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David gall: blaise Pascal distinguished between god of the religious and god of the philosophers. He says richard Rorty called the god of the theologians, sort of god of the "philosophers" but These distinctions overlook a more original sense of what is divine: the god of the thinker. Gall: if daimon is a "last" god, then philosophers have a "first" god.
David gall: blaise Pascal distinguished between god of the religious and god of the philosophers. He says richard Rorty called the god of the theologians, sort of god of the "philosophers" but These distinctions overlook a more original sense of what is divine: the god of the thinker. Gall: if daimon is a "last" god, then philosophers have a "first" god.
David gall: blaise Pascal distinguished between god of the religious and god of the philosophers. He says richard Rorty called the god of the theologians, sort of god of the "philosophers" but These distinctions overlook a more original sense of what is divine: the god of the thinker. Gall: if daimon is a "last" god, then philosophers have a "first" god.
Robert S. Gall Blaise Pascal famously distinguished be- tween the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob (and of Christians) and the God of the philoso- phers. The first is the God of the religious be- liever, the personal, loving God (of whatever religious tradition) that offers hope of salva- tion to the believer and fear of punishment and damnation to the nonbeliever. The second re- fers to all those abstract ultimate realities that have accumulated throughout the history of Western philosophy that complete some comprehensive, intellectual view of all that is (and has been or will be). To this distinction we also might add another sort of God, what Rich- ard Rorty called the God of the theologians, the sort of God that results from running to- gether the needs of religious believers with the needs of the philosophers by changing the la- bel of the latest philosophical costume. 1 Rorty specifically had in mind Paul Tillichs theolog- ical knockoff of Heideggers Sein and Mark Taylors appropriation of Derridas diffrance, but his label would include everything from Philos use of Plotinus and Aquinass use of Aristotle to process theologys reinterpretation of Whitehead, to recent efforts by philoso- phers working in the Continental tradition to reconcile postmodernism with Biblical themes. 2 These distinctions, however, overlook a more original, more primordial sense of what is divine: the god of the thinker. The early Greeks named this understanding of divinity daimo\n (ooimv), a naming which is heard at the crossroads between philosophy and reli- gion, between earlier and later Greek thinking, in Socrates talk of what inspires and drives him. Interestingly, the twentieth century phi- losopher Martin Heidegger wrestles with the meaning of daimo\n in his interpretations of Plato, Aristotle, and early Greek thinkers, hint- ing at his own understanding of what is divine named in the last god (der letzte Gott). This is the field I want to survey in this paper: what are the meanings of daimo\n and the last god, and how do they name the god of the thinker. We begin with Socrates, the paradigmatic thinker of Western philosophy. In the course of his trial, Socrates notes that: I am subject to something divine (daimonion; ooioviov), which Meletus sawfit to travesty in his indictment. It began in my early child- hooda sort of voice which comes to me, and when it comes it always dissuades me from what I am proposing to do, and never urges me on. (Plato, Apology, 31c-d) 3 Socrates daimonion apparently was well known; both Plato and Xenophon note or have Socrates refer to his daimonion a number of times. In addition, as Socrates observes here, his daimonion is part of what is at issue in his indictment; all the sources note that Socrates was charged with introducing or bringing in strange daimonia (ooiovio oivo). 4 Soc- rates daimonion was clearly important to who he was and to what he was charged with being. As a first reading, the noncommital transla- tion of daimonion as something divine seems most appropriate. On the one hand, many of the earliest Greek writers (e.g., Homer, Pindar, the Greek tragedians) use the termdaimo\n in conjunction with theos (0ro), such as in the stock ending for Euripides plays: Many forms are there of the divine (daimo\nion; ooiovimv). Many things the gods (theoi; 0roi) accomplish unexpectedly. What we waited for does not come to pass, while for what remained undreamed the god (theos; 0ro) finds ways. Just such doing was this doing. 