Marielitos Ten Years Later: The Scarface Legacy*

0. E. Aguirre. Texas A 8 M Uniuersity

Rogelio Saenr, Texas A&M University
Brian Sinclair J ames
(3l>/ectnJe. This article presents a brief history of the Cuban mass migration in
spring 1980. I r describes the moral epidemic directed against the Cuhans and the
specitic programs and procedures that facditatcd their institutionalization i n the
United States. Lt documents the impact of these programs and policies on the risk
of lnstitutionalization of the immigrants. Methods. The research uses logistic re-
gresslon t o analyze i nformati on on 50,958 people of Cuban origin in the Public
Llse h-ilcrodata Sample (PUMS) of the 1990 U.S. Census. Results. h,larielitos have
higher rates of lnstitutionaiization than other Cubans. This effect persists even after
statistically controlling for other i mportant determi nants of i n~ti tuti onal i l ati on.
Moreover, I dentification with the Mariel boatlift has important rttects on thr other
predictors o f institutionalization included in the analysis. The nationwide moral
epldernic creatrd important liabilities for all Mariel immigrants irrespectlve o t social
and demographi c statuses that otherwise would have protected them against detec-
ti on ,Ind institlltionalization.
The immigration of Cubans to the United States in the spring and sum-
mer of 1980. known as the Mariel mass migration, transformed Cubas
immigration relations with the United States. I t marked the beginning of
the end of thc cold war practices governing post-1958 Cuban immigration
to the United States. I t also helped bring about a strong anrl-Latino nntivist
movement i n the United States, of which Proposition 187 i n California is
a recenr manlfestation. More important for our purposes, hlarielito im-
migration generated a moral epidemic (Goode and Ben-Yehuda, 1994) dur-
ing which Marielitos were labeled deviants. The Marielitos collective
deviance process included a moral passage in which the customary migra-
tory behaviors of the Cuban people were redefined as devi,lnt, the resulting
deviant identities were magnified by means of official policies and pro-
grams, and otfcial acts were legitimized by the mass media (Aguirre, 1994).
.. Direct a l l correspondence to B. E. Aguirre, Deparrment of Sociologv, Teras A & M l l n-
verbit!, College Statlnn, TX 77843-4351. For purposss of replication, the dntll wed i n thls
rr\rarLh dre .lvallahle trom the U.S. Bureau of the Census.
SOCl AL SC/NC. QL/ ARTRI . Y, Vol ume 78, Number 2, J une 1997
[i 1997 h) the lln~vercitv ot Texas Press, P.O. Box 7619, Austin, TX 7871.?-7819
488 Social Science Quarterly
Officials, assisted by the mass media, changed the moral identity of Cuban
immigrants from "golden" political refugees to "undesirables."
This article documents one lasting effect of this moral epiLlemic (defincd
in the next section). I t shows that society's reaction made the IMarielitos
particularly vulnerable to institutionalization in the United States. In what
follows. a brief history ot the hlariel mass migration serves -1s a prenmble
to the description ot the societal reaction and the specific I3rograms and
procedures uscd against the Marielitos to facilitate their instil utionalizstion
i n the llnited States. Subsrqucntly, the paper draws inform;ltion from the
1990 PUMS to assess the Marielitos' risk of institutionalization.
Mariel as Moral Epidemic
Moral epidemics result in a temporary, heightened, and exygerated con-
cern among significant numbers o f people about the behaviol- of 3 category
o f people; there is Increased hostility toward them and wide\pread consen-
sus that they constitute a serious threat. Mor;ll epidemics are also charac-
terized by the actions o f moral entrepreneurs l i nked to social organizations
and instttutions (Goode and Ben-Yehulla, 1994).
The hlariel incident had all o f these elements. An ethnic group (the Cu-
bans) that was behaving in its customary fashion was perceived by segments
o f the American public a s ;I national threat and singled out tor speciJ l
treatment. Anger and hostility were directed against its ml.mbers. Moral
entrepreneurs instituted programs that victimlzed them and created liabil-
ities for them that can still be measured :I dec.ade after initintion.
A Brief History of the Mass Migration
The Marie1 mass migration began on April 4, 1980, when Fidel Castro
~nnounsed the withdrawal of Cuban guards posted outside the Peruvian
Embassy in Havana. By April 6. close to 10.800 Cubans h'ld entered the
grounds o f the embassy and asked f or political asylum. The tirst airlifts of
close t o 1,000 (:uh;lns iron1 the Peruvian Embassy to San J OG, Costa Rica,
which was t o he the tirst asylum in the international resettlemcnt effort,
began on April 14. O n April 20, the Cul xl n government announced that
anyone wishing to immigrate to the LJ nited Stcites was free to leave through
the northern port of Mariel.
This was the heginning ot the boatlift. Offi c~al l y, it lasted until September
76, 1980, when the Port of Mariel was fornlally closed. 111 al l , 124,779
Cubans migrated to the Unlted States during this period. The last week of
April saw 7,hSO Cubans ,lrriving in Key Wcst, Florida. D~~r i ng the next
eight weeks, thc largest proportion of the mass migration occ.Ilrred: 86,493
people came i n May, 20,800 in J une. By the n~i ddl e of J une. the I1.S. Coast
Guard began to s e~z e hat s to stop thc flow o f immigrant\, and 111 the
Marwlitos Tetz Years Later: The Scnf ; ce f ~g~zcy 489
following months smaller numbers of Cubans arrived: 2,62Y i n J ul y, 3,939
in August, 3,258 in September, and only 10 i n October.
The 61,928 Marielitos who arrived in the first two weeks of the mass
movement were resettled i n Miami (Rowen, 1980), even though onl y 29
percent had immediate family members in the United Statt,s who could act
as sponsors (I lnzueta. 198 1 ) . Cubans disembarked in the Port of Key West,
registered with the Immlgration and Naturalization Service (I NS), and con-
tinued their processing in Miamis lan1ianli Park Fairgrounds (Ilnzueta,
198 1 ) . Roughl y half o f the Marielitos were temporarily cletained at Eglin
Air Force Base, Florida; Fort Chaffee, Arkansas; Fort Illdiantown Gap,
Pennsylvania; and Fort Mc(;oy, Wisconsin. At every camp the aliens went
through an inltial stage o f reception and a s~~hseq~~ent stagt of resettlelnent.
