GR No. 162155.

August 28,2007
CIR V Primetown Property Group Inc.


A Petition for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution
of the Court of Appeals

Facts:

August 1, 2003 decision of Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 64782 and its February resolution denying
reconsideration.
On March 11, 1999, Gilbert Yap, VP of Primetown
Property Group, Inc., applied for refund or credit of Income
Tax and paid.
In Yaps letter to CIR District Director Arturo V. Parcero
of Revenue District No. 049 (Makati) of the BIR, he explained
that the cost of labor and materials increases and their
difficulty in obtaining financing for projects and collecting
receivables caused the real estate industry to slowdown.
Though business was good on the first quarter of 1997 they
suffered loss amounting to P71,879,228 that year. Because of
this losses, Yap or the respondents were not liable for income
taxes. Nevertheless, Respondents paid its quarterly corporate
income tax and remitted creditable withholding tax from real
estate sales to the BIR in the total amount of P26,318,398.32.
Entitling them to tax refund/credit.
On May 13, 1999, BIR Officer Elizabeth Santos
required respondent to submit additional documents to support
its claim. Respondent complied but its claim was not acted
upon.
April 14, 2000, if filed a petition for review in the Court
of Tax Appeals.
December 15, 2000, the CTA dismissed the petition as
it was filed beyond the two-year prescriptive period for filing a
judicial claim for tax refund/credit.

Issue:
Whether or not Primetown Property Group, Inc . filed
beyond a prescriptive period for filing Judicial Claim.

HELD:
Both Article 13 of the Civil Code and Sec. 31, Chapter
VIII, Book of the Administrative Code of 1987 deal with the
same subject matter- the Computation of legal periods. Under
the Civil Code, a year is equivalent to 365 days whether it be a
regular year or a leap year. Under the Administrative Code of
1987, however, a year is composed of 12 calendar months.
Needless to state, under the Administrative Code of 1987, the
number of days is irrelevant.
There obviously exist a manifest incompatibility in the
manner of computing legal periods under the Civil Code and
Administrative Code of 1987. For this reason, Sec. 31,
Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, being
more recent law, governs the computation of legal periods.
Lex Postoriori derogat priori (more recent law prevails)
Accordingly, the Petition is hereby DENIED. The case
is REMANDED to the Court of Tax Appeals which is ordered
to expeditiously proceed to hear C.T.A. Case No. 6113 entitled
Primetown Property Group, Inc. V. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue and Arturo V. Parcero.











MOTAJES V PEOPLE

A petition for review on certiorari are the Resolutions dated
Sept. 21, 2007 and May 19, 2008 of the CA issued CA-GR CR
No. 00410 which dismissed the petition for review filed by
petitioner Alfredo Jaca Montajes for being filed out of time, and
denied reconsideration thereof, respectively.

FACTS:
Dec. 8, 2002, at 1:00 am, at Purok 10 Brgy. Abilan,
Buenavista, Agusan del Norte, the accused Alfredo Montajes,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and hack Jose B.
Rellon, an elected Punong Brgy., while in the performance of
his duties.
On the said date there was a benefit dance, and during
those time, there were people who bought a ticket who were
not able to enter the dance floor so to accommodate the said
ticket holders the Punong Baranggay extend the benefit dance
to 1. During that, theres a throwing of the stone which make
the accused wild and took out his bolo or lagaraw and find
those people who throw stones at his home. The accused saw
the Brgy. Captain and the latter ask him to put away his said
lagaraw. Theres a heated argument between the two which
the made the Brgy. Captain blatter Montajes. In the Baranggay
Legal Conciliation the accused apologises to Brgy. Capt. Jose
Rellon.
Nevertheless, Jose Rellon still file charges to RTC to
teach the accused a lesson.
Dec. 29, 2005, the MTC issued a Judgement finding
petitioner guilty of the crime of direct assault.
On appeal, the RTC, Branch 3, Butuan City, rendered
its decision dated Jan. 23, 2007 affirming in toto the judgment
of the MTC.
Petitoner filed a motion for reconsideration which the
RTC denied in an Order dated May 4, 2007.
Petitioner filed with the CA a petition (should be
motion) for extension of time to file petition for review under
Rule 42 of the Rules of Court praying for an extended period
of 15 days from May 21, 2007 or until June 5, 2007, within
which to file his petition. Petitioner subsequently file his
petition for review on June 5, 2007.
On Sept. 21, 2007, the CA issued its assailed
Resolution dismissing the petition outright for being filed out of
time.

ISSUE:
Whether or Not the CA erred in denying due course for
the petition for review for being filed out of time.

HELD:
A few days late in the filing of the petition for review
does not automatically warrant the dismissal thereof. And even
assuming that a petition for review was filed a few days late,
where a strong consideration of substantial justice are
manifest in the petition, we may relax the stringent application
of technical rules in the exercise of our equity jurisdiction.
Courts should not be so strict about procedural lapses
that do not really impair the proper administration of justice.
The higher objective of procedural rule is to insure that the
substantive right of the parties are protected.
The petition is granted. The assailed Resolution of the
Court of Appeals are SET ASIDE. The CA is ORDERED to
reinstate the Petition for Review filed by petitioner in CA-GR
CR No. 00410

Note: In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by
any applicable statute, the day of the act or event from which
the designated period of time begins to run is to be excluded
and the date of performance included if the last day of the
period, as thus computed, falls on Sat., Sun or a legal Holiday,
the time shall not run until the next working day; A certain
degree circumspection is required of the lower courts in
computing periods, bearing in mind not only to conduct a
perfunctory or mechanical counting of days, but more
importantly a mindful determination as to what specific days
the ends of these periods fall on.


EN BANC
G.R. No. L-19671 November 29, 1965
PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
VICENTA F. ESCAO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
I. V. Binamira & F. B. Barria for plaintiff-appellant.
Jalandoni & Jarnir for defendants-appellees.

D E C I S I O N
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Direct appeal, on factual and legal questions, from the
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, in its Civil
Case No. R-4177, denying the claim of the plaintiff-appellant,
Pastor B. Tenchavez, for legal separation and one million
pesos in damages against his wife and parents-in-law, the
defendants-appellees, Vicente, Mamerto and Mena,
1
all
surnamed Escao, respectively.
2

