1.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 135385 December 6, 2000
ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, petitioners,
vs.
SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, SECRETARY OF BUDGET
AND MANAGEMENT and CHAIRMAN and COMMISSIONERS OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, respondents.
HON. JUAN M .FLAVIER, HON. PONCIANO BENNAGEN, BAYANI ASCARRAGA, EDTAMI
MANSAYANGAN, BASILIO WANDAG, EVELYN DUNUAN, YAOM TUGAS, ALFREMO
CARPIANO, LIBERATO A. GABIN, MATERNIDAD M. COLAS, NARCISA M. DALUPINES, BAI
KIRAM-CONNIE SATURNO, BAE MLOMO-BEATRIZ T. ABASALA, DATU BALITUNGTUNG-
ANTONIO D. LUMANDONG, DATU MANTUMUKAW TEOFISTO SABASALES, DATU
EDUAARDO BANDA, DATU JOEL UNAD, DATU RAMON BAYAAN, TIMUAY JOSE ANOY,
TIMUAY MACARIO D. SALACAO, TIMUAY EDWIN B. ENDING, DATU SAHAMPONG
MALANAW VI, DATU BEN PENDAO CABIGON, BAI NANAPNAY-LIZA SAWAY, BAY INAY
DAYA-MELINDA S. REYMUNDO, BAI TINANGHAGA HELINITA T. PANGAN, DATU
MAKAPUKAW ADOLINO L. SAWAY, DATU MAUDAYAW-CRISPEN SAWAY, VICKY MAKAY,
LOURDES D. AMOS, GILBERT P. HOGGANG, TERESA GASPAR, MANUEL S. ONALAN, MIA
GRACE L. GIRON, ROSEMARIE G. PE, BENITO CARINO, JOSEPH JUDE CARANTES,
LYNETTE CARANTES-VIVAL, LANGLEY SEGUNDO, SATUR S. BUGNAY, CARLING
DOMULOT, ANDRES MENDIOGRIN, LEOPOLDO ABUGAN, VIRGILIO CAYETANO, CONCHITA
G. DESCAGA, LEVY ESTEVES, ODETTE G. ESTEVEZ, RODOLFO C. AGUILAR, MAURO
VALONES, PEPE H. ATONG, OFELIA T. DAVI, PERFECTO B. GUINOSAO, WALTER N. TIMOL,
MANUEL T. SELEN, OSCAR DALUNHAY, RICO O. SULATAN, RAFFY MALINDA, ALFREDO
ABILLANOS, JESSIE ANDILAB, MIRLANDO H. MANGKULINTAS, SAMIE SATURNO, ROMEO
A. LINDAHAY, ROEL S. MANSANG-CAGAN, PAQUITO S. LIESES, FILIPE G. SAWAY,
HERMINIA S. SAWAY, JULIUS S. SAWAY, LEONARDA SAWAY, JIMMY UGYUB, SALVADOR
TIONGSON, VENANCIO APANG, MADION MALID, SUKIM MALID, NENENG MALID,
MANGKATADONG AUGUSTO DIANO, JOSEPHINE M. ALBESO, MORENO MALID, MARIO
MANGCAL, FELAY DIAMILING, SALOME P. SARZA, FELIPE P. BAGON, SAMMY
SALNUNGAN, ANTONIO D. EMBA, NORMA MAPANSAGONOS, ROMEO SALIGA, SR.,
JERSON P. GERADA, RENATO T. BAGON, JR., SARING MASALONG, SOLEDAD M.
GERARDA, ELIZABETH L. MENDI, MORANTE S. TIWAN, DANILO M. MALUDAO, MINORS
MARICEL MALID, represented by her father CORNELIO MALID, MARCELINO M. LADRA,
represented by her father MONICO D. LADRA, JENNYLYN MALID, represented by her father
TONY MALID, ARIEL M. EVANGELISTA, represented by her mother LINAY BALBUENA,
EDWARD M. EMUY, SR., SUSAN BOLANIO, OND, PULA BATO B'LAAN TRIBAL FARMER'S
ASSOCIATION, INTER-PEOPLE'S EXCHANGE, INC. and GREEN FORUM-WESTERN VISAYAS,
intervenors.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, intervenor.
IKALAHAN INDIGENOUS PEOPLE and HARIBON FOUNDATION FOR THE CONSERVATION
OF NATURAL RESOURCES, INC., intervenor.
R E S O L U T I O N
PER CURIAM:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and mandamus as
citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371
(R.A. 8371), otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations (Implementing Rules).
In its resolution of September 29, 1998, the Court required respondents to comment.
1
In compliance,
respondents Chairperson and Commissioners of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples
(NCIP), the government agency created under the IPRA to implement its provisions, filed on October
13, 1998 their Comment to the Petition, in which they defend the constitutionality of the IPRA and
pray that the petition be dismissed for lack of merit.
On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) and Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) filed
through the Solicitor General a consolidated Comment. The Solicitor General is of the view that the
IPRA is partly unconstitutional on the ground that it grants ownership over natural resources to
indigenous peoples and prays that the petition be granted in part.
On November 10, 1998, a group of intervenors, composed of Sen. Juan Flavier, one of the authors
of the IPRA, Mr. Ponciano Bennagen, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, and the
leaders and members of 112 groups of indigenous peoples (Flavier, et. al), filed their Motion for
Leave to Intervene. They join the NCIP in defending the constitutionality of IPRA and praying for the
dismissal of the petition.
On March 22, 1999, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) likewise filed a Motion to Intervene
and/or to Appear as Amicus Curiae. The CHR asserts that IPRA is an expression of the principle of
parens patriae and that the State has the responsibility to protect and guarantee the rights of those
who are at a serious disadvantage like indigenous peoples. For this reason it prays that the petition
be dismissed.
On March 23, 1999, another group, composed of the Ikalahan Indigenous People and the Haribon
Foundation for the Conservation of Natural Resources, Inc. (Haribon, et al.), filed a motion to
Intervene with attached Comment-in-Intervention. They agree with the NCIP and Flavier, et al. that
IPRA is consistent with the Constitution and pray that the petition for prohibition and mandamus be
dismissed.
The motions for intervention of the aforesaid groups and organizations were granted.
Oral arguments were heard on April 13, 1999. Thereafter, the parties and intervenors filed their
respective memoranda in which they reiterate the arguments adduced in their earlier pleadings and
during the hearing.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the IPRA and its Implementing
Rules on the ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over lands
of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the
regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution:
"(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of ancestral domains, and Section 3(b)
which, in turn, defines ancestral lands;
"(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that ancestral domains including inalienable
public lands, bodies of water, mineral and other resources found within ancestral domains are
private but community property of the indigenous peoples;
"(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the composition of ancestral domains
and ancestral lands;
"(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the
ancestral domains;
(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the
ancestral lands;
"(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous peoples in the harvesting,
extraction, development or exploration of minerals and other natural resources within the areas
claimed to be their ancestral domains, and the right to enter into agreements with nonindigenous
peoples for the development and utilization of natural resources therein for a period not exceeding
25 years, renewable for not more than 25 years; and
"(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to maintain, develop, protect
and conserve the ancestral domains and portions thereof which are found to be necessary for critical
watersheds, mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest cover or
reforestation."
2

Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of "ancestral domains"
and "ancestral lands" which might even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a)
and 3(b) violate the rights of private landowners.
3

In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers and jurisdiction of the
NCIP and making customary law applicable to the settlement of disputes involving ancestral
domains and ancestral lands on the ground that these provisions violate the due process clause of
the Constitution.
4

These provisions are:
"(1) sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of delineation and recognition of
ancestral domains and which vest on the NCIP the sole authority to delineate ancestral
domains and ancestral lands;
"(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by the NCIP that a particular area is
an ancestral domain and upon notification to the following officials, namely, the Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources, Secretary of Interior and Local Governments,
Secretary of Justice and Commissioner of the National Development Corporation, the
jurisdiction of said officials over said area terminates;
"(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law, traditions and practices of indigenous
peoples shall be applied first with respect to property rights, claims of ownership, hereditary
succession and settlement of land disputes, and that any doubt or ambiguity in the
interpretation thereof shall be resolved in favor of the indigenous peoples;
"(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and practices shall be used to resolve
disputes involving indigenous peoples; and
"(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction over all claims and disputes
involving rights of the indigenous peoples."
5

Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP Administrative Order
No. 1, series of 1998, which provides that "the administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office of
the President is characterized as a lateral but autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and
program coordination." They contend that said Rule infringes upon the Presidents power of control
over executive departments under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution.
6

Petitioners pray for the following:
"(1) A declaration that Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[I], 57, 58, 59, 63, 65 and 66 and other related
provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional and invalid;
"(2) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Chairperson and Commissioners of the
NCIP to cease and desist from implementing the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371 and its
Implementing Rules;
"(3) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources to cease and desist from implementing Department of
Environment and Natural Resources Circular No. 2, series of 1998;
"(4) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of Budget and Management
to cease and desist from disbursing public funds for the implementation of the assailed
provisions of R.A. 8371; and
"(5) The issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the Secretary of Environment and
Natural Resources to comply with his duty of carrying out the States constitutional mandate
to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization and conservation of
Philippine natural resources."
7

After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court voted as follows:
Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an opinion, which the Chief Justice
and Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and Santiago join, sustaining the validity of the challenged
provisions of R.A. 8371. Justice Puno also filed a separate opinion sustaining all challenged
provisions of the law with the exception of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP Administrative Order
No. 1, series of 1998, the Rules and Regulations Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57 of the
IPRA which he contends should be interpreted as dealing with the large-scale exploitation of natural
resources and should be read in conjunction with Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. On
the other hand, Justice Mendoza voted to dismiss the petition solely on the ground that it does not
raise a justiciable controversy and petitioners do not have standing to question the constitutionality
of R.A. 8371.
Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition. Justice Panganiban filed a
separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related provisions
of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. He reserves judgment on the constitutionality of Sections 58, 59,
65, and 66 of the law, which he believes must await the filing of specific cases by those whose rights
may have been violated by the IPRA. Justice Vitug also filed a separate opinion expressing the view
that Sections 3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena,
Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon join in the separate opinions of Justices Panganiban and Vitug.
As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not obtained, the case
was redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the same. Accordingly,
pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.
Attached hereto and made integral parts thereof are the separate opinions of Justices Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan, Mendoza, and Panganiban.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago,
and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and Panganiban JJ., see separate opinion






















2.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 167707 October 8, 2008
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES,
THE REGIONAL EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, DENR-REGION VI, REGIONAL TECHNICAL
DIRECTOR FOR LANDS, LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU, REGION VI PROVINCIAL
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES OFFICER OF KALIBO, AKLAN, REGISTER OF
DEEDS, DIRECTOR OF LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT OF TOURISM
SECRETARY, DIRECTOR OF PHILIPPINE TOURISM AUTHORITY, petitioners,
vs.
MAYOR JOSE S. YAP, LIBERTAD TALAPIAN, MILA Y. SUMNDAD, and ANICETO YAP, in their
behalf and in behalf of all those similarly situated, respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
G.R. No. G.R. No. 173775 October 8, 2008
DR. ORLANDO SACAY and WILFREDO GELITO, joined by THE LANDOWNERS OF BORACAY
SIMILARLY SITUATED NAMED IN A LIST, ANNEX "A" OF THIS PETITION, petitioners,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES,
THE REGIONAL TECHNICAL DIRECTOR FOR LANDS, LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU,
REGION VI, PROVINCIAL ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES OFFICER, KALIBO,
AKLAN, respondents.
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J .:
AT stake in these consolidated cases is the right of the present occupants of Boracay Island to
secure titles over their occupied lands.
There are two consolidated petitions. The first is G.R. No. 167707, a petition for review on certiorari
of the Decision
1
of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming that
2
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
Kalibo, Aklan, which granted the petition for declaratory relief filed by respondents-claimants Mayor
Jose Yap, et al. and ordered the survey of Boracay for titling purposes. The second is G.R. No.
173775, a petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No. 10645">[3]
issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo classifying Boracay into reserved forest and
agricultural land.
The Antecedents
G.R. No. 167707
Boracay Island in the Municipality of Malay, Aklan, with its powdery white sand beaches and warm
crystalline waters, is reputedly a premier Philippine tourist destination. The island is also home to
12,003 inhabitants
4
who live in the bone-shaped islands three barangays.
5