5 The two termsdaimo\ni and theosare and are not exactly interchangeable. Lacking an image or a cult, ooimv often indicates a strange sort of activity or power rather than a class of beings. In that sense, daimo\n is similar to o theos (o 0ro), which means god or the PHILOSOPHY TODAY Fall 2009 265 god in a generic sense, not the particular and individual gods of the Greek pantheon. Nam- ing a force that drives man forward where no agent can be named, one way to understand daimo\n then is as the veiled countenance of divine activity that is invoked when the event or action eludes characterization and naming. 6 This seems to be exactly the way to describe what is going on with Socrates. As James Beckman has put it, Socrates description of the ooioviov reveals nothing about any god or ooimv precisely because no such thing is revealed to him. . . . The ambiguity of the refer- ence to the ooioviov is the measure of its pre- ciseness as a description (Beckman 77). By citing the daimonion, Socrates acknowledges that some force or power is at work in and through him but about which he can say little more. This initial reading of daimo\n is deepened and complicated when we recall the famous fragment from Heraclitus (DK 119): hthos anthropoi daimon (p0o ov0mam ooimv) Ones character is ones daimo\n or ones daimo\n is ones character. Here daimo\n is sometimes translated as fate or destiny in keeping with the apparent root meaning and the way the ancient Greeks spoke of a life of good or bad fortune. 7 Though Charles Kahn says in his commentary on this fragment that it is a mans own character, not some external power, that assigns to him the quality of his life (261), it is not that simple. It is important that we hear the double sense of the Heraclitus fragment: ones character is ones daimo\n/ ones daimo\n is ones character. For the an- cient Greeks your character is given to you in some sense; who you are is not completely within your control. Your actions reveal your character but are also something given to you, something sent by something divine. Prime examples of this can be found in Greek tragedy, in which key characters continually are identified with a god or divine force. A characters emotions are attributed to some- thing divine, some god, some daimo\n, espe- cially in cases where the character suffers some dislocation, some blindness (ate\; otp) or raving (madness) (lussa; uooo). 8 Per- haps the best example of this human/inhuman coupling is Oedipus in Oedipus Tyrranos. There, in the final choral ode, noting and la- menting the paradigmatic character of Oedipus, the chorus points out how his life is fused with the daimona (1194). 9 Later, after he has gouged out his eyes, the chorus asks him what daimono\n (ooiovmv) urged him, to which he gives the equivocal reply: It was Apollo, friends, Apollo,/ that brought this bit- ter bitterness, my sorrows to completion./But the hand that struck me/was none but my own (132733). 10 Oedipus doubles for the god, as do so many of the tragic heroes, in the ambigu- ous way indicated by Heraclitus fragment. This likewise seems to be the point of Socrates acknowledgment of his daimonion. It marks a puzzling site in his experience that is both inside and outside of who he is and what he does. What we today would reduce to some sort of natural psychological process (a hunch or intuition, i.e., something tells me such and such), it is nonetheless some- thing more to Socrates; he treats it in a down- to-earth, matter-of-fact manner but at the same time acknowledges it to be something be- yond himself and his ordinary consciousness of and thought about the world. The characterization of the divine as daimo\n is given further depth through Martin Heideggers treatment of the saying from Heraclitus. Finding the usual translation more modern than Greek, he offers an alternative translation in his Letter on Humanism: man dwells, insofar as he is man, in the nearness of the god. 11 He finds this translation confirmed in a story about Heraclitus told by Aristotle in which Heraclitus assures some visitors that the gods show themselves in his kitchen. 12 Heideggers point is that, according to Hera- clitus, what is divine shows itself even in an or- dinary, familiar [geheuer] place such as that kitchen. Thus he follows with a second transla- tion: The (familiar [geheure]) abode is for hu- man beings the open region for the presencing of the god (the un-familiar one [des Un- geheuren]) (GA 9, 187; Path, 270). Now Heidegger translates daimon as the un-famil- iar one or the uncanny, recalling a discus- sion Heidegger had of daimo\n in his Parmenides course a few years earlier. There Heideggers clarification of daimo\n starts by way Aristotles use of daimonia in the Nicomachean Ethics as an all-encompassing word for what is excessive, astounding, and difficult. 