CASE: QUILALA vs.

ALCANTARA
TOPIC: MAKING ANG ACCEPTANCE OF DONATION

G.R No.: 132681 December 3, 2001

FACTS:
On February 20, 1981, Catalina Quilala (donor) executed a
"Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos" in favor of Violeta
Quilala (donee) over a parcel of land located in Sta. Cruz,
Manila and registered in her name.
The "Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos" consists of two
pages. The first page contains the deed of donation itself, and
is signed on the bottom portion by Catalina Quilala and
Violeta Quilala, and two instrumental witnesses. The second
page contains the Acknowledgment, which states merely that
Catalina Quilala personally appeared before the notary public
and acknowledged that the donation was her free and
voluntary act and deed. There appear on the left-hand margin
of the second page the signatures of Catalina Quilala and one
of the witnesses, and on the right-hand margin the signatures
of Violeta Quilala and the other witness
On November 7, 1983, Catalina Quilala died. Violeta Quilala
likewise died on May 22, 1984. Petitioner Ricky Quilala
alleges that he is the surviving son of Violeta Quilala.
Meanwhile, respondents Gliceria Alcantara, Leonora
Alcantara, Ines Reyes and Juan Reyes, claiming to be
Catalina's only surviving relatives within the fourth civil
degree of consanguinity instituted an action for the
declaration of nullity of the donation inter vivos, and for the
cancellation of the TCT in the name of Violeta Quilala.
The trial court rendered a decision declaring null and void the
deed of donation of real property inter vivos executed by
Catalina Quilala in favor of Violeta Quilala. The trial court
found that since it was acknowledged before a notary public
only by the donor, Catalina, there was no acceptance by
Violeta of the donation in a public instrument. The decision
was affirmed by the CA.

ISSUE: Whether or not the donation executed by Catalina in
favor of Violeta is valid

HELD: valid even if the acknowledgment was only signed by
the donor
Below the terms and stipulations of the donation, the donor,
donee and their witnesses affixed their signature. However,
the Acknowledgment appearing on the second page
mentioned only the donor, Catalina Quilala. Thus, the trial
court ruled that for Violeta's failure to acknowledge her
acceptance before the notary public, the same was set forth
merely on a private instrument, i.e., the first page of the
instrument.
We disagree.
As provided for in Section 112, paragraph 2 of PD No. 1529,
the second page of the deed of donation, on which the
Acknowledgment appears, was signed by the donor and one
witness on the left-hand margin. The donee and the other
witness signed on the right hand margin. Surely, the
requirement that the contracting parties and their witnesses
should sign on the left-hand margin of the instrument is not
absolute. The intendment of the law merely is to ensure that
each and every page of the instrument is authenticated by
the parties. The requirement is designed to avoid the
falsification of the contract after the same has already been
duly executed by the parties. Hence, a contracting party
affixes his signature on each page of the instrument to certify
that he is agreeing to everything that is written thereon at
the time of signing.
Simply put, the specification of the location of the signature
is merely directory. The fact that one of the parties signs on
the wrong side of the page does not invalidate the document.
In the same vein, the lack of an acknowledgment by the
donee before the notary public does not also render the
donation null and void. The instrument should be treated in
its entirety. It cannot be considered a private document in
part and a public document in another part. The fact that it
was acknowledged before a notary public converts the deed
of donation in its entirety a public instrument. The fact that
the donee was not mentioned by the notary public in the
acknowledgment is of no moment. To be sure, it is the
conveyance that should be acknowledged as a free and
voluntary act. In any event, the donee signed on the second
page, which contains the Acknowledgment only. Her
acceptance, which is explicitly set forth on the first page of
the notarized deed of donation, was made in a public
instrument.
Petition is granted. The appealed decision of the CA is
reversed.
Case title: Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila et. al vs. CA
Topic: Donation; condition may be imposed by the donor to
the donee but such condition must not be contra bonus
mores (contrary to law, morals, public policy or public order)
so as to unreasonably restrict his right to dispose or alienate
the property as a right springing from ownership.