On April 14, 1976, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) approved the
National Reservation Survey of Boracay
Island,
6
which identified several lots as being occupied or claimed by named persons.
7

On November 10, 1978, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1801
8
declaring
Boracay Island, among other islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as tourist zones and
marine reserves under the administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA). President
Marcos later approved the issuance of PTA Circular 3-82
9
dated September 3, 1982, to implement
Proclamation No. 1801.
Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82 precluded them from filing an
application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes,
respondents-claimants
Mayor Jose S. Yap, Jr., Libertad Talapian, Mila Y. Sumndad, and Aniceto Yap filed a petition for
declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan.
In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-
82 raised doubts on their right to secure titles over their occupied lands. They declared that they
themselves, or through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time
immemorial. They declared their lands for tax purposes and paid realty taxes on them.
10

Respondents-claimants posited that Proclamation No. 1801 and its implementing Circular did not
place Boracay beyond the commerce of man. Since the Island was classified as a tourist zone, it
was susceptible of private ownership. Under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141,
otherwise known as the Public Land Act, they had the right to have the lots registered in their names
through judicial confirmation of imperfect titles.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the petition for declaratory
relief. The OSG countered that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public domain. It
formed part of the mass of lands classified as "public forest," which was not available for disposition
pursuant to Section 3(a) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code,
11
as
amended.
The OSG maintained that respondents-claimants reliance on PD No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-
82 was misplaced. Their right to judicial confirmation of title was governed by CA No. 141 and PD
No. 705. Since Boracay Island had not been classified as alienable and disposable, whatever
possession they had cannot ripen into ownership.
During pre-trial, respondents-claimants and the OSG stipulated on the following facts: (1)
respondents-claimants were presently in possession of parcels of land in Boracay Island; (2) these
parcels of land were planted with coconut trees and other natural growing trees; (3) the coconut
trees had heights of more or less twenty (20) meters and were planted more or less fifty (50) years
ago; and (4) respondents-claimants declared the land they were occupying for tax purposes.
12

The parties also agreed that the principal issue for resolution was purely legal: whether Proclamation
No. 1801 posed any legal hindrance or impediment to the titling of the lands in Boracay. They
decided to forego with the trial and to submit the case for resolution upon submission of their
respective memoranda.
13

The RTC took judicial notice
14
that certain parcels of land in Boracay Island, more particularly Lots 1
and 30, Plan PSU-5344, were covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 19502 (RO 2222) in the
name of the Heirs of Ciriaco S. Tirol. These lots were involved in Civil Case Nos. 5222 and 5262
filed before the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan.
15
The titles were issued on
August 7, 1933.
16

RTC and CA Dispositions
On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondents-claimants, with a fallo
reading:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court declares that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA
Circular No. 3-82 pose no legal obstacle to the petitioners and those similarly situated to acquire title
to their lands in Boracay, in accordance with the applicable laws and in the manner prescribed
therein; and to have their lands surveyed and approved by respondent Regional Technical Director
of Lands as the approved survey does not in itself constitute a title to the land.
SO ORDERED.
17

The RTC upheld respondents-claimants right to have their occupied lands titled in their name. It
ruled that neither Proclamation No. 1801 nor PTA Circular No. 3-82 mentioned that lands in Boracay
were inalienable or could not be the subject of disposition.
18
The Circular itself recognized private
ownership of lands.
19
The trial court cited Sections 87
20
and 53
21
of the Public Land Act as basis for
acknowledging private ownership of lands in Boracay and that only those forested areas in public
lands were declared as part of the forest reserve.
22

The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied.
23
The Republic then appealed to the
CA.
On December 9, 2004, the appellate court affirmed in toto the RTC decision, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us DENYING the
appeal filed in this case and AFFIRMING the decision of the lower court.
24

The CA held that respondents-claimants could not be prejudiced by a declaration that the lands they
occupied since time immemorial were part of a forest reserve.
Again, the OSG sought reconsideration but it was similarly denied.
25
Hence, the present petition
under Rule 45.
G.R. No. 173775
On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of G.R. No. 167707, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
issued Proclamation No. 1064
26
classifying Boracay Island into four hundred (400) hectares of
reserved forest land (protection purposes) and six hundred twenty-eight and 96/100 (628.96)
hectares of agricultural land (alienable and disposable). The Proclamation likewise provided for a
fifteen-meter buffer zone on each side of the centerline of roads and trails, reserved for right-of-way
and which shall form part of the area reserved for forest land protection purposes.
On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Dr. Orlando Sacay,
27
Wilfredo Gelito,
28
and other
landowners
29
in Boracay filed with this Court an original petition for prohibition, mandamus, and
nullification of Proclamation No. 1064.
30
They allege that the Proclamation infringed on their "prior
vested rights" over portions of Boracay. They have been in continued possession of their respective
lots in Boracay since time immemorial. They have also invested billions of pesos in developing their
lands and building internationally renowned first class resorts on their lots.
31

Petitioners-claimants contended that there is no need for a proclamation reclassifying Boracay into
agricultural land. Being classified as neither mineral nor timber land, the island is deemed
agricultural pursuant to the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926, known as the first Public Land
Act.
32
Thus, their possession in the concept of owner for the required period entitled them to judicial
confirmation of imperfect title.
Opposing the petition, the OSG argued that petitioners-claimants do not have a vested right over
their occupied portions in the island. Boracay is an unclassified public forest land pursuant to Section
3(a) of PD No. 705. Being public forest, the claimed portions of the island are inalienable and cannot
be the subject of judicial confirmation of imperfect title. It is only the executive department, not the
courts, which has authority to reclassify lands of the public domain into alienable and disposable
lands. There is a need for a positive government act in order to release the lots for disposition.
On November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the consolidation of the two petitions as they principally
involve the same issues on the land classification of Boracay Island.
33

Issues
G.R. No. 167707
The OSG raises the lone issue of whether Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose
any legal obstacle for respondents, and all those similarly situated, to acquire title to their occupied
lands in Boracay Island.
34

G.R. No. 173775
Petitioners-claimants hoist five (5) issues, namely:
I.
AT THE TIME OF THE ESTABLISHED POSSESSION OF PETITIONERS IN CONCEPT OF
OWNER OVER THEIR RESPECTIVE AREAS IN BORACAY, SINCE TIME IMMEMORIAL OR AT
THE LATEST SINCE 30 YRS. PRIOR TO THE FILING OF THE PETITION FOR DECLARATORY
RELIEF ON NOV. 19, 1997, WERE THE AREAS OCCUPIED BY THEM PUBLIC AGRICULTURAL
LANDS AS DEFINED BY LAWS THEN ON JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLES
OR PUBLIC FOREST AS DEFINED BY SEC. 3a, PD 705?
II.
HAVE PETITIONERS OCCUPANTS ACQUIRED PRIOR VESTED RIGHT OF PRIVATE
OWNERSHIP OVER THEIR OCCUPIED PORTIONS OF BORACAY LAND, DESPITE THE FACT
THAT THEY HAVE NOT APPLIED YET FOR JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLE?
III.
IS THE EXECUTIVE DECLARATION OF THEIR AREAS AS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE
UNDER SEC 6, CA 141 [AN] INDISPENSABLE PRE-REQUISITE FOR PETITIONERS TO OBTAIN
TITLE UNDER THE TORRENS SYSTEM?
IV.
IS THE ISSUANCE OF PROCLAMATION 1064 ON MAY 22, 2006, VIOLATIVE OF THE PRIOR
VESTED RIGHTS TO PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OF PETITIONERS OVER THEIR LANDS IN
BORACAY, PROTECTED BY THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION OR IS
PROCLAMATION 1064 CONTRARY TO SEC. 8, CA 141, OR SEC. 4(a) OF RA 6657.
V.
CAN RESPONDENTS BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS TO ALLOW THE SURVEY AND TO
APPROVE THE SURVEY PLANS FOR PURPOSES OF THE APPLICATION FOR TITLING OF THE
LANDS OF PETITIONERS IN BORACAY?
35
(Underscoring supplied)
In capsule, the main issue is whether private claimants (respondents-claimants in G.R. No. 167707
and petitioners-claimants in G.R. No. 173775) have a right to secure titles over their occupied
portions in Boracay. The twin petitions pertain to their right, if any, to judicial confirmation of
imperfect title under CA No. 141, as amended. They do not involve their right to secure title under
other pertinent laws.
Our Ruling
Regalian Doctrine and power of the executive
to reclassify lands of the public domain
Private claimants rely on three (3) laws and executive acts in their bid for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title, namely: (a) Philippine Bill of 1902
36
in relation to Act No. 926, later amended and/or
superseded by Act No. 2874 and CA No. 141;
37
(b) Proclamation No. 1801
38
issued by then
President Marcos; and (c) Proclamation No. 1064
39
issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.
We shall proceed to determine their rights to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under
these laws and executive acts.
But first, a peek at the Regalian principle and the power of the executive to reclassify lands of the
public domain.
The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or timber.
40

Meanwhile, the 1973 Constitution provided the following divisions: agricultural, industrial or
commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or forest and grazing lands, and such other
classes as may be provided by law,
41
giving the government great leeway for classification.
42
Then
the 1987 Constitution reverted to the 1935 Constitution classification with one addition: national
parks.
43
Of these, only agricultural lands may be alienated.
44
Prior to Proclamation No. 1064 of May
22, 2006, Boracay Island had never been expressly and administratively classified under any of
these grand divisions. Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain.
The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, that the State
is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the conservation of such
patrimony.
45
The doctrine has been consistently adopted under the 1935, 1973, and 1987
Constitutions.
46

All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to
the State.
47
Thus, all lands that have not been acquired from the government, either by purchase or
by grant, belong to the State as part of the inalienable public domain.
48
Necessarily, it is up to the
State to determine if lands of the public domain will be disposed of for private ownership. The
government, as the agent of the state, is possessed of the plenary power as the persona in law to
determine who shall be the favored recipients of public lands, as well as under what terms they may
be granted such privilege, not excluding the placing of obstacles in the way of their exercise of what
otherwise would be ordinary acts of ownership.
49

Our present land law traces its roots to the Regalian Doctrine. Upon the Spanish conquest of the
Philippines, ownership of all lands, territories and possessions in the Philippines passed to the
Spanish Crown.
50
The Regalian doctrine was first introduced in the Philippines through the Laws of
the Indies and the Royal Cedulas, which laid the foundation that "all lands that were not acquired
from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain."
51

The Laws of the Indies was followed by the Ley Hipotecaria or the Mortgage Law of 1893. The
Spanish Mortgage Law provided for the systematic registration of titles and deeds as well as
possessory claims.
52

The Royal Decree of 1894 or the Maura Law
53
partly amended the Spanish Mortgage Law and the
Laws of the Indies. It established possessory information as the method of legalizing possession of
vacant Crown land, under certain conditions which were set forth in said decree.
54
Under Section
393 of the Maura Law, an informacion posesoria or possessory information title,
55
when duly
inscribed in the Registry of Property, is converted into a title of ownership only after the lapse of
twenty (20) years of uninterrupted possession which must be actual, public, and adverse,
56
from the
date of its inscription.
57
However, possessory information title had to be perfected one year after the
promulgation of the Maura Law, or until April 17, 1895. Otherwise, the lands would revert to the
State.
58