Once ;I camp, capacity was rexhed, it was closed to all other Cubans and
the task of resettling the aliens began. At the conclusion ot these resettle-
ment efforts, on September 25, 1980, the remaining 5,71 Cubans were
consolidated ;It Fort Chaffee (Pew. 1984) 311d in federal correctional insti-
tutions and health facilities (Bowen, 19801. Fort Chaffec. was closed in
February of 1982, and ,395 unsettled Culx1ns were transferred to the federal
penitcntiary i l l Atlanta, Georgia, Llnd to fcdc~-;ll psychiatrik. facilities.
Historical Comparison
As far bxk as the middle of the nineteenth century, sizahle communities
of Cuban political dissenters lived and prospered in Tampa, Yhor City, and
Key West, Florida, and in New York City and J ersey City, New J ersey. I n
this century, the turbulence of Cuban politics led to exiles in the United
States. Prior to 1959, Cubas political, economic, cultural, and social ties
with the Llnited States were many. From rhe 1950s through the 1 WO s ,
Cuban immigration to the IJ nitecl States was the third mwt si mbl e i mmi -
gration tlow from North America, second onl y to Cunadi,ln and Mexican
immigration.
The advent o f the Castro regime agaill crcated an imporrilnt emigration,
mostly directed toward the United States. I t was effected Ilnder a passive
admission policy (Scanlan and Loescher, 198 I ) , which allowed for a ref-
ugee movement that received special dispensation and sponsorship from
the U.S. government. A t places o f origin, standard migrarion procedures,
such as securiry and health checks, assurancc ot employme~lt and economic
nondependenL.e, and lack of criminal hnckground. were s\\cpt aside i n the
rush to accept the Cubans i nto the United htates. Until the Cuban missile
crisis o f October 1962, Pan American A~rlines had availahle twelve thou-
sand Havana-Miami seats every month. Before the break i n diplolnatic
relations in J anuary 1961, I1.S. visitors visas were available from the U.S.
Consulate In IHav;lna (afterwards, U.S. visas were available. from the Swiss
Embassy). Cubans entered the United Stutes as visitors alld were grilnted
490 Social Scirnce Quarterly
refugee status under the parole power of the U.S. attorney general. Prior
to Mariel, many thousands of undocumented Cubans also came in boats
o r from third countries such as Spain and Venezuela and were paroled into
the United States.
The most important institutional arrangement structuring the 1959-1480
phase of Cuban immigration was the IJ.S. Department o f Health and
Human Services Cuban Refugee Emergency Center, in hliami, Florida
(Pedraza Bailey, 1986). The center was staffed almost exclusively by Cuban
refugees. I t distributed surplus food, offered training in language and oc-
cupational skills, provided health care, paid for the comprehensive carc of
unaccompanied minors. granted financial assistance to help people pur-
chase the basic necessities, and encouraged and financed the resettlement
o f Cubans out o f Florida
Pre- I 980 Cuhan immigrants were not restricted in their movement, place
of residence, and employment. nor were deportation proceedings initiated
against them, even in the case of individuals w.ho subsequently violated the
terms of their paroles. Prior to Mariel, the I1.S. Coast Guard did not in-
tercept Cubans boats 011 the high seas and force then1 to turn back o r
change their destinations.
Pre-Mariel U.S. immigration policy toward Cuba was dolninated by the
logic and moral imperative of the cold war. Cubans fleeing Castro were
living proof of rhc social, political, and economic failures ot the first com-
munist society in the Western Hemisphere. Their staunch allticommunism
clssured the American public o f their moral wwth; their much-touted eco-
nomic success in South Florida reminded everyone of the potential loss that
their entrepreneurship and hard work represented to the economy of the
captive island. They were also welcomed as trustworthy ~l l i es who had
fallen on hard times partly because of the indecision and failures of Amer-
ican foreign policy, particularly President Kennedys hotchcd Bily of Pigs
invasion.
Mariel as Turning Point
Mariel did not represent an anomalous and unprecedented immigration
from Cuba. There was precedent for most of the administrltive and legal
aspects o f the h4arielito mass migration. Prior to Mariel, large numbers of
undocumented and unscreened Cubans had used the United States as the
country of first asylum. As emphasized in the model of moral epidemics,
however, rhc bchavior of the group singled out for special treatment does
not have to change to justify mass hysteria ,1nd hostility dlrected against
rhem. In the present case. the migratory behaL~iw of the Culxln people di d
not chlnge durlng the Mariel incident. What changed was moral entrepre-
neurs definition o f their behavior. Government officials entorced new de-
viance-creating programs. These moral crusaders in Cuba and the United
Marielitos To1 Yeurs Luter: The Scurfuce Legdcy 49 1
States acted in the interests of morally committed bureaucracies (Dickson,
1968; Chauncey, 1980). They transformed the meaning of previously ac-
cepted Cuban migratory behaviors and migratory traditions into unac-
ceptable, deviant behaviors and traditions.
During Mariel, the established institutional mechanisms ,3ssociated with
post-19.59 Cuban immigration were abandoned. The Cubln Refugee Pro-
gram and its staff were not used in the processing of the Mnrieliros. Instead,
the hlarieliros were the first sizable group o f Cuban imnltgrants to have
direct experience with I NS personnel and operations. The. use of the I NS
during the Mariel crisis, the new immigrants entrant labeling, which
deprived them of refugee status, and their detention i n military clmps
throughout the country (discussed later) were the structur.11 preconditions
for the moral redefinition of their behavior that justified hostility against
them and fueled the moral epidemic.
