In this case, the firearm was not found inadvertently and in plain view. It was found
as a result of a meticulous search in the kitchen of petitioners house. This firearm, to
emphasize, was not mentioned in the search warrant. Hence, the seizure was illegal.
[50]
The
seizure without the requisite search warrant was in plain violation of the law and the
Constitution.
[51]
True that as an exception, the police may seize without warrant illegally
possessed firearm or any contraband for that matter, inadvertently found in plain
view. However, [t]he seizure of evidence in plain view applies only where the police
officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but inadvertently comes across an
incriminating object.
[52]
Specifically, seizure of evidence in plain view is justified when
there is:
(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the
police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to
be where they are;
(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, and
(d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.
[53]

Hence, the petitioner rightly rejected the firearm as planted and not belonging to
him. The prosecution was not able to prove that the firearm was in the effective possession
or control of the petitioner without a license. In illegal possession of firearms, the
possessor must know of the existence of the subject firearm in his possession or control.
In People v. de Gracia,
[54]
we clarified the meaning of possession for the purpose of
convicting a person under P. D. No. 1866, thus: x x x In the present case, a distinction
should be made between criminal intent and intent to possess. While mere possession
without criminal intent is sufficient to convict a person for illegal possession of a firearm, it
must still be shown that there was animus possidendi or an intent to possess on the part of
the accused. x x x x Hence, the kind of possession punishable under P. D. No. 1866 is one
where the accused possessed a firearm either physically or constructively with animus
possidendi or intention to possess the same.
[55]
That is the meaning of animus
possidendi. In the absence of animus possidendi, the possessor of a firearm incurs no
criminal liability.
The same is true with respect to the 5.56 cal. magazine found in the bedroom of
petitioners daughter. The seizure was invalid and the seized items were inadmissible in
evidence. As explained in People v. Doria,
[56]
the plain view doctrine applies when the
following requisites concur: (1) the law enforcement officer is in a position where he has a
clear view of a particular area or has prior justification for an intrusion; (2) said officer
inadvertently comes across (or sees in plain view) a piece of incriminating evidence; and
Page 20 of 96 |

(3) it is immediately apparent to such officer that the item he sees may be evidence of a
crime or a contraband or is otherwise subject to seizure.
With particular reference to the two 2-way radios that the raiding policemen also
seized in the bedroom of petitioners daughter, there was absolutely no reason for the
seizure. The radios were not contraband per se. The National Telecommunications
Commission may license two-way radios at its discretion.
[57]
The burden is on the
prosecution to show that the two-way radios were not licensed. The National
Telecommunication Commission is the sole agency authorized to seize unlicensed two-way
radios. More importantly, admittedly, the two-way radios were not mentioned in the
search warrant. We condemn the seizure as illegal and a plain violation of a citizens
right. Worse, the petitioner was not charged with illegal possession of the two-way radios.
Consequently, the confiscation of the two 2-way radios was clearly illegal. The
possession of such radios is not even included in the charge of illegal possession of
firearms (violation of P. D. No. 1866, as amended) alleged in the Information.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby REVERSES the decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G. R. CR No. 22255, promulgated on July 09, 1999.
The Court ACQUITS petitioner Vicente del Rosario y Nicolas of the charge of
violation of P. D. No. 1866, as amended by R. A. No. 8294 (illegal possession of firearms
and ammunition), in Criminal Case No. 800-M-96, Regional Trial Court, Bulacan, Branch
20, Malolos.
Costs de oficio.
The Chief, Firearms and Explosives Division, PNP shall return to petitioner his
caliber .45 Colt pistol, with Serial Number No. 70G23792, the five (5) extra magazines and
twenty seven (27) rounds of live ammunition, and the two 2-way radios confiscated from
him. The Chief, Philippine National Police, or his duly authorized representative shall
show to this Court proof of compliance herewith within fifteen (15) days from notice. The
.22 caliber revolver with Serial No. 48673, and eight (8) live ammunition and the magazine
for 5.56 mm. caliber Armalite rifle are confiscated in favor of the government.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Kapunan, J., on leave.

Page 21 of 96 |

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-25232 December 20, 1973
ASIAN SURETY and INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. JOSE HERRERA, as Judge, City Court of Manila, NBI Agent CELSO J.
ZOLETA, JR. and MANUEL CUARESMA, respondents.
Astraquillo, Laquio, Brillantes and Associates, Taada, Carmon and Taada and Alidio,
Elegir, Anchete and Catipon petitioner.
Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro and Solicitor Augusto M. Amores for
respondent Celso J. Zoleta, Jr.
Antonio Barredo for respondent Manuel Cuaresma.

ESGUERRA, J .:
Petition to quash and annul a search warrant issued by respondent Judge Jose Herrera of
the City Court of Manila, and to command respondents to return immediately the
documents, papers, receipts and records alleged to have been illegally seized thereunder by
agents of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) led by respondent Celso Zoleta, Jr.
On October 27, 1965, respondent Judge Herrera, upon the sworn application of NBI agent
Celso Zoleta, Jr. supported by the deposition of his witness, Manuel Cuaresma, issued a
search warrant in connection with an undocketed criminal case for estafa, falsification,
insurance fraud, and tax evasion, against the Asian Surety and Insurance Co., a corporation
duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, with principal office at
Room 200 Republic Supermarket Bldg., Rizal Avenue, Manila. The search warrant is
couched in the following language:
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned, after examining under
oath NBI Agent Celso J. Zoleta, Jr. and his witness Manuel
Cuaresma that there are good and sufficient reasons to believe thatMr.
William Li Yao or his employees has/have in his/their control in
premises No. 2nd Floor Republic Supermarket Building, in Rizal
Avenue district of Sta. Cruz, Manila, property (Subject of the offense;
stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense used or
intended to be used as the means of committing the offense) should be
seized and brought to the undersigned.
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any time in
the ----- of the premises above-described and forthwith seize and take
possession of the following personal property to wit: Fire Registers, Loss
Bordereau, Adjusters Report including subrogation receipt and proof of
loss, Loss Registers, Books of Accounts, including cash receipts and
disbursements and general ledger, check vouchers, income tax returns,
and other papers connected therewith ... for the years 1961 to 1964 to be
dealt with as the law directs.
Armed with the search warrant Zoleta and other agents assigned to the Anti-graft Division
of the NBI entered the premises of the Republic Supermarket Building and served the
search warrant upon Atty. Alidio of the insurance company, in the presence of Mr. William
Li Yao, president and chairman of the board of directors of the insurance firm. After the
search they seized and carried away two (2) carloads of documents, papers and receipts.
Petitioner assails the validity of the search warrant, claiming that it was issued in
contravention of the explicit provisions of the Constitution and the Rules of Court,
particularly Section 1, of Art. III of the 1935 Constitution, now Section 3, of Art. IV of the
new Constitution, and Sections 3, 5, 8 and 10 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, hereunder
quoted for convenience of reference, viz:
Sec. 3 The rights of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not
be violated, and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause to be
determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnessed he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons, or things to be
seized." (Art. IV, Section 3, New Constitution)
Sec. 3 Requisites for issuing search warrant A search warrant shall
not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense
to be determined by the judge or justice of the peace after examination
Page 22 of 96 |

under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
No search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense. (Sec. 3,
Rule 126, Rules of Court)
Sec. 5 Issuance and form of search warrant If the judge or justice
of the peace is thereupon satisfied of the existence of facts upon which
the application is based, or that there is probable cause to believe that
they exist, he must issue the warrant in the form prescribed by these
rules. (Sec. 5, Rule 126)
Sec. 8 Time of making search The warrant must direct that it be
served in the day time, unless the affidavit asserts that the property is on
the person or in the place ordered to be searched, in which case a
direction may be inserted that it be served at any time of the night or day.
(Sec. 8, Rule 126)
Sec. 10 Receipt for property seized. The officer seizing property under
the warrant must give a detailed receipt for the same to the person on
whom or in whose possession it was found, or in the absence of any
person, must, in the presence of at least one witness, leave a receipt in the
place in which he found the seized property. (Sec. 10, Rule 126) .
"Of all the rights of a citizen, few are of greater importance or more essential to his peace
and happiness than the right of personal security, and that involves the exemption of his
private affairs, books, and papers from the inspection and scrutiny of others.
1
While the
power to search and seize is necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and
the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for the
enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic
principles of government (People v. Elias, 147 N.E. 472)."
I.
In the case at bar, the search warrant was issued for four separate and distinct offenses of :
(1) estafa, (2) falsification, (3) tax evasion and (4) insurance fraud, in contravention of the
explicit command of Section 3, Rule 126, of the Rules providing that: "no search warrant
shall issue for more than one specific offense." The aforequoted provision, which is found
in the last paragraph of the same section, is something new. "There is no precedent on this
amendment prohibition against the issuance of a search warrant for more than one
specific offense either in the American books on Criminal procedure or in American
decisions."
2
It was applied in the celebrated case of Harry S. Stonehill v. Secretary of
Justice
3
where this Court said:
To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out
completely one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our
Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and the
privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the
whims, caprice or passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil
sought to be remedied by the constitutional provision abovequoted to
outlaw the so-called general warrants. It is not difficult to imagine what
would happen in times of keen political strife, when the party in power
feels that the minority is likely to wrest it, even though by legal means.
Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with
the disputed search warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend
section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court by providing in its
counterpart, under the Revised Rules of Court, that a search warrant shall
not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific
offense. Not satisfied with this qualification, the court added thereto a
paragraph, directing that no search warrant shall issue for more than one
specific offense.
II.
Petitioner likewise contests the validity of the search warrant on the ground that it
authorized the search and seizures of personal properties so vaguely described and not
particularized, thereby infringing the constitutional mandate requiring particular
description of the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. It also assails
the noncompliance with the above-requirement as likewise openly violative of Section 2 of
Rule 126 which provides:
SEC. 2. A search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of the
following personal property:
(a) Property subject of the offense;
(b) Property stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the
offense; and
Page 23 of 96 |

(c) Property used or intended to be used as the means of committing an
offense.
The search warrant herein involved reads in part: "... property (Subject of the offense,
stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense used or intended to be used as the
means of committing the offense) should be seized and brought to the undersigned." The
claim of respondents that by not cancelling the description of one or two of the classes of
property contained in the form when not applicable to the properties sought to be seized,
the respondent judge intended the search to apply to all the three classes of property. This
is a patent impossibility because the description of the property to be searched and seized,
viz: Fire Registers, Loss Bordereau, Adjusters Report, including subrogation receipts and
proof of loss, Loss Registers, Books of Accounts including cash receipts and disbursements
and general ledger, etc. and the offenses alleged to have been committed by the corporation
to wit: estafa, falsification, tax evasion and insurance fraud, render it impossible for Us to
see how the above-described property can simultaneously be contraband goods, stolen or
embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of one and the same offense. What is plain and clear
is the fact that the respondent Judge made no attempt to determine whether the property he
authorized to be searched and seized pertains specifically to any one of the three classes of
personal property that may be searched and seized under a search warrant under Rule 126,
Sec. 2 of the Rules. The respondent Judge simply authorized search and seizure under an
omnibus description of the personal properties to be seized. Because of this all embracing
description which includes all conceivable records of petitioner corporation, which if
seized (as it was really seized in the case at bar), could possibly paralyze its
business,
4
petitioner in several motions, filed for early resolution of this case, manifested
that the seizure of TWO carloads of their papers has paralyzed their business to the grave
prejudice of not only the company, its workers, agents, employees but also of its numerous
insured and beneficiaries of bonds issued by it, including the government itself, and of the
general public.
5
And correlating the same to the charges for which the warrant was issued,
We have before Us the infamous general warrants of old. In the case of Uy Kheytin, et al.,
v. Villareal, 42 Phil. 896, cited with approval in the Bache case, supra, We had occasion to
explain the purpose of the requirement that the warrant should particularly describe the
place to be searched and the things to be seized, to wit:
"... Both the Jones Law (sec. 3) and General Orders No. 58 (sec. 97)
specifically require that a search warrant should particularly describe the
place to be searched and the things to be seized. The evident purpose and
intent of this requirement is to limit the things to be seized to those, and
only those, particularly described in the search warrant to leave the
officers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles they shall
seize, to the end that "unreasonable searches and seizures" may not be
made. That this is the correct interpretation of this constitutional
provision is borne out by American authorities."
The purpose as thus explained could, surely and effectively, be defeated under the search
warrant issued in this case.
III.
Moreover, as contended by petitioner, respondents in like manner transgressed Section 10
of Rule 126 of the Rules for failure to give a detailed receipt of the things seized. Going
over the receipts (Annexes "B", "B-1", B-2", "B-3" and "B-4" of the Petition) issued, We
found the following: one bordereau of reinsurance, 8 fire registers, 1 marine register, four
annual statements, folders described only as Bundle gm-1 red folders; bundle 17-22 big
carton folders; folders of various sizes, etc., without stating therein the nature and kind of
documents contained in the folders of which there were about a thousand of them that were
seized. In the seizure of two carloads of documents and other papers, the possibility that the
respondents took away private papers of the petitioner, in violation of his constitutional
rights, is not remote, for the NBI agents virtually had a field day with the broad and
unlimited search warrant issued by respondent Judge as their passport.
IV.
The search warrant violated the specific injunctions of Section 8 of Rule 126.
6
Annex "A"
of the Petition which is the search warrant in question left blank the "time" for making
search, while actual search was conducted in the evening of October 27, 1965, at 7:30 p.m.,
until the wee hours of the morning of October 28, 1965, thus causing untold
inconveniences to petitioners herein. Authorities
7
are of the view that where a search is to
be made during the night time, the authority for executing the same at that time should
appear in the directive on the face of the warrant.
In their Memorandum
8
respondents, relying on the case of Moncado v. Peoples Court (80
Phil. 1), argued:
Even assuming that the search warrant in question is null and void, the
illegality thereof would not render the incriminating documents
inadmissible in evidence.
This Court has reverted to the old rule and abandoned the Moncado ruling (Stonehill
case, supra). Most common law jurisdictions have already given up this approach and
eventually adopted the exclusionary rule, realizing that this is the only practical means of
enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. Thus the
Supreme Court of the United States declared:
9

Page 24 of 96 |

If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in
evidence against a citizen accused of an offense the protection of the 4th
Amendment, declaring his right to be secured against such searches and
seizures is of no value, and so far as those thus placed are concerned,
might as well be stricken from the Constitution. The efforts of the courts
and their officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praise-worthy as
they are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles
established by years of endeavor and suffering which have resulted in
their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land.
Moreover, the criminal charges filed by the NBI have all been dismissed and/or dropped by
the Court or by the office of the City Fiscal of Manila in 1968, as manifested in the petition
filed by petitioner dated October 24, 1972, for early resolution of this case.
V.
It has likewise been observed that the offenses alleged took place from 1961 to 1964, and
the application for search warrant was made on October 27, 1965. The time of the
application is so far remote in time as to make the probable cause of doubtful veracity and
the warrant vitally defective. Thus Mr. Joseph Varon, an eminent authority on Searches,
Seizures and Immunities, has this to say on this point:
From the examination of the several cases touching upon this subject, the
following general rules are said to apply to affidavits for search warrants:
(1) xxx xxx xxx
(2) Such statement as to the time of the alleged offense must be clear and
definite and must not be too remote from the time of the making of the
affidavit and issuance of the search warrant.
(3) There is no rigid rule for determining whether the stated time of
observation of the offense is too remote from the time when the affidavit
is made or the search warrant issued, but, generally speaking, a lapse of
time of more than three weeks will be held not to invalidate the search
warrant while a lapse of four weeks will be held to be so.
A good and practical rule of thumb to measure the nearness of time given
in the affidavit as to the date of the alleged offense, and the time of
making the affidavit is thus expressed: The nearer the time at which the
observation of the offense is alleged to have been made, the more
reasonable the conclusion of establishment of probable cause. [Emphasis
Ours]
PREMISES CONSIDERED, petition is hereby granted; the search warrant of October 27,
1965, is nullified and set aside, and the respondents are hereby ordered to return
immediately all documents, papers and other objects seized or taken thereunder. Without
costs.
Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Fernandez * and Muoz Palma, JJ., concur.
Makasiar, J., concurs in the result.

Page 25 of 96 |

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 129651. October 20, 2000]
FRANK UY and UNIFISH PACKING CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. BUREAU
OF INTERNAL REVENUE and HON. MERCEDES GOZO-
DADOLE, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
KAPUNAN, J .:
Petitioners assail the validity of the warrants issued for the search of the premises of
the Unifish Packing Corporation, and pray for the return of the items seized by virtue
thereof.
On 30 September 1993, a certain Rodrigo Abos reported to the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) that petitioners Unifish Packing Corporation and Uy Chin Ho alias Frank
Uy were engaged in activities constituting violations of the National Internal Revenue
Code. Abos, who claimed to be a former employee of Unifish, executed an
Affidavit
[1]
stating:
1. He has personal knowledge that UNIFISH PACKING CORPORATION (hereinafter
referred to as UNIFISH), a canning factory located at Hernan Cortes Street, under the
active management of UY CHIN HO alias Frank Uy [,] is selling by the thousands of [sic]
cartons of canned sardines without issuing receipt. This is in violation of Sections 253 and
263 of the Internal Revenue Code.
2. This grand scale tax fraud is perpetrated through the following scheme:
(1) Uy Chin Ho a director of UNIFISH buys in bulk from the
company;
(2) Being a director, Uy Chin Ho has a lot of clout in the
distribution of the canned sardines processed by UNIFISH;
(3) Uy Chin Ho dictates the value of canned sardines that he orders
and buys from UNIFISH without any receipt of his purchases;
(4) The moment he has the quantity he wants, UNIFISH through Uy
Chin Ho delivers to the different supermarkets such as White
Gold, Gaisano, etc.;
(5) Payments made by these tax evading establishments are made
by checks drawn payable to cash and delivered to Uy Chin Ho;
These payments are also not receipted (sic);
(6) Uy Chin Ho will then pay UNIFISH for the quantity of sardines
he had withdrawn from the corporation;
3. Another fraudulent practice perpetrated by UNIFISH through Uy Chin Hos direction is
the sale of imported oil locally to different customers. This is a case of smuggling in the
sense that UNIFISH, being an export company registered with the Board of Investments, is
enjoying certain exemptions in their importation of oil as one of the raw materials in its
processing of canned tuna for export. These tax exemptions are granted by the government
on the condition that the oil is to be used only in the processing of tuna for export and that
it is not to be sold unprocessed as is to local customers.
4. Another fraudulent practice involves the sales of unused cans; UNIFISH also enjoys tax
exemptions in its purchases of tin cans subject to the condition that these are to be used as
containers for its processed tuna for export. These cans are never intended to be sold
locally to other food processing companies.
5. Prior to 1990, that is from 1980 to 1990, the factory of the UNIFISH PACKING
CORPORATION was then run by the PREMIER INDUSTRIAL & DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION (hereinafter referred to as PREMIER) [,] which corporation was being
controlled by the same majority stockholders as those now running and controlling
UNIFISH; [a]t that time, PREMIER was also committing the same fraudulent acts as what
is being perpetrated by UNIFISH at present.
6. The records containing entries of actual volume of production and sales, of both
UNIFISH AND PREMIER, are found in the office of the corporation at its factory site at
H. Cortes Street, Mandaue City. The particular place or spot where these records [official
receipts, sales invoices, delivery receipts, sales records or sales books, stock cards,
accounting records (such as ledgers, journals, cash receipts books, and check
disbursements books)] are kept and may be found is best described in the herein attached
sketch of the arrangement of the offices furniture and fixture of the corporation which is
made an integral part hereof and marked as Annex A,
7. He is executing this affidavit to attest under oath the veracity of the foregoing allegations
and he is reserving his right to claim for reward under the provisions of Republic Act No.
2338.
Page 26 of 96 |

On 1 October 1993, Nestor N. Labaria, Assistant Chief of the Special Investigation
Branch of the BIR, applied for search warrants from Branch 28 of the Regional Trial Court
of Cebu. The application sought permission to search the premises of Unifish.
After hearing the depositions of Labaria and Abos, Judge Mercedes Gozo-Dadole
issued the disputed search warrants. The first
[2]
is docketed as SEARCH WARRANT NO.
93-10-79 FOR: VIOLATION OF SECTION 253 ("Search Warrant A-1"), and consists of
two pages. A verbatim reproduction of Search Warrant A-1 appears below:
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CEBU
7th Judicial Region
Branch 28
Mandaue City
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff,
- versus - SEARCH WARRANT NO. 93-10-79
FOR: VIOLATION OF SEC. 253
UY CHIN HO alias FRANK UY,
Unifish Packing Corporation
Hernan Cortes St., Cebu City
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - /
(with sketch)
SEARCH WARRANT
TO ANY PEACE OFFICER:
G R E E T I N G S:
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned, after examination underoath (sic),
Nestor N. Labaria, Asst. Chief, Special Investigation Branch, BIR and witness Rodrigo
Abos that there is a (sic) probable cause to believe that the crime of violation of Section
253 - attempt to evade or defeat the tax has been committed and there is good and
sufficient reason to believe that Uy Chin Ho c/o Unifish Packing Corporation, Hernan
Cortes St., Mandaue City has in his possession, care and control, the following:
1. Multiple sets of Books of Accounts; Ledgers, Journals, Columnar Books,
Cash Register Books, Sales Books or Records; Provisional &
Official Receipts;
2. Production Record Books/Inventory Lists [,] Stock Cards;
3. Unregistered Delivery Receipts;
4. Unregistered Purchase & Sales Invoices;
5. Sales Records, Job Order;
6. Corporate Financial Records; and
7. Bank Statements/Cancelled Checks
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any time of day or night of
said premises and its immediate vicinity and to forthwith seize and take possession of the
articles above-mentioned and other properties relative to such violation and bring said
properties to the undersigned to be dealt with as the law directs.
WITNESS MY HAND this 1st day of October, 1993.
(sgd.)
MERCEDES GOZO-DADOLE
Judge
The second warrant
[3]
is similarly docketed as SEARCH WARRANT 93-10-79
FOR: VIOLATION OF SEC. 253 ("Search Warrant A-2"). Search Warrant A-2,
reproduced below, is almost identical in content to Search Warrant A-1, save for the
portions indicated in bold print. It consisted of only one page.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CEBU
7th Judicial Region
Branch 28
Mandaue City
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff,
- versus - SEARCH WARRANT NO. 93-10-79
FOR: VIOLATION OF SEC. 253
UY CHIN HO alias FRANK UY, and
Unifish Packing Corporation
Page 27 of 96 |

Hernan Cortes St., Mandaue City
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - /
(with sketch)
SEARCH WARRANT
TO ANY PEACE OFFICER:
G R E E T I N G S:
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned, after examination underoath [sic],
Nestor N. Labaria, Asst. Chief, Special Investigation Branch, BIR and witness Rodrigo
Abos that there is a [sic] probable cause to believe that the crime of violation of Section
253 - attempt to evade or defeat the tax has been committed and there is good and
sufficient reason to believe that Uy Chin Ho alias Frank Uy and Unifish Packing
Corporation, Hernan Cortes St., Mandaue City has in his possession, care and control, the
following:
Cash Register Books, Sales Books or Records; Provisional &
Official Receipts;
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any time of day or night of
said premises and its immediate vicinity and to forthwith seize and take possession of the
articles above-mentioned and other properties relative to such violation and bring said
properties to the undersigned to be dealt with as the law directs.
WITNESS MY HAND this 1
st
day of October, 1993.
(sgd.)
MERCEDES GOZO-DADOLE
Judge
Judge Gozo-Dadole issued a third warrant,
[4]
which was docketed as SEARCH
WARRANT 93-10-80 FOR: VIOLATION OF SEC. 238 in relation to SEC. 263
(hereinafter, "Search Warrant B"). Except for the docket number and the designation of the
crime in the body of the warrant (Section 238 in relation to Sec. 263 - non-issuance of
sales invoice and use and possession of unregistered delivery receipts and/or sales
invoices), Search Warrant B is a verbatim reproduction of Search Warrant A-2.
On the strength of these warrants, agents of the BIR, accompanied by members of the
Philippine National Police, on 2 October 1993, searched the premises of the Unifish
Packing Corporation. They seized, among other things, the records and documents of
petitioner corporation. A return of said search was duly made by Nestor Labaria with the
RTC of Cebu , Branch 28.
On 8 February 1995, the BIR filed against petitioners a case before the Department of
Justice. The records, however, do not reveal the nature of this case.
On 31 March 1995, petitioners filed motions to quash the subject search warrants
with Branch 28 of the Cebu RTC.
The RTC, however, denied petitioners' motions to quash as well as their subsequent
motion for reconsideration, prompting petitioners to file a petition for certiorari with the
Court of Appeals (CA). The CA dismissed their petition, holding that petitioners failed to
comply with Section 2(a), Rule 6 of the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals
(RIRCA), which states:
a. What Should be Filed. - The petition shall be filed in seven (7) legible copies and a copy
thereof shall be served on each of the respondents, and must be accompanied by a certified
true copy of the decision or order complained of and true copies of the pleadings and other
pertinent documents and papers. (As amended by S.Ct. Res., dated November 24, 1992).
The CA found that petitioners did not submit certified true copies of (1) the Motions to
Quash, (2) the Motion for Reconsideration, and (3) the Affidavit of Rodrigo Abos.
The CA also held that certiorari was not the proper remedy to question the resolution
denying the motion to quash.
In this case now before us, the available remedies to the petitioners, assuming that the
Department of Justice will eventually file the case, are: a petition for reinvestigation; the
right to post bail; a Motion to Quash the Information; and in case of denial, an appeal, after
judgment on the merits, or after the case shall have been tried. This brings us to the case
of Lai vs. Intermediate 220 SCRA 149 and the pronouncement, thus:
Page 28 of 96 |

Criminal Procedure: Certiorari: Certiorari should not be allowed where petitioner has other
remedies available. -- Anent the remedy resorted to by petitioners (referring to the petition
for certiorari) from the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental presided by Judge Diez,
the same should not have been granted. Petitioners were not without plain, speedy and
adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law against Judge Lomeda's order for their
arrest. These remedies are as enumerated by respondent appellate court in its
decision: "1. they can post bail for their provisional release; 2. They can ask the Provincial
Fiscal for a reinvestigation of the charge against them. If unsatisfied with the fiscal's
resolution they can ask for a review by the Minister of Justice; (Sec. 1(), RA 5180 as
amended by P.D.
911); 3. if their petition for reviewdoes not prosper, they can file a motion to quash the info
rmation in the trial court. (Rule 117, Rules of
Court). 4. If the motion is denied, theycan appeal the judgment of the court after the case sh
all have been tried on the merits.
x x x Where motion to quash is denied, remedy is not certiorari, but to go to trial.--
Moreover, in the case of Acharon vs. Purisima, this Court held
that when a motion to quash a criminal case is denied, the remedy is not certiorari but to go
to trial without prejudice to reiterating thespecial defenses involved in said Motion. In the
event that an adverse decision is rendered after trial on the merits, an appeal therefrom
should be the next legal step.
xxx
In this case now before Us, there is no pretention [sic] that the Court issued the Search
Warrants without jurisdiction. On the contrary, it had jurisdiction. The argument therefore
that the Court committed an error in not describing the persons or things to be searched;
that the Search Warrants did not describe with particularity the things to be seized/taken;
the absence of probable cause; and for having allegedly condoned the discriminating
manner in which the properties were taken, to us, are merely errors in the Court's finding,
certainly not correctible by certiorari, but instead thru an appeal.
[5]

In any event, the CA ruled, no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction was committed by the RTC in the issuance of the warrants.
As petitioners' motion for reconsideration proved futile, petitioners filed the instant
petition for review.
Petitioners claim that they did submit to the CA certified true copies of the pleadings
and documents listed above along with their Petition, as well as in their Motion for
Reconsideration. An examination of the CA Rollo, however, reveals that petitioners first
submitted the same in their Reply, after respondents, in their Comment, pointed out
petitioners failure to attach them to the Petition.
Nevertheless, the CA should not have dismissed the petition on this ground although,
to its credit, it did touch upon the merits of the case. First, it appears that the case could
have been decided without these pleadings and documents. Second, even if the CA deemed
them essential to the resolution of the case, it could have asked for the records from the
RTC. Third, in a similar case,
[6]
we held that the submission of a document together with
the motion for reconsideration constitutes substantial compliance with Section 3, Rule 46
of the Rules of Court, requiring the submission of a certified true copy of material
portions of the record as are referred to [in the petition], and other documents relevant or
pertinent thereto along with the petition. So should it be in this case, especially
considering that it involves an alleged violation of a constitutionally guaranteed right. The
rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense; rules of procedure
are used only to help secure substantial justice. If a technical and rigid enforcement of the
rules is made, their aim could be defeated.
[7]

The CA likewise erred in holding that petitioners cannot avail of certiorari to
question the resolution denying their motions to quash the subject search warrants. We note
that the case of Lai vs. Intermediate, cited by the appellate court as authority for its
ruling does not appear in 220 SCRA 149. The excerpt of the syllabus quoted by the
court, as observed by petitioners,
[8]
appears to have been taken from the case of Yap vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 220 SCRA 245 (1993). Yap, however, is inapplicable since
that case involved a motion to quash a complaint for qualified theft, not a motion to quash
a search warrant.
The applicable case is Marcelo vs. De Guzman,
[9]
where we held that the issuing
judges disregard of the requirements for the issuance of a search warrant constitutes grave
abuse of discretion, which may be remedied by certiorari:
Expressly announced in Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the general rule that
certiorari is available where a tribunal or officer exercising judicial functions has acted
without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion and there is
no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
In the light of the findings of the lower court, herein above quoted, it is indisputable that
Judge de Guzman gravely abused his discretion in issuing the said search warrant. Indeed,
he acted whimsically and capriciously when he ignored the explicit mandate of Section 3,
Rule 126 of the Rules of Court that a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable
cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined by the municipal or city
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things
to be seized; and that no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense.
The utter disregard by Judge de Guzman of the requirements laid down by the said rule
renders the warrant in question absolutely null and void. It has been held that where the
Page 29 of 96 |

order complained of is a patent nullity, a petition for certiorari and mandamus may
properly be entertained despite the existence of the remedy of appeal.
Moreover, an appeal from the order of Judge de Guzman would neither be an adequate nor
speedy remedy to relieve appellee of the injurious effects of the warrant. The seizure of her
personal property had resulted in the total paralization of the articles and documents which
had been improperly seized. Where the remedy of appeal cannot afford an adequate and
expeditious relief, certiorari can be allowed as a mode of redress to prevent irreparable
damage and injury to a party.
This Court had occasion to reiterate the above pronouncement in Silva vs.
Presiding Judge, RTC of Negros Oriental, Br. XXXIII,
[10]
which also involved a special
civil action for certiorari:
[11]

Thus, in issuing a search warrant, the judge must strictly comply with the constitutional
requirement that he must determine the existence of probable cause by examining the
applicant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers. His failure to
comply with this requirement constitutes grave abuse of discretion. As declared in Marcelo
vs. De Guzman, G.R. No. L-29077, June 29, 1982, 114 SCRA 657, the capricious
disregard by the judge in not complying with the requirements before issuance of search
warrants constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
In this case, petitioners alleged in their petition before the CA that the issuing judge
violated the pertinent provisions of the Constitution and the Rules of Court in issuing the
disputed search warrants, which, if true, would have constituted grave abuse of
discretion. Petitioners also alleged that the enforcers of the warrants seized almost all the
records and documents of the corporation thus resulting in the paralysis of its
business. Appeal, therefore, would not be an adequate remedy that would afford petitioners
expeditious relief.
We now proceed to the merits of the case.
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution guarantees the right of the people against
unreasonable searches and seizures:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
In relation to the above provision, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 3. Requisite for issuing search warrant. - A search warrant shall not issue but upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be
seized.
SEC. 4. Examination of complainant; record. - The judge must, before issuing the warrant,
personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under
oath the complainant and any witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them
and attach to the record their sworn statements together with any affidavits submitted.
A search warrant must conform strictly to the requirements of the foregoing
constitutional and statutory provisions. These requirements, in outline form, are:
(1) the warrant must be issued upon probable cause;
(2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the
applicant or any other person;
(3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath
or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce;
and
(4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and
[12]

The absence of any of these requisites will cause the downright nullification of the
search warrants.
[13]
The proceedings upon search warrants must be absolutely legal, for
there is not a description of process known to the law, the execution of which is more
distressing to the citizen. Perhaps there is none which excites such intense feeling in
consequence of its humiliating and degrading effect. The warrants will always be
construed strictly without, however, going the full length of requiring technical
accuracy. No presumptions of regularity are to be invoked in aid of the process when an
officer undertakes to justify under it.
[14]

Petitioners contend that there are several defects in the subject warrants that
command their nullification. They point out inconsistencies in the description of the place
to be searched in Search Warrant A-1, as well as inconsistencies in the names of the
persons against whom Search Warrants A-1 and A-2 were issued. That two search warrants
(Search Warrants A-1 and A-2) were issued for the same crime, for the same place, at a
single occasion is cited as another irregularity. Petitioners also dispute the existence of
probable cause that would justify the issuance of the warrants. Finally, they claim that the
Page 30 of 96 |

things to be seized were not described with particularity. These defects, according to
petitioners, render the objects seized inadmissible in evidence.
[15]

