Oxford Respondent

-MEMORANDUM for theRESPONDENT-
220R

THE UNIVERSAL FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION COURT

IN

THE UNIVERSAL COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS

THE 2014 MONROE E.PRICE MEDIA LAW MOOT COURT COMPETITION

SANG& CENTIPLEX.
(APPLICANTS)

V.

REPUBLIC OF MHUGAN
(RESPONDENT)

CASE CONCERNING RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE UNIVERSAL
DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

MEMORIAL FOR THE RESPONDENT
4984 WORDS


TABLEOFCONTENTS

LIST OF ABBREVIATION__________________________________________________
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES________________________________________________
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS _______________________________________
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION __________________________________________
QUESTIONS PRESENTED__________________________________________________
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS_____________________________________________
ARGUMENTS_____________________________________________________________
A. THE DAMAGES IMPOSED ON SANG ARE NOT CONSISTENT WITH THE
PROVISIONS OF UDHR__________________________________________________
I. The damages restrict Article 19,UDHR____________________________________
II. The damages impose a restriction on Article 20, UDHR_______________________
III. The damages impose a restriction on Article 17, UDHR_______________________
IV. The damages are not permissible under Article 29, UDHR_____________________
V. The dissemination does not violate the Wiretap Act and Article 12,
UDHR________
VI. Right to receive and disseminate information is protected under international
law___
B. THE REQUIREMENT TO DISCLOSE THE SOURCE OF THE RECORDED
VOICEMAIL IS NOT CONSISTENT WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE
UDHR_______________
I. The article imposes a restriction on Article 19, UDHR_________________________
II. The requirement indirectly affects the right of association under Article 20, UDHR___


III. The requirement contravenes Article 12, UDHR______________________________
IV. The requirement is not permissible under Article 29(2), UDHR__________________
C. THE FINDING OF THE COURT THAT THE IMPUGNED INFORMATION SHALL
NOT APPEAR ON THE FIRST PAGE OF THE SEARCH RESULTS OUGHT TO
BE SET ASIDE_________________________________________________________
I. The requirement restricts scope of Article 19,UDHR__________________________
II. The requirement violates Article 20,UDHR_________________________________
III. The requirement contravenes Article 17, UDHR_____________________________
IV. The requirement is impermissible under Article 29(2), UDHR__________________

D. THE PROVSIONS OF THE 2013 SEARCH PRIVACY ACT ARE INCONSISTENT
WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE UDHR__________________________________
I. ROM cannot demand restriction on the disclosure of the search queries without
violating Article 19 of the UDHR________________________________________
II. The requirement is impermissible under Article 29 (2), UDHR__________________
III. Requirement restricts Article 8, UDHR____________________________________


LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Paragraph
AfCHR African Convention on Human and Peoples Rights
ACtHPR African Court of Human and Peoples Rights
ACHR American Convention on Human Rights
AIR All India Reporter
App no Application Number
Art Article
cf Confer from
cl Clause
EC European Council
EU European Union
ECHR European Convention on Human Rights
ECtHR European Court of Human Rights
ECmHr European Commission of Human Rights
EHRR European Human Rights Reports
SPA Search Privacy Act


HRC Human Rights Committee
IACHR Inter American Court of Human Rights
ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
Prin Principle
ROM Republic of Mhugan
s Section
UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights


LIST OF AUTHORITIES

ARTICLES AND JOURNALS
Warren Francke, The Evolving Watchdog:The Medias Role in Government
Ethics(The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science1995 )

Principles for Ethicals Journalism< http://www.caj.ca/?p=1785> accessed 5
October 2013.

Legal definition < http://www.wisegeek.com/what-is-an-unlawful-act.htm>
accessed 5 October 2013

Law Media, Definition of Media Law And Ethics < http://media-
laws.blogspot.in/2011/06/definition-of-media-law-and-ethics.html> accessed
5 October 2013

Censorship < http://mashable.com/category/censorship/> accessed 5 October
2013.

Manner of collection of personal information (principle four) <
http://privacy.org.nz/the-privacy-act-and-codes/privacy-principles/manner-
of-collection-of-personal-information-principle-four/> accessed 5 October
2013


Public Order<http://www.usip.org/guiding-principles-stabilization-and-
reconstruction-the-web-version/7-rule-law/public-order> accessed 4 October
2013

Domestic Violence<http://legal-
dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Spousal+abuse> accessed 6 October 2013

What is negative publicity <http://www.prsawestdist.org/what-is-negative-
publicity-and-how-to-turn-it-into-a-good-thing.php> accessed 4 October
2013

Ferdinand D Schoeman, Privacy and Social Freedom (Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge 1992) 115

Electronic Privacy Information Centre, Data Retention<
http://www.epic.org/ privacy/intl/data_retention.html> accessed 8 October
2013.

Daniel J Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, (2006) 154 U Pa L Rev 477
Susan Freiwald, Uncertain Privacy: Communication Attributes After the
Digital Telephony Act, 69 S Cal L Rev 949 (1996).

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD
Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal
Data
<http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,3343,en_2649_201185_1815186_1_1_
1_1,00.html> accessed 3 October 2013.


Electronic Privacy Information System, Records, Computers and the Rights
of Citizens Report of the Secretary's Advisory Committee on Automated
Personal Data Systems, July 1973
<http://www.epic.org/privacy/hew1973report> accessed 1 October 2013.

Reasonable Expectation of Privacy<http://legal-
dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Reasonable+expectation+of+privacy>

Allegra Knopf, Privacy and the Internet: Welcome to the Orwellian World
(1999-2000) 11 U Fla J L & Pub Poly 79, 82; Catherine Crump, Data
Retention: Privacy, Anonymity and Accountability Online (2003) 56
Stanford Law Review 191.

Legal protection for Journalistic Sources.<
http://www.splc.org/knowyourrights/legalresearch.asp?id=31> accessed 5
October 2013

Mark dueze, What is journalism?Professional identity and ideology of
journalists reconsidered <http://jou.sagepub.com/content/6/4/442.abstract>
accessed 9 October 2013.

BBC News UK politics, Government considers 'right to know' on domestic abuse <
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-1544457>>ax6> accessed 16
September 2013

Privacy and freedom from state


intrusion<http://www.indexoncensorship.org/2013/07/privacy-and-freedom-
from-state-intrusion/> accessed 9 October 2013
Freedom from suspicion: Principles to protect freedom of expression and
privacy against mass surveillance<
http://www.article19.org/resources.php/resource/37186/en/freedom-from-
suspicion:-principles-to-protect-freedom-of-expression-and-privacy-against-
mass-surveillance#sthash.L4Ui70RS.dpuf> accessed 9 October 2013

Public Order< http://arc.gov.in/speechcpr.htm> accessed 9 October 2013
The substance of the right to effective judicial protection against violation of
social rights <
http://www.cidh.oas.org/countryrep/accesodesc07eng/accesodescv.eng.htm>

African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights, Resolution on the
Adoption of the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression in
Africa (2002) Res. 62(XXXII)02, Principle XV

CASES OF THE AFRICAN COURT OF HUMAN AND PEOPLES
RIGHTS
Referred to in:


Media Rights Agenda and Others v Nigeria Commnos 2, 23
105/93, 128/94,130/94 and 152/96 (1998) (ACHPR)
Kenneth Good v. Republic of Botswana 313/05 (ACHPR 26 May 2010)

CASES OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Referred to in:
Stoll v Switzerland App no 69698/01 (ECtHR 10 December 2007).
BladetTroms and Stensaas v Norway [GC] App no 21980/93 (ECHR
20 May 1999) 65
Erdodu and nce v. Turkey App. no 25067/94, 25068/94 (ECHR 8 July 1999)
The Sunday Times v United Kingdom App no 6538/74 (ECHR 26April 1979)
BladetTromsTroms AndStensaas V. NorwayApp No. 21980/93 (ECtHR20
May 1999)
Tammer v Estonia App no 41205/98 (ECHR 6 February 2001)
Jersild v Denmark App no 15980/8 (ECHR 23 September 1994)
Hachette Filipacchi Associes v France App no 71111/01( ECHR 14 June
2007)


Handyside v United Kingdom App no 5493/72( ECHR 7 December 1976)
Klass and Others v Germany App no 5029/71(EHRR 6 September 1978)
Chauvy and Others v. France App no 64915/01( ECHR 26 June 2004)
Karhuvaara and Iltalehti v Finland App no 53678/00 (ECHR 16 November
2004)

KU v Finland App no 2872/02 (ECtHR 2 March 2009
Gaweda v Poland App no 26229/95 (ECtHR, 14 March 2002).