The difficulties faced by the bureaucracie\ involved in the social control
and resettlement o f the Cubans detained in the camps contributed pro-
foundly to the trouhles in the camps. The lack of securiry in the camps
meant that at ti mes di ens hoke the l aw to protect themselves and their
loved ones, by, for example, manufacturing knives and other weapons
(Agulrre, 1994). I n turn, these and other deviant acts confirmed the appro-
priateness o f the state-produced redefinition of their collective identtty as
dangerous people.
Creating the Marielitos Deviant I dentity in Cuba
Cuban government officials reaction to people wanting to leave the is-
land during hlariel was to call them lumpcm proletariat--working-class
people whose unrepentant immorality md blemished chlracter rendered
them incapable ot appreciating socialism. Their migratorv behavior thus
redefined, they were rendered vulnerable t ( ~ deviance-creating procedural
arrangements in Cuba. Official policy forced many would be emigrants to
self-identity as criminals and contaminated the Mariel inltnigration with
small number.; of actual criminals and mental patients. Further, it encour-
aged incrimination and conflict among the inlmigrants and created divisions
among the kL1rielitos that amplified their deviilnce.
Cuban otticials insisted on generating the proofs of the criminality and
immorality ot those leaving the island through Mariel Harbor. They in-
cluded among the emigrants a small number of people serving prison sen-
tence>. These convicts were joined by ex-convicts and by close to six
hundred people sutfering from mental illness (Gordon, 19S2). They joined
political prisoners, homosexuals, and religious sectarians like the J chovlhs
Kitnesses and Seventh-l)ay Adventists ns certified antikocials. The C;u-
ban authorities gave these people, the dregs, or escoriJ>. nb they were
called. enviable priorities i n the emigration procedures. Sonle were rounded
492 Social Science Quarterly
up by the Committees for the Defense o f the Revolution (CDRs) and the
police and forced against their will to abandun the island ((hrcia, 1983) .
A special certification was created, the so-called cartas de escovia (dregs
letters). Government otficials insisted that would-be emigrants publicly con-
tess their crimitlality and degeneracy. These confessions were duly signed
and recorded by the authorities, and. afterward, the confesred deviants
received oific~al letters stating and corroborating their moral blemishes. In
many instances, people hrilwd their CDK officials to obtaln these docu-
ments, which \voulJ support the proper reconstruction ot their lite his-
tories, because rhe letter facilitated their emigration (Garcia. 1983). Given
the goals o f thc C:uban state, it did llot check the accuracy of any self-
accusations. The majority of the M;lrielitos did not fit the deviant categories
used by the C:trImn pvernment.
From the per5pective ot the would-be emigrtnts, certification was merely
another tormality that had to be satisfied i f they were to be able to leave.
In many instances, howe\er, after arriving in the United States, Marielitos
talked about these otficial clocuments that proved their deviance and
would refer to their mostly new and tictitlous deviant identities i n front of
INS officials and others who were unaware o f the context 111 which these
identities had been created (L yon, 1911 I ).
The Cuhan governments policy created distrust and schisms among the
Marielitos, man!; ot whom, on arriving I n the United States. began to ac-
cuse other hlarielitob o f ha\ing the deviant identity they themselves now
renounced as they tried to gain the trust of their hosts. 1 he cumulative
effect of thib practlcc was t o add credence to the Cuban governments
claims regarding the antisocial nature o f the Marielitos.
Reaction in the United States
The nuances o f Marxist theory intorming the Cuban governments ac-
cusations against the immigrants were never strriously examitled by the U.S.
press or effectively challenged by U.S. officials. Borrowing the imagery of
degeneracy from thc (:uban press, the U.S. mass media supported the trnns-
formation of the moral identity of the h,larielitos. A naive rchalisrn allowed
the official Cuban I,lbels against the hlarielitos to be directly applied i n the
L1.S. context (Neilsen, 19XOi. This uncritical acceptance of the definition of
the Marielitos ;IS dangerous people was tacilltated by the absence o f a le-
gitimate U.S. rthgee identity, whi.h would have countered the emergent
collective deviant definition.
lnitiLllly, about one thi rd ot the (lubans i n the Peruvian Embassy in Ha-
vana were given refugee status under the Refugee Act of 1980, after the
Senate J udiciary (:otnmittce supported Iresidcnt Carters request to use the
emergency prc~visions o f the act. Thc first torty-five hundred Marielitos
processed at Tamiami Park i n Miami were issued refugee eligibility cards.
Mdri el i t os Ten Yt ur , Lcltcr: The Scclrjllcc L qgcy 493
Soon after, however, the admlnistration argued that, in contrast to those
in the Peruvian Embassy, the rest of the M,lrielitos were I 1ot refugees and
could not be classltied 3 s emergency refugees. I t argued that Marielitos were
motivated to tmigrate not by political but by economic considerations and
that they had not suffered persecution in Cuba prior to declaring and acting
on thelr intentions to I e~\:e. I n short, they were not retuget,s. hut economic
migrants.
The adminlstrations attcmpt t o deal with the crisis first made the Ma-
rielitos, in the language o f the INS, applicants for politic;ll asylum. This
classification requlred a lengthy and costly ,Idministrative and judicial ex-
amination of cach persons claim for asylum and refugee status. This option
was quickly discarded. Thr ill-fated official immigration c.ltegory o f Tu-
ban/Hai ti an t ntrant (st~tus pendi ng) was adopted on lune 30, 1980.
There was no provision i n the l aw for entrant aliens (hennedy, 19X1),
so, i n October 1980, ,atter losses during n presidential eleitlon year in i r n -
portant states like Florida, the administration again reversed itself.
Many oi thtb initi;1l diiticulties experienced by the Marieliros derived from
the decision to make them entrants. Since they did not have refugee
status, federal support o f their health ar e, education, ]oh training, and
general welfare cdme from the allocated huAgets of federal agencies or in-
volved special congressional acts. These raids into agenc? budgets cllused
considerable Iwrenucratic in-fighting while funding through special con-
gresslonal acts WAS dela!.ed and uncertain. I n the end, federal support was
insufticient and, in efiect. transferred a tedernl responsibilit! onto the shoul-
ders o f local and state governments. This i n turn caused considerable public
resentment and hostility against the newconlers iVoboril, I 981 ) and made
their Integration into American society much more difficult.