The facts, supported by the evidence of record, are the
following:
Missing her late afternoon classes on 24 February 1948 in the
University of San Carlos, Cebu City, where she was then
enrolled as a second year student of commerce, Vicenta
Escao, 27 years of age (scion of a well-to-do and socially
prominent Filipino family of Spanish ancestry and a sheltered
colegiala), exchanged marriage vows with Pastor Tenchavez,
32 years of age, an engineer, ex-army officer and of
undistinguished stock, without the knowledge of her parents,
before a Catholic chaplain, Lt. Moises Lavares, in the house of
one Juan Alburo in the said city. The marriage was the
culmination of a previous love affair and was duly registered
with the local civil register.
Vicentas letters to Pastor, and his to her, before the marriage,
indicate that the couple were deeply in love. Together with a
friend, Pacita Noel, their matchmaker and go-between, they
had planned out their marital future whereby Pacita would be
the governess of their first-born; they started saving money in
a piggy bank. A few weeks before their secret marriage, their
engagement was broken; Vicenta returned the engagement
ring and accepted another suitor, Joseling Lao. Her love for
Pastor beckoned; she pleaded for his return, and they
reconciled. This time they planned to get married and then
elope. To facilitate the elopement, Vicenta had brought some
of her clothes to the room of Pacita Noel in St. Marys Hall,
which was their usual trysting place.
Although planned for the midnight following their marriage, the
elopement did not, however, materialize because when
Vicente went back to her classes after the marriage, her
mother, who got wind of the intended nuptials, was already
waiting for her at the college. Vicenta was taken home where
she admitted that she had already married Pastor. Mamerto
and Mena Escao were surprised, because Pastor never
asked for the hand of Vicente, and were disgusted because of
the great scandal that the clandestine marriage would provoke
(t.s.n., vol. III, pp. 1105-06). The following morning, the
Escao spouses sought priestly advice. Father Reynes
suggested a recelebration to validate what he believed to be
an invalid marriage, from the standpoint of the Church, due to
the lack of authority from the Archbishop or the parish priest
for the officiating chaplain to celebrate the marriage. The
recelebration did not take place, because on 26 February 1948
Mamerto Escao was handed by a maid, whose name he
claims he does not remember, a letter purportedly coming
from San Carlos college students and disclosing an amorous
relationship between Pastor Tenchavez and Pacita Noel;
Vicenta translated the letter to her father, and thereafter would
not agree to a new marriage. Vicenta and Pastor met that day
in the house of Mrs. Pilar Mendezona. Thereafter, Vicenta
continued living with her parents while Pastor returned to his
job in Manila. Her letter of 22 March 1948 (Exh. M), while still
solicitous of her husbands welfare, was not as endearing as
her previous letters when their love was aflame.
Vicenta was bred in Catholic ways but is of a changeable
disposition, and Pastor knew it. She fondly accepted her being
called a jellyfish. She was not prevented by her parents from
communicating with Pastor (Exh. 1-Escao), but her letters
became less frequent as the days passed. As of June, 1948
the newlyweds were already estranged (Exh. 2-Escao).
Vicenta had gone to Jimenez, Misamis Occidental, to escape
from the scandal that her marriage stirred in Cebu society.
There, a lawyer filed for her a petition, drafted by then Senator
Emmanuel Pelaez, to annul her marriage. She did not sign the
petition (Exh. B-5). The case was dismissed without
prejudice because of her non-appearance at the hearing (Exh.
B-4).
On 24 June 1950, without informing her husband, she applied
for a passport, indicating in her application that she was single,
that her purpose was to study, and she was domiciled in Cebu
City, and that she intended to return after two years. The
application was approved, and she left for the United States.
On 22 August 1950, she filed a verified complaint for divorce
against the herein plaintiff in the Second Judicial District Court
of the State of Nevada in and for the County of Washoe, on
the ground of extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character.
On 21 October 1950, a decree of divorce, final and absolute,
was issued in open court by the said tribunal.
In 1951 Mamerto and Mena Escao filed a petition with the
Archbishop of Cebu to annul their daughters marriage to
Pastor (Exh. D). On 10 September 1954, Vicenta sought
papal dispensation of her marriage (Exh. D-2).
On 13 September 1954, Vicenta married an American, Russell
Leo Moran, in Nevada. She now lives with him in California,
and, by him, has begotten children. She acquired American
citizenship on 8 August 1958.
But on 30 July 1955, Tenchavez had initiated the proceedings
at bar by a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cebu,
and amended on 31 May 1956, against Vicenta F. Escao, her
parents, Mamerto and Mena Escao, whom he charged with
having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from joining her
husband, and alienating her affections, and against the Roman
Catholic Church, for having, through its Diocesan Tribunal,
decreed the annulment of the marriage, and asked for legal
separation and one million pesos in damages. Vicenta claimed
a valid divorce from plaintiff and an equally valid marriage to
her present husband, Russell Leo Moran; while her parents
denied that they had in any way influenced their daughters
acts, and counterclaimed for moral damages.
The appealed judgment did not decree a legal separation, but
freed the plaintiff from supporting his wife and to acquire
property to the exclusion of his wife. It allowed the
counterclaim of Mamerto Escao and Mena Escao for moral
and exemplary damages and attorneys fees against the
plaintiff-appellant, to the extent of P45,000.00, and plaintiff
resorted directly to this Court.
The appellant ascribes, as errors of the trial court, the
following:
1. In not declaring legal separation; in not holding defendant
Vicenta F. Escao liable for damages and in dismissing the
complaint;.
2. In not holding the defendant parents Mamerto Escano and
the heirs of Doa Mena Escao liable for damages;.
3 In holding the plaintiff liable for and requiring him to pay the
damages to the defendant parents on their counterclaims; and.
4. In dismissing the complaint and in denying the relief sought
by the plaintiff.
That on 24 February 1948 the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor
Tenchavez, and the defendant-appellee, Vicenta Escao,
were validly married to each other, from the standpoint of our
civil law, is clearly established by the record before us. Both
parties were then above the age of majority, and otherwise
qualified; and both consented to the marriage, which was
performed by a Catholic priest (army chaplain Lavares) in the
presence of competent witnesses. It is nowhere shown that
said priest was not duly authorized under civil law to solemnize
marriages.
The chaplains alleged lack of ecclesiastical authorization from
the parish priest and the Ordinary, as required by Canon law,
is irrelevant in our civil law, not only because of the separation
of Church and State but also because Act 3613 of the
Philippine Legislature (which was the marriage law in force at
the time) expressly provided that
SEC. 1. Essential requisites. Essential requisites for marriage
are the legal capacity of the contracting parties and consent.
(Emphasis supplied)
The actual authority of the solemnizing officer was thus only a
formal requirement, and, therefore, not essential to give the
marriage civil effects,
3
and this is emphasized by section 27 of
said marriage act, which provided the following:
SEC. 27. Failure to comply with formal requirements. No
marriage shall be declared invalid because of the absence of
one or several of the formal requirements of this Act if, when it
was performed, the spouses or one of them believed in good
faith that the person who solemnized the marriage was
actually empowered to do so, and that the marriage was
perfectly legal.
The good faith of all the parties to the marriage (and hence the
validity of their marriage) will be presumed until the contrary is
positively proved (Lao vs. Dee Tim, 45 Phil. 739, 745;
Francisco vs. Jason, 60 Phil. 442, 448). It is well to note here
that in the case at bar, doubts as to the authority of the
solemnizing priest arose only after the marriage, when
Vicentas parents consulted Father Reynes and the
archbishop of Cebu. Moreover, the very act of Vicenta in
abandoning her original action for annulment and
subsequently suing for divorce implies an admission that her
marriage to plaintiff was valid and binding.
Defendant Vicenta Escao argues that when she contracted
the marriage she was under the undue influence of Pacita
Noel, whom she charges to have been in conspiracy with
appellant Tenchavez. Even granting, for arguments sake, the
truth of that contention, and assuming that Vicentas consent
was vitiated by fraud and undue influence, such vices did not
render her marriage ab initio void, but merely voidable, and the
marriage remained valid until annulled by a competent civil
court. This was never done, and admittedly, Vicentas suit for
annulment in the Court of First Instance of Misamis was
dismissed for non-prosecution.
It is equally clear from the record that the valid marriage
between Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta Escao remained
subsisting and undissolved under Philippine law,
notwithstanding the decree of absolute divorce that the wife
sought and obtained on 21 October 1950 from the Second
Judicial District Court of Washoe County, State of Nevada, on
grounds of extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character. At
the time the divorce decree was issued, Vicenta Escao, like
her husband, was still a Filipino citizen.
4
She was then subject
to Philippine law, and Article 15 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines (Rep. Act No. 386), already in force at the time,
expressly provided:
Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status,
condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon the
citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
The Civil Code of the Philippines, now in force, does not admit
absolute divorce, quo ad vinculo matrimonii; and in fact does
not even use that term, to further emphasize its restrictive
policy on the matter, in contrast to the preceding legislation
that admitted absolute divorce on grounds of adultery of the
wife or concubinage of the husband (Act 2710). Instead of
divorce, the present Civil Code only provides for legal
separation (Title IV, Book 1, Arts. 97 to 108), and, even in that
case, it expressly prescribes that the marriage bonds shall not
be severed (Art. 106, subpar. 1).
For the Philippine courts to recognize and give recognition or
effect to a foreign decree of absolute divorce between Filipino
citizens could be a patent violation of the declared public
policy of the state, especially in view of the third paragraph of
Article 17 of the Civil Code that prescribes the following:
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property,
and those which have for their object public order, policy and
good customs, shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or
judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions
agreed upon in a foreign country.
Even more, the grant of effectivity in this jurisdiction to such
foreign divorce decrees would, in effect, give rise to an
irritating and scandalous discrimination in favor of wealthy
citizens, to the detriment of those members of our polity whose
means do not permit them to sojourn abroad and obtain