In sum, private ownership of land under the Spanish regime could only be founded on royal
concessions which took various forms, namely: (1) titulo real or royal grant; (2) concesion especial or
special grant; (3) composicion con el estado or adjustment title; (4) titulo de compra or title by
purchase; and (5) informacion posesoria or possessory information title.
59
>
The first law governing the disposition of public lands in the Philippines under American rule was
embodied in the Philippine Bill of 1902.
60
By this law, lands of the public domain in the Philippine
Islands were classified into three (3) grand divisions, to wit: agricultural, mineral, and timber or forest
lands.
61
The act provided for, among others, the disposal of mineral lands by means of absolute
grant (freehold system) and by lease (leasehold system).
62
It also provided the definition by
exclusion of "agricultural public lands."
63
Interpreting the meaning of "agricultural lands" under the
Philippine Bill of 1902, the Court declared in Mapa v. Insular Government:
64

x x x In other words, that the phrase "agricultural land" as used in Act No. 926 means those
public lands acquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands. x x x
65
(Emphasis
Ours)
On February 1, 1903, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land
Registration Act. The act established a system of registration by which recorded title becomes
absolute, indefeasible, and imprescriptible. This is known as the Torrens system.
66

Concurrently, on October 7, 1903, the Philippine Commission passed Act No. 926, which was the
first Public Land Act. The Act introduced the homestead system and made provisions for judicial and
administrative confirmation of imperfect titles and for the sale or lease of public lands. It permitted
corporations regardless of the nationality of persons owning the controlling stock to lease or
purchase lands of the public domain.
67
Under the Act, open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands for the next ten (10) years preceding July 26, 1904
was sufficient for judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
68

On November 29, 1919, Act No. 926 was superseded by Act No. 2874, otherwise known as the
second Public Land Act. This new, more comprehensive law limited the exploitation of agricultural
lands to Filipinos and Americans and citizens of other countries which gave Filipinos the same
privileges. For judicial confirmation of title, possession and occupation en concepto dueo since time
immemorial, or since July 26, 1894, was required.
69

After the passage of the 1935 Constitution, CA No. 141 amended Act No. 2874 on December 1,
1936. To this day, CA No. 141, as amended, remains as the existing general law governing the
classification and disposition of lands of the public domain other than timber and mineral lands,
70
and
privately owned lands which reverted to the State.
71

Section 48(b) of CA No. 141 retained the requirement under Act No. 2874 of possession and
occupation of lands of the public domain since time immemorial or since July 26, 1894. However,
this provision was superseded by Republic Act (RA) No. 1942,
72
which provided for a simple thirty-
year prescriptive period for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The provision was last amended by
PD No. 1073,
73
which now provides for possession and occupation of the land applied for since
June 12, 1945, or earlier.
74

The issuance of PD No. 892
75
on February 16, 1976 discontinued the use of Spanish titles as
evidence in land registration proceedings.
76
Under the decree, all holders of Spanish titles or grants
should apply for registration of their lands under Act No. 496 within six (6) months from the effectivity
of the decree on February 16, 1976. Thereafter, the recording of all unregistered lands
77
shall be
governed by Section 194 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3344.
On June 11, 1978, Act No. 496 was amended and updated by PD No. 1529, known as the Property
Registration Decree. It was enacted to codify the various laws relative to registration of property.
78
It
governs registration of lands under the Torrens system as well as unregistered lands, including
chattel mortgages.
79

A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the
presumption of State ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that there must be a
positive act of the government, such as an official proclamation,
80
declassifying inalienable public
land into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.
81
In fact, Section 8 of CA No. 141 limits
alienable or disposable lands only to those lands which have been "officially delimited and
classified."
82

The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public
domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the
land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.
83
To overcome this presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is
alienable or disposable.
84
There must still be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as
alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable,
the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of
Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.
85
The applicant may also secure a certification
from the government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the required number of years
is alienable and disposable.
86

In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report, statute, or
certification was presented to the Court. The records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to
2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a government
proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable. Absent such well-nigh incontrovertible
evidence, the Court cannot accept the submission that lands occupied by private claimants were
already open to disposition before 2006. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be
assumed. They call for proof.
87

Ankron and De Aldecoa did not make the whole of Boracay Island, or portions of it,
agricultural lands. Private claimants posit that Boracay was already an agricultural land pursuant to
the old cases Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands (1919)
88
and De Aldecoa v. The Insular
Government (1909).
89
These cases were decided under the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902
and Act No. 926. There is a statement in these old cases that "in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is shown."
90

Private claimants reliance on Ankron and De Aldecoa is misplaced. These cases did not have the
effect of converting the whole of Boracay Island or portions of it into agricultural lands. It should be
stressed that the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926 merely provided the manner through which
land registration courts would classify lands of the public domain. Whether the land would be
classified as timber, mineral, or agricultural depended on proof presented in each case.
Ankron and De Aldecoa were decided at a time when the President of the Philippines had no power
to classify lands of the public domain into mineral, timber, and agricultural. At that time, the courts
were free to make corresponding classifications in justiciable cases, or were vested with implicit
power to do so, depending upon the preponderance of the evidence.
91
This was the Courts ruling in
Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols Vda. De Palanca v. Republic,
92

in which it stated, through Justice Adolfo Azcuna, viz.:
x x x Petitioners furthermore insist that a particular land need not be formally released by an act of
the Executive before it can be deemed open to private ownership, citing the cases of Ramos v.
Director of Lands and Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands.
x x x x
Petitioners reliance upon Ramos v. Director of Lands and Ankron v. Government is misplaced.
These cases were decided under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the first Public Land Act No. 926
enacted by the Philippine Commission on October 7, 1926, under which there was no legal provision
vesting in the Chief Executive or President of the Philippines the power to classify lands of the public
domain into mineral, timber and agricultural so that the courts then were free to make corresponding
classifications in justiciable cases, or were vested with implicit power to do so, depending upon the
preponderance of the evidence.
93

To aid the courts in resolving land registration cases under Act No. 926, it was then necessary to
devise a presumption on land classification. Thus evolved the dictum in Ankron that "the courts have
a right to presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are
agricultural lands until the contrary is shown."
94

But We cannot unduly expand the presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa to an argument that all
lands of the public domain had been automatically reclassified as disposable and alienable
agricultural lands. By no stretch of imagination did the presumption convert all lands of the public
domain into agricultural lands.
If We accept the position of private claimants, the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926 would have
automatically made all lands in the Philippines, except those already classified as timber or mineral
land, alienable and disposable lands. That would take these lands out of State ownership and worse,
would be utterly inconsistent with and totally repugnant to the long-entrenched Regalian doctrine.
The presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa attaches only to land registration cases brought under
the provisions of Act No. 926, or more specifically those cases dealing with judicial and
administrative confirmation of imperfect titles. The presumption applies to an applicant for judicial or
administrative conformation of imperfect title under Act No. 926. It certainly cannot apply to
landowners, such as private claimants or their predecessors-in-interest, who failed to avail
themselves of the benefits of Act No. 926. As to them, their land remained unclassified and, by virtue
of the Regalian doctrine, continued to be owned by the State.
In any case, the assumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa was not absolute. Land classification was, in
the end, dependent on proof. If there was proof that the land was better suited for non-agricultural
uses, the courts could adjudge it as a mineral or timber land despite the presumption. In Ankron, this
Court stated:
In the case of Jocson vs. Director of Forestry (supra), the Attorney-General admitted in effect that
whether the particular land in question belongs to one class or another is a question of fact. The
mere fact that a tract of land has trees upon it or has mineral within it is not of itself sufficient to
declare that one is forestry land and the other, mineral land. There must be some proof of the extent
and present or future value of the forestry and of the minerals. While, as we have just said, many
definitions have been given for "agriculture," "forestry," and "mineral" lands, and that in each case it
is a question of fact, we think it is safe to say that in order to be forestry or mineral land the proof
must show that it is more valuable for the forestry or the mineral which it contains than it is for
agricultural purposes. (Sec. 7, Act No. 1148.) It is not sufficient to show that there exists some trees
upon the land or that it bears some mineral. Land may be classified as forestry or mineral today,
and, by reason of the exhaustion of the timber or mineral, be classified as agricultural land tomorrow.
And vice-versa, by reason of the rapid growth of timber or the discovery of valuable minerals, lands
classified as agricultural today may be differently classified tomorrow. Each case must be decided
upon the proof in that particular case, having regard for its present or future value for one or
the other purposes. We believe, however, considering the fact that it is a matter of public
knowledge that a majority of the lands in the Philippine Islands are agricultural lands that the courts
have a right to presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are
agricultural lands until the contrary is shown. Whatever the land involved in a particular land
registration case is forestry or mineral land must, therefore, be a matter of proof. Its superior
value for one purpose or the other is a question of fact to be settled by the proof in each
particular case. The fact that the land is a manglar [mangrove swamp] is not sufficient for the courts
to decide whether it is agricultural, forestry, or mineral land. It may perchance belong to one or the
other of said classes of land. The Government, in the first instance, under the provisions of Act No.
1148, may, by reservation, decide for itself what portions of public land shall be considered forestry
land, unless private interests have intervened before such reservation is made. In the latter case,
whether the land is agricultural, forestry, or mineral, is a question of proof. Until private interests
have intervened, the Government, by virtue of the terms of said Act (No. 1148), may decide for itself
what portions of the "public domain" shall be set aside and reserved as forestry or mineral land.
(Ramos vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 175; Jocson vs. Director of Forestry, supra)
95
(Emphasis ours)
Since 1919, courts were no longer free to determine the classification of lands from the facts of each
case, except those that have already became private lands.
96
Act No. 2874, promulgated in 1919
and reproduced in Section 6 of CA No. 141, gave the Executive Department, through the President,
the exclusive prerogative to classify or reclassify public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral
or forest.
96-a
Since then, courts no longer had the authority, whether express or implied, to determine
the classification of lands of the public domain.
97

Here, private claimants, unlike the Heirs of Ciriaco Tirol who were issued their title in 1933,
98
did not
present a justiciable case for determination by the land registration court of the propertys land
classification. Simply put, there was no opportunity for the courts then to resolve if the land the
Boracay occupants are now claiming were agricultural lands. When Act No. 926 was supplanted by
Act No. 2874 in 1919, without an application for judicial confirmation having been filed by private
claimants or their predecessors-in-interest, the courts were no longer authorized to determine the
propertys land classification. Hence, private claimants cannot bank on Act No. 926.
We note that the RTC decision
99
in G.R. No. 167707 mentioned Krivenko v. Register of Deeds of
Manila,
100
which was decided in 1947 when CA No. 141, vesting the Executive with the sole power to
classify lands of the public domain was already in effect. Krivenko cited the old cases Mapa v.
Insular Government,
101
De Aldecoa v. The Insular Government,
102
and Ankron v. Government of the
Philippine Islands.
103