I n Miami, this tlx hurcien on the local citizenry was I major irritant.
The I x k of funding made the task of the sponsors of the Marielitos much
more tinancially onerous Llnd accounted i n part for many of the break-
downs that occurred (EstCvez. 19x3). I t also meant that nearly two
thousand unaccompanied minors were det;lined in camp\; some o f them
were sexually and physically abused and neglected. Without legal and ad-
ministrative precedents tor the entrant alien immigratic!n category, nei-
ther state govtrnmtmt nor federal nor ans other agenc). would accept
responsibility tor their welfare. As entrants, the minor\ could not be
adopted or pl ~ced in foster homes (Gardiner, 1981 ).
Negative public opinion against the Marielitos emerged soon after their
arrival, formed b!. the. combined effects of reporting practices and national
politics i n 1 presidential election year. The Marielitos coldemnation was
so sudden th3t it could not have resulted from their behavlor in the United
States. Rather, it had Cuban origins. As early as the middle of May 1980,
57 pcrcent ot adult respondents nationwide thought thar the Marielitos
should not be allowed to li1.e i n the I !nited States; three fourths thought it
494 Social Scitmce Quarterly
was wrong to let them in, given the serious economic and unemployment
difficulties facing the country; 68 percent of the respondents thought that
President Carter had been wrong in letting the Marielitos enter the United
States; 62 percent felt that Castro had made the United States look foolish
when he sent so many criminals and other misfits (AB( News-Harris
Survey, 1980a).
By J une, public opposition to the Cubans WJ S even more extreme. Almost
three fourths o f respondents nationwide now disapproved of the Carter
administrations handling of the crisis. Close to 90 percent agreed that
caretul screening o f all refugees was needed to identify and deport the crim-
tnals and troublemakers among them. A full 60 percent felt that the best
policy was to get rid of as many Marielitos as possible by sending them
huck to Cuba o r to third countries (ABC News-Harris Survey, 1980b).
Eighteen months later, negative public consensus persisted; klarielitos were
ranked as the second-least-desirable neighbors to have front a list of nine
categories of people, behind members of minority religious cults and sects
i Gal l up Poll. I 481 1.
@ne expression of the peoples concern was the fear of hlarielito crime
r n Miami, which ~n some media accounts was dubbed the L rime and mur-
der capital of the country. Yet, the most exhaustive examination of hom-
icides i n Dade County, Florida (Wilsbank, 1984) concluded that the
Marielitos wert. responsible for only one fourth of the 60 percent increase
in the I 980 county homiade rate. Most Marirlito homicides involved other
Marielitos. I n fact, the increase in homicides could be traced bask at least
J decade; from 1970 to 1980, Dades homicide rate increased 54 percent
(VCilsbankl 198.1). very much affected by drug traffic-related murders in
which the Martelitos did not participate. Furthermore, compared with the
homicide rate In Cuba. the homicide rate involving Marlelitos in Dade
County was not high (Gordon, 1982).
Despite these facts, once the collective image of the Marielltos as deviants
solidified in the minds of the majority of Cuban Americans a d other Amrr-
icans, it became ditticult for the Marielitos and the voluntary social service
agencies that were helping them find work or minimum support. In August
198 I , the mayor of Atlanta, joined by Florida officials, expressed concern
;lbout the impcnding release of Cubans from the federal penitentiary in
Atlanta (Kunstcl and Harris, 1981; Wells, 19x1). Two years later. a similar
concern was expressed by police officials in New Orleans (Lesser and Ussery,
1983). In Santa Clara County, California, a training program for Marielitos
had to he canceled because of the publics fear of them (Skipitares,
I 98 I ). The mayor of Selma, Alabama, called the aliens misfits that nobody
will take and declared that he would station armed personnel to take the
aliens to prison i f they arrived (Benn and Roberson, 1981). In South Flor-
ida, i n Novemher 1980, 71 percent of white non-Hispanics voted to elim-
I nate the use of public monies to teach language and culture courses
Marielitos Tor Years Later: The Scarface Lcgacy 49s
other than English. The most blatant act of discrimination occurred in Sep-
tember 1983, when the Miami Beach City Commission gave initial ap-
proval to an ordinance requiring the police to conduct inspections of the
residences of Miami Beach residents who wanted to sponsor Marielitos out
of federal prisons. The sponsors were required to register with the police
(Kranish, 198.3), and the decision was justified on the grounds of a rumor
that one thousand Mariel inmates in the federal penitentiary in Atlanta
were about to be released and planned to move en masse Into the city.
A year later, in December 1984, as Marielitos began to adjust their im-
migration status to legal residence, the first step toward C1.S. citizenship,
another collective fear swept South Florida-that they would be able to
bring close to half a million relatives from Cuba through legal immigration
channels (Santiago and Voboril, 1984). The rumor was started by a local
talk-show program and by Citizens of Dade United, a local savc-the-
English-language group.
This reaction was also facilitated by the ambivalence of the <:uban coni-
munity in South Florida toward the Marielitos. Despite the communitys
show of support for the Marielitos at the beginning of the c.risis, very soon,
political and cultural differences surfaced. Most Cubans in the United States
sympathize with the Republican Party. During the Mariel crisis, their ethnic
loyalties conflicted with their political loyalties, for the crlsis was used by
then-presidential candidate Ronald Reagan to discredit President Carters
administration. I t became clear to members of the Cuban American com-
munity that the Marielitos were very different from thcm racially and
socioeconomically. Moreover, they had been socialized in revolutionary
Cuba to accept practices and values disapproved of by other members of
the community. A great many clashes among Cubans in the aftermath of
Mariel can be understood in these terms.