absolute divorces outside the Philippines.
From this point of view, it is irrelevant that appellant Pastor
Tenchavez should have appeared in the Nevada divorce court.
Primarily because the policy of our law cannot be nullified by
acts of private parties (Civil Code, Art. 17, jam quot.); and
additionally, because the mere appearance of a non-resident
consort cannot confer jurisdiction where the court originally
had none (Area vs. Javier, 95 Phil. 579).
From the preceding facts and considerations, there flows as a
necessary consequence that in this jurisdiction Vicenta
Escaos divorce and second marriage are not entitled to
recognition as valid; for her previous union to plaintiff
Tenchavez must be declared to be existent and undissolved. It
follows, likewise, that her refusal to perform her wifely duties,
and her denial of consortium and her desertion of her husband
constitute in law a wrong caused through her fault, for which
the husband is entitled to the corresponding indemnity (Civil
Code, Art. 2176). Neither an unsubstantiated charge of deceit
nor an anonymous letter charging immorality against the
husband constitute, contrary to her claim, adequate excuse.
Wherefore, her marriage and cohabitation with Russell Leo
Moran is technically intercourse with a person not her
husband from the standpoint of Philippine Law, and entitles
plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez to a decree of legal separation
under our law, on the basis of adultery (Revised Penal Code,
Art. 333).
The foregoing conclusions as to the untoward effect of a
marriage after an invalid divorce are in accord with the
previous doctrines and rulings of this court on the subject,
particularly those that were rendered under our laws prior to
the approval of the absolute divorce act (Act 2710 of the
Philippine Legislature). As a matter of legal history, our
statutes did not recognize divorces a vinculo before 1917,
when Act 2710 became effective; and the present Civil Code
of the Philippines, in disregarding absolute divorces, in effect
merely reverted to the policies on the subject prevailing before
Act 2710. The rulings, therefore, under the Civil Code of 1889,
prior to the Act above-mentioned, are now, fully applicable. Of
these, the decision in Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855, is of
particular interest. Said this Court in that case:
As the divorce granted by the French Court must be ignored, it
results that the marriage of Dr. Mory and Leona Castro,
celebrated in London in 1905, could not legalize their relations;
and the circumstance that they afterwards passed for husband
and wife in Switzerland until her death is wholly without legal
significance. The claims of the very children to participate in
the estate of Samuel Bishop must therefore be rejected. The
right to inherit is limited to legitimate, legitimated and
acknowledged natural children. The children of adulterous
relations are wholly excluded. The word descendants as
used in Article 941 of the Civil Code cannot be interpreted to
include illegitimates born of adulterous relations. (Emphasis
supplied)
Except for the fact that the successional rights of the children,
begotten from Vicentas marriage to Leo Moran after the
invalid divorce, are not involved in the case at bar,
the Gmur case is authority for the proposition that such union
is adulterous in this jurisdiction, and, therefore, justifies an
action for legal separation on the part of the innocent consort
of the first marriage, that stands undissolved in Philippine law.
In not so declaring, the trial court committed error.
True it is that our ruling gives rise to anomalous situations
where the status of a person (whether divorced or not) would
depend on the territory where the question arises. Anomalies
of this kind are not new in the Philippines, and the answer to
them was given in Barretto vs. Gonzales, 58 Phil. 667:
The hardship of the existing divorce laws in the Philippine
Islands are well known to the members of the Legislature. It is
the duty of the Courts to enforce the laws of divorce as written
by Legislature if they are constitutional. Courts have no right to
say that such laws are too strict or too liberal. (p. 72)
The appellants first assignment of error is, therefore,
sustained.
However, the plaintiff-appellants charge that his wifes
parents, Dr. Mamerto Escao and his wife, the late Doa
Mena Escao, alienated the affections of their daughter and
influenced her conduct toward her husband are not supported
by credible evidence. The testimony of Pastor Tenchavez
about the Escaos animosity toward him strikes us to be
merely conjecture and exaggeration, and are belied by
Pastors own letters written before this suit was begun (Exh.
2-Escao and Vicenta, Rec. on App., pp. 270-274). In these
letters he expressly apologized to the defendants for
misjudging them and for the great unhappiness caused by
his impulsive blunders and sinful pride, effrontery and
audacity [sic]. Plaintiff was admitted to the Escao house to
visit and court Vicenta, and the record shows nothing to prove
that he would not have been accepted to marry Vicente had he
openly asked for her hand, as good manners and breeding
demanded. Even after learning of the clandestine marriage,
and despite their shock at such unexpected event, the parents
of Vicenta proposed and arranged that the marriage be
recelebrated in strict conformity with the canons of their
religion upon advice that the previous one was canonically
defective. If no recelebration of the marriage ceremony was
had it was not due to defendants Mamerto Escao and his
wife, but to the refusal of Vicenta to proceed with it. That the
spouses Escao did not seek to compel or induce their
daughter to assent to the recelebration but respected her
decision, or that they abided by her resolve, does not
constitute in law an alienation of affections. Neither does the
fact that Vicentas parents sent her money while she was in
the United States; for it was natural that they should not wish
their daughter to live in penury even if they did not concur in
her decision to divorce Tenchavez (27 Am. Jur. 130-132).
There is no evidence that the parents of Vicenta, out of
improper motives, aided and abetted her original suit for
annulment, or her subsequent divorce; she appears to have
acted independently, and being of age, she was entitled to
judge what was best for her and ask that her decisions be
respected. Her parents, in so doing, certainly cannot be
charged with alienation of affections in the absence of malice
or unworthy motives, which have not been shown, good faith
being always presumed until the contrary is proved.
SEC. 529. Liability of Parents, Guardians or Kin. The law
distinguishes between the right of a parent to interest himself
in the marital affairs of his child and the absence of rights in a
stranger to intermeddle in such affairs. However, such
distinction between the liability of parents and that of strangers
is only in regard to what will justify interference. A parent is
liable for alienation of affections resulting from his own
malicious conduct, as where he wrongfully entices his son or
daughter to leave his or her spouse, but he is not liable unless
he acts maliciously, without justification and from unworthy
motives. He is not liable where he acts and advises his child in
good faith with respect to his childs marital relations in the
interest of his child as he sees it, the marriage of his child not
terminating his right and liberty to interest himself in, and be
extremely solicitous for, his childs welfare and happiness,
even where his conduct and advice suggest or result in the
separation of the spouses or the obtaining of a divorce or
annulment, or where he acts under mistake or misinformation,
or where his advice or interference are indiscreet or
unfortunate, although it has been held that the parent is liable
for consequences resulting from recklessness. He may in
good faith take his child into his home and afford him or her
protection and support, so long as he has not maliciously
enticed his child away, or does not maliciously entice or cause
him or her to stay away, from his or her spouse. This rule has
more frequently been applied in the case of advice given to a
married daughter, but it is equally applicable in the case of
advice given to a son.
Plaintiff Tenchavez, in falsely charging Vicentas aged parents
with racial or social discrimination and with having exerted
efforts and pressured her to seek annulment and divorce,
unquestionably caused them unrest and anxiety, entitling them
to recover damages. While this suit may not have been
impelled by actual malice, the charges were certainly reckless
in the face of the proven facts and circumstances. Court
actions are not established for parties to give vent to their
prejudices or spleen.
In the assessment of the moral damages recoverable by
appellant Pastor Tenchavez from defendant Vicente Escao, it
is proper to take into account, against his patently
unreasonable claim for a million pesos in damages, that (a)
the marriage was celebrated in secret, and its failure was not
characterized by publicity or undue humiliation on appellants
part; (b) that the parties never lived together; and (c) that there
is evidence that appellant had originally agreed to the
annulment of the marriage, although such a promise was
legally invalid, being against public policy (cf. Art. 88, Civ.
Code). While appellant is unable to remarry under our law, this
fact is a consequence of the indissoluble character of the
union that appellant entered into voluntarily and with open
eyes rather than of her divorce and her second marriage. All
told, we are of the opinion that appellant should recover
P25,000 only by way of moral damages and attorneys fees.
With regard to the P45,000 damages awarded to the
defendants, Dr. Mamerto Escao and Mena Escao, by the
court below, we opine that the same are excessive. While the
filing of this unfounded suit must have wounded said
defendants feelings and caused them anxiety, the same could
in no way have seriously injured their reputation, or otherwise
prejudiced them, lawsuits having become a common
occurrence in present society. What is important, and has
been correctly established in the decision of the court below, is
that said defendants were not guilty of any improper conduct in
the whole deplorable affair. This Court, therefore, reduces the
damages awarded to P5,000 only.
Summing up, the Court rules:
(1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and
decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil Code (Rep. Act
386), is not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction;
and neither is the marriage contracted with another party by
the divorced consort, subsequently to the foreign decree of
divorce, entitled to validity in the country;
(2) That the remarriage of divorced wife and her co-habitation
with a person other than the lawful husband entitle the latter to
a decree of legal separation conformably to Philippine law;
(3) That the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce
decree by one consort entitles the other to recover damages;
(4) That an action for alienation of affections against the
parents of one consort does not lie in the absence of proof of
malice or unworthy motives on their part.
WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified
as follows;
(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a
decree of legal separation from defendant Vicenta F. Escao;
(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escao to pay
plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez the amount of P25,000 for
damages and attorneys fees;
(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the
appellee, Mamerto Escao and the estate of his wife, the
deceased Mena Escao, P5,000 by way of damages and
attorneys fees.
Neither party to recover costs.