Facts:
On August 23, 1930, Spouses Eusebio de Castro and Martina
Rieta (donor), now both deceased, executed a deed of
donation in favor of therein defendant Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Manila (donee) covering a parcel of land with
an area of 964 square meters, more or less.
On or about June 30, 1980, and while still within the
prohibitive period to dispose of the property, petitioner
Roman Catholic Bishop of Imus, in whose administration all
properties within the province of Cavite owned by the
Archdiocese of Manila was allegedly transferred on April 26,
1962, executed a deed of absolute sale of the property
subject of the donation in favor of petitioners Florencio and
Soledad C. Ignao.
Private respondents on Nov 1984 as plaintiffs, filed a
complaint for nullification of deed of donation, rescission of
contract and reconveyance of real property with damages
against petitioners Florencio and Soledad C. Ignao and church
( defendants therein).
Trial court issued an order dismissing the complaint on the
ground that the cause of action has prescribed.
The case was elevated to CA. CA holding that the action has
not yet prescribed, rendered a decision in favor of private
respondents (plaintiff therein).
Petitioners contended that the cause of action of herein
private respondents has already prescribed, invoking Article
764 of the Civil Code which provides that "(t)he donation
shall be revoked at the instance of the donor, when the
donee fails to comply with any of the conditions which the
former imposed upon the latter," and that "(t)his action shall
prescribe after four years from the non-compliance with the
condition, may be transmitted to the heirs of the donor, and
may be exercised against the donee's heirs."
Thus should have raised the action between Jan 1980- Jan
1984. On Nov. 1984, it has prescribed.
Issues:
1.WON judicial declaration is required as the revocatory act
of the donation in this case
2.WON the cause of action of respondents has prescribed
under Art. 765
3.WON respondents have a cause of action granting the
cause of action has not prescribed
Ruling:
1.No judicial declaration needed. Automatic revocation by
virtue of the stipulation in the deed of donation
2. Action has not prescribed
SC quoting CAs decision:
The deed of donation involved herein expressly provides for
automatic reversion of the property donated in case of
violation of the condition therein, hence a judicial declaration
revoking the same is not necessary.
"By the very express provision in the deed of donation itself
that the violation of the condition thereof would render ipso
facto null and void the deed of donation, WE are of the
opinion that there would be no legal necessity anymore to
have the donation judicially declared null and void for the
reason that the very deed of donation itself declares it so.
Phrase reading 'would render ipso facto null and void' would
not appear in the deed of donation, if the intention was
otherwise.
The Court of Appeals committed no error in holding that the
cause of action of herein private respondents has not yet
prescribed since an action to enforce a written contract
prescribes in ten (10) years ( 1980-1990, respondents filed
the case on 1984 Nov). Article 764 was intended to provide a
judicial remedy in case of non-fulfillment or contravention of
conditions specified in the deed of donation if and when the
parties have not agreed on the automatic revocation of such
donation upon the occurrence of the contingency
contemplated therein.
3.
The issue whether or not the action by respondents has
prescribed is not really the case at bar. Private respondents
have no cause of action from the beginning.
Action filed by private respondents may not be dismissed by
reason of prescription; the same should be dismissed on the
ground that private respondents have no cause of action
against petitioners.
The cause of action of private respondents is based on the
alleged breach by petitioners of the resolutory condition in
the deed of donation that the property donated should not
be sold within a period of one hundred (100) years from the
date of execution of the deed of donation. Said condition, in
our opinion, constitutes an undue restriction on the rights
arising from ownership of petitioners and is, therefore,
contrary to public policy.
Donation, as a mode of acquiring ownership, results in an
effective transfer of title over the property from the donor to
the donee. Once a donation is accepted, the donee becomes
the absolute owner of the property donated. Although the
donor may impose certain conditions in the deed of donation,
the same must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order and public policy. The condition imposed in the
deed of donation in the case before us constitutes a patently
unreasonable and undue restriction on the right of the donee
to dispose of the property donated, which right is an
indispensable attribute of ownership. Such a prohibition
against alienation, in order to be valid, must not be perpetual
or for an unreasonable period of time.
Certain provisions of the Civil Code illustrative of the
aforesaid policy may be considered applicable by analogy.
Under the third paragraph of Article 494, a donor or testator
may prohibit partition for a period which shall not exceed
twenty (20) years. Article 870, on its part, declares that the
dispositions of the testator declaring all or part of the estate
inalienable for more than twenty (20) years are void.
That the prohibition in the deed of donation against the
alienation of the property for an entire century, being an
unreasonable emasculation and denial of an integral
attribute of ownership, should be declared as an illegal or
impossible condition within the contemplation of Article 727
of the Civil Code. Consequently, as specifically stated in said
statutory provision, such condition shall be considered as
not imposed.
The net result is that, absent said proscription, the deed of
sale supposedly constitutive of the cause of action for the
nullification of the deed of donation is not in truth violative of
the latter hence, for lack of cause of action, the case for
private respondents must fail


Title: Eufemia Pajarillo, Claudio Suterio Jr. vs. IAC, Salud
Suterio
G.R. No. 72908, August 11, 1989
Topic: Perfection of Donation, Making and Acceptance of
Donation
Facts:
First Generation: There were 3 siblings, Perfecta, Felipe, and
Juana.
Second Generation: The children of Juana, Salud
(respondent) and Claudio Sr.
Third Generation: The children of Claudio from spouse
Pajarillo (petitioners)
Perfecta (donor) here died but never left a will but
left a desire to donate the land she owned to her niece Salud
(donee). So the forced heirs herein, Felipe and Juana, carried
out the desire of deceased Perfecta and donated the land to
Salud. A deed of donation was made by the two through an
execution of a public instrument (extra-judicial partition) on
May 20, 1946 with a note of the acceptance of Salud BUT the
actual acceptance was made by Salud in a separate public
instrument only on June 20, 1946 with Pajarillo-Suterio as
witness. No registration was made nor title transferred to
Saluds name but she immediately took possession.
Because of the request of her mother, Juana, Salud
transferred possession and enjoyment of the fruits of the
land to her mother, Juana, who then occupied the land
together with Claudio Sr. and his family. Claudio Sr. paid the
realty taxes thereon. On May 25, 1965, Juana executed a
deed of absolute sale conveying the land to Claudio Sr. for a
declared consideration of P12,000 and after 2 years was able
to obtain a TCT. Claudio Sr. died in 1961 and Juana died on
1963.
The mother who did not even have the right to convey the
property sold the property to the brother of the donee
On June 30, 1965, Salud (joined by her husband)
initiated a complaint for the reconveyance of the property on
the ground that the deed of absolute sale in favor of Claudio
Sr. was fictitious and its registration in his name is null and
void.
On April 17,1979, Judge Juan M. Montecillo of the
Court of First Instance of Quezon rendered judgment
upholding the donation to the plaintiff and annulling the
deed of sale and the registration of the land in favor of
Claudio Suterio, Sr. On appeal, the decision was affirmed in
toto.
Issue:
Whether or not the deed of donation is valid?
Ruling:
It is also pointed out that the donation is defective in
form because of non-compliance with the requirements of
the law regarding its acceptance. As it was executed in 1946,
the applicable rule is Article 633 of the old Civil Code reading
as follows:
Art. 633. In order that a donation of real
property be valid it must be made by public
instrument in which the property donated
must be specifically described and the
amount of the charges to be assumed by
the donee expressed.
The acceptance may be made, in the deed
of gift or in a separate public writing; but it
shall produce no effect if not made during
the lifetime of the donor.
If the acceptance is made, by separate
public instrument, authentic notice thereof
shall be given the donor, and this
proceeding shall be noted in both
instruments.
There is no question that the donation was accepted
in a separate public instrument and that it was duly
communicated to the donors. Even the petitioners cannot
deny this. But what they do contend is that such acceptance
was not "noted in both instruments," meaning the
extrajudicial partition itself and the instrument of acceptance,
as required by the Civil Code. There is nothing in either of the
two instruments showing that "authentic notice" of the
acceptance was made by Salud to Juana and Felipe. And while
the first instrument contains the statement that "the donee
does hereby accept this donation and does hereby express
her gratitude for the kindness and liberality of the donor," the
only signatories thereof were Felipe Balane and Juana Balane
de Suterio. That was in fact the reason for the separate
instrument of acceptance signed by Salud a month later.
So basically, the donor was aware that the donee has
accepted the donation. This was confirmed by the mother
hence the reason of asking the donee not to register the
property under her name during the lifetime of the donor
The purpose of the formal requirement is to insure
that the acceptance of the donation is duly communicated to
the donor. In the case at bar, it is not even suggested that
Juana was unaware of the acceptance for she in fact
confirmed it later and requested that the donated land be not
registered during her lifetime by Salud. Given this significant
evidence, the Court cannot in conscience declare the
donation ineffective because there is no notation in the
extrajudicial settlement of the donee's acceptance. That
would be placing too much stress on mere form over
substance. It would also disregard the clear reality of the
acceptance of the donation as manifested in the separate
instrument dated June 20,1946, and as later acknowledged
by Juana.
The donation became effective upon acceptance by
Salud except that, in obedience to her mother's request, she
chose not to register the land in the meantime and to allow
her mother to enjoy its fruits. What was deferred was not its
effectivity but only its enjoyment by Salud. Registration was
not necessary to make the donation a binding commitment
insofar as the donors and the donee were concerned.
It is clear that Juana Balane de Suterio had no right
to sell the subject land to Claudio because she was no longer
its owner, having previously donated it to her daughter Salud.
Juana herself was holding the land merely as a trustee of
Salud, who had transferred possession to her mother at the
old woman's request. The deed of sale was itself vitiated by
bad faith as Claudio is presumed to have known of the
previous donation to his sister Salud, whose acceptance of
the donation was formally witnessed by his own wife, the
herein principal petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs
against the petitioners.
Topic: Donation Mortis Causa