Krivenko, however, is not controlling here because it involved a totally different issue. The pertinent
issue in Krivenko was whether residential lots were included in the general classification of
agricultural lands; and if so, whether an alien could acquire a residential lot. This Court ruled that as
an alien, Krivenko was prohibited by the 1935 Constitution
104
from acquiring agricultural land, which
included residential lots. Here, the issue is whether unclassified lands of the public domain are
automatically deemed agricultural.
Notably, the definition of "agricultural public lands" mentioned in Krivenko relied on the old cases
decided prior to the enactment of Act No. 2874, including Ankron and De Aldecoa.
105
As We have
already stated, those cases cannot apply here, since they were decided when the Executive did not
have the authority to classify lands as agricultural, timber, or mineral.
Private claimants continued possession under Act No. 926 does not create a presumption
that the land is alienable. Private claimants also contend that their continued possession of
portions of Boracay Island for the requisite period of ten (10) years under Act No. 926
106
ipso facto
converted the island into private ownership. Hence, they may apply for a title in their name.
A similar argument was squarely rejected by the Court in Collado v. Court of Appeals.
107
Collado,
citing the separate opinion of now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in Cruz v. Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources,
107-a
ruled:
"Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance of the provisions of the Philippine
Bill of 1902. The law governed the disposition of lands of the public domain. It prescribed rules and
regulations for the homesteading, selling and leasing of portions of the public domain of the
Philippine Islands, and prescribed the terms and conditions to enable persons to perfect their titles to
public lands in the Islands. It also provided for the "issuance of patents to certain native settlers upon
public lands," for the establishment of town sites and sale of lots therein, for the completion of
imperfect titles, and for the cancellation or confirmation of Spanish concessions and grants in the
Islands." In short, the Public Land Act operated on the assumption that title to public lands in the
Philippine Islands remained in the government; and that the governments title to public land sprung
from the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent treaties between Spain and the United States. The
term "public land" referred to all lands of the public domain whose title still remained in the
government and are thrown open to private appropriation and settlement, and excluded the
patrimonial property of the government and the friar lands."
Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public
Land Act No. 926, mere possession by private individuals of lands creates the legal
presumption that the lands are alienable and disposable.
108
(Emphasis Ours)
Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an unclassified land of the
public domain prior to Proclamation No. 1064. Such unclassified lands are considered public
forest under PD No. 705. The DENR
109
and the National Mapping and Resource Information
Authority
110
certify that Boracay Island is an unclassified land of the public domain.
PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified lands of the public domain as
public forest. Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 defines a public forest as "a mass of lands of the public
domain which has not been the subject of the present system of classification for the determination
of which lands are needed for forest purpose and which are not." Applying PD No. 705, all
unclassified lands, including those in Boracay Island, are ipso facto considered public forests. PD
No. 705, however, respects titles already existing prior to its effectivity.
The Court notes that the classification of Boracay as a forest land under PD No. 705 may seem to
be out of touch with the present realities in the island. Boracay, no doubt, has been partly stripped of
its forest cover to pave the way for commercial developments. As a premier tourist destination for
local and foreign tourists, Boracay appears more of a commercial island resort, rather than a forest
land.
Nevertheless, that the occupants of Boracay have built multi-million peso beach resorts on the
island;
111
that the island has already been stripped of its forest cover; or that the implementation of
Proclamation No. 1064 will destroy the islands tourism industry, do not negate its character as
public forest.
Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and the Constitution
112
classifying lands of the
public domain into "agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks," do not
necessarily refer to large tracts of wooded land or expanses covered by dense growths of trees and
underbrushes.
113
The discussion in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of Forestry
114
is particularly
instructive:
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply
because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as
forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other
farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas
covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also
be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and
does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land
classified as "forest" is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of
the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do
not apply.
115
(Emphasis supplied)
There is a big difference between "forest" as defined in a dictionary and "forest or timber land" as a
classification of lands of the public domain as appearing in our statutes. One is descriptive of what
appears on the land while the other is a legal status, a classification for legal purposes.
116
At any
rate, the Court is tasked to determine the legal status of Boracay Island, and not look into its
physical layout. Hence, even if its forest cover has been replaced by beach resorts, restaurants and
other commercial establishments, it has not been automatically converted from public forest to
alienable agricultural land.
Private claimants cannot rely on Proclamation No. 1801 as basis for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title. The proclamation did not convert Boracay into an agricultural land. However,
private claimants argue that Proclamation No. 1801 issued by then President Marcos in 1978 entitles
them to judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The Proclamation classified Boracay, among other
islands, as a tourist zone. Private claimants assert that, as a tourist spot, the island is susceptible of
private ownership.
Proclamation No. 1801 or PTA Circular No. 3-82 did not convert the whole of Boracay into an
agricultural land. There is nothing in the law or the Circular which made Boracay Island an
agricultural land. The reference in Circular No. 3-82 to "private lands"
117
and "areas declared as
alienable and disposable"
118
does not by itself classify the entire island as agricultural. Notably,
Circular No. 3-82 makes reference not only to private lands and areas but also to public forested
lands. Rule VIII, Section 3 provides:
No trees in forested private lands may be cut without prior authority from the PTA. All forested areas
in public lands are declared forest reserves. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the reference in the Circular to both private and public lands merely recognizes that the
island can be classified by the Executive department pursuant to its powers under CA No. 141. In
fact, Section 5 of the Circular recognizes the then Bureau of Forest Developments authority to
declare areas in the island as alienable and disposable when it provides:
Subsistence farming, in areas declared as alienable and disposable by the Bureau of Forest
Development.
Therefore, Proclamation No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed to classify Boracay
Island as alienable and disposable land. If President Marcos intended to classify the island as
alienable and disposable or forest, or both, he would have identified the specific limits of each, as
President Arroyo did in Proclamation No. 1064. This was not done in Proclamation No. 1801.
The Whereas clauses of Proclamation No. 1801 also explain the rationale behind the declaration of
Boracay Island, together with other islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as a tourist
zone and marine reserve to be administered by the PTA to ensure the concentrated efforts of the
public and private sectors in the development of the areas tourism potential with due regard for
ecological balance in the marine environment. Simply put, the proclamation is aimed at
administering the islands for tourism and ecological purposes. It does not address the areas
alienability.
119

More importantly, Proclamation No. 1801 covers not only Boracay Island, but sixty-four (64) other
islands, coves, and peninsulas in the Philippines, such as Fortune and Verde Islands in Batangas,
Port Galera in Oriental Mindoro, Panglao and Balicasag Islands in Bohol, Coron Island, Puerto
Princesa and surrounding areas in Palawan, Camiguin Island in Cagayan de Oro, and Misamis
Oriental, to name a few. If the designation of Boracay Island as tourist zone makes it alienable and
disposable by virtue of Proclamation No. 1801, all the other areas mentioned would likewise be
declared wide open for private disposition. That could not have been, and is clearly beyond, the
intent of the proclamation.
It was Proclamation No. 1064 of 2006 which positively declared part of Boracay as alienable
and opened the same to private ownership. Sections 6 and 7 of CA No. 141
120
provide that it is
only the President, upon the recommendation of the proper department head, who has the authority
to classify the lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable, timber and mineral lands.
121

In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo merely exercised the authority
granted to her to classify lands of the public domain, presumably subject to existing vested rights.
Classification of public lands is the exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department, through the
Office of the President. Courts have no authority to do so.
122
Absent such classification, the land
remains unclassified until released and rendered open to disposition.
123

Proclamation No. 1064 classifies Boracay into 400 hectares of reserved forest land and 628.96
hectares of agricultural land. The Proclamation likewise provides for a 15-meter buffer zone on each
side of the center line of roads and trails, which are reserved for right of way and which shall form
part of the area reserved for forest land protection purposes.
Contrary to private claimants argument, there was nothing invalid or irregular, much less
unconstitutional, about the classification of Boracay Island made by the President through
Proclamation No. 1064. It was within her authority to make such classification, subject to existing
vested rights.
Proclamation No. 1064 does not violate the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. Private
claimants further assert that Proclamation No. 1064 violates the provision of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) or RA No. 6657 barring conversion of public forests into agricultural
lands. They claim that since Boracay is a public forest under PD No. 705, President Arroyo can no
longer convert it into an agricultural land without running afoul of Section 4(a) of RA No. 6657, thus:
SEC. 4. Scope. The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 shall cover, regardless of
tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands as provided
in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229, including other lands of the public domain
suitable for agriculture.
More specifically, the following lands are covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program:
(a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain devoted to or suitable for agriculture. No
reclassification of forest or mineral lands to agricultural lands shall be undertaken after the
approval of this Act until Congress, taking into account ecological, developmental and equity
considerations, shall have determined by law, the specific limits of the public domain.
That Boracay Island was classified as a public forest under PD No. 705 did not bar the Executive
from later converting it into agricultural land. Boracay Island still remained an unclassified land of the
public domain despite PD No. 705.
In Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols v. Republic,
124
the Court
stated that unclassified lands are public forests.
While it is true that the land classification map does not categorically state that the islands
are public forests, the fact that they were unclassified lands leads to the same result. In the
absence of the classification as mineral or timber land, the land remains unclassified land until
released and rendered open to disposition.
125
(Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, the prohibition under the CARL applies only to a "reclassification" of land. If the land had
never been previously classified, as in the case of Boracay, there can be no prohibited
reclassification under the agrarian law. We agree with the opinion of the Department of Justice
126
on
this point:
Indeed, the key word to the correct application of the prohibition in Section 4(a) is the word
"reclassification." Where there has been no previous classification of public forest [referring, we
repeat, to the mass of the public domain which has not been the subject of the present system of
classification for purposes of determining which are needed for forest purposes and which are not]
into permanent forest or forest reserves or some other forest uses under the Revised Forestry Code,
there can be no "reclassification of forest lands" to speak of within the meaning of Section 4(a).
Thus, obviously, the prohibition in Section 4(a) of the CARL against the reclassification of forest
lands to agricultural lands without a prior law delimiting the limits of the public domain, does not, and
cannot, apply to those lands of the public domain, denominated as "public forest" under the Revised
Forestry Code, which have not been previously determined, or classified, as needed for forest
purposes in accordance with the provisions of the Revised Forestry Code.
127

Private claimants are not entitled to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under CA
No. 141. Neither do they have vested rights over the occupied lands under the said law. There
are two requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title under CA No. 141, namely:
(1) open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land by
himself or through his predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of ownership since time
immemorial or from June 12, 1945; and (2) the classification of the land as alienable and disposable
land of the public domain.
128

As discussed, the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801 did not convert
portions of Boracay Island into an agricultural land. The island remained an unclassified land of the
public domain and, applying the Regalian doctrine, is considered State property.
Private claimants bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, relying on the Philippine Bill of 1902,
Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801, must fail because of the absence of the second element of
alienable and disposable land. Their entitlement to a government grant under our present Public
Land Act presupposes that the land possessed and applied for is already alienable and disposable.
This is clear from the wording of the law itself.
129
Where the land is not alienable and disposable,
possession of the land, no matter how long, cannot confer ownership or possessory rights.
130

Neither may private claimants apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Proclamation No.
1064, with respect to those lands which were classified as agricultural lands. Private claimants failed
to prove the first element of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of their lands in
Boracay since June 12, 1945.
We cannot sustain the CA and RTC conclusion in the petition for declaratory relief that private
claimants complied with the requisite period of possession.
The tax declarations in the name of private claimants are insufficient to prove the first element of
possession. We note that the earliest of the tax declarations in the name of private claimants were
issued in 1993. Being of recent dates, the tax declarations are not sufficient to convince this Court
that the period of possession and occupation commenced on June 12, 1945.
Private claimants insist that they have a vested right in Boracay, having been in possession of the
island for a long time. They have invested millions of pesos in developing the island into a tourist
spot. They say their continued possession and investments give them a vested right which cannot
be unilaterally rescinded by Proclamation No. 1064.
The continued possession and considerable investment of private claimants do not automatically
give them a vested right in Boracay. Nor do these give them a right to apply for a title to the land
they are presently occupying. This Court is constitutionally bound to decide cases based on the
evidence presented and the laws applicable. As the law and jurisprudence stand, private claimants
are ineligible to apply for a judicial confirmation of title over their occupied portions in Boracay even
with their continued possession and considerable investment in the island.
One Last Note
The Court is aware that millions of pesos have been invested for the development of Boracay Island,
making it a by-word in the local and international tourism industry. The Court also notes that for a
number of years, thousands of people have called the island their home. While the Court
commiserates with private claimants plight, We are bound to apply the law strictly and judiciously.
This is the law and it should prevail. Ito ang batas at ito ang dapat umiral.
All is not lost, however, for private claimants. While they may not be eligible to apply for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of CA No. 141, as amended, this does not denote
their automatic ouster from the residential, commercial, and other areas they possess now classified
as agricultural. Neither will this mean the loss of their substantial investments on their occupied
alienable lands. Lack of title does not necessarily mean lack of right to possess.
For one thing, those with lawful possession may claim good faith as builders of improvements. They
can take steps to preserve or protect their possession. For another, they may look into other modes
of applying for original registration of title, such as by homestead
131
or sales patent,
132
subject to the
conditions imposed by law.
More realistically, Congress may enact a law to entitle private claimants to acquire title to their
occupied lots or to exempt them from certain requirements under the present land laws. There is one
such bill
133
now pending in the House of Representatives. Whether that bill or a similar bill will
become a law is for Congress to decide.
In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, the government has taken the step necessary to open up the
island to private ownership. This gesture may not be sufficient to appease some sectors which view
the classification of the island partially into a forest reserve as absurd. That the island is no longer
overrun by trees, however, does not becloud the vision to protect its remaining forest cover and to
strike a healthy balance between progress and ecology. Ecological conservation is as important as
economic progress.
To be sure, forest lands are fundamental to our nations survival. Their promotion and protection are
not just fancy rhetoric for politicians and activists. These are needs that become more urgent as
destruction of our environment gets prevalent and difficult to control. As aptly observed by Justice
Conrado Sanchez in 1968 in Director of Forestry v. Munoz:
134

The view this Court takes of the cases at bar is but in adherence to public policy that should be
followed with respect to forest lands. Many have written much, and many more have spoken, and
quite often, about the pressing need for forest preservation, conservation, protection, development
and reforestation. Not without justification. For, forests constitute a vital segment of any country's
natural resources. It is of common knowledge by now that absence of the necessary green cover on
our lands produces a number of adverse or ill effects of serious proportions. Without the trees,
watersheds dry up; rivers and lakes which they supply are emptied of their contents. The fish
disappear. Denuded areas become dust bowls. As waterfalls cease to function, so will hydroelectric
plants. With the rains, the fertile topsoil is washed away; geological erosion results. With erosion
come the dreaded floods that wreak havoc and destruction to property crops, livestock, houses,
and highways not to mention precious human lives. Indeed, the foregoing observations should be
written down in a lumbermans decalogue.
135

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:
1. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 167707 is GRANTED and the Court of Appeals Decision in
CA-G.R. CV No. 71118 REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
2. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 173775 is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.






