13 Thus, Heidegger chooses to trans- late to daimonion as das Un-geheur. It is a PHILOSOPHY TODAY 266 somewhat old-fashioned term he borrows from Hlderlins translation of a choral ode in Antigone (33275) that calls human beings to deinon (to orivov), the strangest. 14 Suggest- ing monster or the monstrous (das Ungeheuere), Heidegger makes it clear in those lectures that Un-geheur means the un- canny, the unfamiliar, or the extraordi- nary. Daimo\n is the uncanny because it pres- ents itself in everything ordinaryand is hence the most naturalwithout being the or- dinary. With the ancient Greeks, the daemonic appears not only through elements inside the self (the passions, the blood) as noted above, but also outside the selfthrough wind, rain, fire, animals. Socrates himself makes a point of this in Xenophons Apology (1213), noting that people take the sounds of birds to be omens from the gods. Continuing to elabo- rate on daimo\n, Heidegger notes its relation to daio\ (ooim), which Heidegger translates as to present oneself in the sense of pointing and showing (GA 54, 151; P, 102). This sense of pointing or showing relates to a significant characteristic of the Greek gods: they give signs and point (GA 54, 59; P, 40). Heraclitus noted this as well (DK 93): The Lord whose oracle is in Delphi [the god Apollo] neither speaks nor conceals but hints [winkt] (o ovo, ou to ovtriov roti to rv Aroi, outr ryri outr uatri oo opoivri ). 15 Socra- tes knew this, which is why he was wise to question the oracle at Delphi (Apology 21b) rather than simply accept the answer of the or- acle. In this way, recognizing and acknowledg- ing what is divine, listening to something di- vine, he acknowledged something strange and uncanny, what is questionable and ques- tion worthywhat calls for thinking. The as- tonishing being of the ordinarywhat is strange and uncannytakes name and figure and place in the work, as the god. The god is an indication, a sign, a hint, of howthings are and who we are. As a result, daimonion points to being; daimo\n (and its cognates that acknowl- edge the gods or divinity) indicates invisi- ble and ungraspable being itself, whereby what is divine is manifest in the abyssal space of being itself. Such, according to Heidegger, is the fundamental Greek experience of what is divine. 16 What Heideggers interpretations of daimo\n show is that the word is a recognition of something divine, overwhelming, unsur- passable, which emerges in, through, and from our actions and refuses our control. In that way the ancient Greeks came to know and find themselves dwelling in the neighborhood of the uncanny and strange. What was meaning- ful and significant was not seen beyond this world, beyond the things in the world and the things that take place in the world, but in them- selves and things themselves. The gods then are not objects of speculation or a theology but indications of the awesome forces and powers active in the world in and around us that reveal the significance of things. What is divine is in- comprehensible not because it so utterly tran- scends us or is so esoteric by nature that we cannot understand it, but because it is so close, so near, so simple, so ordinary, and so spe- cific to particular events and activities. These senses of daimo\n that we have been discussingas something that is given, a des- tiny that is bound up with who one is and how one acts, as the uncanny that calls into ques- tion, showing us as we are and what is signifi- cantare connected to Socrates other signifi- cant mention of divinity in the Apology, namely, his explanation of his mission to philosophize (Apology 20e ff.). The story is well known: Socrates reports that his friend Chaerephon went to Delphi and asked the god (o theos) whether there was anyone wiser than Socrates, to which the priestess simply answered no. 17 Note here that Socrates (and throughout much of the Apology) uses the ge- neric the god and never refers to any particu- lar god in which the city believes (though he slyly leaves the jury to assume that he is talking about Apollo by talking about the god at Delphi [Apology 20e]). The god did not give him any directions, just as Socrates daimonion never urges himon. Instead, the or- acles answer strikes Socrates as strange, un- canny, extraordinary, since he claims no spe- cial knowledge for himself. Thus he questions the meaning of the answer given Chaerephon. What results is his interpretation of the ocular saying: that his questioning of others is done at the gods command and that he acts in ser- vice to the god such that the god has ap- pointed himor given hima mission to act as he doesto question. The god leads him to questioning, even to questioning the god (Apology 21c). Thus he refuses to give up his THE LAST GOD 267 destiny, saying