Maglasang vs. Heirs of Cabatingan June 5, 2002 GR 131953

Facts: On Feb. 1992, Conchita Cabatingan (donor) executed a
Deed of Conditional Donation Intervivos in favor of her
brother Nicolas Cabatingan (donee) over a house and lot in
Liloan. She also executed 4 other donation in favor of Estela
Maglasang, Nicolas and Merly Cabatingan. These deeds of
donation contain similar provisions, to wit:

"That for and in consideration of the love and affection of the
DONOR for the DONEE, x x x the DONOR does hereby, by
these presents, transfer, convey, by way of donation, unto
the DONEE the above-described property, together with the
buildings and all improvements existing thereon, to become
effective upon the death of the DONOR; PROVIDED,
HOWEVER, that in the event that the DONEE should die
before the DONOR, the present donation shall be deemed
automatically rescinded and of no further force and effect; x x
x"[3] (Emphasis Ours)

On May 9, 1995, Conchita Cabatingan died.

The heirs of Conchita filed in RTC Mandaue for the
Annulment and/or declaration of Nullity of the deeds of
donation and accounting alleging that through sinister
machinations and strategies taking advantage of Conchitas
fragile condition and that it was null and void for failing to
comply with the Civil Code regarding formalities of the wills
and testament considering that the donation was mortis
causa. Petitioners contends that it was inter vivos because it
was made in consideration of the love and affection not in
consideration of death and that the recission provided
therein is a resolutory condition confirming that it is inter
vivos.

RTC found for the respondents and declared the donation as
mortis causa and null and void for failing to comply with Art
806 of the Civil Code.

Petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 posing the question of law.

Issue: WON the Donation was inter vivos or mortis causa.

Ruling: The instrument was a donation mortis causa.

In a donation mortis causa, "the right of disposition is not
transferred to the donee while the donor is still alive."[12] In
determining whether a donation is one of mortis causa, the
following characteristics must be taken into account:

(1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before
the death of the transferor; or what amounts to the same
thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or
naked) and control of the property while alive;

(2) That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by
the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be
provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the
donor to dispose of the properties conveyed;

and

(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should
survive the transferee.[13]

In the present case, the nature of the donations as mortis
causa is confirmed by the fact that the donations do not
contain any clear provision that intends to pass proprietary
rights to petitioners prior to Cabatingans death. The phrase
"to become effective upon the death of the DONOR" admits
of no other interpretation but that Cabatingan did not intend
to transfer the ownership of the properties to petitioners
during her lifetime. Petitioners themselves expressly
confirmed the donations as mortis causa in the following
Acceptance and Attestation clauses, uniformly found in the
subject deeds of donation, to wit:

"That the DONEE does hereby accept the foregoing donation
mortis causa under the terms and conditions set forth
therein, and avail herself of this occasion to express her
profound gratitude for the kindness and generosity of the
DONOR."

x x x

"SIGNED by the above-named DONOR and DONEE at the foot
of this Deed of Donation mortis causa, which consists of two
(2) pages x x x."[15]

That the donations were made "in consideration of the love
and affection of the donor" does not qualify the donations as
inter vivos because transfers mortis causa may also be made
for the same reason. [16]

The herein subject deeds expressly provide that the donation
shall be rescinded in case petitioners predecease Conchita
Cabatingan. As stated in Reyes v. Mosqueda,[20] one of the
decisive characteristics of a donation mortis causa is that the
transfer should be considered void if the donor should
survive the donee. This is exactly what Cabatingan provided
for in her donations. If she really intended that the donation
should take effect during her lifetime and that the ownership
of the properties donated be transferrred to the donee or
independently of, and not by reason of her death, she would
have not expressed such proviso in the subject deeds.

Considering that the disputed donations are donations mortis
causa, the same partake of the nature of testamentary
provisions[21] and as such, said deeds must be executed in
accordance with the requisites on solemnities of wills and
testaments under Articles 805 and 806 of the Civil Code, to
wit:

"ART. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be
subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by
the testators name written by some other person in his
presence, and by his express direction, and attested and
subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the
presence of the testator and of one another.

The testator or the person requested by him to write his
name and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also
sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the
last, on the left margin, and all the pages shall be numbered
correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page.

The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon
which the will is written , and the fact that the testator
signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some
other person to write his name, under his express direction,
in the presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that the
latter witnessed and signed the will and all the pages
thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.

If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the
witnesses, it shall be interpreted to them. (n)

ART. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary
public by the testator and the witnesses. The notary public
shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file
another with the office of the Clerk of Court. (n)"

The deeds in question although acknowledged before a
notary public of the donor and the donee, the documents
were not executed in the manner provided for under the
above-quoted provisions of law.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.