Inconsistencies
in the
description of
the place to be
searched
Petitioners observe that the caption of Search Warrant A-1 indicates the address of Uy
Chin Ho alias Frank Uy as Hernan Cortes St., Cebu City while the body of the same
warrant states the address as Hernan Cortes St., Mandaue City. Parenthetically, Search
Warrants A-2 and B consistently state the address of petitioner as Hernan Cortes
St., Mandaue City.
The Constitution requires, for the validity of a search warrant, that there be a
particular description of the place to be searched and the persons of things to be
seized.
[16]
The rule is that a description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer
with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended
[17]
and
distinguish it from other places in the community.
[18]
Any designation or description known
to the locality that points out the place to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry leads
the officers unerringly to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement.
[19]
Thus, in Castro vs.
Pabalan,
[20]
where the search warrant mistakenly identified the residence of the petitioners
therein as Barrio Padasil instead of the adjoining Barrio Maria Cristina, this Court
"admitted that the deficiency in the writ is not of sufficient gravity to call for its
invalidation."
In this case, it was not shown that a street similarly named Hernan Cortes could be
found in Cebu City. Nor was it established that the enforcing officers had any difficulty in
locating the premises of petitioner corporation. That Search Warrant A-1, therefore,
inconsistently identified the city where the premises to be searched is not a defect that
would spell the warrants invalidation in this case.
Inconsistencies
in the
description of
the persons
named in the
two warrants
Petitioners also find fault in the description of the names of the persons in Search
Warrants A-1 and A-2. Search Warrant A-1 was issued solely against Uy Chin Ho alias
Frank Uy. Search Warrant A-2, on the other hand, was directed against UY CHIN HO
alias FRANK UY, and Unifish Packing Corporation.
These discrepancies are hardly relevant.
In Miller v. Sigler,
[21]
it was held that the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution, from which Section 2, Article III of our own Constitution is historically
derived, does not require the warrant to name the person who occupies the described
premises. Where the search warrant is issued for the search of specifically described
premises only and not for the search of a person, the failure to name the owner or occupant
of such property in the affidavit and search warrant does not invalidate the warrant; and
where the name of the owner of the premises sought to be searched is incorrectly inserted
in the search warrant, it is not a fatal defect if the legal description of the premises to be
searched is otherwise correct so that no discretion is left to the officer making the search as
to the place to be searched.
[22]

Since, in the case at bar, the warrant was issued not for search of the persons owning
or occupying the premises, but only a search of the premises occupied by them, the search
could not be declared unlawful or in violation of the constitutional rights of the owner or
occupants of the premises, because of inconsistencies in stating their names.
[23]

Two warrants
issued at one
time for one
crime and one
place
In any event, Search Warrant A-1 should be deemed superseded by Search Warrant
A-2.
Two warrants, Search Warrants A-1 and A-2, were actually issued by the trial court
for the same crime (violation of SEC. 253 of the National Internal Revenue Code). It
appears, however, that Search Warrant A-2 was issued merely to correct the
inconsistencies in the address in Search Warrant A-1, as well as to include Unifish Packing
Corporation as a party against whom the warrant was issued. Search Warrant A-2 was
evidently an attempt by the issuing judge to be more precise in the names of the persons
against whom the warrant was issued and in the description of the place to be
searched. Indeed, it would be absurd for the judge to issue on a single occasion two
warrants authorizing the search of a single place for a single offense.Inasmuch as the
apparent intent in issuing Search Warrant A-2 was to supersede Search Warrant A-1, the
latter should be deemed revoked by the former.
The alleged
absence of
probable cause
Petitioners claim there was no probable cause for Judge Gozo-Dadole to issue the
subject search warrants.
Page 31 of 96 |

Probable cause is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that
the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.
[24]

In the determination of probable cause, the Constitution and the Rules of Court
require an examination of the witnesses under oath. The examination must be probing and
exhaustive, not merely routine or pro forma. The examining magistrate must not simply
rehash the contents of the affidavit but must make his own inquiry on the intent and
justification of the application.
[25]
Asking of leading questions to the deponent in an
application for search warrant, and conducting of examination in a general manner, would
not satisfy the requirements for issuance of a valid search warrant.
[26]

The witnesses, in turn, must testify under oath to facts of their own personal
knowledge. The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal
knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the
committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of
the warrant, of the existence of probable cause.
[27]
Search warrants are not issued on loose,
vague or doubtful basis of fact, nor on mere suspicion or belief.
[28]

It may be recalled that before issuing the warrants, the judge deposed two witnesses,
namely, Nestor Labaria of the BIR, and Rodrigo Abos, who claimed to be an old employee
of Unifish. Petitioners claim that the testimonies of Labaria and Abos are hearsay. We
agree with this contention, but only as to the testimony of Labaria, who stated during the
examination:
Q. Do you know of a certain Uy Chin Ho alias Frank Uy?
A. No.
Q. Do you know his establishment known as Unifish Packing Corporation?
A. I have only heard of that thru the affidavit of our informer, Mr. Abos.
Q. Why are you applying for search warrant in the premises of Unifish Packing
Corporation?
A. Because of that information we received that they are using only delivery receipts
instead of the legal sales invoices. It is highly indicative of fraud.
Q. From where did you get that information?
A. From our informer, the former employee of that establishment.
[29]

The above portion of the transcript shows that Labarias knowledge of the alleged
illegal activities of petitioners was acquired not through his own perception but was merely
supplied by Abos. Therefore, the deposition of Labaria, which is based on hearsay,
standing alone, cannot justify the issuance of the search warrants.
[30]

The application for the warrants, however, is not based solely on Labarias deposition
but is supported by that of Abos, whose knowledge of petitioners alleged illegal practices
was apparently obtained during his employment with Unifish. In his deposition, Abos
detailed the schemes employed by Frank Uy and Unifish to evade the payment of taxes,
and described the place where the documents supposedly evidencing these schemes were
located:
Q Do you know Frank Uy?
A Yes.
Q Why do you know him?
A Because I were (sic) an employee of his from 1980 until August of 1993.
Q Where is this Unifish Packing Corporation located?
A Hernan Cortes St.
Q What is it being engaged of?
A It is engaged in canning of fish.
Q You have executed an affidavit here to the effect that it seems that in his business
dealings that he is actually doing something that perpetrated tax evasion. Is that
correct?
A Yes.
Q How is it done?
A As an officer, he is an active member of the corporation who is at the same time
making his authority as appointing himself as the distributor of the company's
products. He sells these products thru supermarkets in Visayas and Mindanao, in
fact, the whole Philippines. He makes it appear that it is the company which is
selling when actually it is him selling the goods and he does not issue any
invoices.
Q Since he does not issue any invoices, how is it done?
A Thru delivery receipts.
Q Is the delivery receipt official?
A No. It is unregistered.
Q For how long has this been going on?
A As far as I know, it is still in 1986 since we started producing the sardines.
Page 32 of 96 |

Q When was the last time that you observed that that is what he is doing?
A August, 1993, last month.
Q How did you happen to know about this last month?
A Because he delivered to certain supermarkets and the payments of that supermarket
did not go directly to the company. It went to him and he is the one who paid the
company for the goods that he sold.
Q Can you tell this Court the name of that certain supermarkets?
A White Gold and Gaisano.
Q How did you know this fact?
A As a manager of the company I have access to all the records of that company for the
last three years. I was the Operating Chief.
Q Until now?
A No. I was separated already.
Q When?
A August, 1993.
Q How does he do this manipulation?
A He sells the goods to the supermarkets afterwhich the company, Unifish will deliver
to his customers, then his customers will pay directly to him and in turn, he pays
to the company.
Q And these transactions, were they reflected in their books of account or ledger or
whatever?
A It is written but it is supposed to be a secret transaction. It is not for the public, not
for the BIR but it is only for the purpose of keeping the transactions between the
company and him. It is not made to be shown to the BIR.
Q In that books of account, is it reflected that they have made some deliveries to certain
supermarkets?
A Yes.
Q For the consumption of the BIR what are the papers that they show?
A It is the private accounting firm that prepares everything.
Q Based on what?
A Based on some fictitious records just as they wish to declare.
Q In your affidavit you stated that there are sales invoices, official receipts, delivery
receipts, sales records, etc. These documents are records that you have stated, in
your affidavit, which are only for the consumption of the company?
A Yes, not for the BIR.
Q Where are they kept now?
A They are kept on the table which I have drawn in the sketch. This is the bird's
eyeview (sic) of the whole office. When you enter thru the door this Gina Tan is
the one recording all the confidential transactions of the company. In this table
you can find all the ledgers and notebooks.
Q This sketch is a blow-up of this portion, Exh. "A"?
A Yes. Exh. "B" is the blow-up of Exh. "A" inside the office.
In this blow-up there are four personnel plus one new personnel. Gina Tan collects all
the records from this girl and this girl makes the statements. This first girl delivers
the receipts. The second girl prepares the bill of lading. The third girl keeps the
inventory of all the stocks.
This sketch here is the bodega where the records are kept. The records from these
people are stored in this place which is marked as "C".
Q So what you want to impress on that now is that only current records are kept by
Gina because according to you the whole records are already placed in the
bodega?
A Yes.
Q But how can you enter the bodega?
A Here, from the main entrance there is a door which will lead to this part here. If you
go straight there is a bodega there and there is also a guard from this exit right
after opening the door.
Q The problem is that, when actually in August have you seen the current records kept
by Gina?
A I cannot exactly recall but I have the xerox copies of the records.
Q Where are they now?
A They are in my possession (witness handling [sic] to the Court a bunch of records).
Page 33 of 96 |

Q The transactions that are reflected in these xerox copies that you have given me,
especially this one which seems to be pages of a ledger, they show that these are
for the months of January, February, March, April and May. Are these
transactions reflected in these xerox copies which appear in the ledger being
shown to the BIR?
A As far as I know, it did not appear.
Q What about this one which says Columnar Book Cash Receipt for the month of
January, what does it show?
A It shows that Frank Uy is the one purchasing from the company and these are his
customers.
Q Do these entries appear in the columnar books which are the basis for the report to
the BIR?
A As far as I know, it does not reflect.
Q What are these xerox copies of checks?
A I think we cannot trace it up. These ones are the memos received by Unifish for
payment of sardines. This is the statement of the company given to Uy Chin Ho
for collection.
Q It is also stated in your affidavit that the company imported soya oil. How is it done?
A The company imports soya oil to be used as a component in the processing of canned
tuna for export. The company enjoys certain BOI privilege and so it is tax free. As
far as I know, they profit more to dispose the product locally. Whatever excess of
this soya oil are sold to another company.
Q Is that fact reflected in the xerox copies?
A No. I have the actual delivery receipt.
Q In other words, the company imports soya oil supposedly to be used as a raw material
but instead they are selling it locally?
A Yes. ([W]itness showing DR No. 3053 dated November 13, 1991.) This delivery
receipt was the delivery receipt to Celebes Canning Corp. of the 90 grams soya
oil.
Q In other words, this soya oil should have to be used by Unifish but instead they are
seeling (sic) it?
A Yes, at a profit.
Q You also said that there is tax evasion in the selling of cans. What do you mean by
this?
A There is another privileged [sic] by the BOI for a special price given to packaging
materials. When you export the product there is a 50% price difference. Now,
taking that advantage of that exemption, they sold it to certain company here,
again to Virginia Farms.
Q Do you have proof to that effect?
A No, but we can get it there.
Q Will that fact be shown in any listed articles in the application for search warrant
since according to you, you have seen this manipulation reflected on the books of
account kept by Gina? Are you sure that these documents are still there?
A Yes. I have received information.
COURT: Alright.
[31]

Abos stated that, as former Operating Chief of Unifish, he had access to the company
records, and even showed the issuing judge photocopies thereof. Thus, we reject the
contention that this witness did not have personal knowledge of the facts to which he
testified. The contents of the deposition clearly demonstrate otherwise.
The deposition also shows that, contrary to petitioners submission, the inquiries
made by the judge were far from leading or being a rehash of the witness affidavit. We
find such inquiries to be sufficiently probing.
Alleged lack
of
particularity
in the
description of
the things
seized
Petitioners note the similarities in the description of the things to be seized in the
subject warrants and those in Stonehill vs. Diokno,
[32]
Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc. vs.
Ruiz,
[33]
and Asian Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Herrera.
[34]

In Stonehill, the effects to be searched and seized were described as:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals correspondence, receipts, ledgers,
portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all
business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and
loss statements.
Page 34 of 96 |

This Court found that the foregoing description failed to conform to the requirements
set forth by the Constitution since:
x x x the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business
transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions
were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners
and the aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the
explicit command of our Bill of Rights - that the things to be seized
beparticularly described - as well as tending to defeat its major object: the elimination
of general warrants.
In Bache & Co., this Court struck down a warrant containing a similar description as
those in Stonehill:
The documents, papers, and effects sought to be seized are described in Search Warrant
No. 2-M-70 in this manner:
Unregistered and private books of accounts (ledgers, journals, columnars, receipts and
disbursements books, customers' ledgers); receipts for payments received; certificates of
stocks and securities; contracts, promissory notes and deeds of sale; telex and coded
messages; business communications; accounting and business records; checks and check
stubs; records of bank deposits and withdrawals; and records of foreign remittances,
covering the years 1966 to 1970.
The description does not meet the requirement in Art. III, Sec. 1, of the Constitution, and of
Sec. 3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, that the warrant should particularly
describe the things to be seized.
x x x
In Uy Kheytin, et al. vs. Villareal, etc., et al., 42 Phil. 886, 896, this Court had occasion to
explain the purpose of the requirement that the warrant should particularly describe the
place to be searched and the things to be seized, to wit:
x x x Both the Jones Law (sec. 3) and General Orders No. 68 (sec. 97) specifically require
that a search warrant should particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to
be seized. The evident purpose and intent of this requirement is to limit the things to be
seized to those, and only those, particularly described in the search warrant - to leave the
officers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles they shall seize, to the end
that unreasonable searches and seizures may not be made, - that abuses may not be
committed.That is the correct interpretation of this constitutional provision borne out by the
American authorities.
The purpose as thus explained could, surely and effectively, be defeated under the search
warrant issued in this case.
A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the
description therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow (People vs.
Rubio, 57 Phil, 384); or when the description expresses a conclusion of fact - not of law -
by which the warrant officer may be guided in making the search and seizure (idem.,
dissent of Abad Santos, J.,); or when the things described are limited to those which bear
direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued (Sec. 2, Rule 126,
Revised Rules of Court). The herein search warrant does not conform to any of the
foregoing tests. If the articles desired to be seized have any direct relation to an offense
committed, the applicant must necessarily have some evidence, other than those articles, to
prove the said offense; and the articles subject of search and seizure should come in handy
merely to strengthen such evidence. In this event, the description contained in the herein
disputed warrant should have mentioned, at least, the dates, amounts, persons, and other
pertinent data regarding the receipts of payments, certificates of stocks and securities,
contracts, promissory notes, deeds of sale, messages and communications, checks, bank
deposits and withdrawals, records of foreign remittances, among others, enumerated in the
warrant.
In Asian Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Herrera, the description of the things to be
seized, i.e., Fire Registers, Loss, Bordereau, Adjusters' Report, including subrogation
receipts and proof of loss, Loss Registers, Book of Accounts including cash receipts and
disbursements and general ledger, etc. was held to be an omnibus description and,
therefore, invalid:
x x x Because of this all embracing description which includes all conceivable records of
petitioner corporation, which if seized x x x, could paralyze its business, petitioner in
several motions filed for early resolution of this case, manifested that the seizure of TWO
carloads of their papers has paralyzed their business to the grave prejudice of not only the
company, its workers, agents, employees but also of its numerous insured and beneficiaries
of bonds issued by it, including the government itself, and of the general public. And
correlating the same to the charges for which the warrant was issued, We have before Us
the infamous general warrants of old.
In the case at bar, the things to be seized were described in the following manner:
Page 35 of 96 |

Cash Register Books, Sales Books or Records; Provisional & Official
Receipts;
We agree that most of the items listed in the warrants fail to meet the test of
particularity, especially since witness Abos had furnished the judge photocopies of the
documents sought to be seized. The issuing judge could have formed a more specific
description of these documents from said photocopies instead of merely employing a
generic description thereof. The use of a generic term or a general description in a warrant
is acceptable only when a more specific description of the things to be seized is
unavailable. The failure to employ the specificity available will invalidate a general
description in a warrant.
[35]
The use by the issuing judge of the terms multiple sets of
books of accounts, ledgers, journals, columnar books, cash register books, sales books or
records, provisional & official receipts, production record books/inventory lists, stock
cards, sales records, job order, corporate financial records, and bank
statements/cancelled checks is therefore unacceptable considering the circumstances of
this case.
As regards the terms unregistered delivery receipts and unregistered purchase &
sales invoices, however, we hold otherwise. The Solicitor General correctly argues that
the serial markings of these documents need not be specified as it is not possible to do so
precisely because they are unregistered.
[36]
Where, by the nature of the goods to be seized,
their description must be rather general, it is not required that a technical description be
given, as this would mean that no warrant could issue.Taking into consideration the nature
of the articles so described, it is clear that no other more adequate and detailed description
could have been given, particularly because it is difficult to give a particular description of
the contents thereof.
[37]
Although it appears that photocopies of these unregistered
documents were among those handed by Abos to the issuing judge, it would be impractical
to require the latter to specify each and every receipt and invoice, and the contents thereof,
to the minutest detail.
The general description of most of the documents listed in the warrants does not
render the entire warrant void. Insofar as the warrants authorize the search and seizure of
unregistered delivery receipts and unregistered purchase and sales invoices, the warrants
remain valid. The search warrant is severable, and those items not particularly described
may be cut off without destroying the whole warrant. In United States v. Cook,
[38]
the
United States Court of Appeals (Fifth Circuit) made the following pronouncement:
x x x. The leading decision is Aday v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.2d 789, 362 P.2d 47, 13
Cal.Rptr. 415 (1961). In Aday, a warrant was issued authorizing the seizure of two
particularly described books and myriad other generally described items. On appeal, the
California Supreme Court held that only the books were particularly described in the
warrant and lawfully seized. The court acknowledged that the warrant was flawed, but
rather than suppress everything seized, the court chose to sever the defective portions of the
warrant and suppress only those items that were not particularly described.
Although the warrant was defective x x x it does not follow that it was invalid as a
whole. Such a conclusion would mean that the seizure of certain articles, even though
proper if viewed separately, must be condemned merely because the warrant was defective
with respect to other articles. The invalid portions of the warrant are severable from the
authorization relating to the named books x x x. The search for and seizure of these books,
if otherwise valid, were not rendered illegal by the defects concerning other articles.
x x x
x x x We agree with the reasoning of the Supreme Court of California and the majority of
state courts that have considered this question and hold that in the usual case the district
judge should sever the infirm portion of the search warrant as passes constitutional
muster. See United States v. Giresi, 488 F.Supp. 445, 459-60 (D.N.J.1980). Items that were
not described with the requisite particularity in the warrant should be suppressed, but
suppression of all of the fruits of the search is hardly consistent with the purposes
underlying exclusion. Suppression of only the items improperly described prohibits the
Government from profiting from its own wrong and removes the court from considering
illegally obtained evidence. Moreover, suppression of only those items that were not
particularly described serves as an effective deterrent to those in the Government who
would be tempted to secure a warrant without the necessary description. As the leading
commentator has observed, it would be harsh medicine indeed if a warrant which was
issued on probable cause and which did particularly describe certain items were to be
invalidated in toto merely because the affiant and the magistrate erred in seeking and
permitting a search for other items as well. 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise
on the Fourth Amendment 4.6(f) (1978).
Accordingly, the items not particularly described in the warrants ought to be returned to
petitioners.
Page 36 of 96 |

Petitioners allege that the following articles, though not listed in the warrants, were
also taken by the enforcing officers:
1. One (1) composition notebook containing Chinese characters,
2. Two (2) pages writing with Chinese characters,
3. Two (2) pages Chinese character writing,
4. Two (2) packs of chemicals,
5. One (1) bound gate pass,
6. Surety Agreement.
[39]

In addition, the searching party also seized items belonging to the Premier Industrial and
Development Corporation (PIDC), which shares an office with petitioner Unifish.
The things belonging to petitioner not specifically mentioned in the warrants, like
those not particularly described, must be ordered returned to petitioners. In order to comply
with the constitutional provisions regulating the issuance of search warrants, the property
to be seized under a warrant must be particularly described therein and no other property
can be taken thereunder.
[40]
In Tambasen vs. People,
[41]
it was held:
Moreover, by their seizure of articles not described in the search warrant, the police acted
beyond the parameters of their authority under the search warrant. Section 2, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution requires that a search warrant should particularly describe the things
to be seized. The evident purpose and intent of the requirement is to limit the things to be
seized to those, and only those, particularly described in the search warrant, to leave the
officers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles they should seize, to the end
that unreasonable searches and seizures may not be made and that abuses may not be
committed (Corro v. Lising, 137 SCRA 541, 547 [1985]); Bache & Co. [Phil.], Inc. v.
Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 [1971]; Uy Kheytin v. Villareal, 42 Phil. 886 [1920]). The same
such usurpations when attempted (People v. Damaso, 212 SCRA 547 [1992] citing Alvero
v. Dizon, 76 Phil. 637, 646 [1946]).
Clearly then, the money which was not indicated in the search warrant, had been illegally
seized from petitioner. The fact that the members of the police team were doing their task
of pursuing subversives is not a valid excuse for the illegal seizure. The presumption juris
tantum of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot by itself prevail against the
constitutionally protected right of an individual (People v. Cruz, 231 SCRA 759 [1994];
People v. Veloso, 48 Phil. 169, 176 [1925]). Although public welfare is the foundation of
the power to search and seize, such power must be exercised and the law enforced without
transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens (People v. Damaso, supra, citing
Rodriguez v. Evangelista, 65 Phil. 230, 235 [1937]). As the Court aptly puts it
in Bagahilog v. Fernandez, 198 SCRA 614 (1991), [z]eal in the pursuit of criminals
cannot ennoble the use of arbitrary methods that the Constitution itself abhors.
The seizure of the items not specified in the warrants cannot be justified by the
directive in the penultimate paragraph thereof to "seize and take possession of other
properties relative to such violation," which in no way can be characterized as a particular
description of the things to be seized.
As regards the articles supposedly belonging to PIDC, we cannot order their return in
the present proceedings. The legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose
rights have been impaired thereby, and the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is
purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties.
[42]

WHEREFORE, the Resolutions of respondent Court of Appeals dated 27 June 1996
and 14 May 1987, affirming the Order of the Regional Trial Court dated 17 July 1995, are
hereby AFFIRMED insofar as said Resolutions upheld the validity of the subject Search
Warrants authorizing the seizure of the unregistered delivery receipts and unregistered
purchase and sales invoices, but REVERSED with respect to the rest of the articles subject
of said warrants. The respondent Bureau of Internal Revenue is hereby ordered to return to
petitioners all items seized from the subject premises and belonging to petitioners, except
the unregistered delivery receipts and unregistered purchase and sales invoices.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Page 37 of 96 |

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-35149 June 23, 1988
EDUARDO QUINTERO, petitioner,
vs.
THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, HON. ELIAS ASUNCION,
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and HON. JOSE FLAMINIANO, City
Fiscal of Pasay City, respondents.

PADILLA, J .:
Supervening events, like the February 1986 revolution and the reported death in the United
States of herein petitioner, of which the Court cannot however take cognizance (in the
absence of formal notice from the parties), could be the most convenient grounds for
declaring this case closed and terminated. But the convenient way is not necessarily the
proper judicial recourse, especially when the issues raised remain contentions, sharpened
by the persuasive force of enlightened advocacy, and which not even the impact of such
supervening events has succeeded to meet.
Besides, what the Court says and decides today in this case may well be the source of
wisdom for succeeding governments which should all be determined, at the very least, to
avoid the excesses and, therefore, fatal pitfalls of a past regime.
In this petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction, with preliminary injunction,
petitioner seeks to annul and declare as void and without legal effect Search Warrant No. 7,
issued on 31 May 1972 by respondent Judge Elias Asuncion of the then Court of First
Instance of Manila, as well as all acts and proceedings taken thereunder.
The antecedents, now a part of the country's political history, are as follows:
On 19 May 1972, petitioner Eduardo Quintero, delegate of the first district of Leyte to the
1971 Constitutional Convention (Con-Con, for short) delivered a privilege speech
1
at a
plenary session of the Con-Con. In his speech, Delegate Quintero disclosed that, on
different occasions, certain persons had distributed money to some delegates of the Con-
Con, apparently in an effort to influence the delegates in the discharge of their functions.
As an offshoot of this disclosure, Delegate Quintero delivered to the Con-Con the
aggregate amount of the "payola" he himself had received, the amount of eleven thousand
one hundred fifty pesos (P11,150.00) in cash, preserved intact for delivery to the proper
officials of the Con-Con, for whatever action it may wish to take on the matter. Delegate
Quintero, however, did not reveal the names of the persons who gave him the money; and
he begged at that time not to be made to name names.
2

However, pressure mounted on Delegate Quintero to reveal the Identities of the people
behind the "payola" scheme. Hence, on 30 May 1972 (the day after he returned from
Tacloban City, where he had attended the funeral of his brother), Delegate Quintero
released from his hospital bed in San Juan de Dios Hospital, where he was hospitalized due
to an indisposed condition, a sworn statement addressed to the Committee on Privileges of
the Con-Con, mentioning the names of the persons who gave him the "payola." The full
text of the sworn statement released by Delegate Quintero is quoted hereunder:
1971 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
Manila
THE COMMITTEE ON PRIVILEGES
1971 Constitutional Convention
Manila Hotel
Manila
Thru: THE PRESIDENT
1972 Constitutional Convention
Dear Colleagues:
Complying with your request that I shed more light on
the privileged speech which I delivered on the floor of
the Convention last May 19,1972, I wish to state under
Page 38 of 96 |

oath the following facts, without prejudice to supplying
additional details:
1. Amount No. 1. P500.00 The envelope containing the amount was
handed to me at the Manila Hotel on March 19, 1971, by Delegate
Gabriel Yniquez. He later made me understand it from the First Lady.
received from the office of Representative Nicanor Yniquez of Southern
Leyte on April 22, 1971.
received from Mrs. Paz Mate (wife of Congressman Mate of Leyte) in
May 1971. She told me that other delegates from Leyte were being given
the same amount of money by the First Lady.
received in the house of Congressman Marcelino Veloso on June 2, 1971
from Delegate Domingo Veloso at Bayview Hotel, Manila. Other
envelopes were also given to other Samar-Leyte delegates.
handed to me by Delegate Jaime Opinion on June 10, 1971 in the suite of
Delegate Domingo Veloso at the Bayview Hotel, Manila. Other
envelopes were also given to other Samar-Leyte delegates.
6. Amount No 6 P500.00 The envelope containing this amount was
handed to me by Delegate Domingo Veloso in the Convention Hall on
June 23, 1971. He made me understand it came "from the same source."
7. Amount No. 7. P2,000.00 The envelope containing the amount was
handed to me by Delegate Ramon Salazar on June 27, 1971, in the
residence of Delegate Augusta Syjuco. Delegate Salazar told me that the
First Lady met Samar-Leyte delegates that noon and since I was not in
that meeting, the money was being sent to me.
handed to me by Delegate Domingo Veloso on June 28, 1971 during a
party given by President and Mrs. Diosdado Macapagal for the delegates
and their ladies. Delegate Veloso told me the money came from Delegate
Augusta Syjuco.
handed to me by Delegate Federico dela Plana at the Convention Hall on
July 13, 1971.
left inside my drawer in the Convention Hall on August 5, 1971 by
Delegate Constantino Navarro, Jr. He said it came from Delegate
Venancio Yaneza.
placed on my desk under a piece of paper in the session hall on August
11, 1971 by Delegate Constantino Navarro, Jr. He said it came from
Delegate Venancio Yaneza.
handed to me by Delegate Domingo Veloso on September 6,1971. He
said it came "from Imelda." According to Delegate Veloso, Yniquez took
from the envelope P50.00 for an unnamed delegate.
handed to me on September 23, 1971 by Delegate Domingo Veloso near
the men's room. He said it came "from the First Lady."
handed to me on October 6, 1971 by Delegate Domingo Veloso near the
office of the Sergeant-at-Arms. Two other delegates, Delegate Damian
Aldaba and Delegate Antero Bongbong, received an envelope each that
same afternoon.
handed to me by Delegate Gabriel Yniquez on December 2, 1971 at the
entrance of the Oakroom.
16. Amount No. 16. P1,000.00 The envelope containing the amount
was handed to me by Delegate Gabriel Yniquez on January 13,1972. He
said. "This is for the months of December and January.
handed to me on March 7, 1972 by Delegate Flor Sagadal, in the session
hall. The envelope was covered by a piece of paper which Delegate
Sagadal placed on my desk.
Page 39 of 96 |

18. Amount No. 18. P1,000.00 The envelope containing the amount
was handed to me by Delegate Damian Aldaba on May 8, 1972. He said
it came from Delegate Gabriel Yniquez.
In my privilege speech, I also said that "in that same evening of January
6,1972, after the dinner was over, when we were still inside the
Malacanang grounds on our way to our cars, one of the delegates made
this announcement: "The envelopes are ready. They will be distributed in
a couple of days." There was sepulchral silence from the other
delegates."
The delegate who made that announcement was Delegate Casimiro
Madarang of Cebu.
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Page 40 of 96 |

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3

Thus, the then First Lady, Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos, among others, was implicated in the
Quintero in expose. Hours after Delegate Quintero's statement was made public, then
President Ferdinand E. Marcos went on the air as well as on TV to denounce Mr. Quintero,
and Mr. Marcos averred that he "shall not rest until I have unmasked this pretender, his
master-minds and accomplices."
4

The following day, 31 May 1972, Mr. Marcos also made a statement which was reported in
the Bulletin issue of 1 June 1972, as follows:
The President said he had already taken up the matter with his legal
counsel and that unlike the Quintero expose, he was preparing a
"meticulous, circumspect and legal" case against this tool of the hate
Marcos group.
The President said his report from witnesses who would soon be
presented showed that the Quintero affidavit was originally prepared in
the office of Senator Salonga, a known oppositionist, and signed by a
notary public who also works in the Salonga law office.
The document according to the President, was brought to the hospital
room of Quintero and there it was signed by the Leyte delegate. The
President said that at the proper time and at the proper occasion, he
would complete the jigsaw puzzle of the case.
We will prove the personal motivation of this witness who turned about
and sought to implicate the name of the First Lady, after previously
making public statements to the effect that the First Family had nothing
to do with this affair," the President said.
We will prove that this delegate came to Malacanang demanding money
from the President and the First Lady, and had been denied.
We will prove that this delegate has engaged in other immoral activities
violative of his oath as a delegate, as lawyer and which rendered him
unacceptable as witness to anything whatsoever.
The President said that while he suffered so much in the past over the
verification heaped on him, he had never seen a man who could stoop so
low as to implicate the First Lady on hearsay simply because the First
Family had refused to give him money.
I am passionate about this dastardly act," the President said. "I would, if
necessary, spend the rest of my life to uncover the person or persons
behind this act. Quintero was just a tool in the hands of these people.
(Manila Bulletin, Thursday, June 1, 1972).
5

In the evening of the same day that Mr. Marcos issued the afore-quoted statement, the
agents of the respondent National Bureau of Investigation (NBI, for short) raided the house
of Delegate Quintero, at 2281 Mayon St., Sta., Aria, Manila, on the basis of Search
Warrant No. 7 issued also on 31 May 1972 by respondent Judge Elias Asuncion of the
Court of First Instance of Manila. After the raid, said NBI agents claimed to have found in
the Quintero residence, and therefore seized, bundles of money amounting to P379,000.00.
On 1 June 1972, the NBI filed with the City Fiscal of Pasay a criminal complaint for direct
bribery against Delegate Quintero. The fiscal immediately scheduled a preliminary
investigation in relation thereto.
On 5 June 1972, Delegate Quintero availed of the present recourse.
On 6 June 1972, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the use in any
proceeding of the objects seized by the respondent NBI from the Quintero residence. The
1935 Constitution which was in force at the time of the issuance of the questioned search
warrant, provides:
Article IIIBill of Rights
Section 1 (3) The rights of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable
cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or
Page 41 of 96 |

affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized.
Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provided:
Sec. 3. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall
not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense
to be determined by the judge or justice of the peace after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
No search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense.
Under the aforequoted provisions, a search warrant may issue only upon the finding of the
judge of "probable cause," and the latter has been defined as "such facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed, and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place
sought to be searched.
6

In the case at bar, the questioned search warrant was issued by respondent Judge, upon
application of NBI agent Samuel Castro. Said application was accompanied by an affidavit
of the complainant, Congressman Artemio Mate, whose affidavit was allegedly made also
before the respondent judge.
The interrogations conducted by the respondent judge, upon the applicant NBI agent
Samuel Castro, showed that the latter knew nothing, of his own personal knowledge, to
show that Mr. Quintero had committed any offense. Said interrogation is quoted hereunder:
Interrogations Conducted by Judge Elias B. Asuncion
Upon NBI Agent Samuel Castro, this 31st day of May
1972 at City Hall, Manila
Questions by the Court:
(Witness Being Sworn To In Accordance With Law')
Q. Please state your name and other personal
circumstances.
A. Samuel Castro, of legal age, married and NBI
Agent, Manila.
Q. You are applying for a search warrant, what are the
facts upon which you base your application?
A. Facts gathered from my investigation on
Congressman Artemio Mate of Leyte who declared to
us that he has seen Delegate Eduardo Quintero receive
bribe money from two men as a consideration of
signing a statement which he submitted to the
Committee on Privileges of the Constitutional
Convention.
Q. Do you know where the bribe money is now kept?
A. We have reason to believe that the bribe money is
now kept in the residence of Delegate Eduardo
Quintero at 2281 Mayon St., Sta. Ana, Manila.
That is all.
Certification
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a record of the proceedings I took on
my interrogation of NBI agent Samuel Castro, the questions having been
asked by me and the answers given by NBI agent Samuel Castro in
connection with his application for a search warrant.
May 31,1972, Manila.
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On the other hand, the sworn statement of Congressman Mate states:
CITY OF MANILA
INTERROGATION BY JUDGE
ELIAS B. ASUNCION UPON
CONGRESSMAN ARTEMIO
MATE IN CONNECTION WITH
AN APPLICATION FOR SEARCH
WARRANT AT THE CHAMBER
OF JUDGE ELIAS B. ASUNCION
THIS 31ST DAY OF MAY, 1972.
COURT QUESTIONING: (After Deponent was sworn to in accordance
with law)
Q Please state your name and other personal
circumstances.
A Artemio Mate, of legal age, married, Congressman
of the first district of Leyte, and a resident of Tacloban.
Q Why are you here, Congressman?
A I would want to declare in connection with the fact
that Delegate Eduardo Quintero had received half a
million pesos as a consideration for having signed an
affidavit, or statement.
Q What about this affidavit or statement?
A It is his affidavit which he released to the Committee
on Privileges of the Constitutional Convention naming
certain persons as having doled out to him on various
occasions sums of money contained in envelopes.
Q Why do you say that Delegate Quintero received
half a million pesos as consideration of his having
signed that affidavit?
A Because when I went to the San Juan De Dios
Hospital in the evening of May 29, 1972 where
Delegate Eduardo Quintero is confined, for the purpose
of greeting him on his birthday, as I was about to enter
Room Number 307, I saw two persons at his bedside.
On seeing, them, I did not enter the room because from
the door screen I noticed that they were in serious
huddle. So I stayed behind the door screen which kept
me out from their view. While there, I heard one of
them say that "half of the amount" promised will be
delivered immediately provided that he (Delegate
Page 43 of 96 |