3.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-35744 September 28, 1984
WENCESLAO JUNIO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
FELICIANO DE LOS SANTOS and REGISTER OF DEEDS OF PANGASINAN, respondents-
appellees.
Julian U. De Vera for petitioner-appellant.
The Solicitor General and Juan C. Austria for respondents-appellees.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J .:
The question involved being purely one of law, the then Court of Appeals certified to us petitioner's
appeal from the Decision of the former Court of First Instance of Pangasinan in Case No. 16362,
G.L.R.O. Record No. 52512, dismissing his Petition for the cancellation of the Adverse Claim
annotated on his transfer certificate of title. The case is being decided under the provisions of the
former Land Registration Act (Act No. 496).
Petitioner-appellant, Wenceslao Junio, is the registered owner of a parcel of land situated at
Bayambang, Pangasinan, with an area of 7.65 hectares, more or less, covered by TCT No. 1004 of
the Registry of Deeds of Pangasinan.
By virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale allegedly executed by petitioner over the said parcel of land in
favor of respondent Feliciano de los Santos and his co-vendees, Guillermo de la Cruz and Jose
Junio, an Affidavit of Adverse Claim was executed by respondent, Feliciano de los Santos, claiming
a one-third undivided portion of petitioner's property, which claim was annotated on petitioner's title.
Petitioner denies having sold any portion of his property to private respondent. hence, his Petition for
the cancellation of said adverse claim. Petitioner disputes the appropriateness of the annotation
alleging that under Section 110 of the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496), such inscription may be
resorted to only when there is no other means of registering an interest or right; that Section 57 of
the same statute provides for the registration of a documented sale involving a titled property; and
that the Register of Deeds acted negligently in registering the document without the formal legal
requisities.
Opposing, respondent de los Santos countered that he had tried to avail himself of Section 57 by
requesting petitioner to surrender his owner's duplicate certificate of title but since the latter refused
to do so he was compelled to present an adverse claim pursuant to Section 110 of the Land
Registration Act.
The case was submitted for decision, without the presentation of evidence, and based on the
pleadings, the lower Court denied the petition for cancellation for lack of merit and because
"petitioner has his own remedy but not in this summary proceedings." The provision on adverse
claim reads in part:
Sec. 110. Whoever claims any right or interest in registered land adverse to the
registered owner, arising subsequent to the date of the original registration, may, if
no other provision is made in this Act for registering the same, make a statement in
writing setting forth fully his alleged right or interest, and how or under whom
acquired, and a reference to the volume and page of the certificate of title of the
registered owner, and a description of the land in which the right or interest is
claimed. The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall state the adverse
claimant's residence and designate a place at which all notices may be served upon
him. This statement shall be entitled to registration as an adverse claim, and the
court, upon a petition of any party in interest, shall grant a speedy hearing upon the
question of the validity of such adverse claim and shall enter such decree therein as
justice and equity may require. If the claim is adjudged to be invalid the registration
shall be cancelled. If in any case the court after notice and hearing shall find that a
claim thus registered was frivolous or vexatious, it may tax the adverse claimant
double or treble costs in its discretion.
... (Emphasis ours)
The "other provision for registering" referred to above is, indeed, provided for in Section 57, thus:
Sec. 57. An owner desiring to convey in fee his registered land or any portion thereof
shall execute a deed of conveyance, which the grantor or grantee may present to the
register of deeds in the province where the land lies. The grantor's duplicate
certificate shall be produced and presented at the same time. The register of deeds
shall thereupon, in accordance with the rules and instructions of the court, make out
in the registration book a new certificate of title to the grantee, and shall prepare and
deliver to him an owner's duplicate certificate. The register of deeds shall note upon
the original and duplicate certificates the date of transfer, the volume and page of the
registration book where the new certificate is registered, and a reference by number
to the last prior certificate. The grantor's duplicate certificate shall be surrendered
and the word 'canceled' stamped upon it. The original certificate shall also be
stamped 'canceled'. The deed of conveyance shall be filed and indorsed with the
number and place of registration of the certificate of title of the land conveyed.
(Emphasis supplied).
However, considering that petitioner had refused to surrender the title, private respondent could not
avail of Section 57. Hence, the latter correctly resorted to the annotation of an adverse claim. Where
the vendor fails to deliver to the vendee the duplicate certificate of title, the vendee should file men."
with the Register of Deeds an adverse claim under Section 110 of Act No. 496, as amended. 1
Petitioner, however, calls attention to the case of Register of Deeds of Quezon City vs. Nicandro,
2

which held that when a claim is based on a perfected contract of sale executed in their favor by the lawful
owner of the land, the remedy provided in Section 110 would be ineffective considering that the Land
Registration Act specifically provides the procedure for registration in Section 57 thereof. The factual
milieu in that case, however, is completely different, for, therein there was no question about the
existence of a perfected contract of sale, unlike in the case at bar, where the sale between the parties is
contested. Moreover, as already adverted to, private respondent could not register the document of sale
under Section 57 because of petitioner's refusal to surrender the duplicate certificate of title.
But petitioner additionally submits that because of such refusal, it is Section 111 of the same Act No.
496, which provides the proper remedy, and we quote:
Sec. 111. In every case where the clerk or any register of deeds is requested to enter
a new certificate in pursuance of an instrument purporting to be executed by the
registered owner, or by reason of any instrument or proceedings which divests the
title of the registered owner against his consent, if the outstanding owner's duplicate
certificate is not presented for cancellation when such request is made, the clerk or
register of deeds shall not enter a new certificate, but the person claiming to be
entitled thereto may apply by petition to the court. The court, after hearing, may order
the registered owner or any person withholding the duplicate to surrender the same,
and direct the entry of a new certificate upon such surrender.
If in any case the person withholding the duplicate certificate is not amenable to the
process of the court, or if for any reason the outstanding owner's duplicate certificate
cannot be delivered up, the court may by decree annul the same and order a new
certificate of title to be entered. Such new certificate and all duplicates thereof shall
contain a memorandum of the annulment of the outstanding duplicate.
If in any case an outstanding mortgagee's or lessee's duplicate certificate is not
produced and surrendered when the mortgage is discharged or extinguished or the
lease is terminated, like proceedings may be had to obtain registration as in the case
of the nonproduction of an owner's duplicate.
We find that contention again bereft of merit as said Section 111 can be availed of only if
controversial issues are not involved.
3
In this case, the genuineness and due execution of the sale
between the parties is in controversy.
Although the grounds relied upon by petitioner for cancellation of the adverse claim were
unmeritorious, it behooved the lower Court to have conducted a speedy hearing upon the question
of validity of the adverse claim pursuant to the second paragraph of Section 110 of the Land
Registration Act, reading:
The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall state the adverse claimant's
residence, and designate a place at which all notices may be served upon him. This
statement Shall be entitled to registration as an adverse claim, and the court, upon a
petition of any party in interest, shall grant a speedy hearing upon the question of the
validity of such adverse claim and shall enter such decree therein as justice and
equity may require. If the claim is adjudged to be invalid, the registration shall be
cancelled. If in any case the court after notice and hearing shall find that a claim thus
registered was frivolous or vexatious, it may tax the adverse claimant double or
treble costs in its discretion. (Emphasis ours)
In fact, the lower Court, instead of confining itself to the propriety of the registration of the adverse
claim should already have decided the controversy between the parties on the merits thereof.
Doctrinal jurisprudence holds that the Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court), as a
Land Registration Court, can hear cases otherwise litigable only in ordinary civil actions, since the
Courts of First Instance are at the same time, Courts of general jurisdiction and could entertain and
dispose of the validity or invalidity of respondent's adverse claim, with a view to determining whether
petitioner is entitled or not to the relief that he seeks.
4
That doctrine is based on expediency. In fact,
petitioner has also prayed in his Brief that the case be returned to the lower Court for further proceedings.
Note should also be taken of the fact that an adverse claim may be cancelled only after it is adjudged
invalid or unmeritorious by the Court acting either as a land registration Court or a Court of general
jurisdiction.
5
The two other co-vendees, however, should be impleaded as parties so that the entire
controversy as to ownership may be threshed out in a single action to prevent multiplicity of suits.
WHEREFORE, this case is hereby ordered remanded to the Regional Trial Court corresponding to
the former Court of First Instance of Pangasinan for hearing and for passing upon the controversy on
the merits between petitioner, as the registered owner, and private respondent, who had filed the
adverse claim, impleading for that purpose the alleged co-vendees, Guillermo de la Cruz and Jose
Junio.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.






























4.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 81401 May 18, 1990
VIRGINIA FRANCO VDA. DE ARCEO, CARMELITA ARCEO, ZENAIDA ARCEO, ROMEO
ARCEO, RODOLFO ARCEO and MANUEL ARCEO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS (Former 16th Division), PEDRO M. ARCEO, SOTERA ARCEO,
LORENZO ARCEO, and ANTONIO ARCEO, respondents.
Ricardo S. Inton and Jose F. Tiburcio for petitioners.
Hermin E. Arceo for private respondents.
SARMIENTO, J .:
The Court grants this petition on a successful demonstration of error committed by the Court of
Appeals.
1

It appears that the spouses Abdon Arceo and Escolastica Geronimo were the owners of four parcels
of unregistered land (six were involved but only four were disputed) located in Pulilan, Bulacan,
identified as lots nos. 2582, 2595, 3054, and 8131. Escolastica died on September 16, 1942 while
Abdon passed away in 1953. They had one son, Esteban, who died on September 2, 1941. Esteban
had five children, Jose, Pedro, Lorenzo, Antonio, and Sotera. Jose married Virginia Franco, with
whom he fathered six children, Carmelita, Zenaida, Rodolfo, Manuel, Cesar, and Romeo.
2
Pedro,
Lorenzo, Antonio, and Sotera are the private respondents herein while Jose's widow, Virginia (Jose died
on March 8, 1970), and their children are the petitioners.
It also appears that on October (or September) 27, 1941, the Arceos executed a deed of donation
inter vivos, marked as Exhibit "J", in which the spouses bestowed the properties in favor of Jose.
3

Since 1942, Jose had been paying taxes thereon.
4
In 1949, he took personal possession thereof, worked
thereon, and claimed them as owner thereof
5

It furthermore appears that on August 2, 1950, the spouses executed another deed of donation inter
vivos, marked as exhibit "T" disposing of the properties further in favor of Jose.
6