EVELYN DE LUNA, et., a l., petitioners, vs. HON. SOFRONIO F.
ABRIGO, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Quezon, Branch IX, and LUZONIAN UNIVERSITY
FOUNDATION, INC., respondents.
G.R. No. 57455. January 18, 1990
Topic: Revocation and Reduction of Donation
Facts of the Case:
On January 24, 1965, Prudencio de Luna (donor) donated a
portion of 7,500 square meters of Lot No. 3707 of the
Cadastral Survey of Lucena covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 1-5775 to the Luzonian Colleges, Inc.,(donee) (now
Luzonian University Foundation, Inc., herein referred to as
the foundation). The donation, embodied in a Deed of
Donation Intervivos was subject to certain terms and
conditions and provided for the automatic reversion to the
donor of the donated property in case of violation or non-
compliance. The foundation failed to comply with the
conditions of the donation. On April 9, 1971, Prudencio de
Luna "revived" the said donation in favor of the foundation,
in a document entitled "Revival of Donation Intervivos
subject to terms and conditions.
The donation was registered and annotated on April 15, 1971
in the memorandum of encumbrances as Entry No. 17939 of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-5775.
On August 3, 1971, Prudencio de Luna and the foundation
executed a "Deed of Segregation" whereby the area donated
which is now known as Lot No. 3707-B of Subdivision Plan
Psd-40392 was adjudicated to the foundation. As a result,
transfer certificate of title No. T-16152 was issued in the
name of the foundation. The remaining portion known as Lot
No. 3707-A was retained by the donor.
On September 23, 1980, herein petitioners, who claim to be
the children and only heirs of the late Prudencio de Luna who
died on August 18, 1980, filed a complaint with the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon alleging that the terms and conditions
of the donation were not complied with by the foundation.
Among others, it prayed for the cancellation of the donation
and the reversion of the donated land to the heirs. The
complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 8624.
Respondent foundation claimed that it had partially and
substantially complied with the conditions of the donation
and that the donor has granted the foundation an indefinite
extension of time to complete the construction of the chapel.
It also invoked the affirmative defense of prescription of
action and prayed for the dismissal of the complaint.
The trial Court finds the motion to dismiss deemed filed by
the defendant on the ground of prescription to be well-taken
and the same is hereby GRANTED.
Issue of the Case:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN TREATING THE COMPLAINT AS
ONE FOR JUDICIAL DECREE OF REVOCATION OF THE
DONATION IN QUESTION AS CONTEMPLATED IN ARTICLE 764
OF THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND WHICH
PRESCRIBES IN FOUR (4) YEARS AND IN NOT CONSIDERING IT
AS AN ACTION TO ENFORCE A WRITTEN CONTRACT WHICH
PRESCRIBES IN TEN (10) YEARS AS PROVIDED IN ARTICLE
1144, HENCE, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
COMPLAINT.
Ruling:
Donations may be 1) simple, 2) remuneratory or 3) onerous.
A simple donation is one the cause of which is pure liberality
(no strings attached). A remuneratory donation is one where
the donee gives something to reward past or future services
or because of future charges or burdens, when the value of
said services, burdens or charges is less than the value of the
donation. An onerous donation is one which is subject to
burdens, charges or future services equal (or more) in value
than that of the thing donated (Edgardo L. Paras, Civil Code of
the Philippines Annotated, 11 ed., 726).
It is the finding of the trial court, which is not disputed by the
parties, that the donation subject of this case is one with an
onerous cause. It was made subject to the burden requiring
the donee to construct a chapel, a nursery and a kindergarten
school in the donated property within five years from
execution of the deed of donation.
New Civil Code as provided in Article 733 thereof which
provides:
"Article 733. Donations with an onerous cause shall be
governed by the rules on contracts, and remuneratory
donations by the provisions of the present Title as regards
that portion which exceeds the value of the burden
imposed."
It is true that Article 764 of the New Civil Code, actions for the
revocation of a donation must be brought within for (4) years
from the non-compliance of the conditions of the donation.
However, it is Our opinion that the said article does not apply
to onerous donations in view of the specific provision of
Article 733 providing that onerous donations are governed by
the rules on contracts.
In the light of the above, the rules on contracts and the
general rules on prescription and not the rules on donations
are applicable in the case at bar.
rule on simple donation, prescription- 4 years
rule on onerous donation, prescription-based on the
contract. Since contract says automatic reversion,
then no need for other docs. Also, if none is
stipulated, the general rule on prescription
enforcement of a written contract- must be within 10 years
from execution.
Under Article 1306 of the New Civil Code, the parties to a
contract have the right "to establish such stipulations,
clauses, terms and conditions as they may deemed
convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public orders or public policy." Paragraph 11
of the "Revival of Donation Intervivos, has provided that"
violation of any of the conditions (herein) shall cause the
automatic reversion of the donated area to the donor, his
heirs, . . . , without the need of executing any other document
for that purpose and without obligation on the part of the
DONOR". Said stipulation not being contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order or public policy, is valid and
binding upon the foundation who voluntarily consented
thereto.
The validity of the stipulation in the contract providing for the
automatic reversion of the donated property to the donor
upon non-compliance cannot be doubted. It is in the nature
of an agreement granting a party the right to rescind a
contract unilaterally in case of breach, without need of going
to court. Upon the happening of the resolutory condition of
non-compliance with the conditions of the contract, the
donation is automatically revoked without need of a judicial
declaration to that effect The trial court was therefore not
correct in holding that the complaint in the case at bar is
barred by prescription under Article 764 of the New Civil
Code because Article 764 does not apply to onerous
donations.
As provided in the donation executed on April 9, 1971,
compliance with the terms and conditions of the contract of
donation, shall be made within five (5) years from its
execution. The complaint which was filed on September 23,
1980 was then well within the ten (10) year prescriptive
period to enforce a written contract (Article 1144[1], New
Civil Code), counted from April 9, 1976.