Quintero) agrees to sign the statement which he was
then holding, after the person pulled out a folder from
his brief case. Then, I heard Delegate Quintero asked.
"Where is the half.?" At this time, one of the two was
holding a suitcase from the other man and then said:
"Here it is," as he opened a little the suitcase. As the
suitcase was half-opened, I saw bundles of money
inside the suitcase.
Q Then, what happened?
A The suitcase was closed, and then I saw Delegate
Quintero took the folder from that person and Delegate
Quintero placed the folder under his pillow, while he
was nodding as if saying "yes."
Q After that, what happened?
A The two stood up, together with Mrs. Quintero and
after wishing Delegate Quintero for speedy recovery,
they were then walking towards the door. Then, I heard
Mrs. Quintero say to her husband that it would be
better for her to bring home the suitcase, and Quintero
agreed, So, Mrs. Quintero and the two men left
together. One of them offered to carry the suitcase for
Mrs. Quintero. As they were already going out, I
pretended to have just arrived and so we met.
Q What happened when you met them?
A I asked Mrs. Quintero where she was going, and she
replied nervously that she was going to their Sta Ana
residence.
Q Why do you say that the money in the suitcase was
for the payment of Delegate Quintero's signing of the
statement?
A Because we had an antecedent conversation with
Mrs. Quintero when we were still in Tacloban. There
was one time I, and Delegate Ramon Salazar, went to
the house of Delegate Quintero at Tacloban City. This
was at the eve of the burial of the deceased brother of
Quintero. At this time, Delegates Feria and Occena
were also in the house of Delegate Quintero and we
were informed that those two-Feria and Occena were
with Delegate Quintero in his room. So, we wanted to
see them also. As we were going up the stairs of the
house to The second floor, we were met by Mrs.
Quintero. Mrs. Quintero pulled us aside and pointblank
whispered to us: "If you or your group can match the
one million pesos offered to us by Mano Pio Pedrosa
and the Liberals, your Tio Dading (Quintero) will
agree not to proceed with the expose."
Q And what did you tell her?
A I was taken aback by her relevation and I would not
answer her. After that we chose to leave her and we
asked that we be allowed to see Delegate Quintero.
Upon seeing them Delegate Quintero, Feria and
Occena in the room, they immediately stopped their
conversation.
Q Now, going back to the money inside the suitcase.
Did you see Mrs. Quintero bring out the suitcase from
the ward where Delegate Quintero was confined?
A Yes, sir. They brought it out. It was held by the man
who offered to carry it for Mrs. Quintero.
Q Do you know where this money was brought?
A I have good reasons to believe that it is now in the
residence of Delegate Eduardo Quintero at 2281
Mayon Street, Sta Ana, Manila, as I heard Mrs.
Quintero told Delegate Quintero that it would be better
for her to bring the suitcase to their residence.
Q Do you wish to say more?
Page 44 of 96 |

A I am ready to answer any question, but if no more
asked now, then I will declare on further details when
the proper time comes.
Q Are you willing to sign this statement freely, without
mental reservations, nor of force, or threat or duress to
vitiate your voluntary will?
A Yes.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I hereunto sign this 31st day of May, 1972, at
City Hall, Manila.
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 31st day of May, 1972,
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8

It is quite evident that the aforequoted statements did not provide sufficient basis for the
finding of probable cause upon which a search warrant could validly issue. The statement
of the applicant, NBI agent Samuel Castro, had no weight at all, for lack of personal
knowledge about any offense that was committed by petitioner. On the other hand, it is
clear from a careful examination of Congressman Mate's statement that, from it, no
judicious, reasonable and prudent man could conclude that probable cause existed that Mr.
Quintero had committed the crime of direct bribery.
The statement of Congressman Mate was characterized with several material omissions.
Firstly, it was not shown by any competent evidence that the document inside the folder
which he (Mate) allegedly saw was being given to Quintero in the hospital room, was the
very statement of "expose which Quintero released to the Committee on Privileges of the
Con-Con. Congressman Mate never made any statement that he knew what the document
was supposedly inside the folder handed to Quintero. Neither was any verification made
by the respondent judge to find out whether Congressman Mate knew, of his personal
knowledge, what the document was contained in the said folder, and whether he (Mate)
knew, of his personal knowledge, that the sworn statement released by Quintero to the
Committee on Privileges, was the very statement or document contained in said folder.
Secondly, it was not shown by any competent evidence that the document supposedly
inside "he folder-whatever it was was actually signed by Quintero. What Congressman
Mate supposedly saw was that Quintero "placed the folder under his pillow, while he was
nodding as if saying "yes." " But the fact remained that the statement of Congressman Mate
did not show that Quintero signed whatever was inside the folder given to him by the two
unidentified persons, before they left the room; and then there was no showing by
Congressman Mate that he ever saw Quintero sign afterwards the alleged "statement"
contained in the folder.
Thirdly, there was no showing by competent evidence that the money supposedly given to
Quintero was the payment for the signing by Quintero of the statement whatever it was
given to him inside a folder by the two persons. The only thing that linked the alleged
giving of the money to Quintero, to his alleged signing of the statement, was an inference
from hearsay evidence, which was the supposed statement of Mrs. Quintero, on a different
occasion, that her husband was being offered P1,000,000.00 by Pio Pedrosa and the
Liberals to make the "expose." And from this, it was drawn by Congressman Mate that the
money supposedly delivered to Quintero in the hospital room was payment for his signing
the alleged document inside the folder, containing the "expose".
The supposed statement of Mrs. Quintero was purely hearsay, insofar as petitioner
Quintero was concerned. Her statement, if any, was not binding upon the petitioner, and
therefore, should not prejudice the latter. The respondent judge should have known this
before he issued the questioned search warrant. As held by the Court, an application for
search warrant, if based on hearsay, cannot, standing alone, justify the issuance of a search
warrant.
9
There is no doubt, in the case at bar, that the alleged statement of Mrs. Quintero
was indubitably hearsay, insofar as petitioner Quintero was concerned.
The statement of Congressman Mate, which was the sole basis for the issuance of the
search warrant, was replete with conclusions and inferences drawn from what he allegedly
witnessed when he visited Mr. Quintero in the hospital. It lacked the directness and
definiteness which would have been present, had the same statement dealt with facts which
Congressman Mate actually witnessed. As held in one case, persons swearing to, or
supporting the application for, search warrants, must set forth the facts that they know
personally
10
and not the conclusions, or the beliefs of the affiant, so as to justify a
reasonable and ordinarily prudent man, whose duty is to ascertain whether probable cause
exists, to conclude that a violation of the law has occurred.
Search warrants are not issued on loose, vague or doubtful basis of fact, nor on mere
suspicion or belief. The facts recited in an affidavit supporting the application for a search
warrant must be stated with sufficient definiteness, so that, if they are false, perjury may be
assigned on the affidavit.
11
Hence, affidavits which go no further than to allege
conclusions of law, or of fact, are insufficient.
Considering the generality of the statement of Congressman Mate, a judicious and prudent
man would have attacked the statements made by the deponent, instead of asking leading
questions, and conducting the examination in a general manner, like what the respondent
Page 46 of 96 |

judge did in the case at bar. As held in Nolasco vs. Pano,
12
the questions propounded by
respondent Executive Judge to the applicant's witness are not sufficiently searching to
establish probable cause. Asking of leading questions to the deponent in an application for
search warrant, and conducting of examination in a general manner, would not satisfy the
requirements for issuance of a valid search warrant.
Had the respondent judge been cautious in issuing the questioned search warrant, he would
have wondered and, therefore, asked the affiant why said incident was reported only on 31
May 1972, when the latter allegedly witnessed it on 29 May 1972. Also, respondent judge
should have questioned the statements of complainant Congressman Mate, and should have
been alert to some ulterior motives on the part of the latter, considering that Congressman
Mate's wife was one of those implicated in the "expose" made by Quintero.
13
An ulterior
motive to an application for search warrant should alert the judge to possible
misrepresentations.
14

Another circumstance which points to the nullity of the questioned search warrant, for
having been issued without probable cause, is the fact that the search warrant delivered to
the occupant of the searched premises, Generoso Quintero (nephew of the petitioner) was
issued in connection with the offense of "grave threats" and not "direct bribery," which
was the criminal complaint filed against Quintero with the respondent fiscal. The offense
charged or labelled in the questioned search warrant had, therefore, no relation at all to the
evidence, i.e., "half a million pesos, Philippine currency," ordered to be seized in said
search warrant. There was thus no ground whatsoever for the respondent judge to claim
that facts and circumstances had been established, sufficient for him to believe that the
crime of "grave threats" had been committed, because, on the basis of the evidence alone,
and what was ordered to be seized in the search warrant he issued, no relation at all can be
established between the crime supposedly committed (grave threats) and the evidence
ordered to be seized.
It is true that the copy of the questioned search warrant that remained in the file of the
respondent Judge, had been changed to indicate that the offense was that of direct bribery
under Art. 210 of the Revised Penal Code. The change was effected by the deletion, in ink,
of the typewritten words "grave threats" and the superimposition, in ink, of the figures
"210" (Art. 210 of Revised Penal Code Direct Bribery) over the typewritten figures
"282" (Art. 282 of the Revised Penal Code Grave Threats). The respondents claimed
that these changes were made at the time the warrant was issued not after the search was
made. But as admitted by respondents
15
the warrant in this case was prepared beforehand
by the NBI, in an NBI form,
16
which stated only the name of the crime charged, but did
not contain any description of the acts constituting the crime charged.
According to respondent judge, when the search warrant was presented to him by applicant
NBI agent Samuel Castro, he saw that the crime charged was for "grave threats." But after
he allegedly conducted his interrogations, he found that the proper charge should be
"Direct Bribery." Hence he caused the proper changes in the search warrant, but
inadvertently, he failed to make the proper changes in the sole copy that was presented by
the NBI agents to Generoso Quintero, although the copy retained by the NBI agents had
been corrected.
On the other hand, petitioner claimed that the changes in the questioned search warrant
were made after the search was made. According to petitioner, his counsel, Atty. Ordonez
who was present during the latter part of the raid-questioned in fact the materiality of the
property being seized to the offense stated on the warrant, i.e., "grave threats."
Consequently, if the copy in the possession of the raiding party had indeed been corrected
before the search, the raiding party, would have been able to clear up the matter at once,
when petitioner's counsel raised the question with them. However, the raiding party kept
silent on the matter at that time, thereby negating their later pretenses.
Besides, the explanation given by the respondent judge as to the difference in the copy of
the warrant served on the petitioner's representative and those retained by the respondents,
cannot be given any weight, for no presumption of regularity in the performance of official
functions can be invoked by a public officer, when he himself undertakes to justify his
acts.
17
Furthermore, the Court notes the admission of the respondents that it was an NBI
form which was used for the search warrant, and that it was pre-filled by the applicant,
before it was presented to the respondent judge, but that, he (the judge) allegedly made the
changes after he had conducted his examination. The Court considers the act of the
respondent judge in entertaining a pre-filled search warrant as irregular; it casts doubt upon
his impartiality.
Disregarding for a moment the absence of "probable cause," the search itself that was
conducted by the NBI agents who raided the house of petitioner, pursuant to the questioned
search warrant, was highly irregular. The two (2) occupants of the house who witnessed the
search conducted, Generoso Quintero and Pfc. Alvaro Valentin, were closeted in a room
where a search was being made by a member of the raiding party, while the other NBI
agents were left to themselves in the other parts of the house, where no members of the
household were in a position to watch them, and thus they conducted a search on their own.
Such a procedure, wherein members of a raiding party can roam around the raided
premises unaccompanied by any witness, as the only witnesses available as prescribed by
law are made to witness a search conducted by the other members of the raiding party in
another part of the house, is held to be violative of both the spirit and the letter of the
law,
18
which provides that "no search of a house, room, or any other premises shall be
made except in the presence of at least one competent witness, resident of the
neighborhood."
Page 47 of 96 |

Another irregularity committed by the agents of respondent NBI was their failure to
comply with the requirement of Sec. 10, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court which provides
that "The officer seizing property under the warrant must give a detailed receipt for the
same to the person on whom or in whose possession it was found, or in the absence of any
person, must, in the presence of at least one-witness, leave a receipt in the place in which
he found the seized property." The receipt issued by the seizing party in the case at
bar,
19
showed that it was signed by a witness, Sgt. Ignacio Veracruz. This person was a
policeman from the Manila Metropolitan Police (MMP), who accompanied the agents of
respondent NBI during the conduct of the search, The requirement under the aforequoted
Rule that a witness should attest to the making of the receipt, was not complied with. This
requirement of the Rules was rendered nugatory, when the one who attested to the receipt
from the raiding party was himself a member of the raiding party.
The circumstances prevailing before the issuance of the questioned search warrant, and the
actual manner in which the search was conducted in the house of the petitioner, all but
imperfectly, and yet, strongly suggest that the entire procedure, from beginning to end, was
an orchestrated movement designed for just one purpose to destroy petitioner Quintero's
public image with "incriminating evidence," and, as a corollary to this, that the evidence
allegedly seized from his residence was "planted" by the very raiding party that was
commanded to "seize" such incriminating evidence.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds, and so holds, that the questioned search warrant issued
by respondent judge, is null and void, for being violative of the Constitution and the Rules
of Court.
WHEREFORE, Search Warrant No. 7 issued on 31 May 1972 by respondent Judge is
declared NULL and VOID and of no force and effect. The Temporary Restraining Order
issued by this Court on 6 June 1972 is hereby made PERMANENT The amount of
P379,200.00 allegedly seized from the house of petitioner Quintero, now in the possession
of the Central Bank, and already demonetized, is left with said Central Bank, to be
disposed of, as such, in accordance with law and the regulations.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
Yap, C.J., took no part.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 135406. July 11, 2000]
DAVID GUTANG Y JUAREZ, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
DE LEON, JR., J .:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the
Decision
[1]
dated September 9, 1998 rendered by the former Twelfth Division of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 19463. The assailed Decision
affirmed the judgment
[2]
dated October 13, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig, Metro Manila, finding petitioner David J. Gutang guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for violation of Sections 8 and 16 of RA 6425, as amended,
(for illegal possession and use of prohibited drugs) as charged in Criminal Cases
Nos. 2696-D and 2697-D, respectively.
The facts are as follows:
On March 5, 1994, accused-appellant David Gutang, together with Noel
Regala, Alex Jimenez and Oscar de Venecia, Jr., was arrested by elements of the
PNP NARCOM, in connection with the enforcement of a search warrant
[3]
in his
residence at No. 331 Ortigas Avenue, Greenhills, San Juan, Metro
Manila. When the police operatives of the PNP-NARCOM served the search
warrant, which was issued by Judge Martin Villarama, Jr. of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 156, Pasig, Metro Manila, they found the petitioner and his three
(3) companions inside the comfort room of the masters bedroom, at the second
floor of the house.
[4]
During the search, the following materials were found on
top of a glass table inside the masters bedroom:
a. shabu paraphernalias, such as tooters;
b. aluminum foil;
c. two (2) burners (one small, one big);
d. fourteen (14) disposable lighters;
e. three (3) weighing scales;
f. plastic sealant used in repacking shabu;
g. several transparent plastic bags of different sizes;
Page 48 of 96 |

h. about 1.4 grams of suspected marijuana fruiting tops contained in a small
white plastic;
i. about 0.7 gram of suspected dried marijuana contained in a small plastic
container.
[5]

The PNP-NARCOM team also inspected the cars of accused Regala,
Jimenez and de Venecia, Jr. which were parked inside the compound of the
residence of petitioner Gutang. They found a Winchester Rayban case
(sunglasses) with an undetermined amount of suspected shabu residues and
tooters in a black plastic container and aluminum foil inside the car of
Regala. The cars of Jimenez and de Venecia, Jr. yielded negative results. The
items which were confiscated were then brought to the crime laboratory of the
Philippine National Police (PNP) at Camp Crame, Quezon City for laboratory
tests. The results of the laboratory examinations showed that the said items
found in the masters bedroom of the residence of petitioner Gutang were
positive for marijuana and methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu). The items
found inside the car of Regala were also positive for shabu.
The findings are as follows:
PHYSICAL SCIENCES REPORT NO. D-168-94
CASE: Alleged Viol. Of RA 6425
SUSPECTS: DAVID GUTANG Y JUAREZ
NOEL REGALA Y YORRO
ALEX JIMENEZ Y ESPINOSA
CAREY DE VENECIA Y LOCSIN
TIME AND DATE RECEIVED: 1430H, 05 MARCH 1994
REQUESTING PARTY/UNIT: C, 2
nd
SOG NARCOM
Camp Crame, Q.C.
SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:
Exh. A One (1) white plastic bag containing the following:
Exh. A-1 One (1) white film case with dried suspected marijuana fruiting tops
weighing 1.56 grams.
Exh. A-2 One (1) small black box with dried suspected marijuana fruiting tops
weighing 0.70 gram.
Exh. A-3 Two (2) pieces of improvised tooter with white crystalline residue.
Exh. A-4 Several foil and small plastic bag with white crystalline residue.
Exh. B One (1) white plastic bag marked ROEL REGALA containing the following:
Exh. B-1 One (1) Winchester case with white crystalline substance.
Exh. B-2 One (1) black case containing several tooters with white crystalline residue.
PURPOSE OF LABORATORY EXAMINATION:
To determine the presence of prohibited and/or regulated drug.
FINDINGS:
Qualitative examination conducted on the above-stated specimen gave the following
results:
1. Exhs. A-1 and A-2 POSITIVE to the test for Marijuana, a prohibited
drug.
2. Exhs. A-3, A-4, B-1 and B-2 POSITIVE to the test for
methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), a regulated drug.
CONCLUSION
Exhs. A-1 and A-2 contain marijuana, a prohibited drug.
Exhs. A-3, A-4, B-1 and B-2 contain Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu) a
regulated drug. xxx
REMARKS:
TIME AND DATE COMPLETED: 1630H, Or
March 1994
(Annex A, pp. 6-8)
Page 49 of 96 |

On the same day, March 5, 1994, immediately after Gutang, Regala,
Jimenez and de Venecia, Jr. were placed under arrest, they were brought to the
PNP Crime Laboratory at Camp Crame. According to PNP Forensic Chemist
Julita De Villa, their office received from PNP-NARCOM which is also based
in Camp Crame a letter-request for drug dependency test on the four (4)
men.
[6]
After receiving the said request, Mrs. Esguerra of the PNP Crime
Laboratory asked the four (4) men including the petitioner to give a sample of
their urine. The petitioner and his co-accused complied and submitted their
urine samples to determine the presence of prohibited drugs. After examining
the said urine samples, PNP Forensic Chemist De Villa came out with
Chemistry Report No. DT-107-94
[7]
and Physical Report No. DT-107-94
[8]
dated
March 9, 1994, showing that the said urine samples all tested positive for the
presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu).
Consequently, the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 2696-D and 2697-
D were filed in court against the petitioner and his companions for violation of
Sections 8 and 16 of Republic Act No. 6425, (otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act) as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. Incidentally, the
charge against accused Oscar de Venecia, Jr. was dismissed by the trial court in
an Order
[9]
dated August 3, 1994 on the ground that he voluntarily submitted
himself for treatment, rehabilitation and confinement at the New Beginnings
Foundation, Inc., a private rehabilitation center accredited by the Dangerous
Drugs Board.
Upon arraignment, petitioner Gutang entered a plea of not guilty. His co-
accused, Regala and Jimenez, likewise pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, joint trial
of the cases proceeded. However, petitioner Gutang did not present any
evidence.
After trial, the lower court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the Court finds 1) accused DAVID GUTANG and
ALEXANDER JIMENEZ in Criminal Case No. 2696-D, GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt for violation of Section 8 of R.A. 6425 as amended (Possession and use of prohibited
drug); and are hereby sentenced to suffer a penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor to
two (2) years, four (4) months of prision correccional and to pay the costs; 2) In Criminal
Case No. 2697-D (Possession) accused DAVID GUTANG, NOEL REGALA and
ALEXANDER JIMENEZ, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 16
(ibid) and are hereby sentenced to suffer a penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor to
two (2) years, four (4) months of prision correccional and to pay the costs; 3) accused
NOEL REGALA, in Criminal Case No. 2698-D (Possession of regulated drugs) is hereby
sentenced to suffer a penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor to two (2) years, four (4)
months of prision correccional and to pay the costs.
The items confiscated are ordered forfeited in favor of the government and to be disposed
of in accordance with law.
SO ORDERED.
[10]

The judgment of conviction of the lower court was affirmed by the Court
of Appeals.
Hence, this petition wherein the petitioner raises the following assignments
of error:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE RECEIPT
FOR PROPERTY SEIZED; EXHIBIT I AND EXHIBIT R; THE PHYSICAL
SCIENCE REPORT NO. D-168-94. EXHIBIT D; THE CHEMISTRY REPORT
NO. DT-107-94, EXHIBIT L; AND THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE REPORT NO.
DT-107-94, EXHIBIT M ARE INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED HAS NOT BEEN
OVERCOME BY PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
We affirm the conviction of the petitioner.
Petitioner insists that the trial court erred in admitting in evidence Exhibits
I and R, which are the Receipts of Property Seized, considering that it was
obtained in violation of his constitutional rights. The said Receipts for Property
Seized, which described the properties seized from the petitioner by virtue of the
search warrant, contain his signature. According to petitioner, inasmuch as the
said evidence were obtained without the assistance of a lawyer, said evidence
are tantamount to having been derived from an uncounselled extra-judicial
confession and, thus, are inadmissible in evidence for being fruits of the
poisonous tree.
We agree. It has been held in a long line of cases that the signature of the
accused in the Receipt of Property Seized is inadmissible in evidence if it was
obtained without the assistance of counsel.
[11]
The signature of the accused on
such a receipt is a declaration against his interest and a tacit admission of the
crime charged for the reason that, in the case at bar, mere unexplained
possession of prohibited drugs is punishable by law. Therefore, the signatures
Page 50 of 96 |

of the petitioner on the two (2) Receipts of Property Seized (Exhibits I and R)
are not admissible in evidence, the same being tantamount to an uncounselled
extra-judicial confession which is prohibited by the Constitution.
Petitioner further contends that since the Receipts for Property Seized
(Exhibits I and R) are inadmissible in evidence, it follows that the Physical
Science Reports Nos. D-168-94 and DT-107-94 (Exhibit D and M) and
Chemistry Report No. DT-107-94 (Exhibit L) finding the said items seized to be
positive for marijuana and shabu, are also inadmissible inasmuch as they are
mere conclusions drawn from the said Receipts and hence a part thereof.
We disagree. The fact that the Receipts of Property Seized (Exhibits I and
R) are inadmissible in evidence does not render inadmissable the Physical
Science Reports (Exhibit D and M) and the Chemistry Report (Exhibit L)
inasmuch as the examined materials were legally seized or taken from the
petitioners bedroom on the strength of a valid search warrant duly issued by
Judge Villarama, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila. Since
the said materials were validly seized or taken from the bedroom of the
petitioner in his presence, the laboratory tests conducted thereon were legally
and validly done. Hence, the said Reports containing the results of the
laboratory examinations, aside from the testimonial and other real evidence of
the prosecution, are admissible in evidence and sufficiently proved that the
petitioner used and had the said prohibited drugs and paraphernalia in his
possession. In other words, even without the Receipts of Property Seized
(Exhibits I and R) the alleged guilt of the petitioner for the crimes charged were
proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Petitioner also posits the theory that since he had no counsel during the
custodial investigation when his urine sample was taken and chemically
examined, Exhibits L and M, which are the respective Chemistry and
Physical Reports, both dated March 9, 1994, are also inadmissible in evidence
since his urine sample was derived in effect from an uncounselled extra-judicial
confession. Petitioner claims that the taking of his urine sample allegedly
violates Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution, which provides that:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their person, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the person or things to be seized.
We are not persuaded. The right to counsel begins from the time a person
is taken into custody and placed under investigation for the commission of a
crime, i.e., when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit
information and/or confession or admissions from the accused. Such right is
guaranteed by the Constitution and cannot be waived except in writing and in
the presence of counsel. However, what the Constitution prohibits is the use of
physical or moral compulsion to extort communication from the accused, but
not an inclusion of his body in evidence, when it may be material.
[12]
In fact, an
accused may validly be compelled to be photographed or measured, or his
garments or shoes removed or replaced, or to move his body to enable the
foregoing things to be done, without running afoul of the proscription against
testimonial compulsion.
[13]
The situation in the case at bar falls within the
exemption under the freedom from testimonial compulsion since what was
sought to be examined came from the body of the accused. This was a
mechanical act the accused was made to undergo which was not meant to
unearth undisclosed facts but to ascertain physical attributes determinable by
simple observation. In fact, the record shows that petitioner and his co-accused
were not compelled to give samples of their urine but they in fact voluntarily
gave the same when they were requested to undergo a drug test.
[14]

Assuming arguendo that the urine samples taken from the petitioner are
inadmissible in evidence, we agree with the trial court that the record is replete
with other pieces of credible evidence including the testimonial evidence of the
prosecution which point to the culpability of the petitioner for the crimes
charged.
First of all, the petitioner has not satisfactorily explained the presence in
his bedroom of the assorted drug paraphernalia
[15]
and prohibited drugs found
atop a round table therein at the time of the raid.
[16]
Petitioners feeble excuse
that he and his co-accused were not in the masters bedroom but inside the
comfort room deserves scant consideration since the comfort room is part of the
masters bedroom.
[17]
Prosecution witness Capt. Franklin Moises Mabanag, head
of the said PNP-NARCOM raiding team, testified that when petitioner was
arrested, the latter showed manifestations and signs that he was under the
influence of drugs, to wit:
By Fiscal Villanueva (To the witness)
Q: Mr. Witness, why was a drug defendant (sic) test requested on the persons of
David Gutang, Noel Regala, Alexander Jimenez and Oscar de Venecia?
A: A drug test was made on them because when we held these persons David Gutang,
Noel Regala, Alexander Jimenez and Oscar de Venecia, they showed
manifestations and signs that they are under the influence of drugs.
Atty. Arias:
That is a conjectural answer. The witness is not authorized to testify on that.
Page 51 of 96 |

Fiscal Villanueva:
We agreed as to the expertise of this witness at the time when I was qualifying
him (interrupted)
By Fiscal Villanueva (To the witness)
Court:
At any rate, that was only his observation it is not necessarily binding to the
court, that is his testimony, let it remain.
Atty. Arias:
But the rule is clear.
Court:
That is what he observed.
Fiscal Villanueva:
And what is this manifestation that you observed?
Atty. Arias:
Precisely, that is already proving something beyond what his eyes can see.
Fiscal Villanueva:
That is part of his testimony.
Court:
Let the witness answer.
Witness:
I observed they are profusely sweating and their lips are dry, I let them show
their tongue and it was whitish and their faces are pale, reason why we made the
necessary request for drug test.
[18]

It is worth noting that the search warrant was served only after months of
surveillance work by the PNP-NARCOM operatives led by Chief Inspector
Franklin Mabanag in the residence of petitioner. Earlier, a confidential
informant had even bought a gram of shabu from petitioner
Gutang. Prosecution witness Mabanag also found, during the surveillance,
persons who frequented the house of petitioner, and that the confidential
informant of the PNP-NARCOM had in fact gained entry into the house. The
police officers are presumed to have performed the search in the regular
performance of their work. Allegedly improper motive on the part of the PNP-
NARCOM team must be shown by the defense, otherwise, they are presumed to
be in the regular performance of their official duties.
[19]
But the defense failed to
do so.
All told, in the face of the evidence adduced by the prosecution, it is clear
that petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the
Court of Appeals affirming the judgment of the Regional Trial Court is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ., concur.

Page 52 of 96 |

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 121662-64. July 6, 1999]
VLASON ENTERPRISES CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS a
nd DURAPROOFSERVICES, represented by its General Manager, Cesar U
rbino Sr., respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J .:
Summons to a domestic or resident corporation should be served on officers, agents
or employees, who are responsible enough to warrant the presumption that they will
transmit to the corporation notice of the filing of the action against it. Rules on the service
of motions should be liberally construed in order to promote the ends of substantial
justice. A rigid application that will result in the manifest injustice should be avoided. A
default judgment against several defendants cannot affect the rights of one who was never
declared in default. In any event, such judgment cannot include an award not prayed for in
the complaint, even if proven ex parte.
The Case

These principles were used by this Court in resolving this Petition for Review
on Certiorari before us, assailing the July 19, 1993 Decision
[1]
and the August 15, 1995
Resolution,
[2]
both promulgated by the Court of Appeals. The assailed Decision disposed
as follows:
[3]

ACCORDINGLY, in view of the foregoing disquisitions, all the three (3) consolidated
petitions for certiorari are hereby GRANTED.
THE assailed Order of respondent Judge Arsenio Gonong of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 8, dated April 5, 1991, in the first petition for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No.
24669); the assailed Order of Judge Bernardo Pardo, Executive Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 8, dated July 6, 1992, in the second petition for certiorari (CA-
G.R. SP No. 28387); and finally, the assailed order or Resolution en banc of the respondent
Court of Tax Appeals Judges Ernesto Acosta, Ramon de Veyra and Manuel Gruba, under
date of October 5, 1992, in the third petition for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 29317) are all
hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE thereby giving way to the entire decision dated
February 18, 1991 of the respondent Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8, in Civil
Case No. 89-51451 which remains valid, final and executory, if not yet wholly executed.
THE writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued by this Court on March 6, 1992 and
reiterated on July 22, 1992 and this date against the named respondents specified in the
dispositive portion of the judgment of the respondent Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 8 in the first petition for certiorari, which remains valid, existing and enforceable, is
hereby MADE PERMANENT without prejudice (1) to the [private respondents]
remaining unpaid obligations to the herein party-intervenor in accordance with the
Compromise Agreement or in connection with the decision of the respondent lower court
in CA-G.R. SP No. 24669 and (2) to the government, in relation to the forthcoming
decision of the respondent Court of Tax Appeals on the amount of taxes, charges,
assessments or obligations that are due, as totally secured and fully guaranteed payment by
the [private respondents] bond, subject to the relevant rulings of the Department of
Finance and other prevailing laws and jurisprudence.
The assailed Resolution ruled:
ACCORDINGLY, in the light of the foregoing disquisitions, as well as considering these
clarifications, the three (3) motions aforementioned are hereby DENIED.
The Facts

Poro Point Shipping Services, then acting as the local agent of Omega Sea Transport
Company of Honduras & Panama, a Panamanian company, (hereafter referred to as
Omega), requested permission for its vessel M/V Star Ace, which had engine trouble, to
unload its cargo and to store it at the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) compound in San
Fernando, La Union while awaiting transhipment to Hongkong. The request was approved
by the Bureau of Customs.
[4]
Despite the approval, the customs personnel boarded the
vessel when it docked on January 7, 1989, on suspicion that it was the hijacked M/V Silver
Med owned by Med Line Philippines Co., and that its cargo would be smuggled into the
country.
[5]
The district customs collector seized said vessel and its cargo pursuant to
Section 2301, Tariff and Customs Code. A notice of hearing of SFLU Seizure
Identification No. 3-89 was served on its consignee, Singkong Trading Co. of Hongkong,
and its shipper, Dusit International Co., Ltd. of Thailand.
Page 53 of 96 |

While seizure proceedings were ongoing, La Union was hit by three typhoons, and
the vessel ran aground and was abandoned. On June 8, 1989, its authorized representative,
Frank Cadacio, entered into a salvage agreement with private respondent to secure and
repair the vessel at the agreed consideration of $1 million and fifty percent (50%) [of] the
cargo after all expenses, cost and taxes.
[6]

Finding that no fraud was committed, the District Collector of Customs, Aurelio M.
Quiray, lifted the warrant of seizure on July 16, 1989.
[7]
However, in a Second Indorsement
dated November 11, 1989, then Customs Commissioner Salvador M. Mison declined to
issue a clearance for Quirays Decision; instead, he forfeited the vessel and its cargo in
accordance with Section 2530 of the Tariff and Customs Code.
[8]
Accordingly, acting
District Collector of Customs John S. Sy issued a Decision decreeing the forfeiture and the
sale of the cargo in favor of the government.
[9]

To enforce its preferred salvors lien, herein Private Respondent Duraproof Services
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition
and Mandamus
[10]
assailing the actions of Commissioner Mison and District Collector
Sy. Also impleaded as respondents were PPA Representative Silverio Mangaoang and
Med Line Philippines, Inc.
On January 10, 1989, private respondent amended its Petition
[11]
to include former
District Collector Quiray; PPA Port Manager Adolfo Ll. Amor Jr; Petitioner Vlason
Enterprises as represented by its president, Vicente Angliongto; Singkong Trading
Company as represented by Atty. Eddie Tamondong; Banco Du Brasil; Dusit International
Co., Inc.; Thai-Nan Enterprises Ltd. and Thai-United Trading Co., Ltd.
[12]
In both Petitions,
private respondent plainly failed to include any allegation pertaining to petitioner, or any
prayer for relief against it.
Summonses for the amended Petition were served on Atty. Joseph Capuyan for Med
Line Philippines: Angliongto (through his secretary, Betty Bebero), Atty. Tamondong and
Commissioner Mison.
[13]
Upon motion of the private respondent, the trial court allowed
summons by publication to be served upon the alien defendants who were not residents and
had no direct representatives in the country.
[14]