that this duty I have accepted, as I said, in obedience to the gods commands given in oracles and dreams and in every other way that any divine dispensation has ever im- pressed a duty upon man. 18 Socrates is not willing to stop his questioning, his inquiries, because that would be impious; it would go against who he has been given to beby the god, by his daimonion. His daimonion de- fines who he is by pointing to what is strange, what is uncanny, what is worthy of thought. To the philosopher and the religious be- liever, Socratesjustification of himself and his daimonion make little sense. As James S. Hans puts it, not only does it seem implausible, his justification contradicts itself: he is paying great fealty to the gods throughout his life by trying to cast doubt on their oracles. 19 By the standards of philosophical and religious thoughtwhich seek justified beliefsSoc- rates is impious because he asks questions. Yet this is only impious and contradictory if we take Socrates to be expressing beliefs that do or do not conform to some sort of philosophi- cal or theological orthodoxy. But Socrates does not express belief in the gods (of the city) anywhere in the Apology. He does proclaimhis piety, though, because piety for him comes fromacknowledging that the god wants ev- erybody every day to be questioning: examin- ing and re-examining the values by which their life is led. 20 While daimo\n and the Greek gods are no more, it is within the context of such an under- standing of divinity that we should hear Heideggers own talk of what is divinetalk that shifts in ways that seem, like the term daimo\n, designed to avoid assertions about what is divine while at the same time acknowl- edging something divine. On the one hand, he notes the daemonic references to divinity in predecessors such as Hlderlin and Nietzsche, then appropriates them in his own thinking. For instance, Hlderlins remembrance of the ancient Greeks and their gods inspires Heideggers talk of gods or divinities (in keeping with there being many forms of daimonio\n, as Euripides said), the beckoning (winkenden) messengers of what is divine that are revealed (though in some sense hid- den) in and through things. Likewise, in the essay . . . Poetically Man Dwells . . . , Heidegger elaborates on Hlderlins un- known god, which is revealed by the sky and pervades what is intimate to human beings. It thereby serves as a measure by which human beings dwell on the earth, though it remains a stranger (Fremde) even as it emerges in and through things and events. 21 Such references have and continue to provoke thought, puz- zling philosophers and theologians alike who are accustomed to the Western tradition and its (philosophical or religious) monotheism. Nietzsche too echoes the daemonic with his word God is dead. When the madmanone without the sense of othersproclaims this in The Gay Science (section 125), it elicits ques- tioningfirst, the sarcastic questioning of atheists but then the more original questioning of the madman himself: Whither is God? he cried; I will tell you. We have killed him you and I. All of us are his murders. But howdid we do this? Howcould we drink up the sea? Who gave us the sponge to wipe away the entire horizon? What were we doing when we unchained this earth from its sun? Whither is it moving now? Whither are we moving? Away from all suns? Are we not plunging continually? Backward, sideward, forward, in all directions? Is there still any up or down? Are we not straying as through an infi- nite nothing? Do we not feel the breath of empty space? Has it not become colder? Is not night continually closing in on us? Do we not need to light lanterns in the morning? Do we hear noth- ing as yet of the noise of the gravediggers who are burying God? Do we smell nothing as yet of the divine decomposition? . . . How shall we comfort ourselves, the murderers of all murder- ers? What was holiest and mightiest of all that the world has yet owned has bled to death under our knives: who will wipe this blood off us? What water is there for us to clean ourselves? What festivals of atonement, what sacred games shall we have to invent? Is not the great- ness of this deed too great for us? Must we our- selves not become gods simply to appear wor- thy of it? 22 There are no answers from the listeners, who stare at the madman in astonishment. We are left with the questions. Later, echoing the mourning that Heidegger has noted in Hlderlin, the madman strikes up his requiem PHILOSOPHY TODAY 268 aeternam deo in several churches, acknowl- edging them as the tombs and sepulchers of God. God has passed away, leaving usif we thinkwith questions about ourselves and seeking what is divine. 