Flux v Moldova (No. 6) App no 22824/04 (ECHR 29 July 2008)
Tara and Poiata v Moldova App no 36305/03 ECHR 16 October 2007)
RumyanaIvanova v Bulgaria (App no 36207/03) ECHR 14 February 2008
Worm v Austria (1997) 25 EHRR 454.
Hinczewski v Poland App no 34907/05 (ECtHR, 5 October 2010).
Silver and Others v United Kingdom Application no. 5947/72 (25
March 1983);
The Sunday Times v United Kingdom App no 13166/87 (ECtHR, 26 November
1991);


Rekvnyi v Hungary App no 25390/94 (ECtHR, 20 May 1999);
Gaweda v Poland App no 26229/95 (ECtHR, 14 March 2002).
Rekvnyi v Hungary App no 25390/94 (ECtHR, 20 May 1999).
Kruslin v France App no. 11801/85(ECHR 24 April 1990);
Huvig v France App No. 11105/84,( ECHR 24 April 1990)
Burghartz v Switzerland (1994) 18 EHRR 101;
Von Hannover v Germany (2005) 40 EHRR 1
Schssel v Austria App no 42409/98 (ECtHR 21 February 2002)
Nebraska Press Association v Stuart427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976)
PG and JH v United Kingdom App no 44787/98 (ECtHR, 25 September 2001);
Peck v United Kingdom (2003) 36 EHRR 41
New York Times Co v Sullivan 376 US 254 (1964);
Lingens v Austria App no 9815/82 (ECtHR, 8 July 1986);
Friedl v Austria 15225/89 (ECHR 31 January 1995);
PG and JH v United Kingdom App no 44787/98 (ECtHR, 25 September 2001);
Peck v United Kingdom (2003) 36 EHRR 41;
Mirror Group Newspapers v United KingdomApp no 39401/04 (ECtHR,


18 January 2011).
X and Y v Netherlands App no. 8978/80.(ECHR 26 March 1985)
ETK v News Group Newspapers [2011] EWCA Civ 439.
Campmany y Diez de Revenga and Lopez GaliachoPerona v Spain App no
54224/00
(ECtHR, 12 December 2000);
Julio BouGibert and El Hogar Y La Moda J.A. v Spain App no 14929/02
(ECtHR,
13 May 2003);
Leempoel v Belgium App no 64772/01 (ECtHR, 9 November 2006);

Mosley v UnitedKingdom App no 48009/08 (ECtHR, 10 May 2011).
Groppera Radio AG and Others v. Switzerland, App. No. 10890/84(ECtHR
28 March 1990)
HRH Princess of Wales v MGN Newspapers App no13069/97 (ECtHR, 11
December 2003);


Hachette Filipacchi Associs v France App no 71111/01 (ECtHR, 23 July
2009).
Klass and Others v Germany (App no 5029/71)Application
No: 5029/71(ECHR 6 September1978)
Margareta and Roger Anderson v. Sweden App. no 12936/87(ECHR 25
February 1992)
Plon(socit) v FranceApp no 58148/00(ECHR 18 May 2004)
X and Y v Netherlands App no.8978/80(ECHR 26 March 1985)
Funke v France App no. 10828/84(ECHR 25 February 1993); Keegan v
Ireland (1994) 18 EHRR 342
Mosley v United Kingdom App no 48009/08 (ECtHR, 10 May 2011).

UNITED STATES
Referred to in:
McIntyre v Ohio Elections Commission 514 US 334 (1995)
Buckley v Valeo424 US 1 (1976).


Branzburg v Hayes 408 U.S. 665
O'Shea v Littleton 414 US 488 (1974)
Johnson v Stuart 702 F 2d 193 (9th Cir 1983).
Laird v Tatum 408 US 1 (1972)
Meese v Keene 481 US 465 (1987).
Niemotko v Maryland 340 US 268 (1951)
Shuttleworth v Birmingham 394 US 147 (1969)
Frisby v Schultz 487 US 474 (1988);
Katz v United States 389 US 347 (1967)
Acrara v Cloud Books Inc478 US 697 (1986)
Alexander v US 509 US 544 (1993).
Gertz v Welch 418 US 323 (1974);
Time Inc v Firestone 424 US 448 (1976);
Bartnicki v Vopper532 US 514 (2001)
Hutchinson v Proxmire443 US 111 (1979);
Wolston v Readers Digest Association, Inc443 US 157 (1979)


Dresbach v Double Day & Co 518 F Supp 1285, 1295 (DDC 1981)
Jacobsen v Rochester Communications 410 NW 2d 830, 836 (Minn 1987)
Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
Freedman v Maryland 380 US 51 (1965);
Madsen v Womens Health CenterInc et al 512 US 753 (1994).
United States v O'Brien 391 US 367 (1968);
Turner Broadcasting System Inc v FCC 512 US 622 (1994);
Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York Inc et al v Village of Stratton
536 US 150 (2002).
Ward v Rock Against Racism 491 US 781 (1989);
Galella v Onassis, 487 F 2d 986 (1973).
Madsen v Womens Health Center Inc et al 512 US 753 (1994);
Bartnicki v Vopper532 US 514 (2001).
R v Oakes [1986] 1 SCR 103
New York Times Co. v United States 403 US 713.
Chelmsford Trailer Park Inc v Town of Chelmsford and Others 393 Mass 186
(1984).


HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE
Referred to in:
Aduayom, Diasso and Dobou v Togo, Communications Nos. 422/1990,
423/1990
and 424/1990, U.N. Doc CCPR/C/51/D/422/1990, 423/1990 and 424/1990
(1996).
ZeljkoBodrozic vSerbia and Montenegro Communication No 1180/2003, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/85/D/1180/2003 (2006) (UN Human Rights Committee)
ENGLISH CASES
Referred to
in:
A v B and Anr[2002] EWCA Civ 337 (UK)
McKennitt v Ash [2007] 3 WLR 194.
Theakston v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd [2002] EWHC 137(QB) (UK);
D v L [2004] EMLR 1 (UK);
Theakston v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd [2002] EWHC 137(QB) (UK);
Douglas v Hello! (No 3) [2005] EWCA Civ 595 (UK);


R. v Broadcasting Standards Commission, ex parte British Broadcasting
Corporation (Liberty intervening) [2000] 3 All ER 989 (UK);
R. v Loveridge[2001] EWCA Crim 973 (UK);
INDIAN CASES
Referred to in:

Zimbabwe
Nyambirai v National Social Security Authority and Anr. 1995 (9) BCLR
1221(Zimbabwean SC) 1231
REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS
African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (adopted 27 June
1981,entered into force 21 October 1986) (1982) 21 ILM 58

American Convention on Human Rights (adopted 22 November
1969,entered into force 18 July 1978)

European Convention on Human Rights (adopted 4 November 1950,
entered into force 3 September 1953)


International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16
December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171

Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948
UNGA Res 217 A(III)

CONSTITUTION
The Constitution of United States of America 1788

The Constitution of Argentina 1853
The Constitution of Belgium 1831,
The Constitution of Brazil 1988,
The Constitution Act of Finland 2000,
The Constitution of India 1950
STATUTES


MISCELLANEOUS
Resolution 1003 (1993) on the ethics of journalism, adopted by the
Parliamentary Assembly of Council of Europe on 1July 1993, Article 4

Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic
Republic of the Congo v Belgium) (Merits) International Court of Justice,
14 February 2002
21
Resolution 1165 (1998) on Right to privacy, adopted by the Parliamentary
Assembly of Council of Europe, 26 July 1998, Article 14(i).
25


STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS

ECONOMIC SCENARIO IN MHUGAN
1. The respondent country, Republic of Mhugan is a country which obtained
independence in 1959, and since then, it has had a parliamentary form of government
1
. Its
economy has grown rapidly since the late twentieth century, fueled by a combination of
information technology industries, manufacturing, and financial services
2
.
SOCIAL STATUS OF RHO
2. BansitSangnont, better known by his stage name Rho, is a pop music singer-
songwriter in Mhugan
3
. Rho after his music video for his song PokPok in 2011 became
very successful and was known throughout the world. In early 2013, rumors began to
surface that Rho has been physically and/or emotionally abusive to his wife, an allegation
that Rho has vehemently denied
4
.
COMPANIES PROVIDING INFORMATION ON SEARCH QUERIES
3. Centiplex Corporation, based in Mhugan, is the leading Internet services company in
Mhugan
5
. It runs an Internet search engine. More than 80% of all search queries in Mhugan
are conducted through Centiplex and the remaining being conducted through Google
6
.

1
Compromis, 1
2
Ibid
3
Compromis, 2
4
Compromis, 3
5
Compromis, 4
6
Ibid


Dexian is a global information services company, based in the United States.
7
Its core
business is collecting, aggregating, analyzing, and disseminating information relating to
individuals
8
. Dexian claims to have records for almost 500 million people, although those
records vary widely in their scope, completeness, and correctness
9
. The particular methods
that Dexian uses to combine sources and build individual records are not publicly known,
and Dexian claims such information to be a trade secret
10
.
4. Centiplex is a Dexian client and both buys and sells data to Dexian
11
. Prior to the
2013 Search Privacy Act, described below, no law or regulation in Mhugan restricted a
search engines ability to collect, disclose, or use information
12
.
ALLEGATIONS IMPOSED ON THON SANG
5. Thon Sang maintains an active blog on the Centiplex platform in Mhugan
13
. The ad
revenue goes to the centiplex and is not shared with the bloggers themselves
14
.Sang is
celebrity-obsessed and his news is dedicated to Mhuganian celebrities
15
.Sang has blogged

7
Compromis, 5
8
Ibid
9
Ibid
10
Ibid
11
Compromis, 6
12
Ibid
13
Compromis, 7
14
Ibid
15
Compromis, 8


about the rumors of Rho abusing his wife, writing that if true, people should boycott Rhos
music in protest.
16
On May 1, 2013, Sang posted a voicemail that Rho left for his friend,
TaurAklamit
17
. In the voicemail, someone identifying himself as Bansit said that he was
furious with my wife for not being more obedient, and that I need to give her a good
smacking to show her whos in charge.
18
Sang wrote in his post that he got this recording
from someone who tried to get into Aklamits voicemail. Sang also wrote so the rumors are
true. Boycott Rho and dont even think about dancing the PokPok!
19

6. The next day, Sang posted again to gain more popularity- More evidence, this time
from Rhos web searches, which include how to control your wife and whipping
techniques. Sang was very anxious to acquire information regarding Rho and therefore he
purchased Rhos profile from Dexian for 20,000 MHD which is approximately 0.02 Euros.

7. On May 4, Rho held a press conference, with his wife at his side, where he stated
that he left the recorded voicemail for his friend TaurAlkamit and he would never even
dream of striking his wife. He called Sang and whoever had recorded the voicemail,
vicious, unethical, and unprofessional rumor mongers, who were criminals who deserve
to be punished while his wife was busy listening to him and did not utter a word at the
conference. On May 5, Sang again posted a reply stating that he was disgruntled by Rhos
explanations.