G.R. No. 178551 October 11, 2010
ATCI OVERSEAS CORPORATION, AMALIA G. IKDAL
and MINISTRY OF PUBLIC HEALTH-
KUWAIT Petitioners,
vs.
MA. JOSEFA ECHIN, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J .:
Josefina Echin (respondent) was hired by petitioner ATCI
Overseas Corporation in behalf of its principal-co-
petitioner, the Ministry of Public Health of Kuwait (the
Ministry), for the position of medical technologist under a
two-year contract, denominated as a Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA), with a monthly salary of
US$1,200.00.
Under the MOA,
1
all newly-hired employees undergo a
probationary period of one (1) year and are covered by
Kuwaits Civil Service Board Employment Contract No. 2.
Respondent was deployed on February 17, 2000 but was
terminated from employment on February 11, 2001, she
not having allegedly passed the probationary period.
As the Ministry denied respondents request for
reconsideration, she returned to the Philippines on March
17, 2001, shouldering her own air fare.
On July 27, 2001, respondent filed with the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a complaint
2
for
illegal dismissal against petitioner ATCI as the local
recruitment agency, represented by petitioner, Amalia
Ikdal (Ikdal), and the Ministry, as the foreign principal.
By Decision
3
of November 29, 2002, the Labor Arbiter,
finding that petitioners neither showed that there was just
cause to warrant respondents dismissal nor that she
failed to qualify as a regular employee, held that
respondent was illegally dismissed and accordingly
ordered petitioners to pay her US$3,600.00, representing
her salary for the three months unexpired portion of her
contract.
On appeal of petitioners ATCI and Ikdal, the NLRC
affirmed the Labor Arbiters decision by
Resolution
4
of January 26, 2004. Petitioners motion for
reconsideration having been denied by Resolution
5
of
April 22, 2004, they appealed to the Court of Appeals,
contending that their principal, the Ministry, being a
foreign government agency, is immune from suit and, as
such, the immunity extended to them; and that
respondent was validly dismissed for her failure to meet
the performance rating within the one-year period as
required under Kuwaits Civil Service Laws. Petitioners
further contended that Ikdal should not be liable as an
officer of petitioner ATCI.
By Decision
6
of March 30, 2007, the appellate court
affirmed the NLRC Resolution.
In brushing aside petitioners contention that they only
acted as agent of the Ministry and that they cannot be
held jointly and solidarily liable with it, the appellate court
noted that under the law, a private employment agency
shall assume all responsibilities for the implementation of
the contract of employment of an overseas worker,
hence, it can be sued jointly and severally with the
foreign principal for any violation of the recruitment
agreement or contract of employment.
As to Ikdals liability, the appellate court held that under
Sec. 10 of Republic Act No. 8042, the "Migrant and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995," corporate officers,
directors and partners of a recruitment agency may
themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the
recruitment agency for money claims and damages
awarded to overseas workers.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration having been
denied by the appellate court by Resolution
7
of June 27,
2007, the present petition for review on certiorari was
filed.
Petitioners maintain that they should not be held liable
because respondents employment contract specifically
stipulates that her employment shall be governed by the
Civil Service Law and Regulations of Kuwait. They thus
conclude that it was patent error for the labor tribunals
and the appellate court to apply the Labor Code
provisions governing probationary employment in
deciding the present case.
Further, petitioners argue that even the Philippine
Overseas Employment Act (POEA) Rules relative to
master employment contracts (Part III, Sec. 2 of the
POEA Rules and Regulations) accord respect to the
"customs, practices, company policies and labor laws
and legislation of the host country."
Finally, petitioners posit that assuming arguendo that
Philippine labor laws are applicable, given that the
foreign principal is a government agency which is
immune from suit, as in fact it did not sign any document
agreeing to be held jointly and solidarily liable, petitioner
ATCI cannot likewise be held liable, more so since the
Ministrys liability had not been judicially determined as
jurisdiction was not acquired over it.
The petition fails.
Petitioner ATCI, as a private recruitment agency, cannot
evade responsibility for the money claims of Overseas
Filipino workers (OFWs) which it deploys abroad by the
mere expediency of claiming that its foreign principal is a
government agency clothed with immunity from suit, or
that such foreign principals liability must first be
established before it, as agent, can be held jointly and
solidarily liable.
In providing for the joint and solidary liability of private
recruitment agencies with their foreign principals,
Republic Act No. 8042 precisely affords the OFWs with a
recourse and assures them of immediate and sufficient
payment of what is due them. Skippers United Pacific v.
Maguad
8
explains:
. . . [T]he obligations covenanted in the recruitment
agreement entered into by and between the local
agent and its foreign principal are not coterminous
with the term of such agreement so that if either or
both of the parties decide to end the agreement, the
responsibilities of such parties towards the contracted
employees under the agreement do not at all end, but the
same extends up to and until the expiration of the
employment contracts of the employees recruited and
employed pursuant to the said recruitment
agreement. Otherwise, this will render nugatory the
very purpose for which the law governing the
employment of workers for foreign jobs abroad was
enacted. (emphasis supplied)
The imposition of joint and solidary liability is in line with
the policy of the state to protect and alleviate the plight of
the working class.
9
Verily, to allow petitioners to simply
invoke the immunity from suit of its foreign principal or to
wait for the judicial determination of the foreign principals
liability before petitioner can be held liable renders the
law on joint and solidary liability inutile.
As to petitioners contentions that Philippine labor laws
on probationary employment are not applicable since it
was expressly provided in respondents employment
contract, which she voluntarily entered into, that the
terms of her engagement shall be governed by prevailing
Kuwaiti Civil Service Laws and Regulations as in fact
POEA Rules accord respect to such rules, customs and
practices of the host country, the same was not
substantiated.
Indeed, a contract freely entered into is considered the
law between the parties who can establish stipulations,
clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem
convenient, including the laws which they wish to govern
their respective obligations, as long as they are not
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or
public policy.
It is hornbook principle, however, that the party invoking
the application of a foreign law has the burden of proving
the law, under the doctrine of processual presumption
which, in this case, petitioners failed to discharge. The
Courts ruling in EDI-Staffbuilders Intl., v.
NLRC
10
illuminates:
In the present case, the employment contract signed by
Gran specifically states that Saudi Labor Laws will
govern matters not provided for in the contract (e.g.
specific causes for termination, termination procedures,
etc.). Being the law intended by the parties (lex loci
intentiones) to apply to the contract, Saudi Labor Laws
should govern all matters relating to the termination of
the employment of Gran.
In international law, the party who wants to have a
foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of
proving the foreign law. The foreign law is treated as a
question of fact to be properly pleaded and proved as the
judge or labor arbiter cannot take judicial notice of a
foreign law. He is presumed to know only domestic or
forum law.
Unfortunately for petitioner, it did not prove the pertinent
Saudi laws on the matter; thus, the International Law
doctrine of presumed-identity approach or processual
presumptioncomes into play. Where a foreign law is not
pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the
presumption is that foreign law is the same as ours.
Thus, we apply Philippine labor laws in determining the
issues presented before us. (emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
The Philippines does not take judicial notice of foreign
laws, hence, they must not only be alleged; they must be
proven. To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must
present a copy thereof and comply with Sections 24 and
25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court which
reads:
SEC. 24. Proof of official record. The record of public
documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19,
when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by
an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the
officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his
deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the
Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the
custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a
foreign country, the certificate may be made by a
secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general,
consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in
the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept, and
authenticated by the seal of his office. (emphasis
supplied)
SEC. 25. What attestation of copy must state.
Whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for
the purpose of the evidence, the attestation must state, in
substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original,
or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The
attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting
officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court
having a seal, under the seal of such court.
To prove the Kuwaiti law, petitioners submitted the
following: MOA between respondent and the Ministry, as
represented by ATCI, which provides that the employee
is subject to a probationary period of one (1) year and
that the host countrys Civil Service Laws and
Regulations apply; a translated copy
11
(Arabic to English)
of the termination letter to respondent stating that she did
not pass the probation terms, without specifying the
grounds therefor, and a translated copy of the certificate
of termination,
12
both of which documents were certified
by Mr. Mustapha Alawi, Head of the Department of
Foreign Affairs-Office of Consular Affairs Inslamic
Certification and Translation Unit; and respondents
letter
13
of reconsideration to the Ministry, wherein she
noted that in her first eight (8) months of employment,
she was given a rating of "Excellent" albeit it changed
due to changes in her shift of work schedule.
These documents, whether taken singly or as a whole,
do not sufficiently prove that respondent was validly
terminated as a probationary employee under Kuwaiti
civil service laws. Instead of submitting a copy of the
pertinent Kuwaiti labor laws duly authenticated and
translated by Embassy officials thereat, as required
under the Rules, what petitioners submitted were
mere certifications attesting only to the correctness
of the translations of the MOA and the termination
letter which does not prove at all that Kuwaiti civil
service laws differ from Philippine laws and that
under such Kuwaiti laws, respondent was validly
terminated. Thus the subject certifications read:
x x x x
This is to certify that the herein attached translation/s
from Arabic to English/Tagalog and or vice versa
was/were presented to this Office for review and
certification and the same was/were found to be in
order. This Office, however, assumes no
responsibility as to the contents of the document/s.
This certification is being issued upon request of the
interested party for whatever legal purpose it may serve.
(emphasis supplied)1avvphi1
Respecting Ikdals joint and solidary liability as a
corporate officer, the same is in order too following the
express provision of R.A. 8042 on money claims, viz:
SEC. 10. Money Claims.Notwithstanding any provision
of law to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the
original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide,
within ninety (90) calendar days after the filing of the
complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-
employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract
involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment
including claims for actual moral, exemplary and other
forms of damages.
The liability of the principal/employer and the
recruitment/placement agency for any and all claims
under this section shall be joint and several. This
provision shall be incorporated in the contract for
overseas employment and shall be a condition precedent
for its approval. The performance bond to be filed by the
recruitment/placement agency, as provided by law, shall
be answerable for all money claims or damages that may
be awarded to the workers. If the recruitment/placement
agency is a juridical being, the corporate officers and
directors and partners as the case may be, shall
themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the
corporation or partnership for the aforesaid claims and
damages. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.