ELOY IMPERIAL, petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 11248
Topic:Prescriptive period to revoke donations
Leoncio Imperial was the registered owner of a 32,837-square
meter parcel of land. On July 7, 1951, Leoncio sold the said lot
for P1.00 to his acknowledged natural son, petitioner herein,
who then acquired title over the land and proceeded to
subdivide it into several lots. Petitioner and private
respondents admit that despite the contract's designation as
one of "Absolute Sale", the transaction was in fact a
donation.
On July 28, 1953, Leoncio filed a complaint for annulment of
the said Deed of Absolute Sale, on the ground that he was
deceived by petitioner herein into signing the said document.
The dispute, however, was resolved through a compromise
agreement, under which terms: (1) Leoncio recognized the
legality and validity of the rights of petitioner to the land
donated; and (2) petitioner agreed to sell a designated 1,000-
square meter portion of the donated land, and to deposit the
proceeds thereof in a bank, for the convenient disposal of
Leoncio. In case of Leoncio's death, it was agreed that the
balance of the deposit will be withdrawn by petitioner to
defray burial costs.
On January 8, 1962, and pending execution of the above
judgment, Leoncio died, leaving only two heirs --- the herein
petitioner, who is his acknowledged natural son, and an
adopted son, Victor Imperial. On March 8, 1962, Victor was
substituted in place of Leoncio in the above-mentioned case,
and it was he who moved for execution of judgment. On
March 15, 1962, the motion for execution was duly granted.
Fifteen years thereafter, Victor died single and without issue,
survived only by his natural father, Ricardo Villalon. Four
years hence, or on September 25, 1981, Ricardo died, leaving
as his only heirs his two children, Cesar and Teresa Villalon.
Five years thereafter, Cesar and Teresa filed a complaint for
annulment of the donation with the Regional Trial Court of
Legazpi City, docketed as Civil Case No. 7646. Petitioner
moved to dismiss on the ground of res judicata, by virtue of
the compromise judgment rendered by the Court of First
Instance of Albay. The trial court granted the motion to
dismiss, but the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's
order and remanded the case for further proceedings.
On October 18, 1989, Cesar and Teresa filed an amended
complaint in the same case, Civil Case No. 7646, for
"Annulment of Documents, Reconveyance and Recovery of
Possession" with the RTC, seeking the nullification of the
Deed of Absolute Sale affecting the above property, on
grounds of fraud, deceit and inofficiousness. In the amended
complaint, it was alleged that petitioner caused Leoncio to
execute the donation by taking undue advantage of the
latter's physical weakness and mental unfitness, and that the
conveyance of said property in favor of petitioner impaired
the legitime of Victor Imperial, their natural brother and
predecessor-in-interest.
The RTC held the donation to be inofficious and impairing the
legitime of Victor. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC
Decision in toto.
Issue: WON private respondents' action is barred by
prescription, laches and estoppel
What, then, is the prescriptive period for an action for
reduction of an inofficious donation? The Civil Code specifies
the following instances of reduction or revocation of
donations: (1) four years, in cases of subsequent birth,
appearance, recognition or adoption of a child;16 [Civil Code,
Art. 763.] (2) four years, for non-compliance with conditions
of the donation;17 [Id., Art. 764.] and (3) at any time during
the lifetime of the donor and his relatives entitled to support,
for failure of the donor to reserve property for his or their
support.18 [Id., Art. 750.] Interestingly, donations as in the
instant case,19 [Governed by Articles 752 and 771 of the Civil
Code, which read thus:Art. 752. xxx (N)o person may give or
receive, by way of donation, more than what he may give or
receive by will.
The donation shall be inofficious in all that it may exceed this
limitation.
Art.771. Donations which in accordance with the provisions
of Article 752, are inofficious bearing in mind the estimated
net value of the donor's property at the time of his death,
shall be reduced with regard to the excess, but this reduction
shall not prevent the donations from taking effect during the
life of the donor, nor shall it bar the donee from
appropriating the fruits. xxx] the reduction of which hinges
upon the allegation of impairment of legitime, are not
controlled by a particular prescriptive period, for which
reason we must resort to the ordinary rules of prescription.
Under Article 1144 of the Civil Code, actions upon an
obligation created by law must be brought within ten years
from the time the right of action accrues. Thus, the ten-year
prescriptive period applies to the obligation to reduce
inofficious donations, required under Article 771 of the Civil
Code, to the extent that they impair the legitime of
compulsory heirs.
From when shall the ten-year period be reckoned? The case
of Mateo vs. Lagua, 29 SCRA 864, which involved the
reduction for inofficiousness of a donation propter nuptias,
recognized that the cause of action to enforce a legitime
accrues upon the death of the donor-decedent. Clearly so,
since it is only then that the net estate may be ascertained
and on which basis, the legitimes may be determined.
It took private respondents 24 years since the death of
Leoncio to initiate this case. The action, therefore, has long
prescribed.
Private respondents are also guilty of estoppel by laches. It
may be recalled that Leoncio died on January 8, 1962. Fifteen
years later, Victor died, leaving as his sole heir Ricardo
Villalon, who also died four years later. While Victor was
alive, he gave no indication of any interest to contest the
donation of his deceased father. As we have discussed earlier,
the fact that he actively participated in Civil Case No. 1177 did
not amount to a renunciation of his inheritance and does not
preclude him from bringing an action to claim his legitime.
These are matters that Victor could not possibly be unaware
of, considering that he is a lawyer.21 Ricardo Villalon was
even a lessee of a portion of the donated property, and could
have instituted the action as sole heir of his natural son, or at
the very least, raised the matter of legitime by way of
counterclaim in an ejectment case filed against him by
petitioner in 1979. Neither does it help private respondents'
cause that five years have elapsed since the death of Ricardo
in 1981 before they filed their complaint with the RTC.