In sum, societys reaction made it more difficult for the Marielitos to
adjust quickly to the United States; their inability to adjust was used
as proof of the validity of the American publics initial fears. Unsurpris-
ingly, their adjustment difficulties were also widely dissenlinated in Cuba
and officially interpreted as confirmation of the degeneracy of the traitors
and of the wisdom of the Cuban governments policy tacilitating thelr
emigration.
Collective Deviance
The American publics condemnation of the Marielitos was paired with
official procedures that had the unintended effect of creating the Marielitos
collective deviance. This was the case even though no one knew the exact
number of mentally ill persons, prisoners, and former prisoners in the Ma-
riel sealift. Using uncorroborated information collected by INS officials
from the Marielitos at their time of arrival, Bach (1 980) .;bowed that the
496 Social Scicwe Quarterly
majority (84 percent) of the hlarielitos did not have prison records in Cuba.
Most o f those serving prison sentences were jailed either tor crimes that
would not even be considered crimes in the United States (e.g., black mar-
keteering and stealing rationed commodities such as food or clothes) or for
political crimes. Montgomery (1981) estimated that 7 perccnt of the Ma-
rielitos were serious criminals. Other studies (Del Castillo, 1983) showed
somewhat smaller proportions of serious criminals among rhe hlarlelitos.
What is claimed in these studies about the Cubans is based solely on their
confessions and the accusations of fellow immigrants; the (.uban authori-
ties refused to share court records, medical documents, ant1 other related
I nformation with their American counterparts.
The image ot hlarielito collective deviance was strengthened by other
I1.S. government prxti ces duri ng the crisis. Many Marielitok were officially
labeled deviant after arrival. The entrant label initially giwn to the Ma-
rielitos provided justification tor the internment of the allens in camps,
where they were examined and screened prior to being releascd to sponsors.
Some of the aliens were found inadmissible ,Ind were sent trom the camps
to federal penlll institutions for indefinite detention until they could be
returned to Cuba. This incarceration stage hrld two phases The first was
the continuation of the admission processing begun in the camps. It cen-
tered on the assessment of the relative dangerousness of the aliens and was
meant to release some of them from prison and to repatriate the rest. These
Immigrants were the so-called excludnhles. They could not he deported,
but could be excluded under the terms of the 1952 Immigrqtion and Na-
tionality Act (Audet, 1987), hecause the U.S. government nlaint,lined chat
they had never IegnIIy entered the territory o t the United Srlres. Since they
had not entcred the country, they had no constitutional right to due pro-
cess. While waiting tor their exclusion, they could be derained indefi-
nitely, byhat amounted to a prison sentence ot indeterminate length (Audet,
1987). After persistent prodding from the federal courts. n1oG.r were relensed
from prison by December 1982.
The criterla used to justity the removal o f these aliens 1 0 prison were
constructed in rhe camps dnd varied case hy case. These crlreria eventually
included acts of protest or attempts to escape by hilarielito, who objected
t o their imprisonment I n the camps, the aliens self-incrim~natory confes-
sions to an assortment ot crimes they had allegedly comnlitted i n Cuba,
and the ;qccusarions of fellow aliens. The U.S. nuthorities accepted the un-
corroborated confessions o f the aliens and their denunciallons by fellow
aliens J S valid grounds for exclusion, but rejected their cla~rns of persecu-
tion i n Cuba a\ grounds tor asylum.
The second phase I S still going o n . I t reprcsenrs the Marlclitos reincar-
ceracion as a result o f charges brought against then1 by the I NS for violation
of the terms of their parole. Those who arc convicted ot J felony after
satisfying the penalties imposed by the court of proper jurisdlction are liable
Murielitos Ten Yerlrs Ldter: T h Scorfi1c-t. l , ~, y ac y 497
to deportation or, in the absence of an agreement with the Cuban govern-
ment prior to 1992. to indeterminate terms of imprisonment. Thousands
of Marielitos are in INS custody. They ww convicted of the commission
of a felony in .I L J . 5 court and, after satisfying the terms of their sentences
or plea bargaining t o a lesser charge, were released by the courts into the
custody of the I NS unti l they can be deported to Cuba (Alder, 1987).
The ongoing relationship between thc crlminal justice system and the
immigration agencie\ has created loops of selt-lncrirnination and discrimi-
nation against the Marielitos. Many ot the excludahles arc. lured by their
lawyers i nto INS jurisdlction through plea hargaining. I NS personnel. i n
some cases, con\:ince loc;ll district attorneys in charge of prosecuting the
Marielitos t o accept plea bargains in return tor promises ot quick transfer
i nto federal cmt ody (Kuolncr, 1985). Likewise, judges use prohation as a
mechanism tor the quick trmsfer o f Marielitos from the courts into the
jurisdiction ot the I NS. While presiding judges can advise ag:,linst it (Audet,
1987). the decision to put Marielitos in the jurisdiction o t the I NS is left
mostly t o INS regional directors. The grounds tor such decisions are con-
fidential. Variations i n the use o f this power by I NS region.11 directors and
the reasons tor its selective entorcement are unknown. I t i k ;In administra-
tive decision outside due process.
Rescarch to date 113s failed to demonsrrnre the moral epidemics long-
term consequences on Mnrielitos incorporaLion exper1encc.s i n the United
States. We shull address this shortcoming by documentins the impact of
participation i n the Mariel mass migrution on the institutionali~.ation rates
of (:ubans i n the llnitecl States. Specifically. we hypothesize that Marirlitos
have higher r3tes of institutlollalizatlon than do other CIihatls, that this
effect persists even after statistically controlling for other &terminants of
institutionalization, and that participation i l l the Mariel ilnmigration has
important effects on the other predictors included in the starlstical analysis.
Ten Years Later
Datu and Methods. This study uses weighted and unwelghted informa-
tion on S0,YSX persons o f Cuban origin i n the PLlhlS o f rhe 1990 11,s.