TUNA PROCESSING INC V PHIL. KINGFORD
G.R. No. 185582 (February 29, 2012)
PEREZ, J .:
FACTS:
Kanemitsu Yamaoka, co-patentee of a US
Patent, Philippine Letters Patent, and an
Indonesian Patent, entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA) with five Philippine tuna
processors including Respondent Philippine
Kingford, Inc. (KINGFORD). The MOA
provides for the enforcing of the
abovementioned patents, granting licenses
under the same, and collecting royalties, and
for the establishment of herein Petitioner Tuna
Processors, Inc. (TPI).
Due to a series of events not mentioned in the
Petition, the tuna processors, including
Respondent KINGFORD, withdrew from
Petitioner TPI and correspondingly reneged on
their obligations. Petitioner TPI submitted the
dispute for arbitration before the International
Centre for Dispute Resolution in the State of
California, United States and won the case
against Respondent KINGFORD.
To enforce the award, Petitioner TPI filed
a Petition for Confirmation, Recognition, and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Award before
the RTC of Makati City. Respondent
KINGFORD filed a Motion to Dismiss, which the
RTC denied for lack of merit. Respondent
KINGFORD then sought for the inhibition of
the RTC judge, Judge Alameda, and moved for
the reconsideration of the order denying the
Motion. Judge Alameda inhibited himself
notwithstanding [t]he unfounded allegations
and unsubstantiated assertions in the motion.
Judge Ruiz, to which the case was re-raffled, in
turn, granted Respondent KINGFORDSs Motion
for Reconsideration and dismissed the Petition on
the ground that Petitioner TPI lacked legal
capacity to sue in the Philippines. Petitioner
TPI is a corporation established in the State of
California and not licensed to do business in
the Philippines.
Hence, the present Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a foreign corporation not
licensed to do business in the Philippines, but
which collects royalties from entities in the
Philippines, sue here to enforce a foreign
arbitral award?
ARGUMENT:
Petitioner TPI contends that it is entitled to
seek for the recognition and enforcement of the
subject foreign arbitral award in accordance
with RA No. 9285 (Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of
2004), the Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards drafted
during the United Nations Conference on
International Commercial Arbitration in
1958 (New York Convention), and the UNCITRAL
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration
(Model Law), as none of these specifically
requires that the party seeking for the
enforcement should have legal capacity to sue.
RULING:
YES. Petitioner TPI, although not licensed to do
business in the Philippines, may seek
recognition and enforcement of the foreign
arbitral award in accordance with the
provisions of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of
2004. A foreign corporations capacity to sue in
the Philippines is not material insofar as the
recognition and enforcement of a foreign
arbitral award is concerned.
The Resolution of the RTC is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
Sec. 45 of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of
2004 provides that the opposing party in an
application for recognition and enforcement of
the arbitral award may raise only those
grounds that were enumerated under Article V
of the New York Convention, to wit:
Article V
1. Recognition and enforcement of the award
may be refused, at the request of the party
against whom it is invoked, only if that party
furnishes to the competent authority where the
recognition and enforcement is sought, proof
that:
a. The parties to the agreement referred to in
Article II were, under the law applicable to
them, under some incapacity, or the said
agreement is not valid under the law to which
the parties have subjected it or, failing any
indication thereon, under the law of the
country where the award was made;
b. The party against whom the award is invoked
was not given proper notice of the appointment
of the arbitrator or of the arbitration
proceedings or was otherwise unable to
present his case;
c. The award deals with a difference not
contemplated by or not falling within the terms
of the submission to arbitration, or it contains
decisions on matters beyond the scope of the
submission to arbitration, provided that, if the
decisions on matters submitted to arbitration
can be separated from those not so submitted,
that part of the award which contains decisions
on matters submitted to arbitration may be
recognized and enforced;
d. The composition of the arbitral authority or
the arbitral procedure was not in accordance
with the agreement of the parties, or, failing
such agreement, was not in accordance with
the law of the country where the arbitration
took place; or
e. The award has not yet become binding on the
parties, or has been set aside or suspended by a
competent authority of the country in which, or
under the law of which, that award was made.
2. Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral
award may also be refused if the competent
authority in the country where recognition and
enforcement is sought finds that:
a. The subject matter of the difference is not
capable of settlement by arbitration under the
law of that country; or
b. The recognition or enforcement of the award
would be contrary to the public policy of that
country.
Not one of the abovementioned exclusive
grounds touched on the capacity to sue of the
party seeking the recognition and enforcement
of the award.
Pertinent provisions of the Special Rules of Court
on Alternative Dispute Resolution, which was
promulgated by the Supreme Court, likewise
support this position.
Rule 13.1 of the Special Rules provides that [a]ny
party to a foreign arbitration may petition the
court to recognize and enforce a foreign
arbitral award. The contents of such petition
are enumerated in Rule 13.5. Capacity to sue is
not included. Oppositely, in the rule on local
arbitral awards or arbitrations in instances
where the place of arbitration is in the
Philippines, it is specifically required that a
petition to determine any question concerning
the existence, validity and enforceability of
such arbitration agreement available to the
parties before the commencement of
arbitration and/or a petition for judicial relief
from the ruling of the arbitral tribunal on a
preliminary question upholding or declining its
jurisdiction after arbitration has already
commenced should state [t]he facts showing
that the persons named as petitioner or
respondent have legal capacity to sue or be
sued.
Indeed, it is in the best interest of justice that
in the enforcement of a foreign arbitral
award, the Court deny availment by the
losing party of the rule that bars foreign
corporations not licensed to do business in the
Philippines from maintaining a suit in
Philippine courts. When a party enters into a
contract containing a foreign arbitration
clause and, as in this case, in fact submits
itself to arbitration, it becomes bound by the
contract, by the arbitration and by the result of
arbitration, conceding thereby the capacity of
the other party to enter into the contract,
participate in the arbitration and cause the
implementation of the result. Although not on
all fours with the instant case, also worthy to
consider is the wisdom of then Associate
Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero in her
Dissenting Opinion in Asset Privatization Trust v.
Court of Appeals [1998], to wit:
xxx Arbitration, as an alternative mode of
settlement, is gaining adherents in legal and
judicial circles here and abroad. If its tested
mechanism can simply be ignored by an
aggrieved party, one who, it must be stressed,
voluntarily and actively participated in the
arbitration proceedings from the very
beginning, it will destroy the very essence of
mutuality inherent in consensual contracts.
Clearly, on the matter of capacity to sue, a
foreign arbitral award should be respected not
because it is favored over domestic laws and
procedures, but because Republic Act No. 9285 has
certainly erased any conflict of law question.
Finally, even assuming, only for the sake of
argument, that the RTC correctly observed that
theModel Law, not the New York Convention,
governs the subject arbitral award, Petitioner
TPI may still seek recognition and enforcement
of the award in Philippine court, since the Model
Lawprescribes substantially identical exclusive
grounds for refusing recognition or
enforcement.