23 This especially is the case where Heidegger speaks elusively of the last god (der letzte Gott)more specifically, the passing by (Vorbeigang) of the last god. 24 This perhaps is Heideggers most riddling naming of what is divine. On the one hand, it means the ultimate God and thereby echoes Hlderlin and Nietz- sche: the passing by of the ultimate God marks the transition in which we find ourselves, in which all the philosophical and religious ulti- mates (including the Christian God), all the gods that have been, have passed by, with no new god or gods yet revealing themselves. On the other hand, echoing both Nietzsches Twi- light of the Idols and Hegels observation that the owl of Minerva flies at dusk, Heideggers reference to the passing by of the last god seems to indicate that only in the transition from the last godwhichever god has been to an unknown future god, gods or lack of gods do we catch a glimpse of the essence of divin- ity (Gottwesen). Only now do we have a sense of something divine. Thus Heidegger says in the Der Spiegel interview that: Only a god can save us. The only possibility available to us is that by thinking and compos- ing (dichten) we prepare a readiness for the ap- pearance of a god, or for the absence of a god in our going-down, for in the face of the godwhois absent, we go-down. 25 The going-down here is a coming back down to earth from the speculative heights of traditional philosophy to abide in who we are. The salvation of which Heidegger speaks, then, is a matter of becoming who we are. 26 To become who we are we need a measure, a god, something divinewhich can even be an ab- sence of god. This then is another meaning of the last god: last as end, as goal, as an es- sential indicator (a hint or sign) of human be- ing. That is Da-sein, being t/here, the being for whom its being is an issue, the being that asks the meaning of being (GA 65, 40708, 409, 413; CP 28687, 288, 291). Here, now, is the heart of the matter. Poeti- cally naming daimo\n in conjunction with its heroes, Greek tragedy showed human beings and their actions not as things that can be de- fined or described, but as problems, resulting in a questioning to which there can be no [fi- nal] answers. 27 Socrates thoughtfully echoed and acknowledged the question and question- ing that we are by acknowledging his daimonion and the mission he had been given by the god. Heidegger, thoughtfully respond- ing to the Greeks, to Hlderlin, to Nietzsches madman, speaks of the gods and the last god. All agree: the measure given by daimo\n, by the uncanny, by the last god, is questioning. Questioning, because it violates the familiar understanding of things and ourselves, makes things strange, makes us strange (who was and remains stranger than Socra- tes?). As Sophocles says, echoing Heraclitus: There is much that is strange, but nothing/ that surpasses man in strangeness (Antigone 33233). Human beings are the strangest among many strange things because in their (ordinary) deeds and activities they are cast out of the familiar. However, by violating those fa- miliar limits, human beings show what is es- sential to who they are (see GA 40, 158ff.; IM 148ff.; GA 53, 63ff.; HHI 51ff.). In question- ing we become who we are, open to possibili- ties, open to the mysteries of the world and ourselves. To stop questioning, to lead an un- examined life, is to lead a life not worth liv- ingbecause it is no longer a meaningful life, the life of a human being. Questioning is the piety of thinking (GA 7, 36; QCT 35) because it is a submission and response to the god the god as daimo\n, what is uncanny, the last godand the strangeness indicated by the god. The god of the thinker then is not the God of the philosophers. Philosophy speaks of god onto-theo-logicallyas the most universal or the highest being/the first causeand that re- duces what is divine (and ourselves) to an an- swer, to some thing that can be calculated. Likewise the daimo\n/the last god then is not a sense of God which is distinctly powerful, monotheistic, and devoted, as one commenta- tor recently has put it. 28 This too is a calculat- ing determination of what is divine, a calcula- tion which Heidegger repeatedly undermines in his frequent reference to the gods. All theisms collapse before the hinting of the gods THE LAST GOD 269 and the last god; the multitude of gods cannot be quantified. 