Census; this number represents 5 percent o f the U.S. populdtion of Cuban
origin. The PLIMS contains a large number of variables, which allows us
to compare Marielitos with other categories ot Cubans. Our analysis em-
ploys multivariate logistic regression to model the occurrcnce o f Institu-
tionaliz.ation among Cuhans i n the United Sratcs.
Table 1 includes descriptive demographic. living arrangements and so-
cioeconomically weighted information about Marielitos, other Cuban im-
migrants, and native-born people ot Cuban origin. Tahle 2 Includes the f ul l
multivariate logistic regression model without interaction tcnns ilnd log~sttc
regression moclels that Include interactioll terms o f h4ariel with [he other
. .
498 Social Science Quarterly
predictors separately. I t tests the extent to which Mariel 31so affects the
intluence on institutionalization of these other independent variables.
Variables. The dependent variable is dichotomously scored I i f the re-
spondents were institutionalized at the time of the 1990 (:ensus. Institu-
tionalized respondents are defined as persons under fornlally authorized,
supervised cart or custody i n institutions . . . such persons are classified
3s patients or inmates (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1993: b7). Non-
institutionalized respondents, scored 0, lived in household5 or in uninsti-
tutionalized group quarters like college dormitories. The PITMS does not
include information that would allow us to differentiate between patlents
and inmates; it is a cross-sectional daca set and cannot be uwd to calculate
cumulative institutionaliz3tion rates.
The theoretically specified dichotomous predictor of instirutionalization,
hlariel, is scored 1 i f the respondents immigrated during 1980 or 1981.
Since other predictors can also be expected to be associated with Mariel,
they are included in the multivariate logistic regression analyses. Among
them are the respondents age (fifteen-forty-four =1, othrr =O), gender
(female = I , male =0). race (white = 1, other =O), marital status
(married =I , other =0, tor persons fifteen years old and older). Following
long-established sociological convention, the odds of instlrutionalization
:Ire hypothesized co increase for young, nonwhite, unmarritd males.
Living arrangements include information on state of residence (Flor-
ida = 1, elsewhere =0). This variable is used in the analysis to test the
assumed protective effects of nearness to the ethnic enclave In that state. I n
addition. four other social characteristics of the respondenrs are hypothe-
sized to increahe their odds ot institutionalization: their lessrr knowledge of
the English language (a 5-item scale ranging from very well to not at all;
coded not well and not at all =1, other =0) ; education (high school
graduation ant1 beyond =1 ; other =0); cittzenship status (naturalized or
native-born citizen = I ; other =0); and whether they had a physical or
mental handicap (mobility or self-care limitation =1; other =0 ) .
The results o f the logistic regression models do not change substantially
when (a) very young (less than fifteen years old) and very old (more than
sixty-five years ol d) respondents are excluded from the anal! sis, 1 b) Cubans
in the PUMS who are institutionalized mrl have disabilitic-s are excluded
(in effect, mostly limiting the analysis to the prediction of I mprisonment),
( c ) native-horrl Cubans are excluded from the analysis, (dl predictors are
deleted one c7t ; I time from the equations, (e) weighted and unweighted cases
are used, and ( f ) the h,lariel migratory stream is compared with other his-
torically relevant migratory streams. None o f the cells in the hivariate cross-
tabulations arc empty. The predictors are not multicollinear. All tolerance
indexes are .70 or higher.
Marielitos Ten Years Luter: The Scarface Legacy 499
Findings
Manelitos and Other Cubans. Table 1 presents the difterences in dern-
ographic, social, and economic characteristics among Marielitos (1 980-
198 I ) , native-born Cuban Americans, and Cubans immigrating in other
years. I n comparison with other Cuban immigrants, Marielitos are younger,
with a median age of thirty-nine in 1990. Only native-born Cubans are
significantly lounger, with a median age of fourteen. Likewise, i n relative
terms, more Marielitos are male (59.4 percent) and nonwhite (22.4 per-
cent). Moreover, in comparison with other pre-1980 immigration cohorts,
a lower proportion of Marielitos are married (47.3 percent); however, they
do not differ significantly from other Cuban immigrant cohorts in terms of
their low fertllity.
Compared with other pre-1980 Cuban immigrants and native-born Cu-
bans, grearer proportions of Marielitos live in Florida (71.9 percent). Only
the Cubans who came between 1982 and 1990 have a higher concentra-
tion in Florid;] (76.8 percent). A similar pattern is evident with respcct to
housing: compared with native-born and pre-1980 Cuban immigrants,
fewer Marielitos live in single-family dwellings (50.6 pcrcenr); mort. of
them rent (58.9 percent), mostly in multiple-unit apartment buildings (not
shown).
Marielitos (77.6 percent) tend to be less likely to live in nuclear iamilies.
Perhaps as a strategy for survival, the Marielitos are more prone to expe-
rience alternative household arrangements. For example, more ,Varielitos
than native-born and pre-1970 Cuban immigrants live in extended families.
More Marielitos cohabit, live with nonrelatives, and in households with
subfamilies present. And, ominously, 3.4 percent of the Marielitos were
institutionalizc.d ten years after arrival, a higher proportion than for all
other cohorts.
Marielitos command of the English language is lower Lvhen compared
with that of pre-1980 Cuban immigrants and natives; onl y 27.8 percent
stated that they spoke English very well and almost half (43.9 percent) lived
i n linguistic isolation. Similarly, a lower percentage of Marielitos were high
school ( 35. 3 percent) and college (5.5 percent) graduates. The contrast with
the cohort of golden Cuban immigrants (1960-1969), who have 6.3.5
percent and 20 percent high school and college graduation rates, respec-
tively, is striking. Nearly 1 I percent of Marielitos are persons with disa-
bilities and need help to move about and for self-care, comparable to the
proportions of persons with disabilities among the 1960-1 969 (10.7 per-
cent), 1970-1979 (12.9 percent), and 1981-1990 (10 percent) Cuban
immigrants. As expected, Marielitos differ most in this indrv from the very
young and the very old: the native-born, a relatively youthful category of
Cubans, have relatively few people with disabilities (2.4 percent), whilc the
CTc?Cu-
w o w - 0
I - l l
m Lor n-
d - b N
cn mmm
502 Social Science Quartcrly
pre-1960 immigrants, the oldest cohort, have The highest perientage (16.4)
o f persons with disabilities. Marielitos are more likely than other Cubnns
to he unempl qed (11.2 percent), looking f or work (21.3 percent), and
living i n poverty (26.9 percent). I n addition, they earn les\ money than
native-born Cubans and other immigrants, even though they worked
roughly compardble number of hours in 1989. A s shown, hlxielitos me-
dian household income in 1989 was $25,000, lower than the median i l l -
come ot native-lwrn ($39,989) and pre-1980 I mmigrant houwholds. Their
median personal income was $12,000 i n 1989, again lower. than the me-
di m i ncome o f native-born ($13,000) and prr-1980 immigrilnts.
