INTRODUCTION

At the present day it has become fashionable to refer to justice with epithets, such as social
justice, moral justice, and even democratic justice. Such a usage assumes that justice is not one
and indivisible but can differ in varying circumstances. Indeed, it even suggests that action may
be justifiable in politics or economics which could not be justified as between man and man in
the moral sphere. This is a dangerous doctrine and proceeds from the notion that it is right and
just that individuals should suffer unjustly for the benefit of others. There is nothing new in
this view; it is at least as old as politics of politicians, that is, those entitled to inflict this
suffering upon others. Nevertheless, ideas can only be expressed in words and words may be
used to provide a cloak of respectability for notions that, otherwise expressed, might be rejected.
Probably there are few words more respectable than justice, and if I can say that is Social
Justice, to take my neighbors goods and give them to the poor, I must escape without too much
notice being taken of what I do with my own property. If I can claim that democratic justice
demands the suppression of opponents of freedom or of the people it may be that no one will
look too closely at the methods used. These may be the hopes and certainly are the dangers, for
words can prove tyrannical over ideas.
Traditionally, law has been associated with the administration of justice
1
and, indeed, law is
often serving besides administering justice. In many matters rules of law are neutral and have
no particular quality of justice but are determined by convenience, as, for example, the rules of
the road. Nevertheless, a lawyer can scarcely be unconcerned with the problems of justice, and
so it is my purpose here as a lawyer to examine the nature of Justice. In so doing it is necessary
to consider the application of the principle of justice to the determination of rules and disputes
and to see how far, if at all, epithets such as social or democratic may prove reliable guides
to social behavior.
It is generally assumed that it is the highest, if not the only, purpose of law to do justice.







11
Cf. salmond, jurisprudence, para.15: definition of law.
The nature of justice
Most man believes that they understand the meaning of justice, but in fact their notions prove
to be vague. It frequently goes no farther than that is just which seems to be just to a just man.
This, of course, begs the whole issue because it assumes that a just man can be recognized
without abstract tests. This is not so, because justice if it has any meaning, is determined by its
moral content. Aristotle, indeed, described justice as the practice of perfect virtue, but perfect
virtue is a question of abstract principle.
According to J.S. MILL, Justice implies something which is not only right to do, and wrong not
to do, but which some individual person can claim from us as his moral right.
No one has a moral right to our generosity beneficence, because we are not morally bound to
practice those virtues towards any given individual.
This statement assumes a balance of moral claims and superficially sounds a proper statement
distinguishing justice from mercy. This assumption is not free from criticism, but at the moment
I wish only to draw attention to the essential basis of the definition, namely, the existence of a
moral rule determining the rights of a party. What the statement does not do is to describe how a
man may decide what the moral rule shall be. Furthermore the whole conception assumes an
ethical view that accepts the imposition of rights as well as duties on the individual. Justice
cannot exist apart from the moral basis, but communities change their moral codes as well as
their laws. This can be conveniently illustrated from English law, where justice according to
law has produced different results in accordance with this change.
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries it was repeatedly held that Christianity was part of
the common Law and advised writing against that a religion was a crime. On the other hand in
the nineteenth century it was held that reverent criticism of Christianity was not blasphemous nor
an offence. A similar change of view has taken place in connection with superstitious uses that a
gift for masses for the souls of the departed was held no longer to be unlawful as it was formerly
thought to be.
So long, therefore, as the view of perfect virtue varies, any acceptance of a definition of
justice based on moral values must accept the further proposition that in the reall of human
affairs justice will vary in place and time.this,indeed ,is really inherient in mills own description
,because he realtes it to each own moral values.
The fact is that the utilitarian is based upon Kants idea of the fundamental of all morals so to act
that the rule of conduct might be adopted as lawby all rational beings.this challenging
proposition is open to question since it presupposes a point of view common to humanity.there
is a little incontemporary affairs to justify the optimism of this criterion.further more it assumes
that moral rules of conduct should be expressed in terms of laws.
In communities justice can scarcely be regarded solely as between individuals.N ot only in
criminal law but , indeed , in all law,the relation of individual can not be diverged from
relationship to the community as a whole.Some claims for democratic justice are based on
emphesis on this second point almost to the elimination of the first . The same is true , perhaps,of
some claims made in the name of social justice.
Never the less, there is real difficulty upon occasion in reconciling these two points of view as
maybe evidenced ,indeed,from the utilitarian proposition the greatest good of the greatest
number,which it self is highly ambigious.it maybe true that justice to the individual ,this
reguarding the community,may always be for the ultimate good of the gretest number.though it is
in point here also to draw attention to the second rule of English law that is suppose to be
founded upon natural justice,moral law that is a man may not be judged and prosecuted to .
The difficulties thus presented ,perhaps ,derived from the fact that justice is after all one aspect
of truth indeed, Disrali is reported to have said that justice is truth in action .unless the judge
knows the whole truth of the facts affecting his decision no judgement can rest on sure
foundation.But further more even the complete knowledge of the truth of facts is not known
sufficient since the judgement depends upon true view of all the considerations that lead to a
confusion.Thus,assuming that we know all the details of little Tommy taking the apple and all
the details of little Tommys life and character ,we must still have a true view of moral values
before we can decide justly whether or not little Tommy should be blamed , much less
punished.those familiar with the book of common prayer will at once call to the mind the
celebrated petition of truth and justice,religion and piety to be established.The concurrence of
these words and phrases can not have been accidental , and it significant in more ways then
one.Just as ideas of religion and piety have varied from age to age and place to place so have the
notions of justice and truth been obscured by prejudice and obscurandism and the
relationship of these conceptions have been ignored.