16
Ibid
17
Compromis, 9
18
Ibid
19
Ibid


8. Sang clarified that the source of the voicemail had explained to him how he or she
had come across the message
20
. The source had entered Aklamits number by mistake.
Aklamit and the source apparently shared the same password, because neither had ever
changed it from the default password for the voicemail system, 123456. Before the source
had realized the mistake, he/she clicked on the first message and heard it
21
. Suspecting that
the Bansit on the message was in fact Rho, the source then realized that this mailbox was
not his/hers. The source downloaded the copy of the message and sent the copy to Sang but
asking him not to reveal his/her identity.
22

PROVISIONS OF WIRETAP ACT
9. Mhuganian law makes it illegal under the Wiretap Act to intentionally intercept or
obtain unauthorized access to any telephone or electronic communications, whether in
transit or in storage
23
. The Wiretap Act further makes it illegal for any person to
disseminate the contents of a telephone or electronic communications that the person knows
to have been unlawfully intercepted or obtained under this Act
24
. The Wiretap Act provides
for both civil and criminal penalties. Among the civil penalties are statutory damages up to
1,000,000 MHD. The portion of the Wiretap Act described here contains an exception for
anyone acting in an official government capacity
25
.

20
Compromis, 13
21
Ibid
22
Ibid
23
Compromis, 14
24
Ibid
25
Ibid


The Wiretap Act defines
a) directly accessed to include both (1) a link that leads directly to the material, and
(2) any link that from the surrounding context reasonably indicates that it will lead
to the prohibited material, and does in fact lead to such material, regardless of how
many links it takes to reach the prohibited material
26
.
b) A search engine can meet its obligations under such an order by de-indexing the
relevant web pages, but such de-indexing is not required so long as the relevant web
pages do not appear on the first page of search results
27
.
c) The order remains in force unless and until the court rules against the plaintiff on
the Wiretap Act claim (or an appellate court rules against the plaintiff on this claim),
or the case is otherwise dismissed. If the plaintiff prevails on the claim, and
continues to prevail through any appeals, the order effectively becomes
permanent
28
.
d) The Act provides for both civil and criminal penalties for a violation of such a
search engine order, with statutory damages of up to 10,000 MHD per day of
violation for a negligent violation, and up to 1,000,000 MHD per day for an
intentional violation. Criminal penalties are only available for an intentional
violation
29
.

26
Compromis, 15
27
Ibid
28
Ibid
29
Ibid


10. On May 8, 2013, Rho sued Sang under the Wiretap Act for knowingly disseminating
the contents of unlawfully obtained communications
30
. Rho immediately applied for a
search engine order under the Act against Centiplex, which the court granted
31
. The court
ultimately ruled that Sang had violated the Wiretap Act and awarded statutory damages to
Rho of 400,000 MHD. In so ruling, the court found, under Mhuganian law, that while the
sources initial hearing of the voicemail message may have been accidental, the subsequent
downloading of the message to his/her computer was intentional and unauthorized under the
Wiretap Act, and that furthermore, because Sang had recounted on his blog all of the
relevant facts about the circumstances under which the source had acquired the voicemail
message, Sang had the knowledge required to be liable under the Act
32
.

11. Centiplex was given the search engine order by the court for disseminating the
contents of the recorded voicemail under the wiretap act and centiplex immediately began to
comply with the order entered against it
33
. Centiplex made an appearance in Rhos case
against Sang in order to challenge the validity of the search engine order, but the court
upheld the order
34
.

30
Compromis, 16
31
ibid
32
ibid
33
Compromis, 16,17
34
Ibid


12. In the same lawsuit, Rho also sued the unknown source of the recorded voicemail
message as a John Doe
35
. Rho subpoenaed Sang for the identity of that person. Sang filed
a motion with the court to quash the subpoena, asserting a privilege to hide the identity of
his source
36
. The court denied the motion to quash as under Mhuganian law the court does
recognize a qualified privilege not to reveal sources but only to professional journalists,
but Sang was not a professional journalist as he did not disseminate the information to the
public for the gain of livelihood as the revenue goes to the Centiplex.However, the court did
grant a stay of the subpoena.
2013 SEARCH PRIVACY ACT
13. On May 15, 2013, Mhugan enacted the Search Privacy Act, which makes it unlawful
for a search engine to sell information about a persons search queries without that persons
consent
37
.
a) For purposes of this Act, a sale is defined to be a transfer in exchange for
anything of value.
b) Information is considered to be information about a persons search queries if
individual search queries are associated with any identifier, including, without
limitation, a name, address, phone number, email address, government identification
number, date of birth, or IP address.
c) The Act does not apply to non-sale transfers of such information, nor does it apply
to any subsequent transfers of the same information after an initial transfer by the
search engine, whether or not those subsequent transfers are sales.

35
Compromis, 18
36
Ibid
37
Compromis, 19


d) The Act contains explicit exceptions for disclosures to law enforcement agencies
pursuant to a warrant, subpoena, or court order, and disclosures incident to the
search engines ordinary course of business.
e) The Act provides for compensatory or statutory damages, at the plaintiffs election,
as well as punitive damages for a willful violation.
f) The Act is scheduled to become effective on May 1, 2014
38
.

14. On May 20, 2013, Centiplex sued in Mhugan to have the Search Privacy Act
declared invalid under the laws and Constitution of Mhugan
39
. But the court held the search
privacy act to be valid
40
.

15. All of the rulings described above were appealed to the Mhugan Supreme Court, the
highest appellate court in Mhugan, and the Mhugan Supreme Court dismissed all of the
appeals
41
.

16. Sang and Centiplex have challenged all of the following in the Universal Court of
Human Rights
42
:
a) the damages imposed on Sang for disseminating the recorded voicemail;

38
ibid
39
Compromis, 20
40
Ibid
41
Compromis, 21
42
Compromis, 22


b) the subpoena to Sang to disclose the source of the recorded voicemail;
c) the order against Centiplex requiring that webpages that link to the recorded
voicemail, including Sangs blog posts, never appear on the first page of search
results;
d) the validity of the 2013 Search Privacy Act
43
.

17. No law, domestic or international, restricts either Sangs or Centiplexs standing to
bring these challenges
44
. Both Sangs and Centiplexs positions have been rejected on the
merits in the domestic courts of Mhugan, and all appeals or other legal remedies within the
Mhuganian court system have been exhausted
45
.

43
Ibid
44
Compromis, 23
45
Ibid


STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

CASE CONCERNING RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE UDHR
SANG AND CENTIPLEX .....Applicants

v.

THE REPUBLIC OF MHUGAN .....Respondent
Sang and Centiplex (the Applicants) and the Republic of Mhugan (the Respondent), have
submitted their differences to the Universal Freedom of Expression Court special chamber
of the Universal Court of Human Rights. These differences concern the rights of freedom of
expression and privacy in accordance with Articles 19 and 12 of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights. The Universal Freedom of Expression Court has jurisdiction in place of
all other regional courts and is the final adjudicator when all national remedies have been
exhausted. Due to the failure to resolve the matter with all available Mhuganian means, the
Universal Freedom of Expression Court has jurisdiction in this matter.

IN THE UNIVERSAL FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION COURT
THE RESPONDENT MOST HUMBLY AND RESPECTFULLY SUBMITS TO THE
JURISDICTION OF THIS HONBLE COURT


QUESTIONSPRESENTED

THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS HAVE BEEN PRESENTED BEFORE THE COURT
FOR ITS DETERMINATION:

1. WHETHER THE DAMAGES IMPOSED ON THE APPLICANT ARE CONSISTENT
WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE UDHR.

2. WHETHER THE REQUIREMENT TO DISCLOSE THE SOURCE OF THE
RECORDED VOICEMAIL IS CONSISTENT WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE
UDHR.

3. WHETHER THE SECTION OF THE WIRETAP ACT THAT PROVIDES FOR A
SPECIAL PROVISIONAL REMEDY IS CONSISTENT WITH THE UDHR.

4. WHETHER THE PROVISIONS OF THE 2013 SEARCH PRIVACY ACT ARE
CONSISTENT WITH THE UDHR.


SUMMARYOF ARGUMENTS

A. The courts finding imposed damages of 400,000 MHD on the Applicant. First, the
requirement does not infringe the right to freedom of expression of the Applicant. Herein,
firstly, Respondent submits that the impugned requirement does not restrict the right to
freedom of expression and; secondly, it does not cause a chilling effect. Second, property
rights under Article 17 are not infringed because the Applicant cannot enjoy his right by
violating one's right under Article 12. The allegation emphasised by the Applicant does not
contribute to public debate as there are no facts substantiating the allegation. Third, the
Respondent possess a reasonable expectation of privacy under Article 12 which has been
violated after the dissemination of the unauthorised information took place. In any event, the
restriction is permissible under Article 29(2) of the UDHR. It is prescribedby law under the
Wiretap Act. The situation in Mhugan shows that the Wiretap Act is clearly in pursuit of the
legitimate aims of serves to protect an individuals right from arbitrary interference with his
privacy as guaranteed by Article 12 of the UDHR. The restriction is necessary in a
democratic society as it corresponds to a pressing social need and is proportionate to the
legitimate aims.
B. The requirement by the court has mandated the Applicant to disclose the identity of
the source of the voicemail and it does not contravene the rights to freedom of expression
enshrined in Article 19 of the UDHR. Herein, firstly, Article 19 does not include the right to
anonymity; secondly, it does not cause a chilling effect; and finally, the requirement does
not constitute prior restraint.
Further, the requirement does notcontravene the right to privacy guaranteed under Article 12
of the UDHR because there is no actual subjective expectation of privacy which is
objectively reasonable. Finally, theright to remedy enshrined in Article 8 of the UDHR has


not been violated because the Respondent has a right to effective remedy which is possible
only when the Applicant will disclose the name of the source of the information that
infiltrated the voicemail.In any event, these measures are valid limitations under Article
29(2) of the UDHR. Theysatisfy the three-tiered test of legality, legitimacy and necessity.

C. The requirement by the Court mandated Centiplex to remove the impugned
information from the first page of search result. First, it does not contravene the right to
expression enshrined in Article 19 of the UDHR. Herein, firstly, the restriction doesn't
impose filtering or prior restraint; secondly, it does not create a Chilling effect. Second, the
right to privacy guaranteed under Article 12 is violated as it has a superseding effect on
Applicants right guaranteed under Article 19. In any event, these measures are valid
limitations under Article 29(2) of the UDHR. They satisfy the three-tier test of legality,
legitimacy and necessity.