Digested by: Gayle Opsima

Subject: Property
Title: SOLEDAD CALICDAN, represented by her guardian
GUADALUPE CASTILLO, petitioner vs. SILVERiO CENDAA,
substituted by his legal heir CELSA CENDAA-
ALARAS, respondent
G.R. No. 155080 February 5, 2004
Topic: Void donation as basis for title by acquisitive
prescription
Facts:
The instant controversy involves a 760 square meter parcel of
unregistered land formerly owned by Sixto Calicdan, who
died intestate. He was survived by his wife, Fermina, and
three children, namely, petitioner Soledad, Jose and Benigno.
On August 25, 1947, Fermina executed a deed of
donation inter vivos whereby she conveyed the land to
respondent Silverio Cendaa, who immediately entered into
possession of the land, built a fence around the land and
constructed a two-storey residential house thereon
sometime in 1949, where he resided until his death in 1998.
On June 29, 1992, petitioner, through her legal guardian
Guadalupe Castillo, filed a complaint for "Recovery of
Ownership, Possession and Damages" against the
respondent, alleging that the donation was void; that
respondent took advantage of her incompetence in acquiring
the land.
The trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner but
was reversed by the CA.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner lost ownership of the land by
prescription
Ruling:
The factual findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals
are conflicting; thus, we are constrained to review the
findings of facts.
After a review of the evidence on record, we find that the
Court of Appeals ruling that the donation was valid was not
supported by convincing proof. The donation of the land is
void because Fermina was not the owner thereof,
considering that it was inherited by Sixto from his parents.
Thus, the land was not part of the conjugal property of the
spouses Sixto and Fermina Calicdan, because under the
Spanish Civil Code, the law applicable when Sixto died in
1941, the surviving spouse had a right of usufruct only over
the estate of the deceased spouse. Consequently,
respondent, who derived his rights from Fermina, only
acquired the right of usufruct as it was the only right which
the latter could convey.
Notwithstanding the invalidity of the donation, we find that
respondent has become the rightful owner of the land by
extraordinary acquisitive prescription.
Prescription is another mode of acquiring ownership and
other real rights over immovable property. It is concerned
with lapse of time in the manner and under conditions laid
down by law, namely, that the possession should be in the
concept of an owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted and
adverse.
The records show that the subject land is an unregistered
land. When the petitioner filed the instant case on June 29,
1992, respondent was in possession of the land for 45 years
counted from the time of the donation in 1947. This is more
than the required 30 years of uninterrupted adverse
possession without just title and good faith. Such possession
was public, adverse and in the concept of an owner.
Moreover, the deed of donation inter vivos, albeit void for
having been executed by one who was not the owner of the
property donated, may still be used to show the exclusive and
adverse character of respondents possession. Thus, in Heirs
of Segunda Maningding v. Court of Appeals,
19
we held:
Even assuming that the donation propter nuptias is void for
failure to comply with formal requisites, it could still
constitute a legal basis for adverse possession. With clear and
convincing evidence of possession, a private document of
donation may serve as basis for a claim of ownership.
In Pensader v. Pensader we ruled that while the verbal
donation under which the defendant and his predecessors-in-
interest have been in possession of the lands in question is
not effective as a transfer of title, still it is a circumstance
which may explain the adverse and exclusive character of the
possession. (Underscoring ours)
In sum, the Court of Appeals correctly ordered the dismissal
of the case, and declared respondent the rightful owner of
the subject property, not on the basis of the Deed of
Donation Inter Vivos, which is hereby declared void, but on
extraordinary acquisitive prescription.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED.
CASE TITLE: Concepcion vs. Concepcion
G.R. No.: L-4225 August 25, 1952
TOPIC: Inter Vivos or Mortis Causa
FACTS
After the execution of a deed of donation on November 18,
1947, the donor Manuela Concepcion died. Plaintiffs-
appellees who are 6 nephews and nieces of the donor
instituted special proceedings in the CFI of Zambales for the
summary settlement of the estate of their aunt. Because the
estate or the greater portion thereof sought to be summarily
settled and distributed was included in the donation, the
donee Emilia Concepcion filed opposition to the petition
claiming that the 6 parcels subject of the donation belonged
to her. The Court in said special proceedings without deciding
the title and right of possession to the 6 parcels claimed by
Emilia, merely ordered the partition of the estate of Manuela
Concepcion among all her heirs who are besides the 6
petitioners, Emilia Concepcion and her 4 brothers. Because
Emilia refused to give up the parcels said to have been
donated to her, the 6 original petitioners in the special
proceedings filed the present action in the CFI of Zambales to
have themselves declared owners of and entitled to the
possession of their shares in those properties claimed by
Emilia in the proportion of one-eleventh (1/11) for each.
After trial, the lower court found that the donation was one
mortis causa and because it was not executed in the manner
required by law on wills, it was declared null and void; the
properties therein included were all declared part if the
estate of the deceased Manuela Concepcion subject to
distribution among the heirs in the proportion of 1/11 for
each as declared by the court in the special proceedings.
Emilia Concepcion appealed the decision to the CA, but
finding that only questions of law were involved in the
appeal, said court by resolution certified the case to this
Court.
ISSUE:
Whether the deed of donation is inter vivos or mortis causa.
(because if the former, it is valid having been duly accepted by
the donee, but if the latter it would be void because being in
the nature of disposal of property by will, according to the
article 620 of the Civil Code, it shall be governed by the rules
established for testamentary succession)
HELD:
Here, the donation is entitled and called donacion onerosa
mortis causa. From the body, however, we find that the
donation was of a nature remunerative rather that onerous.
The donation instead of being onerous or for a valuable
consideration, as in payment of a legal obligation was more of
remuneratory or compensatoruy nature, besides being partly
motivated by affection.
In the case of De Guzman et al. vs. Ibea, et al. (67 Phil., 633),
this Court through said that if a donation by its terms is inter
vivos, this character is not altered by the fact that the donor
styles it mortis causa.
It is clear that even when the donor calls the donation mortis
causa instead of inter vivos, even if he says it is to take effect
after his death, when from the body of the instrument or
donation is to be gathered that the main consideration of the
donation is not the death of the donor but rather services
rendered to him, by the donee or his affection for the latter,
then the donation should be considered as inter vivos, and
when duly accepted, it transfers title immediately to the
donee, and the condition that the donation is to take effect
only after the death of donor should be interpreted as
meaning that the possession and enjoyment of the fruits of
the property donated should take place only after donor's
death
One other consideration may be mentioned in support of our
stand. The donation here was accepted by Emilia; said
acceptance is embodied in the deed of donation, and both
donor and donee signed below said acceptance conclusively
showing that the donor was aware of said acceptance. The
deed and acceptance was by agreement of both recorded or
registered. Everything was complete. Only donations inter
vivos need be accepted. Donation mortis causa being in the
nature of a legacy need not be accepted. Presuming that the
donor Manuela and the donee Emilia knew the law, the fact
that they not only be agreed to the acceptance but regarded
said acceptance necessary argues for their understanding and
intention that the donation was inter vivos.
In view of the foregoing, we find that the donation in
question is inter vivos and not mortis causa, and that it is
valid because the requisites of the law about the execution of
wills do not apply to it. The decision appealed from is hereby
reversed with costs.