Additive Model s. Tahle 2 shows the result.; o f the ful l (tt:n predictors)
multivuriate logistic regression models. All of the hypothesized effects are
supported by the results. Thus, females have lower odds ot institutionali-
zation than do males (..3.36); whites have lower odds than do nonwhltcs
(.643); the young have much higher odds than do others (3.471 ); married
people have lower odds thun do the unmarried (.39S); peoplc with :It least
a high xhool degree have lower odds than do the lesser educated (.774);
(hbans with low English language ability have higher odds than do those
with greilter English abilities (1.93 I ) ; persons with disal~ilitic~s have highcr
odds of instittltic)nalization than do those without (7.40.3); Florids residents
have lower odds than do residents of other states (502); L1.S. citizens h;lve
lower odds than do noncitizens (.go). Despite the inclusion of other poten-
tlally confounding predictors, Marielitos have higher log odds than do
other Cuban\ (2.1 62)
We use the logistic parameter estimates in Table 2 (f ul l Inodc*l) to tal-
culate composite rates ot institution~llization per 10,000 Cubam. The re-
sulting contrilsts in the rates o f instit~ltionaliz,tioll are very Ilrgc, ranging
from 6 per 10,000 tor a least-likelihood cunstructed case (Female, white,
not young, married, high school graduate or higher, with good English
language skills, no disabilities, living in Florida, U.S. ci ti xn, not a hlnrie-
lito) to 4,403 per I 0 , O O O tor 3 lnasinlurn-likelihood caw iwith the op-
posite characterlstics: male. black, etc.). I n the least-likelihootl case, kreping
rverything else const;lnt but xsurning that the respondent 15 a Marielito
increases the rate o f imprisonment more th;l n twice, from 6 to 13 per
10,000; in the grentest-likelihood CL I S~, switching the varl abl e to non-
Marielito decrexes the rate almost hy halt, from 4,404 to l ,hh9.
Interaction Effects. So tar, the results document the relative importance
ot partlcipation in the Mariel boatlift in ,711 ;Idditive statistical c-ontest i n
which other predictors o f institutionalization are included i n the equations;
however, Mariel also aftects the influence of the other prediccors i n the f ul l
model (see Table 2) .
The Mariel experience renders categories ot Cubans more likely tu ex-
perience instittltionalizatio~l.
TABLE 2
Logistic Regression Results for Interaction and
Full Models Predicting Institutionalization
2-Varlable Models
wllh Interactlor Full ModfAl wllhalt Interactions
Pararneter Odl Is PararneIt-t Eslinlate Odds Rallo
Estlrnale Ratlo (9596 crnfldemt? Interval)
- ~ _ _ -
4 3190
0 8233
1 4452
1 ,421
~ J 1033
- 0 7045
1 5729
C ' 4591
-1 8309
I' 3956
I j 8084
( 8 72133
- 4 3050
0 9b68
1 2736
1664
- 4 4914
f i 4062
12610
[, I> 142
4 6U22
[: 424'
1 5109
r 5466
-4 9741
08719
1 5493
c 4595
4 4l U6
(. 4 136
L' 1425
1 5354
4 4957
I' 2558
1 1437
C 2317
5 04 Social Science Quarterly
Rclc-e. The rate o f white non-Mariel Cubans is 81 per 10,000; for white
Marlelitos, the rate rises to 2.35 per 10,000; and for nonwhite Marielitos
it is 737.
Age. The rate of young non-Mariel Cubans I S 129 per 10,000; for young
hlarielitos, the rate is ,571; for older Marielitos, it is 176.
Gender. The rate of non-Mariel females is 58 per 10,001); for Mariel
females, the rate rises to 68; for male Marielitos, it is 204. I t may be that
the lower rate of institutionalization among Mariel females is in part the
result ot 1 historical accident, for late-arriving Marielitos were predorni-
tlantly Innles and, as explained earlier, were sent to the detention camps
much more often than were those, many o f thvm females, who came in the
early phase of the mass migration.
Illurit,zl stiztlls. lhe rate tor married non-Marie1 Cubans is SO per 10,000;
tor married Marielitos, it is 208; for unmarried Marielitos, i t is 480.
Edrrc~tio?l. The rate for non-Mariel Cubans with at least J. high school
education is 74 per 10,000; for Marielitos with the same level of education,
it is 160; for Marielitos with lower levels of education, it is 180.
E?l&h lunguizge skills. The rate for non-Mariel Cubans with poor En-
glish language skills is 53 per 10,000; for hlarielitos with poor English
language skills, I t is 3 IY; for Marielitos with good English language skills,
I t is 359. Among the Marielitos, good English language skills is not asso-
clated with a lower rate o f institutionalization.
U . S . ci t i zemhl p. The rate for non-Mariel Cubans who arc US. citizens
is 86 per 10,000; for Marielitos who are U.S. citizens, the r;lte is 332; tor
Marielitos who Ire not United States citizens. it is 340. Among the Mar-
ieliros, U.S. c.itizenship is not associated with n reduction 111 the risk of
institutionalization.