On January 29, 1990, private respondent moved to declare respondents in default, but
the trial court denied the motion in its February 23, 1990 Order,
[15]
because Mangaoang and
Amor had jointly filed a Motion to Dismiss, while Mison and Med Line had moved
separately for an extension to file a similar motion.
[16]
Later it rendered an Order dated July
2, 1990, giving due course to the motions to dismiss filed by Mangaoang and Amor on the
ground of litis pendentia, and by the commissioner and district collector of customs on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction.
[17]
In another Order, the trial court dismissed the action
against Med Line Philippines on the ground of litis pendentia.
[18]

On two other occasions, private respondent again moved to declare the following in
default: petitioner, Quiray, Sy and Mison on March 26, 1990;
[19]
and Banco Du Brazil,
Dusit International Co., Inc., Thai-Nan Enterprises Ltd. and Thai-United Trading Co., Ltd.
on August 24, 1990.
[20]
There is no record, however, that the trial court acted upon the
motions. On September 18, 1990, petitioner filed another Motion for leave to amend the
petition,
[21]
alleging that its counsel failed to include the following necessary and/or
indispensable parties: Omega represented by Cadacio; and M/V Star Ace represented by
Capt. Nahon Rada, relief captain. Aside from impleading these additional respondents,
private respondent also alleged in the Second (actually, third) Amended Petition
[22]
that the
owners of the vessel intended to transfer and alienate their rights and interests over the
vessel and its cargo, to the detriment of the private respondent.
The trial court granted leave to private respondent to amend its Petition, but only to
exclude the customs commissioner and the district collector.
[23]
Instead, private respondent
filed the Second Amended Petition with Supplemental Petition against Singkong Trading
Company; and Omega and M/V Star Ace,
[24]
to which Cadacio and Rada filed a Joint
Answer.
[25]

Declared in default in an Order issued by the trial court on January 23, 1991, were the
following: Singkong Trading Co., Commissioner Mison, M/V Star Ace and
Omega.
[26]
Private respondent filed, and the trial court granted, an ex parte Motion to
present evidence against the defaulting respondents.
[27]
Only private respondent, Atty.
Tamondong, Commissioner Mison, Omega and M/V Star Ace appeared in the next pretrial
hearing; thus, the trial court declared the other respondents in default and allowed private
respondent to present evidence against them.
[28]
Cesar Urbino, general manager of private
respondent, testified and adduced evidence against the other respondents, including herein
petitioner. As regards petitioner, he declared: Vlason Enterprises represented by Atty. Sy
and Vicente Angliongto thru constant intimidation and harassment of utilizing the PPA
Management of San Fernando, La Union x x x further delayed, and [private respondent]
incurred heavy overhead expenses due to direct and incidental expenses xxx causing
irreparable damages of about P3,000,000 worth of ship tackles, rigs, and appurtenances
including radar antennas and apparatuses, which were taken surreptitiously by persons
working for Vlason Enterprises or its agents[.]
[29]

On December 29, 1990, private respondent and Rada, representing Omega, entered
into a Memorandum of Agreement stipulating that Rada would write and notify Omega
regarding the demand for salvage fees of private respondent; and that if Rada did not
receive any instruction from his principal, he would assign the vessel in favor of the
salvor.
[30]

On February 18, 1991, the trial court disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, based on the allegations, prayer and
evidence adduced, both testimonial and documentary, the Court is convinced, that, indeed,
defendants/respondents are liable to [private respondent] in the amount as prayed for in the
petition for which it renders judgment as follows:
Page 54 of 96 |

1. Respondent M/V Star Ace, represented by Capt. Nahum Rada, [r]elief [c]aptain of
the vessel and Omega Sea Transport Company, Inc., represented by Frank Cadacio[,] is
ordered to refrain from alienating or [transferring] the vessel M/V Star Ace to any third
parties;
2. Singkong Trading Company to pay the following:
a. Taxes due the government;
b. Salvage fees on the vessel in the amount of $1,000,000.00 based on xxx Lloyds
Standard Form of Salvage Agreement;
c. Preservation, securing and guarding fees on the vessel in the amount of
$225,000.00;
d. Maintenance fees in the amount of P2,685,000.00;
e. Salaries of the crew from August 16, 1989 to December 1989 in the amount of
$43,000.00 and unpaid salaries from January 1990 up to the present;
f. Attorneys fees in the amount of P656,000.00;
3. [Vlason] Enterprises to pay [private respondent] in the amount of P3,000,000.00 for
damages;
4. Banco [Du] Brazil to pay [private respondent] in the amount of $300,000.00 in
damages; and finally,
5. Costs of [s]uit.
Subsequently, upon the Motion of Omega, Singkong Trading Co. and private
respondent, the trial court approved a Compromise Agreement
[31]
among the movants,
reducing by 20 percent the amounts adjudged. For their part, respondents-movants agreed
not to appeal the Decision.
[32]
On March 8, 1991, private respondent moved for the
execution of judgment, claiming that the trial court Decision had already become final and
executory.
[33]
The Motion was granted
[34]
and a Writ of Execution was issued.
[35]
To satisfy
the Decision, Sheriffs Jorge Victorino, Amado Sevilla and Dionisio Camagon were
deputized on March 13, 1991 to levy and to sell on execution the defendants vessel and
personal property.
On March 14, 1991, petitioner filed, by special appearance, a Motion for
Reconsideration, on the grounds that it was allegedly not impleaded as a defendant, served
summons or declared in default; that private respondent was not authorized to present
evidence against it in default; that the judgment in default was fatally defective, because
private respondent had not paid filing fees for the award; and that private respondent had
not prayed for such award.
[36]
Private respondent opposed the Motion, arguing that it was a
mere scrap of paper due to its defective notice of hearing.
On March 18, 1991, the Bureau of Customs also filed an ex parte Motion to recall the
execution, and to quash the notice of levy and the sale on execution.
[37]
Despite this
Motion, the auction sale was conducted on March 21, 1991 by Sheriff Camagon, with
private respondent submitting the winning bid.
[38]
The trial court ordered the deputy
sheriffs to cease and desist from implementing the Writ of Execution and from levying on
the personal property of the defendants.
[39]
Nevertheless, Sheriff Camagon issued the
corresponding Certificate of Sale on March 27, 1991.
[40]

On April 12, 1991,
[41]
private respondent filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition to nullify the cease and desist orders of the trial
court.
[42]
Respondent Court issued on April 26, 1991 a Resolution which reads:
[43]

MEANWHILE, in order to preserve the status quo and so as not to render the present
petition moot and academic, a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER is hereby ISSUED
enjoining the respondent Judge, the Honorable Arsenio M. Gonong, from enforcing and/or
implementing the Orders dated 22 March 1991 and 5 April 1991 which ordered respondent
Sheriff to cease and desist from implementing the writ of execution and the return thereof,
the quashing of the levy xxx on [the] execution [and sale] of the properties levied upon and
sold at public auction by the Sheriff, for reason of grave abuse of discretion and in excess
of jurisdiction, until further orders from this Court.
WITHIN ten (10) days from notice hereof, respondents [petitioner included] are also
required to SHOW CAUSE why the prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction should not
be granted.
On May 8, 1991, petitioner received from Camagon a notice to pay private
respondent P3 million to satisfy the trial court Decision. Not having any knowledge of the
CA case to which it was not impleaded, petitioner filed with the trial court a Motion to
Dismiss ex abutandi ad cautelam on the grounds that (1) the Petition of private respondent
stated no cause of action against it, (2) the trial court had no jurisdiction over the case, and
(3) litis pendentia barred the suit.
[44]

On May 10, 1991, Camagon levied on petitioners properties, which were scheduled
for auction later on May 16, 1991. Specific descriptions of the properties are as follows:
[45]

Page 55 of 96 |

a) Motor Tugboat DEN DEN ex Emerson-I
Length: 35.67 ms. Breadth: 7.33 ms.
Depth: 3.15 ms. Gross Tons: 205.71
Net tons: 67.78 Official Number 213551
Material: Steel Class License: CWL
License No. 4424
b) Barge - FC99" ex YD-153
Length: 34.15 ms. Breadth: 15.85 m.s.
Depth: 2.77 m.s. Gross Tons: 491.70
Net Tons: 491.70 Official Number 227236
Material: Steel Class License: CWL
License No. 83-0012
c) Barge LAWIN ex Sea Lion 2
Length: 66.92 ms. Breadth: 11.28 ms.
Depth: 4.52 m.s. Gross Tons: 1,029.56
Net Tons: 1,027/43 Official Number 708069
Material: Steel Class License: Coastwise
License No. 81-0059
Petitioner also filed a special appearance before the CA. It prayed for the lifting of
the levy on its properties or, alternatively, for a temporary restraining order against their
auction until its Motion for Reconsideration was resolved by the trial court.
[46]

Acting on petitioners Motion for Reconsideration, the trial court reversed its
Decision of February 18, 1991, holding in its May 22, 1991 Resolution as follows:
[47]

xxx [T]hat xxx Motion For Reconsideration [of the petitioner] was filed on March 14,
1991 (See: page 584, records, Vol.2) indubitably showing that it was seasonably filed
within the 15-day time-frame. Therefore, xxx said default-judgment ha[d] not yet become
final and executory when the Writ of Execution was issued on March 13, 1991 xxx The
rules [provide] that [the e]xecution shall issue as a matter of right upon the expiration of
the period of appeal from a judgment if no appeal has been duly perfected (Sec. 1, R-39,
RRC). That being the case, VEC has all the right to file as it did xxx the aforementioned
reconsideration motion calling [the] attention of the Court and pointing therein its supposed
error and its correction if, indeed, any [error was] committed. It is in this light that this
Court made an in-depth reflection and assessment of the premises or reasons raised by
[petitioner], and after a re-examination of the facts and evidence spread on the records, it
has come to the considered conclusion that the questioned default-judgment has been
improvidently issued. By the records, the claim of [private respondent] that his January 29,
1990 Ex-Parte Motion To Declare Defendants In Default (pp. 174-177, records, Vol. 1)
including VEC had been granted is belied by the February 23, 1990 Order (pp. 214-215,
records, ibid) par. 2, thereof, reading to wit:
By the foregoing, for reasons stated thereunder respectively, this Court, in the exercise of
its judicious discretion, in the sense that the rules should be liberally construed in order to
promote their object and to assist the parties, resolves to DENY petitioners Motion to have
the Commissioner of Customs AND OTHER ENUMERATED RESPONDENTS
DECLARED IN DEFAULT. [Emphasis ours].
Not even [private respondents] November 23, 1990 Ex-Parte Motion To Present
[Evidence] Against Defaulting Defendants (page 489, records, Vol.2) [can] be deemed as
a remedy of the fact that there never was issued an order of default against respondents
including [petitioner] VEC. Having thus established that there [had] been no order of
default against VEC as contemplated by Sec. 1, Rule 18, in relation to Sec. 9, Rule 13,
Revised Rules of Court, there could not have been any valid default-judgment rendered
against it. The issuance of an order of default is a condition sine qua non in order [that] a
judgment by default be clothed with validity. Further, records show that this Court never
had authorized [private respondent] to adduce evidence ex-parte against [petitioner]
VEC. In sum, the February 18, 1991 decision by default is null and void as against
[petitioner] VEC. With this considered conclusion of nullity of said default judgment in
question, this Court feels there is no more need for it to resolve Arguments I-A & I-B, as
well as III-A & III-B, of the March 14, 1991 Motion for Reconsideration. The Court
agrees, however, with said discussions on the non-compliance [with] Sec. 2, Rule 7 (Title
of Complaint) and Sec. I, Rule 8 on the requirement of indicating in the complaint the
ultimate facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim of defense [--] which is
Page 56 of 96 |

absent in the January 9, Amended Petition (pp. 122-141, records, Vol. I) [--] for it merely
mentioned [petitioner] VEC in par. 5 thereof and no more. It abides, likewise, with
[Argument] III-B that the Decision in suit award[ed] amounts never asked for in instant
petition as regards VEC (Sec. 5, Rule 18, RRC). xxx.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, and as prayed for, the February 18,
1991 Judgment by Default is hereby reconsidered and SET ASIDE.
On June 26, 1992, then Executive Judge Bernardo P. Pardo
[48]
of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila issued an Order
[49]
annulling the Sheriffs Report/Return dated April 1,
1991, and all proceedings taken by Camagon.
The CA granted private respondents Motion to file a Supplemental Petition
impleading petitioner in CA-GR 24669.
[50]
In view of the rampant pilferage of the cargo
deposited at the PPA compound, private respondent obtained from the appellate court a
Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated March 6, 1992. The Writ reads:
[51]

ACCORDINGLY, in view of the foregoing disquisitions, the urgent verified motion for
preliminary injunction dated February 11, 1992 is hereby GRANTED. Therefore, let a writ
of preliminary injunction forthwith issue against the respondents and all persons or agents
acting in their behalf, enjoining them not to interfere in the transferring of the
aforementioned vessel and its cargoes, or in removing said cargoes xxx from [the] PPA
compound.
On September 15, 1992, Sheriff Amado Sevilla seized petitioners motor tugboat Den
Den by virtue of the Order
[52]
dated April 3, 1992, issued by the RTC of Manila, Branch
26.
[53]

On August 6, 1992, the CA consolidated CA-GR SP No. 28387
[54]
with CA-GR SP
No. 24669.
[55]
The Court of Tax Appeals issued on October 5, 1992, a Resolution in CTA
Case Nos. 4492, 4494 and 4500, which disposed as follows:
Confirming the order in open court on October 5, 1992, the Court hereby RESOLVES to:
1. Order Respondent Commissioner of Customs to assign or detail [a] sufficient number of
customs police and guards aboard, and around the vicinity of, the vessel M/V Star Ace
now in anchor at Mariveles, Bataan or elsewhere, in order to ensure its safety during the
pendency of these cases;
2. Direct him to assign personnel and/or representatives to conduct an inventory of part of
the vessels cargo now in the possession of Mr. Cesar S. Urbino, Sr. at 197 Heroes del 96
Street, Caloocan City, which inventory may be participated in by all the parties interested
in said cargo.
To enjoin the CTA from enforcing said Order, private respondent filed before the
Court of Appeals another Petition for Certiorari,
[56]
which was later also consolidated with
CA-GR SP No. 24669.
On July 19, 1993, the CA rendered the assailed Decision. Petitioner filed (1) a
Motion for Clarification, praying for a declaration that the trial court Decision against it
was not valid; and (2) a partial Motion for Reconsideration, seeking to set aside the
assailed Decision insofar as the latter affected it.
On July 5, 1995, the Court of Appeals issued the following Resolution:
[57]

Pending resolution of the motions for reconsideration, filed by Vlason Enterprises
Corporation and Banco [Du] Brazil, and considering [private respondents] Motion for
Entry of Judgment with respect to respondent PPA having already been granted by this
Court as far back as June 17, 1994, pursuant to the resolution of the Supreme Court dated
December 8, 1993 in G.R. No. 111270-72 (Philippine Ports Authority vs. Court of Appeals,
et al.) informing the parties in said case that the judgment sought to be reviewed has now
become final and executory, the lower court may now take appropriate action on the
urgent ex-parte motion for issuance of a writ of execution, filed by [private respondent] on
July 15, 1994.
On August 28, 1995, the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 26, issued a Writ of
Possession which resulted in private respondent taking possession of petitioners
barge Lawin (formerly Sea Lion 2) on September 1, 1995.
[58]

Hence, this Petition.
[59]

Ruling of the Respondent Court

As already adverted to, Respondent Court granted the Petition for Certiorari of the
private respondent, which was consolidated with the latters two other Petitions. The
court a quo issued the following rulings:
1. The trial court had jurisdiction over the salvors claim or admiralty case
pursuant to Batas Pambansa Bilang 129.
2. Since the Decision of the trial court became final and executory, never
having been disputed or appealed to a higher court, the trial judge committed
Page 57 of 96 |

grave abuse of discretion in recalling the Writ of Execution and in quashing
the levy and the execution of the sale of M/V Star Ace and its cargo.
2. Such acts constituted an alteration or a modification of a final and executory
judgment and could never be justified under law and jurisprudence.
3. Civil Case 59-51451 dealt only with the salvors claim without passing upon
the legality or the validity of the undated Decision of the Commissioner of
Customs in the seizure proceeding.
4. Petitioner and his co-respondents could not invoke the jurisdiction of a court
to secure affirmative relief against their opponent and, after failing to obtain
such relief, question the courts jurisdiction.
5. Petitioner had no recourse through any of the following judicially accepted
means to question the final judgment:
a. a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38,
b. a direct action to annul and enjoin the enforcement of the questioned judgment, and
c. a collateral attack against the questioned judgment which appears void on its face.
6. A court which has already acquired jurisdiction over a case cannot be ousted
by a coequal court; the res in this casethe vessel and its cargowere
placed under the control of the trial court ahead of the CTA.
7. The admiralty Decision had attained finality while the issue of the validity of
the seizure proceedings was still under determination.
In the assailed Resolution, Respondent Court clarified that there was no need to serve
summons anew on petitioner, since it had been served summons when the Second
Amended Petition (the third) was filed; and that petitioners Motion for Reconsideration
was defective and void, because it contained no notice of hearing addressed to the counsel
of private respondent in violation of Rule 16, Section 4 of the Rules of Court.
To this second motion, [private respondent] contends that there was no need to serve
summons anew to VEC when the second amended petition was filed impleading VEC,
pursuant to the ruling of the Supreme Court in Asiatic Travel Corp. vs. CA (164 SCRA
623); and that finally, the decision of the court a quo o[n] February 18, 1991 became final
and executory, notwithstanding the timely filing of the motion for reconsideration of VEC
for the reason that the said motion for reconsideration was defective or void, there being no
notice of hearing addressed to the counsel of petitioner. In fact, no motion such as this
instant one can be acted upon by the Court without proof of service of the notice thereof,
pursuant to Rule 16, Section 4 of the Rules of Court.
x x x x x x x x x
Finally, we should never lose sight of the fact that the instant petition for certiorari is
proper only to correct errors of jurisdiction committed by the lower court, or grave abuse of
discretion which is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. Where the error is not one of
jurisdiction but an error of law or of fact which is a mistake of judgment, appeal is the
remedy (Salas vs. Castro, 216 SCRA 198). Here, respondents failed to appeal. Hence, the
decision dated February 18, 1991 of the lower court has long become final, executory and
unappealable. We do not and cannot therefore review the instant case as if it were on
appeal and direct actions on these motions. While the proper remedy is appeal, the action
for certiorari will not be entertained. Indeed, certiorari is not a substitute for lapsed appeal.
At any rate, the decision dated July 19, 1993 of this Court on the main petition
for certiorari is not yet final (except with respect to respondent PPA), the Bureau of
Customs having filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition, under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court, with the Supreme Court, necessitating prudence on Our part to await its final
verdict.
[60]

Assignment of Errors

Before us, petitioner submits the following assignment of errors on the part of
Respondent Court:
[61]

I
The Court of Appeals committed serious error in ruling that the entire decision of the trial
court in Civil Case No. 89-51451 dated 18 February 1991 became final and executory
because it was never disputed or appealed.
A. VEC filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision two days before
deadline, which motion was granted by the trial court.
B. The trial court correctly granted VECs motion for reconsideration and set aside the
18 February 1991 decision xxx against VEC, for:
Page 58 of 96 |

1. The trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the person of VEC as to enable it to
render any judgment against it:
(i) VEC was not impleaded as a respondent in Civil Case No. 89-51451;
(ii) Summons was not served on VEC;
2. The trial court improperly rendered judgment by default against VEC;
(i) The trial court never issued an order of default against VEC;
(ii) The trial court never authorized ex-parte presentation of evidence against VEC.
3. The Judgment by default was fatally defective because:
(i) No filing fee was paid by [private respondent] for the staggering amount of
damages awarded by the trial court.
(ii) The 18 February 1991 decision violates the Revised Rules of Court, which
prescribe that a judgment by default cannot decree a relief not prayed for.
II
Since the 18 February 1991 Decision in Civil Case No. 89-51451 is void as against VEC,
the recall of the writ of execution was valid, as far as VEC is concerned.
The Court believes that the issues can be simplified and restated as follows:
1. Has the February 18, 1991 RTC Decision become final and executory in
regard to petitioner?
2. Did the trial court acquire jurisdiction over the petitioner?
3. Was the RTC default judgment binding on petitioner?
4. Was the grant of damages against petitioner procedurally proper?
5. Was private respondent entitled to a writ of execution?
This Courts Ruling

The petition is meritorious.
First Issue: Finalityof theRTC Decision

A judgment becomes final and executory by operation of law. Its finality becomes
a fact when the reglementary period to appeal lapses, and no appeal is perfected within
such period.
[62]
The admiralty case filed by private respondent with the trial court involved
multiple defendants. This being the case, it necessarily follows that the period of appeal of
the February 18, 1991 RTC Decision depended on the date a copy of the judgment was
received by each of the defendants. Elsewise stated, each defendant had a different period
within which to appeal, depending on the date of receipt of the Decision.
[63]

Omega, Singkong Trading Co. and M/V Star Ace chose to enter into a compromise
agreement with private respondent. As to these defendants, the trial court Decision had
become final, and a writ of execution could be issued against them.
[64]
Doctrinally, a
compromise agreement is immediately final and executory.
[65]

Petitioner, however, is not in the same situation. Said Decision cannot be said to have
attained finality as to the petitioner, which was not a party to the compromise. Moreover,
petitioner filed a timely Motion for Reconsideration with the trial court, thirteen days after
it received the Decision or two days before the lapse of the reglementary period to
appeal. A motion for reconsideration tolls the running of the period to appeal.
[66]
Thus, as
to petitioner, the trial court Decision had not attained finality.
Exception totheRuleon Noticeof Hearing

Respondent Court and private respondent argue that, although timely filed,
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was a mere scrap of paper, because (1) it did not
contain a notice of hearing addressed to the current counsel of private respondent, and (2)
the notice of hearing addressed to and served on private respondents deceased counsel was
not sufficient. Admittedly, this Motion contained a notice of hearing sent to Atty. Jesus C.
Concepcion who, according to private respondent, had already died and had since been
substituted by its new counsel, Atty. Domingo Desierto. Therefore, the appellate court
ruled that the said Motion did not toll the reglementary period to appeal and that the trial
court Decision became final.
This Court disagrees. Rule 15 of the Rules of Court states:
Page 59 of 96 |

SEC. 4. Notice.Notice of a motion shall be served by the applicant to all parties
concerned, at least three (3) days before the hearing thereof, together with a copy of the
motion, and of any affidavits and other papers accompanying it. The court, however, for
good cause may hear a motion on shorter notice, specially on matters which the court may
dispose of on its own motion.
SEC. 5. Contents of notice.The notice shall be directed to the parties concerned, and shall
state the time and place for the hearing of the motion.
[67]

Ideally, the foregoing Rule requires the petitioner to address and to serve on the
counsel of private respondent the notice of hearing of the Motion for Reconsideration. The
case at bar, however, is far from ideal. First, petitioner was not validly summoned and it
did not participate in the trial of the case in the lower court; thus, it was understandable that
petitioner would not be familiar with the parties and their counsels. Second, Atty. Desierto
entered his appearance only as collaborating counsel,
[68]
who is normally not entitled to
notices even from this Court. Third, private respondent made no manifestation on record
that Atty. Concepcion was already dead. Besides, it was Atty. Concepcion who signed the
Amended Petition, wherein petitioner was first impleaded as respondent and served a copy
thereof. Naturally, petitioners attention was focused on this pleading, and it was within its
rights to assume that the signatory to such pleading was the counsel for private respondent.
The Court has consistently held that a motion which does not meet the requirements
of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court is considered a worthless piece of
paper, which the clerk of court has no right to receive and the trial court has no authority to
act upon. Service of a copy of a motion containing a notice of the time and the place of
hearing of that motion is a mandatory requirement, and the failure of movants to comply
with these requirements renders their motions fatally defective.
[69]
However, there are
exceptions to the strict application of this rule. These exceptions are as follows:
[70]

xxx Liberal construction of this rule has been allowed by this Court in cases (1) where a
rigid application will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice;
[71]
especially if a
party successfully shows that the alleged defect in the questioned final and executory
judgment is not apparent on its face or from the recitals contained therein; (2) where the
interest of substantial justice will be served;
[72]
(3) where the resolution of the motion is
addressed solely to the sound and judicious discretion of the court;
[73]
and (4) where the
injustice to the adverse party is not commensurate [to] the degree of his thoughtlessness in
not complying with the procedure prescribed.
[74]

The present case falls under the first exception. Petitioner was not informed of any
cause of action or claim against it. All of a sudden, the vessels which petitioner used in its
salvaging business were levied upon and sold in execution to satisfy a supposed judgment
against it. To allow this to happen simply because of a lapse in fulfilling the notice
requirement which, as already said, was satisfactorily explained would be a manifest
failure or miscarriage of justice.
A notice of hearing is conceptualized as an integral component of procedural due
process intended to afford the adverse parties a chance to be heard before a motion is
resolved by the court. Through such notice, the adverse party is permitted time to study
and answer the arguments in the motion.
Circumstances in the case at bar show that private respondent was not denied
procedural due process, and that the very purpose of a notice of hearing had been
served. On the day of the hearing, Atty. Desierto did not object to the said Motion for lack
of notice to him; in fact, he was furnished in open court with a copy of the motion and was
granted by the trial court thirty days to file his opposition to it. These circumstances
clearly justify a departure from the literal application of the notice of hearing rule.
[75]
In
other cases, after the trial court learns that a motion lacks such notice, the prompt resetting
of the hearing with due notice to all the parties is held to have cured the defect.
[76]

Verily, the notice requirement is not a ritual to be followed blindly. Procedural due
process is not based solely on a mechanistic and literal application that renders any
deviation inexorably fatal. Instead, procedural rules are liberally construed to promote
their objective and to assist in obtaining a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of
any action and proceeding.
[77]
For the foregoing reasons, we believe that Respondent Court
committed reversible error in holding that the Motion for Reconsideration was a mere scrap
of paper.
Second Issue: J urisdiction Over Petitioner

Service of Summons on a Corporation

The sheriffs return shows that Angliongto who was president of petitioner
corporation, through his secretary Betty Bebero, was served summons on January 18,
1990.
[78]
Petitioner claims that this service was defective for two reasons: (1) Bebero was
an employee of Vlasons Shipping, Inc., which was an entity separate and distinct from
Petitioner Vlason Enterprises Corporation (VEC); and (2) the return pertained to the
service of summons for the amended Petition, not for the Second Amended Petition with
Supplemental Petition, the latter pleading having superseded the former.
A corporation may be served summons through its agents or officers who under the
Rules are designated to accept service of process. A summons addressed to a corporation
and served on the secretary of its president binds that corporation.
[79]
This is based on the
rationale that service must be made on a representative so integrated with the corporation
Page 60 of 96 |

sued, that it is safe to assume that said representative had sufficient responsibility and
discretion to realize the importance of the legal papers served and to relay the same to the
president or other responsible officer of the corporation being sued.
[80]
The secretary of the
president satisfies this criterion. This rule requires, however, that the secretary should be
an employee of the corporation sought to be summoned. Only in this manner can there be
an assurance that the secretary will bring home to the corporation [the] notice of the filing
of the action against it.
In the present case, Bebero was the secretary of Angliongto, who was president of
both VSI and petitioner, but she was an employee of VSI, not of petitioner. The piercing
of the corporate veil cannot be resorted to when serving summons.
[81]
Doctrinally, a
corporation is a legal entity distinct and separate from the members and stockholders who
compose it. However, when the corporate fiction is used as a means of perpetrating a
fraud, evading an existing obligation, circumventing a statute, achieving or perfecting a
monopoly or, in generally perpetrating a crime, the veil will be lifted to expose the
individuals composing it. None of the foregoing exceptions has been shown to exist in the
present case. Quite the contrary, the piercing of the corporate veil in this case will result in
manifest injustice. This we cannot allow. Hence, the corporate fiction remains.
Effect of Amendment of Pleadingson J urisdiction

Petitioner claims that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over it, because the
former had not been served summons anew for the Second Amended Petition or for the
Second Amended Petition with Supplemental Petition. In the records, it appears that only
Atty. Tamondong, counsel for Singkong Trading, was furnished a copy of the Second
Amended Petition.
[82]
The corresponding sheriffs return indicates that only Omega, M/V
Star Ace and Capt. Rada were served summons and copies of said Petition.
[83]

We disagree. Although it is well-settled that an amended pleading supersedes the
original one, which is thus deemed withdrawn and no longer considered part of the record,
it does not follow ipso facto that the service of a new summons for amended petitions or
complaints is required. Where the defendants have already appeared before the trial court
by virtue of a summons on the original complaint, the amended complaint may be served
upon them without need of another summons, even if new causes of action are
alleged.
[84]
After it is acquired, a courts jurisdiction continues until the case is finally
terminated. Conversely, when defendants have not yet appeared in court and no summons
has been validly served, new summons for the amended complaint must be served on
them.
[85]
It is not the change of cause of action that gives rise to the need to serve another
summons for the amended complaint, but rather the acquisition of jurisdiction over the
persons of the defendants. If the trial court has not yet acquired jurisdiction over them, a
new service of summons for the amended complaint is required.
In this case, the trial court obviously labored under the erroneous impression that
petitioner had already been placed under its jurisdiction since it had been served summons
through the secretary of its president. Thus, it dispensed with the service on petitioner of
new summons for the subsequent amendments of the Petition. We have already ruled,
however, that the first service of summons on petitioner was invalid. Therefore, the trial
court never acquired jurisdiction, and the said court should have required a new service of
summons for the amended Petitions.
I mpleadingaPartyin theTitleof theComplaint

Petitioner further claims that the trial court failed to acquire jurisdiction to render
judgment against it because (1) the title of the three Petitions filed by private respondent
never included petitioner as a party-defendant, in violation of Rule 7; and (2) the Petitions
failed to state any allegation of ultimate facts constituting a cause of action against
petitioner.
We disagree with petitioner on the first ground. The judicial attitude has always been
favorable and liberal in allowing amendments to pleadings. Pleadings shall be construed
liberally so as to render substantial justice to the parties and to determine speedily and
inexpensively the actual merits of the controversy with the least regard to technicalities.
[86]

The inclusion of the names of all the parties in the title of a complaint is a formal
requirement under Section 3, Rule 7. However, the rules of pleadings require courts to
pierce the form and go into the substance, and not to be misled by a false or wrong name
given to a pleading. The averments in the complaint, not the title, are
controlling. Although the general rule requires the inclusion of the names of all the parties
in the title of a complaint, the non-inclusion of one or some of them is not fatal to the cause
of action of a plaintiff, provided there is a statement in the body of the petition indicating
that a defendant was made a party to such action.
Private respondent claims that petitioner has always been included in the caption of
all the Petitions it filed, which included Antonio Sy, field manager of petitioner. We
checked and noted that in the caption and the body of the Amended Petition and Second
Amended Petition with Supplemental Petition, Antonio Sy was alleged to be representing
Med Line Philippines, not petitioner. Because it was private respondent who was
responsible for the errors, the Court cannot excuse it from compliance, for such action will
prejudice petitioner, who had no hand in the preparation of these pleadings. In any event,
we reiterate that, as a general rule, mere failure to include the name of a party in the title of
a complaint is not fatal by itself.
Page 61 of 96 |

StatingaCauseof Action in theComplaint

The general rule is allegata et probata -- a judgment must conform to the pleadings
and the theory of the action under which the case was tried.
[87]
But a court may also rule
and render judgment on the basis of the evidence before it, even though the relevant
pleading has not been previously amended, so long as no surprise or prejudice to the
adverse party is thereby caused.
[88]

In the case at bar, the liability of petitioner was based not on any allegation in the four
Petitions filed with the trial court, but on the evidence presented ex parte by the private
respondent. Since the trial court had not validly acquired jurisdiction over the person of
petitioner, there was no way for the latter to have validly and knowingly waived its
objection to the private respondents presentation of evidence against it.
Third Issue: J udgment ByDefault

The trial court Decision holding petitioner liable for damages is basically a default
judgment. In Section 18, judgment by default is allowed under the following condition:
[89]

SEC. 1. Judgment by default.If the defendant fails to answer within the time specified in
these rules, the court shall, upon motion of the plaintiff and proof of such failure, declare
the defendant in default. Thereupon the court shall proceed to receive the plaintiffs
evidence and render judgment granting him such relief as the complaint and the facts
proven may warrant. xxxx.
Thus, it becomes crucial to determine whether petitioner was ever declared in default, and
whether the reception of evidence ex parte against it was procedurally valid.
Petitioner WasNever DeclaredI n Default

Petitioner insists that the trial court never declared it in default.
We agree. The trial court denied the January 29, 1990 Motion of private respondent
to declare all the defendants in default, but it never acted on the latters subsequent Motion
to declare petitioner likewise. During the pretrial on January 23, 1993, the RTC declared
in default only Atty. Eddie Tamondong, as well as the other defendants Hon. Salvador
Mison, M/V Star Ace, Omega Sea Transport Co., Inc. of Panama and Sinkong Trading Co.,
[but] despite xxx due notice to them, [they] failed to appear.
[90]
Even private respondent
cannot pinpoint which trial court order held petitioner in default.
More important, the trial court, in its Resolution dated May 22, 1991, admitted that it
never declared petitioner in default, viz.:
xxx It is in this light that this [c]ourt made an in-depth reflection and assessment of the
premises or reasons raised by [petitioner] VEC[;] and after a re-examination of the facts
and evidence spread on the records, it has come to the considered conclusion that the
questioned default-judgment has been improvidently issued. [Based on] the records, the
claim of [private respondent] that [its] January 29, 1990 Ex-Parte Motion to Declare
Defendants In Default (pp. 174-177, records, Vol. 1) including VEC had been granted is
belied by the February 23, 1990 Order (pp. 214-215, records, ibid) par. 2, thereof, xxx
x x x x x x x x x
Not even petitioners November 23, 1990 Ex-Parte Motion To Present Evidence Against
Defaulting Defendants (page 489, records, Vol. 2) [can] be deemed as a remedy [for] the
fact that there never was issued an order of default against respondents including
[petitioner] VEC. Having thus established that there ha[d] been no order of default against
VEC as contemplated by Sec. 1, Rule 18, in relation to Sec. 9, Rule 13, Revised Rules of
Court, there could not have been any valid default-judgment rendered against it. The
issuance of an order [o]f default is a condition sine qua non in order [that] a judgment by
default be clothed with validity. Further, records show that this [c]ourt never had
authorized [private respondent] to adduce evidence ex-parte against [Petitioner] VEC. In
sum, the February 18, 1991 decision by default is null and void as against [Petitioner]
VEC. xxxx.
The aforementioned default judgment refers to the February 18, 1989 Decision, not to
the Order finding petitioner in default as contended by private respondent. Furthermore, it
is a legal impossibility to declare a party-defendant to be in default before it was validly
served summons.
Trial Court DidNot AllowPresentation of EvidenceEx ParteAgainst Petitioner