D. The requirement under the 2013 Search Privacy Act is consistent with the UDHR.
First, the requirement does not contravene right to privacy enshrined in Article 12 of the
UDHR.Itexemplifies how, in certain circumstances, the right to privacy outweighs the right
to freedom of expression. Second, it does not contravene Article 19 as it complies with the
three-tier test under Article 29(2). The restriction is prescribed by law as it is made under the
authority of the SPA. It is pursuant to the legitimate aim of protection of rights of others, as
the Respondent possesses a reasonable expectation of privacy. Further, the restriction is
necessary in ademocratic society, as the dissemination does not warrant to a debate of
general interest.


ARGUMENTS

A. THE DAMAGES IMPOSED ON THE APPLICANT ARE JUST, FAIR AND
CONSISTENT WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE UDHR.

1. The courts finding imposed damages of 400,000 MHD
46
on the Applicant.
Respondent submits that this requirement is consistent with the right to freedom of speech
and expression under Article 19 [I]; right to property under Article 17 [II] and valid under
Article 29(2) [III]. Moreover, the dissemination was privacy intrusive under Article 12,
UDHR [IV].

I. The requirement is not a restriction on Article 19, UDHR
2. Article 19 guarantees the right to freedom of opinion and expression without
interferencethrough any media.
47
Respondent submits that the impugned requirement
does not restrict the right to freedom of expression [a] and does not cause a chilling
effect.[b]
a) The requirement does not restrict the freedom of expression
3. Notwithstanding the press vital watchdog role
48
, journalists cannot be released
from their duty to obey the ordinary law on the basis that Article 19 of the UDHR affords

46
Compromis, 16
47
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948 UNGA Res 217 A(III) (UDHR) art 19.
See also International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force
23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR) art 19; African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (adopted 27
June 1981, entered into force 21 October 1986) (1982) 21 ILM 58 (AfCHR) art 9; American Convention on
Human Rights (adopted 22 November 1969, entered into force 18 July 1978) (ACHR) art 13; European
Convention on Human Rights (adopted 4 November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953) (ECHR) art
10.
48
Warren Francke, The Evolving Watchdog:The Medias Role in Government Ethics(The ANNALS of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science1995 )


them protection.
49
In Stoll v Switzerland, the ECtHR held that there is no wholly
unrestricted freedom of expression even with respect to press reporting of matters of serious
public concern.
50
The Respondent emphasises the Courts sentiment that journalistic
ethics
51
play a considerably important role given the influence wielded by the media in
contemporary society.
52
It is no excuse to say that Sangs duty as a journalist compelled
him to commit an unlawful act
53
, when in fact this duty could have been discharged through
legal and ethical means.
54

4. Moreover, it is established that news broadcasting should be based on truthfulness,
ensured by the appropriate means of verification and proof, and impartiality in
presentation, description and narration,
55
Sang clearly did not follow these standards.
56

Having in mind that, duties and responsibilities which accompany the exercise of the right
tofreedom of expression by media professionals assume special significance in situations
ofconflict and tension,
57
it can be manifestly perceived that Rho had sent the voicemailonly

49
Stoll v Switzerland App no 69698/01 (ECtHR 10 December 2007).
50
Stoll (n 49); BladetTroms and Stensaas v Norway [GC] App no 21980/93 (ECHR 20 May 1999) 65
51
Principles for Ethicals Journalism< http://www.caj.ca/?p=1785> accessed 5 October 2013.
52
Stoll (n 49) 104
53
Legal definition < http://www.wisegeek.com/what-is-an-unlawful-act.htm> accessed 5 October 2013.
54
Law Media, Definition of Media Law And Ethics < http://media-laws.blogspot.in/2011/06/definition-of-
media-law-and-ethics.html> accessed 5 October 2013
55
Resolution 1003 (1993) on the ethics of journalism, adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly of Council of
Europe on 1July 1993, Article 4.
56
Compromis, 13
57
Erdodu and nce v. Turkey App. no 25067/94, 25068/94 (ECHR 8 July 1999)


to let off some steam to his good friend Taur
58
, which proves prima faciethere was no such
situation prevailing and dissemination does not meet these standards.

b) The impugned requirement does not cause a Chilling effect
5. Ultimately, the Respondent reiterates that there is no interference with the freedom
of the press.
59
Further, the damages
60
imposed upon Sang do not amount to a form of
censorship
61
intended to discourage the press from expressing criticism.
62
Requirement to
pay damages was merely to discourage journalist for adopting unlawful methods for
obtaining information,
63
protect right to privacy enshrined under Article 12, UDHR and
public order
64
, and is wholly proportionate in this instance. The safeguard afforded by
freedom of speech in relation to journalistic reporting on issues of general interest is subject
to the journalistacting in good faith and in accordance with the ethics of journalism.
65

Regardless of the Applicants misguided beliefs and best intentions, his profession is no
source of immunity or impunity;
66
the road to perdition is paved with bona-fide intentions.

58
Compromis, 11
59
Freedom of the Press <http://www.pucl.org/from-archives/Media/freedom-press.htm> accessed 9 October
2103
60
Compromis, 16
61
Censorship < http://mashable.com/category/censorship/> accessed 5 October 2013.
62
Stoll (n 49) 154
63
Manner of collection of personal information (principle four) < http://privacy.org.nz/the-privacy-act-and-
codes/privacy-principles/manner-of-collection-of-personal-information-principle-four/> accessed 5 October
2013
64
Public Order <http://www.usip.org/guiding-principles-stabilization-and-reconstruction-the-web-version/7-
rule-law/public-order> accessed 4 October 2013
65
Stoll (n 32) 103
66
Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium)
(Merits) International Court of Justice, 14 February 2002


II. The requirement does not restrict Article 17, UDHR
6. Sang had doubtlessly breached his duties and responsibilities
67
, the ethics of
journalism
68
and did not act in good faith
69
.Besides, the information does not bear on
matters of general importance
70
and its dissemination is an abuse of the presss watchdog
role.
71
To enhance this contention reliance is placed upon three grounds.First, while earlier
decisions of the Strasbourg courts tend not to tolerate high damages awards,
72
none of them
involved the scale of character assassination like in this case.
73
Second, spousal abuse
74
is a
serious allegation aimed at scandalising Rhos reputation for negative publicity
75
purposes
and third, such an allegation does not contribute to public debate where there are no facts
substantiating the allegation.
76

7. Furthermore such an allegation is solely speculative and was coldly calculated to
inflict maximum damage to Rhos reputation.
77
Rhos loss must be seen in the context of

67
The Sunday Times v United Kingdom App no 6538/74 (ECHR 26April 1979)
68
BladetTromsTroms AndStensaas V. NorwayApp No. 21980/93 (ECtHR20 May 1999)
69
Pedersen (n 44)
70
Tammer v Estonia App no 41205/98 (ECHR 6 February 2001)
71
Warren(n 49)
72
Jersild v Denmark App no 15980/8 (ECHR 23 September 1994)
73
Clarification #10
74
Domestic Violence<http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Spousal+abuse> accessed 6 October 2013
75
What is negative publicity <http://www.prsawestdist.org/what-is-negative-publicity-and-how-to-turn-it-into-
a-good-thing.php> accessed 4 October 2013
76
Compromis, 12
77
Compromis, 13


his negative publicity
78
and its impact on his pecuniary loss arising from the protest.
79
In
addition to that the grief over loss of reputation and honour, which was clearly compounded
by the tasteless spousal abuse allegations.
80
Rho has absolute right to ask for damages since
his right to privacy is in issue and since the possibility of taking an action under civil law
should be guaranteed, to enable a victim to claim possible damages for invasion of
privacy.
81
Furthermore, the damages are reasonable and does not violate right to enjoyment
of property of the Applicant.

III. I n any event, the requirement is permissible under Article 29(2), UDHR.
a) The requirement is prescribed by law
8. Imposing damages on Sang for breach of the Wiretap Act
82
is a justified interference
with his freedom of expression. The interference in question is validly provided by law, and
serves to protect an individuals right to protection from arbitrary interference with his
privacy as guaranteed by Article 12 of the UDHR.

b) The requirement is in pursuance of legitimate aims
9. The ECtHR in Handyside v United Kingdom
83
acknowledged that state authorities
are in principle in a better position than the international judge to give an opinion on the
exact content of these requirements as well as on the necessity of a restriction of a

78
Clarification, #10
79
Compromis, 9
80
Hachette Filipacchi Associes v France App no 71111/01( ECHR 14 June 2007)
81
Resolution 1165 (1998) on Right to privacy, adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly of Council of Europe,
26 July 1998, Article 14(i).
82
Compromis, 14
83
App no 5493/72( ECHR 7 December 1976)


penalty.
84
Whether a restriction is necessary in the circumstances is therefore an inquiry
based on the facts and circumstances prevailing in the country concerned, which the national
authorities are in a better position to undertake.
85
For the foregoing reasons the requirement
is in pursuance of legitimate aims.

c) The restriction is necessary in a democratic society
10. The thrust of the Mhugan courts reasoning in imposing damages on Sang was
directed at his dissemination of unlawfully obtained material
86
i.e. Rhos recorded
voicemail, a reference to his private conversation with his friend, given the Wiretap Acts
87

explicit aim of preventing dissemination of unlawful or unauthorised accessed information.
If dissemination was limited to lawfully obtained information and not by infiltration of the
account, the court may well have decided differently. The Courts finding had therefore
provided relevant and sufficient reasons
88
for imposing damages on Sang.