AMOS V BELLIS
Bellis vs Bellis
G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967

Lessons Applicable: Divorce, Doctrine of Processual
Presumption

Laws Applicable: Art. 16, 17 1039 NCC


Violet Kennedy (2
nd
wife) Amos G. Bellis --- Mary E. Mallen
(1
st
wife)
Legitimate Children: Legitimate
Children:
Edward A. Bellis Amos Bellis,
Jr.
George Bellis (pre-deceased) Maria
Cristina Bellis
Henry A. Bellis Miriam Palma
Bellis
Alexander Bellis
Anna Bellis Allsman

FACTS:
Amos G. Bellis, a citizen of the State of Texas and of
the United States.
By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he
had 5 legitimate children: Edward A. Bellis, George
Bellis (who pre-deceased him in infancy), Henry A.
Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman
By his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him,
he had 3 legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S.
Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had three
illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina
Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis
August 5, 1952: Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the
Philippines dividing his estate as follows:
1. $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen
2. P40,000.00 each to his 3 illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr.,
Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis
3. remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first
and second wives
July 8, 1958: Amos G. Bellis died a resident of Texas,
U.S.A
September 15, 1958: his will was admitted to probate in
the CFI of Manila on
People's Bank and Trust Company as executor of the
will did as the will directed
Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their
respective oppositions on the ground that they were
deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children
Probate Court: Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it
applied the national law of the decedent, which in
this case is Texas law, which did not provide for
legitimes.
ISSUE: W/N Texas laws or national law of Amos should govern
the intrinsic validity of the will

HELD: YES. Order of the probate court is hereby affirmed
Doctrine of Processual Presumption:
The foreign law, whenever applicable, should be proved
by the proponent thereof, otherwise, such law shall be
presumed to be exactly the same as the law of the
forum.
In the absence of proof as to the conflict of law rule of
Texas, it should not be presumed different from ours.
Apply Philippine laws.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code,
render applicable the national law of the decedent, in
intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to
four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount
of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the
provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed.
They provide that
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is
subject to the law of the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with
respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary
provisions, shall beregulated by the national law of the person
whose succession is under consideration, whatever may he
the nature of the property and regardless of the country
wherein said property may be found.
ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the
law of the nation of the decedent.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis,
was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that
under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or
legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the
provision of the will and the amount of successional
rights are to be determined under Texas law,
the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the
testacy of Amos G. Bellis.


RAYTHEON V. ROUZIE
(2008)
[ G.R. No. 162894, February 26, 2008 ]
FACTS:
Sometime in 1990, Brand Marine Services, Inc., a corporation
duly organized and existing under the laws of the State of
Connecticut, United States of America, and respondent Stockton W.
Rouzie, Jr., an American citizen, entered into a contract whereby
BMSI hired respondent as its representative to negotiate the sale of
services in several government projects in the Philippines for an
agreed remuneration of 10% of the gross receipts. On 11 March
1992, respondent secured a service contract with the Republic of
the Philippines on behalf of BMSI for the dredging of rivers affected
by the Mt. Pinatubo eruption and mudflows.