Fl o r i t h resdencc. The rate for non-Marie1 Cubans residing in Florida is
79 per 10.000; tor Marielitos who reside in Florida, the rate is 144; tor
Marielitos who Lire not residents of Florida, the rate is 931. These rates are
partly produced by the I NS policy during the 1980s of scattcnring detained
I \,larielitos throughout the countrys prisons, particularly in Texas and the
Northeilst, away from Florida.
St dt l f S 0f pt 1r 5<J?7S with diwbilities. The rate for non-Mariel Cubans with
disabilities is 163 per 10,000; for Marielitos with disabilitics, the rate is
465; tor- Marielitos without disabilities, the rate is 312.
These results show that, when Marielitos arc compared with non-Mariel
(:ubans, \.ariablcbs that can be assumed to increase the probability of insti-
tutionalization. such as nonwhite race, youth, and little education, take on
additional virulmcc when combined with Marielito status, whereas those
social characteristics that can be assumed to offer protection from insti-
tutionalization (such JS being married, good English language skills, and
I1.S. citizenship) Ire weakened by it.
Marielitos Ten Years Later: The Scarfoce Legmy
Conclusion
505
Both the theoretical argument and the empirical results demonstrate the
value of interpreting the Mariel mass migration as an instance of moral
epidemic. The effects of the epidemic on rates of institutionalization of
Cubans in the LJ nited States are quite dramatic. The findings support our
hypotheses. Mariel is not only one of the most irnport.Int additive pre-
dictors of institutionalization among Cubans in the United States, but par-
ticipation in the Mariel mass migration also affects the effects of other
well-known predictors. This set of findings is the clearesr documentation
to date of the lasting generalized negative Impact, a decade after its initi-
ation- of the Inoral epidemic against the Marielitos.
Research rtaviewed earlier in this article and the finding5 of this research
showing the effect of Mariel on the other predictors o! Institutionaliza-
tion argue against the commonsense view that their higher rates of insti-
tutionalizaton are 2 function of their higher deviance and criminality.
I nstead, the nloral epidemic created increased opportunitic5 for Marielitos
detection and institutionalization by the social control apparatus o f the
American state. With the exception o f the model of Inoral epidemics
(Goode and Hen-Yehuda, 1994), no present-day explanarlon can account
for the effect of Mariel on the other predictors o f insritutlonalization,
for example, why it decreases the protectice effects of m.lrital status and
race and increases the vulnerability ot the young. Such a theory would be
ad hoc and inelegant.
Instead, it I S more plausible to suggest a parsimonious ,Ind historically
based interpretation: the moral epidemic that occurred during the Mariel
mass migration created important liabilities for all particip.Ints, irrespective
of social and demographic status that otherwise would have protected then1
against detection and institutionalization by formal US. social control or-
ganizations. Future scientific work should attempt to identify the ongoing
bureaucratic and legal practices and the symbols and cultllral understand-
ings that create Marielitos increased odd\ o f institution;llization i n the
United States, I n particular, there is a pressing need for I-csearch on Ma-
rielitos (Audet, 1987) that would test hypotheses derived from the so-called
New Penology (Hagan, 1994: 163-164), or the emphasis on nlanagenlent
through selective incapacitation of categories of people perceived at high
risk of commltnng crimes.
REFERENCES
The Social Adjustment of Vietnamese American
Adolescents: Evidence for a Segmented-
Assimilation Approach*
Carl L. Bankston 111, Unizlersity of Southwestern Louisiana
Min Zhou, UnilJerslty of California, Los Angdes
Ohjectzrle. The segmented-ass~nl i l ati on approach to i mmi grant dj ustment sug-
gests that the benefits o f assimilation for immigrant youth depend on the segment
of society into whlch they assimilate. The purpose of this article is 1 0 exami ne how
young Vlernamesc Americans may be affected by ,I ssociation with peers of maj or
American racial gl-oups and with Americanized coethnics. Methods. This research
uses U.S. Census data to establish that racial groups surroundlllg a particular
\letnamese zommunlty constitute relatively privileged and relatiLely underprivi-
leged segments. The research analyzes dara from 3 survey administel-ed to Vi etmm-
ese studcnrs in puldic schools tn examine how they are affected by ,1soclation with
peers o f different races .lnd with culturally assimilJ ted Vietnamesc. Results. Peer-
group c~s~oc~ati on is n strong predictor o f adjustment. The advantagt.s of association
wt h melnhers o f different racial groups depend on the socioeconnmc privileges o f
those groups. Assoclarion wlth Americanized coethnics has a negative effect on
,1diustment. C o ~ ~ c ~ / u s i o ~ ~ s . Our findings offer support for the segnlenled-a~slnlilation
~rgument. For the Vietndmrse American adolescents in our stud!. following the
traditlonal path of ,Issimilarion by increasing contact with native-horn groups md
losing orl pnal c~1lrur;1I tr3its may turn out to be .I ssimilarion into ;I n underpriri-
leged segment of ,American society.
Since 1975, a massive program of refugee resettlement has led to
the cre,ltion of a sizable Vietnamese American population. Because the
Vietnamese American population was brought into existence by U.S. gov-
ernment policies. and because Vietnamese Americans are be~wming such a
prominent p r t o f American society, investigating the continuing adapta-
tion of young Vietnamese immigrants and second-generation Vietnamese
Americans to American society offers information of intrinsic interest about
Dlrecr ~ l l corre\pondence to L I r I L. Bankston 111, Dcpartmenr of Sociology .Ind \nthro-
pology, l l n~vers~ty c r t Southwestern Louisiana, Lafayerte, I A 70504-0198, telephone: 3 18-482-
6044; tax: 3lX-482 h19i . The darn contai ned in thl s arrlcle will be made a~~i l ahl e on request
t o J nyonr wl shl ng t o rt.pllc<lte these findings. Those wi.;hlng r o use these dara f or reasons
other rh.ln repl l cntl <>n o t the specifc tindings 111 this artl cl r mav, in some c:1ws, he allowed to
dn 5 0 .