29 However, even though the originary, essen- tial thinking initiated here by the daimo\n/the last god seems like a faith compared to the knowing of philosophy (GA 65, 369; CP 258), the god of the thinker also is not the God of the faithful. This can be seen in Socratesin- dictment; his daimonion is strange and dan- gerous to religious orthodoxy. That danger is apparent in Platos Euthyphro, in which Socra- tes raises questions that undermine (or should undermi ne) t he confi dence and fai t h Euthyphro has that he is doing what the gods want. With his famous questionIs what is holy holy because the gods approve it, or do they approve it because it is holy? (Euthyphro 10)Socrates shows us that a more funda- mental thinking is called for than any attitude of faith. Thus, as Heidegger notes, the original experience of what is divine does not come from within religion; the daimo\n, the last god, do not appear through faith or personal, lived experiences, churches or cults. 30 Nor is the god of the thinker the God of the theologians, or the philosopher-theologians, in our midst today who latch onto Heideggers critique of the god of philosophy as prepara- tion for some other kind of theology or authen- tic religion. Richard Kearney speaks of The God Who May Be, a God of possibilities, but his God is a God of limited possibilities be- cause it is a God of hope. As Heidegger notes, all eschatology lives out of a faith in the cer- tainty of a newstate of affairs (GA66, 245; M 216). That is not the daimo\n or the last god, which also acknowledge divine possibility, but a divine possibility that is not some expedient of human beings; the daimo\n/the last god con- founds our expectations, does not fulfill our hopes, and grants us what remained un- dreamed (as Euripides told us). Again, what is divine cannot be calculated. Despised by philosophers and the faithful (such that it eventually becomes an evil spiritor demon as early as Platos later writ- ing), the god of the thinker is the daimo\n, the uncanny, the last god, that calls for question- ing, whereby we are true to ourselves as think- ersand as human beings. It is despised be- cause it yields what is a god-less thinking (GA11, 77; ID72) to both philosophy and reli- gion yet is closer to what is divine than either reason or faith. This essential thinking is a faith in doubt, where the faith of philoso- phy, religion, and theologians is in doubt, in question, even as it shows faith in questioning, in inquiry, in asking the meaning of being. Faith in doubt reveals, and is revealed by, the daimo\n, the last god. ENDNOTES PHILOSOPHY TODAY 270 1. Ri chard Rort y, Comment s on Tayl ors Paralectics, in On the Other: Dialogue and/or Di- alectics, ed. Robert P. Scharlemann (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1991), 71ff. 2. I am thinking herethe work of such philosopher- theologians such as Richard Kearney, The God Who May Be. AHermeneutics of Religion (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001); Jean-Luc Marion, God Without Being, trans. Thomas A. Carlson (Chi- cago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); and, of course, Emmanuel Levinas, Of God Who Comes to Mind, trans. Bettina Bergo (Stanford: Stanford Uni- versity Press, 1998). 3. The translation (slightly altered) is from Plato: The Collected Dialogues, ed. Edith Hamilton and Hun- tington Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961). 4. For references to Socrates daimonion, see, e.g., Xenophon, Apology 4, 1314, Memorabilia 1.1.2ff., 4.8.1ff.; Plato, Apology 31d, 40a, Euthyphro 3a-b, Phaedrus 242b-c, Republic 6.496c. Regarding the indictment, see Plato, Apology 27c-e and Euthyphro 3b (where Euthyphro suggests that the indictment involves Socrates daimonion); Xenophon, Apology 10 and Memorabilia 1.1; Diog- enes Laertius, Lives of the Famous Philosophers 2.40. Thomas C. Brickhouse and Nicholas D. Smith, The Philosophy of Socrates (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2000), 236f., argue that religious consider- ationsrather than political considerationsseem to have played a large part in Socrates indictment (though they attribute views to Socrates that appear more Platonic than we will be argue below). In his discussion of the Apology, James Beckman also takes the indictment (and Socrates defense against the indictment) to be about religious beliefs and practices; see The Religious Dimension of Socrates Thought (Waterloo, Ontario: Canadian Corporation for Studies in Religion/Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1979), 54ff. THE LAST GOD 271 5. Euripides, The Bacchae of Euripides, trans. C. K. Williams (New York: The Noonday Press, 1990), 8687. 6. Walter Burkert, Greek Religion, trans. John Raffan (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), 180. 7. Based upon interpreting the root ooi- as indicating one who distributes or assigns a portion; see Charles H. Kahn, The Art and Thought of Heraclitus (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 261. However, Burkert, Greek Religion, 420n3, while acknowledging the common interpretation of the root ooi - as apportioner, notes some ambigu- ity, given that ooim means to divide. 