On 16 July 1994, respondent filed before the Arbitration
Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission, a suit against
BMSI and Rust International, Inc., Rodney C. Gilbert and Walter G.
Browning for alleged nonpayment of commissions, illegal
termination and breach of employment contract.
On 8 January 1999, respondent, then a resident of La Union,
instituted an action for damages before the Regional Trial Court of
Bauang, La Union. The Complaint named as defendants herein
petitioner Raytheon International, Inc. as well as BMSI and RUST,
the two corporations impleaded in the earlier labor case.
Petitioner also referred to the NLRC decision which disclosed
that per the written agreement between respondent and BMSI and
RUST, denominated as Special Sales Representative Agreement,
the rights and obligations of the parties shall be governed by the
laws of the State of Connecticut. Petitioner sought the dismissal of
the complaint on grounds of failure to state a cause of action and
forum non conveniens and prayed for damages by way of
compulsory counterclaim.
Petitioner asserts that the written contract between
respondent and BMSI included a valid choice of law clause, that is,
that the contract shall be governed by the laws of the State of
Connecticut. It also mentions the presence of foreign elements in
the dispute namely, the parties and witnesses involved are
American corporations and citizens and the evidence to be
presented is located outside the Philippines that renders our local
courts inconvenient forums.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE COMPLAINT BE DISMISSED ON THE
GROUND OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS?
RULING:
On the matter of jurisdiction over a conflicts-of-laws problem
where the case is filed in a Philippine court and where the court has
jurisdiction over the subject matter, the parties and the res, it may
or can proceed to try the case even if the rules of conflict-of-laws or
the convenience of the parties point to a foreign forum. This is an
exercise of sovereign prerogative of the country where the case is
filed.

As regards jurisdiction over the parties, the trial court acquired
jurisdiction over herein respondent (as party plaintiff) upon the
filing of the complaint. On the other hand, jurisdiction over the
person of petitioner (as party defendant) was acquired by its
voluntary appearance in court.
That the subject contract included a stipulation that the same
shall be governed by the laws of the State of Connecticut does not
suggest that the Philippine courts, or any other foreign tribunal for
that matter, are precluded from hearing the civil action. Jurisdiction
and choice of law are two distinct concepts. Jurisdiction considers
whether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this state; choice
of law asks the further question whether the application of a
substantive law which will determine the merits of the case is fair to
both parties.The choice of law stipulation will become relevant only
when the substantive issues of the instant case develop, that is,
after hearing on the merits proceeds before the trial court.

Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a court, in
conflicts-of-laws cases, may refuse impositions on its jurisdiction
where it is not the most convenient or available forum and the
parties are not precluded from seeking remedies elsewhere.
Petitioners averments of the foreign elements in the instant case
are not sufficient to oust the trial court of its jurisdiction over Civil
Case No. No. 1192-BG and the parties involved.

Moreover, the propriety of dismissing a case based on the
principle of forum non conveniens requires a factual determination;
hence, it is more properly considered as a matter of defense. While
it is within the discretion of the trial court to abstain from assuming
jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so only after vital facts are
established, to determine whether special circumstances require
the courts desistance.



Tamano v.Judge Ortiz, G.R. No. 126603, June 29,
1998
FACTS: Sen. Tamano and Zorayda Tamano married in civil rites.
Before Sen. Tamano died, he married Estrellita in civil rites too. A
year after Sen. Tamanos death, Zorayda and her son filed a
complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage of her husband and
Estrellita on the ground that it was bigamous. Zorayda further
claimed that her husband claimed to be divorces and Estrellita as
single, hence, their marriage was fraudulent. Estrellita filed a
motion to dismiss alleging that QC RTC has no jurisdiction because
only a party to a marriage could file an action for annulment against
the other spouse. Estrellita also contended that since Tamano and
Zorayda were both Muslims and married in Muslim rites, the
jurisdiction to hear and try the case is vested in Sharia courts
pursuant to Art 155 of Code of Muslim. RTC denied the petition and
ruled it has jurisdiction since Estrellita and Tamano were married in
accordance with the Civil Code. Motion for reconsideration was also
denied. Petitioner referred to SC which ruled that it should be
referred to CA first. The CA ruled that the case would fall under the
exclusive jurisdiction of sharia courts only when filed in places
where there are sharia courts. But in places where there are no
sharia courts, the instant petition could be at RTC. Hence, this
petition.

ISSUE: W/N Sharia courts and not the RTC has jurisdiction over the
subject case and the nature of action.

HELD: SC held that RTC has jurisdiction over all actions involving the
contract of marriage and marital relations. In this case, both
petitioner and the deceased were married through a civil wedding.
And whether or not they were likewise married in a Muslim
wedding, sharia courts are still not vested with original jurisdiction
over marriages married under civil and Muslim law.



LLAVE v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 169766
Facts:
Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamano married Estrellita
twice initially under the Islamic laws and tradition on May 27,
1993 in Cotabato City and, subsequently, under a civil ceremony
officiated by an RTC Judge at Malabang, Lanao del Sur on June 2,
1993. In their marriage contracts, Sen.Tamanos civil status was
indicated as divorced. Since then, Estrellita has been representing
herself to the whole world as Sen. Tamanos wife, and upon his
death, his widow.On November 23, 1994, private respondents Haja
Putri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) and her son Adib Ahmad A.
Tamano (Adib), in their own behalf and in behalf of the rest of Sen.
Tamanos legitimate children with Zorayda, filed a complaint with
the RTC of Quezon City for the declaration of nullity of marriage
between Estrellita andSen. Tamano for being bigamous. The
complaint alleged that Sen. Tamano married Zorayda on May
31,1958 under civil rites, and that this marriage remained subsisting
when he married Estrellita in 1993.

Issue:
Whether or not the marriage between Estrellita and the late Sen.
Tamano was bigamous.

Held:
Yes. The civil code governs the marriage of Zorayda and late Sen.
Tamano; their marriage was never invalidated by PD 1083. Sen.
Tamanos subsequent marriage to Estrellita is void ab initio.

Ratio:
The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was
celebrated in 1958, solemnized under civil and Muslim rites. The
only law in force governing marriage relationships between Muslims
and non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950, under the
provisions of which only one marriage can exist at any given time.
Under the marriage provisions of the Civil Code, divorce is not
recognized except during the effectivity of Republic Act No. 394
which was not availed of during its effectivity. As far as Estrellita is
concerned, Sen. Tamanos prior marriage to Zorayda has been
severed by way of divorce under PD 1083, the law that codified
Muslim personal laws. However, PD 1083 cannot benefit Estrellita.
Firstly, Article 13(1) thereof provides that the law applies to
marriage and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or
wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is
solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part
of the Philippines.But Article 13 of PD 1083 does not provide for a
situation where the parties were married both in civil and Muslim
rites.

Ruling:
The petition is DENIED


ATTY. MARIETTA D. ZAMORANOS v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 193902. June 1, 2011

Facts:
This is a case for divorce filed by the herein complainant Marietta D. Zamoranos de
Guzman against her husband, the herein respondent, on the ground that the wife,
herein complainant, was previously given by her husband the authority to exercise
Talaq, as provided for and, in accordance with Presidential Decree No. 1083,
otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines. When
this case was called for hearing both parties appeared and herein respondent,
Jesus de Guzman interposes no objection to confirm their divorce, which they
have freely entered into on December 18, 1983. This Court, after evaluating the
testimonies of the herein parties is fully convinced that both the complainant and
the respondent have been duly converted to the faith of Islam prior to their
Muslim wedding and finding that there is no more possibility of reconciliation by
and between them, hereby issues this decree of divorce. The allegation to the
effect that his marriage with Zamoranos on December 28, 1992 is a bigamous
marriage due to the alleged subsisting previous marriage between Zamoranos and
Jesus deGuzman is misplaced. The previous marriage between Jesus de Guzman
and Zamoranos has long been terminated [and] has gone with the wind. The fact
that divorce by Talaq was enteredinto by Zamoranos and her first husband in
accordance with PD 1083, their marriage is dissolved and consequently thereof,
Zamoranos and Jesus de Guzman can re-marry. Moreover,the second marriage
entered into by Zamoranos and her first husband Jesus de Guzman under the
Family Code on July 30, 1982 is merely ceremonial, being unnecessary, it does not
modify/alter or change the validity of the first marriage entered into by them
under PD 1083.
Issues:
Whether or not a divorce decree under Muslim law gives the spouses the right to
remarry.