On October 3 (or 30), 1941, the Arceos supposedly signed a deed of donation mortis causa, marked
as exhibit "1" revoking exhibit "J" and giving away the properties in question in favor of all his
grandchildren including Jose. It seems however that it was notarized only on November 3, 1944,
after Escolastica had died.
On January 12, 1972, Virginia, together with her children, filed with the cadastral court
7
an
application for registration in their names of lots Nos. 2582, 2595, 3054, and 8131 on the strength of
exhibits "J" and "T". Pedro, Antonio, Lorenzo, and Sotera opposed the application on the basis of exhibit
"1". Pedro and Lorenzo specifically contested the application on lots Nos. 3054 and 8131 on claims that
each of them were entitled to one-third thereof.
8

The cadastral court rejected all three documents and distributed the properties according to the law
on intestate succession.
9

Virginia and her children shortly went to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the
cadastral court and dismissed the appeal.
On February 15, 1988, Virginia, et al. petitioned this Court.
The petitioners argue that the cadastral court was bereft of the power to determine conflicting claims
of ownership, and that its authority was solely to confirm an existing title, and that anyway, all the
lots should have been awarded to them by virtue of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession since 1941 (1942, when Jose took possession of the parcels) or otherwise, by
acquisitive prescription.
10
They also assert that exhibits "J" and "T" had validly transferred the subject
lands to them.
In their comment, Pedro, Lorenzo, Antonio, and Sotera contend that the cadastral court had the
jurisdiction to decide questions of ownership of property; that the issue of prescription was never
ventilated below; and that exhibit "J" had been validly rescinded by exhibit "1".
The parties do not quarrel over the genuineness of all three exhibits but rather, over the dates
thereof. Pedro, et al. alleged that exhibit "J" was executed on September 27, 1941, and not October
27, 1941, and that exhibit "l", the instrument that revoked it, came later, or on October 3, 1941.
Virginia et al. maintain on the other hand that exhibit "J' was actually made on October 27, 1941,
twenty-four days after the execution of exhibit "1", and that assuming exhibit "1" came earlier, it was
notarized, and took effect, only on November 3, 1944, after the death of Escolastica, one of the
donors.
Although the parties wrangle over dates, the Court observes that there is no real question of fact to
be resolved in this case. The important question, so we find, is, based on existing facts, legal in
character: Who has the right over lots Nos. 2582, 2595, 3054, and 8131?
As we indicated, we find merit in this petition.
The first question must, however, be resolved against the petitioners. We have held that under
Section 2 of the Property Registration Decree, the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, sitting as a
land registration court, is no longer as circumscribed as it was under Act No. 496, the former land
registration law.
11
We said that the Decree "has eliminated the distinction between the general
jurisdiction vested in the regional trial court and the limited jurisdiction conferred upon it by the former law
when acting merely as a cadastral court." The amendment was "aimed at avoiding multiplicity of suits, the
change has simplified registration proceedings by conferring upon the required trial courts the authority to
act not only on applications for 'original registration' 'but also 'over all petitions filed after original
registration of title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising from such applications or
petitions.'"
12
At any rate, we have also stated that the limited jurisdiction rule governing land registration
courts is subject to recognized exceptions, to wit, (1) where the parties mutually agreed or have
acquiesced in submitting controversial issues for determination; (2) where they have been given full
opportunity to present their evidence; and (3) where the court has considered the evidence already of
record and is convinced that the same is sufficient for rendering a decision upon such controversial
issues.
13
By the same token, it has been held that the rule is not, in reality, one of jurisdiction, but rather,
of mere procedure, which may be waived.
14
It is not amiss to state likewise that where the issue, say, of
ownership, is ineluctably tied up with the question of right of registration, the cadastral court commits no
error in assuming jurisdiction over it, as, for instance, in this case, where both parties rely on their
respective exhibits to defeat one another's claims over the parcels sought to be registered, in which case,
registration would not be possible or would be unduly prolonged unless the court first decided it.
The next question refers to acquisitive prescription. In support of their claims, Virginia, et al. cite four
events: (1) In 1941, Jose entered upon the properties and until his death in 1970, worked thereon;
(2) Upon his death, they, Virginia, et al., divided the same by virtue of an extrajudicial partition; (3)
Ever since, Jose had paid taxes thereon until he died; (4) Pedro, et al., have not lifted a finger to
oust him, Jose, in possession, or otherwise, to impugn his right. Virginia, et al. now say that barring
the above exhibits, they have anyway acquired the parcels by prescription.
We also regret that one can not agree with this proposition. The petitioners suppose that the parcels
' had come under the category of a co-ownership, following the death of their grandparents, but in
that case, it has been held that in order for prescription to set in, the following requisites must
concur: (1) there is a clear showing that the claimant has repudiated the co-ownership; (2) he has
made known to the rest of the co-owners that he is assuming exclusive ownership over the property;
(3) there is clear and convincing evidence thereof; and (4) his possession is open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious.
15

The evidence for Virginia et al. do not persuade us that they (through Jose) have acquired the lots
by lapse of time. The fact that in 1941, Jose wrested possession thereof, so we hold, does not
amount to adverse possession because as a co-owner, he had the right of enjoyment, and his use
thereof can not by itself prejudice the right of his fellow co-owners. The fact that he paid taxes
thereon is not controlling either because payment of real estate taxes does not necessarily confer
title upon a claimant.
16
The fact finally that Virginia, et al. had sought to extrajudicially divide the property
is nothing conclusive because there is no showing that they, Virginia, et al. had made this known to
Pedro, et al. Under these circumstances, we can not validly say that the lands had devolved on Virginia.,
et al., by way of prescription.
We are granting the petition nonetheless on the finding that the lots had been conferred to Jose by a
valid donation inter vivos, that is, exhibit "J".
Other than the claims by Pedro, et al., that exhibit "J" had been revoked by exhibit "1", exhibit "J"
appears to have been executed in compliance with legal requirements, i.e., as to form and
acceptance.
17
It is true that the cadastral court was supposed to have attributed fraud on the part of Jose
in making Abdon sign the exhibit,
18
(according to Pedro, Abdon affixed his signature thereon upon "the
belief that it was a deed of sale of the land purchased from one Marciano Santos"
19
) but as found by the
Court of Appeals, It is a theory that "must be received with a 'grain of salt',
20
because, for one thing, Jose
is dead, and for another, the petitioners have adduced evidence that exhibit "J" was genuine. We are
bound by the factual finding of the Appellate Court and as we averred, we are disposing of this question
on pure questions of law.
As to exhibit "T", the finding of the Court of Appeals that it was defective is just as controlling on this
Court, that is, that "it was signed by Abdon Arceo after the death of his wife on September 16, 1942
and does not contain the acceptance ... by Jose Arceo."
21

We can not say that exhibit "1" had validly revoked exhibit "J". The weight of authority is that a valid
donation, once accepted, becomes
irrevocable,
22
except on account of officiousness,
23
failure by the donee to comply with charges imposed
in the donation,
24
or by reason of ingratitude.
25
There is simply no proof that Abdon when he executed
exhibit "1", was in possession of a legal ground for annulment.
We can not thus accept the Court of Appeals' holding that exhibit "1" had "neutralized the force and
effect"
26
of exhibit "J".
It is therefore this Court's ruling that the disposition under exhibit "J" in favor of Jose (whose rights
were transmitted to Virginia, et al.) should be respected.
We find no need in settling the issue of true dates of the parties' exhibits, because first, it is an issue
of fact and second, because whatever their true dates, there is no obstacle to the validity of the
claims of Virginia, et al.
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is SET ASIDE. The court a quo is ORDERED to
distribute the properties covered by the donation inter vivos, dated October (or September) 27, 1941,
exhibit "J", according to the terms and conditions set forth therein, and in the proportions indicated
thereby. No costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.






