IV. The dissemination was privacy intrusive under Article 12, UDHR.
11. While the press plays an important role in democratic society, press freedom comes
with obligations and responsibilities.
89
The satisfaction of public curiosity is not enough to
justify such a gross infringement of Rhos right to privacy,
90
Article 12 of the UDHR
91
states

84
Handyside(n 28) at [48]; The Sunday Times (n 8) Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Wiarda, Cremona, Thor
Vilhjalmsson, Ryssdal, Ganshof van der Meersch, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, Bindschedler-Robert, Liesh and
Matscher
85
Case of Klass and Others v Germany App no 5029/71(EHRR 6 September 1978)
86
Compromis, 16
87
ibid
88
Chauvy and Others v. France App no 64915/01( ECHR 26 June 2004)
89
BladetTroms(n 33)
90
Karhuvaara and Iltalehti v Finland App no 53678/00 (ECHR 16 November 2004)


that no one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or
correspondence. The privacy of communication is further explicitly protected under Article
17 of the ICCPR,
92
Article 8 of the ECHR
93
and under various national laws.
94
Personal
information privacy is another aspect of right to privacy which essentially means controlling
access to and dissemination of information about oneself.
95
The aforesaid right of Rho has
been violated by the Applicant in the instant matter. Applicants use of unlawful tactics for
unauthorised access to the recorded voicemail to institute dissemination leads to a complete
loss of all Personally Identifiable Information
96
, the aggregation of which has revealed new
facts about the person that he/she did not expect would be revealed
97
and for which there
exists a reasonable expectation of privacy.
98

12. It is also a well established fact that the lines between content/non content are
extremely blurred on the internet.
99
Various examples of regulations to control this
unbridled infringement by the government into the private information of users can be found

91
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948 UNGA Res 217 A (III) (UDHR) art 12.
92
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23
March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR) Art 17
93
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on
Human Rights, as amended) (ECHR) Art 8
94
The Constitution of United States of America 1788, amendment IV; The Constitution of Argentina 1853, s
18, s 19; The Constitution of Belgium 1831, art 22; The Constitution of Brazil 1988, art. 5; The Constitution
Act of Finland 2000, s 8; The Constitution of India 1950, Art 21
95
Ferdinand D Schoeman, Privacy and Social Freedom (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1992) 115
96
Electronic Privacy Information Centre, Data Retention< http://www.epic.org/
privacy/intl/data_retention.html> accessed 8 October 2013.
97
Daniel J Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, (2006) 154 U Pa L Rev 477
98
99
Susan Freiwald, Uncertain Privacy: Communication Attributes After the Digital Telephony Act, 69 S Cal
L Rev 949 (1996).


in the provisions of the EU Privacy Directive
100
, OECD Guidelines for Data Protection
101
,
German Data Protection Laws and the Federal Data Privacy Act, 1974
102
which incorporates
the privacy guidelines laid down in the HEW Report.
103
All these legislations make it
imperative to obtain user consent or at least give the user a warning before procuring his/her
information none of which is being done in the instant case, thereby violating the provisions
of the Wiretap Act
104
and Article 12 of the UDHR.

B. THE REQUIREMENT TO DISCLOSE THE IDENTITY OF THE SOURCE IS
CONSISTENT WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE UDHR.
13. According to the subpoena, the court has mandated the Applicant to disclose the
identity of the source of the voicemail.
105
The Respondent requests this Court to find that
this requirement does not restrict the rights enshrined in Articles 19[I]. Further, it does not
violate the rights to privacy under Article 12 [II] and In any event, the requirement is
permissible under Article 29(2) [III] the requirement is consistent with Article 8 [IV].
I. The requirement does not restrict the rights enshrined in Article 19,UDHR.
14. Respondent submits that the impugned requirement does not infringe the right to
freedom of expression of users as: first, Article 19 does not include the right to anonymity

100
EU Council Directive (EC) 95/46/EC; EU Data Privacy Directive [1995] OJ (L281)
101
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD Guidelines on the Protection of
Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data
<http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,3343,en_2649_201185_1815186_1_1_ 1_1,00.html> accessed 3
October 2013.
102
Federal Data Protection Act 1974
103
Electronic Privacy Information System, Records, Computers and the Rights of Citizens Report of the
Secretary's Advisory Committee on Automated Personal Data Systems, July 1973
<http://www.epic.org/privacy/hew1973report> accessed 1 October 2013.
104
ibid
105
Compromis, 22(b)


[a]; secondly, it does not cause a chilling effect [b]; and finally, the requirement does not
constitute prior restraint [c].

a) Article 19 does not include the right to anonymity
15. The right to anonymous free speech is not recognised under UDHR and other
international human rights instruments.
106
Although such a right is recognised in the United
States,
107
it is not considered absolute. Indeed, in Buckley,
108
the Court upheld the validity of
certain legislations which sought to disclose campaign finance details in informational
interest.
109
Further, anonymity has been the subject of severe criticism as it facilitates
wrong by eliminating accountability.
110
In the context of the Internet, it may be used as a
shield for unlawful purposes.
111
Indeed the African Commission on Human Rights
recognises the need for sources to reveal in judicial proceedings.
112
Indeed, in Branzburg v
Hayes,
113
the U.S. Supreme Court rejected a reporters claim that the flow of information
would be seriously impeded if reporters could be compelled to reveal the names of

106
March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR) art 19; African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (adopted 27 June
1981, entered into force 21 October 1986) (1982) 21 ILM 58 (AfCHR) art 9; American Convention on Human
Rights (adopted 22 November 1969, entered into force 18 July 1978) (ACHR) art 13; European Convention on
Human Rights (adopted 4 November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953) (ECHR) art 10.
107
McIntyre v Ohio Elections Commission 514 US 334 (1995) (Scalia J).
108
Buckley v Valeo424 US 1 (1976).
109
Buckley (n 109)
110
McIntyre (n 108)
111
KU v Finland App no 2872/02 (ECtHR 2 March 2009); Matthew Mazzotta, Balancing Act: Finding
Consensus on Standards for Unmasking Anonymous Internet Speakers (2010) 51 BCL Rev 833, 840.
112
African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights, Resolution on the Adoption of the Declaration of
Principles on Freedom of Expression in Africa (2002) Res. 62(XXXII)02, Principle XV
113
408 U.S. 665


confidential sources. A fortiori, the flow of information cannot be hindered if a reporter is
required to produce a witness to prove his own case.

b) Requirement does not cause a chilling effect
16. The existence of a chilling effect requires a distinct and palpable injury,
114
and not
merely a hypothetical one.
115
In fact, in Laird,
116
the Court rejected the possibility of a
chilling effect merely from the individuals concomitant fears that, armed with the fruits of
those activities,the agency might in the future take some other and additional action
detrimental to thatindividual.
117
Here, no evidence of real injury to the applicant is
available. Consequently, mere apprehension that the disclosure of source may be used
against the applicant in future does not constitute a chilling effect.
118
Given the severity of
the allegations, the lack of even basic facts to support them, the malice of Applicants in
disseminating, and the immateriality of the legitimate questions, the interference posed by
the 400,000 MHD
119
awards of damages is not disproportionate to the right to reputation
120

being protected. In these specific circumstances, there is no general chilling effect to
speech criticising the government.

114
O'Shea v Littleton 414 US 488 (1974); Johnson v Stuart 702 F 2d 193 (9th Cir 1983); Meese v Keene 481
US 465 (1987).
115
O'Shea (n 61); Los Angeles v Lyons 461 US 95 (1983); Johnson v Stuart 702 F 2d 193 (9th Cir 1983).
116
Laird v Tatum 408 US 1 (1972).
117
Laird (n 117)
118
Laird (n117);Meese v Keene 481 US 465 (1987).
119
ibid
120
Heather Rogers, Is there a right to reputation?<http://inforrm.wordpress.com/2010/10/26/is-there-a-right-
to-reputation-part-1-heather-rogers-qc/> accessed 9 October 2013


c) The requirement does not constitute a prior restraint
17. Indeed, a requirement constitutes a prior restraint if the right to free speech is
entirely blocked.
121
Here, the impugned requirement does not forbid, but rather regulates
free speech.
122
Pertinently, Applicant is not prohibited from posting on the website, but only
required to disclose the identity of the source.
123

II. The requirement is not a restriction on Article 12, UDHR.
18. The right to privacy exists when there is an actual subjective expectation of privacy
which is objectively reasonable.
124
Accordingly, a reasonable expectation of privacy
125
is
absent in information which has been voluntarily disclosed, as any subjective expectation is
negated.
126
In this case, the source submitted information to Sang voluntarily
127
as he chose
to disclose his identity. There is no reasonable expectation of privacy on the part of the
source as Sang is not a professional journalist [a] and he is indicative of malice, hence
defeating qualified privilege [b].

121
Niemotko v Maryland 340 US 268 (1951); Shuttleworth v Birmingham 394 US 147 (1969); Frisby v Schultz
487 US 474 (1988); Media Rights Agenda v Nigeria (2000) AHRLR 200 (ACtHPR 1998); Gaweda v Poland
App no 26229/95 (ECtHR, 14 March 2002).
122
Acrara v Cloud Books Inc478 US 697 (1986); Alexander v US 509 US 544 (1993).
123
Compromis, 22(b)
124
Katz v United States 389 US 347 (1967).
125
Reasonable Expectation of Privacy<http://legal-
dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Reasonable+expectation+of+privacy> accessed 9 October 2013
126
Allegra Knopf, Privacy and the Internet: Welcome to the Orwellian World (1999-2000) 11 U Fla J L &
Pub Poly 79, 82; Catherine Crump, Data Retention: Privacy, Anonymity and Accountability Online (2003)
56 Stanford Law Review 191.
127
Compromis, 13


a) The applicant is not a professional journalist.
19. Mhuganian law recognises a qualified privilege
128
for professional journalist
129
who
disseminate information to the public regularly and for a living.
130
Sang does not satisfy the
pre-requisite for being a professional journalist, which makes it manifest that Sang is not
entitled to a qualified privilege. In addition to that, Sang is a renegade journalist and not a
professional journalist because of his prior actions in contravention of the Wiretap Act. A
renegade journalist is therefore one that flagrantly ignores obligations and
responsibilities
131
that come with press freedoms and openly flouts the ethics of
journalism.
132
Such a journalist cannot be relied on to provide accurate and reliable
information. Her words do not contribute to serious public debate, and reactive measures
against their publication are not a significant interference. The protection the press enjoys
requires that they act in good faith and on an accurate factual basis.
133
Sangs statements
reflects neither. The dissemination of unlawfully obtained information was illegal.
134