Austria-Magat vs. CA

Facts:
In 1953, Basilisa bought a parcel of residential land
together with the improvement thereon. On December 17,
1975, Basilisa executed a document designated as Kasulatan
sa Kaloobpala (Donation) over said parcel in favor her
children. Later, Basilisa and her said children likewise
executed another notarized document denominated as
Kasulatan which is attached to the deed of donation where
it was stated that the same parcel will still be in the
possession of their mother in her lifetime and be free from
any encumbrance.
On February 6, 1979, Basilisa executed a Deed of
Absolute Sale of the subject house and lot in favor of herein
petitioner Apolinaria Austria-Magat for P5,000. As the result
of the registration of said sale, TCT No. RT-4036 in the name
of the donor was cancelled and in lieu thereof TCT No. T-
10434 was issued by the RD of Cavite City in favor of
petitioner on February 8, 1979.
On September 21, 1983, herein respondents Teodora
Carampot, Domingo Comia, and Ernesto Apolo (representing
their deceased mother Consolacion Austria), Ricardo,
Mamerto and Segunda, all surnamed Sumpelo (representing
their deceased mother Rosario Austria) and Florentino
Lumubos filed before the RTC of Cavite an action against the
petitioner for annulment of TCT No. T-10434 and other
relevant documents, and for reconveyance and damages.
However, it was dismissed. According to the trial court, the
donation is a donation mortis causa pursuant to Article 728 of
the New Civil Code inasmuch as the same expressly provides
that it would take effect upon the death of the donor; that
the provision stating that the donor reserved the right to
revoke the donation is a feature of a donation mortis
causa which must comply with the formalities of a will; and
that inasmuch as the donation did not follow the formalities
pertaining to wills, the same is void and produced no effect
whatsoever. Hence, the sale by the donor of the said
property was valid since she remained to be the absolute
owner thereof during the time of the said transaction.
On appeal, the decision of the trial court was reversed
by the Court of Appeals in its subject decision declared null
and void the Deed of Sale of Registered Land and TCT No. T-
10434 of and ordering the cancellation thereof; and also
declared that appellants and appellee are co-owners of the
house and lot in question in accordance with the deed of
donation executed by Basilisa Comerciante on December 17,
1975. The appellate court ruled that the deed is a
donation inter vivos based on the provision of the same
which expresses the irrevocability of the conveyance. The
irrevocability of the donation is a characteristic of a donation
inter vivos. By the words hindi mababawi, the donor
expressly renounced the right to freely dispose of the house
and lot in question. The right to dispose of a property is a
right essential to full ownership. Hence, ownership of the
house and lot was already with the donees even during the
donors lifetime. Also, the attached document to the deed of
donation, a stipulation is present which is a mere reiteration
of the irrevocability of the dispossession on the part of the
donor. On the other hand, the prohibition to encumber,
alienate or sell the property during the lifetime of the donor
is recognition of the ownership over the house and lot in
issue of the donees for only in the concept of an owner can
one encumber or dispose a property.

Issue(s):
1. Whether or not it was a donation inter vivos.
2. Whether the action has prescribed under the Statute of
Limitations.

Ruling:
It has been held that whether the donation is inter
vivos or mortis causa depends on whether the donor
intended to transfer ownership over the properties upon the
execution of the deed. Significant to the resolution of this
issue is the irrevocable character of the donation in the case
at bar. In Cuevas v. Cuevas, the Court ruled that when the
deed of donation provides that the donor will not dispose or
take away the property donated (thus making the donation
irrevocable), he in effect is making a donation inter vivos. He
parts away with his naked title but maintains beneficial
ownership while he lives. It remains to be a donation inter
vivos despite an express provision that the donor continues
to be in possession and enjoyment of the donated property
while he is alive.
Construing together the provisions of the deed of
donation, the Court finds and so hold that in the case at bar
the donation is inter vivos. The express irrevocability of the
same (hindi na mababawi) is the distinctive standard that
identifies that document as a donation inter vivos. The other
provisions therein which seemingly make the donation mortis
causa do not go against the irrevocable character of the
subject donation. The provisions which state that the same
will only take effect upon the death of the donor and that
there is a prohibition to alienate, encumber, dispose, or sell
the same, are only necessary assurances that during the
donors lifetime, the latter would still enjoy the right of
possession over the property; but, his naked title of
ownership has been passed on to the donees; and that upon
the donors death, the donees would get all the rights of
ownership over the same including the right to use and
possess the same; and not necessarily proofs that the
donation is mortis causa. The provision in the deed of
donation that the donated property will remain in the
possession of the donor just goes to show that the donor has
given up his naked title of ownership thereto and has
maintained only the right to use (jus utendi) and possess (jus
possidendi) the subject donated property. Also, the
prohibition on the donor to alienate the said property during
her lifetime is proof that naked ownership over the property
has been transferred to the donees. It also supports the
irrevocable nature of the donation considering that the donor
has already divested herself of the right to dispose of the
donated property. On the other hand, the prohibition on the
donees only meant that they may not mortgage or dispose
the donated property while the donor enjoys and possesses
the property during her lifetime. However, it is clear that the
donees were already the owners of the subject property due
to the irrevocable character of the donation. Another
indication in the deed of donation that the donation is inter
vivos is the acceptance clause therein of the donees. An
acceptance clause is a mark that the donation is inter vivos
and is also a requirement for donations inter vivos. On the
other hand, donations mortis causa, being in the form of a
will, are not required to be accepted by the donees during
the donors lifetime.
Also, the act of selling the subject property to the
petitioner herein cannot be considered as a valid act of
revocation of the deed of donation for the reason that a
formal case to revoke the donation must be filed pursuant to
Article 764 of the Civil Code which speaks of an action that
has a prescriptive period of four (4) years from non-
compliance with the condition stated in the deed of
donation. The rule that there can be automatic revocation
without benefit of a court action does not apply to the case at
bar for the reason that the subject deed of donation is devoid
of any provision providing for automatic revocation in event
of non-compliance with the any of the conditions set forth
therein.
As regards the ground of estoppel, the donor, Basilisa,
cannot invoke the violation of the provision on the
prohibition to encumber the subject property as a basis to
revoke the donation thereof inasmuch as she acknowledged
the validity of the mortgage executed by the donee,
Consolacion Austria, when the said donor asked respondent
Domingo Comia to redeem the same. Thereafter, the donor,
Basilisa likewise asked respondent Florentino Lumubos and
the petitioner herein to redeem the same. Those acts implied
that the donees have the right of control and naked title of
ownership over the property considering that the donor,
Basilisa condoned and acknowledged the validity of the
mortgage executed by one of the donees,
Consolacion Austria.
Anent the second issue, the petitioner asserts that the
action, against the petitioner, for annulment of TCT No. T-
10434 and other relevant documents, for reconveyance and
damages, filed by the respondents on September 21, 1983 on
the ground of fraud and/or implied trust has already
prescribed. The sale happened on February 6, 1979 and its
registration was made on February 8, 1979 when TCT No. RT-
4036 in the name of the donor was cancelled and in lieu
thereof TCT No. T-10434 in the name of the petitioner was
issued. Thus, more than four (4) years have passed since the
sale of the subject real estate property was registered and
the said new title thereto was issued to the petitioner. The
petitioner contends that an action for reconveyance of
property on the ground of alleged fraud must be filed within
four (4) years from the discovery of fraud which is from the
date of registration of the deed of sale on February 8, 1979;
and that the same prescriptive period also applies to a suit
predicated on a trust relationship that is rooted on fraud of
breach of trust. However, the four-year prescriptive period is
not applicable to the case at bar for the reason that there is
no fraud in this case. The findings of fact of the appellate
court which are entitled to great respect, are devoid of any
finding of fraud. The records do not show that the donor,
Basilisa, and the petitioner ever intended to defraud the
respondents herein with respect to the sale and ownership of
the said property. On the other hand, the sale was grounded
upon their honest but erroneous interpretation of the deed
of donation that it is mortis causa, not inter vivos;and that the
donor still had the rights to sell or dispose of the donated
property and to revoke the donation. There being no fraud in
the trust relationship between the donor and the donees
including the herein petitioner, the action for reconveyance
prescribes in ten (10) years. Considering that TCT No. T-
10434 in the name of the petitioner and covering the subject
property was issued only on February 8, 1979, the filing of the
complaint in the case at bar in 1983 was well within the ten-
year prescriptive period.
CAs decision is affirmed.