8. E.g., in Aeschylus Seven Against Thebes, Eteocles and Polynieces kill each other ooiovmvtr rv otoipossessed by spirits of blindness (1001) (Seven Against Thebes, trans. Anthony Hecht and Helen H. Bacon [New York: Oxford University Press, 1973], 64)while, in EuripidesThe Phoeni- cian Women, Teiresias tells Creon that it would be best if no one from Oedipus house lived in Thebes since the gods hound them on (ooiovmvto) to spoil the state (888) (The Complete Greek Trage- dies, volume IV, ed. by David Grene and Richmond Lattimore [Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992], 494). A fragment from Euripides noted by Ruth Padel says: When daimo\n prepares evils for a man/he first harms the nous [mind]/of the man whomhe advises. This fragment fromEuripi- des seems to be the originof the Latin phrase Quem deus vult perdere, dementat prius (Whom God wishes to destroy, He first makes mad); see Whom the Gods Destroy. Elements of Greek and Tragic Madness (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 34. 9. This is how Stephen Berg and Diskin Clay translate the reference to daimona; see Oedipus the King (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 78. Robert Fagles translates daimona as destiny (The Three Theban Plays [New York: Viking Penguin, 1983], 233); in The Complete Greek Tragedies, vol- ume II, 64, David Grene translates daimona as fate. 10. This is the Chicago translation, which translates daimono\n as spirit. Robert Fagles translation for daimono\n is superhuman power, while the Berg- Clay translation is demon. 11. Martin Heidegger, Wegmarken, Gesamtausgabe Band 9 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1976), 185 (here- after GA9); Pathmarks, ed. WilliamMcNeill (Cam- bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 269 (hereafter Path). 12. In Aristotles Parts of Animals I.5.645a, 17: The story is told of something Heraclitus said to some strangers who wanted to come visit him. Having ar- rived, they saw him warming himself at a stove. Surprised, they stood there in consternationabove all because he encouraged them, the astounded ones, and called for them to come in with the words, for here too the gods come to presence [wesen an]; GA 9, 185; Pathmarks, 26970 (translation slightly altered). The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. Jona- than Barnes, volume 1 (Princeton: PrincetonUniver- sity Press, 1984), 1004, translates the passage as fol- lows: and as Heraclitus, when the strangers who came to visit him found him warming himself at the furnace in the kitchen and hesitated to go in, is re- ported to have bidden them not to be afraid to enter, as even in that kitchen divinities were present. Aris- totle uses the story to argue for investigating every- thing in nature, even the humbler animals. 13. VI. 7, 1141b: It is saidthat they (the thinkers) indeed know things that are excessive, and thus astounding, and thereby difficult, and hence in general demonic but also useless, for they are not seeking what is, according to straightforward popular opinion, good for man. Mart i n Hei degger, Parmeni des, Gesamtausgabe Band 54 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1982), 148f (hereafter GA 54); Parmenides, trans. Andr Schuwer and Ri chard Roj cewi cz (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), 100ff. (hereafter P). Cf. the translation in The Com- plete Works of Aristotle, volume 2, 1802: we say that they know things that are remarkable, admira- ble, difficult, and divine, but useless, viz. because it is not human goods that they seek. 14. See Martin Heidegger, Hlderlins Hymne Der Ister, Gesamtausgabe Band 53 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1984), 83ff (hereafter GA 53); Hlderlins Hymn The Ister, trans. William McNeill and Julia Davis (Bloomington: Indiana Uni- versity Press, 1996), 68ff (hereafter HHI). Note that Heidegger prefers to translate to deinon (to orivov) as das Unheimliche; see GA 53, 88; Hlderlins Hymn, 71 and, most famously, Einfhrung in die Metaphysik, Gesamtausgabe Band 40 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1983), 153ff. (hereafter GA 40); An Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Ralph Mannheim (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959), 150ff. (hereafter IM). 15. Der Herr, dessen Spruchort zu Delphi is [Gott Apollo], sagt weder, noch verbirgt er, sondern winkt; Hlderlins Hymnen Germanien und Der Rhei n, Gesamt ausgabe 39 (Frankfurt : Klostermann, 1989), 127 (hereafter GA 39). Kahn translates: The lord whose oracle is in Delphi nei- ther declares nor conceals but gives a sign (43). Robinson translates: The lord whose oracle is in Delphi neither indicates clearly nor conceals but gives a sign (57). West Liberty State College, West Liberty, WV 26074 PHILOSOPHY TODAY 272 16. This is a summary of a complex discussion of the Greek gods that Heidegger gives in GA 54, 147- 168; Parmenides, 99113. 