Further, there was no factual basis for his allegations of spousal abuse
135
, and there was thus
no right to make it.
136
His statements, added to the sting with a malicious line fans should

128
Legal protection for Journalistic Sources.< http://www.splc.org/knowyourrights/legalresearch.asp?id=31>
129
Mark dueze, What is journalism?Professional identity and ideology of journalists reconsidered
<http://jou.sagepub.com/content/6/4/442.abstract> accessed 9 October 2013.
130
Compromis, 13
131
Flux v Moldova (No. 6) App no 22824/04 (ECHR 29 July 2008); Tara and Poiata v Moldova App no
36305/03 ECHR 16 October 2007)
132
White (n 56)
133
White (n 56)
134
Compromis 16
135
BBC News UK politics, Government considers 'right to know' on domestic abuse < http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-
politics-1544457>>ax6> accessed 16 September 2013
136
Flux (n 132); Tara (n 132)


stop listening to his music in protest without any research or verification of his own.
137

Therefore, the interference of not extending qualified privilege to such statements is clearly
proportionate.

b) The applicant is indicative of malice, hence defeating qualified privilege.
20. Sangs actions were thus undertaken purely for dramatic effect, inevitably
exacerbating the volatility of the situation. He exploited this increased tension to add to the
gravamen of his accusation. His actions were excessive even if his aim was merely to spur
rational public debate. The irresistible conclusion is that Sang intended for his actions to
have more far-reaching consequences. His actions and statements were thus likely to lead to
demonstrations during troubled times for Rho who was already facing false allegations of
physically and emotionally abusing his wife
138
. Naturally a demonstration under these
circumstances would inexorably increase the propensity of escalation to negative publicity
of Rho. As reasonably expected, this materialised at Rhos vigil and eventually he had to
emerge from his grief of rumours to attempt to quell the negative publicity and called for a
press conference with his wife
139
, but even after elucidate explanation to the public that he
wont even dream about abusing his dear wife and the voicemail was just to give a spice to
his friend
140
, Sang kept on writing against him
141
, thereby causing damage to his reputation
and honour.

III. I n any event, the requirement is permissible under Article 29(2), UDHR.

137
RumyanaIvanova v Bulgaria (App no 36207/03) ECHR 14 February 2008
138
Compromis, 3
139
Compromis, 11
140
Ibid
141
Compromis, 12


21. Respondent submits that the rights guaranteed under Articles 12, 19 and 20 are not
absolute,
142
and may be subject to restrictions.
143
The three-tiered test to determine legality
under Article 29(2)
144
is met in this case as first, the requirement is prescribed by law [a];
secondly, it pursues a legitimate aim [b]; and finally, the requirement is necessary in a
democratic society [c].
a) The requirement is prescribed by law
22. A restriction is prescribed by law if it has a basis in domestic law,
145
and is
accessible, foreseeable and precise.
146
A law is accessible if it gives the citizens an adequate
indication of the legal rules applicable to a given case.
147
It is foreseeable if it is precise
enough to enable citizens to regulate their conduct
148
and predict the consequences of non-

142
143
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948 UNGA Res 217 A(III) (UDHR) art
29(2); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23
March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR) art 19(3); African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (adopted 27
June 1981, entered into force 21 October 1986) (1982) 21 ILM 58 (AfCHR) art 9; American Convention on
Human Rights (adopted 22 November 1969, entered into force 18 July 1978) (ACHR) art 11; Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human Rights, as
amended) (ECHR) art 10(2); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966,
entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR) arts 21 and 22; African Charter on Human and
Peoples Rights (adopted 27 June 1981, entered into force 21 October 1986) (1982) 21 ILM 58 (AfCHR) arts
10 and 11; American Convention on Human Rights (adopted 22 November 1969, entered into force 18 July
1978) (ACHR) arts 15 and 16; European Convention on Human Rights (adopted 4 November 1950, entered
into force 3 September 1953) (ECHR) art 11; Chaplinsky v New Hampshire 315 US 567 (1941).
144
29(2); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23
March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR) art 19; European Convention on Human Rights (adopted 4 November
1950, entered into force 3 September 1953) (ECHR) art 10(2); UNCHR General Comment 34 in Article 19
(Freedom of Opinion and Expression) (2011) UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/34; UNCHR General Comment 10 in
Article 19 (Freedom of Opinion) (1983) UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/10; The Sunday Times v United Kingdom App
no 13166/87 (ECtHR, 26 November 1991); Albert WomahMukong v Cameroon Communication No 458/1991,
UN Doc CCPR/C/51/D/458/1991 (1994) (HRC); Surek v Turkey App no 24122/94 (ECtHR, 8 July 1999);
Herrera-Ulloa v Costa Rica Petition No 12367 (IACtHR, 2 July 2004).
145
Hinczewski v Poland App no 34907/05 (ECtHR, 5 October 2010).
146
Silver and Others v United Kingdom Application no. 5947/72 (25 March 1983); The Sunday Times v United
Kingdom App no 13166/87 (ECtHR, 26 November 1991); Rekvnyi v Hungary App no 25390/94 (ECtHR, 20
May 1999); Gaweda v Poland App no 26229/95 (ECtHR, 14 March 2002).
147
The Sunday Times v United Kingdom App no 13166/87 (ECtHR, 26 November 1991).
148
The Sunday Times v United Kingdom App no 13166/87 (ECtHR, 26 November 1991); Rekvnyi v Hungary
App no 25390/94 (ECtHR, 20 May 1999).


compliance.
149
Further, it must not vest arbitrary powers for interference with the
executive.
150
In this case, the requirement possesses a basis in domestic law as it is imposed
by the Wiretap Act.
151
The restriction is clearly accessible and foreseeable. Indeed, the
precise acts which constitute the dissemination of information and the consequences of non-
compliance are expressly prescribed.
152

b) Requirement pursues a legitimate aim
23. The restriction pursues a legitimate aim: the protection of rights of others.
153
The
unlawful access of the voicemail
154
and further dissemination of the same
155
, infringe the
right to privacy of Rho, established under Article 12 of the UDHR. The protection of private
life extends to a persons identity, such as his name
156
, picture
157
etc even in a public
context.
158
Admittedly, public figures possess a lesser expectation of privacy than ordinary

149
Kruslin v France App no. 11801/85(ECHR 24 April 1990); Huvig v France App No. 11105/84,( ECHR 24
April 1990)

150
Media Rights Agenda v Nigeria (2000) AHRLR 200 (ACtHPR 1998).
151
Compromis, 14
152
Compromis, 15
153
March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR) art 19(3)(a); American Convention on Human Rights (adopted 22
November 1969, entered into force 18 July 1978) (ACHR) art 13(2)(a); European Convention on Human
Rights (adopted 4 November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953) (ECHR) art 10(2).
154
Compromis, 13
155
Compromis, 9
156
Burghartz v Switzerland (1994) 18 EHRR 101; Von Hannover v Germany (2005) 40 EHRR 1.
157
Schssel v Austria App no 42409/98 (ECtHR 21 February 2002); Von Hannover v Germany (2005) 40
EHRR 1; Constitution of Brazil 1988 (Brazil) art 5.
158
PG and JH v United Kingdom App no 44787/98 (ECtHR, 25 September 2001); Peck v United Kingdom
(2003) 36 EHRR 41; Von Hannover v Germany (2005) 40 EHRR 1.


persons.
159
However, Rho is not a public figure. Respondent submits that public figures are
persons holding public office including those who play a role in public life;
160
or those who
thrust themselves voluntarily into the forefront of any public controversy.
161
In this case,
Rho does not exercise any public function, play any role in public life, or feature voluntarily
in any public controversy. At best, his activities attract extensive media attention by virtue
of his song PokPok
162
, which is not sufficient to transform him into a public figure.
163

Indeed, even if Rho is deemed a public personality, he still possesses a reasonable
expectation of privacy in his private life, such as his private conversation with his friends.

24. Moreover, the voicemail
164
in the instant case were not envisaged for limited use, but
disseminated to the public.
165
Finally, the state may undertake positive obligations to secure
the private life of individuals in the sphere of relations of individuals among themselves.
166

Therefore, the impugned requirement is in pursuit of legitimate aims. Public order is a

159
New York Times Co v Sullivan 376 US 254 (1964); Lingens v Austria App no 9815/82 (ECtHR, 8 July
1986); Decision 60/1994 (XII. 24) AB (Hungary); A v B and Anr[2002] EWCA Civ 337 (UK); ZeljkoBodrozic
vSerbia and Montenegro Communication No 1180/2003, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/85/D/1180/2003 (2006) (UN
Human Rights Committee); Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers Declaration on Freedom of Political
Debate in the Media, 12 February 2004 CM/Del/OJ(2004)872E.
160
Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers Declaration on Freedom of Political Debate in the Media, 12
February 2004 CM/Del/OJ(2004)872E.
161
Gertz v Welch 418 US 323 (1974); Time Inc v Firestone 424 US 448 (1976); Bartnicki v Vopper532 US 514
(2001); Susan M Giles, Public Plaintiffs and Private Facts: Should the Public Figure Doctrine be
transplanted into Privacy Law? (2004-05) 83 Neb Law Rev 1204.
162
Compromis, 2
163
Hutchinson v Proxmire443 US 111 (1979); Wolston v Readers Digest Association, Inc443 US 157 (1979);
Dresbach v Double Day & Co 518 F Supp 1285, 1295 (DDC 1981); Jacobsen v Rochester Communications
410 NW 2d 830, 836 (Minn 1987); W Wat Hopkins, The Involuntary Public Figure: Not So Dead After All
(2003) 21 Cardozo Arts and Entertainment Law Journal 1, 29; John Tobin, The United States Public Figure
Test: Should it be introduced into Australia? (1994) 17 UNSW Law Journal 383, 403.
164
Compromis, 19
165
Friedl v Austria 15225/89 (ECHR 31 January 1995);PG and JH v United Kingdom App no 44787/98
(ECtHR, 25 September 2001); Peck v United Kingdom (2003) 36 EHRR 41; Mirror Group Newspapers v
United KingdomApp no 39401/04 (ECtHR, 18 January 2011).
166
X and Y v Netherlands App no. 8978/80.(ECHR 26 March 1985)