5.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 81163 September 26, 1988
EDUARDO S. BARANDA and ALFONSO HITALIA, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE JUDGE TITO GUSTILO, ACTING REGISTER OF DEEDS AVITO SACLAUSO,
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and ATTY. HECTOR P. TEODOSIO, respondents.
Eduardo S. Baranda for petitioners.
Rico & Associates for private respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J .:
Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia were the petitioners in G.R. No. 64432 and the private
respondents in G.R. No. 62042. The subject matter of these two (2) cases and the instant case is
the same a parcel of land designated as Lot No. 4517 of the Cadastral Survey of Sta. Barbara,
Iloilo covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 6406.
The present petition arose from the same facts and events which triggered the filing of the earlier
petitions. These facts and events are cited in our resolution dated December 29, 1983 in G.R. No.
64432, as follows:
. . . This case has its origins in a petition for reconstitution of title filed with the Court
of First Instance of Iloilo involving a parcel of land known as Lot No. 4517 of the Sta.
Barbara Cadastre covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 6406 in the name of
Romana Hitalia. Eventually, Original Certificate of Title No. 6406 was cancelled and
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 106098 was issued in the names of Alfonso Hitalia
and Eduardo S. Baranda The Court issued a writ of possession which Gregorio
Perez, Maria P. Gotera and Susana Silao refused to honor on the ground that they
also have TCT No. 25772 over the same Lot No. 4517. The Court, after considering
the private respondents' opposition and finding TCT No. 25772 fraudulently acquired,
ordered that the writ of possession be carried out. A motion for reconsideration
having been denied, a writ of demolition was issued on March 29, 1982. Perez and
Gotera filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals. On
August 6, 1982, the Court of Appeals denied the petition. Perez and Gotera filed the
petition for review on certiorari denominated as G.R. No. 62042 before the Supreme
Court. As earlier stated the petition was denied in a resolution dated January 7,1983.
The motion for reconsideration was denied in another resolution dated March 25,
1983, which also stated that the denial is final. This decision in G.R. No. 62042, in
accordance with the entry of judgment, became final on March 25, 1983. The
petitioners in the instant case G.R. No. 64432--contend that the writs of possession
and demolition issued in the respondent court should now be implemented; that Civil
Case No. 00827 before the Intermediate Appellate Court was filed only to delay the
implementation of the writ; that counsel for the respondent should be held in
contempt of court for engaging in a concerted but futile effort to delay the execution
of the writs of possession and demolition and that petitioners are entitled to damages
because of prejudice caused by the filing of this petition before the Intermediate
Appellate Court. On September 26, 1983, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining
Order ' to maintain the status quo, both in the Intermediate Appellate Court and in the
Regional Trial Court of Iloilo. Considering that (l)there is merit in the instant petition
for indeed the issues discussed in G.R. No. 64432 as raised in Civil Case No. 00827
before the respondent court have already been passed upon in G.R. No. 62042; and
(2) the Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Intermediate Appellate Court was
only intended not to render the petition moot and academic pending the Court's
consideration of the issues, the Court RESOLVED to DIRECT the respondent
Intermediate Appellate Court not to take cognizance of issues already resolved by
this Court and accordingly DISMISS the petition in Civil Case No. 00827. Immediate
implementation of the writs of possession and demolition is likewise ordered. (pp.
107-108, Rollo G.R. No. 64432)
On May 9, 1984, the Court issued a resolution denying with finality a motion for reconsideration of
the December 29, 1983 resolution in G.R. No. 64432. On this same date, another resolution was
issued, this time in G.R. No. 62042, referring to the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo the ex-parte motion
of the private respondents (Baranda and Hitalia) for execution of the judgment in the resolutions
dated January 7, 1983 and March 9, 1983. In the meantime, the then Intermediate Appellate Court
issued a resolution dated February 10, 1984, dismissing Civil Case No. 00827 which covered the
same subject matter as the Resolutions above cited pursuant to our Resolution dated December 29,
1983. The resolution dated December 29, 1983 in G.R. No. 64432 became final on May 20, 1984.
Upon motions of the petitioners, the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23 presided by Judge Tito
G. Gustilo issued the following order:
Submitted are the following motions filed by movants Eduardo S. Baranda and
Alfonso Hitalia through counsel dated August 28, 1984:
(a) Reiterating Motion for Execution of Judgment of Resolutions dated January 7,
1983 and March 9, 1983 Promulgated by Honorable Supreme Court (First Division)
in G.R. No. 62042;
(b) Motion for Execution of Judgment of Resolution dated December 29, 1983
Promulgated by Honorable Supreme Court (First Division) in G.R. No. 64432;
(c) The Duties of the Register of Deeds are purely ministerial under Act 496,
therefore she must register all orders, judgment, resolutions of this Court and that of
Honorable Supreme Court.
Finding the said motions meritorious and there being no opposition thereto, the same
is hereby GRANTED.
WHEREFORE, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 is hereby declared null and
void and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-106098 is hereby declared valid and
subsisting title concerning the ownership of Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia,
all of Sta. Barbara Cadastre.
The Acting Register of Deeds of Iloilo is further ordered to register the Subdivision
Agreement of Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia as prayed for." (p. 466, Rollo--
G.R. No. 64432)
The above order was set aside on October 8, 1984 upon a motion for reconsideration and
manifestation filed by the Acting Registrar of Deeds of Iloilo, Atty. Helen P. Sornito, on the ground
that there was a pending case before this Court, an Action for Mandamus, Prohibition, Injunction
under G.R. No. 67661 filed by Atty. Eduardo Baranda, against the former which remained
unresolved.
In view of this development, the petitioners filed in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432 ex-parte
motions for issuance of an order directing the Regional Trial Court and Acting Register of Deeds to
execute and implement the judgments of this Court. They prayed that an order be issued:
1. Ordering both the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo Branch XXIII, under Hon. Judge
Tito G. Gustilo and the acting Register of Deeds Helen P. Sornito to register the
Order dated September 5, 1984 of the lower court;
2. To cancel No.T-25772. Likewise to cancel No.T-106098 and once cancelled to
issue new certificates of title to each of Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia;
Plus other relief and remedies equitable under the premises. (p. 473, 64432 Rollo)
Acting on these motions, we issued on September 17,1986 a Resolution in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R.
No. 64432 granting the motions as prayed for. Acting on another motion of the same nature filed by
the petitioners, we issued another Resolution dated October 8, 1986 referring the same to the Court
Administrator for implementation by the judge below.
In compliance with our resolutions, the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23 presided by Judge
Tito G. Gustilo issued two (2) orders dated November 6,1986 and January 6,1987 respectively, to
wit:
O R D E R
This is an Ex-parte Motion and Manifestation submitted by the movants through
counsel on October 20, 1986; the Manifestation of Atty. Helen Sornito, Register of
Deeds of the City of Iloilo, and formerly acting register of deeds for the Province of
Iloilo dated October 23, 1986 and the Manifestation of Atty. Avito S. Saclauso, Acting
Register of Deeds, Province of Iloilo dated November 5, 1986.
Considering that the motion of movants Atty. Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia
dated August 12, 1986 seeking the full implementation of the writ of possession was
granted by the Honorable Supreme Court, Second Division per its Resolution dated
September 17,1986, the present motion is hereby GRANTED.
WHEREFORE, the Acting Register of Deeds, Province of Iloilo, is hereby ordered to
register the Order of this Court dated September 5, 1984 as prayed for.
xxx xxx xxx
O R D E R
This is a Manifestation and Urgent Petition for the Surrender of Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-25772 submitted by the petitioners Atty. Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso
Hitalia on December 2, 1986, in compliance with the order of this Court dated
November 25, 1 986, a Motion for Extension of Time to File Opposition filed by Maria
Provido Gotera through counsel on December 4, 1986 which was granted by the
Court pursuant to its order dated December 15, 1986. Considering that no
Opposition was filed within the thirty (30) days period granted by the Court finding the
petition tenable, the same is hereby GRANTED.
WHEREFORE, Maria Provido Gotera is hereby ordered to surrender Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-25772 to this Court within ten (10) days from the date of this
order, after which period, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 is hereby declared
annulled and the Register of Deeds of Iloilo is ordered to issue a new Certificate of
Title in lieu thereof in the name of petitioners Atty. Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso
Hitalia, which certificate shall contain a memorandum of the annulment of the
outstanding duplicate. (pp. 286-287, Rollo 64432)
On February 9, 1987, Atty. Hector Teodosio, the counsel of Gregorio Perez, private respondent in
G.R. No. 64432 and petitioner in G.R. No. 62042, filed a motion for explanation in relation to the
resolution dated September 17, 1986 and manifestation asking for clarification on the following
points:
a. As to the prayer of Atty. Eduardo Baranda for the cancellation of TCT T-25772,
should the same be referred to the Court of Appeals (as mentioned in the Resolution
of November 27, 1985) or is it already deemed granted by implication (by virtue of
the Resolution dated September 17, 1986)?
b. Does the Resolution dated September 17, 1986 include not only the
implementation of the writ of possession but also the cancellation of TCT T-25772
and the subdivision of Lot 4517? (p. 536, Rollo 4432)
Acting on this motion and the other motions filed by the parties, we issued a resolution dated May
25, 1987 noting all these motions and stating therein:
xxx xxx xxx
Since entry of judgment in G.R. No. 62042 was made on January 7, 1983 and in
G.R. No. 64432 on May 30, 1984, and all that remains is the implementation of our
resolutions, this COURT RESOLVED to refer the matters concerning the execution
of the decisions to the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City for appropriate action and to
apply disciplinary sanctions upon whoever attempts to trifle with the implementation
of the resolutions of this Court. No further motions in these cases will be entertained
by this Court. (p. 615, Rollo-64432)
In the meantime, in compliance with the Regional Trial Court's orders dated November 6, 1986 and
January 6, 1987, Acting Register of Deeds AvitoSaclauso annotated the order declaring Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-25772 as null and void, cancelled the same and issued new certificates of
titles numbers T-111560, T-111561 and T-111562 in the name of petitioners Eduardo S. Baranda
and Alfonso Hitalia in lieu of Transfer Certificate of TItle No. T-106098.
However, a notice of lis pendens "on account of or by reason of a separate case (Civil Case No.
15871) still pending in the Court of Appeals" was carried out and annotated in the new certificates of
titles issued to the petitioners. This was upheld by the trial court after setting aside its earlier order
dated February 12, 1987 ordering the cancellation of lis pendens.
This prompted the petitioners to file another motion in G.R, No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432 to order
the trial court to reinstate its order dated February 12, 1987 directing the Acting Register of Deeds to
cancel the notice of lis pendens in the new certificates of titles.
In a resolution dated August 17, 1987, we resolved to refer the said motion to the Regional Trial
Court of Iloilo City, Branch 23 for appropriate action.
Since respondent Judge Tito Gustilo of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23 denied the
petitioners' motion to reinstate the February 12, 1987 order in another order dated September 17,
1987, the petitioners filed this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary
injunction to compel the respondent judge to reinstate his order dated February l2, 1987 directing the
Acting Register of Deeds to cancel the notice of lis pendens annotated in the new certificates of titles
issued in the name of the petitioners.
The records show that after the Acting Register of Deeds annotated a notice of is pendens on the
new certificates of titles issued in the name of the petitioners, the petitioners filed in the
reconstitution case an urgent ex-parte motion to immediately cancel notice of lis pendens annotated
thereon.
In his order dated February 12, 1987, respondent Judge Gustilo granted the motion and directed the
Acting Register of Deeds of Iloilo to cancel the lis pendens found on Transfer Certificate of Title Nos.
T-106098; T-111560; T-111561 and T-111562.
Respondent Acting Register of Deeds Avito Saclauso filed a motion for reconsideration of the
February 12, 1987 order stating therein:
That the undersigned hereby asks for a reconsideration of the said order based on
the second paragraph of Section 77 of P.D. 1529, to wit:
"At any time after final judgment in favor of the defendant or other
disposition of the action such as to terminate finally all rights of the
plaintiff in and to the land and/or buildings involved, in any case in
which a memorandum or notice of Lis Pendens has been registered
as provided in the preceding section, the notice of Lis Pendens shall
be deemed cancelled upon the registration of a certificate of the clerk
of court in which the action or proceeding was pending stating the
manner of disposal thereof."
That the lis pendens under Entry No. 427183 was annotated on T-106098, T-
111560, T-111561 and T-111562 by virtue of a case docketed as Civil Case No.
15871, now pending with the Intermediate Court of Appeals, entitled, "Calixta
Provido, Ricardo Provido, Sr., Maria Provido and Perfecto Provido, Plaintiffs, versus
Eduardo Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia, Respondents."
That under the above-quoted provisions of P.D. 152, the cancellation of subject
Notice of Lis Pendens can only be made or deemed cancelled upon the registration
of the certificate of the Clerk of Court in which the action or proceeding was pending,
stating the manner of disposal thereof.
Considering that Civil Case No. 1587, upon which the Notice of Lis Pendens was
based is still pending with the Intermediate Court of Appeals, only the Intermediate
Court of Appeals and not this Honorable Court in a mere cadastral proceedings can
order the cancellation of the Notice of Lis Pendens. (pp. 68-69, Rollo)
Adopting these arguments and on the ground that some if not all of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No.
15871 were not privies to the case affected by the Supreme Court resolutions, respondent Judge
Tito Gustilo set aside his February 12, 1987 order and granted the Acting Register of Deeds' motion
for reconsideration.
The issue hinges on whether or not the pendency of the appeal in Civil Case No. 15871 with the
Court of Appeals prevents the court from cancelling the notice of lis pendens in the certificates of
titles of the petitioners which were earlier declared valid and subsisting by this Court in G.R. No.
62042 and G.R. No. 64432. A corollary issue is on the nature of the duty of a Register of Deeds to
annotate or annul a notice of lis pendens in a torrens certificate of title.
Civil Case No. 15871 was a complaint to seek recovery of Lot No. 4517 of Sta. Barbara Cadastre
Iloilo, (the same subject matter of G.R. No 62042 and G.R. No. 64432) from petitioners Baranda and
Hitalia filed by Calixta Provido, Ricardo Provido, Maxima Provido and Perfecta Provido before the
Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23. At the instance of Atty. Hector P. Teodosio, the Provides'
counsel, a notice of is pendens was annotated on petitioners' Certificate of Title No. T-106098
covering Lot No. 4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre.
Acting on a motion to dismiss filed by the petitioners, the court issued an order dated October 24,
1984 dismissing Civil Case No. 15871.
The order was then appealed to the Court of Appeals. This appeal is the reason why respondent
Judge Gustilo recalled the February 12, 1987 order directing the Acting Register of Deeds to cancel
the notice of lis pendens annotated on the certificates of titles of the petitioners.
This petition is impressed with merit.
Maria Provido Gotera was one of the petitioners in G.R. No. 62042. Although Calixta Provido,
Ricardo Provido, Maxima Provido and Perfecta Provido, the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 15871 were
not impleaded as parties, it is very clear in the petition that Maria Provido was acting on behalf of the
Providos who allegedly are her co-owners in Lot No. 4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre as shown by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 issued in her name and the names of the plaintiffs in Civil
Case No. 15871, among others. (Annex "E" G.R. No. 62042, p. 51, Rollo) In fact, one of the issues
raised by petitioners Maria Provido Gotera and Gregoria Perez in G.R. No. 62042 was as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
2. Whether or not, in the same reconstitution proceedings, respondent Judge
Midpantao L. Adil had the authority to declare as null and void the transfer certificate
of title in the name of petitioner Maria Provido Gotera and her other co-owners. (p. 3,
Rollo; Emphasis supplied)
It thus appears that the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 15871 were privies to G.R. No. 62042 contrary to
the trial court's findings that they were not.
G.R. No. 62042 affirmed the order of the then Court of First Instance of Iloilo in the reconstitution
proceedings declaring TCT No. 25772 in the name of Providos over Lot No. 4517, Sta. Barbara
Cadastre null and void for being fraudulently obtained and declaring TCT No. 106098 over the same
parcel Lot No. 4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre in the name of petitioners Eduardo Baranda and Alfonso
Hitalia valid and subsisting.
The decision in G.R. No. 62042 became final and executory on March 25,1983 long before Civil
Case No. 15871 was filed.
Under these circumstances, it is crystal clear that the Providos, private respondents herein, in filing
Civil Case No. 15871 were trying to delay the full implementation of the final decisions in G.R. No.
62042 as well as G.R. No. 64432 wherein this Court ordered immediate implementation of the writs
of possession and demolition in the reconstitution proceedings involving Lot No. 4517, Sta. Barbara
Cadastre.
The purpose of a notice of lis pendens is defined in the following manner:
Lis pendens has been conceived to protect the real rights of the party causing the
registration thereof With the lis pendens duly recorded, he could rest secure that he
would not lose the property or any part of it. For, notice of lis pendens serves as a
warning to a prospective purchaser or incumbrancer that the particular property is in
litigation; and that he should keep his hands off the same, unless of course he
intends to gamble on the results of the litigation. (Section 24, Rule 14, RuIes of
Court; Jamora v. Duran, et al., 69 Phil. 3, 11; I Martin, Rules of Court, p. 415,
footnote 3, citing cases.) (Natanov. Esteban, 18 SCRA 481, 485-486)
The private respondents are not entitled to this protection. The facts obtaining in this case
necessitate the application of the rule enunciated in the cases of Victoriano v. Rovila (55 Phil. 1000),
Municipal Council of Paranaque v. Court of First Instance of Rizal (70 Phil., 363) and Sarmiento v.
Ortiz (10 SCRA 158), to the effect that:
We have once held that while ordinarily a notice of pendency which has been filed in
a proper case, cannot be cancelled while the action is pending and undetermined,
the proper court has the discretionary power to cancel it under peculiar
circumstances, as for instance, where the evidence so far presented by the plaintiff
does not bear out the main allegations of his complaint, and where the continuances
of the trial, for which the plaintiff is responsible, are unnecessarily delaying the
determination of the case to the prejudice of the defendant. (Victoriano v. Rovira,
supra; The Municipal Council of Paranaque v. Court of First Instance of Rizal, supra)
The facts of this case in relation to the earlier cases brought all the way to the Supreme Court
illustrate how the private respondents tried to block but unsuccessfuly the already final decisions in
G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432.
Parenthetically, respondent Judge Tito Gustilo abused his discretion in sustaining the respondent
Acting Register of Deeds' stand that, the notice of lis pendens in the certificates of titles of the
petitioners over Lot No. 4571, Barbara Cadastre cannot be cancelled on the ground of pendency of
Civil Case No. 15871 with the Court of Appeals. In upholding the position of the Acting Register of
Deeds based on Section 77 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, he conveniently forgot the first
paragraph thereof which provides:
Cancellation of lis pendens. Before final judgment, a notice of lis pendens may be
cancelled upon Order of the Court after proper showing that the notice is for the
purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is not necessary to protect the
rights of the party who caused it to be registered. It may also be cancelled by the
Register of Deeds upon verified petition of the party who caused the registration
thereof.
This Court cannot understand how respondent Judge Gustilo could have been misled by the
respondent Acting Register of Deeds on this matter when in fact he was the same Judge who issued
the order dismissing Civil Case No. 15871 prompting the private respondents to appeal said order
dated October 10, 1984 to the Court of Appeals. The records of the main case are still with the court
below but based on the order, it can be safely assumed that the various pleadings filed by the
parties subsequent to the motion to dismiss filed by the petitioners (the defendants therein) touched
on the issue of the validity of TCT No. 25772 in the name of the Providos over Lot Number 4571,
Sta. Barbara Cadastre in the light of the final decisions in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432.
The next question to be determined is on the nature of the duty of the Register of Deeds to annotate
and/or cancel the notice of lis pendens in a torrens certificate of title.
Section 10, Presidential Decree No. 1529 states that "It shall be the duty of the Register of Deeds to
immediately register an instrument presented for registration dealing with real or personal property
which complies with all the requisites for registration. ... . If the instrument is not registrable, he shall
forthwith deny registration thereof and inform the presentor of such denial in writing, stating the
ground or reasons therefore, and advising him of his right to appeal by consulta in accordance with
Section 117 of this Decree."
Section 117 provides that "When the Register of Deeds is in doubt with regard to the proper step to
be taken or memoranda to be made in pursuance of any deed, mortgage or other instrument
presented to him for registration or where any party in interest does not agree with the action taken
by the Register of Deeds with reference to any such instrument, the question shall be submitted to
the Commission of Land Registration by the Register of Deeds, or by the party in interest thru the
Register of Deeds. ... ."
The elementary rule in statutory construction is that when the words and phrases of the statute are
clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the language employed and the
statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says. (Aparri v. Court of Appeals, 127 SCRA 231;
Insular Bank of Asia and America Employees' Union [IBAAEU] v. Inciong, 132 SCRA 663) The
statute concerning the function of the Register of Deeds to register instruments in a torrens
certificate of title is clear and leaves no room for construction. According to Webster's Third
International Dictionary of the English Language the word shall means "ought to, must,
...obligation used to express a command or exhortation, used in laws, regulations or directives to
express what is mandatory." Hence, the function of a Register of Deeds with reference to the
registration of deeds encumbrances, instruments and the like is ministerial in nature. The respondent
Acting Register of Deeds did not have any legal standing to file a motion for reconsideration of the
respondent Judge's Order directing him to cancel the notice of lis pendens annotated in the
certificates of titles of the petitioners over the subject parcel of land. In case of doubt as to the proper
step to be taken in pursuance of any deed ... or other instrument presented to him, he should have
asked the opinion of the Commissioner of Land Registration now, the Administrator of the National
Land Title and Deeds Registration Administration in accordance with Section 117 of Presidential
Decree No. 1529.
In the ultimate analysis, however, the responsibility for the delays in the full implementation of this
Court's already final resolutions in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432 which includes the
cancellation of the notice of lis pendens annotated in the certificates of titles of the petitioners over
Lot No. 4517 of the Sta. Barbara Cadastre falls on the respondent Judge. He should never have
allowed himself to become part of dilatory tactics, giving as excuse the wrong impression that Civil
Case No. 15871 filed by the private respondents involves another set of parties claiming Lot No.
4517 under their own Torrens Certificate of Title.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The February 12, 1987 order of the Regional Trial
Court of Iloilo, Branch 23 is REINSTATED. All subsequent orders issued by the trial court which
annulled the February 12, 1987 order are SET ASIDE. Costs against the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.

