17. Xenophons account is rather different. In his Apol- ogy, 14, he reports that Socrates said: Come now, hear other things as well, so that those of you who wish may disbelieve still more that I have been hon- ored by daimones: once, when Chaerephon asked in Delphi in the presence of many, Apollo responded that no human being was more free, more just, or more moderate than I. The Shorter Socratic Writ- ings, trans. and ed. by Robert C. Bartlett (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), 12. Here then there is a more explicit linking of Socrates daimonion to the god (understood as Apollo), but Xenophons Socrates does not talk of a mission or duty to the god. 18. Plato, Apology 33c (translation slightly altered). Other references by Socrates to the gods com- mand and his obedience to the god may be found at Apology 22a, 23b-c, 28e-29a, 29d, 30a, 30e-31b. 19. James S. Hans, Socrates and the Irrational (Char- lottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2006), 55. 20. M. F. Burnyeat, The Impiety of Socrates, Ancient Philosophy 17 (1997): 5. 21. Note that the references to gods or divinities in Heideggers work goes back at least as far as the 1930s and his Beitrge zur Philosophie, Gesamtausgabe Band 65 (Frankfurt: Kloster- mann,), e.g., 24244, 31011, 50809 (hereafter GA 65); Contributions to Philosophy, trans. Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), e.g., 172, 21819, 35758 (hereafter CP). Later acknowledgment of the god and gods can be found in essays such as Building Thinking Dwelling, The Thing, and . . . Poetically Man Dwells . . . in Vortrge und Aufstze, Gesamtausgabe Band 7 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 2000), 14764, 16787. 191208; Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), 14561, 16586, 21329 (hereafter PLT). For refer- ences to the gods as beckoning messengers of di- vinity or the holy, see, e.g., GA 7, 151, 180; Poetry, Language, Thought, 150, 178. 22. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage/Random House, 1974), 181. 23. Heideggers essay Nietzsches Word: God is Dead, in Holzwege, Gesamtausgabe Band 5 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1977), 20967; Off the Beaten Track, ed. and trans. Julian Young and Ken- neth Hayes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 157199, largely focuses on how Nietzsche and others do not stay with the questions and the search but give answers (e.g., the Will to Power, progress, technology). 24. GA 65, 407; Contributions to Philosophy, 287. Heidegger also speaks of der letzte Gott in Besinnung, Gesamtausgabe Band 66 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1996), e.g., 253, 255; Mindfulness, trans. Parvis Emad and Thomas Kalary (New York: Continuum, 2006), e.g., 223, 225 (hereafter M). 25. Only a God Can Save Us: The Spiegel Interview, trans. WilliamJ. Richardson, in Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker, ed. Thomas Sheehan (Chicago: Pre- cedent, 1981), 57 (translation slightly altered). The absence of the god, Heidegger says later in the inter- view, is not nothing, but a liberation of man from what in Being and Time I call fallenness upon be- ings (58), i.e., an everyday, unquestioning absorp- tion in beings. 26. The theme of the Untergang recalls both Greek trag- edy and Nietzsches Zarathustra; see, e.g., GA 53, 128; Hlerlins Hymn, 103; GA54, 168; Parmenides 113; Nietzsche, vol. 6.1 of Gesamtausgabe (Frank- furt: Klostermann, 1996), 251, 268, 27980; Nietz- sche, Volume II: The Eternal Return of the Same, trans. David Farrell Krell (New York: Harper and Row, 1984), 31, 48, 59. For Heideggers understand- ing of salvation, see GA 7, 29; The Question Con- cerning Technology and Other Essays, trans. Wil- liam Lovitt (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), 28 (hereafter QCT). 27. Jean-Pierre Vernant and Pierre Vidal-Naquet, Myth and Tragedy in Ancient Greece, trans. Janet Lloyd (New York: Zone Books, 1988), 38. Cf. Normand Berlin, The Secret Cause: A Discussion of Tragedy (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1981), 29. 28. Jason Powell, Heideggers Contributions to Philoso- phy: Life and the Last God (New York: Continuum, 2007), 117. 29. Regarding philosophy as onto-theo-logy, see, e.g., Identitt und Differenz, Gesamtausgabe 11 (Frank- furt: Klostermann, 2006), 5179; Identity and Dif- ference, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), 4274 (hereafter ID). 30. GA 65, 50708, 369, 417; Contributions to Philoso- phy, 35758, 258, 293. See also GA 66, 239, 243; Mindfulness, 211, 215.