Held:
Yes. Since the parties are both converted to the faith of Islam prior to their Muslim
wedding, then they are covered by the Muslim code or Muslim law. The spouses
who had divorce under such law is entitled to remarry other person.
Ratio:
If both parties are Muslims, there is a presumption that the Muslim Code or
Muslim lawis complied with. If together with it or in addition to it, the marriage is
likewise solemnized in accordance with the Civil Code of the Philippines, in a so-
called combined Muslim-Civil marriage rites whichever comes first is the validating
rite and the second rite is merelyceremonial one. But, in this case, as long as both
parties are Muslims, this Muslim Code will apply. In effect, two situations will arise,
in the application of this Muslim Code or Muslim law, that is, when both parties are
Muslims and when the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in
accordance with Muslim Code or Muslim law. A third situation occurs when
theCivil Code of the Philippines will govern the marriage and divorce of the parties,
if the maleparty is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with the
Civil Code.Moreover, the two experts, in the same book, unequivocally state that
one of the effectsof irrevocable talaq, as well as other kinds of divorce, refers to
severance of matrimonial bond,entitling one to remarry.It stands to reason
therefore that Zamoranos divorce from De Guzman, as confirmed by
an Ustadz and Judge Jainul of the Sharia Circuit Court, and attested
to by Judge Usman, was valid, and, thus, entitled her to remarry Pacasum in
1989. Consequently, the RTC, Branch 6,Iligan City, is without jurisdiction to try
Zamoranos for the crime of Bigamy.
Ruling:

The petition is GRANTED



G.R. No. L 16439 July 20, 1961
ANTONIO GELUZ, Petitioner
Vs.
The Honorable Court of Appeals and Oscar Lazo, Respondents


FACTS:
Petition for certiorari brings up for review whether the husband
whose wife voluntarily aborted their child without his consent could
recover damages from the physician who performed the abortion.
The Court of Appeals sustained the decision of the lower court in
favour of the plaintiff, ordering the defendant to pay damages and
attorneys fees.

The husband, Oscar Lazo, impregnated his wife, Nita Villanueva
before they were legally married. Desiring to conceal her pregnancy
from her parent, she aborted the fetus performed by the physician,
Antonio Geluz. After her marriage, she again became pregnant and
had herself aborted by Geluz as she was at that time employed in
Comelec and her pregnancy proved to be inconvenient. Less than 2
years later, she again became pregnant and was again aborted of a
two-month old fetus by Geluz. The husband did not know of or gave
consent to the abortion.

Issues

Is an unborn child covered with personality so that if the unborn
child incurs injury, his parents may recover damages from the ones
who caused the damage to the unborn child?

Decision

The decision of the lower court as sustained by the Court of Appeals
is reversed and the complaint was ordered dismissed without legal
costs. Furthermore, the Court ordered that the Department of
Justice and Board of Examiners be furnished of the Decision for
their information and investigation and action as the facts may
warrant.

Reasons

Although personality begins at conception, called provisional
personality, it is essential that the child should be subsequently
born alive. In this case, the fetus was preterminated and is
considered as never having possessed legal personality under
Article 40 of the Civil Code.

Since action for pecuniary damages on account of injury or death
pertains to the one injured, which is the unborn child, which has no
legal personality, it is easy to see that no action for damages could
be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account of injuries it
received.




Quimiguing vs Icao
TI TLE: Quimiguing vs I cao
CI TATI ON: 34 SCRA 132

FACTS:

Carmen Quimiguing, the petitioner, and Felix Icao, the
defendant, were neighbors in Dapitan City and had close and
confidential relations. Despite the fact that Icao was married,
he succeeded to have carnal intercourse with plaintiff several
times under force and intimidation and without her consent.
As a result, Carmen became pregnantdespite drugs supplied by
defendant and as a consequence, Carmen stopped studying.
Plaintiff claimed for support at P120 per month, damages and
attorneys fees. The complaint was dismissed by the lower
court in Zamboanga del Norte on the ground lack of cause of
action. Plaintiff moved to amend the complaint that as a result
of the intercourse, she gave birth to a baby girl but the court
ruled that no amendment was allowable since the original
complaint averred no cause of action.

ISSUE: Whether plaintiff has a right to claim damages.

HELD:

Supreme Court held that a conceive child, although as yet
unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its own for
all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40
of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The conceive child may
also receive donations and be accepted by those persons who
will legally represent them if they were already born as
prescribed in Article 742.

Lower courts theory on article 291 of the civil
code declaring that support is an obligation of parents and
illegitimate children does not contemplate support to children
as yet unborn violates article 40 aforementioned.

Another reason for reversal of the order is that Icao being
a married man forced a woman not his wife to yield to his lust
and this constitutes a clear violation of Carmens rights. Thus,
she is entitled to claim compensation for the damage caused.

WHEREFORE, the orders under appeal are reversed
and set aside. Let the case be remanded to the court of origin
for further proceedings conformable to this decision. Costs
against appellee Felix Icao. So ordered.


De Jesus v. Syquia, 58
Phil. 866
DE JESUS v. SYQUIA, 58 Phil 866 (1933)
FACTS: Cesar Syquia courted Antonia de Jesus
who was 20 years old. Amorous relations resulted in
de Jesus giving birth to a baby boy on June 17,
1931. They lived together for one year until Antonio
got pregnant again after which Cesar left to marry
another woman. Cesar recognized his paternity of
first child in writing with a letter to the priest and
uninterrupted possession of natural child status for
one year Woman files for action for damages for
breach of promise and recognition of the child.
ISSUE: WON Antonia is entitled to damages for
breach of promise to marry and kids to paternal
support
HELD: Promise to marry not satisfactorily proved
so the trial court was right in refusing to grant De
Jesus' prayer. Also, action for breach of promise to
marry has no standing for civil law, apart from the
right to recover money or property advanced by the
plaintiff upon the faith of such promise. This case
exhibits none of the features necessary to maintain
such action. Antonia de Jesus only entitled to the
support of the first child because of Cesar's prior
recognition. No support for the second child
because no proof of paternity or recognition
presented.


Continental Steel v. Montano, G.R. No.
182836, October 13, 2009
FACTS: Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel, filed
a claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death
and Accident Insurance for dependent, pursuant to the CBA. The
claim was for Hortillanos unborn child who died. Hortillanos wife had
a premature delivery while she was on her 38
th
week of pregnancy.
The female fetus died during the labor. The company granted
Hortillanos claim for paternity leave but denied his claims for
bereavement leave and death benefits. Hortillano claimed that the
provision in CBS did not specifically state that the dependent should
have first been born alive or must have acquired juridical personality.
Petitioner argued that the said provision of CBA did not contemplate
death of an unborn child or a fetus without legal personality. They
also claimed that there are two elements for the entitlement of the
benefit: 1) death; and 2) status of legitimate dependent. None which
existed in Hortillanos case. They further contend that the only one
with civil personality could die, based on Art 40-42 of Civil Code.
Hence, according to petitioner, the unborn child never died. Labor
Arbiter Montana argued that the fetus had the right to be supported
by the parents from the very moment he/she was conceived.
Petitioner appealed to CA but CA affirmed Labor Arbiters decision.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: W/N only one with juridical personality can die.
HELD: No. The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41 and
42 of the Civil Code for the legaldefinition of death is misplaced.
Article 40 provides that a conceived child acquires personality only
when it is born, and Article 41 defines when a child is considered
born. Article 42 plainly states that civil personality is extinguished by
death. The issue of civil personality is irrelevant in this case. Arts 40-
42 do not provide at all definition of death. Life is not synonymous to
civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before
s/he could die. The Constitution in fact recognizes the life of the
unborn from conception.

ISSUE: W/N a fetus can be considered as a dependent.
HELD: Yes. Even an unborn child is a dependent of its parents. The fetus
would have not reached 38-39 weeks without depending upon its mother.