The Order of December 10, 1990, which allowed the presentation of
evidence ex parte against the defaulting defendants, could not have included petitioner,
because the trial court granted private respondents motion praying for the declaration of
only the foreign defendants in default. So too, private respondents ex parte Motion to
present evidence referred to the foreign defendants only.
[91]

Page 62 of 96 |

Furthermore, the reception of evidence ex parte against a non-defaulting party is
procedurally indefensible. Without a declaration that petitioner is in default as required in
Section 1, Rule 18, the trial court had no authority to order the presentation of evidence ex
parte against petitioner to render judgment against it by default. The trial judge must have
thought that since it failed to appear despite summons and was in default, it effectively
waived any objection to the presentation of evidence against it. This rule, however, would
have applied only if petitioner had submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the trial court. The
latter correctly declared, in the Resolution just cited, that the default judgment against the
former had been improvidently rendered.
Fourth Issue: AwardsNot PaidandPrayedFor

Additional FilingFeesasLien on theJ udgment

Had the trial court validly acquired jurisdiction over petitioner, nonpayment of docket
fees would not have prevented it from holding petitioner liable for damages. The Court,
in Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals,
[92]
ruled that a court acquires
jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee, not upon the
amendment of the complaint or the payment of the docket fees based on the amount sought
in the amended pleading. This ruling, however, was modified in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd.
v. Asuncion,
[93]
which added:
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim [through] the filing of the
appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the
judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been
left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien
on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized
deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.
Filing fees for damages and awards that cannot be estimated constitute liens on the
awards finally granted by the trial court. Their nonpayment alone is not a ground for the
invalidation of the award.
J udgment byDefault Cannot Grant Relief Not PrayedFor

A declaration or order of default is issued as a punishment for unnecessary delay in
joining issues. In such event, defendants lose their standing in court, they cannot expect
the trial court to act upon their pleadings, and they are not entitled to notice of the
proceeding until the final termination of the case.
[94]
Thus, the trial court proceeds with the
reception of the plaintiffs evidence upon which a default judgment is rendered.
Section 1 of Rule 18 provides that after the defendant has been declared in default,
the court shall proceed to receive the plaintiffs evidence and render judgment granting
him such relief as the complaint and the facts proven may warrant. The reliefs that may be
granted, however, are restricted by Section 5, which provides that a judgment entered
against a party in default shall not exceed the amount or be different in kind from that
prayed for.
In other words, under Section 1, a declaration of default is not an admission of the
truth or the validity of the plaintiffs claims.
[95]
The claimant must still prove his claim and
present evidence. In this sense the law gives defaulting parties some measure of protection
because plaintiffs, despite the default of defendants, are still required to substantiate their
allegations in the complaint. The judgment of default against defendants who have not
appeared or filed their answers does not imply a waiver of all their rights, except their right
to be heard and to present evidence in their favor. Their failure to answer does not imply
their admission of the facts and the causes of action of the plaintiffs, because the latter are
required to adduce evidence to support their allegations.
Moreover, the trial court is not allowed by the Rules to receive evidence that tends to
show a relief not sought or specified in the pleadings.
[96]
The plaintiff cannot be granted an
award greater than or different in kind from that specified in the complaint.
[97]

This case should be distinguished, however, from that of defendants, who filed an
answer but were absent during trial. In that case, they can be held liable for an amount
greater than or different from that originally prayed for, provided that the award is
warranted by the proven facts. This rule is premised on the theory that the adverse party
failed to object to evidence relating to an issue not raised in the pleadings.
The latter rule, however, is not applicable to the instant case. Admittedly, private
respondent presented evidence that would have been sufficient to hold petitioner liable for
damages. However, it did not include in its amended Petitions any prayer for damages
against petitioner. Therefore, the trial court could not have validly held the latter liable for
damages even if it were in default.
Fifth Issue: Execution of Final J udgment

Page 63 of 96 |

Section 1 of Rule 39 provides that execution shall issue only upon a judgment that
finally disposes of the action or proceeding. Such execution shall issue as a matter of right
upon the expiration of the period to appeal it, if no appeal has been duly perfected.
[98]

In the present case, however, we have already shown that the trial courts Decision
has not become final and executory against petitioner. In fact, the judgment does not even
bind it. Obviously, Respondent Court committed serious reversible errors when it allowed
the execution of the said judgment against petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby GRANTED, and the assailed Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED andSET ASIDE insofar as they affect
petitioner. The levy and the sale on execution of petitioners properties are
declared NULL and VOID. Said properties are ordered RESTORED to petitioner. No
pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.
Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Romero, J., (Chairman), on official business abroad.
Vitug, J., concur in the result.
Page 64 of 96 |

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 121917. March 12, 1997]
ROBIN CARIO PADILLA @ ROBINHOOD PADILLA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
FRANCISCO, J .:
On October 26, 1992, high-powered firearms with live ammunitions were found in
the possession of petitioner Robin Padilla @ Robinhood Padilla, i.e.:
"(1) One .357 Caliber revolver, Smith and Wesson, SN-32919 with six (6) live
ammunitions;
"(2) One M-16 Baby Armalite rifle, SN-RP 131120 with four (4) long
and one (1) short magazine with ammunitions;
"(3) One .380 Pietro Beretta, SN-A 35723 Y with clip and eight (8)
ammunitions; and
"(4) Six additional live double action ammunitions of .38 caliber revolver."
[1]

Petitioner was correspondingly charged on December 3, 1992, before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Angeles City with illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions
under P.D. 1866
[2]
thru the following Information:
[3]

"That on or about the 26th day of October, 1992, in the City of Angeles,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in
his possession and under his custody and control one (1) M-16 Baby Armalite
rifle, SN-RP 131120 with four (4) long and one (1) short magazines with
ammunitions, one (1) .357 caliber revolver Smith and Wesson, SN-32919 with
six (6) live ammunitions and one (1) .380 Pietro Beretta, SN-A35723Y with clip
and eight (8) ammunitions, without having the necessary authority and permit to
carry and possess the same.
ALL CONTRARY TO LAW."
[4]

The lower court then ordered the arrest of petitioner,
[5]
but granted his application for
bail.
[6]
During the arraignment on January 20, 1993, a plea of not guilty was entered for
petitioner after he refused,
[7]
upon advice of counsel,
[8]
to make any plea.
[9]
Petitioner
waived in writing his right to be present in any and all stages of the case.
[10]

After trial, Angeles City RTC Judge David Rosete rendered judgment dated April 25,
1994 convicting petitioner of the crime charged and sentenced him to an "indeterminate
penalty from 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as minimum, to 21 years
of reclusion perpetua, as maximum".
[11]
Petitioner filed his notice of appeal on April 28,
1994.
[12]
Pending the appeal in the respondent Court of Appeals,
[13]
the Solicitor-General,
convinced that the conviction shows strong evidence of guilt, filed on December 2, 1994 a
motion to cancel petitioner's bail bond. The resolution of this motion was incorporated in
the now assailed respondent court's decision sustaining petitioner's conviction,
[14]
the
dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, the foregoing circumstances considered, the appealed decision
is hereby AFFIRMED, and furthermore, theP200,000.00 bailbond posted by
accused-appellant for his provisional liberty, FGU Insurance Corporation Bond
No. JCR (2) 6523, is hereby cancelled. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 61,
Angeles City, is directed to issue the Order of Arrest of accused-appellant and
thereafter his transmittal to the National Bureau of Prisons thru the Philippine
National Police where the said accused-appellant shall remain under
confinement pending resolution of his appeal, should he appeal to the Supreme
Court. This shall be immediately executory. The Regional Trial Court is further
directed to submit a report of compliance herewith.
SO ORDERED."
[15]

Petitioner received a copy of this decision on July 26, 1995.
[16]
On August 9, 1995 he filed
a "motion for reconsideration (and to recall the warrant of arrest)"
[17]
but the same was
denied by respondent court in its September 20, 1995 Resolution,
[18]
copy of which was
received by petitioner on September 27, 1995. The next day, September 28, petitioner filed
the instant petition for review on certiorari with application for bail
[19]
followed by two
"supplemental petitions" filed by different counsels,
[20]
a "second supplemental
petition"
[21]
and an urgent motion for the separate resolution of his application for
bail. Again, the Solicitor-General
[22]
sought the denial of the application for bail, to which
the Court agreed in a Resolution promulgated on July 31, 1996.
[23]
The Court also granted
the Solicitor-General's motion to file a consolidated comment on the petitions and
thereafter required the petitioner to file his reply.
[24]
However, after his vigorous resistance
and success on the intramural of bail (both in the respondent court and this Court) and
thorough exposition of petitioner's guilt in his 55-page Brief in the respondent court, the
Solicitor-General now makes a complete turnabout by filing a "Manifestation In Lieu Of
Comment" praying for petitioner's acquittal.
[25]

Page 65 of 96 |

The People's detailed narration of facts, well-supported by evidence on record and
given credence by respondent court, is as follows:
[26]

"At about 8:00 o'clock in the evening of October 26, 1992, Enrique Manarang
and his compadre Danny Perez were inside the Manukan sa Highway Restaurant
in Sto. Kristo, Angeles City where they took shelter from the heavy downpour
(pp. 5-6, TSN, February 15, 1993) that had interrupted their ride on motorcycles
(pp. 5-6, ibid.) along McArthur Highway (ibid). While inside the restaurant,
Manarang noticed a vehicle, a Mitsubishi Pajero, running fast down the highway
prompting him to remark that the vehicle might get into an accident considering
the inclement weather. (p. 7, Ibid) In the local vernacular, he said thus: 'Ka bilis
na, mumuran pa naman pota makaaksidente ya.' (p. 7, ibid). True enough,
immediately after the vehicle had passed the restaurant, Manarang and Perez
heard a screeching sound produced by the sudden and hard braking of a vehicle
running very fast (pp. 7-8,ibid) followed by a sickening sound of the vehicle
hitting something (p. 8, ibid). Danny Cruz, quite sure of what had happened,
remarked 'oy ta na' signifying that Manarang had been right in his observation
(pp. 8-9, ibid).
"Manarang and Cruz went out to investigate and immediately saw the vehicle
occupying the edge or shoulder of the highway giving it a slight tilt to its side
(pp. 9-10, ibid). Manarang, being a member of both the Spectrum, a civic group
and the Barangay Disaster Coordinating Council, decided to report the incident
to the Philippine National Police of Angeles City (p. 10, ibid). He took out his
radio and called the Viper, the radio controller of the Philippine National Police
of Angeles City (p. 10, ibid). By the time Manarang completed the call, the
vehicle had started to leave the place of the accident taking the general direction
to the north (p. 11, ibid).
"Manarang went to the location of the accident and found out that the vehicle
had hit somebody (p. 11, ibid).
"He asked Cruz to look after the victim while he went back to the restaurant,
rode on his motorcycle and chased the vehicle (p. 11ibid). During the chase he
was able to make out the plate number of the vehicle as PMA 777 (p. 33, TSN,
February 15, 1993). He called the Viper through the radio once again (p.
34, ibid) reporting that a vehicle heading north with plate number PMA 777 was
involved in a hit and run accident (p. 20, TSN, June 8, 1993). The Viper, in the
person of SPO2 Ruby Buan, upon receipt of the second radio call flashed the
message to all units of PNP Angeles City with the order to apprehend the
vehicle (p. 20, ibid). One of the units of the PNP Angeles City reached by the
alarm was its Patrol Division at Jake Gonzales Street near the Traffic Division
(pp. 5-7, TSN, February 23, 1993). SPO2 Juan C. Borja III and SPO2 Emerlito
Miranda immediately borded a mobile patrol vehicle (Mobile No. 3) and
positioned themselves near the south approach of Abacan bridge since it was the
only passable way going to the north (pp. 8-9, ibid). It took them about ten (10)
seconds to cover the distance between their office and the Abacan bridge (p.
9, ibid).
"Another PNP mobile patrol vehicle that responded to the flash message from
SPO2 Buan was Mobile No. 7 of the Pulongmaragal Detachment which was
then conducting patrol along Don Juico Avenue (pp. 8-9, TSN, March 8,
1993). On board were SPO Ruben Mercado and SPO3 Tan and SPO2 Odejar
(p. 8, ibid). SPO Ruben Mercado immediately told SPO3 Tan to proceed to the
MacArthur Highway to intercept the vehicle with plate number PMA 777 (p.
10, ibid).
"In the meantime, Manarang continued to chase the vehicle which figured in the
hit and run incident, even passing through a flooded portion of the MacArthur
Highway two (2) feet deep in front of the Iglesia ni Kristo church but he could
not catch up with the same vehicle (pp. 11-12, February 15, 1993). When he
saw that the car he was chasing went towards Magalang, he proceeded to
Abacan bridge because he knew Pulongmaragal was not passable (pp. 12-
14, ibid). When he reached the Abacan bridge, he found Mobile No. 3 and
SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda watching all vehicles coming their way (p. 10,
TSN, February 23, 1993). He approached them and informed them that there
was a hit and run incident (p. 10, ibid). Upon learning that the two police
officers already knew about the incident, Manarang went back to where he came
from (pp. 10-11; ibid). When Manarang was in front of Tina's Restaurant, he
saw the vehicle that had figured in the hit and run incident emerging from the
corner adjoining Tina's Restaurant (p. 15, TSN, February 15, 1993). He saw that
the license plate hanging in front of the vehicle bore the identifying number
PMA 777 and he followed it (p. 15, ibid) towards the Abacan bridge.
"Soon the vehicle was within sight of SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda of Mobile
No. 3 (p. 10, TSN, February 23, 1993). When the vehicle was about twelve (12)
meters away from their position, the two police officers boarded their Mobile
car, switched on the engine, operated the siren and strobe light and drove out to
intercept the vehicle (p. 11, ibid). They cut into the path of the vehicle forcing it
to stop (p. 11, ibid).
"SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda alighted from Mobile No. 3 (P. 12, TSN,
February 23, 1993). SPO2 Miranda went to the vehicle with plate number PMA
777 and instructed its driver to alight (p. 12, ibid). The driver rolled down the
window and put his head out while raising both his hands. They recognized the
driver as Robin C. Padilla, appellant in this case (p. 13, ibid). There was no one
else with him inside the vehicle (p. 24). At that moment, Borja noticed that
Manarang arrived and stopped his motorcycle behind the vehicle of appellant (p.
Page 66 of 96 |

14, ibid). SPO2 Miranda told appellant to alight to which appellant
complied. Appellant was wearing a short leather jacket (p. 16, TSN, March 8,
1993) such that when he alighted with both his hands raised, a gun (Exhibit 'C')
tucked on the left side of his waist was revealed (p. 15, TSN, February 23,
1993), its butt protruding (p. 15, ibid). SPO2 Borja made the move to confiscate
the gun but appellant held the former's hand alleging that the gun was covered
by legal papers (p. 16, ibid). SPO2 Borja, however, insisted that if the gun
really was covered by legal papers, it would have to be shown in the office (p.
16, ibid). After disarming appellant, SPO2 Borja told him about the hit and run
incident which was angrily denied by appellant (p. 17, ibid). By that time, a
crowd had formed at the place (p. 19, ibid). SPO2 Borja checked the cylinder of
the gun and find six (6) live bullets inside (p. 20, ibid).
"While SPO2 Borja and appellant were arguing, Mobile No. 7 with SPO Ruben
Mercado, SPO3 Tan and SPO2 Odejar on board arrived (pp. 11-12, TSN, March
8, 1993). As the most senior police officer in the group, SPO Mercado took
over the matter and informed appellant that he was being arrested for the hit and
run incident (p. 13, ibid). He pointed out to appellant the fact that the plate
number of his vehicle was dangling and the railing and the hood were dented (p.
12, ibid). Appellant, however, arrogantlydenied his misdeed and, instead,
played with the crowd by holding their hands with one hand and pointing to
SPO3 Borja with his right hand saying 'iyan, kinuha ang baril ko' (pp. 13-
15, ibid). Because appellant's jacket was short, his gesture exposed a long
magazine of an armalite rifle tucked in appellant's back right pocket (p.
16, ibid). SPO Mercado saw this and so when appellant turned around as he
was talking and proceeding to his vehicle, Mercado confiscated the magazine
from appellant (pp. 16-17, ibid). Suspecting that appellant could also be carrying
a rifle inside the vehicle since he had a magazine, SPO2 Mercado prevented
appellant from going back to his vehicle by opening himself the door of
appellant's vehicle (16-17, ibid). He saw a baby armalite rifle (Exhibit D) lying
horizontally at the front by the driver's seat. It had a long magazine filled with
live bullets in a semi-automatic mode (pp. 17-21, ibid). He asked appellant for
the papers covering the rifle and appellant answered angrily that they were at
his home (pp. 26-27, ibid). SPO Mercado modified the arrest of appellant by
including as its ground illegal possession of firearms (p. 28, ibid). SPO
Mercado then read to appellant his constitutional rights (pp. 28-29, ibid).
"The police officers brought appellant to the Traffic Division at Jake Gonzales
Boulevard (pp. 31-32, ibid) where appellant voluntarily surrendered a third
firearm, a pietro berreta pistol (Exhibit 'L') with a single round in its chamber
and a magazine (pp. 33-35, ibid) loaded with seven (7) other live
bullets. Appellant also voluntarily surrendered a black bag containing two
additional long magazines and one short magazine (Exhibits M, N, and O, pp.
36-37, ibid). After appellant had been interrogated by the Chief of the Traffic
Division, he was transferred to the Police Investigation Division at Sto. Rosario
Street beside the City Hall Building where he and the firearms and ammunitions
were turned over to SPO2 Rene Jesus Gregorio (pp. 5-10, TSN, July 13,
1993). During the investigation, appellant admitted possession of the
firearms stating that he used them for shooting (p. 14, ibid). He was not able to
produce any permit to carry or memorandum receipt to cover the three firearms
(pp. 16-18, TSN, January 25, 1994).
"On November 28, 1992, a certification (Exhibit 'F') was issued by Captain,
Senior Inspector Mario Espino, PNP, Chief, Record Branch of the Firearms and
Explosives Office (pp. 7-8, TSN, March 4, 1993). The Certification stated that
the three firearms confiscated from appellant, an M-16 Baby armalite rifle SN-
RP 131280, a .357 caliber revolver Smith and Wesson SN 32919 and a .380
Pietro Beretta SN-A35720, were not registered in the name of Robin C. Padilla
(p. 6, ibid). A second Certification dated December 11, 1992 issued by Captain
Espino stated that the three firearms were not also registered in the name of
Robinhood C. Padilla (p. 10, ibid)."
Petitioner's defenses are as follows: (1) that his arrest was illegal and consequently,
the firearms and ammunitions taken in the course thereof are inadmissible in evidence
under the exclusionary rule; (2) that he is a confidential agent authorized, under a Mission
Order and Memorandum Receipt, to carry the subject firearms; and (3) that the penalty for
simple illegal possession constitutes excessive and cruel punishment proscribed by the
1987 Constitution.
After a careful review of the records
[27]
of this case, the Court is convinced that
petitioner's guilt of the crime charged stands on terra firma, notwithstanding the Solicitor-
General's change of heart.
Anent the first defense, petitioner questions the legality of his arrest. There is no
dispute that no warrant was issued for the arrest of petitioner, but that per se did not make
his apprehension at the Abacan bridge illegal.
Warrantless arrests are sanctioned in the following instances:
[28]

"Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested
has committed it.
Page 67 of 96 |

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from
a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.
Paragraph (a) requires that the person be arrested (i) after he has committed or while he is
actually committing or is at least attempting to commit an offense, (ii) in the presence of
the arresting officer or private person.
[29]
Both elements concurred here, as it has been
established that petitioner's vehicle figured in a hit and run - an offense committed in the
"presence" of Manarang, a private person, who then sought to arrest petitioner. It must be
stressed at this point that "presence" does not only require that the arresting person sees the
offense, but also when he "hears the disturbance created thereby AND proceeds at once to
the scene."
[30]
As testified to by Manarang, he heard the screeching of tires followed by a
thud, saw the sideswiped victim (balut vendor), reported the incident to the police and
thereafter gave chase to the erring Pajero vehicle using his motorcycle in order to
apprehend its driver. After having sent a radio report to the PNP for assistance, Manarang
proceeded to the Abacan bridge where he found responding policemen SPO2 Borja and
SPO2 Miranda already positioned near the bridge who effected the actual arrest of
petitioner.
[31]

Petitioner would nonetheless insist on the illegality of his arrest by arguing that the
policemen who actually arrested him were not at the scene of the hit and run.
[32]
We beg to
disagree. That Manarang decided to seek the aid of the policemen (who admittedly were
nowhere in the vicinity of the hit and run) in effecting petitioner's arrest, did not in any way
affect the propriety of the apprehension. It was in fact the most prudent action Manarang
could have taken rather than collaring petitioner by himself, inasmuch as policemen are
unquestionably better trained and well-equipped in effecting an arrest of a suspect (like
herein petitioner) who , in all probability, could have put up a degree of resistance which
an untrained civilian may not be able to contain without endangering his own
life. Moreover, it is a reality that curbing lawlessness gains more success when law
enforcers function in collaboration with private citizens. It is precisely through this
cooperation, that the offense herein involved fortunately did not become an additional entry
to the long list of unreported and unsolved crimes.
It is appropriate to state at this juncture that a suspect, like petitioner herein, cannot
defeat the arrest which has been set in motion in a public place for want of a warrant as the
police was confronted by an urgent need to render aid or take action.
[33]
The exigent
circumstances of - hot pursuit,
[34]
a fleeing suspect, a moving vehicle, the public place and
the raining nighttime - all created a situation in which speed is essential and delay
improvident.
[35]
The Court acknowledges police authority to make the forcible stop since
they had more than mere "reasonable and articulable" suspicion that the occupant of the
vehicle has been engaged in criminal activity.
[36]
Moreover, when caught in flagrante
delicto with possession of an unlicensed firearm (Smith & Wesson) and ammunition (M-16
magazine), petitioner's warrantless arrest was proper as he was again actually committing
another offense (illegal possession of firearm and ammunitions) and this time in the
presence of a peace officer.
[37]

Besides, the policemen's warrantless arrest of petitioner could likewise be justified
under paragraph (b) as he had in fact just committed an offense. There was no supervening
event or a considerable lapse of time between the hit and run and the actual
apprehension. Moreover, after having stationed themselves at the Abacan bridge in
response to Manarang's report, the policemen saw for themselves the fast approaching
Pajero of petitioner,
[38]
its dangling plate number (PMA 777 as reported by Manarang), and
the dented hood and railings thereof.
[39]
These formed part of the arresting police officer's
personal knowledge of the facts indicating that petitioner's Pajero was indeed the vehicle
involved in the hit and run incident. Verily then, the arresting police officers acted upon
verified personal knowledge and not on unreliable hearsay information.
[40]

Furthermore, in accordance with settled jurisprudence, any objection, defect or
irregularity attending an arrest must be made before the accused enters his
plea.
[41]
Petitioner's belated challenge thereto aside from his failure to quash the
information, his participation in the trial and by presenting his evidence, placed him
in estoppel to assail the legality of his arrest.
[42]
Likewise, by applying for bail, petitioner
patently waived such irregularities and defects.
[43]

We now go to the firearms and ammunitions seized from petitioner without a search
warrant, the admissibility in evidence of which, we uphold.
The five (5) well-settled instances when a warrantless search and seizure of property
is valid,
[44]
are as follows:
1. warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under
Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court
[45]
and by prevailing
jurisprudence
[46]
,
2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view", the elements of which are:
[47]

(a). a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless
arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of
their official duties;
(b). the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the
police who had the right to be where they are;
(c). the evidence must be immediately apparent, and
(d). "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without
further search.
[48]

3. search of a moving vehicle.
[49]
Highly regulated by the government,
the vehicle's inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially
Page 68 of 96 |

when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable
suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a
criminal activity.
[50]

4. consented warrantless search, and
5. customs search.
In conformity with respondent court's observation, it indeed appears that the
authorities stumbled upon petitioner's firearms and ammunitions without even undertaking
any active search which, as it is commonly understood, is a prying into hidden places for
that which is concealed.
[51]
The seizure of the Smith & Wesson revolver and an M-16 rifle
magazine was justified for they came within "plain view" of the policemen
who inadvertently discovered the revolver and magazine tucked in petitioner's waist and
back pocket respectively, when he raised his hands after alighting from his Pajero. The
same justification applies to the confiscation of the M-16 armalite rifle which
was immediately apparent to the policemen as they took a casual glance at the Pajero and
saw said rifle lying horizontally near the driver's seat.
[52]
Thus it has been held that:
"(W)hen in pursuing an illegal action or in the commission of a criminal offense,
the . . . police officers should happen to discover a criminal offense being
committed by any person, they are not precluded from performing their duties as
police officers for the apprehension of the guilty person and the taking of
the corpus delicti."
[53]

"Objects whose possession are prohibited by law inadvertently found in plain
view are subject to seizure even without a warrant."
[54]

With respect to the Berreta pistol and a black bag containing assorted magazines, petitioner
voluntarily surrendered them to the police.
[55]
This latter gesture of petitioner indicated a
waiver of his right against the alleged search and seizure
[56]
, and that his failure to quash
the information estopped him from assailing any purported defect.
[57]

Even assuming that the firearms and ammunitions were products of an active search
done by the authorities on the person and vehicle of petitioner, their seizure without a
search warrant nonetheless can still be justified under a search incidental to a lawful arrest
(first instance). Once the lawful arrest was effected, the police may undertake a protective
search
[58]
of the passenger compartment and containers in the vehicle
[59]
which are within
petitioner's grabbing distance regardless of the nature of the offense.
[60]
This satisfied the
two-tiered test of an incidental search: (i) the item to be searched (vehicle) was within the
arrestee's custody or area of immediate control
[61]
and (ii) the search was contemporaneous
with the arrest.
[62]
The products of that search are admissible evidence not excluded by the
exclusionary rule. Another justification is a search of a moving vehicle (third instance). In
connection therewith, a warrantless search is constitutionally permissible when, as in this
case, the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe,
before the search, that either the motorist is a law-offender (like herein petitioner with
respect to the hit and run) or the contents or cargo of the vehicle are or have been
instruments or the subject matter or the proceeds of some criminal offense.
[63]

Anent his second defense, petitioner contends that he could not be convicted of
violating P.D. 1866 because he is an appointed civilian agent authorized to possess and
carry the subject firearms and ammunition as evidenced by a Mission Order
[64]
and
Memorandum Receipt duly issued by PNP Supt. Rodialo Gumtang, the deputy commander
of Task Force Aguila, Lianga, Surigao del Sur. The contention lacks merit.
In crimes involving illegal possession of firearm, two requisites must be
established, viz.: (1) the existence of the subject firearm and, (2) the fact that the accused
who owned or possessed the firearm does not have the corresponding license or permit to
possess.
[65]
The first element is beyond dispute as the subject firearms and
ammunitions
[66]
were seized from petitioner's possession via a valid warrantless search,
identified and offered in evidence during trial. As to the second element, the same was
convincingly proven by the prosecution. Indeed, petitioner's purported Mission Order and
Memorandum Receipt are inferior in the face of the more formidable evidence for the
prosecution as our meticulous review of the records reveals that the Mission Order and
Memorandum Receipt were mere afterthoughts contrived and issued under suspicious
circumstances. On this score, we lift from respondent court's incisive observation. Thus:
"Appellant's contention is predicated on the assumption that the Memorandum
Receipts and Mission Order were issued before the subject firearms were seized
and confiscated from him by the police officers in Angeles City. That is not
so. The evidence adduced indicate that the Memorandum Receipts and Mission
Order were prepared and executed long after appellant had been apprehended on
October 26, 1992.
"Appellant, when apprehended, could not show any document as proof of his
authority to possess and carry the subject firearms. During the preliminary
investigation of the charge against him for illegal possession of firearms and
ammunitions he could not, despite the ample time given him, present any proper
document showing his authority. If he had, in actuality, the Memorandum
Receipts and Missions Order, he could have produced those documents easily, if
not at the time of apprehension, at least during the preliminary
investigation. But neither appellant nor his counsel inform the prosecutor that
appellant is authorized to possess and carry the subject firearms under
Memorandum Receipt and Mission Order. At the initial presentation of his
evidence in court, appellant could have produced these documents to belie the
charged against him. Appellant did not. He did not even take the witness stand
to explain his possession of the subject firearms.
Page 69 of 96 |

"Even in appellant's Demurrer to Evidence filed after the prosecution rested
contain no allegation of a Memorandum Receipts and Mission Order authorizing
appellant to possess and carry the subject firearms.
"At the initial presentation of appellant's evidence, the witness cited was one
James Neneng to whom a subpoena was issued. Superintendent Gumtang was
not even mentioned. James Neneng appeared in court but was not presented by
the defense. Subsequent hearings were reset until the defense found
Superintendent Gumtang who appeared in court without subpoena on January
13, 1994."
[67]

The Court is baffled why petitioner failed to produce and present the Mission Order
and Memorandum Receipt if they were really issued and existing before his
apprehension. Petitioner's alternative excuses that the subject firearms were intended for
theatrical purposes, or that they were owned by the Presidential Security Group, or that his
Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt were left at home, further compound their
irregularity. As to be reasonably expected, an accused claiming innocence, like herein
petitioner, would grab the earliest opportunity to present the Mission Order and
Memorandum Receipt in question and save himself from the long and agonizing public
trial and spare him from proffering inconsistent excuses. In fact, the Mission Order itself,
as well as the Letter-Directive of the AFP Chief of Staff, is explicit in providing that:
"VIII. c. When a Mission Order is requested for verification by
enforcement units/personnels such as PNP, Military Brigade and other
Military Police Units of AFP, the Mission Order should be shown without
resentment to avoid embarrassment and/or misunderstanding.
"IX. d. Implicit to this Mission Order is the injunction that the confidential
instruction will be carried out through all legal means and do not cover an
actuation in violation of laws. In the latter event, this Mission Order is
rendered inoperative in respect to such violation."
[68]

which directive petitioner failed to heed without cogent explanation.
The authenticity and validity of the Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt,
moreover, were ably controverted. Witness for the prosecution Police Supt. Durendes
denied under oath his signature on the dorsal side of the Mission Order and declared further
that he did not authorize anyone to sign in his behalf.
[69]
His surname thereon, we note, was
glaringly misspelled as "Durembes."
[70]
In addition, only Unit Commanders and Chief of
Offices have the authority to issue Mission Orders and Memorandum Receipts under
the Guidelines on the Issuance of MOs, MRs, & PCFORs.
[71]
PNP Supt. Rodialo Gumtang
who issued petitioner's Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt is neither a Unit
Commander nor the Chief of Office, but a mere deputy commander. Having emanated
from an unauthorized source, petitioner's Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt are
infirm and lacking in force and effect. Besides, the Mission Order covers "Recom 1-12-
Baguio City,"
[72]
areas outside Supt. Gumtang's area of responsibility thereby needing prior
approval "by next higher Headquarters"
[73]
which is absent in this case. The Memorandum
Receipt is also unsupported by a certification as required by the March 5, 1988
Memorandum of the Secretary of Defense which pertinently provides that:
"No memorandum receipt shall be issued for a CCS firearms without
corresponding certification from the corresponding Responsible Supply
Officer of the appropriate AFP unit that such firearm has been officially
taken up in that units property book, and that report of such action has been
reported to higher AFP authority."
Had petitioner's Memorandum Receipt been authentic, we see no reason why he cannot
present the corresponding certification as well.
What is even more peculiar is that petitioner's name, as certified to by the Director for
Personnel of the PNP, does not even appear in the Plantilla of Non-Uniform Personnel or
in the list of Civilian Agents or Employees of the PNP which could justify the issuance of a
Mission Order, a fact admitted by petitioner's counsel.
[74]
The implementing rules of P.D.
1866 issued by the then PC-INP Chief and Director-General Lt. Gen. Fidel V. Ramos are
clear and unambiguous, thus:
"No Mission Order shall be issued to any civilian agent authorizing the
same to carry firearms outside residence unless he/she is included in the
regular plantilla of the government agency involved in law enforcement
and is receiving regular compensation for the services he/she is rendering in
the agency. Further, the civilian agent must be included in a specific law
enforcement/police/intelligence project proposal or special project which
specifically required the use of firearms(s) to insure its accomplishment and that
the project is duly approved at the PC Regional Command level or its equivalent
level in other major services of the AFP, INP and NBI, or at higher levels of
command."
[75]

Circular No. 1, dated January 6, 1986, of the then Ministry of Justice likewise provides as
follows:
"If mission orders are issued to civilians (not members of the uniformed
service), they must be civilian agents included in the regular plantilla of the
government agency involved in law enforcement and are receiving regular
compensation for the service they are rendering."
That petitioner's Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt were fabricated pieces of
evidence is accentuated all the more by the testimony and certification of the Chief of the
Records Branch of the firearms and Explosives Office of the PNP declaring that
petitioner's confiscated firearms are not licensed or registered in the name of the
petitioner.
[76]
Thus:
Page 70 of 96 |