6.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-22486 March 20, 1968
TEODORO ALMIROL, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF AGUSAN, respondent-appellee.
Tranquilino O. Calo, Jr. for petitioner-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent-appellee.
CASTRO, J .:
On June 28, 1961 Teodoro Almirol purchased from Arcenio Abalo a parcel of land situated in the
municipality of Esperanza, province of Agusan, and covered by original certificate of title P-1237 in
the name of "Arcenio Abalo, married to Nicolasa M. Abalo." Sometime in May, 1962 Almirol went to
the office of the Register of Deeds of Agusan in Butuan City to register the deed of sale and to
secure in his name a transfer certificate of title. Registration was refused by the Register of Deeds
upon the following grounds, inter alia, stated in his letter of May 21, 1962:
1. That Original Certificate of Title No. P-1237 is registered in the name of Arcenio Abalo,
married to Nicolasa M. Abalo, and by legal presumption, is considered conjugal property;
2. That in the sale of a conjugal property acquired after the effectivity of the New Civil Code it
is necessary that both spouses sign the document; but
3. Since, as in this case, the wife has already died when the sale was made, the surviving
husband can not dispose of the whole property without violating the existing law (LRC
Consulta No. 46 dated June 10, 1958).
To effect the registration of the aforesaid deed of absolute Sale, it is necessary that the
property be first liquidated and transferred in the name of the surviving spouse and the heirs
of the deceased wife by means of extrajudicial settlement or partition and that the consent of
such other heir or heirs must be procured by means of another document ratifying this sale
executed by their father.
In view of such refusal, Almirol went to the Court of First Instance of Agusan on a petition for
mandamus (sp. civ. case 151), to compel the Register of Deeds to register the deed of sale and to
issue to him the corresponding transfer certificate of title, and to recover P5,000 in moral damages
and P1,000 attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. It is Almirol's assertion that it is but a
ministerial duty of the respondent to perform the acts required of him, and that he (Almirol) has no
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
In his answer with counterclaim for P10,000 damages, the respondent reiterated the grounds stated
in his letter of May 21, 1962, averred that the petitioner has "other legal, plain, speedy and adequate
remedy at law by appealing the decision of the respondent to the Honorable Commissioner of Land
Registration," and prayed for dismissal of the petition.
In its resolution of October 16, 1963 the lower court, declaring that "mandamus does not lie . . .
because the adequate remedy is that provided by Section 4 of Rep. Act 1151", dismissed the
petition, with costs against the petitioner.
Hence the present appeal by Almirol.
The only question of law tendered for resolution is whether mandamus will lie to compel the
respondent to register the deed of sale in question.
Although the reasons relied upon by the respondent evince a sincere desire on his part to maintain
inviolate the law on succession and transmission of rights over real properties, these do not
constitute legal grounds for his refusal to register the deed. Whether a document is valid or not, is
not for the register of deeds to determine; this function belongs properly to a court of competent
jurisdiction.
1

Whether the document is invalid, frivolous or intended to harass, is not the duty of a Register
of Deeds to decide, but a court of competent jurisdiction. (Gabriel vs. Register of Deeds of
Rizal, et al., L-17956, Sept. 30, 1953).
. . . the supposed invalidity of the contracts of lease is no valid objection to their registration,
because invalidity is no proof of their non-existence or a valid excuse for denying their
registration. The law on registration does not require that only valid instruments shall be
registered. How can parties affected thereby be supposed to know their invalidity before they
become aware, actually or constructively, of their existence or of their provisions? If the
purpose of registration is merely to give notice, then questions regarding the effect or
invalidity of instruments are expected to be decided after, not before, registration. It must
follow as a necessary consequence that registration must first be allowed, and validity or
effect litigated afterwards. (Gurbax Singh Pablo & Co. vs. Reyes and Tantoco, 92 Phil. 182-
183).
Indeed, a register of deeds is entirely precluded by section 4 of Republic Act 1151 from exercising
his personal judgment and discretion when confronted with the problem of whether to register a
deed or instrument on the ground that it is invalid. For under the said section, when he is in doubt as
to the proper step to be taken with respect to any deed or other instrument presented to him for
registration, all that he is supposed to do is to submit and certify the question to the Commissioner of
Land Registration who shall, after notice and hearing, enter an order prescribing the step to be taken
on the doubtful question. Section 4 of R.A. 1151 reads as follows:
Reference of doubtful matters to Commissioner of Land Registration. When the Register
of Deeds is in doubt with regard to the proper step to be taken or memorandum to be made
in pursuance of any deed, mortgage, or other instrument presented to him for registration, or
where any party in interest does not agree with the Register of Deeds with reference to any
such matter, the question shall be submitted to the Commissioner of Land Registration either
upon the certification of the Register of Deeds, stating the question upon which he is in
doubt, or upon the suggestion in writing by the party in interest; and thereupon the
Commissioner, after consideration of the matter shown by the records certified to him, and in
case of registered lands, after notice to the parties and hearing, shall enter an order
prescribing the step to be taken or memorandum to be made. His decision in such cases
shall be conclusive and binding upon all Registers of Deeds: Provided, further, That when a
party in interest disagrees with the ruling or resolution of the Commissioner and the issue
involves a question of law, said decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court within thirty
days from and after receipt of the notice thereof.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the court a quo correctly dismissed the petition for mandamus.
Section 4 abovequoted provides that "where any party in interest does not agree with the Register of
Deeds . . . the question shall be submitted to the Commissioner of Land Registration," who
thereafter shall "enter an order prescribing the step to be taken or memorandum to be made," which
shall be "conclusive and binding upon all Registers of Deeds." This administrative remedy must be
resorted to by the petitioner before he can have recourse to the courts.
ACCORDINGLY, the Resolution of the lower court of October 16, 1969, is affirmed, at petitioner's
cost.1wph1.t