Department Order No. 018-94, Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. 7658, May 12, 1994, Sec.

2 (b)
May 12, 1994
DEPARTMENT ORDER NO. 18
RULES AND REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7658
By virtue of the provisions of Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7658, An Act Prohibiting the Employment
of Children Below Fifteen (15) Years of Age in Public and Private Undertakings, amending Section 12,
Article VIII of Republic Act No. 7610, the following Rules and Regulations governing the employment
of children are hereby issued:
b. "Legal Guardian" any person duly appointed by a court of competent authority to exercise care
and custody of or parental authority over the person of such child/employee.

CASES
[G.R. No. L-23253. March 28, 1969.]
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR BETTY CHUA SY ALIAS "GRACE CABANGBANG"
FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS. PACITA CHUA, petitioner-appellant, vs.
MR. & MRS. BARTOLOME CABANGBANG, ET AL., respondents-appellees.
CIVIL LAW; PARENTAL AUTHORITY OVER CHILD; POWER OF COURTS TO DEPRIVE
PARENTS OF PARENTAL AUTHORITY OVER THEIR CHILD. While in one breath, Art. 313 of
the Civil Code lays down the rule that "Parental authority cannot be renounced or transferred, except in
cases of guardianship or adoption approved by the courts, or emancipation by concession, " it indicates in
the next that "The courts may, in cases specified by law, deprive parents of their (parental) authority."