"Q. In all these files that you have just mentioned Mr. Witness, what did you
find, if any?
"A. I found that a certain Robin C. Padilla is a licensed registered owner of
one 9 mm pistol, Smith and Wesson with Serial No. TCT 8214 and the
following firearms being asked whether it is registered or not, I did not
find any records, the M-16 and the caliber .357 and the caliber .380
but there is a firearm with the same serial number which is the same
as that licensed and/or registered in the name of one Albert Villanueva
Fallorina.
"Q. So in short, the only licensed firearms in the name of accused Robin C.
Padilla is a pistol, Smith and Wesson, caliber 9 mm with Serial No.
TCT 8214?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. And the firearms that were the subject of this case are not listed in the
names of the accused in this case?
"A. Yes, sir.
[77]

xxx xxx
xxx
And the certification which provides as follows:
Department of the Interior and Local Government
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
POLICE
FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES OFFICE
Camp Crame, Quezon City
"PNPFEO5 28 November 1992
"C E R T I F I C A T I O N
"TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
"THIS IS TO CERTIFY that Robin C. Padilla of 59 Labo St., Quezon City is a
licensed/registered holder of Pistol Smith and Wesson Cal 9mm with serial number
TCT8214 covered by License No. RL M76C4476687.
"Further certify that the following firearms are not registered with this Office per
verification from available records on file this Office as of this date:
M16 Baby Armalite SN-RP131120
Revolver Cal 357 SN-3219
Pistol Cal 380 Pietro Beretta SN-35723
"However, we have on file one Pistol Cal 380, Beretta with serial number 35723Y,
licensed/registered to one Albert Villanueva Fallorina of 29 San Juan St., Capitol Pasig,
MM under Re-Registered License.
"This certification is issued pursuant to Subpoena from City of Angeles.
"FOR THE CHIEF, FEO:
(Sgd.)
JOSE
MARIO M. ESPINO
Sr. Inspector,
PNP
Chief, Records
Branch"
[78]

In several occasions, the Court has ruled that either the testimony of a representative
of, or a certification from, the PNP Firearms and Explosives Office (FEO) attesting that a
person is not a licensee of any firearm would suffice to prove beyond reasonable doubt the
second element of illegal possession of firearm.
[79]
In People vs. Tobias,
[80]
we reiterated
that such certification is sufficient to show that a person has in fact no license. From the
foregoing discussion, the fact that petitioner does not have the license or permit to possess
was overwhelmingly proven by the prosecution. The certification may even be dispensed
with in the light of the evidence
[81]
that an M-16 rifle and any short firearm higher than a
.38 caliber pistol, akin to the confiscated firearms, cannot be licensed to a civilian,
[82]
as in
the case of petitioner. The Court, therefore, entertains no doubt in affirming petitioner's
conviction especially as we find no plausible reason, and none was presented, to depart
from the factual findings of both the trial court and respondent court which, as a rule, are
accorded by the Court with respect and finality.
[83]

Anent his third defense, petitioner faults respondent court "in applying P.D. 1866 in
a democratic ambience (sic) and a non-subversive context" and adds that respondent court
should have applied instead the previous laws on illegal possession of firearms since the
reason for the penalty imposed under P.D. 1866 no longer exists.
[84]
He stresses that the
Page 71 of 96 |

penalty of 17 years and 4 months to 21 years for simple illegal possession of firearm is
cruel and excessive in contravention of the Constitution.
[85]

The contentions do not merit serious consideration. The trial court and the respondent
court are bound to apply the governing law at the time of appellant's commission of the
offense for it is a rule that laws are repealed only by subsequent ones.
[86]
Indeed, it is the
duty of judicial officers to respect and apply the law as it stands.
[87]
And until its repeal,
respondent court can not be faulted for applying P.D. 1866 which abrogated the previous
statutes adverted to by petitioner.
Equally lacking in merit is appellant's allegation that the penalty for simple illegal
possession is unconstitutional. The penalty for simple possession of firearm, it should be
stressed, ranges from reclusion temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua contrary to
appellant's erroneous averment. The severity of a penalty does not ipso facto make the
same cruel and excessive.
"It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe for a penalty
to be obnoxious to the Constitution. 'The fact that the punishment authorized by the statute
is severe does not make it cruel and unusual.' (24 C.J.S., 1187-1188). Expressed in other
terms, it has been held that to come under the ban, the punishment must be 'flagrantly and
plainly oppressive', 'wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the
moral sense of the community' "
[88]

It is well-settled that as far as the constitutional prohibition goes, it is not so much the
extent as the nature of the punishment that determines whether it is, or is not, cruel and
unusual and that sentences of imprisonment, though perceived to be harsh, are not cruel or
unusual if within statutory limits.
[89]

Moreover, every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. The burden
of proving the invalidity of the statute in question lies with the appellant which burden, we
note, was not convincingly discharged. To justify nullification of the law, there must be a
clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative
implication,
[90]
as in this case. In fact, the constitutionality of P.D. 1866 has been upheld
twice by this Court.
[91]
Just recently, the Court declared that "the pertinent laws on
illegal possession of firearms [are not] contrary to any provision of the Constitution. .
."
[92]
Appellant's grievance on the wisdom of the prescribed penalty should not be
addressed to us. Courts are not concerned with the wisdom, efficacy or morality of
laws. That question falls exclusively within the province of Congress which enacts them
and the Chief Executive who approves or vetoes them. The only function of the courts, we
reiterate, is to interpret and apply the laws.
With respect to the penalty imposed by the trial court as affirmed by respondent court
(17 years 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to 21 years of reclusion
perpetua, as maximum), we reduce the same in line with the fairly recent case of People v.
Lian
[93]
where the Court en banc provided that the indeterminate penalty imposable for
simple illegal possession of firearm, without any mitigating or aggravating circumstance,
should be within the range of ten (10) years and one (1) day to twelve years (12) of prision
mayor, as minimum, to eighteen (18) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to twenty
(20) of reclusion temporal, as maximum. This is discernible from the following
explanation by the Court:
"In the case at bar, no mitigating or aggravating circumstances have been alleged or
proved, In accordance with the doctrine regarding special laws explained in People v.
Simon,
[94]
although Presidential Decree No. 1866 is a special law, the penalties therein were
taken from the Revised Penal Code, hence the rules in said Code for graduating by degrees
or determining the proper period should be applied. Consequently, the penalty for the
offense of simple illegal possession of firearm is the medium period of the complex penalty
in said Section 1, that is, 18 years, 8 months and 1 day to 20 years.
"This penalty, being that which is to be actually imposed in accordance with the rules
therefor and not merely imposable as a general prescription under the law, shall be the
maximum of the range of the indeterminate sentence. The minimum thereof shall be taken,
as aforesaid, from any period of the penalty next lower in degree, which is, prision
mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its medium period.
[95]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals
sustaining petitioner's conviction by the lower court of the crime of simple illegal
possession of firearms and ammunitions is AFFIRMED EXCEPT that petitioner's
indeterminate penalty is MODIFIED to ten (10) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to
eighteen (18) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day, as maximum.
SO ORDERED
Narvasa, C.J. (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Melo, and Panganiban, concur.

Page 72 of 96 |

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 96177 January 27, 1993
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARI MUSA y HANTATALU, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Pablo L. Murillo for accused-appellant.

ROMERO, J .:
The appellant, Mari Musa, seeks, in this appeal, the reversal of the decision, dated August
31, 1990,
1
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Zamboanga City, Branch XII, finding him
guilty of selling marijuana in violation of Article II, Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
The information filed on December 15, 1989 against the appellant reads:
That on or about December 14, 1989, in the City of Zamboanga,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, not being authorized by law, did then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell to one SGT. AMADO ANI, two
(2) wrappers containing dried marijuana leaves, knowing the same to be
a prohibited drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
2

Upon his arraignment on January 11, 1990, the appellant pleaded not guilty.
3

At the trial, the prosecution presented three (3) witnesses, namely: (1) Sgt. Amado Ani, Jr.
of the 9th Narcotics Command (NARCOM) of Zamboanga City, who acted as poseur-
buyer in the buy-bust operation made against the appellant; (2) T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga, also
of the 9th Narcotics Command of Zamboanga City, who was the NARCOM team leader of
the buy-bust operation; and (3) Athena Elisa P. Anderson, the Document Examiner and
Forensic Chemist of PC-INP Crime Laboratory of Regional Command (RECOM) 9. The
evidence of the prosecution was summarized by the trial court as follows:
Prosecution evidence shows that in the morning of December 13, 1989,
T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga, leader of a NARCOTICS COMMAND
(NARCOM) team based at Calarian, Zamboanga City, instructed Sgt.
Amado Ani to conduct surveillance and test buy on a certain Mari Musa
of Suterville, Zamboanga City. Information received from civilian
informer was that this Mari Musa was engaged in selling marijuana in
said place. So Sgt. Amado Ani, another NARCOM agent, proceeded to
Suterville, in company with a NARCOM civilian informer, to the house
of Mari Musa to which house the civilian informer had guided him. The
same civilian informer had also described to him the appearance of Mari
Musa. Amado Ani was able to buy one newspaper-wrapped dried
marijuana (Exh. "E") for P10.00. Sgt. Ani returned to the NARCOM
office and turned over the newspaper-wrapped marijuana to T/Sgt. Jesus
Belarga. Sgt. Belarga inspected the stuff turned over to him and found it
to be marijuana.
The next day, December 14, 1989, about 1:30 P.M., a buy-bust was
planned. Sgt. Amado Ani was assigned as the poseur buyer for which
purpose he was given P20.00 (with SN GA955883) by Belarga. The
buy-bust money had been taken by T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga from M/Sgt.
Noh Sali Mihasun, Chief of Investigation Section, and for which Belarga
signed a receipt (Exh. "L" & "L-l" ) The team under Sgt. Foncargas was
assigned as back-up security. A pre-arranged signal was arranged
consisting of Sgt. Ani's raising his right hand, after he had succeeded to
buy the marijuana. The two NARCOM teams proceeded to the target site
in two civilian vehicles. Belarga's team was composed of Sgt. Belarga,
team leader, Sgt. Amado Ani, poseur buyer, Sgt. Lego and Sgt. Biong.
Arriving at the target site, Sgt. Ani proceeded to the house of Mari Musa,
while the rest of the NARCOM group positioned themselves at strategic
places about 90 to 100 meters from Mari Musa's house. T/Sgt. Belarga
could see what went on between Ani and suspect Mari Musa from where
he was. Ani approached Mari Musa, who came out of his house, and
asked Ani what he wanted. Ani said he wanted some more stuff. Ani
Page 73 of 96 |

gave Mari Musa the P20.00 marked money. After receiving the money,
Mari Musa went back to his house and came back and gave Amado Ani
two newspaper wrappers containing dried marijuana. Ani opened the two
wrappers and inspected the contents. Convinced that the contents were
marijuana, Ani walked back towards his companions and raised his right
hand. The two NARCOM teams, riding the two civilian vehicles, sped
towards Sgt. Ani. Ani joined Belarga's team and returned to the house.
At the time Sgt. Ani first approached Mari Musa, there were four persons
inside his house: Mari Musa, another boy, and two women, one of whom
Ani and Belarga later came to know to be Mari Musa's wife. The second
time, Ani with the NARCOM team returned to Mari Musa's house, the
woman, who was later known as Mari Musa's wife, slipped away from
the house. Sgt. Belarga frisked Mari Musa but could not find the P20.00
marked money with him. Mari Musa was then asked where the P20.00
was and he told the NARCOM team he has given the money to his wife
(who had slipped away). Sgt. Belarga also found a plastic bag containing
dried marijuana inside it somewhere in the kitchen. Mari Musa was then
placed under arrest and brought to the NARCOM office. At Suterville,
Sgt. Ani turned over to Sgt. Belarga the two newspaper-wrapped
marijuana he had earlier bought from Mari Musa (Exhs. "C" & "D").
In the NARCOM office, Mari Musa first gave his name as Hussin Musa.
Later on, Mari Musa gave his true name Mari Musa. T/Sgt. Jesus
Belarga turned over the two newspaper-wrapped marijuana (bought at
the buy-bust), the one newspaper-wrapped marijuana (bought at the test-
buy) and the plastic bag containing more marijuana (which had been
taken by Sgt. Lego inside the kitchen of Mari Musa) to the PC Crime
Laboratory, Zamboanga City, for laboratory examination. The turnover
of the marijuana specimen to the PC Crime Laboratory was by way of a
letter-request, dated December 14, 1989 (Exh. "B"), which was stamped
"RECEIVED" by the PC Crime Laboratory (Exh. "B-1") on the same
day.
Mrs. Athena Elisa P. Anderson, the Forensic Chemist of the PC Crime
Laboratory, examined the marijuana specimens subjecting the same to
her three tests. All submitted specimens she examined gave positive
results for the presence of marijuana. Mrs. Anderson reported the results
of her examination in her Chemistry Report D-100-89, dated December
14, 1989, (Exh. "J", "J-1", "J-2", "J-3", "J-4" and "J-5"). Mrs. Anderson
identified in court the two newspaper wrapped marijuana bought at the
buy-bust on December 14, 1989, through her initial and the weight of
each specimen written with red ink on each wrapper (Exhs. "C-1" and
"D-1"). She also identified the one newspaper-wrapped marijuana bought
at the test-buy on December 13, 1989, through her markings (Exh. "E-
1"). Mrs. Anderson also identified her Chemistry Report (Exh. "J" &
sub-markings.)
T. Sgt. Belarga identified the two buy-bust newspaper wrapped
marijuana through his initial, the words "buy-bust" and the words
"December 14, 1989, 2:45 P.M." (written on Exhs. "C" and "D"). Belarga
also identified the receipt of the P20 marked money (with SN
GA955883) (Exh. "L"), dated December 14, 1989, and his signature
thereon (Exh.
"L-1"). He also identified the letter-request, dated December 14, 1989,
addressed to the PC Crime Laboratory (Exh. "B") and his signature
thereon (Exh. "B-2") and the stamp of the PC Crime Laboratory marked
"RECEIVED" (Exh. "B-1").
4

For the defense, the following testified as witnesses: (1) the accused-appellant Mari H.
Musa; and (2) Ahara R. Musa, his wife. The trial court summarized the version of the
defense, thus:
[O]n December 14, 1989, at about 1:30 in the afternoon, Mari Musa was
in his house at Suterville, Zamboanga City. With him were his wife,
Ahara Musa, known as Ara, his one-year old child, a woman manicurist,
and a male cousin named Abdul Musa. About 1:30 that afternoon, while
he was being manicured at one hand, his wife was inside the one room of
their house, putting their child to sleep. Three NARCOM agents, who
introduced themselves as NARCOM agents, dressed in civilian clothes,
got inside Mari Musa's house whose door was open. The NARCOM
agents did not ask permission to enter the house but simply announced
that they were NARCOM agents. The NARCOM agents searched Mari
Musa's house and Mari Musa asked them if they had a search warrant.
The NARCOM agents were just silent. The NARCOM agents found a
red plastic bag whose contents, Mari Musa said, he did not know. He also
did not know if the plastic bag belonged to his brother, Faisal, who was
living with him, or his father, who was living in another house about ten
arms-length away. Mari Musa, then, was handcuffed and when Mari
Musa asked why, the NARCOM agents told him for clarification.
Mari Musa was brought in a pick-up, his wife joining him to the
NARCOM Office at Calarian, Zamboanga City. Inside the NARCOM
Office, Mari Musa was investigated by one NARCOM agent which
Page 74 of 96 |

investigation was reduced into writing. The writing or document was
interpreted to Mari Musa in Tagalog. The document stated that the
marijuana belonged to Mari Musa and Mari Musa was asked to sign it.
But Mari Musa refused to sign because the marijuana did not belong to
him. Mari Musa said he was not told that he was entitled to the assistance
of counsel, although he himself told the NARCOM agents he wanted to
be assisted by counsel.
Mari Musa said four bullets were then placed between the fingers of his
right hand and his fingers were pressed which felt very painful. The
NARCOM agents boxed him and Mari Musa lost consciousness. While
Mari Musa was maltreated, he said his wife was outside the NARCOM
building. The very day he was arrested (on cross-examination Mari Musa
said it was on the next day), Mari Musa was brought to the Fiscal's
Office by three NARCOM agents. The fiscal asked him if the marijuana
was owned by him and he said "not." After that single question, Mari
Musa was brought to the City Jail. Mari Musa said he did not tell the
fiscal that he had been maltreated by the NARCOM agents because he
was afraid he might be maltreated in the fiscal's office.
Mari Musa denied the NARCOM agents' charge that he had sold two
wrappers of marijuana to them; that he had received from them a P20.00
bill which he had given to his wife. He did not sell marijuana because he
was afraid that was against the law and that the person selling marijuana
was caught by the authorities; and he had a wife and a very small child to
support. Mari Musa said he had not been arrested for selling marijuana
before.
5

After trial, the trial court rendered the assailed decision with the following disposition:
WHEREFORE, finding accused Mari Musa y Hantatalu guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of selling marijuana and pursuant to Sec. 4, Art II of
Rep. Act No. 6425, he is sentenced to life imprisonment and to pay the
fine of P20,000.00, the latter imposed without subsidiary imprisonment.
6

In this appeal, the appellant contends that his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt
and impugns the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.
The appellant claims that the testimony of Sgt. Ani, the poseur-buyer, is not credible
because: (1) prior to the buy-bust operation, neither Sgt. Ani nor the other NARCOM
agents were personally known by the appellant or vice-versa; and (2) there was no witness
to the alleged giving of the two wrappers of marijuana by the appellant to Sgt. Ani.
Sgt. Ani testified that on December 13, 1989, upon instruction by T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga, he
conducted a test-buy operation on the appellant whereby he bought one wrapper of
marijuana for P15.00 from the latter.
7
He reported the successful operation to T/Sgt.
Belarga on the same day.
8
Whereupon, T/Sgt. Belarga conducted a conference to organize
a buy-bust operation for the following day.
9

On December 14, 1989, at 1:30 p.m., two NARCOM teams in separate vehicles headed by
T/Sgt. Belarga and a certain Sgt. Foncardas went to the place of operation, which was the
appellant's house located in Laquian Compound, Suterville, Zamboanga City. Sgt. Ani was
with the team of T/Sgt. Belarga, whose other members were Sgts. Lego and Biong.
10
Sgt.
Ani was given a marked P20.00 bill by T/Sgt. Belarga, which was to be used in the
operation.
Upon reaching the place, the NARCOM agents positioned themselves at strategic
places.
11
Sgt. Ani approached the house. Outside the house, the appellant asked Sgt. Ani
what he wanted. Sgt. Ani asked him for some more marijuana.
12
Sgt. Ani gave him the
marked P20.00 bill and the appellant went inside the house and brought back two paper
wrappers containing marijuana which he handed to Sgt. Ani.
13
From his position, Sgt. Ani
could see that there were other people in the house.
14

After the exchange, Sgt. Ani approached the other NARCOM agents and made the pre-
arranged signal of raising his right hand.
15
The NARCOM agents, accompanied by Sgt.
Ani, went inside the house and made the arrest. The agents searched the appellant and
unable to find the marked money, they asked him where it was. The appellant said that he
gave it to his wife.
16

The Court, after a careful reading of the record, finds the testimony of Sgt. Ani regarding
the buy-bust operation, which resulted in the apprehension, prosecution and subsequent
conviction of the appellant, to be direct, lucid and forthright. Being totally untainted by
contradictions in any of the material points, it deserves credence.
The contention that the appellant could not have transacted with Sgt. Ani because they do
not know each other is without merit. The day before the
buy-bust operation, Sgt. Ani conducted a test-buy and he successfully bought a wrapper of
marijuana from the appellant. Through this previous transaction, Sgt. Ani was able to gain
the appellant's confidence for the latter to sell more marijuana to Sgt. Ani the following
day, during the buy-bust operation. Moreover, the Court has held that what matters is not
an existing familiarity between the buyer and the seller, for quite often, the parties to the
transaction may be strangers, but their agreement and the acts constituting the sale and
delivery of the marijuana.
17

Page 75 of 96 |

The appellant, again to cast doubt on the credibility of Sgt. Ani, argues that it was
impossible for the appellant to sell marijuana while his wife, cousin and manicurist were
present. But the place of the commission of the crime of selling prohibited drugs has been
held to be not crucial
18
and the presence of other people apart from the buyer and seller
will not necessarily prevent the consummation of the illegal sale. As the Court observed
in People v. Paco,
19
these factors may sometimes camouflage the commission of the crime.
In the instant case, the fact that the other people inside the appellant's house are known to
the appellant may have given him some assurance that these people will not report him to
the authorities.
The appellant, besides assailing Sgt. Ani's credibility, also questions the credibility of
T/Sgt. Belarga. The appellant submits that since T/Sgt. Belarga admitted that he was about
90 meters away from Sgt. Ani and the appellant, he could not have possibly witnessed the
sale. The appellant invokes People v.
Ale
20
where the Court observed that from a distance of 10-15 meters, a policeman cannot
distinguish between marijuana cigarette from ordinary ones by the type of rolling done on
the cigarette sticks. And since T/Sgt. Belarga allegedly did not see the sale, the appellant
contends that the uncorroborated testimony of Sgt. Ani can not stand as basis for his
conviction.
People v. Ale does not apply here because the policeman in that case testified that he and
his companion were certain that the appellant therein handed marijuana cigarettes to the
poseur-buyer based on the appearance of the cigarette sticks. The Court rejected this claim,
stating that:
This Court cannot give full credit to the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses marked as they are with contradictions and tainted with
inaccuracies.
Bian testified that they were able to tell that the four cigarettes were
marijuana cigarettes because according to him, the rolling of ordinary
cigarettes are different from those of marijuana cigarettes. (tsn,
November 13, 1984, p. 10).
It is however, incredible to believe that they could discern the type of
rolling done on those cigarettes from the distance where they were
observing the alleged sale of more or less 10 to 15 meters.
21

In the case at bar, however, T/Sgt. Belarga did not positively claim that he saw the
appellant hand over marijuana to Sgt. Ani. What he said was that there was an exchange of
certain articles between the two. The relevant portion of T/Sgt. Belarga's testimony
reads:
22

Q Now, do you remember whether Sgt. Ani was able to
reach the house of Mari Musa?
A Yes, ma'am.
Q After reaching Mari Musa, did you see what
happened (sic)?
A Yes, ma'am.
Q Could you please tell us?
A From our vehicle the stainless owner type jeep
where Sgt. Lego, Sgt. Biong were boarded, I saw that
Sgt. Ani proceeded to the house near the road and he
was met by one person and later known as Mari Musa
who was at the time wearing short pants and later on I
saw that Sgt. Ani handed something to him, thereafter
received by Mari Musa and went inside the house and
came back later and handed something to Sgt. Ani.
Contrary to the contention of the appellant, it was not impossible for T/Sgt. Belarga to have
seen, from a distance of 90-100 meters, Sgt. Ani hand to the appellant "something" and for
the latter to give to the former "something."
Notwithstanding the fact that T/Sgt. Belarga could not have been certain that what Sgt. Ani
received from the appellant was marijuana because of the distance, his testimony,
nevertheless, corroborated the direct evidence, which the Court earlier ruled to be
convincing, presented by Sgt. Ani on the following material points: (1) T/Sgt. Belarga
instructed Sgt. Ani to conduct a surveillance and test-buy operation on the appellant at
Suterville, Zamboanga City on December 13, 1989;
23
(2) later that same day, Sgt. Ani
went back to their office and reported a successful operation and turned over to T/Sgt.
Belarga one wrapper of marijuana;
24
(3) T/Sgt. Belarga then organized a team to conduct a
buy-bust operation the following day;
25
(4) on December 14, 1989, T/Sgt. Belarga led a
team of NARCOM agents who went to Suterville, Zamboanga City;
26
(5) T/Sgt. Belarga
gave a P20.00 marked bill to Sgt. Ani which was to be used in the buy-bust
operation;
27
(6) upon the arrival of the NARCOM agents in Suterville, Zamboanga City,
Sgt. Ani proceeded to the house of the appellant while some agents stayed in the vehicles
and others positioned themselves in strategic places;
28
the appellant met Sgt. Ani and an
exchange of articles took place.
29

Page 76 of 96 |

The corroborative testimony of T/Sgt. Belarga strengthens the direct evidence given by
Sgt. Ani. Additionally, the Court has ruled that the fact that the police officers who
accompanied the poseur-buyer were unable to see exactly what the appellant gave the
poseur-buyer because of their distance or position will not be fatal to the prosecution's
case
30
provided there exists other evidence, direct or circumstantial, e.g., the testimony of
the poseur-buyer, which is sufficient to prove the consummation of the sale of the
prohibited drug
The appellant next assails the seizure and admission as evidence of a plastic bag containing
marijuana which the NARCOM agents found in the appellant's kitchen. It appears that after
Sgt. Ani gave the pre-arranged signal to the other NARCOM agents, the latter moved in
and arrested the appellant inside the house. They searched him to retrieve the marked
money but didn't find it. Upon being questioned, the appellant said that he gave the marked
money to his wife.
31
Thereafter, T/Sgt. Belarga and Sgt. Lego went to the kitchen and
noticed what T/Sgt. Belarga described as a "cellophane colored white and stripe hanging at
the corner of the kitchen."
32
They asked the appellant about its contents but failing to get a
response, they opened it and found dried marijuana leaves. At the trial, the appellant
questioned the admissibility of the plastic bag and the marijuana it contains but the trial
court issued an Order ruling that these are admissible in evidence.
33

Built into the Constitution are guarantees on the freedom of every individual against
unreasonable searches and seizures by providing in Article III, Section 2, the following:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant
of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witness he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Furthermore, the Constitution, in conformity with the doctrine laid down in Stonehill v.
Diokno,
34
declares inadmissible, any evidence obtained in violation of the freedom from
unreasonable searches and seizures.
35

While a valid search warrant is generally necessary before a search and seizure may be
effected, exceptions to this rule are recognized. Thus, in Alvero v. Dizon,
36
the Court stated
that. "[t]he most important exception to the necessity for a search warrant is the right of
search and seizure as an incident to a lawful arrest."
37

Rule 126, Section 12 of the Rules of Court expressly authorizes a warrantless search and
seizure incident to a lawful arrest, thus:
Sec. 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested
may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used
as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant.
There is no doubt that the warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest authorizes the
arresting officer to make a search upon the person of the person arrested. As early as 1909,
the Court has ruled that "[a]n officer making an arrest may take from the person arrested
any money or property found upon his person which was used in the commission of the
crime or was the fruit of the crime or which might furnish the prisoner with the means of
committing
violence or of escaping, or which may be used as evidence in the trial of the cause . . .
"
38
Hence, in a buy-bust operation conducted to entrap a drug-pusher, the law enforcement
agents may seize the marked money found on the person
of the pusher immediately after the arrest even without arrest and search warrants.
39

In the case at bar, the NARCOM agents searched the person of the appellant after arresting
him in his house but found nothing. They then searched the entire house and, in the
kitchen, found and seized a plastic bag hanging in a corner.
The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a suspect's lawful arrest, may extend
beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his
immediate control.
40
Objects in the "plain view" of an officer who has the right to be in the
position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence.
41

In Ker v. California
42
police officers, without securing a search warrant but having
information that the defendant husband was selling marijuana from his apartment, obtained
from the building manager a passkey to defendants' apartment, and entered it. There they
found the defendant husband in the living room. The defendant wife emerged from the
kitchen, and one of the officers, after identifying himself, observed through the open
doorway of the kitchen, a small scale atop the kitchen sink, upon which lay a brick-shaped
package containing green leafy substance which he recognized as marijuana. The package
of marijuana was used as evidence in prosecuting defendants for violation of the Narcotic
Law. The admissibility of the package was challenged before the U.S. Supreme Court,
which held, after observing that it was not unreasonable for the officer to walk to the
doorway of the adjacent kitchen on seeing the defendant wife emerge therefrom, that "the
discovery of the brick of marijuana did not constitute a search, since the officer merely saw
what was placed before him in full view.
43
The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the
warrantless seizure of the marijuana was legal on the basis of the "plain view" doctrine and
upheld the admissibility of the seized drugs as part of the prosecution's evidence.
44

The "plain view" doctrine may not, however, be used to launch unbridled searches and
indiscriminate seizures nor to extend a general exploratory search made solely to find
Page 77 of 96 |

evidence of defendant's guilt. The "plain view" doctrine is usually applied where a police
officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently
comes across an incriminating object.
45
Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court stated the
following limitations on the application of the doctrine:
What the "plain view" cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had
a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a
piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the prior
justification whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to
lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search
directed against the accused and permits the warrantless seizure. Of course, the
extension of the original justification is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to
the police that they have evidence before them; the "plain view" doctrine may not be used
to extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until something
incriminating at last emerges.
46

It has also been suggested that even if an object is observed in "plain view," the "plain
view" doctrine will not justify the seizure of the object where the incriminating nature of
the object is not apparent from the "plain view" of the object.
47
Stated differently, it must
be immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be evidence of a
crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure.
In the instant case, the appellant was arrested and his person searched in the living room.
Failing to retrieve the marked money which they hoped to find, the NARCOM agents
searched the whole house and found the plastic bag in the kitchen. The plastic bag was,
therefore, not within their "plain view" when they arrested the appellant as to justify its
seizure. The NARCOM agents had to move from one portion of the house to another
before they sighted the plastic bag. Unlike Ker vs. California, where the police officer had
reason to walk to the doorway of the adjacent kitchen and from which position he saw the
marijuana, the NARCOM agents in this case went from room to room with the obvious
intention of fishing for more evidence.
Moreover, when the NARCOM agents saw the plastic bag hanging in one corner of the
kitchen, they had no clue as to its contents. They had to ask the appellant what the bag
contained. When the appellant refused to respond, they opened it and found the marijuana.
Unlike Ker v. California, where the marijuana was visible to the police officer's eyes, the
NARCOM agents in this case could not have discovered the inculpatory nature of the
contents of the bag had they not forcibly opened it. Even assuming then, that the
NARCOM agents inadvertently came across the plastic bag because it was within their
"plain view," what may be said to be the object in their "plain view" was just the plastic
bag and not the marijuana. The incriminating nature of the contents of the plastic bag was
not immediately apparent from the "plain view" of said object. It cannot be claimed that the
plastic bag clearly betrayed its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its
transprarency, or otherwise, that its contents are obvious to an observer.
48

We, therefore, hold that under the circumstances of the case, the "plain view" doctrine does
not apply and the marijuana contained in the plastic bag was seized illegally and cannot be
presented in evidence pursuant to Article III, Section 3(2) of the Constitution.
The exclusion of this particular evidence does not, however, diminish, in any way, the
damaging effect of the other pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution to prove that
the appellant sold marijuana, in violation of Article II, Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972. We hold that by virtue of the testimonies of Sgt. Ani and T/Sgt. Belarga and
the two wrappings of marijuana sold by the appellant to Sgt. Ani, among other pieces of
evidence, the guilt of the appellant of the crime charged has been proved beyond
reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the judgment of the Regional Trial Court
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin, Davide, Jr. and Melo, JJ., concur.