legitimate aim for restricting the rights guaranteed under Articles 19 and 20.
167
Broadly, it
includes the sum of rules which ensure the functioning of society or the set of fundamental
principles on which society is founded.
168

c) Requirement is necessary in a democratic society
25. The test for determining the necessity of a requirement is whether the disclosure of
confidential source contributes to a debate of general interest.
169
Here, the subpoena
170

relates exclusively to the disclosure of the source of Sang who unlawfully obtained the
voicemail and courts finding complies with protection of private life of Rho, which warrant
no legitimate public interest.
171
At best, they stimulate public curiosity, which does not
override the right to privacy of Rho.
172
Furthermore, the presence of Rhos wife in the press
conference and not objecting to Rhos vehement denials
173
clearly buttresses the fact that the
rumours regarding the spousal abuse by Rho were mendacious and egregiously fake.
IV. The requirement is consistent with Article 8, UDHR.
26. It is reverentially submitted that the requirement to disclose the name of the source is
in consonance with Article 8 as Rho has a right to effective remedy which is possible only

167
29(2); American Convention on Human Rights (adopted 22 November 1969, entered into force 18 July 1978)
(ACHR) art 13(2)(b); European Convention on Human Rights (adopted 4 November 1950, entered into force 3
September 1953) (ECHR) art 10(2); Constitution of India 1950 (India) art 19(2).
168
Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, UN Doc E/CN 4/1985/4, cl I(B)(iii)(22).
169
Von Hannover v Germany (2005) 40 EHRR 1; McKennitt v Ash [2007] 3 WLR 194.
170
Compromis, 22(b)
171
Von Hannover v Germany (2005) 40 EHRR 1; ETK v News Group Newspapers [2011] EWCA Civ 439.
172
Campmany y Diez de Revenga and Lopez GaliachoPerona v Spain App no 54224/00 (ECtHR, 12 December
2000); Julio BouGibert and El Hogar Y La Moda J.A. v Spain App no 14929/02 (ECtHR, 13 May 2003);
VonHannover v Germany (2005) 40 EHRR 1; Leempoel v Belgium App no 64772/01 (ECtHR, 9 November
2006); Mirror Group Newspapers v United Kingdom App no 39401/04 (ECtHR, 18 January 2011); Mosley v
UnitedKingdom App no 48009/08 (ECtHR, 10 May 2011).
173
Compromis, 11


when the Applicant will disclose the name of the source of the information that infiltrated
the voicemail of Alkamit.
174
Therefore, the courts finding mandating that the Applicant
should disclose the source of the impugned information were in furtherance of protecting
Rhos right under Article 8, UDHR.

C. THE COURTS FINDING IS CONSISTENT WITH THE PROVISIONS OF
THE UDHR.
27. The Court's order
175
mandated Centiplex to remove the impugned information from
the first page of search results. The defendants submit that the requirement does not
contravenes the right to freedom of speech and expression under Article 19 [I],Moreover,
the restriction is permissible under Article 29(2) [II].

I. Requirement does not contravene Article 19, UDHR.
28. The interference in question is validly provided by law, and serves to protect an
individuals right to protection from arbitrary interference
176
with his privacy as guaranteed
by Article 12 of the UDHR. Securing recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of
others is legitimate under Article 29(2) of the same. In the instant matter Article 12
supersedes Article 19 as there has been an intrusion
177
in one's privacy regarding others right

174
Compromis, 9
175
Compromis, 19
176
United Nations Cyber School Bus<www.un.org/cyberschoolbus/humanrights/declaration/20.asp> accessed
1 October 2013.

177
Privacy and freedom from state intrusion<http://www.indexoncensorship.org/2013/07/privacy-and-freedom-from-
state-intrusion/> accessed 9 October 2013


to expression.
178
Moreover, the restriction doesn't impose filtering or prior restraint[a] and
does not create a Chilling effect[b].

a) The licensing requirement is not an act of Filtering or Prior Restraint.
29. Article 10 of the ECHR
179
provides that States are allowed to require licensing for
broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.
180
In Cox v. New Hampshire
181
, the U.S.
Supreme Court recognized the need for licensing schemes. Furthermore, if the licensing
board is not granted with arbitrary power and its discretion is exercised with uniformity of
method of treatment upon the facts of each application
182
then it is allowed when necessary
for reasons such as public convenience, proper policing, and prevention of overlapping
schedules.Correlating the aforementioned provision with the instant matter it clearly
buttresses the fact that how an intervention was sought by the Mhugan government where
users were not prohibited from posting on the website but just not on an alleged platform
which was violating one's right.
183
Similar content-neutral requirements prior to actual
expression have been upheld in several cases.
184
Consequently, the standard of intermediate
scrutiny ought to be applied,
185
instead of strict scrutiny which is applicable to prior

178
Freedom from suspicion: Principles to protect freedom of expression and privacy against mass surveillance<
http://www.article19.org/resources.php/resource/37186/en/freedom-from-suspicion:-principles-to-protect-
freedom-of-expression-and-privacy-against-mass-surveillance#sthash.L4Ui70RS.dpuf> accessed 9 October
2013
179
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on
Human Rights, as amended) (ECHR), Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
180
Groppera Radio AG and Others v. Switzerland, App. No. 10890/84(ECtHR 28 March 1990)
181
Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
182
Cox(n )
183
Compromis, 16
184
Freedman v Maryland 380 US 51 (1965); Madsen v Womens Health Center Inc et al 512 US 753 (1994).
185
United States v O'Brien 391 US 367 (1968); Turner Broadcasting System Inc v FCC 512 US 622 (1994);
Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York Inc et al v Village of Stratton 536 US 150 (2002).


restraints
186
and filtering.
187
As per this standard, a content-neutral regulation is lawful if it
furthers a substantial governmental interest.
188
In this matter, the Mhuganian government
pursues aims of protecting the rights of its citizens.
189
Moreover, the restriction should be
incidental, and not of an excessive degree.
190
Further, the restriction is incidental as it does
not prescribe a direct ban on speech, but only a requirement of not to violate one's Article
12.
b) The impugned requirement does not cause a Chilling effect.
30. In the present matter the act implied by the government was a remedy against the
right of other
191
, the act was done as a safeguard measure for securing the vested interests of
its citizens which are secured by the UDHR.
192
In actual, this act is to be settled as a strong
precedent against those who might violate others' right in future. Consequently, not
constitute a chilling effect.

II. Requirement is permissible under Article 29 (2), UDHR.
31. As aforementioned, these obligations require limitations to the freedom of
expression to meet the three tiered test, which demands that interferences with freedom of

186
Prior Restraint< http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/prior_restraint> accessed 8 October 2013

187
Court sys Filtering inPublic Libraries Not
Censorship<http://readwrite.com/2010/05/07/court_says_internet_filtering_in_public_libraries#awesm=~ok9Z
4g2OAPbx3S> accessed 8 October 2013
188
United States (n)
189
Protecting CitizensCivil
Rights<http://www.theiacp.org/PublicationsGuides/Projects/ProtectingCitizens8217CivilRightsPCCR/tabid/30
8/Default.aspx> accessed 8 October 2103

190
Ward v Rock Against Racism 491 US 781 (1989); Madsen v Womens Health Center Inc et al 512 US 753
(1994); Bartnicki v Vopper532 US 514 (2001).
191
The substance of the right to effective judicial protection against violation of social rights <
http://www.cidh.oas.org/countryrep/accesodesc07eng/accesodescv.eng.htm> accessed 8 October 2013
192
Article 12 UDHR


expression [a] be provided by law, [b] for a legitimate aim, and [c] necessary in a
democratic society.
a) Provided by law.
32. The Filtering system is established by the Mhuganian Judiciary, which is empowered
to do so. The requirement of filtering is accessible and precise.In any case, a certain latitude
is allowed for ambiguity in the wording of the law. In the case of Olsson v Sweden
193
where
it is laid down that this requirement refers to the foreseeability of the measure and the
precision with which it is drafted. Also, the law must clearly indicate the scope of any
discretionary power bestowed upon the government and the manner of its exercise.
194
The
facet of law and the role of judiciary in the instant matter is to be undertaken as a valid step
in implying its role in a free society. In Silver and Others v the United Kingdom
195
it was
stated that laws may be couched in terms which are vague and whose interpretation and
application are questions of practice.The right to freedom of expression and ideas does
not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting enterprises.
196
The
preparatory work of Article 19 of the ICCPR also reveals that licensing serves the aim of
public order.
197
Whether a restriction is necessary in the circumstances is therefore an
inquiry based on the facts and circumstances prevailing in the country concerned, which the
national authorities are in a better position to undertake.
198
The interference here is rarely
invasive. In Margareta and Roger Anderson v. Sweden ECtHR stated that "the impugned