Christina Marie Dempsey vs. RTC Branch LXXV, Olongapo City and Joel Dempsey, G.R. Nos.
77737-38, August 15, 1988
NEW FAMILY CODE; EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 209; ERASED THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN
LEGITIMATE OR ADOPTED CHILDREN INSOFAR AS JOINT PARENTAL AUTHORITY IS
CONCERNED. The Solicitor General points out that the new Family Code promulgated as Executive
Order No. 209, July 17, 1978 erases any distinction between legitimate or adopted children on one hand
and acknowledged illegitimate children on the other, insofar as joint parental authority is concerned.
Article 211 of the Family Code, whose date of effectivity is approaching, merely formalizes into statute
the practice on parental authority.
Leouel Santos, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113054, March 16, 1995
IN THE ABSENCE OF THE LEGITIMATE MOTHER, THE LEGITIMATE FATHER IS STILL
PREFERRED OVER THE GRANDPARENTS; LATTER'S WEALTH AND STRONG BONDS OF
LOVE AND AFFECTION AS WELL AS FACT OF BEING A SOLDIER OF LEGITIMATE FATHER,
NOT DECIDING FACTORS; CASE AT BAR. Private respondents' demonstrated love and affection
for the boy, notwithstanding, the legitimate father is still preferred over the grandparents. The latter's
wealth is not a deciding factor, particularly because there is no proof that at the present time, petitioner is
in no position to support the boy. The fact that he was unable to provide financial support for his minor
son from birth up to over three years when he took the boy from his in-laws without permission, should
not be sufficient reason to strip him of his permanent right to the child's custody. While petitioner's
previous inattention is inexcusable and merits only the severest criticism, it cannot be construed as
abandonment. His appeal of the unfavorable decision against him and his efforts to keep his only child in
his custody may be regarded as serious efforts to rectify his past misdeeds. To award him custody would
help enhance the bond between parent and son. It would also give the father a chance to prove his love for
his son and for the son to experience the warmth and support which a father can give. His being a soldier
is likewise no bar to allowing him custody over the boy. So many men in uniform who are assigned to
different parts of the country in the service of the nation, are still the natural guardians of their children. It
is not just to deprive our soldiers of authority, care and custody over their children merely because of the
normal consequences of their duties and assignments, such as temporary separation from their families.
Petitioner's employment of trickery in spiriting away his boy from his in-laws, though unjustifiable, is
likewise not a ground to wrest custody from him. Private respondents' attachment to the young boy whom
they have reared for the past three years is understandable. Still and all, the law considers the natural love
of a parent to outweigh that of the grandparents, such that only when the parent present is shown to be
unfit or unsuitable may the grandparents exercise substitute parental authority, a fact which has not been
proven here.
Herbert Cang vs. Court of Appeals and Sps. Ronald and Ma. Clara Clavano, G.R. No. 105308,
September 25, 1998
Inability to provide material comfort is not sufficient to deprive a personal of parental authority.
Indeed, it would be against the spirit of the law if financial consideration were to be the paramount
consideration in deciding whether to deprive a person of parental authority over his children. There
should be a holistic approach to the matter, taking into account the physical, emotional, psychological,
mental, social and spiritual needs of the child. The conclusion that the husband abandoned his family
needs more evidentiary support other than his inability to provide them the material comfort that his
admittedly affluent in-laws could provide. There should be proof that he had so emotionally abandoned
them that his children would not miss his guidance and counsel if they were given to adopting parents.
Leouel Santos, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113054, March 16, 1995
Parental authority may not be transferred or renounced.
Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or renounced except in
cases authorized by law. The right attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows a
waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a children's home or
an orphan institution. When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or
godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely temporary custody and it does not constitute a
renunciation of parental authority. Even if a definite renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the
same.
Herbert Cang vs. Court of Appeals and Sps. Ronald and Ma. Clara Clavano, G.R. No. 105308,
September 25, 1998
Parental authority may be waived or be subject to a compromise.
The husband may not be deemed as having been completely deprived of parental authority,
notwithstanding the award of custody to his wife in the legal separation case. To reiterate, that award was
arrived at by the lower court on the basis of the agreement of the spouses. While parental authority may
be waived, as in law it may be subject to a compromise, there was no factual finding in the legal
separation case that the husband was such an irresponsible person that he should be deprived of custody
of his children or that there are grounds under the law that could deprive him of parental authority.
Teresita Sagala-Eslao vs. CA and Maria Paz Cordero-Ouye, G.R. No. 116773, January 16, 1997
When the mother entrusted the custody of her minor child to the latters paternal grandmother, what she
gave to the latter was merely temporary custody and it did not constitute abandonment or renunciation of
parental authority. For the right attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows a
waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a children's home or
an orphan institution.
Joey D. Briones vs. Maricel P. Miguel, G.R. No. 156343, October 18, 2004
Grounds for depriving a mother of custody and parental authority.
Only the most compelling of reasons, such as the mother's unfitness to exercise sole parental authority,
shall justify her deprivation of parental authority and the award of custody to someone else. In the past,
the following grounds have been considered ample justification to deprive a mother of custody and
parental authority: neglect or abandonment, unemployment, immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug
addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity, and affliction with a communicable disease.
DAISIE T. DAVID, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, RAMON R. VILLAR, respondents. G.R.
No. 111180 November 16, 1995
CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; PARENTAL AUTHORITY; CHOICE OF MINOR CHILD OVER
SEVEN YEARS OF AGE MUST BE RESPECTED BY THE COURT. In the case at bar, as has
already been pointed out, Christopher J., being less than seven years of age at least at the time the case
was decided by the RTC, cannot be taken from the mother's custody. Even now that the child is over
seven years of age the mother's custody over him will have to be upheld because the child categorically
expressed preference to live with his mother. Under Art. 213 of the Family Code, courts must respect the
"choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit" and here it has not been
shown that the mother is in any way unfit to have custody of her child. Indeed, if private respondent loves
his child, he should not condition the grant of support for him on the award of his custody to him (private
respondent).
[G.R. No. 118870. March 29, 1996.]
NERISSA Z. PEREZ, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS (Ninth Division) and RAY C.
PEREZ, respondents.
CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; PARENTAL AUTHORITY; A CHILD UNDER SEVEN YEARS OF
AGE SHALL NOT BE SEPARATED FROM HIS MOTHER UNLESS THE COURT FINDS
COMPELLING REASONS TO ORDER OTHERWISE; RATIONALE. The rationale for awarding
the custody of children younger than seven years of age to their mother was explained by the Code
Commission: "The general rule is recommended in order to avoid many a tragedy where a mother has
seen her baby torn away from her. No man can sound the deep sorrows of a mother who is deprived of her
child of tender age. The exception allowed by the rule has to be for 'compelling reasons' for the good of
the child; those cases must indeed be rare, if the mother's heart is not to be unduly hurt. If she has erred,
as in cases of adultery, the penalty of imprisonment and the divorce decree (relative divorce) will
ordinarily be sufficient punishment for her. Moreover, moral dereliction will not have any effect upon the
baby who is as yet unable to understand her situation." The Family Code, in reverting to the provision of
the Civil Code that a child below seven years old should not be separated from the mother (Article 363),
has expressly repealed the earlier Article 17, paragraph three of the Child and Youth Welfare Code
(Presidential Decree No. 603) which reduced the child's age to five years.
[G.R. No. L-20996. September 20, 1923.]
MARIA BANCOSTA, petitioner-appellee, vs. JOHN DOE, respondent-appellant.
PARENTAL AUTHORITY. In said habeas corpus proceeding, it is an admitted fact that the petitioner
is natural mother of the child in question, but the respondent claims a right to the custody of the child
under a document signed by one, who is said to be the father of the child, in which document the man
claiming to be the father delivers his alleged daughter to the respondent to be taken care of by the latter
during his absence. Held: That it not appearing that the author of said letter has any right to exercise
parental authority over the child, and it not being allowed to investigate in this proceeding the latter's
paternity, it cannot be held that the trust continued in the document above mentioned is legally
sufficient to deprive the petitioner of the custody of her daughter.
[G.R. No. L-8806. May 25, 1955.]
MARIA N. BANZON, petitioner, vs. PEDRO ALVIAR, TERESA ALVIAR and RUBY ALVIAR,
respondents.
PARENT AND CHILD; PARENTAL AUTHORITY; CUSTODY OF CHILD; ABSENCE OF FATHER;
MOTHER ENTITLED TO CUSTODY. Article 311 of the New Civil Code provides that the father
and mother jointly exercise parental authority over their legitime children who are not emancipated, and
Art. 316 of the same Code imposes upon the parents the duty to support their unemancipated children,
and to be have them in their company, educate and instruct them in keeping with their means. There is
thus no question that petitioner as the mother of minor child is entitled to its custody and care, her
husband being unable to exercise parental authority in view of his mission abroad in the service of the
Republic.