Page 78 of 96 |

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 112659. January 24, 1996]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SUCHINDA LEANGSIRI (at
large), accused, FATI OMOGBOLAHAN Y ALABI, YAMBA LISASI
BHOLA, and ZARIATU AMIDU, accused-appellants.
D E C I S I O N
PUNO, J .:
On June 7, 1993, appellants FATI OMOGBOLAHAN Y ALABI,
[1]
YAMBA
LISASI BHOLA,
[2]
and ZARIATU AMIDU
[3]
pleaded not guilty to the charge of
Violation of Section 4, Article II, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425
[4]
embodied in an
Information, dated April 2, 1993, as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
That on or about the 31st of March, 1993 and sometime prior thereto in Manila and other
parts of Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above
named accused, conspiring, confederating, and mutually helping one another, did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, without authority of law, deliver, give away,
distribute, dispatch in transit or transport 8,225.31 grams of heroin, a prohibited drug,
and/or act as brokers in any of the aforesaid transactions with or without consideration.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
A fourth accused, Thai national SUCHINDA LEANGSIRI, escaped from the Pasay
City Jail before the arraignment. He remains at large.
[5]

The evidence of the prosecution establish that in the early afternoon of May 31, 1993,
accused Leangsiri was arrested at the arrival area of the Ninoy Aquino International
Airport (NAIA). He was in the act of bringing into the country 8,225.31 grams of
heroin
[6]
hidden under the false bottom of a black suitcase.
[7]
He informed the authorities
that he was to deliver the contraband to three (3) people
[8]
at the Las Palmas Hotel
in Manila.
[9]

Leangsiri was brought to the headquarters of the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) at
the Old MIA for further investigation.
[10]
The head of the command, MAJOR ALBINO
SABLAYAN, formed a team, headed by SR. INSP. ADOLFO SAMALA,
[11]
to conduct
follow-up operations in the case.
[12]
The team and agents of the Bureau of Customs
proceeded to the Las Palmas Hotel,
[13]
where they allowed Leangsiri to check into
Room 504 with the confiscated black suitcase containing the heroin.
[14]

At around eight oclock in the evening, two hours after checking in, Leangsiri
received a telephone call from his contact. Leangsiri was told that the black suitcase would
be picked up at about ten oclock that night.
[15]
He relayed the information to his escorts,
NARCOM agents SPO3 FABIAN GAPIANGAO
[16]
and SPO4 ELPIDIO
BALNEG.
[17]
Thereupon, the two NARCOM agents positioned themselves inside the
washroom, with its door opened a fraction to give them visual access to the rest of the hotel
room.
[18]

On the ground floor and outside perimeters of the Las Palmas hotel, Samala and other
NARCOM and Bureau of Customs agents were watching for unusual and suspicious
events.
[19]
From where he sat at the hotels coffee shop, Samala noticed appellant Amidu
paced around the lobby for nearly an hour.
[20]
At about ten p.m., Amidus co-appellants,
Omogbolahan and Bhola, arrived at the hotel.
[21]
As Amidu flashed a thumbs up sign to
them, they all headed for the elevator and went up to the fifth floor of the hotel.
[22]

They knocked on the door of Room 504. Leangsiri stood up from the bed in which he
sat,
[23]
opened the door, and let the three appellants in.
[24]
Leangsiri took the black
suitcase
[25]
and brought it to the dining area of the room where appellants stood in full view
of NARCOM agents Gapiangao and Balneg. Leangsiri opened the suitcase and displayed
its contents to his visitors.
[26]

Appellants briefly examined the black suitcase and two (2) transparent plastic bags
which contained the heroin.
[27]
After the examination, Leangsiri closed the suitcase and
handed it over to appellants.
[28]
Appellants started to leave the hotel room with the
contraband when Gapiangao and Balneg barged out of the washroom, identified
themselves as NARCOM agents, and made the arrest.
[29]

Minutes later, Samala and his companions joined Gapiangao, Balneg, and the four
foreigners in Room 504.
[30]
Appellants Omogbolahan and Bhola identified themselves by
presenting their respective passports. Appellant Amidu, on the other hand, merely said she
was staying in Room 413 of the same hotel.
[31]
Further questioning of appellants revealed
that Omogbolahan and Bhola were billeted at the Royal Palm Hotel, also located
in Manila.
[32]

Accompanied by the hotels owner and security officer, Samala searched appellant
Amidus room. Tucked within the pages of her telephone and address book was a piece of
paper with the name SUCHINDA LEANGSIRI written on it.
[33]
The paper and Amidus
other possessions were confiscated.
[34]

Page 79 of 96 |

The NARCOM and Customs teams then proceeded to the Royal Palm Hotel where
appellants Omogbolahan and Bhola were billeted. The agents coordinated with the security
officers of the hotel, who stood as witnesses when the former entered and searched said
appellants room. Their efforts yielded two black suitcases each with false bottoms and
both smaller than that confiscated from Leangsiri.
[35]
Masking tape and an empty
transparent bag were also found in the room.
[36]

Appellants denied any involvement in the transport of heroin by Leangsiri. They told
a different tale.
[37]

Appellants Omogbolahan and Bhola were staying at Royal Palm Hotel. On that
fateful night of March 31, 1993, they went to the Las Palmas Hotel to meet co-appellant
Amidu and an American named David. When they got to the fourth floor of the hotel, and
as they made their way to Room 413 (Amidus room), they were accosted by some people
who forcibly brought them to Room 504. They explained that they were at the hotel to
meet Amidu. Some of those who intercepted them left the room and returned with
Amidu. Appellants money and jewelry were taken from them. Those who dispossesed
them turned out to be policemen.
Appellants were driven to the Royal Palm Hotel. Only one of the policemen entered
its premises as appellants and the others remained in the car. Afterwards, appellants were
brought to NARCOM headquarters. Together with Leangsiri, they were presented to the
media as members of an international drug syndicate.
On August 31, 1993, the trial court convicted appellants, finding them guilty of
conspiring to transport heroin in violation of Section 4, R.A. 6425. The dispositive portion
of the decision reads:
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered, finding all the accused
(herein appellants) FATI OMOGBOLAHAN y ALABI, YAMBA LISASI BHOLA and
ZARIATU AMIDU, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime described in the
Information, and hereby sentences them to suffer a penalty of life imprisonment plus a
fine of P30,000 for each of (them).
The case as against accused Suchinda Leangsiri is hereby ordered archived.
The Heroin of about 8,225.31 kgs. is hereby ordered destroyed in the manner provided
by law.
SO ORDERED.
On September 9, 1993, appellants filed a motion for new trial grounded on the
following
I. THAT ERRORS OF LAW OR IRREGULARITIES HAVE BEEN COMMITTED
DURING THE TRIAL PREJUDICIAL TO THE SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS OF HEREIN
ACCUSED (HEREIN APPELLANTS);
II. THAT NEW AND MATERIAL EVIDENCE HAS BEEN DISCOVERED WHICH
THE ACCUSED (APPELLANTS) COULD NOT WITH REASONABLE DILIGENCE
HAVE DISCOVERED AND PRODUCED AT THE TRIAL, AND WHICH IF
INTRODUCED AND ADMITTED, WOULD PROBABLY CHANGE
THE JUDGMENT.
The purported new and material evidence consists of the testimony of a certain Julita
Thach Camerino, a Thai citizen, who narrated in her affidavit:
1. That (she) is at present a detention prisoner at the Manila City Jail, Old Bilibid Prison
Compound, Sta. Cruz, Manila;
2. That on or about 11:00 oclock in the morning of 31 August 1993, (she) noticed the
arrival of inmates (appellants) into (the prison) compound, and (Amidu) was still crying;
3. That after a few minutes, Zariatu Amidu started banging her head against the concrete
wall, but after a few attempts she was prevailed upon to stop by another woman;
4. That (she) inquired from some of the inmates the reason why Zariatu Amidu was
behaving that way, and found out that she and the two other male detainees were just
sentenced by the Court of very severe penalty of life imprisonment;
5. That (she) pitied (appellants) of the fate that befell them and (her) conscience rebelled
and started tormenting (her) since (she) knows that they are innocent of the crime charged
against them of transporting heroin into the country;
6. That (her) conscience compelled (her) to approach them and voluntarily offered (her)
help, if it is still possible under the situation, whatever assistance (she) could extend to let
justice prevail and reveal the truth out of that incident on the evening of 31 March 1993, at
Las Palmas Hotel, because (she) was with the police at the NAIA, acting as an interpreter
between Suchinda Leangsiri and the police when the former was being interrogated at the
NARCOM Headquarters at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) in the
afternoon of 31 March 1993, and into the evening of said date at Las Palmas Hotel;
Page 80 of 96 |

7. That in the process of (her) questioning of Leangsiri, the latter revealed to (them) that
he was going to deliver his stuff of heroin to someone at Las Palmas Hotel but did not
identify the person whom he was going to meet at the hotel nor mention the name/s of the
same;
8. That on or about 6:00 oclock in the evening of 31 March 1993, (she), Suchinda
Leangsiri, and the police team arrived at Las Palmas Hotel wherein (she) and Leangsiri
were instructed to proceed to the desk counter and check-in, and got Room 504 to occupy;
9. That (she), Suchinda Leangsiri and a police officer whom (she) knew as Emil went to
Room 504 to await for someone who would allegedly pick up the stuff of heroin but the
claim or testimony that SPO3 Gapiangao and SPO4 Balneg were also inside Room 504
together with Suchinda Leangsiri is absolutely false;
10.That at around 9:30 that evening, the police brought inside Room 504 two black males
whom (she) later knew as Yamba Lisasi Bhola and Fati Omogbolahan Alabi;
11 . That while inside Room 504, (she) heard the two, Yamba Lisasi Bhola and Fati
Omogbolahan Alabi, protesting and complaining to the police why they were brought
inside Room 504;
12. That the two further explained to the police that they were about to visit a lady friend
billeted at Room 413 of the same hotel;
13. That after hearing that information, (she) was requested by Sr. Insp. Dela Cruz to go
with him, and (they) immediately went inside Room 413 and forcibly brought Zariatu
Amidu to Room 504 to join with the two male black nationals already inside;
14. That afterwards, (they) brought (appellants) in the vicinity of Royal Palm Hotel,
where (they) search the room of the two black males and found no prohibited drugs;
15. That from Royal Palm Hotel, (they) went back to NARCOM Headquarters at NAIA,
where (she) divested the three black nationals of their cash and pieces of jewelry, and turn
them over to Sr. Insp. Dela Cruz for safekeeping;
16. That (she is) am going to state further the other details and related matters in court
during my testimony in the trial of the case against (appellants);
xxx xxx xxx
[38]

The trial court denied the motion, ratiocinating thus:
xxx xxx xxx
The Court reviewed the records of the case, the transcript of stenographic notes, and the
pertinent laws and jurisprudence, and the Court finds, and so holds, that the findings and
conclusions regarding the guilt of the herein accused (appellants), as well as the sufficiency
of the evidence against them, are amply supported by the evidence, and the present motion
did not ventilate any new matter as to warrant the said findings to be disturbed and/or set
aside.
With respect to the alleged newly discovered evidence, the Court disagrees with the
stance taken by the accused (appellants) on this point. The testimony of Julita Thach
Camerino could not be considered newly discovered, as said person was brought to the
premises of the Court for identification during the trial of this case. Besides, her testimony,
summarized in the undated Affidavit submitted by the accused (appellants) on September
24, 1993, does not inspire confidence, considering that this witness was convicted by this
Court for violation of the dangerous drugs law, as amended.
xxx xxx xxx
[39]

Appellants now impugn the trial courts decision and its denial of their motion for
new trial, and raise the following assignments of error:
I. THAT THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONSIDERING
THE EXISTENCE OF CONSPIRACY BETWEEN AND AMONG
THE ACCUSED;
II. THAT THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO INTRODUCE DIRECT
AND/OR CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO PROVE THEGUILT OF
THE ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT;
III. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE
CREDIBLE TESTIMONIES AND OTHER SUBSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE THREE ACCUSED.
IV. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE
CONFLICTING TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION AND OTHER
EVIDENCE FAVORABLE TO THE ACCUSED;
V. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENYING ACCUSEDS MOTION
FOR NEW TRIAL.
[40]

We affirm appellants conviction for reasons we shall discuss in seriatim.
One. We hold that the trial court correctly found that appellants conspired with
Leangsiri to transport eight-and-a-half kilos of heroin.
Page 81 of 96 |

Appellants submit a two-pronged argument assailing the finding of conspiracy. The
first prong urges that there is neither direct nor circumstantial evidence linking them to the
transport of heroin by Leangsiri. The second prong posits that only Leangsiris testimony
can prove their alleged conspiracy. The running fault in appellants line of reasoning is
obvious to the eye.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it.
[41]
It is well-entrenched in our
jurisprudence that conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence.
[42]
Proof of previous
agreement to commit the crime is not also essential to establish conspiracy. Conspiracy
may be inferred from the acts of the accused, whose conduct before, during, and after the
commission of the crime can show its existence. In a host of cases, we have upheld the
finding of conspiracy where it is shown that the accused acted in concert to attain the same
objective.
In the case at bar, the positive testimonies of prosecution witnesses Gapiangao,
Balneg, and Samala established the concerted acts of appellants aimed at carrying out the
unlawful design of transporting the heroin confiscated from Leangsiri. When Leangsiri
was interrogated after his arrest, he revealed to the authorities that he was to deliver
the contraband to three (3) people at the Las Palmas Hotel. Later, while in Room 504
of said hotel, Leangsiri received a telephone call in the presence of Gapiangao and
Balneg, by which he was informed that the heroin would be picked up from him atten
oclock in the evening. Shortly before the designated pick-up time, Samala saw
appellant Amidu (who had been waiting in the lobby of the hotel for almost an hour)
flash a thumbs up sign to appellants Omogbolahan and Bhola when they arrived at
the hotel. The three (3) appellants then took the elevator and went up to the fifth
floor. They knocked on the door of Room 504, and Leangsiri let them into the room.
In full view of Gapiangao and Balneg, appellants examined Leangsiris heroin, and
took it and the suitcase with the false bottom in which it was hidden. Appellants were
on their way out of the room with the suitcase and heroin when they were arrested by
Gapiangao and Balneg. These facts show beyond doubt that appellants conspired with
Leangsiri to transport the illegal drug heroin.
Two. We also hold that there was delivery of the heroin under Section 4 of R.A.
6425, from Leangsiri to appellants even though Leangsiri and the heroin were already
under the control of the NARCOM on the evening of March 31, 1993. Too far out from
the fringes of reason is appellants argument that since the NARCOM agents had already
taken Leangsiri and the heroin into their custody and control, it is the NARCOM agents
who should be liable for transporting the said heroin confiscated from Leangsiri.
Section 4, Article II of R.A. 6425 provides, inter alia:
The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from twenty thousand to
thirty thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law,
shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or
transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions. xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
The proviso applies to the NARCOM agents in the case at bar. In bringing Leangsiri
and the heroin to Las Palmas Hotel, the NARCOM agents were performing a lawful act in
furtherance of their follow-up operations. They went to the hotel to apprehend appellants
to whom delivery of the illegal drug was to be made.
Appellants also argue that, even assuming arguendo, they were caught in possession
of the heroin, they cannot be held liable under Section 4 of R.A. 6425 because they were
neither delivering nor transporting the drug. They postulate that said provision does not
penalize the recipient of the delivered contraband.
[43]

The same argument was raised and rejected by this Court in People vs. Lo Ho
Wing.
[44]
In Lo Hong Wing, the authorities gathered from their intelligence and
surveillance activities that the accused were going to bring illegal drugs (shabu) into the
country. The accused were arrested while on-board a taxi cab which they hailed and
boarded at the NAIA. In rejecting the defense argument that there was no delivery,
transporting or dispatching of shabu made by the accused therein, we held:
xxx xxx xxx
The information charged the accused of delivering, transporting or dispatching fifty-six
(56) tea bags containing metamphetamine, a regulated drug. The conjunction or was used,
thereby implying that the accused were being charged of the three specified acts in the
alternative. Appellant argues that he cannot be convicted of delivery because the term
connotes a source and a recipient, the latter being absent under the facts of the case. It is
also argued that dispatching cannot apply either since appellant never sent off or disposed
of drugs. As for transporting, appellant contends that he cannot also be held liable
therefor because the act of transporting necessarily requires a point of destination, which
again is non-existent under the given facts.
The contentions are futile attempts to strain the meaning of the operative acts of which
appellant and his co-accused were charged in relation to the facts of the case. There is no
doubt that law enforcers caught appellant and his co-accused in flagrante delicto of
transporting a prohibited drug. The term transport is defined as to carry or convey from
one place to another. The operative words in the definition are to carry or convey. The
fact that there is actual conveyance suffices to support a finding that the act of transporting
was committed. It is immaterial whether or not the place of destination is
reached. Furthermore, the argument of appellant gives rise to the illogical conclusion that
he and his co-accused did not intend to bring the metamphetamine anywhere, i.e., they had
no place of destination.
Page 82 of 96 |

The situation in the instant case is one where the transport of a prohibited drug was
interrupted by the search and arrest of the accused. Interruption necessarily infers that an
act had already been commenced. Otherwise, there would be nothing to interrupt.
xxx xxx xxx
In the case at bar, appellants were on their way out of Room 504 of the Las Palmas Hotel
carrying the suitcase with a false bottom containing 8.5 kilos of heroin when they were
arrested by the NARCOM agents. At that point, they were in the act of conveying the
heroin to an unknown destination. Their act was part of the process of transporting the
heroin. They were all involved in a conspiracy. The act of Leangsiri in transporting the
heroin is appellants act. They cannot isolate and separate themselves from Leangsiri, for
in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all.
Three. We further rule that the heroin (Exhs. C and its sub-exhibits) and the
suitcase with false bottom (Exh. F) are admissible against appellants.
It is inaccurate for appellants to claim that these evidentiary exhibits were formally
offered only against Leangsiri. They were also offered against them. As correctly noted by
the Solicitor General in his Brief:
xxx xxx xxx
The records show that on July 2, 1993, Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Jovencio Zuo
and State Prosecutor Reynaldo Lugtu formally offered Exhibits A to Q and their
submarkings against Leangsiri, (Omogbolahan), Bhola and Amidu (Original Records, pp.
67-71). xxx
[45]

Four. We now come to the argument of appellants that the piece of paper found in
Amidus hotel room, with the name SUCHINDA LEANGSIRI written on it,
[46]
should
not have been admitted by the trial court.
The Revised Rules of Court provide that (a) person lawfully arrested may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the
commission of an offense, without a search warrant.
[47]
We interpreted this provision
inNolasco vs. Pao,
[48]
thus:
xxx xxx xxx
The better and established rule is a strict application of the exception provided xxx
that is to absolutely limit a warrantless search of a person who is lawfully arrested to his or
her person at the time of and incident to his or her arrest and to dangerous weapons or
anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense. Such warrantless
search obviously cannot be made in a place other than the place of arrest.
We then held that the warrantless search made by the authorities on the accuseds
apartment which was located a few blocks away from where she was arrested was illegal
for being an untenable violation, if not nullification, of the basic constitutional right and
guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Nolasco, however, has undergone some mutations. In subsequent cases, we validated
warrantless searches made not only on the person of the suspect but also in a
permissible area within his reach.
[49]
We ruled that the reach of a valid warrantless search
goes beyond the person of the one arrested and includes the premises or surroundings
under his immediate control.
[50]
The immediate control test was enunciated in
the American case of Chimel vs. State of California.
[51]
In that case, defendant was
arrested in his home for burglary of a coin shop. Afterwards, the arresting officers
conducted a search of his entire three-bedroom house, including the attic, the garage, a
small workshop, and drawers. Various items -primarily coins - were found through the
search, and were admitted in evidence against him by the trial court, which convicted him
of burglary. The United States Supreme Court reversed the conviction as it struck down
the warrantless search on the ground that the search of the accuseds home went far
beyond his person and the area from within which he might have obtained either a
weapon or something that could have been used as evidence against him.
The inadmissibility of evidence obtained in a warrantless search incident to a lawful
arrest outside the suspects person and the premises under his immediate control admits of
an exception. The exception obtains when the Plain View Doctrine applies as explained
in People vs. Musa,
[52]
in this wise:
xxx Objects in the plain view of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have
that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence.
In Ker v. California, police officers, without securing a search warrant but having
information that the defendant husband was selling marijuana from his apartment, obtained
from the building manager a passkey to defendants apartment, and entered it. There they
found the defendant husband in the living room. The defendant wife emerged from the
kitchen, and one of the officers, after identifying himself, observed through the open
doorway of the kitchen, as small scale atop the kitchen sink, upon which lay a brick-shaped
package containing green leafy substance which he recognized as marijuana. The package
of marijuana was used as evidence in prosecuting defendants for violation of the Narcotic
Law. The admissibility of the package was challenged before the U.S. Supreme Court,
which held, after observing that it was not unreasonable for the officer to walk to the
doorway of the adjacent kitchen on seeing the defendant wife emerge therefrom, that the
discovery of the brick of marijuana did not constitute a search, since the officer merely saw
what was placed before him in full view. x x x The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the
warrantless seizure of the marijuana was legal on the basis of the plain view doctrine and
upheld the admissibility of the seized drugs as part of the prosecutions evidence.
Page 83 of 96 |

The plain view doctrine may not, however, be used to launch unbridled searches and
indiscriminate seizures nor to extend a general exploratory search made solely to find
evidence of defendants guilt. The plain view doctrine is usually applied where a police
officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently
comes across an incriminating object. x x x Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court stated
the following limitations on the application of the doctrine.
What the plain view cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had
a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a
piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the prior
justification - whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to
lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a
search directed against the accused - and permits the warrantless seizure. Of course, the
extension of the original justification is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to
the police that they have evidence before them; the plain view doctrine may not be used
to extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until something
incriminating at last emerges.
In the case at bar, appellants were arrested in Room 504 of the Las Palmas
Hotel. The piece of paper bearing Leangsiris name was obtained through a warrantless
search of Room 413 of the same hotel, and found tucked within the pages of appellant
Amidus telephone and address book. Clearly, the warrantless search is illegal and the
piece of paper bearing Leangsiris name cannot be admitted as evidence against
appellants. The inadmissibility of this evidence will not, however, exculpate
appellants. Its exclusion does not destroy the prosecutions case against appellants. The
remaining evidence still established their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Five. We uphold the calibration of the credibility of witnesses made by the court a
quo. The trial court judge had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses
first-hand, and his findings are entitled to great weight.
The inconsistencies in Gapiangaos, Balnegs, and Samalas testimonies alluded to by
appellants hardly relate to the material parts of their testimonies which sufficiently proved
the elements of the crime at bar. It is a well-entrenched rule of evidence that corroborative
testimonies, in order to be credible, need not coincide on all aspects. Given the natural
limitations of the human senses, the immaterial and slight discrepancies in the testimonies
of witnesses, far from weakening their probative value, serve to strengthen their
credibility. Imperfect senses cannot be the source of perfect testimonies.
[53]

Neither is the credibility of the prosecution witnesses crumpled by the fact that the
testimonies of some prosecution witnesses during the trial were not exactly and totally
reflected in their Joint Affidavit, dated April 1, 1993.
[54]
We have held before that:
The general rule has always been that discrepancies between the statements of the affiant
in his affidavit and those made by him on the witness stand do not necessarily discredit him
since ex parte affidavits are generally incomplete. Affidavits are generally subordinated in
importance to open court declarations because they are oftentimes not in such a state as to
afford him a fair opportunity of narrating in full the incident which has transpired. xxx
[55]

In checkered contrast, the testimonies of appellants are incongruous with reality. The
story proffered by appellant Omogbolahan, for instance, is too obviously melodramatic and
incredible to be believed. His story begins in February, 1992, with his wife and two
children being killed in a civil war in his native land of Liberia. Distraught, he decided to
migrate to theUnited States of America.
[56]
He first flew to Thailand, where he stayed for
six months without managing to learn a single Thai word.
[57]
Despite his language
inadequacy, he was able to land a job in a cargo company in that country. He did not
befriend any Thai national. Neither did he apply for an American visa in Thailand.
[58]

He then heard from two co-Liberians named Jabar and Samsi that it was easy to
obtain an American visa from the United States embassy in the Philippines. Omogbolahan
flew from Thailand to our country. He stepped on Philippine soil on March 16, 1993, only
to learn that Jabar and Samsi had long left the country.
[59]
Instead of going to the United
States embassy at Roxas Boulevard or any of the many travel agencies doing business in
the country, he spent his first two weeks here making the rounds of bars and clubs in the
Ermita area, hoping to meet fellow Africans and American citizens who could help him
obtain an American visa. In this clubs, he allegedly befriended his co-appellant
Bhola
[60]
and an American named David whom he was supposed to meet on the fateful
night of March 31, 1993. Omogbolahan soon moved in with Bhola at the Royal Palm
Hotel, and David promised to help him obtain his American passport.
[61]

Omogbolahans story is clearly a fabrication designed to provide him with a
convenient defense and to elicit sympathy from the courts. The testimonies of his co-
appellants are equally incredulous. They are also tattered with inconsistencies. As
observed by the Solicitor General, they could not even get their occupations straight, viz.:
xxx xxx xxx
Appellant Zariatu Amidu is a native of Ghana, Africa, 38 years old at the time she
testified, a widow and as shown in her passport, a seamstress by occupation. However, in
her testimony, she stated that she is a plain housewife. (tsn July 21, 1993, pp. 4 and 27)
On the other hand, appellant Yamba Lisasi Bhola is a native of Kinshasha, Zaire, Central
Africa, 37 years old at the time he testified, married and a high school graduate xxx. In his
testimony, he stated that he is a trader xxx. Later on, he stated that he was working for the
New Star Investment in Thailand as marketing officer.
[62]
(tsn July 16, 1993, p. 23)
Page 84 of 96 |

Lastly, Fati Omogbolahan Alabi was 27 years old at the time he testified and an
elementary graduate and plumber according to his passport. In his testimony, however, he
claimed to be a technician.
[63]
(tsn July 13, 1993 p. 4).
Six. We finally hold that the trial court did not gravely abuse its discretion in denying
appellants motion for new trial.
We find appellants first argument in moving for a new trial as baseless. As
discussed above, the purported errors and irregularities committed in the course of the trial
against the substantive rights of appellants do not exist.
Appellants second argument as to the necessity of a new trial is likewise
unmeritorious. Section 1, Rule 37 of the Revised Rules of Court grants an aggrieved party
the right to move for new trial on the ground, among others, of (n)ewly discovered
evidence, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered, and produced at
the trial, and which if presented would probably alter the result (thereof).
[64]
Newly
discovered evidence, in order to warrant a new trial, must meet three requirements, viz: (1)
it must have been discovered after trial; (2) it could not have been discovered and produced
at the trial despite reasonable diligence; and (3) if presented, it would probably alter the
results of the action.
[65]

In the case at bar, appellants were unable to prove that, even with the use of
reasonable diligence, they could not have obtained Camerinos testimony during the
trial. On the contrary, as correctly noted by the trial court, Camerino was identified in open
court by appellant Bhola on July 26, 1993.
Furthermore, it is unlikely that Camerinos prospective testimony would acquit
appellants. Firstly, her affidavit embodies a narration of events almost identical to that
presented by appellants. As has been discussed earlier, the defense version of what
occurred on the evening of March 31, 1993 is incredible and difficult to believe. Secondly,
Camerinos claim that she was a member of the team that arrested appellants is belied by
the testimony of prosecution witness Samala on rebuttal, viz:
xxx xxx xxx
STATE PROS.:
One Julita Camerino appeared before this Honorable Court and accused
through counsel claim she was a member of the team which arrested the three
Africans now the accused in this case. What can you say to that?
A: I dont know that person, sir.
Q: Were there instances or occasions before the date of March 31, 1993 when
you met this Julita Camerino?
A: I dont know, sir.
Q: You dont recall any?
A: I dont recall any, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Court:
Cross?
ATTY. BORJA:
Capt. Samala, is it not a fact that Julita Camerino served as your
interpreter during the custodial investigation after the arrest of the Thai National
in the person of Suchinda Leangsiri?
A: No, sir.
ATTY. BORJA:
She was not there at any moment from March 31 to April 1, 1993 at the
police headquarters or at the Las Palmas Hotel?
A: I dont know that person, sir.
[66]

Her credibility is also questionable considering the fact that she herself has been previously
convicted of violating the Dangerous Drugs Act.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision, dated August 31, 1993, and the Order,
dated October 11, 1993, of the RTC of Manila, Branch 47, in Criminal Case No. 93-
118913 are AFFIRMED. Costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado (Chairman), Romero, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Page 85 of 96 |

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 95902 February 4, 1992
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DON RODRIGUEZA, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.

REGALADO, J .:
On appeal before us is the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City, Branch 10,
finding accused-appellant Don Rodrigueza guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Section 4, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended) and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine
of P20,000.00 and costs.
1

However, the Solicitor General, deviating from his conventional stance in the prosecution
of criminal cases, recommends the acquittal of appellant for the reasons stated in his
Manifestation for Acquittal (In Lieu of Appellee's Brief) filed with the Court. We have
reviewed and analyzed the testimonial and documentary evidence in this case and we find
said recommendation to be well taken.
The information, dated July 10, 1987, charges Don Rodrigueza and his co-accused, Samuel
Segovia and Antonio Lonceras, with allegedly having in their custody and possession 100
grams of marijuana leaves and for selling, in a buy-bust operation, said 100 grams of dried
marijuana leaves for a consideration of P200.00.
2

During the arraignment, all the accused pleaded not guilty to the charge against them. At
the trial, the prosecution and the defense presented several witnesses after which the
court a quo rendered judgment acquitting Samuel Segovia and Antonio Lonceras but
convicting and penalizing herein appellant as hereinbefore stated.
The following facts are culled from the decision of the trial court and the evidence
presented by the prosecution.
At around 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of July 1, 1987, CIC Ciriaco Taduran was in their
headquarters at the Office of the Narcotics Regional Unit at Camp Bagong Ibalon, Legaspi
City, together with S/Sgt. Elpidio Molinawe, CIC Leonardo B. Galutan and their
commanding officer, Major Crisostomo M. Zeidem, when a confidential informer arrived
and told them that there was an ongoing illegal traffic of prohibited drugs in Tagas, Daraga,
Albay. Major Zeidem formed a team to conduct a buy-bust operation, which team was
given P200.00 in different denominations to buy marijuana. These bills were treated with
ultraviolet powder at the Philippine Constabulary Crime Laboratory (PCCL). Sgt.
Molinawe gave the money to Taduran who acted as the poseur buyer. He was told to look
for a certain Don, the alleged seller of prohibited drugs. Taduran went to Tagas alone and,
while along the road, he met Samuel Segovia. He asked Segovia where be could find Don
and where he could buy marijuana. Segovia left for a while and when be returned, he was
accompanied by a man who was later on introduced to him as Don, herein appellant.
3

After agreeing on the price of P200.00 for 100 grams of marijuana, Don halted a passing
tricycle driven by Antonio Lonceras. He boarded it and left Taduran and Segovia. When he
came back, Don gave Taduran "a certain object wrapped in a plastic" which was later
identified as marijuana, and received payment therefor. Thereafter, Taduran returned to the
headquarters and made a report regarding his said purchase of marijuana.
4

Based on that information, Major Zeidem ordered a team to conduct an operation to
apprehend the suspects. In the evening of the same date, CIC Galutan and S/Sgt. Molinawe
proceeded to Regidor Street, Daraga, Albay and arrested appellant, Antonio Lonceras and
Samuel Segovia. The constables were not, however, armed with a warrant of arrest when
they apprehended the three accused. The arrestees were brought to the headquarters for
investigation.
5

Thereafter, agents of the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) conducted a raid in the house of
Jovencio Rodrigueza, father of appellant. Taduran did not go with them. During the raid,
they were able to confiscate dried marijuana leaves and a plastic syringe, among others.
The search, however, was not authorized by any search warrant.
6

The next day, July 2, 1987, Jovencio Rodrigueza was released from detention but appellant
was detained. An affidavit, allegedly taken from and executed by him, was sworn to by
Page 86 of 96 |

him before the assistant city prosecutor. Appellant had no counsel when his sworn
statement was taken during that custodial investigation. The arrestees were also examined
by personnel of the PCCL and were found positive for ultraviolet powder.
7

The three accused presented different versions of their alleged participations.
Samuel Segovia testified that he was in their house in the evening of July 1, 1987 listening
to the radio. Later, he ate his merienda and then went out to buy cigarettes from the store.
While he was at the store, a jeep stopped behind him. Several armed men alighted
therefrom and ordered him to get inside the jeep. He refused but he was forced to board the
vehicle. He was even hit by the butt of a gun. 8
He was thereafter brought to Camp Bagong Ibalon where he was investigated and was
repeatedly asked regarding the whereabouts of Rodrigueza. He was manhandled by the
NARCOM agents and was detained while inside the camp. He was then made to hold a
P10.00 bill treated with ultraviolet powder. When he was taken to the PCCL and examined
he was found positive of the ultraviolet powder. He was also made to sign some papers but
he did not know what they were all about.
9

Appellant, on the other hand, testified that on said date he was in the house of his aunt in
San Roque, Legaspi City. He stayed there overnight and did not leave the place until the
next day when his brother arrived and told him that their father was taken by some military
men the preceding night. Appellant went to Camp Bagong Ibalon and arrived there at
around 8:00 o'clock in the morning of July 2, 1987. When he arrived, he was asked if he
knew anything about the marijuana incident, to which question he answered in the
negative. Like Segovia, he was made to hold a P10.00 bill and was brought to the crime
laboratory for examination. From that time on, he was not allowed to go home and was
detained inside the camp. He was also tortured in order to make him admit his complicity
in the alleged sale of marijuana.
10

In the assignment of errors in his brief, appellant contends that the trial court erred in (1)
admitting in evidence the sworn statement of appellant which was obtained in violation of
his constitutional rights; (2) convicting appellant of the crime charged despite the fact that
the 100 grams of dried marijuana leaves allegedly bought from him were not properly
identified; (3) convicting appellant of the crime charged despite the fact that the evidence
for the prosecution is weak and not convincing; and (4) finding appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of selling or at least acting as broker in the sale of the 100 grams of
marijuana to CIC Taduran late in the afternoon of July 1, 1987, despite the failure of the
prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
11

We rule for the appellant and approve the recommendation for his acquittal. In disposing of
this case, however, we feel that the issues raised by appellant should properly be
discussed seriatim.
1. A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment employed by peace officers to trap and
catch a malefactor in flagrante delicto.
12
Applied to the case at bar, the term in flagrante
delicto requires that the suspected drug dealer must be caught redhanded in the act of
selling marijuana or any prohibited drug to a person acting or posing as a buyer.
In the instant case, however, the procedure adopted by the NARCOM agents failed to meet
this qualification. Based on the very evidence of the prosecution, after the alleged
consummation of the sale of dried marijuana leaves, CIC Taduran immediately released
appellant Rodrigueza instead of arresting and taking him into his custody. This act of CIC
Taduran, assuming arguendo that the supposed sale of marijuana did take place, is
decidedly contrary to the natural course of things and inconsistent with the aforestated
purpose of a buy-bust operation. It is rather absurd on his part to let appellant escape
without having been subjected to the sanctions imposed by law. It is, in fact, a dereliction
of duty by an agent of the law.
2. The admissibility of the sworn statement allegedly executed by appellant was squarely
placed in issue and, as correctly pointed out by the defense, said sworn statement is
inadmissible in evidence against appellant.
We have once again to reiterate and emphasize that Article III of the 1987 Constitution
provides:
Sec. 12 (1). Any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent
and to have a competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and
in the presence of counsel.
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or section
17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
An examination of said sworn statement shows that appellant was informed of his
constitutional right to remain silent and to be assisted by counsel during custodial
examination. He was also asked if he was waiving his right to be assisted by counsel and
Page 87 of 96 |

he answered in the affirmative. However, while the rights of a person under custodial
investigation may be waived, such waiver must be made not only voluntarily, knowingly
and intelligently but also in the presence and with the assistance of counsel.
13
In the
present case, the waiver made by appellant being without the assistance of counsel, this
omission alone is sufficient to invalidate said sworn statement.
14

3. Corollary to this, we take cognizance of the error of the trial court in admitting in
evidence against appellant the articles allegedly confiscated during the raid conducted in
the house of Jovencio Rodrigueza.
As provided in the present Constitution, a search, to be valid, must generally be authorized
by a search warrant duly issued by the proper government authority.
15
True, in some
instances, this Court has allowed government authorities to conduct searches and seizures
even without a search warrant. Thus, when the owner of the premises waives his right
against such incursion;
16
when the search is incidental to a lawful arrest;
17
when it is made
on vessels and aircraft for violation of customs laws;
18
when it is made on automobiles for
the purpose of preventing violations of smuggling or immigration laws;
19
when it involves
prohibited articles in plain view;
20
or in cases of inspection of buildings and other premises
for the enforcement of fire, sanitary and building regulations,
21
a search may be validly
made even without a search warrant.
In the case at bar, however, the raid conducted by the NARCOM agents in the house of
Jovencio Rodrigueza was not authorized by any search warrant. It does not appear, either,
that the situation falls under any of the aforementioned cases. Hence, appellant's right
against unreasonable search and seizure was clearly violated. The NARCOM agents could
not have justified their act by invoking the urgency and necessity of the situation because
the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses reveal that the place had already been put
under surveillance for quite some time. Had it been their intention to conduct the raid, then
they should, because they easily could, have first secured a search warrant during that time.
4. The Court further notes the confusion and ambiguity in the identification of the
confiscated marijuana leaves and other prohibited drug paraphernalia presented as evidence
against appellant.
CIC Taduran, who acted as the poseur buyer, testified that appellant sold him 100 grams of
dried marijuana leaves wrapped in a plastic bag. Surprisingly, and no plausible explanation
has been advanced therefor, what were submitted to and examined by the PCCL and
thereafter utilized as evidence against the appellant were the following items:
One (1) red and white colored plastic bag containing the following:
Exh. "A"Thirty (30) grams of suspected dried marijuana fruiting tops
contained inside a transparent plastic bag.
Exh. "B" Fifty (50) grams of suspected dried marijuana leaves and
seeds contained inside a white colored plastic labelled "Robertson".
Exh. "C" Four (4) aluminum foils each containing suspected dried
marijuana fruiting tops having a total weight of seven grams then further
wrapped with a piece of aluminum foil.
Exh. "D" Five (5) small transparent plastic bags each containing
suspected dried marijuana fruiting tops having a total weight of
seventeen grams.
Exh. "E" One plastic syringe.
22

Evidently, these prohibited articles were among those confiscated during the so-called
follow-up raid in the house of Jovencio Rodrigueza. The unanswered question then arises
as to the identity of the marijuana leaves that became the basis of appellant's
conviction.
23
In People vs. Rubio,
24
this Court had the occasion to rule that the plastic bag
and the dried marijuana leaves contained therein constitute the corpus delicti of the crime.
As such, the existence thereof must be proved with certainty and conclusiveness. Failure to
do so would be fatal to the cause of the prosecution.
5. It is accepted that, as a rule, minor inconsistencies in the testimony of a witness will not
affect his credibility. It even enhances such credibility because it only shows that he has
not been rehearsed.
25
However, when the inconsistencies pertain to material and crucial
points, the same detract from his overall credibility.
The exception, rather than the rule, applies in the case at bar. As correctly pointed out by
the Solicitor General, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are tainted with serious
flaws and material inconsistencies rendering the same incredible.
26

CIC Taduran, in his testimony, said that they had already been conducting surveillance of
the place where the buy-bust operation was to take place. It turned out, however, that he
did not even know the exact place and the identity of the person from whom he was to buy
marijuana leaves. Thus:
FISCAL TOLOSA
Q What place in Tagas were you able to go (to)?
Page 88 of 96 |

WITNESS
A I am not actually familiar in (sic) that place, in
Tagas, although we occasionally passed there.
Q Now, upon your arrival in Tagas, what did you do
that afternoon?
A I waited for the suspect because previously, we have
already been conducted (sic) surveylance (sic) in the
vicinity.
Q Upon arrival in Tagas, were you able to see the
suspect?
A By the road, sir.
Q Who was the first person did you see (sic) when you
arrived at Tagas?
A The first person whom I saw is Samuel Segovia.
Q Were you able to talk with this Samuel Segovia?
A According to him, we could get some.
27

The same findings go for the testimony of witness Galutan. In his direct examination, he
declared that they arrested the three accused all at the same time on the fateful night of July
1, 1987. But, in his cross-examination and as corroborated by the Joint Affidavit of
Arrest
28
submitted by him and Molinawe, it appeared that Lonceras and Segovia were
arrested on different times and that appellant Don Rodrigueza was not among those who
were arrested. Instead, it was Jovencio Rodrigueza, Don's father, who was picked up at a
much later time.
With said inconsistencies in sharp focus, we are constrained to give more credibility to the
testimony of appellant Rodrigueza. While it is true that appellant's defense amounts to an
alibi, and as such is the weakest defense in a criminal prosecution, there are, nonetheless,
some evidentiary aspects pointing to the truth in his testimony. Firstly, the Joint Affidavit
of Arrest corroborates his testimony that he was not among those who were arrested on the
night of July 1, 1987. His co-accused Segovia also testified that appellant Rodrigueza was
not with them when they were apprehended by the NARCOM agents.
Secondly, the apparent motive of the NARCOM agents in prosecuting the accused was also
revealed during the trial of the case. Rebuttal witnesses Gracita Bahillo, sister of appellant,
and Hospicio Segovia, father of Samuel Segovia, testified that Sgt. Molinawe, who has
since been reportedly dismissed from the service, asked for P10,000.00 from each of them
in exchange for the liberty of the accused.
29
This allegation was never refuted by the
prosecution. Hence, the rule laid down by this Court that the statements of prosecution
witnesses are entitled to full faith and credit
30
has no application in the case at bar.
Finally, the Court has repeatedly ruled that to sustain the conviction of the accused, the
prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the
defense.
31
As clearly shown by the evidence, the prosecution has failed to establish its
cause. It has not overcome the presumption of innocence accorded to appellant. This being
the case, appellant should not be allowed to suffer for unwarranted and imaginary
imputations against him.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction of the court below is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE and accused-appellant Don Rodrigueza is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime
charged. It is hereby ordered that he be immediately released from custody unless he is
otherwise detained for some other lawful cause.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Nocon, JJ., concur.