193
Olsson v Sweden (1988) 11 EHRR 259.
194
ibid
195
Silver and Others v The United Kingdom App no 5947/72 (ECHR, 25 March 1983).
196
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention of
Human Rights, as amended) (ECHR) Article 10 Paragraph 1
197
Public Order< http://arc.gov.in/speechcpr.htm> accessed 9 October 2013
198
Klass and Others v Germany (App no 5029/71)App No: 5029/71(ECHR 6 September1978)


measuresshould have a basis in domestic law".
199
It is clear that the limitations have a basis
in domestic law and is the need of hour in the present matter.
b) For a legitimate aim.
33. Here, the interference was also made pursuant to a legitimate aim within Article
29(2) of the UDHR, specifically for the due recognition of the rights of others, specifically
the right to privacy enshrined in Article 12 of the UDHR. This view is reinforced by
Plon(socit) v France,
200
where the ECtHR observed that one's honour, reputation and
privacy constitutes rights of others within the meaning of Article 10 of the ECHR.
201
In
Margareta and Roger Anderson v. Sweden, the Court stated: a law which confers a
discretion is not in itself inconsistent with this requirement, provided that the scope of the
discretion and the manner of its exercise are indicated with sufficient clarity, having regard
to the legitimate aim in question, to give the individual adequate protection against
arbitrary interference.
202
Defendants contend that safety of the public securing one's right
to privacy,is" recognized as justifiable grounds to limit freedom of expression.
203

c) Necessary in a democratic society.
34. In a democratic society, the freedom of expression cannot be of greater importance
than basic human right to life.
204
There must be proportionality between effects of measures

199
Margareta and Roger Anderson v. Sweden App. no 12936/87(ECHR 25 February 1992)
200
App no 58148/00(ECHR 18 May 2004)
201
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European
Convention of Human Rights, as amended) (ECHR) Article 10 Paragraph 1

202
ibid
203
Kenneth Good v. Republic of Botswana 313/05 (ACHPR 26 May 2010)
204
R v Oakes [1986] 1 SCR 103; Nyambirai v National Social Security Authority and Anr. 1995 (9) BCLR
1221(Zimbabwean SC) 1231


limiting the rights, and the objective which has been identified as of sufficient
importance.
205
In New York Times Co. v United States
206
the court justified the
governments stance in levying restrictions on rights of people when the government is
convinced that the information to be revealed threatens "grave and irreparable"
207
injury
which happened in the present matter. Moreover, the restriction was in favour of the society
as it was aimed at protecting their rights in future.

D. THE REQUIREMENT UNDER 2013 SEARCH PRIVACY ACT IS
CONSISTENT WITH THE UDHR.
35. The 2013 Search Privacy Act provides that it is unlawful for a search engine to sell
information about a person's search queries without his consent. The Respondent submits
that the requirement is consistent with right to privacy under Article 12[I] and right to
freedom of speech and expression under Article 19 which is read in consonance with Article
29(2) [II].
I. Requirement is consistent with Article 12, UDHR.
36. Just as there is a right to freedom of expression, everyone has a right to privacy.
208

When these two rights are in conflict, the court must balance the value of the expression
against the intrusion into ones privacy.
209
In the instant matter its is pertinent to note that
privacy of Rho is incalculably violatedas stated in Von Hannover v Germany
210
itexemplifies

205
ibid
206
403 US 713.
207
Nadine Strossen, Recent U.S. and International Judicial Protection of Individual Rights: A Comparative
Legal Process Analysis and Proposed Synthesis 41 Hastings LJ 805 (1990).
208
UNDR (n 40) art 12; ICCPR (n 41) art 17, 1; ECHR (n45) art 8, 1.
209
Von Hannover v Germany (2005) 40 EHRR 1.
210
Von Hannover(n)


how, in certain circumstances, the right to privacy outweighs the right to freedom of
expression. The court also held that the intrusion into ones private life may be no greater
than that necessary to protect the overriding public interest.
211
Nothing in the Compromis
suggests that the information of Rho was of the public interest. In Von Hannover, the court
found that there is a zone of interaction of a person with others, even in a public context,
which may fall within the scope of private life.
212
The SPA is lawful because it is a
controlled measure aimed at protecting the people of Mhugan unduly burdening the freedom
of expression and even being implemented in an prospective way
213
will act as a safeguard
in future.The SPA only prohibits the selling of search queries about a person without the
persons prior consent
214
as it is pertinent to follow a particular code of conduct. Every
Mhuganian citizen has a right to privacy which, in this case, outweighs others right to
freedom of expression.
II. Requirementis consistent with Article 19, UDHR.
37. Under the authority of the 2013 SPA, the Government has mandated it to be
unlawful for a search engine to sell information about a person's search queries without his
consent.It is submitted that the alleged act is just a procedural weight but not a substantive
factor, it is a requirement to be followed even before implying a speech and crafting an
expression.Respondent submits that the restriction imposed by this requirement on Article
19 is permissible under Article 29(2) as it satisfies the three-tiered test of legality [a],
legitimacy [b], and necessity [c].
215

211
Galella v Onassis, 487 F 2d 986 (1973).
212
Von Hannover( n 2).
213
Compromis, 19(f)
214
Compromis, 9
215


a) The restriction is prescribed by law.
38. Respondent submits that the restriction is prescribed by law.
216
Applicants may
arguethat the restriction is imposed in exercise of executive discretion. However, in the
absence of express provisions, guidance may be obtained from other operative provisions, in
light of the object of such legislation.
217
Consequently, the government order imposing the
requirement arises out of the operative provisions of the Act.

b) The restriction is in pursuance of legitimate aims.
39. The impugned post infringes the right to privacy of Rho. Furthermore, the SPA is
enacted as a medium of Safeguard.
218
Admittedly, public figures possess a lesser
expectation of privacy than ordinary persons
219
and Applicants may contend that the
information was obtained first accidently but then it was maliciously disseminated,
Respondent observes that a spatial conception of the right to privacy has been categorically
rejected universally.
220
Moreover, publication of prima facie records, as compared to other
forms of information, is more intrusive
221
which in the instant matter were used as an

216
Hinczewski v Poland App no 34907/05 (ECHR 5 October 2010).
217
Chelmsford Trailer Park Inc v Town of Chelmsford and Others 393 Mass 186 (1984).
218
Compromis, 19
219
New York Times Co v Sullivan 376 US 254 (1964); Lingens v Austria App no 9815/82 (ECtHR, 8 July
1986); Decision 60/1994 (XII. 24) AB (Hungary); A v B and Anr[2002] EWCA Civ 337 (UK); ZeljkoBodrozic
vSerbia and Montenegro Communication No 1180/2003, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/85/D/1180/2003 (2006) (UN
Human Rights Committee); Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers Declaration on Freedom of Political
Debate in the Media, 12 February 2004 CM/Del/OJ(2004)872E.
220
221
Theakston v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd [2002] EWHC 137(QB) (UK); D v L [2004] EMLR 1 (UK);
Douglas v Hello! (No 3) [2005] EWCA Civ 595 (UK); Mirror Group Newspapers v United Kingdom App no
39401/04 (ECtHR, 18 January 2011); A McClurg, Bringing Privacy Law out of the closet: A tort theory of


element of malice against Rho. It conveys information not otherwise truly
obtainable,
222
Further, clandestine filming without the knowledge of the subject, as in this
case, infringes the right to privacy as its prevention is beyond the control of the subject.
223

Finally, the state may undertake positive obligations to secure the private life of individuals
in the sphere of relations of individuals among themselves.
224
Therefore, the impugned
restriction is in pursuit of legitimate aims.
c) The restriction is in necessary in a democratic society.
40. The test for determining the necessity of a restriction is whether the publication
contributes to a debate of general interest.
225
The impugned measure is proportionate. It
does not impose a complete restriction on the" challenged" freedom of speech, but merely
requires the procurement of consent before publication of private information. Indeed, the
rule of consent finds place in several regimes.
226
The state also enjoys a wide margin of
appreciation in matters involving balancing private and public interests.
227
In addition, this
restriction is only restricted to obtain the consent on search queries
228
and meanwhile,
secures the right of people of Mhugan from further happening of similar acts. Therefore, the
restriction is proportionate to the aim.

liability for intrusions in public places (1995) 73 North Carolina Law Rev 989; NA Moreham, Privacy in
Public Places (2006) 65(3) Cambridge Law Journal 606, 613.
222
Douglas v Hello! (No 1) [2001] QB 967 (UK).
223
R. v Broadcasting Standards Commission, ex parte British Broadcasting Corporation (Liberty intervening)
[2000] 3 All ER 989 (UK); R. v Loveridge[2001] EWCA Crim 973 (UK); Theakston v Mirror Group
29Newspapers Ltd [2002] EWHC 137(QB) (UK); HRH Princess of Wales v MGN Newspapers App no
13069/97 (ECtHR, 11 December 2003); Von Hannover v Germany (2005) 40 EHRR 1; Hachette Filipacchi
Associs v France App no 71111/01 (ECtHR, 23 July 2009).
224
X and Y v Netherlands App no.8978/80(ECHR 26 March 1985)
225
Von Hannover v Germany (2005) 40 EHRR 1; McKennitt v Ash [2007] 3 WLR 194.
226
Theakston v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd [2002] EWHC 137(QB) (UK); Mosley v United Kingdom App
no 48009/08 (ECtHR, 10 May 2011).
227
Funke v France App no. 10828/84(ECHR 25 February 1993); Keegan v Ireland (1994) 18 EHRR 342
228
cCompromis, 19


PRAYER

FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, THE RESPONDENT RESPECTFULLY
REQUESTS THIS COURT TO ADJUDGE AND DECLARE THAT:
A. THE REQUIREMENT TO PAY DAMAGES OF 400,000 MHD FOR
DISSEMINATION OF UNAUTHORISED INFORMATION IS CONSISTENT WITH
THE UDHR.
B. THE REQUIREMENT TO DISCLOSETHE SOURCE OF THE RECORDED
VOICEMAIL IS CONSISTENT WITH THE UDHR.
C. THE REQUIREMENT THAT THE IMPUGNED INFORMATION NEVER APPEAR
ON THE FIRST PAGE IS CONSISTENT WITH THE UDHR.
D. THE 2013 SEARCH PRIVACY ACT IS CONSISTENT WITH THE UDHR.
AND ANY OTHER RELIEF THAT THIS HONBLE COURT MAY BE PLEASED TO
GRANT IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE, EQUITY AND GOOD CONSCIENCE
ALL OF WHICH IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.

ON THIS 22
ND
DAY OF NOVEMBER
Sd/-
ON BEHALF OF SANG AND CENTIPLEX,
220R
AGENTS FOR THE RESPONDENT

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