Subject: Property
Title: Heirs of Salud Dizon Salamat vs. Tamayo
G.R. No. 110644, October 30, 1998
Topic: Making and Acceptance of donation
Facts:
Agustin Dizon died intestate on May 15, 1942 leaving
behind his five children Eduardo, Gaudencio, Salud
(petitioner), Valenta and Natividad (respondent) as surviving
heirs. Among the properties left by the decedent was a parcel
of land in Barrio San Nicolas, Hagonoy, Bulacan, with an area
of 2,188 square meters covered by Original Certificate of Title
No. 10384. Eduardo sold his hereditary rights to his
sister Salud evidenced by a private document bearing with
signatures of Valenta and Natividad. Later on Gaudencio
likewise sold his rights still to Salud evidenced by a notarized
document.
Sometime in 1987, petitioners instituted an action
for compulsory judicial partition of real properties registered
in the name of Agustin Dizon with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 18 of Malolos, Bulacan. The action was prompted by
the refusal of herein respondent Natividad Dizon Tamayo to
agree to the formal distribution of the properties of deceased
Agustin Dizon among his heirs. Respondent claims that her
father donated it to her sometime in 1936 with the
conformity of the other heirs. She presented a private
document of conformity which was allegedly signed and
executed by her elder brother, Eduardo, in 1936. The subject
property is also declared for taxation purposes under Tax
Declaration No. 10376 in the name of respondent.
Trial court noted that the alleged endowment which
was made orally by the deceased Agustin Dizon to herein
respondent partook of the nature of a donation which
required the observance of certain formalities set by law.
Nevertheless, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of
respondent.
Court of Appeals, in affirming the decision of the
RTC, stated that notwithstanding the unexplained erasures
and alterations, a cursory reading of the signed statement of
Eduardo Dizon, which execution is undisputed, showed that
there was an oral donation of the litigated land from Agustin
Dizon to Natividad Dizon Tamayo in 1936.
Issue:
Whether or not the document is authentic inasmuch
as it is marred by unexplained erasures and alterations?
Ruling:
Art 749 of the Civil Code reads:
In order that the donation of an immovable
may be valid, it must be made in a public
document, specifying therein the property
donated and the value of the charges which
the donee must satisfy.
The acceptance may be made in the same
deed of donation or in a separate public
document, unless it is done during the
lifetime of the donor.
If the acceptance is made in a separate
instrument, the donor shall be notified
thereof in an authentic form and this step
shall be noted in both instruments.
It is clear from Article 749 that a transfer of real
property from one person to another cannot take effect as a
donation unless embodied in a public document. The alleged
donation in the case at bar was done orally and not executed
in a public document. Moreover, the document which was
presented by respondent in support of her claim that her
father donated the subject parcel of land to her was a mere
private document of conformity which was executed by her
elder brother, Eduardo in 1956. It may not be amiss to point
out that the brothers Eduardo and Gaudencio had already
ceded their hereditary interests to petitioner Salud Dizon
Salamat even before 1950.
The document which was allegedly executed by
Eduardo was marred by unexplained erasures and alterations.
While the document was originally penned in black ink, the
number thirty-six (36) in blue ink was superimposed on the
number fifty-six (56) to make it appear that the document
was executed in 1936 instead of in 1956. Moreover, a
signature was blotted out with a black pentel pen and the
three other signatures
7
of the alleged witnesses to the
execution of the document at the lower portion of the
document were dated June 1, 1951. This could only mean
that the witnesses attested to the veracity of the document 5
years earlier, if the document was executed in 1956 or 15
years later, if we are to give credence to respondent's claim,
that the document was executed in 1936. Curiously, two of
the signatories, namely, Priscila D. Rivera and Maria D. Jocson
signed the document as witnesses two days after the death
of their father Gaudencio, who, as earlier mentioned, had
already sold his hereditary rights to his sister Salud in 1949.
Assuming that Agustin really made the donation to
respondent, albeit orally, respondent cannot still claim
ownership over the property. While it is true that a void
donation may be the basis of ownership which may ripen into
title by prescription, it is well settled that possession, to
constitute the foundation of a prescriptive right, must be
adverse and under a claim of title. Respondent was never in
adverse and continous possession of the property. It is
undeniable that petitioners and respondent, being heirs of
the deceased, are co-owners of the properties left by the
latter. A co-ownership is a form of a trust, with each owner
being a trustee for each other and possession of a co-owner
shall not be regarded as adverse to other co-owner but in fact
is beneficial to them. Mere actual possession by one will not
give rise to the inference that the possession was adverse
because a co-owner is, after all, entitled to possession of the
property.
The elements in order that a co-owner's possession
may be deemed adverse to the cestui que trust or the co-
owner are: (1) that he has performed unequivocal acts of
repudiation amounting to ouster of the cestui que trust or
other co-owners (2) that such positive acts or repudiation
have been made known to the cestui que trust or other co-
owners and (3) that the evidence thereon must be clear and
convincing.
Since respondent never made unequivocal acts of
repudiation, she cannot acquire ownership over said property
through acquisitive prescription. the fact that the subject
property is declared for taxation purposes in the name of
respondent who pays realty taxes thereon under Tax
Declaration No. 14376 is of no moment. It is well settled that
tax declarations or realty tax payments are not conclusive
evidence of ownership.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby REVERSED.