Page 89 of 96 |

EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. 130568-69. March 21, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CHE CHUN TING alias
"DICK," accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
BELLOSILLO, J .: Missc
CHE CHUN TING alias "DICK," a Hong Kong national, was found guilty by the trial
court on 22 August 1997 of delivering, distributing and dispatching in transit 999.43 grams
of shabu;
[1]
and, having in his custody, possession and control 5,578.68 grams of the same
regulated drug.
[2]
He was meted two (2) death sentences, one for violation of Sec. 15 and
the other for violation of Sec. 16, both of Art. III, of RA 6425 (The Dangerous Drugs Act
of 1972, as amended).
[3]
He was likewise ordered to pay a fine of P1,000,000.00 in the first
case, and P12,000,000.00 in the second.
[4]
He is now before us on automatic review.
The antecedent facts: Following a series of buy-bust operations, the elements of the Special
Operation Unit, Narcotics Command, apprehended a suspected drug courier, Mabel
Cheung Mei Po, after she delivered a transparent plastic bag containing a white crystalline
substance to an informant, in full view of NARCOM agents. When questioned, Mabel
Cheung Mei Po cooperated with the government agents and revealed the name of accused
Che Chun Ting as the source of the drugs.Misspped
On 27 June 1996 the Narcotics Command deployed a team of agents for the entrapment
and arrest of Che Chun Ting. The team was composed of Major Marcelo Garbo, a certain
Captain Campos,
[5]
P/Insp. Raymond Santiago, SPO3 Renato Campanilla, and a civilian
interpreter. The members of the NARCOM team were in two (2) vehicles: a Nissan Sentra
Super Saloon driven by Mabel with P/Insp. Santiago and SPO3 Campanilla as passengers;
and the other vehicle, with Major Garbo, Captain Campos and the civilian interpreter on
board. At around 7 oclock in the morning they proceeded to the Roxas Seafront Garden in
Pasay City where Che Chun Ting was and had the place under surveillance. Later, they
moved to the McDonalds parking lot where the civilian interpreter transferred to the
Nissan car. Mabel then called Che Chun Ting through her cellular phone and spoke to him
in Chinese. According to the interpreter, who translated to the NARCOM agents the
conversation between Mabel and Che Chun Ting, Mabel ordered one (1) kilo of shabu.
At around 10:30 oclock in the morning of the same day, Mabel received a call from the
accused that he was ready to deliver the stuff. She immediately relayed the message to the
NARCOM agents. After receiving the go-signal from Major Garbo, P/Insp. Santiago,
SPO3 Campanilla and Mabel proceeded to the Roxas Seafront Garden. The other vehicle
followed but trailed behind within reasonable distance to serve as a blocking force.
Upon arriving at the Roxas Seafront Garden, Mabel honked twice and went to Unit 122.
The two (2) NARCOM agents, who waited inside the car parked two (2) meters away, saw
the door of the unit open as a man went out to hand Mabel a transparent plastic bag
containing a white crystalline substance. The NARCOM agents immediately alighted and
arrested the surprised man who was positively identified by Mabel as Che Chun Ting. Then
the agents radioed their superiors in the other car and coordinated with the security guard
on duty at the Roxas Seafront Garden to make a search of Unit 122. During the search
SPO3 Campanilla seized a black bag with several plastic bags containing a white
crystalline substance in an open cabinet at the second floor. The bag was examined in the
presence of Major Garbo, the accused himself, and his girlfriend Nimfa Ortiz. The accused
together with the evidence was then brought to Camp Crame where Forensic Chemist P/Sr.
Inspector Julita T. de Villa after conducting laboratory tests found the white crystalline
substance to be positive for methylamphetamine hydrochlorideor shabu.
[6]
Spped
The defense has a different version. Nimfa Ortiz narrated that she sent her brother Noli
Ortiz to meet Mabel Cheung Mei Po in front of the Allied Bank at the EDSA Extension to
help the latter find a lawyer and at the same time get the laser disc she lent to Mabel. Noli
testified that when he got inside the car of Mabel a policeman sitting at the back of the car
suddenly hit him on the head. The car then proceeded to McDonalds at Roxas Boulevard
near the Roxas Seafront Garden where he was moved to another car, a green Nissan Sentra,
with Major Garbo, Captain Lukban and a certain Palma (perceived to be the civilian
interpreter) on board. Mabel stayed behind at McDonalds until she was brought back to
Camp Crame.
Noli Ortiz, Major Garbo, Captain Lukban and Palma went to the Roxas Seafront Garden
where they parked the car five (5) to seven (7) meters away from Unit 122. Noli rang the
doorbell of the unit. When Nimfa opened the door, two (2) NARCOM officers suddenly
forced their way inside and searched the premises. Noli denied having seen any black bag
seized by SPO3 Campanilla; instead, what he saw was his sister's video camera being
carted away by the NARCOM agents. He further testified that when his sister was made to
sign a certification on the conduct of the search on Unit 122 she was frightened and crying.
He claimed that accused Che Chun Ting was then asleep at the second floor of the unit.
The defense presented documents showing that the owner of Unit 122 was Nimfa Ortiz and
not accused Che Chun Ting who lived at 1001 Domingo Poblete St., BF Homes,
Paranaque.
[7]
This information, according to the defense, was vital for purposes of
ascertaining the legality of the search on Unit 122 as well as the seizure therein of a black
bag containing several plastic bags of shabu. Finally, the defense assailed the lower court
Page 90 of 96 |

for relying on the testimony of Mabel who turned hostile witness in the course of the
trial.
[8]

Accused Che Chun Ting now contends that the trial court erred: (a) in convicting him on
the basis of the shabu seized inside Unit 122, which was constitutionally inadmissible as
evidence since it was seized without a search warrant; (b) in failing to recognize that the
testimony of Mabel Cheung Mei Po, who turned hostile witness in the course of the trial,
has discredited the prosecution case and cast doubt on the testimonies of P/Insp. Santiago
and SPO3 Campanilla; and, (c) in assuming that the entire white crystalline substance
seized is positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride. Jospped
We resolve. The 1987 Constitution ordains that no arrest, search or seizure can be made
without a valid warrant issued by a competent judicial authority. Thus -
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose, shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant
of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.
[9]

It further mandates that any evidence obtained in violation thereof shall be inadmissible for
any purpose in any proceeding.
[10]

The right is not absolute and admits of certain well-recognized exceptions. For instance, a
person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may
be used as proof of the commission of the offense, without a search warrant.
[11]
The search
may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the permissible area or
surroundings within his immediate control.
[12]

The issue is whether this case falls within the exception.
The accused was admittedly outside unit 22 and in the act of delivering to Mabel Cheung
Mei Po a bag of shabu when he was arrested by the NARCOM operatives. Moreover, it is
borne by the records that Unit 122 was not even his residence but that of his girlfriend
Nimfa Ortiz, and that he was merely a sojourner therein. Hence, it can hardly be said that
the inner portion of the house constituted a permissible area within his reach or immediate
control,
[13]
to justify a warrantless search therein. Sppedjo
The lawful arrest being the sole justification for the validity of the warrantless search under
the exception, the same must be limited to and circumscribed by the subject, time and place
of the arrest. As to subject, the warrantless search is sanctioned only with respect to the
person of the suspect, and things that may be seized from him are limited to "dangerous
weapons" or "anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense."
With respect to the time and place of the warrantless search, it must be contemporaneous
with the lawful arrest. Stated otherwise, to be valid, the search must have been conducted
at about the time of the arrest or immediately thereafter and only at the place where the
suspect was arrested,
[14]
or the premises or surroundings under his immediate control.
It must be stressed that the purposes of the exception are only to protect the arresting
officer against physical harm from the person being arrested who might be armed with a
concealed weapon, and also to prevent the person arrested from destroying the evidence
within his reach.
[15]
The exception therefore should not be strained beyond what is needed
in order to serve its purposes, as what the Solicitor General would want us to do.
We therefore hold that the search in Unit 122 and the seizure therein of some 5,578.68
grams of shabu do not fall within the exception, hence, were illegal for being violative of
ones basic constitutional right and guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures.
As a consequence of the illegal search, the things seized on the occasion thereof are
inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary rule. They are regarded as having been
obtained from a polluted source, the "fruit of a poisonous tree." However, objects and
properties the possession of which is prohibited by law cannot be returned to their owners
notwithstanding the illegality of their seizure. Thus, the shabu seized by the NARCOM
operatives which cannot legally be possessed by the accused under the law, can and must
be retained by the government to be disposed of in accordance with law.
Be that as it may, the inadmissibility of the 5,578.68 grams of shabu in evidence does not
totally exonerate the accused. The illegal search in Unit 122 was preceded by a valid arrest.
The accused was caught in flagrante delicto as a result of an entrapment conducted by
NARCOM operatives on the basis of the information provided by Mabel Cheung Mei Po
regarding the accused's illegal trade. NARCOM agents P/Insp. Santiago and SPO3
Campanilla saw him handing over a bag of white crystalline substance to Mabel Cheung
Mei Po. His arrest was lawful and the seized bag of shabu weighing 999.43 grams was
admissible in evidence, being the fruit of the crime. Miso
The second assigned error hinges on the credibility of witnesses. As we have consistently
stressed in the majority of appeals in criminal cases, appellate courts give weight, and at
times even finality, to the findings of the trial judge who is in a better position to determine
the credibility of witnesses, as he can observe firsthand their demeanor and deportment
Page 91 of 96 |

while testifying. Appellate courts have none of the judges advantageous position; they rely
merely on the cold records of the case and on the judges discretion.
As mentioned earlier, Mabel Cheung Mei Po turned hostile witness in the course of the
trial. The defense capitalized on such fact and hammered the prosecution on this point,
arguing that Mabels testimony during her cross-examination virtually belied the
prosecutions factual theory of the case and cast doubt on the testimony of the NARCOM
agents.
But we are not persuaded. Mabel Cheung Mei Po turned hostile witness understandably
because of her adverse interest in the case. She was separately charged for violation of Sec.
15, Art. III, RA 6425,
[16]
although she was subsequently acquitted by the trial court on
reasonable doubt.
[17]
It is therefore to be expected that she would be extremely cautious in
giving her testimony as it might incriminate her. At any rate, the testimony of the police
informant in an illegal drug case is not essential for the conviction of the accused since that
testimony would merely be corroborative and cumulative.
[18]
Hence, even if we concede
that Mabel Cheung Mei Pos testimony was discredited on account of the dismissal of the
criminal case against her, the prosecution could still rely on the testimonies of the arresting
officers and secure a conviction on the basis thereof.
Further, the attempt of the accused to downgrade the testimonies of the NARCOM agents
is bereft of substantial basis since it has not been shown that they had an improper motive
for testifying as they did. It would not be amiss to point out that NARCOM agents are not
just ordinary witnesses but are law enforcers. As compared to the baseless disclaimers of
the witnesses for the defense, the narration of the incident of the police officers is far more
worthy of belief coming as it does from law enforcers who are presumed to have regularly
performed their duty in the absence of proof to the contrary.
[19]
From the evidence at hand,
we find no reason to denigrate their declarations.
Indeed, there is no doubt from the records that the accused was caught in flagrante
delicto, i.e., in the act of delivering shabu. The evidence for the prosecution is both
substantial and convincing. At its core is the testimony of P/Insp. Santiago and SPO3
Campanilla who categorically pointed to the accused as the person who handed to Mabel a
plastic bag of white crystalline substance which, upon forensic examination, was found
positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. As can be gleaned from the
assailed decision of the trial court, the narration of events by the police officers is positive,
credible and entirely in accord with human experience. It bears all the earmarks of truth
that it is extremely difficult for a rational mind not to give credence to it. They testified in a
clear, precise and straightforward manner, and even the rigid cross-examination by the
defense could not dent the essence of their testimonies. Nexold
As regards the third assigned error, the accused questions the accuracy of the laboratory
tests conducted by the forensic chemist on the seized articles. He contends that the PNP
Crime Laboratory should have subjected the entire 999.43 grams and 5,578.66 grams of
white crystalline substance taken from him, to laboratory examination and not merely
representative samples thereof in milligrams.
The argument is untenable. Primarily, there is no law or rule of evidence requiring the
forensic chemist to test the entire quantity of seized drugs to determine whether the whole
lot is really prohibited or regulated drugs as suspected. On the contrary, it has always been
the standard procedure in the PNP Crime Laboratory to test only samples of the drugs
submitted for laboratory examination. A sample taken from a package may be logically
presumed to be representative of the whole contents of the package.
[20]

Moreover, we held in one case that chemical analysis is not an indispensable prerequisite to
establish whether a certain substance offered in evidence is a prohibited drug. The ability to
recognize these drugs can be acquired without any knowledge of chemistry to such an
extent that the testimony of a witness on the point may be entitled to great weight. Such
technical knowledge is not required, and the degree of familiarity of a witness with such
drugs only affects the weight and not the competency of his testimony.
[21]
Manikx
At any rate, it was up to the defense to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the
findings of the forensic chemist were erroneous. In the absence of such evidence, the
positive results of the tests conducted by the chemist should be accepted as conclusive.
After all, she has in her favor the presumption that she regularly performed her official
duty, which was to carry out those tests in accordance with the accepted standard
procedure.
[22]

All told, this Court is satisfied that the prosecution has established the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt in Crim. Case No. 96-8932. Accordingly, he must suffer for his
serious crime of poisoning the health and future of this nation. However, we refrain from
imposing the capital punishment. As amended by RA 7659, Sec. 20, Art. IV
of The Dangerous Drugs Act now provides in part that the penalty in Sec. 15, Art. III, shall
be applied if the dangerous drug involved is, in the case of shabu ormethylampethamine
hydrochloride 200 grams or more and the delivery or distribution of regulated drugs
without proper authority is penalized with reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging
from P500,000.00 to P10,000,000.00. Thus the law prescribes two (2) indivisible
penalties, reclusion perpetua and death. Pursuant to Art. 63 of The Revised Penal
Code, since there were neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances attending
accused's violation of the law, the lesser penalty ofreclusion perpetua is the proper
imposable penalty.
Page 92 of 96 |

The legislature never intended that where the quantity of the dangerous drugs involved
exceeds those stated in Sec. 20, the maximum penalty of death shall automatically be
imposed. Nowhere in the amendatory law is there a provision from which such a
conclusion may be drawn. On the contrary, this Court has already concluded in People v.
Gatward
[23]
that RA 7659 did not amend Art. 63 of The Revised Penal Code, and the rules
therein were observed although the cocaine subject of that case was also in excess of the
quantity provided in Sec. 20.
[24]
Maniksx
With respect to Crim. Case No. 96-8933, since the constitutional right of the accused
against unreasonable searches and seizures was violated, which rendered the evidence
against him inadmissible, he is acquitted of the offense charged.
Finally, we take this opportunity to remonstrate the law enforcement agencies regarding
respect for the constitutional rights of persons suspected of committing crimes. As the
phalanx of our united efforts to stem the surging tide of drug-trafficking in this country, the
police force is not only expected to be well-trained and well-equipped in the detection and
apprehension of drug pushers, but more importantly, it must also be aware that arrests,
searches and seizures should at all times and in all instances be done within the context of
the Constitution. While we encourage an active and vigorous law enforcement, we
nevertheless defer to and uphold the sacredness of constitutional rights. In the instant case,
while the penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed by this Court on the accused may be
sufficient to put him away for good, it is nonetheless lamentable that he will walk away
unpunished in the other case of possession of more than 5,000 grams of illegal narcotics on
account of a blunder which could have easily been avoided had the NARCOM officers
faithfully adhered to the requirements of the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the trial court in Crim. Case No. 96-8932 convicting
accused CHE CHUN TING alias "DICK" for violation of Sec. 15, Art. III, of RA 6425
(The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended) is AFFIRMED, subject to the
modification that the penalty imposed by the trial court is reduced to reclusion perpetua.
The accused is ordered to pay a fine in the increased amount of P2,000,000.00, and the
costs.
In Crim. Case No. 96-8933, accused CHE CHUN TING alias "DICK" is ACQUITTED for
failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt the evidence against
him being inadmissible.
The 999.43 grams and 5,578.68 grams of shabu, subject of Crim. Case Nos. 96-8932 and
96-8933 are FORFEITED in favor of the government to be turned over immediately to the
Dangerous Drugs Board and the National Bureau of Investigation for proper disposition.
SO ORDERED. Manikanx
Davide, Jr., C.J., Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon Jr., JJ., concur.

Page 93 of 96 |

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 79021 May 17, 1993
ROMEO S. CHUA, Petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, DENNIS
CANOY AND ALEX DE LEON, Respondents.
Roberto R. Palmares for petitioner.chanrobles virtual law library
Josefino B. Remotigue for private respondents.
BIDIN, J .:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court
assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 7, 1987 which nullified the orders
dated April 18, 1986 and May 19, 1986 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City Branch
VIII.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The facts of the case are not disputed. On April 12, 1986, Judge Lauro V. Francisco of the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City Branch XIII, after examining 2Lt. Dennis P. Canoy and
two (2) other witnesses, issued a search warrant directing the immediate search of the
premises of R.R. Construction located at M.J. Cuenco Avenue, Cebu City, and the seizure
of an Isuzu dump truck with plate number GAP-175. At twelve noon of the same date,
respondent Canoy seized the aforesaid vehicle and took custody
thereof.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
On April 14, 1986, a civil action for Replevin/Sum of Money for the recovery of
possession of the same Isuzu dump truck was filed by petitioner against respondent Canoy
and one "John Doe" in the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City Branch VIII, presided by
Judge Leonardo B. Caares and docketed thereat as Civil Case No. CEB 4384 alleging
among other things, petitioner's lawful ownership and possession of the subject vehicle;
that he has not sold the subject vehicle to anyone; that he has not stolen nor carnapped it,
and that he has never been charged of the crime of carnapping or any other crime for that
matter. Further, petitioner questioned the validity of the search warrant and the subsequent
seizure of the subject vehicle on the strength of the aforesaid search
warrant.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
On the same date, April 14, 1986, Judge Caares of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City
Branch VIII directed the issuance of a writ of replevin upon the posting of a bond in the
amount of one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00). The writ of replevin was also issued
on the same date, and the subject vehicle was seized on 15 April 1986 by Deputy Sheriff
Galicano V. Fuentes.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
On April 16, 1986, respondent Canoy filed a motion for the dismissal of the complaint and
for the quashal of the writ of replevin. The motion was opposed by petitioner. The motion
to dismiss and to quash the writ of replevin was denied in an Order dated April 18, 1986. A
motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned Order was filed and was opposed by
petitioner. In an order dated May 19, 1986, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu Branch VIII
denied the motion for reconsideration and directed the delivery of the subject vehicle to
petitioner. Not satisfied, herein private respondents filed with the Court of Appeals a
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition praying for the nullification of the orders dated
April 18, 1986 and May 19, 1986.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Meanwhile, a case for Carnapping docketed as I.S. No. 86-185, entitled "Alex De Leon,
Complainant, vs. Romeo Chua, Respondent" pending preliminary investigation before the
Office of the City Fiscal of Cebu City was provisionally dismissed upon motion of Romeo
Chua with the following reservation: "without prejudice to its reopening once the issue of
ownership is resolved", (Rollo, p. 62).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
In a decision dated May 17, 1987, the Court of Appeals reversed the Regional Trial Court
of Cebu City Branch VIII, and nullified the questioned orders. The appellate court ordered
the dismissal of the Replevin action, and directed that possession of the subject vehicle be
restored to Canoy. It applied the ruling in the case ofPagkalinawan vs. Gomez (21 SCRA
1275 [1967]) which held:
Once a Court of First Instance has been informed that a search warrant has been issued by
another court of first instance, it cannot require a sheriff or any proper officer of the court
to take the property subject of the replevin action, if theretofore it came into custody of
another public officer by virtue of a search warrant. Only the court of first instance that
issued such a search warrant may order its release.
Furthermore, it was also pointed out in the same case that the validity of a search warrant
may only be questioned in the same court that issued
it.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the decision, but the respondent court denied the
same. Thus, petitioner filed this appeal bycertiorari. The parties submitted their respective
memoranda, and thereafter the case was deemed submitted for
decision.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Page 94 of 96 |

The issue presented before the Court is whether or not the validity of a seizure made
pursuant to a search warrant issued by a court can be questioned in another branch of the
same court, where the criminal action filed in connection with which the search warrant
was issued, had been dismissed provisionally.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
At the outset, it must be pointed out that the ruling made by the Office of the City Fiscal in
the complaint for carnapping was erroneous. It held: ". . . the preliminary investigation of
that case is premature until such time that the issue of ownership will be resolved by the
Court of Appeals, so that the instant case is herebydismissed provisionally without
prejudice to its reopening once the issue of ownership is resolved in favor of complainant."
(emphasis supplied).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
A criminal prosecution for carnapping need not establish the fact that complainant therein
is the absolute owner of the motor vehicle. What is material is the existence of evidence
which would show that respondent took the motor vehicle belonging to another. The Anti-
Carnapping Law or Republic Act No. 6539 punishes as carnapping the taking with intent to
gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another person, without the latter's consent or by
means of violence or intimidation of person or by using force upon
things.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Another aspect which needs to be stressed is the fact that since a preliminary investigation
is not part of the trial, the dismissal of a case by the fiscal will not constitute double
jeopardy and hence there is no bar to the filing of another complaint for the same offense
(People vs. Medted, 68 Phil. 435).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
We find no merit in the main issue presented before Us. Petitioner seeks a reversal of a
decision of the Court of Appeals which relied on the decision in Pagkalinawan vs. Gomez
(supra).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The principle followed among courts in the dispensation of justice is that a judge who
presides in a branch of a court cannot modify or annul the orders issued by another branch
of the same court, since the two (2) courts are of the same rank, and act independently but
coordinately (Montesa vs. Manila Cordage Co., 92 Phil. 25
[1952]).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
It is a basic tenet of civil procedure that replevin will not lie for property in custodia legis.
A thing is in custodia legis when it is shown that it has been and is subjected to the official
custody of a judicial executive officer in pursuance of his execution of a legal writ
(Bagalihog vs. Fernandez, 198 SCRA 614 [1991]). The reason posited for this principle is
that if it was otherwise, there would be interference with the possession before the function
of the law had been performed as to the process under which the property was taken. Thus,
a defendant in an execution or attachment cannot replevy goods in the possession of an
officer under a valid process, although after the levy is discharged, an action to recover
possession will lie (Francisco, Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines: Provisional
Remedies, p. 402 [1985]).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The Court had occasion to rule on this issue in the case of Vlasons Enterprises Corporation
vs. Court of Appeals (155 SCRA 186 [1987]). In the aforementioned case, two (2) propeller
pieces were seized on the strength of a search warrant issued by the Court of First Instance
of Manila Branch XVIII. After the seizure, criminal complaints were filed against the
alleged thieves. However, the complaints were later on dismissed. Five (5) months later, a
civil action for the recovery of the possession of the propellers were filed in the Court of
First Instance of Manila Branch XXIX. The latter court granted the motion for repossession
of the propellers. On appeal this Court held:
The proceeding for the seizure of the property in virtue of a search warrant does not end
with the actual taking of the property . . . and its delivery . . ., to the court . . . . It is merely
the first step in the process to determine the character of the seized property. That
determination is done in the criminal action involving the crime or crimes in connection
with which the search warrant was issued. Hence, such a criminal action should be
prosecuted, or commenced if not yet instituted, and prosecuted. The outcome of the
criminal action will dictate the disposition of the seized property. (Vlasons Enterprises
Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, supra.)
In the Vlasons case, the Court differentiated the case brought before it therein, from
thePagkalinawan case. It stated that in thePagkalinawan case, there was a conflict in
jurisdiction. On the other hand, in the Vlasons case, it was certain that no criminal case
would ensue subsequent to or in connection with the search warrant, hence no conflict in
jurisdiction or in the ultimate disposition of the property could arise. Thus, where personal
property is seized under a search warrant and it appears that the seizure will not be
followed by the filing of any criminal action, but there are conflicting claims asserted over
the seized property, the appropriate remedy is the institution of an ordinary civil action by
any interested party, or of an interpleader action by the Government itself, in the proper
competent court to which the seizing court shall transfer custody of the articles. Another
branch of the same court, in an action to recover said property and during the pendency
thereof, cannot order the delivery of said personal property to therein plaintiff pendente
lite.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Construing the Pagkalinawan case together with the Vlasons case, we rule that where
personal property is seized under a search warrant and there is reason to believe that the
seizure will not anymore be followed by the filing of a criminal and there are conflicting
claims over the seized property, the proper remedy is the filing of an action for replevin, or
an interpleader filed by the Government in the proper court, not necessarily the same one
Page 95 of 96 |

which issued the search warrant; however, where there is still a probability that the seizure
will be followed by the filing of a criminal action, as in the case at bar where the case for
carnapping was "dismissed provisionally, without prejudice to its reopening once the issue
of ownership is resolved in favor of complainant" (emphasis supplied), or the criminal
information has actually been commenced, or filed, and actually prosecuted, and there are
conflicting claims over the property seized, the proper remedy is to question the validity of
the search warrant in the same court which issued it and not in any other branch of the said
court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Thus, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu Branch VIII erred when it ordered the transfer of
possession of the property seized to petitioner when the latter filed the action for replevin.
It should have dismissed the case since by virtue of the "provisional dismissal", of the
carnapping case there is still a probability that a criminal case would be filed, hence a
conflict in jurisdiction could still arise. The basic principle that a judge who presides in one
court cannot annul or modify the orders issued by another branch of the same court because
they are co-equal and independent bodies acting coordinately, must always be
adhered to.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, the petition is denied. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 7,
1987 is AFFIRMED.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
DAVIDE, JR., J ., concurring and dissenting:chanrobles virtual law library
I agree with the majority that Branch VIII of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu should not
have taken cognizance of the civil case for replevin (Civil Case No. CEB-
However, I am not prepared to go along with the restatement of the rule on the recovery of
property seized by virtue of a search warrant, to wit:
Construing the Pagkalinawan casetogether with the Vlasons case, we rule that where
seizure will not anymore be followed by the filing of a criminal action, and there are
conflicting claims over the seized property, the proper remedy is the filing of an action for
replevin, or an interpleader filed by the Government in the proper court, not necessarily the
same one which issued the search warrant; however, where there is still a probability that
the seizure will be followed by the filing of a criminal action, as in the case at bar where
the case for carnapping was "dismissed provisionally, without prejudice to reopening once
issue of ownership resolved in favor of complainant"(emphasis supplied), or the criminal
the search warrant in the same court which issued it and not in any branch of the said court.
I respectfully submit that regardless of the number of claimants to the property seized, the
remedy should be obtained from the court which issued the warrant either by a motion to
quash the search warrant or a motion to release the property. Replevin does not lie because
regardless of the validity or invalidity of the search warrant, the property was effectively
placed in custodia legis and, therefore, beyond the reach of a replevin suit. It would be
entirely different if the seizure was unlawful, in which case replevin may
prosper.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The reasons why the application for the recovery of the seized property must be made with
the court issuing the warrant are quite obvious. It had acquired jurisdiction over the res.
The pendency of the application could prod the Government to expedite the investigation
and prosecution of the criminal case, if any, in connection with which the warrant was
secured. The parties, especially the innocent parties, should not be made to await
indefinitely the outcome of the criminal action which the prosecution arm may either delay
or not file at all for reasons only known to itself.
Separate Opinions
DAVIDE, JR., J ., concurring and dissenting:chanrobles virtual law library
I agree with the majority that Branch VIII of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu should not
have taken cognizance of the civil case for replevin (Civil Case No. CEB-
However, I am not prepared to go along with the restatement of the rule on the recovery of
property seized by virtue of a search warrant, to wit:
Page 96 of 96 |

Construing the Pagkalinawan casetogether with the Vlasons case, we rule that where
seizure will not anymore be followed by the filing of a criminal action, and there are
conflicting claims over the seized property, the proper remedy is the filing of an action for
replevin, or an interpleader filed by the Government in the proper court, not necessarily the
same one which issued the search warrant; however, where there is still a probability that
the seizure will be followed by the filing of a criminal action, as in the case at bar where
the case for carnapping was "dismissed provisionally, without prejudice to reopening once
issue of ownership resolved in favor of complainant"(emphasis supplied), or the criminal
the search warrant in the same court which issued it and not in any branch of the said court.
I respectfully submit that regardless of the number of claimants to the property seized, the
remedy should be obtained from the court which issued the warrant either by a motion to
quash the search warrant or a motion to release the property. Replevin does not lie because
regardless of the validity or invalidity of the search warrant, the property was effectively
placed in custodia legis and, therefore, beyond the reach of a replevin suit. It would be
entirely different if the seizure was unlawful, in which case replevin may
prosper.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The reasons why the application for the recovery of the seized property must be made with
the court issuing the warrant are quite obvious. It had acquired jurisdiction over the res.
The pendency of the application could prod the Government to expedite the investigation
and prosecution of the criminal case, if any, in connection with which the warrant was
secured. The parties, especially the innocent parties, should not be made to await
indefinitely the outcome of the criminal action which the prosecution arm may either delay
or not file at all for reasons only known to itself.

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Criminal Procedure Rule 126: Searches and Seizures

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